Appendix — General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert

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APPENDIX - VOL. Il, NOV 94. 975

‘

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 74-1589

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

MARTHA V. GILBERT,

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND

MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, CLC, et al,

Respondents.

No. 74-1590

MARTHA V. GILBERT,

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND

MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO-CLC, eft al,

Petitioners,

v.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,

Respondent.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI FILED JUNE 17, 1975

CERTIORARI GRANTED OCTOBER 6, 1975

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PLAINTIFFS’ EXHIBIT NO. 2B.

EXHIBIT NO. J-1 to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. K-1 to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. K-2 to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBITS NOS. L-1 to L-70 to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. M to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. N-1 to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. N-2 to Pre-Trial Stipulation

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EXHIBIT NO. O-3 to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. O-S to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. O-6 to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. P to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. Q to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. R to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. S to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. T to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. U-2 to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. U-3 to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. V to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. X to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. Y to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. Z-1 to Pre-Trial Stipu ation

EXHIBIT NO. AA to Pre-Trial Stipulation.

EXHIBIT NO. BB to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. CC to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. DD to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. HH to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. LL to Pre-Trial Stipulation

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EXHIBIT NO. MM to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. NN to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. OO to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. B to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. PP to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. XX to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. YY to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. C to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. E to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. F to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. G to Pre-Trial Stipulation .

EXHIBIT NO. H-! to Pre-Trial Stipulation

EXHIBIT NO. I to Pre-Trial Stipulation

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G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 27 - Memorandum of the Bell Companies

received August 1, 1972 in the Matter of Petitions filed

by the EEOC, et al., before the FCC, Docket No. 19143.

Before the

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of :

Petitions filed by the Equal )

Employment OpportunityCom- ) Docket No. 19143

Commission (EEOC), et al. )

MEMORANDUM ACCOMPANYING THE

AUGUST 1, 1972

SUBMISSION OF THE BELL COMPANIES

I. INTRODUCTION

The Bell companies are filing on this date with the Federal

Communications Commission testimony documenting their

commitment to equal employment opportunity and the steps

they have taken to implement that commitment in all phases

of the employment process. The testimony responds in de-

tail to the allegations of discrimination which the Equal Em-

ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has made against

them.

This memorandum and the testimony it summarizes show:

(1) the Bell companies are fully and firmly committed to the

national goal of equal employment opportunity, and have

been so committed as that policy has evolved over the years;

(2) their commitment has produced results - good, substantial

results; (3) these results are being produced by employment

practices that are, contrary to the assertions of the EEOC,

762

progressive and lawful and nondiscriminatory; on an equal

basis to male and female employees in the event of sickness,

on-the-job accident or retirement. Also, in the event of

death of an active or retired employee, a survivor annuity is

payable to either a widow or widower. The Benefit Plans

were revised during collective bargaining in 1971 and now

make absolutely no distinctions among employees on the

basis of sex.

2. Maternity Leave

While authoritative judicial interpretations have not as

yet been given, we consider the maternity leave policies of

the Bell companies fair and nondiscriminatory!93 Leave

policies, in general, as well as the features of maternity leaves

in particular, are discussed in the testimony of Therese F.

Pick, Secretary of the Employees’ Benefit Committee.

The maternity leave policies of the companies permit

any female employee, consistent with medical advice, to de-

termine when she will take up to a year’s leave. There

is no fixed period for taking leave. Maternity leave is a

personal , but carries substantially greater assurance

of employment than in the case of other personal leaves.

The Employee Benefit Plans provide sickness disability

benefits to any employee with six months’ service, beginning

the eighth day of an absence from work because of physical

1331n the only decision to date by a United States Court of

Appeals, the Fifth Circuit held that a leave system requiring term-

ination at a fixed date was reasonable and rationally related to a

permissible purpose and did not violate the Civil Rights Act of 1871.

Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, F.2d ,

4 F.E.P. Cases 358 (Sth Cir. 1972), rehearing denied, F.2d

,4 F.E.P. Cases 543.

2 iD ee ers et -

763

disability to work by reason of sickness. Since employees

on leave are not “absent”’ from work within the meaning

of the Plan, no employee on any category of leave, in-

cluding maternity leave, is eligible for sickness disability

benefits. Moreover, a normal pregnancy is not a “sick-

ness” within the meaning of the Plan, or by common

medical definition.'*4 While EEOC by its latest guide-

lines seeks to characterize such an approach as discrimina-

tory, this is a change of position by EEOC and it has not

been judicially approved. The Bell companies’ practices

are consistent with initial EEOC interpretations that did

not seek to compare an employer’s treatment of mater-

nity with his treatment of illness or injury. '5

The estimated annual cost of providing disability bene-

fits in all maternity cases ranges from $26 million, based

on an average duration of eight weeks, to $58 million,

consuming a 24-week duration. In relating this cost to

service, it must be considered that a large number of

women taking maternity leave do not return to work. A

recent survey of 4,715 maternity leaves in six Bell com-

panies showed that 38 percent did not wish to return.'%6

Since Bell will employ women who are already pregnant,

and in light of the relatively short service period required

13406 testimony of EEOC witnesses Hellegers and Barter

(EEOC Exhibits 13, 26 and Tr. 1089 er seq., 2017 ef seq.).

135 gee G.C. Opinion 218-66 (June 23, 1966); G.C. Opinions

dated Nov. 15, 1966, and Feb. 17, 1967, CCH Emp. Prac. Guide,

41219 (1969); and Dec. No. 70-360 (Dec. 16, 1969), CCH Emp.

Prac, Guide, $6084,

136 pick Testimony, p. 8.

764

for sickness disability eligibility, there is considerable room

for abuse if benefits were extended to cover pregnancy.

Accordingly, the Bell companies could not be justified in

asking our customers to assume this added cost.

D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCEMENT

The Bell companies have always emphasized the promo-

tion of current employees to fill their higher positions.

In part this is due to the unique nature of many telephone

jobs, and in part to a recognition by the Bell companies

of the desirability of providing meaningful and rewarding

careers to their employees.

The EEOC has alleged that many Bell jobs, particularly

those in which minorities and women have been employed.

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 28 - Testimony of Therese Pick, In

the Matter of Petitions filed by the EEOC, et al.,

FCC Docket No. 19143, Bell Exhibit No. 5 of

8/1/72 and Official Transcript, Volume 47, pgs.

5455-5557.

TESTIMONY OF THERESE PICK

Qualifications

My name is Therese F. Pick. I am secretary of the

Employees’ Benefit Committee of the American Telephone

and Telegraph Company, at 195 Broadway, New York,

New York. Before assuming my current responsibilities,

I was an assistant secretary of the benefit committee at

765

AT&T for 8 years. Prior to that I had some 12 years of

a variety of responsibilities in the Personnel Department

at AT&T.

My present responsibilities include the design of pen-

sion, benefit and insurance programs for Bell Telephone

companies, formulation of policies related to these pro-

grams, administration and interpretation of specific pro-

visions of the programs and consultation on problem areas

with the benefit secretaries of the several telephone com-

panies.

Purpose

The purpose of my testimony is to provide an explana-

tion and overview of the Bell System’s “Plan for Employ-

ees’ Pensions, Disability Benefits and Death Benefits” with

particular emphasis on “Leaves of Absence” policies and

our policies respecting pregnant applicants and employees.

The Benefit Plan

Each Bell System company’s “Plan for Employees’

Pensions, Disability Benefits and Death Benefits” provides

coverage on an equal basis with the same eligibility re-

quirements for male and female employees in the event

of sickness, on-the-job accident, retirement or death. Al-

so, in the event of death of an active or retired employee,

a survivor annuity is payable to either a widow or widow-

er under conditions that will be described later. Eligibility

requirements are the same for all employees regardless of

race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

Leaves of Absence

The plans provide that any absence without pay, other

766

than a “leave of absence’’ shall be considered as a break

in continuity of service. A leave of absence thus is the

usual technique to prevent such a break, which is impor-

tant since continuity of service determines length of vaca-

tion and eligibility to sickness benefits and group life and

medical insurance and is the basis for pension credit.

Personal Leaves

These are granted by the committee at the request

of the employee depending on the work needs of

the department, the work record of the employee,

the probability of his or her return, the duration

of absence requested, the reason given for the leave

requested, etc. Personal leaves generally carry serv-

ice credit for the first month, elibibility to death

benefits during the leave depending on the length

of leave and expectancy of return. Employees on

personal leave are not eligible for sickness disability

benefits. However, where the employee is sched-

uled to return to work at the termination of the

leave, but is prevented from doing so by a sickness

disability, he or she may be eligible for benefits

on the eighth day following termination of the

leave. At the end of the leave the application for

reinstatement is reviewed on the basis of jobs avail-

able and every effort is made to reinstate the em-

ployee interested in returning. No wage progres-

sion credit, i.e., service time upon which the em-

ployee’s wage progression is based accompanies per-

sonal leaves. Generally the employee on personal

leave continues to participate in the company’s med-

ical expense and group life insurance programs for

a limited period, usually up to one year.

767

Maternity Leaves

The Bell companies have for years granted pregnant

employees leaves of absence for matemity reasons.

These leaves have followed generally the pattern

of personal leaves as outlined above. There was

no uniformity as to all features among the com-

panies. Most companies have personnel practices

relating to this subject but some companies have

the terms embodied in their union co stracts.

With a view to achieving more uniformity, the labor

relations staff of the American Company in April, 1971,

in anticipation of that year’s round of labor negotiations,

distributed to the labor relations staffs of the Bell oper-

ating companies a list of principles relating to maternity

leaves which it was suggested be incorporated in their

contracts or practices as follows:

(1) Apply to all females whether married or not;

(2) No fixed date for going on leave. Each case to

be decided upon individual basis considering such

factors as employee’s condition, requirements of

her job, medical advice, etc;

(3) Upon application for reemployment, a like posi-

tion should be provided unless conditions make it

impossible, and no applicant should be refused

without concurrence of appropriate Personnel De-

partment representative;

Note - Language on leave application form indicat-

ing no guarantee of reemployment should

be deleted.

768

(4) Where the nature of the job precludes continued

work but other less arduous work that the employ-

ee could safely perform is available, the employee

should be given such work but ‘red circled’ at her

former higher rate where the company practice is

to treat other employees (men) in that fashion;

(5) The leave should carry eligibility to death benefits

but not sickness disability benefits during the leave.

Several comments should be made about these princi-

ples. We recognize that, subject to medical advice, the

time when a pregnant employee should stop working is

largely an individual matter.

There is a strong commitment to reemploy as stated in

item 3 above. This generally is not a written uncondi-

tional guarantee because the nature of some jobs, particu-

larly in small operating locations, makes it impossible to

replace the employee by another without assuring the new

employee of permanency. Every effort is made, however,

and usually successfully, to place the employee wishing

to return after her leave in the same job she left or in a

comparable job in the same or nearby location.

A recent survey was made of 4715 maternity leaves

ending in the period July 1, 1971 - January 31, 1972 in

four large Bell operating companies. Oniy 2937 (62 per-

cent) of those on leave returned to work, 97.1 percent

of those not returning acted on their own volition. Jobs

were not available for only 51 employees who wanted to

return to work, or just a little under 1.1 percent of the

leaves.

* Dlinois, Southwestern, four Chesapeake and Potomac companies

and Southern Bell.

-9-

769

I should also note that maternity leaves are ordinarily

granted for a period of two to six months with exten-

sions permitted up to a year.

Sickness Disability Benefits

I should now ljike to turn to the subject of sickness

disability benefits. Under our benefit plans, sickness dis-

ability benefits are paid on the eighth day of absence “on

account of physical disability to work by reason of sick-

ness” (Section 6 (1) of the plan). Disability on account

of injury other than that arising out of and in the course

of employment constitutes “sickness” for this purpose.

Sickness disability benefits are paid to employees having

a minimum service period of 6 months at the rate of one

half-pay for up to 52 weeks of sickness disability. The

duration and rates of benefits increase with added service

to 52 weeks at full pay after 25 years of service.

It will be noted that sickness disability benefits are

paid for the absence resulting from sickness, and not

merely for the sickness. An employee on leave is not on

the active roll of employees scheduled or expected to

work, and hence is not classified as “absent”. Accord-

ingly, sickness disability benefits are not paid to any em-

ployees on any class of leave. Furthermore, benefits are

not paid for disability or inability to work as such—the

disability or inability to work must be on account of

sickness.

By the same token, we do pay sickness benefits when

a pregnant employee is absent (i.e., before going on a

leave, the date of which is fixed not automatically but by

770

her individual situation, medical advice, etc.) due to sick-

ness disability either unrelated to her pregnancy or arising

out of it in the form of sickness complications or abnor-

malities, such as toxemia, hypertension, miscarriage, abor-

tion, etc. And the benefits in such cases continue until

the sickness disability ceases or up to one year as out-

lined above.

We believe our practices regarding maternity leaves are

fair and do not discriminate. They carry the perquisites

of leaves granted for personal reasons. In addition they

carry even greater assurance of a return to work if the

employee desires.

To pay sickness benefits for all maternity cases would

be most costly, contrary to the “absence-sickness” intent

of our plans. We have estimated the cost to range from

about $26 million a year based on a duration of eight

weeks, to about $58 million a year based on twenty-four

weeks. These figures do not include the estimated $2

million to $6 million premium costs for Blue Cross-Blue

Shield which would be incurred by the companies if we

were required to pay sickness benefits for all maternity

cases. This expense would be unwarranted even if all

these people returned to work. But as indicated above,

about 38 percent choose not to do so. Accordingly we

do not believe our rate payers should bear this substantial,

added cost.

EEOC Summary 3396 states that the Bell Companies’

Extraordinary Medical Expense Plans in effect in 1971

exclude medical expenses for pregnancy, childbirth and

related care. It should be noted that severe medical or

surgical complications arising from pregnancy or the re-

sulting childbirth are not excluded from coverage if they

5455

5456

771

otherwise qualify as covered medical expense. In addition,

it should be noted that medical expenses for pregnancy,

childbirth and related care are covered in the Bell Com-

panies’ Basic Medical Plan.

Whereupon,

THERESE F. PICK

was called as a witness and, after being first duly sworn,

was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. LEVY:

Q. Please state your name.

Therese Pick.

Q. What is your business address? A. Iam at the

American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 195 Broad-

way, New York, New York.

Q. What is your occupation? A. My occupation

is Employees Benefit Secretary, the Benefit Committee of

the AT&T Company.

Q. Do you have before you a copy of the document

that has just been marked Bell Exhibit No. 5, “Testimony

of Therese Pick’? A. Yes, I have.

Q. Did you prepare that document or was it prepared

under your supervision and control? A. Yes, it was.

A. My name is

A. On page | in the first line, first paragraph, change

the comma to period after my name Pick.

On page 5, line 6 in the last paragraph, the comma

should be deleted and the word “and” inserted.

172 773

JUDGE DENNISTON: That is between the words 5460 Q. Further on in the personal leave of one month or

“‘month” and “eligibility”? less and we have continuity of service, would there ever

THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. be any sickness disability granted? You have a statement

On that same page 5, iine 8, in the last paragraph, de- here on page 5 which is a little confusing to me, that

lete “‘personal” in the second to the last line. same statement that the personal leaves up to one month

Page 8, line 2 of the last paragraph, the study period is carry service credit and you indicated that that meant

July 1, 1971 to January 31, 1972. continuity of service is maintained and further up there

BY MR. LEVY: 5461 in the page you said continuity of service determines

Q. Your correction then is to change “1970” to length of vacations and eligibility to sickness benefits?

1971"? A. That’s right. A. However, while a person is on a leave of absence,

On page 10, lines 3 and 4 of the last paragraph to de- they are not scheduled to report to work so they are not

lete the four words “in the case of.” absent. If they become ill while on that leave of absence,

since they are not scheduled to come to work they would

” 2 ° not become eligible for sickness benefits.

