Amicus Brief — Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown

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FILED

Nos. 75-909, 75-960, and 7541 05PEC 8 1976

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI TP bGaatA ENBK JR..CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1976 \be

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER

V.

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

FOR ARGUMENT

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER

V.

STATE OF MARYLAND, ET AL.

RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER

V.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH, FOURTH AND

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE CITY

OF NEW YORK

W. BERNARD RICHLAND

Corporation Counsel

of The City of New York

Municipal Building

New York, New York 10007

ALEXANDER GIGANTE, JR,

of Counsel

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... sees eecccsesecs

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS

= 4 | SP PrvTuTITITTTrrirerfrryrTs Pe

SUMMARY OF i. | PPP TeTTTTTyTTeTy he

ARGUMENT -

IF UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT,

THE ADMINISTRATOR COULD COM-

PEL THE STATES TO EXERCISE

THEIR POLICE POWERS, THE

ACT WOULD CONTRAVENE THE

TENTH AMENDMENT TO THE

CONSTITUTION AND PRINCIPLES

INHERENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM

OF GOVERNMENT... ..ceeescccssess

Cores eOec cecceeeeseeeeeete ceeeeeeesues

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES ©

Page

Ex Parte, Commonwealth of Virginia,

100, U.S. (10 Otto) 339 (1880)........ 25

Friends of the Earth, et al.

v. Carey, et al., 74 Civ. 4500,

S.D.N.Y., October, BUUGecetoeeseeeees se Ze

Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.

542 Bg) rere yr TT eT TT TT TT TTTTTTe 6-7

Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. .

405 (1938). cece eececececvcceess cocccese Ll

Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24

How. ) 66 [ Dens 66666466 606666680060 ¢¢ 23-25

National League of Cities v.

Usery, -U.S.- 44 U.S.L.W. 4974

(no. 74-878, June 24, 1976)..... TeTTT $7,

14-16,

27-28,

32,35

New York v. United States, 326 U.S.

DIS Chee veccccecocosccoococoeeoceceocs | 6bEUPESEs

15

Oklahoma v. United States Civil

Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127

CBee Pe séceceeeseceeeesecoeetecoooeooce§ 60

Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S.

184 De 6S eebeneebeeeeounceeeeeeve ce 10

iii iv

Page Miscellaneous

Prigg v. Pennsylvania,-41l U.S. Page

[S20 POSSE) BSP Cheese ccececenseocsecs 22-23,

25 L Ammale Of CORBTOES. cccccccceccccccccss§ §

South Carolina v. United States, The PeGeralist, BO. B3.ccccccccecccecsce 16

199 U.S. 437 Re) 66660068 6ebbb E0668 10

The Federalist, NOS. 43-46....cceeeeecees 7

Steward Machine Co. v.

Davis, 301 U.S. 548 CA9ST pd ceccccesoecs 17-20 Elliots DeDateS.ccccccccecesessesesscsees 7

Tarble's Case 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution

397 (1871) e*eeseeeeseee e*eenereeneenenenseneeneensee#es . 21 (1937 SG. )ecccccccccccecccssecsecssesecccccse 7

Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)

700 [Bee leoces es eeee#see e*eeeeeee*eeeee#ee#ee#8e#« 8

United States v. California,

297 U.S. 175 cB) 666666066666660886 10

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.

100 ios 6006066 eebee eseecteee eee eee 6

United States v. Mayo, 319 U.S.

4L (19463) cccccccecse TTTTTT ececcevce 20

United States v. Railroad Company,

84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1873)....... ; 10

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8

Wall.) 533 (1869) eeeeee eeeeer eeeeeeee 9-10

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER

V.

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER

V.

STATE OF MARYLAND, ET AL.

RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER

V.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH, FOURTH AND

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE CITY

OF NEW YORK

INTEREST OF THE

AMICUS CURIAE

In October, 1974, a coalition of en-

vironmental organizations filed suit in the

United States District Court for the South-

ern District of New York to compel The City

of New York, under the authority of the

Clean Air Act, to implement certain measures

to reduce motor vehicle traffic. Friends

of the Earth, et al. v. Carey, et al., 74

Civ. 4500, S.D.N.Y., October, 1974. The City

has interposed as a defense the same consti-

tutional argument in issue here. By direct

appeal and by motion in an earlier appeal,

the constitutional question is now pending

before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

Should the plaintiffs prevail against

the City, the consequences for the City's

governmental structure would be catastrophic.

