Amicus Brief — Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown
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serene Cont v8
FILED
Nos. 75-909, 75-960, and 7541 05PEC 8 1976
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI TP bGaatA ENBK JR..CLERK
OCTOBER TERM, 1976 \be
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER
V.
EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
FOR ARGUMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER
V.
STATE OF MARYLAND, ET AL.
RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER
V.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH, FOURTH AND
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE CITY
OF NEW YORK
W. BERNARD RICHLAND
Corporation Counsel
of The City of New York
Municipal Building
New York, New York 10007
ALEXANDER GIGANTE, JR,
of Counsel
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... sees eecccsesecs
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS
= 4 | SP PrvTuTITITTTrrirerfrryrTs Pe
SUMMARY OF i. | PPP TeTTTTTyTTeTy he
ARGUMENT -
IF UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT,
THE ADMINISTRATOR COULD COM-
PEL THE STATES TO EXERCISE
THEIR POLICE POWERS, THE
ACT WOULD CONTRAVENE THE
TENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND PRINCIPLES
INHERENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT... ..ceeescccssess
Cores eOec cecceeeeseeeeeete ceeeeeeesues
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES ©
Page
Ex Parte, Commonwealth of Virginia,
100, U.S. (10 Otto) 339 (1880)........ 25
Friends of the Earth, et al.
v. Carey, et al., 74 Civ. 4500,
S.D.N.Y., October, BUUGecetoeeseeeees se Ze
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542 Bg) rere yr TT eT TT TT TT TTTTTTe 6-7
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. .
405 (1938). cece eececececvcceess cocccese Ll
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24
How. ) 66 [ Dens 66666466 606666680060 ¢¢ 23-25
National League of Cities v.
Usery, -U.S.- 44 U.S.L.W. 4974
(no. 74-878, June 24, 1976)..... TeTTT $7,
14-16,
27-28,
32,35
New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
DIS Chee veccccecocosccoococoeeoceceocs | 6bEUPESEs
15
Oklahoma v. United States Civil
Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127
CBee Pe séceceeeseceeeesecoeetecoooeooce§ 60
Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S.
184 De 6S eebeneebeeeeounceeeeeeve ce 10
iii iv
Page Miscellaneous
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,-41l U.S. Page
[S20 POSSE) BSP Cheese ccececenseocsecs 22-23,
25 L Ammale Of CORBTOES. cccccccceccccccccss§ §
South Carolina v. United States, The PeGeralist, BO. B3.ccccccccecccecsce 16
199 U.S. 437 Re) 66660068 6ebbb E0668 10
The Federalist, NOS. 43-46....cceeeeecees 7
Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 CA9ST pd ceccccesoecs 17-20 Elliots DeDateS.ccccccccecesessesesscsees 7
Tarble's Case 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution
397 (1871) e*eeseeeeseee e*eenereeneenenenseneeneensee#es . 21 (1937 SG. )ecccccccccccecccssecsecssesecccccse 7
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
700 [Bee leoces es eeee#see e*eeeeeee*eeeee#ee#ee#8e#« 8
United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175 cB) 666666066666660886 10
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 ios 6006066 eebee eseecteee eee eee 6
United States v. Mayo, 319 U.S.
4L (19463) cccccccecse TTTTTT ececcevce 20
United States v. Railroad Company,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1873)....... ; 10
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 533 (1869) eeeeee eeeeer eeeeeeee 9-10
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER
V.
EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER
V.
STATE OF MARYLAND, ET AL.
RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER
V.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH, FOURTH AND
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE CITY
OF NEW YORK
INTEREST OF THE
AMICUS CURIAE
In October, 1974, a coalition of en-
vironmental organizations filed suit in the
United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York to compel The City
of New York, under the authority of the
Clean Air Act, to implement certain measures
to reduce motor vehicle traffic. Friends
of the Earth, et al. v. Carey, et al., 74
Civ. 4500, S.D.N.Y., October, 1974. The City
has interposed as a defense the same consti-
tutional argument in issue here. By direct
appeal and by motion in an earlier appeal,
the constitutional question is now pending
before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Should the plaintiffs prevail against
the City, the consequences for the City's
governmental structure would be catastrophic.