Q. Having read those corrections into the record, do Q. So if somebody took a personal leave of absence,

you now adopt this testimony you have before you as either the one-month leave or the longer one, they could

your own and is it true and correct to the best of your never be eligible for sickness disability benefits? A.

knowledge, information and belief? A. Yes. You are meaning during the period of the leave?

Q. Yes. A. If they became ill while on the leave

s . . of absence?

458 CROSS-EXAMINATION Q. Yes. A. They would not become eligible for

sickness benefits.

BY MISS LONGO: Q. Never?

A. First, I would like to ask you a few questions P . E

about some items that appear on page 5.

On page 5, lines 4 through 6, you say that continuity 5480 Q. A little further down the page, I guess it is the

of service determines the length of vacation and eligibility second full paragraph, you state that the Labor Relations

to sickness benefits, group life and medical insurance and 5481 Staff of the American Company in April of 1971 distrib-

is the basis for pension credit. Does continuity of service uted a list of principles relating to maternity leave and

also determine wage progression credit? A. To my then you list five principles.

knowledge it does, yes. | Can you indicate which companies as of today or in

* * . the recent past have adopted this policy in toto that you

have listed on page 7 and page 8?

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774

MR. LEVY: You are asking for a listing of the individ-

ual companies?

MISS LONGO: Yes, the individual companies that have

adopted this set of principles that your Labor Relations

Committee drew up.

THE WITNESS: I would not be able to make the

statement about all five principles. I believe this can be

ascertained fairly easily.

BY MISS LONGO: |

Q. Are there companies that would have adopted only

some of them and not others? A. You are wonder-

ing about right now as of this date?

Q. Yes. A. There are some companies that may

not have adopted one of these as an example. That is

why I am reluctant to make an overall statement because

I think there might be a company that has not adopted

one of these.

Q. I would like to ask you a few questions about

your sickness disability. Let’s go over to page 9, lines

4, 5 and 6 of that first paragraph on sickness disability.

You state “Disability on account of injury other than

that arising out of and in the course of employment con-

stitute sickness for this purpose.”

You used the phrase “‘disability on account of injury”.

Does “injury” include disease? A. In trying to dis-

tinguish between sickness which would include disease and

injury, which might be an accident that happens off the

job.

Q. But you are not answering my question. A.

Injury does not refer to disease.

Q. Can there be sickness disability benefits for someone

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775

who is not injured but who is diseased? A. Yes.

JUDGE DENNIS19N: I think the preceding sentence

says that, doesn’t it, Miss Longo?

BY MISS LONGO:

Q. Are there any illnesses that are not covered under

the sickness disability benefits, any specific illnesses?

A. No, there are not.

Q. Any specific operations?

tion requires absence from the job.

A. Not if the opera-

Q. What happens, say, when an employee has an oper-

ation in the doctor’s office or else it is a very simple

operation and may require only one or two days of re-

cuperative time and there are complications and instead

of being absent two or three days they would be absent

for ten days.

Under which plan would they be covered? A. As

soon as they reach the 8th day, they would be covered

under the plan.

Q. I would like to ask you about a specific kind of

operation that may be performed in a doctor’s office.

Are abortions covered under those plans the same as

other operations? A. Yes.

Q. There is some medical confusion or lay confusion

about a spontaneous abortion as opposed to a medically-

induced one. A. A spontaneous abortion would be

covered — the absence for that.

Q. Would a medically-induced abortion be covered, a

voluntary, intentional abortion? Would that be covered?

A. Yes, it would?

5533

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Q. For someone to collect sickness disability benefits,

am I to understand that they cannot be on a leave to

collect those benefits? A. That is correct.

Q. What is their absence called if they are not on a

leave, if they are ill and away from the job? Do you

call it anything? A. Sickness disability absence.

Q. During the duration of a sickness disability absence,

is there any wage progression credit?

Q. Is there any pension credit? A. Yes.

Q. Are they still covered — this is a silly question, but

are they stil! covered by group life insurance and medical

expense? A. Yes.

Q. Thank you very much on that.

Let’s turn to your testimony on maternity leave which

I believe begins on page 7, and there is a list of the

principles you have already discussed with Miss Longo on

pages 7 and 8 and I have just a brief question on the

fourth of these principles on page 8 where it states that

the nature of the job precludes continued work but other

less arduous work that the employee could perform is

available, the employee should be given such work but

red circled at her former higher rate where the company

practice is to treat the other men employees in that

fashion.

Is that correct? A. That is correct.

Q. I don’t understand where the company practices

to treat other employees, men, in that fashion, and could

you give an example of that? A. There may be in-

stances where an employee has had an illness and has re-

turned to the job and is not quite capable of doing his

regular job, where he is then put in a lower assigned job

but at the red circled rate.

A. Yes, there is.

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There may be instances where, again, he is just partial-

ly disabled. His usual job is to climb poles, he strained

his wrist —

Q. Let’s say if he had a heart attack he would be in

a less arduous job but he would be circled? A. That

could be a policy.

Q. If a company has that policy for males, it will

have the same policy for females? A. Yes, this was

the principle that was being offered.

Q. You said you were not sure which companies had

adopted this principle? A. We understand from our

labor relations staff that this is being generally and widely

implemented. I would not be able to say the status of

it company by company.

Q. All employees are entitled, according to the plan,

to sickness disability benefits when they are working and

not on leave? A. That is correct. To be eligible, one

needs six months’ service to be covered by the full plan.

Q. But after that all employees are covered? A.

Yes.

Q. A pregnant woman employee is covered until she

begins that maternity leave? A. That is correct.

Q. Once she begins maternity leave, she is not covered

by the sickness disability benefits? A. That is correct.

Q. On these principles on maternity leave that you

have on pages 7 to 8, what recourse does a woman have

if she believes that those principles are not being followed?

Let me give you an example in my own mind.

For example, if she applies for re-employment and she

thinks there is a position open, that her old job is open

5545

778

and they are just not giving it to her, what can she

do? A. I think she could speak to higher levels of

authority within her department.

I have to make the assumption here when she returns

to her department and has gone to her immediate super-

visor and the immediate supervisor demures to this em-

ployment provision, then her next recourse would be to

go to higher levels and say, “I believe this is one of my

rights.”

Q. This is not a matter covered by any union grievance

procedure? A. I don’t believe so.

Q. And there is no formal sort of grievance procedure

for these kinds of matters. It is merely an informal ques-

tioning of her supervisors and higher company officials?

A. I believe that is the way it works.

MR. GARRISON: I have no more questions, Your

Honor.

Q. You said in the testimony that the 97.1 percent

of the women not returning acted on their own volition.

That means that they just were not refused a job; is that

right?

JUDGE DENNISTON: What page are you referring to,

Miss Gemma?

MISS GEMMA: Page 8.

THE WITNESS: Perhaps the best thing is to read it

“97.1 of those not returning acted on their own volition.

They did not want to return.”

BY MISS GEMMA:

Q. They did not want to return or they were refused

a job? A. They refused a job.

Q. How did you know they did not want to return?

A. This is part of the procedure at the expiration of the

leave.

5546

779

Q. Do you mean you called them up and asked them

whether or not they wanted to return? A. In the

companies included in the survey they had evidence to

show either these women volunteered this or took the

initiative or upon contact indicated they were not inter-

ested in returning.

Q. Say a woman returned back to work and she was

offered a job that was not as high-paying as the one she

had before she left because it was not open and she de-

cided not to go back to work. Wouldn’t she be returning

on her own volition? A. She would make the deci-

sion not to return under those conditions.

Q. So this 97.1 could include any number of women

who decided not to return to work because they were

not offered a job as high paying as the one they had

before? A. It could be, I don’t know.

* * *

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 30 - Testimony of Robert H. Barter,

EEOC Exhibit 26 and Official Report of Proceedings,

pgs. 1088 through 1112, February 14, 1972, In the

Matter of Petitions filed by the EEOC, et al., FCC

Docket No. 19143.

780

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of: )

)

) DOCKET NO. 19143

Petitions filed by the )

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT )

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, )

et al. )

Docket No.: 19143 et al. Exhibit no.: 26

Presented by: EEOC

Identified x

Disposition Received x

Rejected

Reporter: Short

Date: 3/2/72

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT HENRY BARTER

My name is Robert Henry Barter. I received my B.S.

(1937) and M.D. (1940) from the University of Wisconsin.

I then interned at Cleveland City Hospital and worked as

a resident at both Chicago Lying-in-Hospital and at Wis-

consin General Hospital. In 1949 I was certified by the

American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology.

I served in the U.S. Army Medical Corps for a period

of four years after which I was Chief Medical Officer in

Obstetrics and Gynecology at Gallinger Municipal Hospital

in Washington, D. C. For the past thirteen years I have

been Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at The George

781

Washington University School of Medicine. Between 1958

and 1967 I served as Chairman of the Department of Ob-

stetrics and Gynecology. In addition, I am Consultant

Emeritus in Obstetrics and Gynecology to the Surgeon

General of the United States Air Force, Consultant to the

National Institutes of Health, and Senior Consultant at

Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

During the course of my career I have published over

30 articles in professional medical journals and produced

six professional films concerning Obstetrics and Gynecolo-

gy. In addition to being a member of eleven professional

societies, I have served on the Executive Board of the

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, as

President of the Southern Gynecological and Obstetrical

Society and as Chairman of the Section on Obstetrics and

Gynecology of the American Medical Association.

It is my impression, as a Professor of Obstetrics and

Gynecology and a practicing Obstetrician and Gynecolo-

gist, that there is no reason why a patient who is preg-

nant should not be able to work as long as she feels cap-

able of so doing.

In the early history of this country there is certainly

nothing which would lead one to believe that women

were not allowed to work as long as they wished. The

rules and regulations which have prevented pregnant wo-

men from working have not had any basis in actual fact.

I am of the firm belief that many women who are

presnant do much better in those pregnancies if they are

allowed to work. Such is particularly true of a woman

who has worked all of her life and who, when unable to

work, may develop anxiety and depression which she

2018

782

would not have had if she had continued her regular place

in the work-a-day world.

Therefore, I would like to go on record as saying that

in the absence of any complications of pregnancy, there

is no reason why any normally pregnant woman should

not be allowed to work as long in her gestation as she

may comfortably do so.

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT

March 2, 1972

Pages: 2018-2030

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. COPUS:

Q. What is your name, please? A. Robert Henry

Barter.

Q. Dr. Barter, what is your business address? A.

2141 K Street, Northwest.

Q. Washington? A. Washington, D. C.

Q. What is your occupation, Dr. Barter? A. Phy-

sician.

Q. What kind of a physician? A. Obstetrician and

gynecologist.

Q. What is your place of employment? A. Self-

employed.

Q. Do you have in front of you a document which is

entitled “Testimony of Robert Henry Barter’’ which has

been marked for the record as EEOC-26? A. Yes.

Q. Was that document prepared by you or under your

2019

2020

783

your direction? A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any changes you want to make in it

at this time? A. No, it is correct.

Q. Do you now adopt this testimony as your own

testimony and is it true and correct to the best of your

information, knowledge and belief? A. It is.

MR. COPUS: Mr. Examiner, we now offer Dr. Barter

for voir dire and cross-examination.

PRESIDING EXAMINER: I assume the list of publi-

cations, 28, was a correct list of your writings?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

PRESIDING EXAMINER: Very well.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. LEVY:

Q. Dr. Barter, have you practiced industrial medicine?

A. Not as such.

Q. Are you familiar with the physical requirements of

positions which pregnant women may hold in private in-

dustry generally? A. No, I don’t keep any such

women from my practice, if that is what you mean. I don’t

discriminate against anyone who happens to be working

and who is also pregnant.

Q. I was asking, Doctor, whether you were familiar

with the physical requirements and environment of jobs

or positions in private industry which pregnant women

might hold. A. Well, such as?

Q. Such as the range of jobs which pregnant women

might hold, Doctor.

Let me be more specific — . A. A pregnant woman

can hold any job a non-pregnant woman might hold.

Q. Are you familiar with the requirements of the

positions which women may hold in the Bell companies?

784

A. No, not specifically.

Q. You are not familiar, then, with the physical re-

quirements of the lineman job or the cable splicer job or

the telephone operator job in the Bell System? A. No.

Q. Doctor, in the first paragraph on page 3 of your

testimony you state, and I quote, “there is no reason why

a patient who is pregnant should not be able to work as

long as she feels capable of so doing.” A. Yes, that

is correct.

Q. And in the concluding paragraph at the bottom of

page 3, carried over to page 4, you again state categoric-

ally, and I quote, “‘there is no reason why any normally

pregnant woman should not be allowed to work as long

in her gastation as she may comfortably do so.” A.

Yes, that is correct.

Q. Is it your feeling that the subjective feelings of the

pregnant working women are controlling as to whether or

not she may safely and efficiently continue to work at

her job? A. Yes, I think that has a bearing. I think

as long as she feels like working, I don’t see any reason

why she should not continue to work.

Q. Medically speaking, Doctor, can’t it be subjectively

comfortable, to use the word you used, for a normally

pregnant woman to continue at her job and yet be unsafe

for her to do so? A. Well, in the types of occupations

of women who I see and who are “normally pregnant” the

majority of women I see are doing jobs that there is no

reason why they could not do safely. Certainly being a

secretary you can do just as safely being pregnant as not

being pregnant.

Q. Even though a woman is comfortable while work-

ing, Doctor, isn’t it true that her pregnancy places certain

stress on such organs as the kidney and the liver? A.

Not in the normal patient, no.

2022

785

Q. Might exposure to certain potentially toxic sub-

stances which would produce no harm to a normal non-

pregnant women be harmful to a normally pregnant wo-

man? A. Not to the patient herself, no.

Q. Would jobs involving exposure to various kinds of

radiation and toxic matter be potentially harmful to the

unborn child? A. Yes. It would also be harmful to

the patient.

Q. They would be harmful to the patient? A.

Yes, sure. There is not anything that is going to harm

the fetus that does not have some adverse effect on the

patient.

Q. Don’t the physical limitations of normal pregnancy

tend to increase the risk of accident in certain jobs as

pregnancy progresses? A. I would not say so in the

jobs with which I am familiar, which my patients occupy,

which my patients hold.

Q. What about a woman in a job involving climbing

up and down telephone poles or in and out of manholes

or visiting and making installations on outside premises as

pregnancy progresses, as weight increases, as normal agil-

ity is affected by the weight carried by the pregnant wom-

an, is it likely that accident risk would be increased?

A. Well, for the specific occupations that you mentioned

I am sure that would be true, but I just don’t happen to

know any telephone pole climbers who are pregnant and

I don’t think you do, either.

Q. Well, those questions I asked you, Doctor, were

from the medical viewpoint. Let me ask you from the

perspective of industrial efficiency as to your comments

that I previously quoted. Can’t a women feel capable of

working and yet be inadequate or inefficient in attempting

to do so? A. I don’t think any more than a non-

pregnar.: patient. I think the pregnancy is not a factor.

2023

2024

2025

786

Q. Doctor, when your colleague, Dr. Hellegers was

here, he made reference to an article by a Dr. R. W.

Biddle in the January 1970 Journal of Medicine, entitled

“Gravid Women at Work.” Are you familiar with that

article, Doctor? A. I am.

Q. Would you agree with the following statement from

that article, Doctor, and I quote from the first page of

the reprint which Mr. Copus made available to us: “Preg-

nancy may affect both the ability and capacity of gravid

women to work efficiently; working may affect the preg-

nancy as well.”

Would you agree with that statement, Doctor? A.

Not entirely, no.

Q. To what extent do you disagree with that? A.

Would you read it again? I remember having read that

and thinking that was too broad a statement.

MRS. POTTER: Perhaps it would be helpful if the

Doctor could look at the article. ;

MR. LEVY: Do you have a copy? My copy is mark-

ed up.