It is a matter of public knowledge that the

City is suffering through a severe fiscal

crisis. The measures that plaintiffs would

require of the City would necessitate the

diversion of scare resources at the expense

2

of fundamental governmental services. For

example, the City's already-depleted police

force would be compelled to augment its traf-

fic enforcement and vehicle towaway program,

thereby reducing the manpower available for

anti-crime activities. Among the other mea-

Sures that would be required of the City

would be the tolling of bridges which con-

nect the City's boroughs; the complete alter-

ation of the pattern of goods deliveries to

business and industry; and the elimination of

parking facilities in large areas of Mar

hattan. The City's Mayor has advised the

Court, by affidavit, that whatever the merit

of those measures in the abstract, implemen-

tation at this time would place an undue

financial burden upon the City. Nevertheless,

the plaintiffs insist upon immediate action,

relying upon the allegedly mandatory provi-

sions of the Clean Air Act.

3

The City is thus vitally interested in

the outcome of this litigation. Although the

issues in Friends of the Earth v. Carey, su-

pra, have arisen in a somewhat different con-

text (specifically, a State-adopted plan is

involved, rather than a federally-imposed

plan), this Court's resolution of the cases

at bar will have a direct impact upon the

City's obligations under the Clean Air Act.

Accordingly, the City submits this brief,

pursuant to Rule 42(4) of the Court's Rules,

as amicus curiae in support of the respon-

dents.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

It is a well-established principle of

our federal oveten that the National Govern-

ment may not, in the exercise of its author-

ity under the Commerce Clause, control the

governmental powers of the States and their

subdivisions. The Administrator “concedes”

4

the point in his brief. Yet the measures

that the Administrator would require of the

respondents would nevertheless directly af-

fect their police powers and, hence, consti-

tute federal control inconsistent with prin-

ciples of federalism.

Furthermore, even if the Administra-

tor's requirements did not directly impinge

upon the respondents' police powers, the ef-

fect of those requirements is to interfere

significantly with the decision-making pro-

cess underlying Lhe utilization and applica-

tion of those powers. Accordingly, the limit

drawn by National League of Cities v. Usery

-U.S.-, 44 U.S.L.W. 4974 (No. 74-878, June

24, 1976), is transgressed. The Administra-

tor's argument that the compliance measures

at issue are narrow in scope - being direct-

ed only at a State's transportation policy -

is disingenuous, for it totally ignores the

5

budgetary and manpower ramifications of com-

pliance and the consequential effect on other

vital governmental services.

ARGUMENT

IF, UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT,

THE ADMINISTRATOR COULD COMPEL

THE STATES TO EXERCISE THEIR

POLICE POWERS, THE ACT WOULD

CONTRAVENE THE TENTH AMENDMENT

TO THE CONSTITUTION AND PRINCIPLES

INHERENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM OF

GOVERNMENT,

l. The Tenth Amendment

The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution

provides that:

The powers not delegated to the

United States by the Constitution,

nor prohibited by it to the States,

are reserved to the States respect-

ively, or to the people.

Although the Tenth Amendment has some-

times been described as merely stating a

"truism" [United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.

100, 124 (1941)], “it is not without signif-

icance." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,

6

547 n. 7 (1975). Accord, National League

of Cities v. Usery, -U.S-., 44 U.S.L.W.

4974, 4976 (No. 74-878, June 24, 1976).

Indeed, the history of the Amendment indi-

cates that it embodies a principle of govern-

ment deemed fundamental to liberty by many

of the Framers.

The fear that the National Government

would use its powers to destroy the indepen-

dence of the States, a fear which the Amend-

ment was intended to allay, had been a power-

ful weapon in the arsenal of those in the

State conventions opposing ratification of

the Constitution. See, e.g., II Elliot's

Debates 60-1, 200, 239, 266-7, 303, 319,

334, 353-56, 377-8, 443-4, 459-61, (1836

ed.); III id. 171, 259, 395, 395-6; IV id.

161, 178-80, 180-1; see also The Federalist,

Nos. 43-46; C. Warren, The Making of the

Constitution 769 (1937 ed.). Ratification

7

had, in fact, been accomplished in several

of the conventions by very narrow margins

and with bitter divisions. And, when Madison

introduced in the First Session of Congress

his amendment to quell those fears (1 Annals

of Congress 441), Rhode Island had still not

ratified and North Carolina had already re-

jected the Constitution.

