Jurisdictional Statement — Gaby v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
Supreme Court brief1976
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IN THE ¥
5° Supreme Court of the United States
Octoper Term, 1975
LA
No. 75-1712
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, as Trustee for The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-
First Series, on its own behalf and on behalf of all holders of Consolidated Bonds
of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and all others similarly
situated,
Appellant,
Uv.
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, BRENDAN T. BYRNE, Governor of the State of
) Jersey, and WILLIAM F, HYLAND, Attorney General of the State of New
ersey,
Appellees.
DANIEL M. GABY,
Appellant,
v.
THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, JAMES C.
KELLOGG, III, HOYT AMMIDON, GUSTAVE L. LEVY, JAMES G. HELL-
MUTH, ANDREW C. AXTELL, WILLIAM J, RONAN, W. PAUL STILLMAN,
WALTER H. JONES, BERNARD J, LASKER, PHILIP B. HOFMANN, and
JERRY FINKELSTEIN, Commissioners of the Port of New York Authority,
AUSTIN J. TOBIN, Exccutive Director of the Port of New York Authority, and
WILLIAM T. CAHILL, Governor of the State of New Jersey,
Appellees,
_ bp
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
Intervenor.
On Appeal from the Supreme Court of New Jersey
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
HOWARD STERN,
Attorney for Appellant, Daniel M. Gaby,
125 Ellison Stree
Paterson, New _ 07505.
Of Counsel:
THEODORE W. KHEEL.
Dated: May 1976
Adams Press Corp., 11 Commerce Street, Newark, N. J. 07102—(201) 623-8611
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
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A. Legislative history of Port Authority mass
transit commitment prior to the Covenant .... 4
B. Enactment of the Covenant and subsequent
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APPENDIX:
A—Decision of the Supreme Court of New Jer-
RR ne Al
B—Decision of the Superior Court of New Jer-
sey, Law Division, Bergen County ............... A40
C—Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of
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Cases Cited
Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, reh. den. 404
Ft ee ee 2
Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n v. Col-
ee Oe nn 18
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Howell v. Port of New York Authority, 34 F. Supp.
et Se ee en
Parden v. Terminal Railway of Ala., State Docks
UE
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359
eC aE Ee
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Com-
mission, 380 U. 8S. 685 (1965)
United States Constitution Cited
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Article I, Section 10, Clause 3
Statutes Cited
Laws of 1962:
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Laws of New Jersey (1974):
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Laws of New York (1973):
Ch. 317
Ch. 318
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TABLE OF CONTENTS ii
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IN THE
Supreme Court cf the United States
Octoser Term, 1975
No.
—<p~—
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, as Trustee for The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey Consolidated Bonds, Fortieth and Forty-
First Series, on its own behalf and on behalf of all holders of Consolidated Bonds
of The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and all others similarly
situated,
Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF NEW jERSEY, BRENDAN T. BYRNE, Governor of the State of
New Jersey, and WILLIAM F, HYLAND, Attorney General of the State of New
Jersey,
Appellees.
DANIEL M. GABY,
Appellant.
v.
THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, JAMES C.
KELLOGG, Ill, HOYT AMMIDON, GUSTAVE L. LEVY, JAMES G. HELL-
MUTH, ANDREW C. AXTELL, WILLIAM J. RONAN, W. PAUL. STILLMAN,
WALTER H. JONES, BERNARD J. LASKER, PHILIP B. HOFMANN, and
JERRY FINKELSTEIN, Commissioners of the Port of New York Authority,
AUSTIN J. TOBIN, Exccutive Director of the Port of New York Authority, and
WILLIAM T. CAHILL, Governor of the State of New Jersey,
and
Appellees,
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
Intervenor.
On Appeal from the Supreme Court of New Jersey
— >
“JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Opinion Below
The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court is re-
ported at 69 N.J. 253, 353 A. 24 514 and appears herein
as Appendix A. The trial court’s opinion rendered in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, is reported
at 134 N.J.Super. 124, 338 A. 2d 833 and appears herein
at Appendix B.