It is a matter of public knowledge that the
City is suffering through a severe fiscal
crisis. The measures that plaintiffs would
require of the City would necessitate the
diversion of scare resources at the expense
2
of fundamental governmental services. For
example, the City's already-depleted police
force would be compelled to augment its traf-
fic enforcement and vehicle towaway program,
thereby reducing the manpower available for
anti-crime activities. Among the other mea-
Sures that would be required of the City
would be the tolling of bridges which con-
nect the City's boroughs; the complete alter-
ation of the pattern of goods deliveries to
business and industry; and the elimination of
parking facilities in large areas of Mar
hattan. The City's Mayor has advised the
Court, by affidavit, that whatever the merit
of those measures in the abstract, implemen-
tation at this time would place an undue
financial burden upon the City. Nevertheless,
the plaintiffs insist upon immediate action,
relying upon the allegedly mandatory provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act.
3
The City is thus vitally interested in
the outcome of this litigation. Although the
issues in Friends of the Earth v. Carey, su-
pra, have arisen in a somewhat different con-
text (specifically, a State-adopted plan is
involved, rather than a federally-imposed
plan), this Court's resolution of the cases
at bar will have a direct impact upon the
City's obligations under the Clean Air Act.
Accordingly, the City submits this brief,
pursuant to Rule 42(4) of the Court's Rules,
as amicus curiae in support of the respon-
dents.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is a well-established principle of
our federal oveten that the National Govern-
ment may not, in the exercise of its author-
ity under the Commerce Clause, control the
governmental powers of the States and their
subdivisions. The Administrator “concedes”
4
the point in his brief. Yet the measures
that the Administrator would require of the
respondents would nevertheless directly af-
fect their police powers and, hence, consti-
tute federal control inconsistent with prin-
ciples of federalism.
Furthermore, even if the Administra-
tor's requirements did not directly impinge
upon the respondents' police powers, the ef-
fect of those requirements is to interfere
significantly with the decision-making pro-
cess underlying Lhe utilization and applica-
tion of those powers. Accordingly, the limit
drawn by National League of Cities v. Usery
-U.S.-, 44 U.S.L.W. 4974 (No. 74-878, June
24, 1976), is transgressed. The Administra-
tor's argument that the compliance measures
at issue are narrow in scope - being direct-
ed only at a State's transportation policy -
is disingenuous, for it totally ignores the
5
budgetary and manpower ramifications of com-
pliance and the consequential effect on other
vital governmental services.
ARGUMENT
IF, UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT,
THE ADMINISTRATOR COULD COMPEL
THE STATES TO EXERCISE THEIR
POLICE POWERS, THE ACT WOULD
CONTRAVENE THE TENTH AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND PRINCIPLES
INHERENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT,
l. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution
provides that:
The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respect-
ively, or to the people.
Although the Tenth Amendment has some-
times been described as merely stating a
"truism" [United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 124 (1941)], “it is not without signif-
icance." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,
6
547 n. 7 (1975). Accord, National League
of Cities v. Usery, -U.S-., 44 U.S.L.W.
4974, 4976 (No. 74-878, June 24, 1976).
Indeed, the history of the Amendment indi-
cates that it embodies a principle of govern-
ment deemed fundamental to liberty by many
of the Framers.
The fear that the National Government
would use its powers to destroy the indepen-
dence of the States, a fear which the Amend-
ment was intended to allay, had been a power-
ful weapon in the arsenal of those in the
State conventions opposing ratification of
the Constitution. See, e.g., II Elliot's
Debates 60-1, 200, 239, 266-7, 303, 319,
334, 353-56, 377-8, 443-4, 459-61, (1836
ed.); III id. 171, 259, 395, 395-6; IV id.
161, 178-80, 180-1; see also The Federalist,
Nos. 43-46; C. Warren, The Making of the
Constitution 769 (1937 ed.). Ratification
7
had, in fact, been accomplished in several
of the conventions by very narrow margins
and with bitter divisions. And, when Madison
introduced in the First Session of Congress
his amendment to quell those fears (1 Annals
of Congress 441), Rhode Island had still not
ratified and North Carolina had already re-
jected the Constitution.