THE WITNESS: As a broad generalization, I guess you

would have to say that that isn’t incorrect. I think it is

too broad a general statement.

BY MR. LEVY:

Q. At the top of the right-hand column of the second

page of the reprint supplied by Mr. Copus is the follow-

ing statement, Doctor, It is a separate paragraph, and I

quote: “Hyperemesis gravidarium,. urinary frequency,

symptoms of pressure, constipation, excess vaginal dis-

charge, and fetal activity might militate against efficiency

at work.”

Would you agree with that statement?

would not agree with that.

Q. What is your basis for your disagreement, Doctor?

A. No, I

2026

187

A. The basis for my disagreement is that very few pa-

tients have any or all of those symptoms. I mean, every

gal that gets pregnant does not get morning sickness which

is what you read from hyperemesis.

Q. I thought that was a strain of gladiola.

women wish that it were.

No, I was rather surprised at Dr. Biddle, whom I hap-

pen to know, let his name be put on that article. In fact,

I think that he is an obstetrician and gynecologist in prac-

tice and to the best of my knowledge he is not an indus-

trial, or I would say commercial obstetrician and I won-

dered where he got that and why he would make such a

statemeni because I personally don’t agree with it.

Now, I would agree that if someone had a severe morn-

ing sickness she obviously is not as efficient but I person-

ally don’t know of any patient who had quit her job be-

cause she had moming sickness.

The other things in the article, I mean constipation is

not peculiar to pregnancy in the average female.

Q. Doctor, of course, the quote did not talk about

these reasons for quitting work. The quote was framed

in terms of these several factors listed, ““may mitigate

A. Some

against efficiency at work.”

Perhaps you misunderstood it when I read it. Would

you agree that these are factors which if they obtain in

a given pregnant woman may militate against her efficien-

cy at work? A. In a very broad generalization, but

it applies to very few women who are pregnant as individ-

uals.

Q. The last quote from the article that I would like to

read to you, Doctor, and ask your views on is the follow-

ing, and it is from the bottom of the left-hand column,

top of the right-hand column of the fifth page of the

1027

788

reprint supplied by Mr. Copus: “In many pregnant

women their capacity for work is affected by increased

weight, change in posture and physiologic changes in the

urinary tract and cardiovascular system. Fatigue may pre-

dispose to instability of the nervous system and to poor

food intake leading to anemia. Complications of pregnan-

cy are seldom affected by work itself unless the patient

works with dust, certain kinds of chemicals or with lab-

Oratory viruses. On the contrary, pregnancy may decrease

efficiency of concentration and alertness.”

Would you agree with that statement, Doctor?

Perhaps you would like to see it. I know there were a

number of thoughts in it. A. Well, again, that is a

very broad generalization. On the other hand, I don’t

think there would be very many women who think that

they are mentally less alert because they are pregnant. I

doubt if you sampled any large number of women that

they would agree with that. Women do not complain of

that as a problem of pregnancy.

Q. Were you familiar with the work that farm women

did years back? A. Yes.

Q. And still do, presumably. A. Yes.

Q. And were their tasks physically demanding? “° A.

Yes, I would say that the average woman on a farm works

pretty hard.

Q. And did they stop working hard when they were

pregnant? A. Not to the best of my knowledge, no.

Q. Would not their tasks demand lifting and bending

and stretching and many other types of physical strains?

A. I think that the average farm woman today probably

does pretty much the same type of work when she is

2030

1/89

pregnant that she does when she is not pregnant. I am

sure there is very little limitation of their ability to do

things.

Q. All right. A. My whole philosphy is that a

pregnant patient can to a great extent adjust her own

life as to her ability to adapt to different situations, and

I think that, if I may enlarge upon that, that telling

somebody that when you are 28 weeks pregnant, for

example, for in that article that Mr. Levy quoted one of

the companies saying that women had to quit work when

they were 12 weeks pregnant, first of all nobody knows

it so that in itself is foolish. I think to tell any patient

that when she is 28 weeks pregnant you automatically

have to quit, say, teaching school or working in an office,

or doing some secretary type of labor, there is no physi-

ologic justification for it.

Q. Or even a physical type of labor, would you in-

clude that in it, too? We just discussed the farm woman.

A. Well, physical to the point of within her own capac-

ity.

Q. Well, then, I gather from your testimony what you

are suggesting is that instead of a company trying to set

down ground rules as to one woman must desist from

physical activity that you think it is an adequate gauge

to allow the woman herself t~ decide when she could not

carry out certain tasks? A. I think the average wom-

an does that. I don’t have in mind — my principal con-

cern through the years has been the school teachers be-

cause I just don’t see any reason why a woman cannot

teach school pregnant as well as she can teach school

unpregnant and that has been the basis of my contention

through the years.

Q. Do you think that many of the restrictions on

pregnant women are just a reflection of our cultural

790

mores rather than physical necessity? A. Yes, I

think that they are too arbitrary and again without physi-

ologic background.

MR. JUNTILLA: All right. Thank you, Doctor.

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 31 - FCC Staff Exhibit 36 (list of

questions to be asked of company witnesses) dated

November 24, 1972, in the Matter of Petitions

filed by the EEOC, et al., FCC Docket No. 19143

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Docket No.: 19143 Exhibit No.: 36

Presented by: FCC Staff

Identified x

Disposition Received x

Rejected

Reporter: BRM

Date: 11-29-72

Mr. Harold Levy, Esquire

AT&T

195 Broadway

New York, New York 10007

Dear Mr. Levy:

As promised, you will find herein a list of questions in-

tended to be asked all company witnesses. The witness-

es scheduled to appear November 27, 1972 through De-

cember 1, 1972 will be asked these questions orally.

Company witnesses thereafter are requested to respond

in writing if they can.

791

You will note that all the questions below are the same

as those asked of Therese Pick, with the exception of

questions regarding “‘the Bridge.”

1.

26.

For non-management employees does continuity

of service determine eligibility for:

a. Pension credit?

b. Wage progression credit?

c. Sickness disability benefits?

For management employees does continuity of

service determine eligibility for;

a. Pension credit?

b. Wage progression credit?

c. Sickness disability benefits?

a. Are benefits accompanying personal leaves

administered differently depending on the

length of leave?

b. Are personal leaves divided into categories

by length? What are those categories (i.e.,

leaves of one month or less and leaves of

more than one month)?

Are non-management employees on maternity

leave eligible for sickness disability benefits?

Answer the same question for management em-

ployees.

Mr. Harold Levy, Esquire

34.

Specify whether your answers would be dif-

ferent for married and unmarried females in

792

questions 6-16, 16-21, 26, 28, 30, and, 31-33.

I apologize for the delay in sending you these questions.

Sincerely,

Giovanna H. Longo

Counsel

cc: Frederick W. Denniston, Administrative Law Judge

Federal Communications Commission

1919 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20554

David A. Copus, Esquire

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

1800 G Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20506

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 32 - EEOC “Request for Statistics,

Received 4/13/71, In Matter of Petitions filed by

EEOC, et al., FCC Docket 19143.

211 East 35th Street

New York, New York 10016

April 8, 1971

Honorable Jacob K. Javits

United States Senate

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Javits:

—

793

I have just reviewed the discovery request propounded by

EEOC to AT&T which is now being considered in FCC

Docket No. 19143. (Copy attached.) I am certain you

will agree that providing the information requested by

EEOC is a horrendous undertaking, and I would guess

that just gathering this material will cost the Bell System

somewhere in the area of $1,000,000.

I also happen to be a customer of New York Telephone

which, as you know, has serious service problems. AT&T

may not have a perfect record in satisfying the insatiable

demands of EEOC, but I for one would much prefer that

such funds be spent on plant and equipment leading to

improved service,

EEOC is seeking enforcement powers similar to the NLRB.

It is obvious from this demand and other EEOC activities

that they are incapable of objectivity. I therefore urge

that you deny them additional powers.

Very truly yours,

/s/ JAMES R. THOMPSON

James R. Thompson

JIRT:tg

Attachment

cc: Mr. Ben F. Waple

794

REQUESTS FOR STATISTICS

For the thirty SMSA’s designated by EEOC: give sex and

ethnic composition as of December 31, 1970, by EEO-1

job categories, job titles and departments.

27.

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

For each company: each collective bargaining agree-

ment (including supplements) which was in effect

January 1, 1960 and January 1, 1971.

For thirty cities: current job descriptions for all

job classifications, including both management and

non-management jobs.

For each current EEO-1 reporting unit, EEO-1 report

as of December 31, 1970.

For thirty cities: for the thirteenth day of each

month in the periods January 1968 - December 1968

and January 1970 - December 1970, copies of all

classified ads, with specification of date, media, and

column heading.

For each company: for the period July 1, 1964, to

the present, copies of all internal memoranda relating

to company policy conerning equal employment and

advertising.

For each company: if a married woman takes

maternity leave:

(a) what is length of leave she may take?

(b) does she have written reassurance of employ-

ment?

795

(c) is she eligible for benefits during leave, under

the Employees Pension Disability Benefits and

Death Benefits plan?

(d) is maternity leave compulsory as of any given

time?

28. For each company: same as No. 27 for unmarried

women who take maternity leave.

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 33 - Motion of EEOC to Terminate

FCC Proceedings.

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20554

In the Matter of

Petitions filed by the

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

(EEOC) et al.

DOCKiT NO. 19143

ee i

MOTION TO TERMINATE PROCEEDINGS

(To be Acted Upon by the Commission)

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC), respectfully requests that Docket No. 19143 be

terminated and that its complaint therein dismissed. In

support whereof it is stated as follows:

1. On December 10, 1970, the EEOC filed a “Petition

796

for Intervention” in Docket No. 19129 wherein it oppos-

ed proposed revisions in tariffs filed by AT&T providing

for increases in rates for long distance message telephone

service. In its Petitition, the EEOC alleged that AT&T

and the Bell companies engaged in systemwide discrimina-

tion in employment against women, blacks, Spanish-sur-

named Americans, and other minorities in violation of the

Communications Act of 1934, the Commission’s Rules

and Regulations, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, the Civi! Rights Act of 1866, the Equal Pay Act

of 1963, Executive Order No. 11246, and the fair em-

ployment practices acts of numerous states and cities.

The Commission in a Memorandum Opinion and Order

released January 21, 1971, rejected the EEOC’s request

that these allegations be considered in the context of

Docket No. 19129. However, it set the EEOC charges

for separate hearing in Docket No. 19143 on the basis

that “‘the filing by the EEOC clearly alleges ‘a general

pattern of disregard of equal employment practices’ pur-

suant to [the Commission’s] Rules.” 27 F.C.C.2d 309,

311 (1971).

2. American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T)

and its associated operating telephone companies (Be‘l

companies) denied the charges of the EEOC and the other

complaining parties and presented testimony showing the

progress that had been made in the Bell System in the

hiring and promotion of women and minorities.

3. Since the institution of this proceeding, AT&T and

the Bell companies have made a number of changes in

their recruiting, hiring, job placement, promotion and

transfer practices which should result in greater oppor-

tunities for women and minorities. Also AT&T and the

797

Bell companies have adopted new Affirmative Action

Programs which contain specific goals and timetables for

women and minorities in major job categories. These

plans, in conjunction with new Upgrading and Transfer

Plans which AT&T and the Bell companies have also

adopted, should further accelerate the progress Bell is

making in an effective utilization of women and minori-

ties in all job categories and at all levels.

4. For the past several months extensive negotiations

have been engaged in by the EEOC, the U.S. Department

of Labor and AT&T, on behalf of itself and the Bell

companies, for the purpose of resolving many of the re-

maining controversies between the parties. These nego-

tiations have resulted in an Agreement signed by repre-

sentatives of AT&T and the Bell companies, EEOC and

the U.S. Department of Labor, a copy of which is attach-

ed hereto as Exhibit A. By the terms of this Agreement

the Bell companies have agreed to establish and make a

good faith effort to reach revised goals for job classifica-

tions within each establishment where underutilization is

determined to exist. They have agreed to provide oppor-

tunities for transfer or advancement for female and mi-

nority employees in particular job classifications and to

make pay adjustments both for the past and the fu‘ure.

5. The EEOC and the U.S. Department of Labor have

agreed that if AT&T and the Bell companies comply with

the terms of the Agreement, they will be in full compliance

with the laws and regulations governing equal employment

opportunity and equal pay for equal work which are

covered in the Agreement.

6. The Agreement further provides for securing the reso-

lution, to the extent feasible, of all pending litigation,

798

including this proceeding, coneming compliance by AT&T

and the Bell companies with all laws and regulations con-

cerning equal employment opportunity and equal pay for

equal work.

7. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner believes that the

goals of equal employment opportunity and equal pay for

equal work can best be achieved by the termination of

this proceeding. To the extent that any issues of com-

pliance of Bell companies with equal employment laws

remain unresolved, they can be more effectively dealt

with outside this proceeding.

WHEREFORE, EEOC requests that Docket No. 19143

be terminated and its complaint be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

/s/ DAVID COPUS

David Copus

Attorney

January 19, 1973

799

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 18th

day of January, 1973, among the American Telephone

and Telegraph Company, for itself and on behalf of its

associated telephone companies (hereinafter collectively

referred to as the Bell Companies),* the Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Commission, and the U.S. Department

of Labor,

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS there are certain currently outstanding equal

employment opportunity and equal pay for equal work

* American Telephone and Telegraph Company

New England Telephone and Telegraph Company

The Southern New England Telephone Company

New York Telephone Company

New Jersey Bell Telephone Company

The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania and The

Diamond State Telephone Company

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West

Virginia

Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company

South Central Bell Telephone Company

The Ohio Bell Telephone Company

Cincinnati Bell Inc.

Michigan Bell Telephone Company

Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated

Wisconsin Telephone Company

Illinois Bell Telephone Company

Northwestern Bell Telephone Company

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company

The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company

Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company

The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company and

Bell Telephone Company of Nevada

800

issues which are the subject of Equal Employment Oppor-

tunity Commission (EEOC) charges, government contract

compliance reviews or pending litigation or investigations

involving the Bell Companies, and

WHEREAS the Bell Companies deny that they have

engaged in any discriminatory employment practices which

constitute violations of federal laws, regulations or Execu-

tive Orders, and

WHEREAS the undersigned parties desire to resolve

the aforesaid equal employment opportunity and equal

pay for equal work issues and to assure the Bell Com-

panies’ compliance with applicable equal employment

opportunity and equal pay for equal work laws and

regulations with respect to such issues,

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants

herein expressed, it is mutually agreed as follows:

PART A

I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS

The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC)

of the Department of Labor accepts, as consistent with

the requirements of Revised Order No. 4, the American

Telephone and Telegraph Company’s (AT&T’s) Model

Affirmative Action Program, Upgrading and Transfer Plan,

and Job Briefs and Qualifications, attached hereto as

Exhibits A, B and C, respectively (said three exhibits

being referred to herein as the “Model Programs”),

subject to the clarifications and amplifications contained

in this Agreement. The OFCC agrees that subject to the

clarifications and amplifications contained herein, such

Model Programs, if adopted and implemented without

material deviation by individual Bell Companies for each

of their respective establishments, shall be considered as

complying with the requirements of Revised Order No. 4.

801

EEOC agrees that such Model Programs, as clarified and

amplified herein, constitute a “bona fide seniority or

merit system” within the meaning of Section 703(h) of

Title VII and that employment decisions made in con-

formity with such Programs will comply with Title VII.

Provided, however, that all individual Company programs

embodying material deviations from such Model Programs

and any material revisions of such programs resulting from

the annual reviews thereof will be submitted to the OFCC

and the EEOC prior to i: slemeritation by any Bell Com-

pany. Such programs shall be deemed accepted unless

disapproved by the OFCC within 45 days from the date

of submission, consistent with Section 718 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 as amended.

Il. GOALS AND TIMETABLES

A utilization analysis of each of the fifteen (15) Affirma-

tive Action Program Job Classifications as defined in Sec-

tion IV of the Model AAP (Exhibit A hereto) within each

establishment will be conducted pursuant to 41 C.F.R.