Jurisdiction —
These consolidated actions involve the validity of cer-
tain statutes enacted by the Legislature of the State of
New Jersey, which acts are alleged to be in violation of
the Constitution of the United States. Judgment uphold-
ing the validity of the state statutes was entered by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey on February 25, 1976. Ap-
peal is made to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2).
Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, reh. den. 404 U.S. 876
(1971), Warren Trading Post Co. y. Arizona State Tax
Commission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
Questions Presented
Whether N.J.S. 52:1-35.55, enacted in 1962, a covenant
with holders of certain bonds issued by the Port Au-
thority that the Authority was, in effect, to niake funds
unavailable for mass transit use, constitutes a violation
of U.S.Const. Art. I, See. 10, Cl. 3 in that it represents
an interstate compact not ratified by or consented to by
the Congress.
3
Statement of Facts
The litigation was commenced by the filing of a class
action complaint by the plaintiff, Daniel Gaby, on May 16,
1972. The principal relief sought was a declaratory judg-
ment that Chapter 8 of the Laws of 1962, N.J.S.A. 32:1-
35.50 (the 1962 Covenant) violated the Federal and State
Constitutions. The 1962 legislation authorized the con-
struction of the World Trade Center and the acquisition
of the Hudson and Manhattan Railroai Company by the
Port Authority and, except in certain limited circum-
stances, precluded the States of New York and New Jer-
sey from applying the Authority’s revenues and reserves
for passenger railroad purposes. It was agreed that the
United States Trust Company should be permitted to in-
tervene in the Gaby action on behalf of the bondholders.
On April 30, 1974, legislation repealing the 1962 Cov-
enant was signed into law. The United States Trust Com-
pany instituted a separate action on behalf of itself and
the bondholders naming the State of New Jersey, the
Governor, an the Attorney General as defendants. In that
action U.S. Trust sought declaratory judgment that the
repeal violated the Federal and State Constitutions.
The State of New Jersey answered the complaint of
U. S. Trust and asserted by answer and counterclaim the
validity of the repealer as well as the invalidity of the
1962 Covenant.
On December 10, 1974, the Gaby and U.S. Trust actions
were consolidated.
There was a limited trial concerned with narrow fac-
tual issues in the U. S. Trust action. All other facts in
both actions were stipulated. After oral argument ad-
dressed to all issues, the Law Division decided the mat-
4
ter by written opinion, May 14, 1975. By the terms of
that opinion and the judgment which followed, the 1974
repealer was held to be constitutional. The Court de-
clined to decide the constitutionality of the 1962 Covenant.
U.S. Trust appealed and its motion for direct certification
was granted. In order to preserve the issue of the con-
stitutionality of the 1962 Covenant, Gaby cross-appealed
to the N.J. Supreme Court and his cross-motion for cer-
tification was granted.
Central to the issue of the validity of the Covenant is
the question whether the mass transportation of people
within the Port District was one of the principal activi-
ties authorized by the Company (N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.50 et
seq.) and whether the insulation of the Port Authority
from that activity was in such derogation of the Com-
pact as to frustrate its meaning and intent and so ma-
terial as to require Congressional approval.
The movement of persons within the Port District was
a fundamental and integral part of the plan of port de-
velopment authorized by the Congress to be undertaken
when it approved the Company. Until the enactment of
the 1962 Covenant, the Port Authority recognized that
it had a responsibility in this area albeit one which had
not been the subject of specific implementation.
A. Legislative history of Port Authority mass transit com-
mitment prior to the Covenant.
Art. XXII of the Compact defined transportation facili-
ties to
“. . . inelude railroads, steam or electric, motor
truck or other street or highway vehicles, tunnels,
bridges, boats, ferries, carfloats, lighters, tugs, float-
5
ing elevators, barges, scows or harbor craft of any
kind, aircrafts suitable for harbor service, and every
kind of transportation facility now in use or here-
after designed for use for the transportation of
carriage of persons or property.” (N.J.S.A. 32:1-
23) (emphasis supplied)
In 1922 a Comprehensive Plan setting forth a develop-
ment program for implementation by the Port Authority
was enacted in the States and approved by Congress (Stip.
at Tr. 8 et seq.). An integral part of that plan was the
existing and proposed railroad lines in the Port District
(9-10). The railroads were, of course, to be utilized both
for freight and passengers.