It should be remembered that prior
to the formation of the United States the
States were essentially thirteen independent,
sovereign powers. The partial surrender of
their sovereignty to another government was
a novel concept, the implications of which
were not at all clear. The Tenth Amendment,
then, served as an assurance that the system
of government created by the Constitution
would be “an indestructible Union composed
of indestructible States." Texas v. White,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868). An
8
assertion of seterai power which ignores
the vital role reserved to the States by
the Constitution therefore would be repug-
nant to the basic concept of government held
by the Framers.
2. The Sovereign Powers Protected
By The Tenth Amendment
Among the governmental powers reserved
to the States* and protected by the Tenth
Amendment are:
The right to pass laws, to give
effect to laws through executive
action, to administer justice through
the courts, and to employ all
necessary agencies for legitimate
purposes of State government....
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533,
547 (1869). Such powers are obviously the es-
sence of independent State government and,
*Reference herein to "States" includes their
political subdivisions as repositories of
State power. See National League of Cities
v. Usery, -U.S.- 44, U.S.L.W. 4974, 4980n.
20 (No. 74-878, June 24, 1976).
9
hence, must be beyond the reach of the powers
powers expressly delegated to Congress by the
Constitution (in Article I, Section 8). Id.;
United States v. Railroad Company, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 322, 327-28 (1873); The Federalist,
No. 33.
It is true that when a State chooses
to exercise its reserved powers to engage in
activities otherwise subject to federal regu-
lation, those activities may not escape such
regulation merely by virtue of the fact that
they are conducted by a State. See, e.g.,
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936); South Carolina v. United States, 199
U.S. 437 (1905). In such cases, however, the
State has voluntarily submitted itself to the
power of the National Government; it may vol-
untarily withdraw. Parden v. Terminal Railway,
377 U.S. 184, 192 n. 11 (1964). A converse
rule, which extends an immunity from federal
10
regulation to all State activities, would
quickly debilitate the National Government,
for the States, clothed with such immunity,
could, by enlarging the scope of their activ-
ities, block Congress from effectively legis-
lating in many spheres of national concern.
See, e.g., Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S.
405, 417 (1938).
The distinction, then, is that while
the National Government may never directly
regulate the sovereign functions of State
government (e.g., enacting State laws), it is
not necessarily precluded from regulating
all activities engaged in by States.* This
distinction is drawn sharply in New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), which
involved the imposition of a federal tax
*See pp. 26-28, infra, for a discussion
of when such otherwise proper federal regu-
lation may nevertheless not be applied to
State activities.
ll
on the revenues earned by a State agency
from the sale of State-owned mineral water.
In delivering the judgment of the Court up-
holding the tax, Justice Frankfurter, in an
opinion joined by Justice Rutledge, gave the
following reasoning:
There are, of course, State activities
and State-owned property that partake
of uniqueness from the point of view
of intergovernmental relations....
But so long as Congress generally
taps a source of revenue by whomso-
ever earned and not uniquely capable
of being earned only by a State,
the Constitution of the United States
does not forbid it merely because
its incidence also falls on a State.
Id. at 582. (Emphasis added.)
As an example of revenue “uniquely cap-
able of being earned only by a State", Jus-
tice Frankfurter noted that only a State
could get income from taxation. Id. The Na-
tional Government could not tax that revenue,
for to do so would constitute regulation of
a State as a State, since the power to tax
12
belongs to the State as a sovereign entity.
Id.
Chief Justice Stone's concurring opin-
ion, joined by Justices Reed, Murphy and
Burton, agreed with Justice Frankfurter that
an attempt by the National Government to con-
trol or regulate a power uniquely capable of
being exercised by a State, i.e., sovereign
in character, "would be an unconstitutional
exertion of power over a coexisting sover-
eignty within the same framework of govern-
ment." Id. at 586. But the Chief Justice felt
that, in addition, some instances of federal
regulation of even an activity not uniquely
a State function could, nevertheless, impair
State sovereignty. Id. at 586-90. As an il-
lustration, Chief Justice Stone stated that
even a general, nondiscriminatory federal
tax on property would be invalid if applied
to State-owned property, notwithstanding that
13
the ownership of property was not uniquely a
State activity, because such a tax would in-
terfere with the State's “performance of its
functions as a government which the Consti-
tution recognizes as sovereign.” Id. at 588.