It should be remembered that prior

to the formation of the United States the

States were essentially thirteen independent,

sovereign powers. The partial surrender of

their sovereignty to another government was

a novel concept, the implications of which

were not at all clear. The Tenth Amendment,

then, served as an assurance that the system

of government created by the Constitution

would be “an indestructible Union composed

of indestructible States." Texas v. White,

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868). An

8

assertion of seterai power which ignores

the vital role reserved to the States by

the Constitution therefore would be repug-

nant to the basic concept of government held

by the Framers.

2. The Sovereign Powers Protected

By The Tenth Amendment

Among the governmental powers reserved

to the States* and protected by the Tenth

Amendment are:

The right to pass laws, to give

effect to laws through executive

action, to administer justice through

the courts, and to employ all

necessary agencies for legitimate

purposes of State government....

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533,

547 (1869). Such powers are obviously the es-

sence of independent State government and,

*Reference herein to "States" includes their

political subdivisions as repositories of

State power. See National League of Cities

v. Usery, -U.S.- 44, U.S.L.W. 4974, 4980n.

20 (No. 74-878, June 24, 1976).

9

hence, must be beyond the reach of the powers

powers expressly delegated to Congress by the

Constitution (in Article I, Section 8). Id.;

United States v. Railroad Company, 84 U.S.

(17 Wall.) 322, 327-28 (1873); The Federalist,

No. 33.

It is true that when a State chooses

to exercise its reserved powers to engage in

activities otherwise subject to federal regu-

lation, those activities may not escape such

regulation merely by virtue of the fact that

they are conducted by a State. See, e.g.,

United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175

(1936); South Carolina v. United States, 199

U.S. 437 (1905). In such cases, however, the

State has voluntarily submitted itself to the

power of the National Government; it may vol-

untarily withdraw. Parden v. Terminal Railway,

377 U.S. 184, 192 n. 11 (1964). A converse

rule, which extends an immunity from federal

10

regulation to all State activities, would

quickly debilitate the National Government,

for the States, clothed with such immunity,

could, by enlarging the scope of their activ-

ities, block Congress from effectively legis-

lating in many spheres of national concern.

See, e.g., Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S.

405, 417 (1938).

The distinction, then, is that while

the National Government may never directly

regulate the sovereign functions of State

government (e.g., enacting State laws), it is

not necessarily precluded from regulating

all activities engaged in by States.* This

distinction is drawn sharply in New York v.

United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), which

involved the imposition of a federal tax

*See pp. 26-28, infra, for a discussion

of when such otherwise proper federal regu-

lation may nevertheless not be applied to

State activities.

ll

on the revenues earned by a State agency

from the sale of State-owned mineral water.

In delivering the judgment of the Court up-

holding the tax, Justice Frankfurter, in an

opinion joined by Justice Rutledge, gave the

following reasoning:

There are, of course, State activities

and State-owned property that partake

of uniqueness from the point of view

of intergovernmental relations....

But so long as Congress generally

taps a source of revenue by whomso-

ever earned and not uniquely capable

of being earned only by a State,

the Constitution of the United States

does not forbid it merely because

its incidence also falls on a State.

Id. at 582. (Emphasis added.)

As an example of revenue “uniquely cap-

able of being earned only by a State", Jus-

tice Frankfurter noted that only a State

could get income from taxation. Id. The Na-

tional Government could not tax that revenue,

for to do so would constitute regulation of

a State as a State, since the power to tax

12

belongs to the State as a sovereign entity.

Id.

Chief Justice Stone's concurring opin-

ion, joined by Justices Reed, Murphy and

Burton, agreed with Justice Frankfurter that

an attempt by the National Government to con-

trol or regulate a power uniquely capable of

being exercised by a State, i.e., sovereign

in character, "would be an unconstitutional

exertion of power over a coexisting sover-

eignty within the same framework of govern-

ment." Id. at 586. But the Chief Justice felt

that, in addition, some instances of federal

regulation of even an activity not uniquely

a State function could, nevertheless, impair

State sovereignty. Id. at 586-90. As an il-

lustration, Chief Justice Stone stated that

even a general, nondiscriminatory federal

tax on property would be invalid if applied

to State-owned property, notwithstanding that

13

the ownership of property was not uniquely a

State activity, because such a tax would in-

terfere with the State's “performance of its

functions as a government which the Consti-

tution recognizes as sovereign.” Id. at 588.