§60-2.11. For those job classifications wherein there

exists a substantial salary range, such analysis shall speci-

fically include reference to the relative distribution of

minorities and women within such salary range. Each

factor in 41 C.F.R. §60-2.11(a)(1) and (2) for which

accurate and relevant data are available shall be considered.

A goal will be developed for each of the 15 AAP job

Classifications within each establishment where under-

utilization is determined to exist pursuant to 41 C.F.R.

§60-2.12. In a good faith effort to meet such goals,

each Bell Company will establish intermediate targets for

one, two and three-year time frames. At the end of

each intermediate three-year time frame, the goal for

each classification for which a goal has been set will be

re-evaluated to determine whether underutilization still

802

exists, and the goals for each job classification will be

adjusted or eliminated as appropriate. All goals and all

intermediate targets and time frames for each Company

and each establishment must be individually approved by

the OFCC, and shall be submitted for approval to the

OFCC within 120 days from the date of this Agreement,

together with the relevant utilization analysis, including

worksheets. Such goals, intermediate targets and time

frames shall be deemed approved unless disapproved by

the OFCC within 90 days of their submission, notwith-

standing Section 718 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended. Worksheets shall include that portion of

the goal which each establishment will make a good

faith effort to achieve as intermediate targets — within

stated time frames.

The foregoing utilization analysis, goals, intermediate

targets, and time frames shall also by developed for males

in the operator and clerical classifications as part of

each Bell Company’s program.

All goals and all intermediate targets and time frames,

as approved by the OFCC, and as adjusted at the end

of each intermediate time frame will promptly be sub-

mitted by each Bell Company to the appropriate collective

bargaining representative of its employees.

Ill. TRANSFER, PROMOTION, LAYOFF AND RECALL

A. Each Bell Company agrees to offer each of its

female and minority employees, in nonmanagement, non-

craft jobs, who had four or more years of net credited

service on July 1, 1971, and who expresses a desire for

transfer as required by the appropriate upgrading and

transfer plan or posting and bidding system to a job in

AAP job classification 9 or 10, an opportunity to com-

pete therefor with other employees on the basis of net

303

credited service and basic qualifications, as set forth in

Exhibit C, if females or minorities currently are under-

utilized in such AAP job classification 9 or 10 and such

employee is a member of the group which is under-

utilized. For purposes of this Agreement, “net credited

service”’ shall mean total length of service with the opera-

ting company in which the vacancy occurs. Provided,

however, that total length of service within the Bell Sys-

tem shall continue to be used for other purposes, including

bridging rights, consistent with the provisions of the

applicable Bell Company’s collective bargaining agreement(s).

Provided further, each Bell Company and each collec-

tive bargaining representative of their employees shall be

free to bargain to expand this definition of net credited

service, for purposes of this Agreement, to mean total

length of service with the Bell System.*

Where the term net credited service is presently defined

in applicable collective bargaining agreements as length of

service greater than that of the company into which the

employee was last hired, definition of that term shall be

unaffected by this paragraph.

B. In filling vacancies in AAP job classifications 6 and

7, candidates for promotion shall be evaluated on tlie

basis of net credited service and best qualified, unless a

lower standard of qualification is provided in a collective

bargaining agreement or pursuant to Bell Company prac-

tices. However, if any Bell Company is unable to meet

its intermediate targets within the stated time frames

using these criteria, it will use only the criteria of net

* Employees returning from maternity leave do not have their

service broken (absence in excess of 30 days will be deducted

from net credited service).

804

credited service and a basic qualified criterion and, if

necessary, will seek new hires who meet at least the

basic qualified criterion. Efforts to achieve intermediate

targets should be substantially uniform throughout the

appropriate time frame. Each Bell Company agrees to

notify the appropriate collective bargaining representative

of its employees prior to promoting or transferring persons

into AAP job classifications 6 and 7 on the basic of net

credited service and basic qualifications.

C. Net credited service shall be used for determining

layoff and related force adjustments and recall to jobs

where nonmanagement female and minority employees

would otherwise be laid off, affected or not recalled.

Collective bargaining agreements or Bell Company prac-

tices shall govern the confines of the group of employees

being considered. Provided, however, vacancies created

by layoff and related force adjustments shall not be

considered vacancies for purposes of transfer and promo-

tion under this Section.

D. Minimum residency (time in title) requirements

shall not be greater than the following, in the major job

titles noted below:

1. Clerical; six-twelve months time in title;

2. Operator, six-twelve months time in title;

3. Service Representative, fifteen-eighteen months

time in title;

4. Lower and Middle Craft, fifteen-eighteen months

time in title;

5. Top Craft (Switchman, PBX Installer, PBX Repair-

man, Toll Test man, etc.) twenty-four - thirty

months time in title.

Collective bargaining agreements or company practices

which provide lower minimum residency requirements than

those outlined above shall continue in effect.

805

IV. EMPLOYEE INFORMATION PROGRAM

A. Each Bell Company agrees to inform its employees

who are affected by the provisions of this Agreement, and

the appropriate collective bargaining representatives of its

employees of the terms thereof in a manner approved by

AT&T, EEOC and OFCC.

B. Each Bell Company will, with respect to each

of its transfer bureaus, provide a quarterly notice to

non-management employees served by such transfer

bureau and to any collective bargaining representative

representing such employees of the projected number

of job opportunities by the major job titles (e.g., installer,

lineman) set forth in the Job Briefs contained in Exhibit

C hereto, in his or her transfer bureau for the balance of

the calendar year and the number of jobs filled during

the previous quarter by net credited service date, date of

transfer, job title, EEO-1 minority designation, sex, and

last previous job assignment.

V. TESTING

Each Bell Company reserves the right to utilize test

scores on validated tests along with other job-related con-

siderations in assessing individual qualifications. However,

each Bell Company agrees that it shall not rely upon the

minimum scores required or preferred on its pre-employ-

ment aptitude test batteries as justification for its failure

to meet its intermediate targets for any job classification.

VI. PROMOTION PAY PLAN

Each empioyee promoted from one nonmanagement job

to another with a higher basic maximum rate of pay, shall

have his or her rate of pay in the higher rated job deter-

mined as follows:

806

The employee shall be placed on the step

of the new wage table as determined by allow-

ing the employee full wage experience credit,

both in progression and at maximum, on the

old wage table, but shortened in 1970 or 1971

collective bargaining, then the wage experience

credit allowance shall be used.

. Current promotion pay practices which provide

more favorable treatment than the procedure

outlined above shall continue in effect.

. Modification of Plan for Promotion from Sim-

ple to Complex Line Assigning

Employees who have work experience in

simple plant line assigning (not including

clerks whose duties do not require that they

use cable books to locate available cable pairs)

and are promoted to complex line assigning

(Top or Second Craft) will be treated as

follows:

a. Those with over four years of wage ex-

perience credit or net credited service (as

provided in note 3 above), at least one

year of which is simple plant line assign-

ing experience, upon promotion will re-

ceive wage experience credit on the new

wage schedule equal to their wage ex-

perience credit or their net credited

service (as provided in note 3 above).

b. Employees to whom paragraph (a) is not

applicable will be accorded promotion pay

under the basic promotion pay plan de-

scribed above.

807

Vil. COLLEGE GRADUATE FEMALES HIRED

DIRECTLY INTO MANAGEMENT

In each Bell Company (other than Cincinnati Bell Inc.,

which did not have an Initial Management Development

Program (IMDP) at any time between July 2, 1965, and

December 31, 1971, and The Bell Telephone Company

of Pennsylvania, which has heretofore satisfactorily re-

solved issues respecting female college graduate manage-

ment hires):

A. Four-year college graduate female employees hired

directly into management other than IMDP between July

2, 1965, and December 31, 1971, with the exception of

those thereafter placed in IMDP or who were offered

placement in IMDP and declined, will be surveyed to

determine their interest in promotion to District level

(third level) and above management positions. Provided,

however, that any Bell Company may during the thirty-

day period following execution of this Agreement and

entry of the decree provided for in Part C., Section I.A.,

present to the EEOC and OFCC data indicating that an

IMDP program was not underutilizing women during any

year or years between July 2, 1965, and December 31,

1971. Upon presenting such data, this Section VII shall

be inapplicable to four-year college graduate women hired

directly into management for those years during which

underutilization did not exist in the IMPD program in

question. For purposes of this paragraph only, an ab-

sence of underutilization shall mean 25% of all enrollees

in an IMDP program. The parties agree that failing agree-

ment as to whether an IMDP program or an individual

should be excluded from the application of this Section

such determination shall be submitted to the Court for

final and binding adjudication under the decree.

808

B. Those employees who are found to be interested

will be scheduled for a two-to-three day assessment at a

management center to evaluate their potential for promo-

tion to District level. This assessment will be conducted

under procedures outlined by AT&T and will be completed

to the extent possible within twelve months of the date

of the execution of this Agreement. Those employees

assessed as satisfactory and who are below second level

will be candidates for promotion .to second level as

vacancies occur and will be added to the District level

potential list. Those employees assessed as satisfactory

and who are at second level at the date of assessment

will be candidates for promotion to District level as

vacancies occur. Prior to promotion, both these second

level and below second level employees may be reassigned

for further developmental experience preparatory to

promotion.

C. AT&T agrees to provide the EEOC and OFCC with

descriptions of the criteria employed in making such assess-

ments and on request will provide data at reasonable inter-

vals on the number of persons evaluated and rated satis-

factory; provided, however, the foregoing assessment pro-

cedure may not be relied upon as a defense by any indi-

vidual Bell Company for its failure to reach the inter-

mediate targets for those job classifications for which such

procedures are used.

D. Those employees evaluated under paragraphs A and

B of this Section VII. who do not receive a satisfactory

rating will return to their current assignments and their

assessment rating will not be entered into their permanent

personnel file.

809

Vill. PAY ADJUSTMENTS

A. Nonmanagement Jobs.

Employees promoted prior to January 1, 1973,

will have their rate of pay adjusted as of the first pay

period after January 1, 1973, to the rate they would have

achieved if the promotion pay plan described in Section VI

above had been ii effect at the time of their promotion.

B. Craft Jobs Only.

1. In recognition of alleged claims of possible dis-

Crimination in compensation:

a. Except for Switchroom Helpers at

Michigan Bell Telephone Company (Michigan

Bell), back wages shall be accorded those

female employees who were resident in AAP

job classifications 6, 7, 9 and 10 at any time

during the period January 1, 1971, to

December 31, 1972, as follows:

Each such employee shall be paid an

amount equal to the difference between the

amount which was paid to her under the

promotion pay plan in effect at that time,

and that which would have been paid to

her during the period from January 1, 1971,

to December 31, 1972, had the promotion

pay plan described in Section VI above been

in effect at the time of her promotion and

for the period of time such employee was

resident in a position in AAP job classifice-

tions 6, 7, 9 or 10.

b. In order to bring the minimum and maximum

rate of pay of Switchroom Helpers at Michigan

Bell into the range for the Frameman job in other

Bell Companies, the rates for such job will be in-

creased by means of the following formula to be

Zone |

Zone 2

Zone 3

Zone 4

810

effective the beginning of the first pay period

following January 1, 1973.

Present Present Proposed Proposed

Minimum Minimum Minimum Minimum

Rate Rate Rate Rate

$124.50 $157.00 $127.50 $169.50

117.00 $153.50 119.00 166.00

111.00 151.00 113.50 161.50

109.00 149.50 111.50 159.00

Michigan Bell will establish new wage sched-

ules similar to those in effect for the Frame-

man job in other Bell Companies to reflect

these minimum and maximum rates of pay.

Michigan Bell will pay to Switchroom

Helpers who were so classified during any

part of the period from January 1, 1971,

to December 31, 1972, the difference be-

tween what they earned had the wage sched-

ule set forth in the columns “Present Maxi-

mum Rate” and “Present Minimum Rate”’

been in effect during the period January |

1971, to December 31, 1972, and what

they would have earned had the wage sched-

ules been those set forth in the columns

“Proposed Maximum Rate” and “Proposed

Minimum Rate.”

2. In recognition of alleged claims of possible

delay in promotion in nonmanagement jobs because of

discrimination, lump sum payments shall be made to.

each female and minority employee in each establishment

where there exists in his or her respective job classifica-

tion an underutilization of the group of which he or she

is a member, who meets the following criteria:

&11

a. had four or more years’ net credited

service on July 1, 1971;

b. has been or will be promoted from non-

management, noncraft jobs into AAP job

classifications 6, 7, 9 and 10 subsequent to

June 30, 1971, and prior to July 1, 1974:

and

c. remains in that job or another job in AAP

job classifications 6, 7, 9 and 10 for a total

of more than six months.

Those employees meeting the criteria listed

in a), b) and c) will receive lump sum pay-

ments in accordance with the following schedule

(it being understood that a female minority

employee shall be entitled to receive only

one lump sum payment).

PROMOTION DATE PAYMENT

7/1/71 through 12/31/71 $ 100

1/1/72 through 12/31/72 200

1/1/73 through 12/31/73 300

1/1/74 through 6/30/74 400

In the event that on July 1, 1974, at least

ten thousand (10,000) employees have not re-

ceived payments pursuant to this Section VIII.B.(2),

the Bell Companies will extend the date until

10,000 employees have been paid. All payments

after July 1, 1974, shall be at the rate of $400.

Management Jobs.

Those employees who are assessed as satisfactory

pursuant to Section VII above will have their salary in-

creased $100 per month as of their assessment date or

September 1, 1973, whichever is earlier.

812

D. Limitation on Recovery

No individual who has received back pay and/or

individual relief under a prior settlement agreement, con-

ciliation, or consent decree shall be elibigle to receive

back pay or individual relief with respect to the same

claim of discrimination as a result of this Agreement.

PART B

I. PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING EEOC CHARGES

A. It is the intent of the parties that, to the extent

feasible, all charges of employment discrimination under

Title VII will be resolved in a manner consistent with

the principles set forth in this Agreement and the Decree

provided for in Part C, Section I.A. To this end, upon

the execution of this Agreement, the EEOC will:

1) Assert jurisdiction over all matters which have

have been pending before state or local agencies

designated as deferral agencies pursuant to Section

706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, for more than the minimum deferral

period and which have been the subject of charges

filed with the EEOC.

2) With respect to charges on which “notice of

right to sue”’ letters have been issued within the

90 days immediately preceding the date of this

Agreement, or may be issued subsequent thereto,

contact the charging parties, through their attorneys

or otherwise, and urge them to agree to a settlement

consistent with the principles set forth in the Agree-

ment and Decree.

813

B. In order to facilitate conciliation of charges filed

with the EEOC during the life of the Decree provided

for in Part C., Section I.A.:

1) Beginning within 60 days from the date of

this Agreement and weekly thereafter, EEOC

will provide AT&T with copies of all charges not

yet served on Bell Companies and with separate

lists for each Bell Company of all charges (a)

pending, (b) settled, (c) administratively closed,

and (d) in which notices of right to sue have been

issued.

2) Beginning within 60 days from the date of

this Agreement, AT&T or the Bell Company involved

will supply EEOC with proposals for settling charges

which any individual Bell Company is prepared to

settle.

3) Beginning within 60 days after such proposal is

submitted to EEOC, AT&T or the Bell Company in-

volved and EEOC will seek to resolve through con-

ciliation any charge for which a settlement has been

proposed.

C. The EEOC and Department of Labor further agree:

1) That they will not, in any claim, action or pro-

ceeding (including rate cases), involving any of the

Bell Companies, initiate encourage, fund, intervene

in support of or advocate by amicus brief or other-

wise, a position inconsistent with the Agreement

or the Decree.