Chief Justice Stone's reasoning was re-
cently adopted by a majority of this Court in
National League of Cities v. Usery, -U.S.-,
44 U.S.L.W. 4974 (No. 74-878, June 24, 1976).
The Court held that
there are attributes of sovereignty
attaching to every state government
which may not be impaired by Congress,
not because Congress may lack an
affirmative grant of legislative
authority to reach the matter, but
because the Constitution prohibits
it from exercising the authority
in that manner.
Id. at 4977. The dissent in National League
of Cities disagreed vigorously that there was
any such limitation on the exercise of an
otherwise conceded federal power. Id. at
4981. But even the dissent accepted the
14
narrower view postulated by Justice Frank-
furter in New York v. United States that fed-
eral regulation could not reach the govern-
mental powers of the States. Thus, Mr. Justice
Brennan recognized in his dissenting opinion
that federal law could “neither impose policy
objectives on the States nor deny the States
complete freedom to fix their own objectives.”
National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, 44
U.S.L.W. at 4986.
3. The National Government May Not Impose
Upon The States Decisions Regarding The
Conduct Of Government Functions.
Two principles emerge, then, from the
decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery. First, under no circumstances may Con-
gress regulate directly the governmental pow-
ers of the States and their subdivisions. Such
powers are not “commerce” within the meaning
of Article I, section 8, of the Constitution
and, hence, are beyond the ambit of federal
15
federal authority. National League of Cities
v. Usery, supra, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4981-82
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, even State
activities which do constitute "commerce" may
not be regulated by Congress "so as to force
directly upon the States its choices as to
how essential decisions regarding the conduct
of integral governmental functions are to be
made." Id. at 4980.
a) Direct regulation of State
governmental powers by the
National Government. ,
In the vast, complex federal system of
government existing in the United States, in-
teraction between the powers of the State and
National Government is, of course, inevit-
able. For example, many times the States, in
response to action taken by the National
Government, exercise their sovereign powers
to implement or aid the achievement of na-
tional goals adopted by Congress. In such
16
instances of federal-State interaction, Tenth
Amendment considerations become relevant only
in the rare event that the line drawn by Jus-
tice Cardozo in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937), is transgressed by Con-
gress.
That case involved the unemployment com-
pensation provisions of the Social Security
Act of 1935 (c. 531, 49 Stat. 620). A federal
excise tax was imposed upon certain employ-
ers, but a credit against that tax was allow-
ed for taxes paid to an unemployment fund
established by State law which, in the judg-
ment of the federal Social Security Board,
satisfied federally-prescribed minimum cri-
teria. Petitioner, a business located in
Alabama, a State which had passed such a law
in response to the federal legislation, chal-
lenged the Social Security Act on the ground,
inter alia, that it violated the Tenth Amend-
17
ment and principles implicit in a federal .
system of government, because the State law
was extracted by economic pressure and be-
cause Alabama was forced to surrender powers
essential to its sovereign existence. Justice
Cardozo's seminal discussion of that issue is
of critical importance to the instant case
because, as we show later, viewed in its
light, the constitutional infirmity of peti-
tioner's interpretation of the Act becomes
readily discernable.
In rejecting the petitioner's argument,
Justice Cardozo observed that to sustain such
a challenge there must be established the
proposition that the federal law operated as
a "[weapon] of coercion, destroying or im-
pairing the autonomy of the states." Id. at
586. Justice Cardozo viewed the "temptation"
for the States contained in the federal law -
i.e., the prospect of retaining control over
18
funds that would have otherwise been paid to
the National Government by employers - as
not akin to the exertion of undue influence
or to coercion by the National Government.
Id. at 590. A State choosing to join the fed-
eral program acted of its “unfettered will."
Id.
A crucial factor leading Justice Cardozo
to the conclusion that Alabama was participa-~
ting of its own free will was that the Social
Security Act permitted a State, at its plea-
sure, to repeal its unemployment statute and
thereby relieve itself of the obligation of
satisfying the federally-prescribed criteria:
Alabama is still free, without breach
of an agreement, to change her system
over night. No officer or agency of
the National Government can force a
compensation law upon her or keep
it_in existence. No officer or agency
of that Government, either by suit
Or other means, can supervise or con-
trol the application of the [unemploy-
ment compensation] payments.