Chief Justice Stone's reasoning was re-

cently adopted by a majority of this Court in

National League of Cities v. Usery, -U.S.-,

44 U.S.L.W. 4974 (No. 74-878, June 24, 1976).

The Court held that

there are attributes of sovereignty

attaching to every state government

which may not be impaired by Congress,

not because Congress may lack an

affirmative grant of legislative

authority to reach the matter, but

because the Constitution prohibits

it from exercising the authority

in that manner.

Id. at 4977. The dissent in National League

of Cities disagreed vigorously that there was

any such limitation on the exercise of an

otherwise conceded federal power. Id. at

4981. But even the dissent accepted the

14

narrower view postulated by Justice Frank-

furter in New York v. United States that fed-

eral regulation could not reach the govern-

mental powers of the States. Thus, Mr. Justice

Brennan recognized in his dissenting opinion

that federal law could “neither impose policy

objectives on the States nor deny the States

complete freedom to fix their own objectives.”

National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, 44

U.S.L.W. at 4986.

3. The National Government May Not Impose

Upon The States Decisions Regarding The

Conduct Of Government Functions.

Two principles emerge, then, from the

decision in National League of Cities v.

Usery. First, under no circumstances may Con-

gress regulate directly the governmental pow-

ers of the States and their subdivisions. Such

powers are not “commerce” within the meaning

of Article I, section 8, of the Constitution

and, hence, are beyond the ambit of federal

15

federal authority. National League of Cities

v. Usery, supra, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4981-82

(Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, even State

activities which do constitute "commerce" may

not be regulated by Congress "so as to force

directly upon the States its choices as to

how essential decisions regarding the conduct

of integral governmental functions are to be

made." Id. at 4980.

a) Direct regulation of State

governmental powers by the

National Government. ,

In the vast, complex federal system of

government existing in the United States, in-

teraction between the powers of the State and

National Government is, of course, inevit-

able. For example, many times the States, in

response to action taken by the National

Government, exercise their sovereign powers

to implement or aid the achievement of na-

tional goals adopted by Congress. In such

16

instances of federal-State interaction, Tenth

Amendment considerations become relevant only

in the rare event that the line drawn by Jus-

tice Cardozo in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,

301 U.S. 548 (1937), is transgressed by Con-

gress.

That case involved the unemployment com-

pensation provisions of the Social Security

Act of 1935 (c. 531, 49 Stat. 620). A federal

excise tax was imposed upon certain employ-

ers, but a credit against that tax was allow-

ed for taxes paid to an unemployment fund

established by State law which, in the judg-

ment of the federal Social Security Board,

satisfied federally-prescribed minimum cri-

teria. Petitioner, a business located in

Alabama, a State which had passed such a law

in response to the federal legislation, chal-

lenged the Social Security Act on the ground,

inter alia, that it violated the Tenth Amend-

17

ment and principles implicit in a federal .

system of government, because the State law

was extracted by economic pressure and be-

cause Alabama was forced to surrender powers

essential to its sovereign existence. Justice

Cardozo's seminal discussion of that issue is

of critical importance to the instant case

because, as we show later, viewed in its

light, the constitutional infirmity of peti-

tioner's interpretation of the Act becomes

readily discernable.

In rejecting the petitioner's argument,

Justice Cardozo observed that to sustain such

a challenge there must be established the

proposition that the federal law operated as

a "[weapon] of coercion, destroying or im-

pairing the autonomy of the states." Id. at

586. Justice Cardozo viewed the "temptation"

for the States contained in the federal law -

i.e., the prospect of retaining control over

18

funds that would have otherwise been paid to

the National Government by employers - as

not akin to the exertion of undue influence

or to coercion by the National Government.

Id. at 590. A State choosing to join the fed-

eral program acted of its “unfettered will."

Id.

A crucial factor leading Justice Cardozo

to the conclusion that Alabama was participa-~

ting of its own free will was that the Social

Security Act permitted a State, at its plea-

sure, to repeal its unemployment statute and

thereby relieve itself of the obligation of

satisfying the federally-prescribed criteria:

Alabama is still free, without breach

of an agreement, to change her system

over night. No officer or agency of

the National Government can force a

compensation law upon her or keep

it_in existence. No officer or agency

of that Government, either by suit

Or other means, can supervise or con-

trol the application of the [unemploy-

ment compensation] payments.