“In 1927 the New Jersey Legislature, stating that
it was acting ‘under and pursuant to the provisions
of the (Port Authority) company,’ ‘authorized and
directed’ the Port Authority ‘to make such plans
for the development of said district supplementary
to or amendatory of the comprehensive plan here-
tofore adopted by the Legislatures of the two States
. as will provide adequate interstate and sub-
urban transportation facilities for passengers tra-
veling to and from one State to the other within
the said district, and from one part of the said dis-
trict to another, sometimes referred to as commuter
or suburban passenger traffic, to the end that travel
between various parts of the port district may be
made more convenient, practicable and economical
for those residing in one region in the port district
and doing business in another region thereof.’”
(Stip. 75).
Governor Moore of New Jersey approved legislation
directing the Port Authority to establish commuter fa-
6
cilities. A similar bill was vetoed in the State of New
York by Governor Smith who was of the ecpinion that
the initial objection of unifying freight facilities should
first be accomplished (Stip. 76 to 78).
Governor Smith stated that:
“T am satisfied that the Port Authority should stick
to this program, and I am entirely unwilling to give
my approval to any measure which at the expense of
the solution of the great freight distribution prob-
lew will set the Port Authority off on an entirely
new line of problem connected with the solution of
the suburden passenger problem.” (Stip. 77)
The Port Authority has pointed to Governor Smith’s state-
ment as the basis for its conclusion that it does not have
responsibility for the transport of persons as distinguished
from freight. The States had the right under the Com-
pact to require the Port Authority to undertake projects
within the scope of its authority. The veto of Governor
Smith constituted nothing more than a judgment that the
problems relating to freight should take pricrity (in 1928)
over problems relating to the transportation of people.
The veto was not based upon an absence of authority on
the part of the States to require the Port Authority to
provide for the transport of persons.
In 1928 Annual Report of the Port Authority included
this comment:
“The Commissioners of the Port Authority have
found in their studies that no adequate or effective
interstate transportation development can take place
without taking full account of transportation of
passengers as well as of freight throughout the
Port District.” (Stip. 78)
ce
“Annual reports issued by the Port Authority
pursuant to the Compact. after 1923 included ma-
terial relative to the Port Authority’s efforts relat-
ing to ‘Suburban Transit.’” (Stip. 79)
In 1928 the North Jersey Transit Commission Report
stated that:
“decision (was) reached that the bi-state character
of the Port of New York authority enabled it to
function admirably as a co-ordinating agency be-
tween the: various official bodies severally engaged
in the study of the commuter problem in different
parts of the Metropolitan District of New York and
New Jersey.” (Stip. 79)
“On June 22, 1936, the Legislature of the State
of New Jersey in Joint Resolution No. 6, Laws of
New Jersey of 1936, noting that the Port Authority
had been ‘created’ for the purpose, among other
things, of ‘coordinating and developing transporta-
tion facilities within the Port of New York Dis-
trict,’ requested the Port Authority to report upon
interstate and suburban passenger transportation.”
(Stip. 83)
Pursuant to the 1936 Joint Resolution, the Port Au-
thority issued a report on suburban transit in 1937 (Stip.
84-85). In that report the Port Authority specifically
recognized that suburban rapid transit and its coordina-
tion and development were “. . . functions (which) are
within the scope of the Port of New York Authority. .. .”
(Stip. 85)
The 1938 Legislature cf New Jersey by Resolution No. 1
requested the Port Authority to continue its studies with
respect to, financing mass transit facilities (Stip. 86).
In 1949 the Coverdale report relating to mass transit
in northern New Jersey was issued and made use of
“« .. extensive plans and estimates which the Port Author-
ity had previously compiled . . .” (Stip. 89)
In 1951 Commissioner Erdman (Department of Con-
servation and Economic Development) reported to Gover-
nor Driscoll with respect to mass transit that:
“The Port of New York Authority studied the
situation in 1920, in 1930 and again in 1937. It is
the type of organization for this task. It should
be made to recognize its responsibility because it
is the human equation which makes the port im-
portant.