19
Id. at 595. (Emphasis added.) That state-
ment by Justice Cardozo clearly indicates
that, had the federal law not preserved free
choice by the States, there would have been
a conflict with the Tenth Amendment. The
rationale is obvious: any abridgement of a
State's freedom to choose necessarily is
in derogation of its sovereignty, because
"freedom is inherent in sovereignty." United
States v. Mayo, 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943).
The salient point, then, is that Con-
gress may involve the States in the enforce-
ment of federal law, so long as the States'
freedom of choice remains unrestricted, i.e.,
the States may be induced, but not compelled,
to exercise their sovereign powers. See
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Com-
mission, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). Congress
therefore may not, in the guise of implement-
ing national policy, dictate to the States
20
laws to be enacted and executive action to
be undertaken. Cf. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 397, 407 (1871). This fundamental
principle inherent in a federal system of
government is strikingly illustrated by two
nineteenth century cases arising under Article
IV, Section 2 of the Constitution.
That constitutional provision declares,
in pertinent part:
A Person charged in any State with
Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee from Justice, and
be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the State from which he
fled, be delivered up, to be removed
to the State having Jurisdiction of
the Crime.
No Person held to Service or Labour ~
in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall in Con-
sequence of any Law or Regulation
therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered upon Claim of the Party
to whom such Service or Labour may
be due.
After a dispute had arisen between Vir-
21
ginia and Pennsylvania regarding the extra-
dition to Pennsylvania of a person indicted
there for the forcible removal of a fugitive
Slave to Virginia, Congress enacted legisla-
tion regulating the disposition of all fugi-
tives covered by Article IV, Section 2. Act
of February 12, 1793, c. 7, 1 Stat. 302. The
question then arose in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
41 U.S. (16 Peters) 539 (1842), whether the
federal law could require a State official
to enforce the constitutional provision, not-
withstanding that no such authority was con-
ferred on the official by State law. Justice
Story, writing for the Court, concluded that
the federal law constitutionally could not
have that effect:
The clause [Art. IV, Sec. 2, Cl. 3]
is found in the national Constitution,
and not in that of any state. It does
not point out any state functionaries,
Or any state action to carry its
provisions into effect. The states
cannot, therefore, be compelled to
22
enforce them; and it might well be
deemed an unconstitutional exercise
of the power of interpretation, to
insist that the states are bound to
provide means to carry into effect
the duties of the national government,
nowhere delegated or intrusted to them
by the Constitution.
Id. at 615-16.
The point was stated even more force-
fully by Chief Justice Taney for a unanimous
Court in Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 66 (1860), a case that involved section
1 of the 1793 legislation, which dealt with
the extradition of fugitive criminals. The
law provided that, upon the presentation of
certain proofs by the State demanding extra-
dition, “it shall be the duty of the execu-
tive authority of the state or territory to
which such person shall have fled" to deliver
him over. Dennison, the Governor of Ohio, had
refused to deliver to Kentucky a person char-
ged there with the crime of assisting a slave
23
to escape, whereupon Kentucky sued in the
Supreme Court, on original jurisdiction, for
issuance of a mandamus against the Governor.
Chief Justice Taney's discussion of the
effect of the fugitive law is a significant
indication of the limitations imposed on the
National Government by the principles of fed-
eralism:
The words “it shall be the duty,"
in ordinary legislation, imply the
assertion of the power to command
and to coerce obedience. But looking
to the subject matter of this law,
and the relations which the United
States and the several States bear
to each other, the court is of opinion,
the words "it shall b- the duty" were
not used as mandatory and compulsory,
but as declaratory of the moral duty
which this compact created, when
Congress had provided the mode of
carrying it into execution. The
act does not provide any means to
compel the execution of this duty,
nor inflict any punishment for
neglect or refusal on the part of
the Executive of the State; nor
is there any clause or provision
in the Constitution which arms the
Government of the United States
with this power. Indeed, such a
24
power would place every State under
the control and dominion of the
General Government, even in the
administration of its internal
concerns and reserved rights. And
we think it clear, that the Federal
Government, under the Constitution,
has no power to impose on a State
officer, as such, any duty whatever,
and compel him to perform it; for
if it possessed this power, it might
overload the officer with duties
which would fill up all his time,
and disable him from performing
his obligations to the State....