19

Id. at 595. (Emphasis added.) That state-

ment by Justice Cardozo clearly indicates

that, had the federal law not preserved free

choice by the States, there would have been

a conflict with the Tenth Amendment. The

rationale is obvious: any abridgement of a

State's freedom to choose necessarily is

in derogation of its sovereignty, because

"freedom is inherent in sovereignty." United

States v. Mayo, 319 U.S. 441, 447 (1943).

The salient point, then, is that Con-

gress may involve the States in the enforce-

ment of federal law, so long as the States'

freedom of choice remains unrestricted, i.e.,

the States may be induced, but not compelled,

to exercise their sovereign powers. See

Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Com-

mission, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). Congress

therefore may not, in the guise of implement-

ing national policy, dictate to the States

20

laws to be enacted and executive action to

be undertaken. Cf. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S.

(13 Wall.) 397, 407 (1871). This fundamental

principle inherent in a federal system of

government is strikingly illustrated by two

nineteenth century cases arising under Article

IV, Section 2 of the Constitution.

That constitutional provision declares,

in pertinent part:

A Person charged in any State with

Treason, Felony, or other Crime,

who shall flee from Justice, and

be found in another State, shall on

Demand of the State from which he

fled, be delivered up, to be removed

to the State having Jurisdiction of

the Crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour ~

in one State, under the Laws thereof,

escaping into another, shall in Con-

sequence of any Law or Regulation

therein, be discharged from such

Service or Labour, but shall be

delivered upon Claim of the Party

to whom such Service or Labour may

be due.

After a dispute had arisen between Vir-

21

ginia and Pennsylvania regarding the extra-

dition to Pennsylvania of a person indicted

there for the forcible removal of a fugitive

Slave to Virginia, Congress enacted legisla-

tion regulating the disposition of all fugi-

tives covered by Article IV, Section 2. Act

of February 12, 1793, c. 7, 1 Stat. 302. The

question then arose in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,

41 U.S. (16 Peters) 539 (1842), whether the

federal law could require a State official

to enforce the constitutional provision, not-

withstanding that no such authority was con-

ferred on the official by State law. Justice

Story, writing for the Court, concluded that

the federal law constitutionally could not

have that effect:

The clause [Art. IV, Sec. 2, Cl. 3]

is found in the national Constitution,

and not in that of any state. It does

not point out any state functionaries,

Or any state action to carry its

provisions into effect. The states

cannot, therefore, be compelled to

22

enforce them; and it might well be

deemed an unconstitutional exercise

of the power of interpretation, to

insist that the states are bound to

provide means to carry into effect

the duties of the national government,

nowhere delegated or intrusted to them

by the Constitution.

Id. at 615-16.

The point was stated even more force-

fully by Chief Justice Taney for a unanimous

Court in Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24

How.) 66 (1860), a case that involved section

1 of the 1793 legislation, which dealt with

the extradition of fugitive criminals. The

law provided that, upon the presentation of

certain proofs by the State demanding extra-

dition, “it shall be the duty of the execu-

tive authority of the state or territory to

which such person shall have fled" to deliver

him over. Dennison, the Governor of Ohio, had

refused to deliver to Kentucky a person char-

ged there with the crime of assisting a slave

23

to escape, whereupon Kentucky sued in the

Supreme Court, on original jurisdiction, for

issuance of a mandamus against the Governor.

Chief Justice Taney's discussion of the

effect of the fugitive law is a significant

indication of the limitations imposed on the

National Government by the principles of fed-

eralism:

The words “it shall be the duty,"

in ordinary legislation, imply the

assertion of the power to command

and to coerce obedience. But looking

to the subject matter of this law,

and the relations which the United

States and the several States bear

to each other, the court is of opinion,

the words "it shall b- the duty" were

not used as mandatory and compulsory,

but as declaratory of the moral duty

which this compact created, when

Congress had provided the mode of

carrying it into execution. The

act does not provide any means to

compel the execution of this duty,

nor inflict any punishment for

neglect or refusal on the part of

the Executive of the State; nor

is there any clause or provision

in the Constitution which arms the

Government of the United States

with this power. Indeed, such a

24

power would place every State under

the control and dominion of the

General Government, even in the

administration of its internal

concerns and reserved rights. And

we think it clear, that the Federal

Government, under the Constitution,

has no power to impose on a State

officer, as such, any duty whatever,

and compel him to perform it; for

if it possessed this power, it might

overload the officer with duties

which would fill up all his time,

and disable him from performing

his obligations to the State....