2) That EEOC will advise its Regional and District

offices, as well as state and local agency grantees,

and the Department of Labor will advise its Regional

and District offices and contract compliance agencies,

that the Decree will bring the Bell Companies into

compliance with Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, an:

814

Executive Order 11246 requirements as to the issues

identified in the Decree and that, to the limit of

EEOC’s contractual power to insure such a result,

such Companies shall not be the subject of enforce-

ment programs funded by EEOC, as to the matters

covered therein.

3) That any actions taken by EEOC Regional or

District offices or Department of Labor Regional or

District offices or OFCC field offices which any Bell

Company believes to be inconsistent with the terms

of the Agreement or Decree may be brought to the

attention of the national headquarters of the EEOC,

Department of Labor, or OFCC, as appropriate

and such national headquarters shall become the par-

ty with whom such Bell Company may resolve such

compliance issues.

II. PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING EQUAL PAY

AND CONTRACT COMPLIANCE QUESTIONS

It is the intent of the parties that, to the extent feasi-

ble, all questions of the Bell Companies’ further compli-

ance with the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Executive Or-

der 11246 will be resolved without the need for adminis-

trative proceedings or litigation. The parties also agree

that should the Department of Labor or the designated

compliance agency conclude that a Bell Company is vio-

lating the Equal Pay Act or the Executive Order and that

it is unable to resolve such matter with that Company it

will inform AT&T and give the latter 30 days in which

to seek a resolution of such matter.

II]. SETTLEMENT OF PENDING LITIGATION

It is the intent of the parties to secure the resolution,

to the extent feasible, of all outstanding employment

$15

discrimination cases involving each Bell Company’s com-

pliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, and

the Equal Pay Act of 1963, consistent with the principles

set forth in this Agreement and the Decree.

A. The Michigan Bell case will be settled by a stipula-

tion of dismissal. Michigan Bell will be a party to this

agreement, provided that the statute of limitations cutoff

date in that case shall be used for the calculation of back

wages for Michigan Bell craftswomen.

B. In cooperation with the Department of Labor, AT

&T will use its best efforts to achieve a settlement in the

New England Telephone and Telegraph Company case.

C. Each Bell Company further agrees that within 90

days after the execution of this Agreement, it will advise

the EEOC of those cases which it believes can be resolved

in whole or in part consistent with the terms set forth in

the Agreement and Decree. If requested by all parties to

such a case, EEOC will offer conciliation services to faci-

litate such a resolution.

PART C

I. CONSENT DECREE

A. The provisions of this agreement shall not become

effective until such time as they are embodied in the Con-

sent Decree attached hereto to be entered simultaneously

with the execution of this Agreement in a United States

district court, designated by the parties, originating in an

action brought by the EEOC pursuant to Sections 706(f)

and 707(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seqg., by the Secretary

of Labor under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Section 6(d)

of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29

816

U.S.C. §206(d), and by the United States pursuant to Ex-

ecutive Order 11246, as amended.

Such Decree shall provide for the retention of jurisdic-

tion by the Court to enter such orders as are necessary

to effectuate the provisions of the Agreement and shall

state that the life of the Decree shall be limited to six

years, except that as to the issues in Part A, Sections VI,

and VIII the Decree shall provide that the Bell Compa-

nies are permanently enjoined from violating the Equal

Pay Act. Provided that AT&T and each Bell Company

retains its right to move for dissolution or modification

of the Decree as to such Company. Provided further,

that should either opinion letter, provided for in Part C,

Section II of this Agreement or any portion of such

letters be withdrawn or overruled, the Bell Company af-

fected by such withdrawal or overruling may move the

Court to dissolve any portion of the Decree which in-

volves the issue or issues with respect to which the opin-

ion letter has been withdrawn or modified, and to strike

any portion of the pleadings in this action relevant there-

to, and such motion shall be granted.

B. By entering into this Agreement and accepting the

Consent Decree referred to in Part C, Section I.A., the

Bell Companies do not make any admission that they

have engaged in any discriminatory employment practices

or other practices which constitute violations of the Fed-

eral laws, regulations or Executive Orders set forth in Part

C, Section I.A.

II. OPINION LETTERS

Pursuant to this Agreement, and simultaneous with its

execution, the Wage and Hour Administrator of the De-

partment of Labor, in conformity with the requirements

of 29 C.F.R. 8790.13 and 790.17, shall issue an opinion

317

letter dealing with the pay practices set forth in Part A,

Sections VI and VII, as respects compliance with the pro-

visions of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. In addition, the

General Counsel of EEOC, in conformity with the require-

ments of Section 713(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, and 29 C.F.R. 8 1601.28-1601.30, shall is-

sue an opinion letier dealing with the employment prac-

tices set forth in Part A, Sections III, IV, VI, and VIII,

as respects compliance with the provisions of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

Il. DURATION OF AGREEMENT —

DISMISSAL OF DOCKET NO. 19143

A. The provisions of this Agreement shall become ef-

fective upon the entry of the Decree provided for in Part

C., Section I.A. and shall terminate as to each Bell Com-

pany at the time that such Decree shall terminate as to

such Company.

B. It is the intent of the parties that this Agreement

shall result in the dismissal of Docket No. 19143 which

is presently pending before the Federal Communications

Commission (FCC). Upon the execution of this Agree-

ment, the EEOC will move for the dismissal of Docket

No. 19143. The EEOC will undertake to secure the con-

currence of all intervening parties, to such dismissal.

IV. INDIVIDUAL RELIEF

A. The payments or adjustments for individual relief

set forth in Part A, Section VIII of this Agreement, shall

not be made until such time as the opinion letters referred

to in Part C, Section I.C., have been issued, the Decree de-

scribed in Part C, Section I.A. has been entered and

Docket No. 19143 has been dismissed.

818

B. The Bell Companies may require that acceptance

by any person of individual relief pursuant to the terms

of Part A, Section VIII. shall constitute a waiver and re-

lease by such person of any claims for alleged violations

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. 81981, 1983, Executive Order 11246, or any

applicable state fair employment practice laws or regula-

tions based upon occurrences prior to the date of this

Agreement and the Decree, and such person shall sign a

waiver of such claims as a condition to receipt of such

individual relief.

V. COMPLIANCE PROCEDURE

A. As to the issues identified in the Decree provided

for in Part C., Section I.A., compliance with the terms

thereof resolves all questions of the Bell Companies’ com-

pliance, for acts or practices occurring prior to the date

of this Agreement, with the requirements of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the Equal Pay

Act of 1963, and Executive Order 11246. Moreover, com-

pliance with the terms of the Decree in the future will

constitute compliance with such laws, orders, and regula-

tions as respects those issues dealt with in the Decree.

B. The EEOC will make reasonable cause determina-

tions of charges filed against Bell Companies within the

life of the Decree and to the extent that they relate to

issues identified therein on the basis of whether or not

the practices complained of violate the terms of the De-

cree. In the event that the EEOC determines that there

is reasonable cause to believe that the Decree is being vio-

lated, it shall follow the compliance procedure as set forth

below.

C. The government plaintiffs shall endeavor to coordi-

nate their efforts to assure compliance with the Decree

819

and shall develop such procedures as may be appropriate

to this end.

D. The government will promptly notify the Bell Com-

pany involved and AT&T of any complaints of noncom-

pliance. Such Company will be given 60 days to investi-

gate the complaint and conciliate with the government re-

garding the appropriate corrective action to be taken. At

the end of this period, the government, if not satisfied

may seek an appropriate judicial resolution of the ques-

tion.

E. Each Bell Company is to be responsible for its com-

pliance with the terms of the Agreement or Decree. The

responsibility of AT&T, @Part from responsibility for the

compliance of its own departments, shall be limited to:

(1) in case of an irreconcilable conflict between the gov-

ernment and an individual Bell Company, to use its good

offices to aid in achieving a resolution of such conflict:

(2) the provision of advice to its associated telephone

companies as to the meaning of the Agreement or Decree

and procedures for compliance; (3) where appropriate, the

coordination of reports required by the terms of the Agree-

ment or Decree; and (4) the provision of assistance on the

development of the management assessment procedure pro-

vided in Part A. Section VII.

VI. REPORTING

A. EEOC and OFCC will each receive summaries of

the information compiled pursuant to Part A, Section

IV.B. by each Bell Company for each of the first two

full calendar quarters following the execution of this

Agreement and annually thereafter during the duration

of the Decree provided for in Part C, Section I.A. These

quarteriy and annual compilations will be forwarded in

duplicate within 45 days subsequent to the second

820

full calendar quarter following the execution of this

Agreement and within 45 days after the close of each

calendar year, respectively.

B. During the term of this Agreement or the Decree

provided for in Part C, Section I.A., except for the re-

quirements of 29 C.F.R. Part 516, the filing of EEO-1

reports and reports required pursuant to the equal em-

ployment rules of the Federal Communications Commis-

sion (FCC), 47 C.F.R. 81.815, 21.307, and 23.49, or such

other reports of general application which are hereaf-

ter promulgated by EEOC, FCC, or the Department of

Labor, the reports required by Part C, Section VI.A. of

the Agreement will be exclusive, and the Bell Companies

shall not be required to file any additional reports or, ex-

cept as noted below,* submit to any compliance reviews

with respect to obligations under the laws listed in Part

C., Section LA.

VII. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

This Agreement shall not be interpreted as requiring or

permitting the abandonment of any provision in any Bell

Company’s collective bargaining agreement(s) except as re-

quired to maintain compliance with Federal law, Execu-

tive Orders and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto

pertaining to discrimination in employment. The govern-

ment asserts that all of the Bell Companies’ obligations

in this Agreement are required for compliance with Fed-

eral law; provided, however, that nothing in this Agreement

* The above provision concerning compliance reviews shall not

apply to investigations of charges by the EEOC pursuant to Section

706(b) of Title VII and to investigations pursuant to Section 11(a)

of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

321

is intended to restrict the right of the Bell Companies and

the collective bargaining representatives of their employees

to negotiate alternatives to the provisions of this Agree-

ment which would also be in compliance with Federal law.

To the extent that any Bell Company has in effect, in

connection with the promotion and transfer of employees,

a posting and bidding system, or other system, said sys-

tem shall continue to be used. Provided, however, that

such system will be modified to the extent necessary to

conform with PART A, Section III of the Agreement.

Each Bell Company agrees that it will notify all appro-

priate collective bargaining representatives of the terms

of this Agreement and of its willingness to negotiate in

good faith concerning these terms.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused

this Agreement to be executed by their respective represen-

tatives on the day and year first above written.

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND

TELEGRAPH COMPANY, for itself

and on behalf of its associated tele-

phone companies as set forth herein.

By /s/ David Easlick

David Easlick, Vice President

THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-

TUNITY COMMISSION

By /s/ William H. Brown III

William H. Brown III, Chairman

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

By /s/ Richard F. Schubert

Richard F. Schubert, Solicitor

of Labor

822

/s/ William Kilberg

William Kilberg, Associate

Solicitor of Labor

/s/ Carin Ann Clauss

Carin Ann Clauss, Associate

Solicitor of Labor

G. E. EXHIBIT NO. 35

Complaint in Communication Workers of America,

AFL-CIO, et al., v. Illinois Bell Telephone Com-

pany, filed 4-13-73, in the Northern District of Il-

linois, Eastern Division, Case No. 73C-9599.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA,

AFL-CIO; ROSE MARIE BYARD and JEWEL

WHITE; individually and on behalf of all simi-

larly situated female employees of Dlinois Bell

Telephone Company,

Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION

<a NO. 73C 959

ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Defendant.

COMPLAINT

Now come Plaintiffs by their attorneys and complain

of Defendant as follows:

Count I

1. This is a class action authorized and instituted pur-

suant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

fi pea Crue A ”

823

U.S.C. 82000e et seq. as amended (hereinafter referred to

as “The Act’). Jurisdiction of the Court is invoked pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. 8'343(4), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f), 28

U.S.C. 2201 and 2202 and 42 U.S.C. $1981.

2. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and

on behalf of other persons similarly situated pursuant to

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class

which Plaintiffs represent is composed of females who are

employed or who were employed since July 2, 1965, but

are no longer employed, or who might be employed, by

Defendant Illinois Bell Telephone Company, an Illinois

corporation in their facilities or operations in Chicago, II-

linois and in other locations in the State of Illinois, who

have been, are, and who will or may be adversely affected

by the practices complained of herein. There are com-

mon questions of law and fact affecting the rights of the

members of this class who are and who continue to be

limited, classified, and discriminated against in ways which

deprive and tend to deprive them of equal employment

oppertunities and otherwise adversely affect their status

as employees and union members because of sex. These

persons are sO numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable. A common relief is sought, except as to

the amount of damages suffered by each individual mem-

ber of the class. The claims of the representative parties

are typical of the class; the interests of said class are ade-

quately represented by Plaintiffs. The questions of law

or fact common to the members of the class predominate

over any questions affecting only individual members. De-

fendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally

applicable to the class, and a class action is superior to

other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudi-

cation of the controversy.

3. This is a proceeding (a) for a declaratory judgment

824

as to the rights of the parties, (b) for a preliminary and

permanent injunction, restraining and enjoining Defendant

from maintaining a policy, practice, custom, or usage of

discriminating against Plaintiffs and other female members

of this class because of sex, including discrimination in

the treatment of female employees who are unable to work

or who are absent from work due to pregnancy or child-

birth or complications resulting therefrom as compared to

employees who are absent due to other forms of tempo-

rary disabilities, and such other forms of discrimination on

account of sex which are in violation of the Act, with re-

spect to compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment and limiting, segregating, and classifying em-

ployees of the Defendant, who are members of the class

described in paragraph 3 above in ways which deprive or

tend to deprive the individual Plaintiffs and other female

persons in this class of equal employment opportunities

and otherwise adversely affect their status as employees

because of sex, and (c) for monetary and other appropri-

ate relief.

4. Plaintiffs Rose Marie Byard and Jewel White are fe-

male citizens of the United States and are residents of

Chicago and other communities, in the State of Illinois.

Plaintiffs are or have been employed by the Defendant at

its various locations and operations in and around the City

of Chicago and in many other areas in the State of Illinois

5. Defendant Illinois Bell Telephone Company does busi-

ness in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois, and in many

other locations in the State of Illinois. It is engaged in

the installation, operation and maintenance of telephone

equipment and related types of communications equipment

and in the sale of various kinds of communications services,

and is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.

§2000e-(b) or (c) in that it is enaged in an industry affect-

825

ing commerce and employs many thousands of persons.

6. Plaintiff, Communications Workers of America, AFL-

CIO (hereinafter referred to as “C.W.A.”) is a person within

the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §2000e(a) and it is a labor organ-

ization within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 82000e(d) and (e)

in that it is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and

exists, in whole or in part, for the purpose of dealing with

employers, including the Defendant, concerning grievances,

labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, and other terms

or conditions of employment of the employees of the De-

fendant at its plants and other facilities in and around the

City of Chicago and elsewhere in the State of Illinois.

Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, has many

thousands of members, including many thousands of fe-

male members employed by the Defendant.

7. At all times since July 2, 1964, and continuing until

the present time, the Defendant has promulgated and main-

tained a policy, practice, custom, and usage made unlawful

by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

of limiting the employment opportunity of female em-

ployees of the Defendant because of sex, in that the De-

fendant has since the passage of the Act consistently dis-

Criminated against females as a class, including the indi-

vidual Plaintiffs, and the members of the class described

in paragraph 2 above, by failing to provide equal benefits,

rights and privileges to females under temporary disability

due to pregnancy or childbirth or complications result-

ing therefrom as are made available by the Defendant to

male employees under temporary disability. The discrimi-

natory policy, practice, custom and usage involve the com-

mencement and duration of leave, the availability of ex-

tensions, the _.crual of seniority and other benefits and

privileges, reinstatement, and payments under health or

disability insurance or sick leave plans, and other terms

826

or conditions of employment, concerning which the Plain-

tiffs and the class they represent suffer discriminatory

treatment by reason of their sex.