[W]e are very far from supposing,
that in using ths word "duty", the
Statesmen who framed and passed the
law, or the President who approved
and signed it, intended to exercise
a coercive power over State officers
not warranted by the Constitution.
Id. at 107-8. (Emphasis added. )*
It is noteworthy that Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania and Kentucky v. Dennison dealt with
a provision of the Constitution (Art. IV,
Sec. 2) that contains language which seem-
*See Ex parte, Commonwealth of Virginia,
100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339 (1880), a Recon-
struction era case involving the Civil Rights
Amendments which cites approvingly (id. at
347-8) to Chief Justice Taney's opinion in
Dennison.
25
ingly imposed affirmative duties on the
States. Yet this Court, in order to per-
serve the delicate balance between the State
and National Governments in our federa. sys-
tem, strained not to find any authority in
the National Government to control the exer-
cise of State power. Any attempt to find such
authority in the Commerce Clause, upon which
the Clean Air Act is premised, would, then,
clearly be violative of the Tenth Amendment
and basic principles of federalism; for Ar-
ticle I, Section 8, where the Commerce Clause
ts found, contains no language even arguably
directed at the States, but rather is a lim-
ited surrender of power to the National Gov-
ernment.
b) Direct regulation of State
activities affecting commerce
by the National Government
Moreover, even when a particular State
activity is “commerce” within the meaning of
26
the Commerce Clause, Congress nevertheless
may not regulate that activity when to do so
would "abrogate the States' otherwise plenary
authority” to make policy determinations in-
volving governmental functions essential to
the States' separate and independent exis-
tence. National League of Cities v. Usery,
supra, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4976. Thus, in Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court held that
Congress could not regulate the employment
practices of States and their subdivisions,
because compliance with the federal require-
ments would
Significantly alter or displace the
States' abilities to structure employer-
employee relationships in such areas as
fire prevention, police protection, sani-
tation, public health, and parks and re-
creation. These activities are typical
of those performed by state and local
governments in discha: ting their dual
functions of administering the public
law and furnishing public services.
Indeed, it is functions such as these
which governments are created to provide,
27
services such as these which the states
have traditionally afforded their citi-
zens. If Congress may withdraw from
the states the authority to make those
fundamental employment decisions upon
which their systems for performance of
those functions must rest, we think
there would be little left of the
states’ “separate and independent
existence."
Id. at 4979 (footnote omitted; citation omit-
ted). The constitutionality of federal regu-
lation of a particular State activity affec-
ting commerce thus is not determined simply
by looking to the nature of the activity it-
self, but by assessing the impact of the reg-
ulation on the entire decision-making system
with which the State provides essential gov-
ernmental services.
4. The Administrator's
Position
The Administrator pays lip service to
these principles. Thus, conceding that the
National Government may only regulate "the
State as polluter, not...the State as State"
28
(Pet. Br.,p. 20), the Administrator indicates The logic underlying the Administra-
to this Court a recognition of the consti- tor's position is patently flawed. A State's
tutional limits to his powers: ° transportation policy is a function of the
The Administrator has never asserted
any power to compel the State to
carry out its governmental responsi-
bilities under an implementation plan
by, for example, monitoring ambient
air quality and enforcing the emission
controls applicable to private stationary
sources. Nor does he contend that he
can direct the State to adopt laws or
regulations creating transportation
control plans that comply with the Act
(see Pet. No. 1055, App. 27a-29a; Pet.
No. 75-909, p. 17, n. 15). He thus
concedes the necessity of removing from
the regulations all requirements that
the States submit legally adopted
regulations; the regulations contain
no requirement that the State adopt
laws.
(Pet. Br., p. 20n. 14.) Despite that state-
ment, however, the Administrator persists in
arguing that as "owners and operators of pol-
luting transportation facilities" - i.e.,
highways - the States are properly subject to
federal regulation of their transportation
policies (Pet. Br., p. 32).
29
State as a State, i.e., such a policy is
developed and implemented by a State in its
constitutional role of a quasi-sovereign
possessing certain reserved police powers.
The “remedies” which the Administrator seeks
to enforce against the respondents - inspec-
tion programs and enforcement of traffic
laws - accordingly involve actions which can
be performed by a State only as sovereign.