[W]e are very far from supposing,

that in using ths word "duty", the

Statesmen who framed and passed the

law, or the President who approved

and signed it, intended to exercise

a coercive power over State officers

not warranted by the Constitution.

Id. at 107-8. (Emphasis added. )*

It is noteworthy that Prigg v. Penn-

sylvania and Kentucky v. Dennison dealt with

a provision of the Constitution (Art. IV,

Sec. 2) that contains language which seem-

*See Ex parte, Commonwealth of Virginia,

100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339 (1880), a Recon-

struction era case involving the Civil Rights

Amendments which cites approvingly (id. at

347-8) to Chief Justice Taney's opinion in

Dennison.

25

ingly imposed affirmative duties on the

States. Yet this Court, in order to per-

serve the delicate balance between the State

and National Governments in our federa. sys-

tem, strained not to find any authority in

the National Government to control the exer-

cise of State power. Any attempt to find such

authority in the Commerce Clause, upon which

the Clean Air Act is premised, would, then,

clearly be violative of the Tenth Amendment

and basic principles of federalism; for Ar-

ticle I, Section 8, where the Commerce Clause

ts found, contains no language even arguably

directed at the States, but rather is a lim-

ited surrender of power to the National Gov-

ernment.

b) Direct regulation of State

activities affecting commerce

by the National Government

Moreover, even when a particular State

activity is “commerce” within the meaning of

26

the Commerce Clause, Congress nevertheless

may not regulate that activity when to do so

would "abrogate the States' otherwise plenary

authority” to make policy determinations in-

volving governmental functions essential to

the States' separate and independent exis-

tence. National League of Cities v. Usery,

supra, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4976. Thus, in Na-

tional League of Cities, the Court held that

Congress could not regulate the employment

practices of States and their subdivisions,

because compliance with the federal require-

ments would

Significantly alter or displace the

States' abilities to structure employer-

employee relationships in such areas as

fire prevention, police protection, sani-

tation, public health, and parks and re-

creation. These activities are typical

of those performed by state and local

governments in discha: ting their dual

functions of administering the public

law and furnishing public services.

Indeed, it is functions such as these

which governments are created to provide,

27

services such as these which the states

have traditionally afforded their citi-

zens. If Congress may withdraw from

the states the authority to make those

fundamental employment decisions upon

which their systems for performance of

those functions must rest, we think

there would be little left of the

states’ “separate and independent

existence."

Id. at 4979 (footnote omitted; citation omit-

ted). The constitutionality of federal regu-

lation of a particular State activity affec-

ting commerce thus is not determined simply

by looking to the nature of the activity it-

self, but by assessing the impact of the reg-

ulation on the entire decision-making system

with which the State provides essential gov-

ernmental services.

4. The Administrator's

Position

The Administrator pays lip service to

these principles. Thus, conceding that the

National Government may only regulate "the

State as polluter, not...the State as State"

28

(Pet. Br.,p. 20), the Administrator indicates The logic underlying the Administra-

to this Court a recognition of the consti- tor's position is patently flawed. A State's

tutional limits to his powers: ° transportation policy is a function of the

The Administrator has never asserted

any power to compel the State to

carry out its governmental responsi-

bilities under an implementation plan

by, for example, monitoring ambient

air quality and enforcing the emission

controls applicable to private stationary

sources. Nor does he contend that he

can direct the State to adopt laws or

regulations creating transportation

control plans that comply with the Act

(see Pet. No. 1055, App. 27a-29a; Pet.

No. 75-909, p. 17, n. 15). He thus

concedes the necessity of removing from

the regulations all requirements that

the States submit legally adopted

regulations; the regulations contain

no requirement that the State adopt

laws.

(Pet. Br., p. 20n. 14.) Despite that state-

ment, however, the Administrator persists in

arguing that as "owners and operators of pol-

luting transportation facilities" - i.e.,

highways - the States are properly subject to

federal regulation of their transportation

policies (Pet. Br., p. 32).

29

State as a State, i.e., such a policy is

developed and implemented by a State in its

constitutional role of a quasi-sovereign

possessing certain reserved police powers.

The “remedies” which the Administrator seeks

to enforce against the respondents - inspec-

tion programs and enforcement of traffic

laws - accordingly involve actions which can

be performed by a State only as sovereign.