8. Each of the individual Plaintiffs, and each member

of the class represented by them, has suffered and will

continue to suffer irreparable harm by reason of the ille-

gal conduct of the Defendant. Plaintiffs have no plain,

adequate or complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs

alleged herein unless this Court affords them the equita-

ble relief prayed for.

9. On or about April 25, 1972, Plaintiff C.W.A. filed

a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-

mission (referred to as EEOC) alleging the aforesaid un-

fair employment practices. Said charge was also duly de-

ferred to the Fair Employment Practices Commission of

the State of Illinois in accordance with the provisions of

the Act. On or about August 31, 1972 the Director of

the Chicago District Office of the EEOC issued his “Dis-

trict Director’s Findings of Fact” finding that the Defend-

ant’s policy does not afford female employees the same

benefits for maternity or pregnancy as are provided for

other temporary disabilities. On or about March 20,

1973 the EEOC notified the Plaintiffs that Defendant’s

compliance with the Act had not been accomplished with-

in the period allowed to the EEOC by Title VII of the

Act and that pursuant to the Act a civil action could be

instituted in the appropriate United States District Court.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this

Court advance this case on the docket, order a speedy

hearing at the earliest practical date, and, upon such hear-

ing,

(a) Declare the rights of the parties, finding that the

aforesaid practice, policy, usage and conduct of the De-

fendant is violative of the Act;

~<

827

(b) Grant Plaintiffs and the class they represent a pre-

liminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendant

from conduct violative of the Act;

(c) Order Defendant by mandatory injunction to take

such affirmative actions as are necessary to assure that the

effects of said violations are eliminated and do not con-

tinue to adversely affect the employment rights of Plain-

tiffs and the class they represent;

(d) Order Defendant to provide monetary relief includ-

ing backpay to any of the Plaintiffs or members of the

Class they represent for monetary losses sustained by them

by reason of the violations of the Act by Defendant:

(e) Order Defendant to pay Plaintiffs’ costs in this

action;

(f) Order the Defendant to pay a reasonable attorneys’

fee; and

(g) Order such other and additional relief as to the

Court seems necessary or proper.

/s/ Irving M. Friedman

IRVING M. FRIEDMAN

HAROLD A. KATZ

CHARLES V. KOONS

KATZ & FRIEDMAN

7 South Dearborm Street

Chicago, Illinois 60603

312/263-6330

KANE & KOONS

1100 Seventeenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

202/659-2044

Of Counsel

828

GE EXHIBIT NO. 36

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS REGULATIONS

dated 3/8/71 re: Sick Leave, LCR 2015-5.

Subject: Sick Leave

A. Accrual of Sick Leave. All staff members will

earn 4 hours of sick leave for each bi-weekly pay period

to be credited at the beginning of the pay period in

which it is earned. There is no qualifying period for the

use of sick leave.

B. Grant of Sick Leave. Sick leave shall be granted

by designated supervisors when staff members are in-

capacitated for the performance of their duties by sick-

ness, injury, pregnancy and confinement, or for medical,

dental, or optical examination or treatment, or when a

member of the immediate family of the staff member

has a contagious disease (see LCR 2015-2, Section 2.E.)

and requires the care and attendance of the staff member,

or when, through exposure to contagious disease, the

presence of the staff member at his post of duty would

jeopardize the health of others.

C. Application for Sick Leave. Staff members who

are sick shall be responsible for notifying their super-

visors as soon as possible of their illness and the date

they expect to return to duty. If it is impossible to

estimate the date of return when reporting an absence

covered by sick leave, it is the staff member’s respon-

sibility to provide such estimate without delay when a

forecast is possible. Written application for sick leave

shall be filed on the prescribed form when he returns

829

to duty. Requests for sick leave for medical, dental, or

optical examinations shall be submitted for approval in

advance.

D. Supporting Evidence. Where absence from duty

exceeds three workdays, it must be supported by a med-

ical certificate or a statement, signed by the staff mem-

ber, stating the reasons why he did not have a physician,

which must be filed within 5 days after return to duty.

Applications for sick leave for a staff member to care

for a member of his immediate family having a disease

requiring isolation, quarantine, or restriction of move-

ment, or when the staff member is required to be ab-

sent because of exposure to contagious disease, require

a statement from the local health authorities or a physi-

cian indicating the period of isolation, quarantine, or

restriction of movement of the patient. The division

chief shall determine whether the statement of the staff

member in lieu of a medical certificate shall be con-

sidered sufficient evidence to support the request for

sick leave. Upon recommendation of the division chief,

and with the approval of the Director of Personnel,

staff members may be required to furnish medical certi-

ficates for absences of three workdays or less.

E. Sickness During Annual Leave. When sickness

occurs while a staff member is on annual leave, the

period of illness may be charged as sick leave, subject

to the provisions of D. above. In such cases a medical

certificate must be submitted. Dental, physical or optical

examinations requiring a total of less than one day and

occuring during a time when the staff member is on

annual leave shall not be converted to sick leave, how-

ever

(Supersedes May 3, 1962 issuance of page 1 of LCR

2015-5)

830

F. Advance of Sick Leave. In cases of serious dis-

ability or ailment, staff members with other than tempo-

rary status may be granted sick leave in advance of its

accrual, up to a total of 30 days; in granting such ad-

vance sick leave the following facts shall be taken into

consideration:

* * * * *

Sick leave shall not be advanced in maternity cases

(see LCR 2015-13) or in instun es in which a staff

member is absent because a member of his family has

a contagious disease.

Page 12

Page 13

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 37

Dept of Health, Education and Welfare

Employee Leave Benefits, dated 11/22/65,

Chapter IV, Guide 5, Supp. 1.

13. Advance of Sick Leave

b.

Sick leave up to 30 days may be ad-

vanced in case of serious disability or

ailment, and when required by the

exigencies of the situation. The leave-

approving officer must determine that

the illness is serious and that an ex-

igency exists. Usually the approving

official for advance sick

* * *

Sick leave cannot be advanced for

pregnancy or confinement, exposure

or care for a person with a contagious

seer os ade

ak nb Rane nth eR Muse im nll wart. -

831

disease, or when it is likely the em-

ployee will retire, be separated or

resign before the advance leave will

be earned. There must be a reason-

able expectation that the employee

will return to duty.

* * *

23. Maternity Leave

b. Normally the period of absence for

maternity reasons is about 14 weeks—

6 weeks before expected date of de-

livery, unless an operating agency head

establishes by regulation that a long-

er period of incapacitation is normal

in his agency for types of positions

of a strenuous or physically exacting

nature. This is referred to hereafter

as the “usual presumed” period of

incapecitation. It is Department policy

not to continue the employee in

duty status during the actual or

“usual presumed” period of incapaci-

tation. She may be permitted to work

during

832

G. E. EXHIBIT NO. 38

Petition of EEOC for Suspension, Hearing, Intervention

and Declaration of Unlawfulness, filed with FCC in

matter of AT & T, Revision of Tariff FCC No. 263,

cine BEFORE THE 7°

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20554

+ *

a ee

PETITION FOR SUSPENSION, HEARING,

INTERVENTION AND DECLARATION OF

UNLAWFULNESS

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC) Files this Petition pursuant to 47 C.F.R.

§§ 1.773, 23.49(e)(1 (iv) and 23.49 (e)(2).

The petitioner, EEOC, shows:

1) That EEOC is the federal agency charged with

administering Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. §2000e et seg. The post office address of

the EEOC is 1800 G Street, N.W., Office of the Chair-

man, Washington, D. C. 20506.

2) That American Telephone and Telegraph Com-

pany (hereafter, AT&T) is a holding corporation con-

trolling twenty-four operating companies, which are

communications common carriers providing telephone

and telegraph services to the public under a government-

sactioned monopoly. The post office address of AT&T

is 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York,

833

3) That AT&T, Long Lines Department, has filed

changed tariff material, bearing Tariff FCC No. 263, pro-

posing a rate increase for long-distance telephone calls,

effective January 21, 1971, for the twenty-four operating

companies controlled by AT&T. This rate increase is de-

signed to produce additional annual net earnings of $250

million before income taxes.

4) That the proposed rate increase constitutes a

rate established by the Commission and as such is un-

lawful in that it has been established without following

the procedures required by 47 U.S.C. §205, 54 U.S.C.

§ §551(4)(S), 553(b), 556(d), 552(aX 1B), 552(aK 1B).

5) That no “good cause” has been shown why the

proposed rate increase should be effective prior to 60

days notice as required by 47 U.S.C. §203(b) and 47

C.F.R. §61.58 and that no application for waiver or

modification of the notice requirements has been made

by AT&T as required by 47 C.F.R. §61.151.

6) That AT&T’s operating companies engage in

pervasive, system-wide, and blatantly unlawful discrimina-

tion in employment against women, blacks, Spanish-

surnamed Americans, and other minorities. Such discrim-

ination violates the following laws, regulations, and orders:

a. Sections 201(b), 202(a), 214, 501, and 502 of

the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.

§ §201(b), 202(a), 214, 501, and 502;

b. 47 C.F.R. § §23.49(a), (b), and (c);

c. Sections 703(a) and 703(d) of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § §2000e-2(a) and

2000e-2(d);

d. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. §206(d)

(1);

834

e. Executive Order 11246, 30 F.R. 12,319 (1965),

as amended by Executive Order 11375, 32 F.R. 14303

(1967);

f. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1981;

g. The Fair employment practice acts of approxi-

mately 30 states and the District of Columbia;

h. The fair employment practice ordinances of

numerous large cities; and

i. (illegible)

7) That because AT&T’s Operating companies en-

gage in pervasive and unlawful discrimination in employ-

ment against women, blacks, Spanish-surnained Americans,

and other minorities, any rate increase proposed and

filed by AT&T with the Commission is unjust and un-

reasonable, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § §201(b) and

202(a). Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § §154(i), 204, 205 and

47 C.F.R. §23.49(e)(2), the Commission is under a

statutory obligation to find any proposed rate increase

unjust and unreasonable, and to declare it unlawful.

8) That the AT&T system is a government-sanctioned

monopoly, whose market and profits are quaranteed by

the United States government and whose practices are

otherwise extensively regulated by the government. Under

these circumstances, approval by the Commission of any

proposed rate increase constitutes a denial of due pro-

cess of law under the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution to those women, blacks, Spanish-

surnamed Americans, and other minorities who are sub-

ject to the discriminatory practices of AT&T’s operating

companies. Therefore, the Commission has a constitu-

tional obligation to declare illegal any proposed rate

increase.

9) That the EEOC incorporates herein by reference

the entire Memorandum in Support of EEOC Petition to

Intervene previously filed under Transmittal No. 10989.

835

10) That the EEOC incorporates by reference the en-

tire Request For Further Relief previously filed by the

EEOC in regard to Transmittal No. 10989.

11) That this Petition is NOT a formal complaint as

allowed by 47 C.F.R. §1.721.

12) Then, as required by Rule 18 of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner hereby requests

that, if this Petition is denied in whole or in part, the

Commission stay its decision or order pending direct re-

view in the appropriate United States Court of Appeals.

Wherefore, EEOC asks that the Commission require

60 days notice for any proposed rate increase, suspend

the rate increase proposed by AT&T, conduct a hearing,

permit the EEOC to participate at said hearing and to

develop fully its view that AT&T’s operating companies

discriminate, and declare any proposed rate increase un-

lawful until AT&T has ceased such discrimination.

Dated at Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1971.

WILLIAM H. BROWN, III

Chairman

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission

1800 G Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20506

1124

836

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 39

EEOC Memorandum to Employees,

dated 1/26/73 re “‘Advance Sick Leave”’.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Date: January 26, 1973

TO: All Employees

FROM: Ronald B. Krueger /s/

SUBJECT: Advance Sick Leave

It has been brought to our attention that there is some

question as to why maternity cases were singled out as

the only example in our Adfance Sick Leave memoran-

dum dated December 20, 1972. Our reason for indicat-

ing maternity cases as a specific example was that GSA

Payroll has, on a continuing basis, refused to honor our

requests for advance sick leave for normal pregnancy pur-

poses since it is in direct conflict with U.S. Civil Service

Commission rules and regulations. It was our feeling that

if all employees were made aware of this fact, it would,

perhaps, stop the numerous requests from coming into

the Personnel Division.

Our maternity leave policy still permits up to six months

of leave — sick, annual, leave without pay, or any combi-

nation thereof. In some instances, the time period can be

extended.

We hope the above clarifies our previous memorandum,

concerning advance sick leave for pregnancy and confine-

ment.

Approved for circulation:

/s/ * * * 2D. Butler /s/ Thomas G. * * *

Director, Office of Management Executive Director

1125

$37

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 40

EEOC Manual Sec. 911—Excerpts of Pages 1-6

Dated 11-15-68 & 7-25-69

Date: Nov. 15, 1968

Subject: Leave Section: 911

X. PURPOSE ~— |

the purpose of this Section is to state overall require-

ments of law, regulation, and Commission policy concern-

ing leave of absence. Questions concerning leave policies

or procedures not answered herein should be referred to

the Office of Administration.

XI. COVERAGE

All employees are subject to the leave provisions of this

Section except:

the Chairman and Commissioners who are Pre-

sidential appointees,

Part-time or employees without a regular tour

of duty, and

Employees without compensation or on a “fee”

basis.

XII. ANNUAL LEAVE

Annual leave is absence with pay for vacation or other

personal reasons. It is normally planned in advance and

is always subject to approval by the employee's immedi-

ate supervisor.

A. Accrual

Full-time employees earn annual leave as follows:

1. One-half pay for each full payperiod for em-

ployees with less than three years service,

838

GENERAL COUNSEL’S EXHIBIT NO. 40

EEOC MANUAL

Subject: Leave Date: Nov. 15, 1968 Section: 911

* * *

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this Section is to state overall requirements

of law, regulation, and Commission policy concerning leave

of absence. Questions concerning leave policies or proce-

dures not answered herein should be referred to the Office

of Administration.

ll. COVERAGE

All employees are subject to the leave provisions of this Sec-

tion except:

The Chairman and Commissioners who are Presidential

appointees,

Part-time or WAE employe’ without a regular tour of

duty, and

Employees without compensation or on a “fee” basis.

Il. ANNUAL LEAVE

Annual leave is absence with pay for vacation or other per-

sonal reasons. It is normally planned in advance and is

always subject to approval by the employee’s immediate

supervisor.

A. Accrual

Full-time employees earn annual leave as follows:

1. One-half day for each full payperiod for employees

with less than three years’ service,

839

2. Three-fourths day for each full payperiod (except

one and one-fourth days for the last payperiod in

the calendar year) for employees with * * *

EEOC MANUAL

Page 4(R-1) Section: 91)

Vv. MATERNITY LEAVE

Date: July 25, 1969

Employees will begin maternity leave not later than four

weeks prior to the expected date of delivery.

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846

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 42 - Cost Estimates Regarding Mater-

nity Benefits. Statistical Study by Paul H. Jackson,

Fellow, Society of Actuaries.

A. Privately Insured Short-term Disability Coverage

The cost for maternity coverage on the same basis

as any other disability was developed on the following

assumptions:

1. Annual births in United States among working

mothers approximately 1,463,000 based on annual rate

of birth by age of mother assumed equal to the 1968

live birth rates (latest published), Table 56, Statistical

Abstract of tne United States, discounted by a judgment

factor of .9 to allow for a lower rate of birth among

married women in the working population than among

married women generally. See attached worksheet.

2. 40% of working employees under 65 are covered

by group sickness and accident insurance. (Source Book

of Health Insurance 1972-1973, page 25, and Special La-

bor Force Report 144, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table

B.)

3. Insurance company premiums for short-term dis-

ability approximately 123% of claim payments, Table 735,

American Almanac—Source—U.S. Social Security Adminis-

tration—S.S. Bulletin, April 1972.