(Clearly, a private “owner and operator" of
a highway has no power to regulate the acti-
vities of persons using the road, other than
by controlling access.) Quite plainly, the
Administrator regards the States as “pollu-
ters" solely to support the assertion of
federal authority to demand relief from the
States as governmental entities.
30
But the discussion above demonstrates
(and the Administrator apparently concedes)
that the National Government may not assert
its constitutional powers to exercise such
control over State Government. Obviously,
then, it cannot be enough to pass constitu-
tional scrutiny merely to recite the incanta-
tion that the State is being regulated only
as a "polluter." The scope of the federal
regulation - i.e., the nature of the re-
quired State compliance - must likewise be
limited to the State as a "polluter", lest
such State activities be used - as the Admin-
istrator attempts here-as the rationale for
an impermissible intrusion of federal author-
ity into an area reserved to State sover-
eignty.
Furthermore, even assuming that the
Administrator's actions did not involve such
direct control over State police powers, the
31
Administrator's application of the Act does
not survive scrutiny under this Court's re-
cent holding in National League of Cities
v. Usery, supra. The Administrator argues
that the Act passes the constitutional test
set forth in that decision because the sta-
tute: (1) affects only a small portion of
a State's transportation policy, and not
the full range of fundamental State activi-
ties; (2) permits the States to determine
the means of compliance; and (3) does not
have a significant financial impact (Pet.
Br., pp. 47-49). That argument is specious
because it ignores the critical interrelation-
ship between transportation policy and other
fundamental governmental services. There can
be little doubt that in a modern, urbanized
area, a public highway system is absolutely
essential. Every vital governmental func-
tion - police protection, fire prevention,
32
health care, sanitation, education, etc. - is
virtually totally dependent upon that highway
system. Nor could such an area long exist as
a viable economic unit, providing employment
and business for its inhabitants, without its
streets and highways. Thus, conforming a
State transportation policy to federal re-
guirements would have a significant impact
on the process by which States and their sub-
divisions provide the whole range of funda-
mental services. (Moreover, although the
States are permitted an initial say in fash-
ioning the terms of compliance, all such State
proposals are subject to approval and over-
ride by the Administrator.)
In the City's case, for example, the
plaintiffs in Friends of the Earth v. Carey
would require a disposition of police man-
power that the Police Commissioner has stated,
by affidavit, would affect the Police Depart-
33
ment's ability to maintain public order and
safety. Police officers would be diverted
from anticrime activities to parking and
traffic enforcement. Another measure de-
manded by the plaintiffs would require the
City, at a time of acute fiscal crisis, to
reconstruct many of the highway approaches
to the City's bridges in order to permit
tolling. These measures, along with many
others, have been deemed infeasible at this
time by the City's Mayor, who, as the elected
executive officer, has determined that basic
governmental services must be maintained
while the City struggles to regain its fin-
ancial health. Yet if the Clean Air Act were
were construed to support the Administra-
tor's position in these cases, that decision
by the Mayor would be superseded by the de-
mands of federal requirements - a clear ex-
ample of the extent to which local decision-
34
making regarding essential governmental ser-
vices would be undermined.*
*Mr. Justice Blackmun's reference to "state
facility compliance with imposed federal
{environmental] standards" in his concurring
opinion in National League of Cities v.
Usery, supra, does not weaken the import
of the majority decision for this case.
A facility directly under State con-
trol - e.g., an incinerator - can easily be
conformed to federal standards without in any
way impairing basic policy determinations by
the State. What the Administrator seeks here,
however, is to use State jurisdiction over
its highway system - an alleged "facility"
affecting “commerce” - as a mere pretext
for commandeering the entire panoply of
State police powers, clearly not the situ-
ation envisioned by Mr. Justice Blackmun.
35
$
CONCLUSION
The Decisions of the Fourth and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals should be affirmed,
and the decision of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed
insofar as said decision would compel the
states to deny vehicle registration, to
provide bus lanes and to make financial
commitments for the purchase of additional
buses.
Dated: New York, New York
December 7, 1976
Respectfully submitted,
W. BERNARD RICHLAND
Corporation Counsel
of the City of New York
Municipal Building
New York, N.Y. 10007
ALEXANDER GIGANTE, JR.,
of Counsel.
36
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.