(Clearly, a private “owner and operator" of

a highway has no power to regulate the acti-

vities of persons using the road, other than

by controlling access.) Quite plainly, the

Administrator regards the States as “pollu-

ters" solely to support the assertion of

federal authority to demand relief from the

States as governmental entities.

30

But the discussion above demonstrates

(and the Administrator apparently concedes)

that the National Government may not assert

its constitutional powers to exercise such

control over State Government. Obviously,

then, it cannot be enough to pass constitu-

tional scrutiny merely to recite the incanta-

tion that the State is being regulated only

as a "polluter." The scope of the federal

regulation - i.e., the nature of the re-

quired State compliance - must likewise be

limited to the State as a "polluter", lest

such State activities be used - as the Admin-

istrator attempts here-as the rationale for

an impermissible intrusion of federal author-

ity into an area reserved to State sover-

eignty.

Furthermore, even assuming that the

Administrator's actions did not involve such

direct control over State police powers, the

31

Administrator's application of the Act does

not survive scrutiny under this Court's re-

cent holding in National League of Cities

v. Usery, supra. The Administrator argues

that the Act passes the constitutional test

set forth in that decision because the sta-

tute: (1) affects only a small portion of

a State's transportation policy, and not

the full range of fundamental State activi-

ties; (2) permits the States to determine

the means of compliance; and (3) does not

have a significant financial impact (Pet.

Br., pp. 47-49). That argument is specious

because it ignores the critical interrelation-

ship between transportation policy and other

fundamental governmental services. There can

be little doubt that in a modern, urbanized

area, a public highway system is absolutely

essential. Every vital governmental func-

tion - police protection, fire prevention,

32

health care, sanitation, education, etc. - is

virtually totally dependent upon that highway

system. Nor could such an area long exist as

a viable economic unit, providing employment

and business for its inhabitants, without its

streets and highways. Thus, conforming a

State transportation policy to federal re-

guirements would have a significant impact

on the process by which States and their sub-

divisions provide the whole range of funda-

mental services. (Moreover, although the

States are permitted an initial say in fash-

ioning the terms of compliance, all such State

proposals are subject to approval and over-

ride by the Administrator.)

In the City's case, for example, the

plaintiffs in Friends of the Earth v. Carey

would require a disposition of police man-

power that the Police Commissioner has stated,

by affidavit, would affect the Police Depart-

33

ment's ability to maintain public order and

safety. Police officers would be diverted

from anticrime activities to parking and

traffic enforcement. Another measure de-

manded by the plaintiffs would require the

City, at a time of acute fiscal crisis, to

reconstruct many of the highway approaches

to the City's bridges in order to permit

tolling. These measures, along with many

others, have been deemed infeasible at this

time by the City's Mayor, who, as the elected

executive officer, has determined that basic

governmental services must be maintained

while the City struggles to regain its fin-

ancial health. Yet if the Clean Air Act were

were construed to support the Administra-

tor's position in these cases, that decision

by the Mayor would be superseded by the de-

mands of federal requirements - a clear ex-

ample of the extent to which local decision-

34

making regarding essential governmental ser-

vices would be undermined.*

*Mr. Justice Blackmun's reference to "state

facility compliance with imposed federal

{environmental] standards" in his concurring

opinion in National League of Cities v.

Usery, supra, does not weaken the import

of the majority decision for this case.

A facility directly under State con-

trol - e.g., an incinerator - can easily be

conformed to federal standards without in any

way impairing basic policy determinations by

the State. What the Administrator seeks here,

however, is to use State jurisdiction over

its highway system - an alleged "facility"

affecting “commerce” - as a mere pretext

for commandeering the entire panoply of

State police powers, clearly not the situ-

ation envisioned by Mr. Justice Blackmun.

35

$

CONCLUSION

The Decisions of the Fourth and Ninth

Circuit Courts of Appeals should be affirmed,

and the decision of the District of Columbia

Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed

insofar as said decision would compel the

states to deny vehicle registration, to

provide bus lanes and to make financial

commitments for the purchase of additional

buses.

Dated: New York, New York

December 7, 1976

Respectfully submitted,

W. BERNARD RICHLAND

Corporation Counsel

of the City of New York

Municipal Building

New York, N.Y. 10007

ALEXANDER GIGANTE, JR.,

of Counsel.

36

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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