4. Average benefit $1,276 based on 45% under 13

week plans with $60 average benefit, 50% under 26 week

plans with $70 average benefit, 5% under 52 week plans

with $80 average benefit. (Source Book of Health Insur-

ance 1972-1973, 12th Annual Survey 1971, Health Insur-

ance Institute and 1971 Reports Mortality and Morbidity

847

Experience, Society of Actuaries.) Utilization—13 weeks

under 13 week plans, 23 weeks under 26 week plans and

30 weeks under 52 week plans. (Judgment item assuming

modest claim abuse and malingering with maximum claim

controls.)

| 5. Total Annual Cost - $918,460,000. (1,463,000 x

1.23 x $1,276 as per above.)

6. Present Annual Cost - $114,016,000 based on

40% of insured plans providing 6 week maternity benefit

averaging $396. (Source — 1971 Reports.) (1,463,000 x

4x 4x 1.23 x 396.)

7. Added Annual Cost (5-6) - $804,000,000.

B. Sick Leave Program

Added cost under sick leave programs $406,000,000

based on annual sick leave payments projected to

$1,070,000,000 in 1973 (Source — Research and Statistics

Note 23, DHEW Pub. No. SSA 73-i1701) and same ratio

of increase as applicable to short-term disability (804/2121).

C. Long-term Disability Coverage

Added annual cost $143,000,000 based on 10% of

workforce with LTD coverage (Source Book of Health

Insurance, p. 25) and 5% of covered births (7315) claim-

ing disability and collecting average benefit of $75 per

week for 5 year average claim. The 7315 claims at 5%

of total births is an estimate of uncontrollable claim abuse

such as feigned disability based on claims of mental and

nervous ailments, etc. that cannot be objectively disproven.

(It was assumed that all claims presented under disability

pension provisions could be denied.)

849

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850

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 47 - List of Published Writings of

Paul Jackson, Actuary.

ACTUARIAL PAPERS

l.

“Experience Rating”, Transactions, Society of Actu-

aries, Vol. 5.

“Investment Risk for Pension Funds’, The Proceed-

ings, Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice, Vol.

XX.

“The Senate Labor Subcommittee Study of Private

Pension Plans - An Actuarial Appraisal’, Proc. C.A.,

Vol. XXI.

Co-authored with James A. Hamilton:

“The Valuation of the Equity Assets of Pension

Funds”, Transactions, 18th International Congress

of Actuaries, Vol. Il.

“The Valuation of Pension Fund Assets’, T.S.A.,

Vol. XX.

BOOKS

l.

Chapter 24, “Group Paid-up and Group Permanent

Life Insurance”, Life and Health Insurance Handbook,

Edited by D. W. Gregg (Irwin, 1959).

Chapter 12, “Experience Rating in Group Life Insur-

ance”, Group Insurance Handbook, Edited by Robert

Eilers and Robert Crowe (Irwin, 1965).

Chapter 5, “Income Replacement”, The Total Ap-

proach to Employee Benefits, Edited by Deric, AMA,

1967.

4.

&51

Chapter 41, “Trust Fund Pension Plans”, Life and

Health Insurance Handbook, Edited by Gregg and

Lucas (Irwin, 1972).

GENERAL PAPERS

1.

“Self Insurance and Group Insurance”, CLU Journal,

Vol. XVI, No. 4.

“Planning and Developing a Sound Form of Employ-

ee Long-Term Disability Benefits”, The Insurance

Manager, 1963.

“Developments in Group Insurance”, CLU Journal,

Vol. XIX, No. 4.

“Disability Benefits in Pension Plans and Group In-

surance Programs”, PW News, April, 1966.

“How and When to Recognize Appreciation in Valu-

ing Pension Assets”, Summary of Proceedings, Third

Annual Corporate Pension Conference, DLJ, 1966.

“Criticism of ‘First Lollar’ Health Insurance Cover-

age”, PW News, July, 1966.

“New Rules on Social Security Integration”, Proceed-

ings, First Annual Conference on Employee Benefits

1967.

“Current Considerations in the Selection of Actuarial

Assumptions”, PW News, January, 1968.

“Public Employee Retirement - The Future of Social

Security Benefits and Their Impact on Integrated

Pension Plans”, Proceedings, 67th Annual Conference,

Municipal Finance Officers Association of the United

States and Canada.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

852

“The Long Range Effect of New Integration Rules on

Benefit Plans”, Proceedings, 5th Annual Corporate

Pension Conference, DLJ, 1968.

“The Dilemma of Social Security Integration”, Re-

tirement Plan Perspective, Manufacturers-Hanover,

September-October, 1968.

“Survivor Benefits”, PW News, January, 1970.

“Toward a Full Share in Abundance”, Profit Sharing,

Vol. 18, No. 4., April, 1970.

“Pensions, A Different Point of View’, Private Pen-

sions and the Public Interest, AEI, 1970.

“Investment Risks for Pension Funds’’, Proceedings,

4th Annual Conference on Employee Benefits, 1970.

“The Impact of Federal Law and Regulation on

Benefit Design and Change”, Proceedings, Sth Annual

Conference on Employee Benefits, 1971.

“The Role of the Actuary in Collective Bargaining”,

TSA, Vol. XXIII, March, 1972.

“Early Retirement - U.S. Patterns and Problems”’,

Benefits International, June, 1972.

“Investment Advice and Performance Analyses in the

United States”, IACA, 1972.

“Early Retirement”, PW News, September-October,

1972.

“Effect of the New Higher Levels of Social Security

Benefits”, Risk Management, June-July, 1973.

£53

BOOK REVIEWS

Measuring the Investment Performance of Pension Funds

for the Purpose of Inter-Fund Comparison, Cohen, Dean,

Durand, Fama, Fisher, Lorie, Shapiro, TSA, April, 1969.

Investment Practices, Performance and Management of

Profit Sharing Trust Funds, Metzger, Bert L., TSA,

November, 1969.

Pension Fund Investment Management, C.P.A. Research

Seminar (Esmond B. Gardner, Editor), TSA, April, 1970.

Early Retirement - The Decision and the Experience,

Barfield, Richard, and Morgan, James, TSA, April, 1970.

Early Retirement Benefits - Panacea, Purgatory or Pallia-

tive, Blagden, Harry E., TSA, April, 1971.

The Automobile Worker and Retirement: A Second Look,

Barfield, Richard E., TSA, April, 1971.

Private Pensions and the Public Interest, American Enter-

prise, Institute, TSA, April, 1971.

Early Retirement: A Survey of Company Policies and

Retirees’ Experiences, Greene, Mark R., Pyron, M.

Charles, Manion, U. Vincent, Winklevoss, Howard, TSA,

April, }971.

1970 Study of Industrial Retirement Plans, Bankers Trust

Company, TSA, April, 1971.

Pensions and Severance Pay for Displaced Defense Workers,

Folk, Hugh and Hartman, Paul, TSA, March, 1972.

Private Pension Scheme Finance, Tutt, Leslie and Sylvia,

TSA, March, 1972.

854

The Fundamentals of Pension Mathematics, Berin, TSA,

September, 1972.

Early Retirement Programs, Myer and Fox, TSA, Septem-

ber, 1972.

Analysis of the Cost 2f Vesting in Pension Plans, Winkle-

voss, TSA, March, 1973.

Income - Background and Issues, 1971 White House Con-

ference on Aging, TSA, March, 1973.

Protecting Purchasing Power in Retirement, Mackin, TSA,

March, 1973.

Flexibility of Retirement Age, OECD, TSA, June, 1973.

Canadian Handbook on Pension and Welfare Plans, Mercer

and Coward, TSA, June, 1973.

You and Your Pension - Nader and Blackwell, PW News,

May, 1973.

WRITTEN DISCUSSION OF PAPERS

Transactions Society of Actuaries

Volume and Page Topic

1963 439-445 “Collective Risk Theory”

1966 76-79 “Concepts of Adequacy in

Pension Plan Funding”’

1966 459-461 “Excess Ratio Distribution in

Risk Theory”

1969 219-221 “Empirical Approach to Credi-

bility Factors”

1970 483-485 “Asset Values under Equity

Based Products”

1972 133-139 “Frequency of Pension Plan

Actuarial Valuation”

855

PUBLISHED DISCUSSIONS

Transactions Society of Actuaries

Volume and Pages Topic

1957 65-66 Group Insurance

1959 482 Employee Benefit Plans

1964 249 Optional Accident Insurance

1964 275-277 “New Money” Interest Rates

1965 100-103 Long Term Disability Benefits

1969 362 Utility Theory

1972 386-390 Principles and Practices for

Pension Plans

OFFICIAL STUDY NOTES-Society of Actuaries

1961 Experience Rating

1963 Long Term Disability Insurance

1964 Group Permanent Life Insurance

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 48 - Sex Discrimination Guidelines for

Government Contractors, United States Office of

Federal Contract Compliance, CCH Employment

Practices, pages 2169 to 2169-3, 10-5-72

Office of Federal Contract Compliance

SEX DISCRIMINATION GUIDELINES

for GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS

q 4340

The following Sex Discrimination Guidelines, amending

Chapter 60 of Title 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations

by adding a new Part 60-20, were published in the Fed-

eral Register of June 9, 1970 (35 F. R. 8888).! The

| authority.—Issued under Section 201, Executive Order 11246 (30

F. R. 12819), and Executive Order 11375 (32 F.R. 14303).

856

Guidelines constitute interpretations as to the requirements

with respect to sex discrimination imposed upon govern-

ment contractors and subcontractors and upon federally-

assisted construction contractors and subcontractors by

Executive Order 11246 as amended by Executive Order

11375. The Guidelines became effective June 9, 1970.

Table of Contents

Section Paragraph

60-20.1 TitleandPurpose. ...... . . 434001

60-20.2 Recruitment and Advertisement. . . . 4340.02

60-20.3 Job Policiesand Practices... .. . 4340.03

60-20.4 SenioritySystems. ...... . . 4340.04

60-20.5 Discriminatory Wages ..... . . 4340.05

60-20.6 Affirmative Action . ..... . . 4340.06

[4 4340.01]

Section 60-20.1. Title and Purpose.—The purpose of

the provisions in this part is to set forth the interpreta-

tions and guidelines of the Office of Federal Contract

Compliance regarding the implementation of Executive

Order 11375 for the promotion and insuring of equal op-

portunity for all persons employed or seeking employment

with Government contractors and subcontra tors or with

contractors and subcontractors performing under federally-

assisted construction contracts, without regard to sex.

Experience has indicated that special problems related to

the implementation of Executive Order 11375 require a

definitive treatment beyond the terms of the order itself.

These interpretations are to be read in connection with

existing regulations, set forth in Part 60-1 of this chapter.

[4 4340.02]

Sec. 60-20.2. Recruitment and Advertisement.—(a)

Employers engaged in recruiting activity must recruit

857

employees of both sexes for all jobs unless sex is a bona

fide occupational qualification.

(b) Advertisement in newspapers and other media for

employment must not express a sex preference unless sex

is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job. The

placement of an advertisement in columns headed “Male”

or “Female” will be considered an expression of a prefer-

ence limitation, specification or discrimination, based on

sex.

[4 4340.03}

Sec. 60-20.3. Job Policies and Practices.—(a) Written

personnel policies relating to this subject area must ex-

pressly indicate that there shall be no discrimination against

employees on account of sex. If the employer deals with

a bargaining representative for his employees and there is

a written agreement on conditions of employment, such

agreement shall not be inconsistent with these guidelines.

(b) Employees of both sexes shall have an equal oppor-

tunity to any available job that he or she is qualified to

perform, unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualifica-

tion.

Note: In most Government contract work there

are only limited instances where valid reasons can

be expected to exist which would justify the ex-

clusion of all men or all women from any given

job.

(c) The employer must not make any distinction based

upon sex in employment opportunities, wages, hours, or

other conditions of employment. In the area of employer

contributions for insurance, pensions, welfare programs and

other similar “fringe benefits” the employer will not be

considered to have violated these guidelines if his contri-

858

butions are the same for men and women or if the re-

sulting benefits are equal.

(d) Any distinction between married and unmarried

persons of one sex that is not made between married and

unmarried persons of the opposite sex will be considered

to be a distinction made on the basis of sex. Similarly,

an employer must not deny employment to women with

young children unless it has the same exclusionary policies

for men; or terminate an employee of one sex in a par-

ticular job classification upon reaching a certain age un-

less the same rule is applicable to members of the oppo-

site sex.

(e) The employer’s policies and practices must assure

appropriate physical facilities to both sexes. The em-

ployer may not refuse to hire men or women, or deny

men or women a particular job because there are no

restroom or associated facilities, unless the employer is

able to show that the construction of the facilities would

be unreasonable for such reasons as excessive expense or

lack of space.

(f) (1) An employer must not deny a female employ-

ee the right to any job that she is qualified to perform

in reliance upon a State “protective” law. For example,

such laws include those which prohibit women from per-

forming in certain types of occupations (e.g., a bartender

or a core-maker); from working at jobs requiring more

than a certain number of hours; and from working at

jobs that require lifting or carrying more than designated

weights.

(2) Such legislation was intended to be beneficial, but,

instead, has been found to result in restricting employment

859

opportunities for men and/or women. Accordingly, it

cannot be used as a basis for denying employment or for

establishing sex as a bona fide occupational qualification

for the job.

(g) (1) Women shall not be penalized in their con-

ditions of employment because they require time away

from work on account of childbearing. When, under the

employer’s leave policy the female employee would qualify

for leave, then childbearing must be considered by the

employer to be a justification for leave of absence for fe-

male employees for a reasonable period of time. For ex-

ample, if the female employee meets the equally applied

minimum length of service requirements for leave time,

she must be granted a reasonable leave on account of

childbearing. The conditions applicable to her leave (other

than the length thereof) and to her return to employment,

shall be in accordance with the employer’s leave policy.

(2) If the employer has no leave policy, childbearing

must be considered by the employer to be a justification

for a leave of absence for a female employee for a reason-

able period of time. Following childbirth, and upon sig-

nifying her intent to return within a reasonable time, such

female employee shall be reinstated to her original job or

to a position of like status and pay, without loss of

service credits.

(h) The employer must not specify andy differences

for male and female employees on the basis of sex in

either mandatory or optional retirement age.

(i) Nothing in these guidelines shall be interpreted to

mean that differences in capabilities for job assignments

do not exist among individuals and that such distinctions

860

may not be recognized by the employer in making spe-

cific assignments. The purpose of these guidelines is to

insure that such distinctions are not based upon sex.

[4 4340.04]

Sec. 60-20.4. Seniority Systems.—Where they exist,

seniority lines and lists must not be based solely upon

sex. Where such a separation has existed, the employer

must eliminate this distinction.

[ 4 4340.05]

Sec. 60-20.5. Discriminatory Wages.—(a) The employ-

er’s wages schedules must not be related to or based on

the sex of the employees.

Note: The more obvious cases of discrimination

exist where employees of different sexes are paid

different wages on jobs which require substantial-

ly equal skill, effort and responsibility and are

performed under similar working conditions.

(b) The employer may not discriminatorily restrict one

sex to certain job classifications. In such a situation, the

employer must take steps to make jobs available to all

qualified employees in all classifications without regard

to sex. (Example: An electrical manufacturing company

may have a production division with three functional

units: One (assembly) all female; another (wiring), all

male; and a third (circuit boards), also all male. The

highest wage attainable in the assembly unit is consider-

ably less than that in the circuit board and wiring units.

In such a case the employer

361

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 49 - Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, “Guidelines on Discrimination Because

of Sex”—Pre-1972 Version (29 CFR Par. 1604, as

revised as of Jan. 1, 1972).

PART 1604—GUIDELINES ON

DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX

Sec.

1604.1 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.

1604.2 Separate lines of progression and seniority systems.

Sec.