“Tt has recently announced its intentions to spend
some $80,000,000 for an ac litional vericular tunnel
near the Holland Tunnel. This will increase street
traffic, where there is now altogether too much of
this type of transportation. The streets have reached
the saturation point. Therefore, the need is not
for more streets, but rather for the relief of those
we have. It would seem far better if the Author-
ity has $80,000,000 to spend on a tunnel that it
should be a rapid transit tunnel and not a vehicular
one.” (Stip. 91)
In 1951 the Jenny report noted that:
“. . . the 1920 Plan of the New York-New Jersey
Port and Harbor Development Commission had
stated, ‘Our Port problem is primarily a railroad
problem ... therefore, the comprehensive plan to
evolve which this Commission was created is es-
sentially a railroad plan... A complete ceorgani:+-
tion of the railroad terminal system is the most
fundamental physical need of the Port of New York.
... The most pressing element of the entire port
problem is that of railroad service to and from
Manhattan.’ Mr. Jenny further noted that ‘al-
though 30 years have elapsed since, and our prob-
lem has grown very much worse, we still have “one
nothing to solve it.’ Noting that the Port Author-
ity’s March 1, 1937 report had stressed the desir-
ability of the development of rapid transit facili-
ties for northern New Jersey, Mr. Jenny stated:
‘This sound advice was given a decade and a half
ago, yet no one has paid any attention to it, not
even the Port Authority itself... .’” (Stip. 94)
In 1952 the New Jersey Regional Planning Commission
recommended : 10e
“ ,. the creation of a Metropolitan Rapid Transit
Authority. The Regional Planning Commission fur-
ther recommended that the Port Authority be re-
quested to provide the funds needed for further
study and such other assistance as might be re-
quested by the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Author-
ity.” (Stip. 97)
Tn 1955 the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission
negotiated with the Port Authority with which it reached
a Memorandum of Understanding that the Port Authority
would finance a compresensive study of the interstate rail
problem in the Port District (Stip. 100-101).
In 1958 by Assembly Bill No. 16 a proposal was made
that the Port Authority take over, develop and improve
rail passenger facilities between New Jersey and New
York. The Port Authority expressed its active opposition
(Stip. 110 et seq.).
10
In 1959 the Metropolitan Rapid Transit District and
Port Authority issued a joint report. That joint report
first recognized that:
“There can be no question that the carrying on
of a transit function was well within the Port Au-
thority Compact terms and well within the present
powers.” (Stip. 123)
It also stated the Port Authority’s reasons for opposing
legislation which would commit it to implementing plans
for improving transit facilities (Stip. 123).
In 1959 New York and New Jersey enacted legislation
facilitating the utilization of Port Authority funds (with
State guarantees of payment) for the purchase of com-
muter railroad cars. The State of New York has made
use of the program. The State of New Jersey has not
(Stip. 129).
In 1960 the New Jersey Senate created the Farley Com-
mittee to conduct “a full and unlimited investigation of
the Port Authority.” (Stip. 141 et seq.) Dwight R. G.
Palmer (New Jersey Highway Commissioner) testified be-
fore that Committee in 1961. With respect to commuter
railroads, he said that:
“... In other words, we became convinced that the
Port Authority’s responsibility in the rail transit
field should be concerned principally with the inter-
state aspects of the problem as the Authority is an
interstate or by-state agency. Our recommenda-
tions were consistent with that philosophy.” (Stip.
145)“
Port Authority Commissioner James C. Kellogg testi-
fied before the Farley Committee in part as follows:
ll
“At the outset, I would like to re-affirm our view
that both rail and highway transportation are es-
sential to the economic welfare of the people of
the New Jersey-New York metropolitan region. It
was for this reason that the Port Authority made
$800,000 available to the Metropolitan Rapid Trans-
it Commission to undertake a comprehensive inter-
state transit survey. We do not now, nor have
we ever regarded arterial highway or our own bus
terminal services for the accommodation of New
Jersey commuters as substitutes for a program of
maintaining and improving rail passenger facilities
between New Jersey and Manhattan and throughout
the Port District.