1604.3 Discrimination against married women.

1604.4 Job opportunities advertising.

1604.5 Employment agencies.

1604.6 Pre-employment inquiries as to sex.

1604.7 Relationship of Title VII to the Equal Pay Act.

1604.31 Pension and retirement plans.

AUTHORITY: The provisions of this Part 1604 are

issued pursuant to Sec. 713(b), 78 Stat. 265; 43 U.S.C.

2000e-1 2.

SOURCE: The provisions of this Part 1604 appear at

30 F.R. 14927, Dec. 2, 1965, unless otherwise noted.

§ 1604.1 Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification.

(a) The Commission believes that the bona fide occu-

pational qualification exception as to sex should be inter-

preted narrowly. Labels——‘“Men’s jobs” and “Women’s

862

jobs”—tend to deny employment opportunities unneces-

sarily to one sex or the other.

(1) The Commission will find that the following sit-

uations do not warrant the application of the bona fide

occupational qualification exception:

(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex,

based on assumptions of the comparative employment

characteristics of women in general. For example, the

assumption that the turnover rate among women is high-

er than among men.

(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereo-

typed characterizations of the sexes. Such stereotypes in-

clude, for example, that men are less capable of assemb-

ling intricate equipment; that women are less capable of

aggressive salesmanship. The principle of non-discrimina-

tion requires that individuals be considered on the basis

of individual capacities and not on the basis of any

characreristics generally attributed to the group.

(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the

preferences of co-workers, the employer, clients or cus-

tomers except as covered specifically in subparagraph (2)

of this paragraph.

(iv) The fact that the employer may have to provide

separate facilities for a person of the opposite sex will

not justify discrimination under the bona fide occupa-

tional qualification exception unless the expense would

be clearly unreasonable.

(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenti-

city or genuineness, the Commission will consider sex to

be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an actor

or actress.

(b)(1) Many States have enacted laws or promulgated

administrative regulations with respect to the employment

of females. Among these laws are those which prohibit

863

or limit the employment of females, e.g., the employ-

- ment of females in certain occupations, in jobs requir-

ing the lifting or carrying of weights exceeding certain

prescribed limits, during certain hours of the night, or

for more than a specified number of hours per day or

per week.

(2) The Commission believes that such State laws

and regulations, although originally promulgated for the

purpose of protecting females, have ceased to be relevant

to our technology or to the expanding role of the fe-

male worker in our economy. The Commision has found

that such laws and regulations do not take into account

the capacities, preferences, and abilities of individual fe-

males and tend to discriminate rather than protect. Ac-

cordingly, the Commission has concluded that such laws

and regulations conflict with Title VIl of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 and will not be considered a defense to an

otherwise established unlawful employment practice or

as a basis for the application of the bona fide occupa-

tional qualification exception.

[30 F.R. 14927, Dec. 2, 1965, as amended at 34 F.R. 13368,

Aug. 19, 1969]

§ 1604.2 Separate lines of progression and seniority

systems;

(a) It is an unlawful employment practice to clas-

sify a job as “male” or “female” or to maintain sepa-

rate lines of progression or separate seniority lists based

on sex where this would adversely affect any employee

unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for

that job. Accordingly, employment practices are un-

lawful which arbitrarily classify jobs so that:

(1) A female is prohibited from applying for a job

labeled “‘male”, or for a job in a “male” line of pro-

gression; and vice versa.

864

(2) A male scheduled for layoff is prohibited from

displacing a less senior female on a “‘female”’ seniority

list; and vice versa.

(b) A seniority system or line of progression which

distinguishes between “‘light’”’ and “heavy” jobs consti-

tutes an unlawful employment practice if it operates as

a disguised form of classification by sex, or creates un-

reasonable obstacles to the advancement by members of

either sex into jobs which members of that sex would

reasonably be expected to perform.

§ 1604.3 Discrimination against married women.

(a) The Commission has determined that an em-

ployer’s rule which forbids or restricts the employment of

married women and which is not applicable to married

men is a discrimination based on sex prohibited by Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act. It does not seem to us rele-

vant that the rule is not directed against all females, but

only against married females, for so long as sex is a fac-

tor in the application of the rule, such application in-

volves a discrimination based on sex.

(b) It may be that under certain circumstances, such

a rule could be justified within the meaning of Section

703(e)(1) of Title VII. We express no opinion on this

question at this time except to point out that sex as a

bona fide occupational qualification must be justified

in terms of the peculiar requirements of the particular

job and not on the basis of a general principle such as

the desirability of spreading work.

§ 1604.4 Job opportunities advertising.

It is a violation of Title VII for a help-wanted ad-

vertisement to indicate a preference, limitation, specifica-

tion, or discrimination based on sex unless sex is a bona

fide occupational qualification for the particular job in-

&65

volved. The placement of an advertisement in columns

classified by publishers on the basis of sex, such as

columns headed “‘Male”’ or “‘Female,” will be considered

an expression of a preference, limitation, specification,

or discrimination based on sex.

[33 F.R. 11539, Aug. 14, 1968]

§ 1604.5 Employment agencies.

(a) Section 703(b) of the Civil Rights Act specifically

states that it shall be unlawful for an employment agency

to discriminate against any individual because of sex. The

Commission has determined that private employment

agencies which deal exclusively with one sex are engaged

in an unlawful employment practice, except to the ex-

tent that such agencies limit their services to furnishing

employees for particular jobs for which sex is a bona

fide occupational qualification.

(b) An employment agency that receives a job order

containing an unlawful sex specification will share respon-

sibility with the employer placing the job order if the

agency fills the order knowing that the sex specification

is not based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.

However, an employment agency will not be deemed to

be in violation of the law, regardless of the determination

as to the employer, if the agency does not have reason

to believe that the employer’s claim of bona fide occupa-

tions qualification is without substance and the agency

makes and maintains a written record available to the

Commission of each such job order. Such record shall in-

clude the name of the employer, the description of the

job and the basis for the employer’s claim of bona fide

occupational qualification.

(c) It is the responsibility of employment agencies

to keep informed of opinions and decisions of the Com-

mission on sex discrimination.

866

§ 1604.6 Pre-employment inquiries as to sex.

A pre-employment inquiry may ask “Male

Female. ” or “Mr. Mrs., Miss,” provided that the

inquiry is made in good faith for a non-discriminatory

purpose. Any pre-employment inquiry in connection with

prospective employment which expresses directly or in-

directly any limitation, specification or discrimination as

to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a bona fide

occupational qualification.

§ 1604.7 Relationship of Title VII to the Equal Pay Act.

(a) Title VII requires that its provisions be harmon-

ized with the Equal Pay Act (section 6(d) of the Fair La-

bor Standards Act of 1938 (section 29, U.S.C. 206(d) in

order to avoid conflicting interpretations or require-

ments with respect to situations to which both statutes

are applicable. Accordingly, the Commission interprets

section 703(h) to mean that the standards of “equal pay

for equal work”’ set forth in the Equal Pay Act for de-

termining what is unlawful discrimination in ~ompensa-

tion are applicable to Title VII. However, it 1s the judg-

ment of the Commission that the employee coverage of

the prohibition against discrimination in compensation

because of sex is co-extensive with that of the other

prohibitions in section 703, and ‘s not limited by sec-

tion 703(h) to those employees covered by the Fair

Labor Standards Act.

(b) Accordingly, the Commission will make applicable

to equal pay complaints filed under Title VII the rele-

vant interpretations of the Administrator, Wage and Hour

Division, Department of Labor. These interpretations are

found in 29 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 800.-

119—800.163. Relevant opinions of the Administrator

interpreting “the equal pay for equal work standard”

will also be adopted by the Commission.

267

(c) . The Commission will consult with the Adminis-

trator before issuing an opinion on any matter covered

by both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.

§ 1604.3! Pension and retirement plans.

(a) A difference in optional or compulsory retirement

ages based on sex violates Title VII.

(b) Other differences based on sex such as differences

in benefits for survivors, will be decided by the Commis-

sion by the issuance of Commission decisions in cases

raising such issues. [33 F.R.3344, Feb. 24, 1968]

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 50 - G.E. Health Information, Term-

ination of Active Work During Pregnancy, July 7, 1964

The Medical Advisory Council has discussed and re-

considered the Advice on “Termination of Active Work

During Pregnancy” issued March 10, 1961 as Health

Information Letter, H61-2. The following revises and

supplements that recommendation.

Introduction

A perennially difficult problem in different parts of

the Company centers about the point-of-time during a

period of pregnancy when the employer should insist

that a pregnant employee terminate active work. The

answer to the problem is necessarily a variable one

depending upon such factors as (a) the general health of

the employee involved, (b) the nature of the work to

which the employee is assigned, (c) the general nature

of working conditions and safety factors in the area or

plant in which the employee works, and (d) State laws.

It is generally agreed that pregnant women may continue

to work through the sixth month of pregnancy and

868

beyond when the pregnancy is uncomplicated, and may

resume work at the end of eight weeks following term-

ination of pregnancy, but it is generally agreed that

women should terminate employment at the end of the

sixth month and this is the recommendation of the

Medical Advisory Council. However, it is recognized by

the Council that an employee may—under certain cir-

cumstances—he permitted to continue to work up to one

month before the expected delivery date, with the con-

currence of her obstetrician and the plant physician. The

foregoing considerations should be kept in mind in es-

tablishing local practices in this general area. It is appre-

ciated that in some cases it may not be possible for the

employee to continue working until the end of the sixth

month, and that it may be necessary for her to be ab-

sent from work longer than the eight week period, when

health or other circumstances so indicate.

Iliness-Pregnancy

Upon leaving due to pregnancy, an employee’s status

is indicated as “‘illness-pregnancy”’ during the absence and

is covered by the current rules relating to such absence.

Thus, she is under no obligation to keep her supervisor

notified as to her condition until eight weeks after term-

ination of pregnancy. Failure to resume work after the

eight week period would be expected to terminate ser-

vice unless there was lack of work, illness, complications

from pregnancy or some other valid reason, v/hich should

thereafter become the reason for absence on employment

and payroll records.

Suggested Forms

The following information from the attending and/or

plant physician should be given the supervisor of the

woman leaving due to pregnancy in the normal case:

869

Dear Doctor:

It is the policy of the General Electric Company

to request women who are pregnant to leave their work “—

at the conclusion of the second trimester. In certain ex-

ceptional cases the employee may continue beyond this

time, up to four weeks before the expected delivery date,

with the approval of her private physician and the concur-

rence of the General Elect-ric physician.

Would you kindly certify to the following statement:

As near as can be determined, Mrs.

will be delivered on (date). I recommend

that she work until ~ (date).

Signed M,D,

Place

Date

In the event the absence following termination of preg-

nancy exceeds eight weeks, due to reasons of health, the

employee should furnish to management a medical state-

ment in essentially the following form:

Dear Sir:

The pregnancy of Mrs. terminated on

wee ewww eww nnns (date). Health considerations will not permit

her to resume work until approximately ------------------ (date),

Signed M.D,

When circumstances warrant, it is permissible to re-

instate a woman who has been out due to pregnancy

before the lapse of eight weeks under the explicit direc-

tion of the attending physician and with the knowledge

of the plant physician and in compliance with any state

law that may be applicable.

870

A woman may elect, of course, to stop work at any

time during her pregnancy. Also, the plant physician

should not hesitate to exercise his prerogative of ad-

vising a cessation of work when he has good reason to

do so.

John V. Grimaldi, Consultant

Health, Safety & Plant Protection

Distribution: SOABGH Employee Relations Managers

51J Doctors serving the Company

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 53 - G.E. Employee Handbook,

Daytona Beach Plant

WELCOME TO GENERAL ELECTRIC

AT DAYTONA BEACH

We have written this booklet for you, whether you are

a new employee or a veteran employee.

Here you'll find useful information about your job and

the Company . . . about our policies, practices, and

routines. You'll see what an outstanding “‘package” a

General Electric job offers you and how we continually

try to make General Electric jobs even better.

871

This booklet cannot, of course, cover everything, so if

you have a question that we haven’t answered, please

discuss it with your supervisor or foreman. He is ex-

perienced and competent and interested in helping you,

and if he doesn’t know the answer, he'll get it for you.

We try to make this a friendly as well as a productive

and good place .o work, Just as you received equal

consideration when you were employed, you are assured

equal consideration for promotional and all other oppor-

tunities to develop your skills, to progress, and to en-

hance your value to your family, to your community,

and to the Company without regard to race, creed, sex,

or age.

G. T. Smiley

General Manager

A wide variety of in-house Company courses is available

to employees who are interested in pursuing other develop-

mental activities. Listings of these courses and start dates

are publicized in the Astronote

Leave of Absence

A leave of absence, without pay, may be granted to an

employee to protect his continuity of service during a

temporary absence from work. For the period of the

leave of absence you may continue all insurance cover-

age (except Weekly Sickness and Accident benefits) by

payments of regular contribution monthly in advance, as

long as you maintain continuity of service. Of course, re-

employment upon return from a leave of absence is sub-

ject to business conditions at that time.

872

Educational Leave of Absence

Leave may be granted to employees to pursue under-

graduate or graduate studies. Employee must have a

minimum of two year’s service to apply. The course

work to be pursued must lead to either an undergraduate

or graduate degree related to the employee’s work.

Maternity Absence

Employees who are pregnant may work through the end

of their sixth month, or through the eighth month if

they have permission from their personal doctor and the

Company physician.

An absence for pregnancy is treated as an absence for

illness, except that no weekly sickness and accident pay-

ment is made. Unless there are verified medical compli-

cations, employees returning to work must report back

no later than eight weeks after the delivery date. It may

be possible to return earlier if you have the written con-

sent of your doctor and the approval of the Company

physician.

Military Service

While you are on military leave of absence, you do not

break your Company service. You continue to build

service credits for up to four years. When you are

honorably discharged, you are entitled to be re-employed

on your former job or on a job having the same status,

pay, and seniority if you are still able to do the work.

If you enter U.S. military service for active duty after

one year of continuous service with GE, you are eligible

for a military duty allowance equal to one month’s

straigh. time pay. Effective January 1, 1971, continuous

service requirement will be reduced to 30 days.

873

If you are called into service for a reason other than

active milit»ry duty (summer encampment, emergency

duty or training, for instance), you are eligible for mili-

tary pay differential for the first 17 days of military

service in a calendar year, based on the number of work-

ing days included in such 17 days. Effective January 1,

1971, military pay differential will be increased

G.E. EXHIBIT NO. 54 - G.E. Employee Handbook,

Brockport Plant

YOU AND YOUR JOB

INTRODUCTION

In this booklet you will find answers to many of the

questions which may arise on your job. It sets forth

those practices and policies of Brockport General Electric

which are of utmost importance to each of us.

This booklet has been designed as a brief guide for each

of us in our daily working relationships. More detailed

explanations of our policies, practices and benefits are

available. If questions come to mind which are not

specifically mentioned in this handbook, see your Super-

visor or Foreman. (For the pyrposes of this booklet, the

term “Supervisor” will be used throughout, meaning your

immediate superior whether he be Foreman, Supervisor

or Manager.) He is eager and able to help you. In the

event he does not have an immediate answer to your

question, he will know where to get the answer for you.

This booklet will be revised from time to time in order

874

to keep it up to date, and in agreement with current

plant policies and proceduress. However, until you are

notified of changes (either by new pages to insert in

this book or through a written publication) the various

rules and procedures in this employee handbook will re-

main in effect, and both employees and the plant man-

agement will be bound by them.

It will be very helpful if you read this booklet carefully

and then keep it for future reference.

MATERNITY ABSENCE

A female employee is not required to begin a maternity

leave at any specific time during her pregnancy. She may

work as long as her doctor and the Plant Physician con-

sider it safe.

If you leave on Maternity Absence, your service with the

Company will be automatically protected for 8 weeks

after the birth of your child or termination of pregnancy.

In order to be considered for reinstatement there are

several notifications to E & CR and medical releases re-

quired. Before you go on Maternity Absence be sure

you discuss these with E & CR so you know exac

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.