“For more than thirty years, the Port Authority
has been engaged in studies of all aspects of ter-
minal and transportation facilities and services with-
in the New Jersey-New York metropolitan area.
We have continuously searched for solutions to the
commuter railroad problem in the form of physical
plans which could adequately serve the commuting
public and which, at the same time, could be de-
veloped on a self-supporting basis... .” (Stip. 154-
155)
B. Enactment of the Covenant and subsequent actions.
In 1962 New York and New Jersey enacted legislation
authorizing the Port Authority to construct the World
Trade Center and to take over the Hudson and Manhattan
Railroad (N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.51, et seq.). As a part of that
legislation the Covenant with bondholders (N.J.S.A. 32:1-
35.55) was also enacted.
12
The Covenant contained in N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.55 is in the
following language:
“The 2 States covenant and agree with each other
and with the holders of any affected bonds, as here-
inafter defined, that so long as any of such bonds
remain outstanding and unpaid and the holders
thereof shall not have given their consent as pro-
vided in their contract with the port authority,
(a) the 2 States will not diminish or impair the
power of the port authority (or any subsidiary
corporation incorporated for any of the purposes
of this act) to establish, levy and collect rentals,
tolls, fares, fees or other charges in connection with
any facility constituting a portion of the port de-
velopment project or any other facility owned or
operated by the port authority of which the rev-
enues have been or shall be pledged in whole or
in part as security for such bonds (directly or in-
directly, or through the medium of the general re-
serve fund or otherwise), or to determine the quan-
tity, quality, frequency or nature of the service pro-
vided in connection with each such facility; and
(b) neither the States nor the port authority nor
any subsidiary corporation incorporated for any of
the purposes of this act shall apply any of the
rentals, tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or re-
serves, which have been or shall be pledged in whole
or in part as security for such bonds, for any rail-
road purposes whatsoever other than permitted here-
inafter set forth.” (Stip. 204)
The Statutes continues with a definition of affected
bonds:
““Affected bonds’ as used in this section shall
mean bonds of the port authority issued or ineurred
13
by it from time to time for any of the purposes
of this act or bonds as security for which there may’
or shall be pledged, in whole or in part, the gen-
eral contract between the port authority and the
holders of such bonds, or the revenues of the world
trade center, Hudson tubes, Hudson tubes exten-
sions or any other facility owned or operated by
the port authority any surplus revenues of which
would be payable into the general reserve fund, or
bonds both so issued or incurred and so secured,”
The practical effect of the Covenant was to make Port
Authority funds unavailable for mass transport use (ex-
cept PATH) to at least the year 2007.
The Port Authority purchased and proceeded to oper.
ate PATH after certification in accordance with the pre-
existing consolidated bond resolution that the prospective
losses would not impair the sound credit rating of the
Authority (Stip. 209).
In 1970 Governors Chaill and Rockefeller enacted pro-
posed legislation to increase the role of the Port Author-
ity in mass transit, more particularly by extending PATH
to Newark Airport and building a rail link to Kennedy
Airport. Governor Cahill said that: “one purpose of the
legislation that will be introduced in both state bodies will
be to erase the authority’s impression that as long as the
PATH system is operating at a loss the authority is ab-
solved from any further responsibility for mass transit.”
(Stip. 222)
“Tn June 1971, the Legislatures of New York and
New Jersey enacted legislation authorizing the Port
Authority to extend passenger rail transportation
to Kennedy International Airport and to Newark
14
International Airport and Cranford (Chapter 245,
Laws of New Jersey of 1971). While this legisla-
tion was pending, the Port Authority obtained opin-
ion letters from the New York firms of Hawkins,
Delafield & Wood (May 3, 1971) and Davis Polk &
Wardwell (June 3, 1971), which concluded that the
proposed rail extensions were subject to the pro-
visions of the 1962 Covenant and could not be fi-
nanced out of Port Authority revenues or reserves
unless ‘self-supporting’ ...” (Stip. 233)
The Hawkins Delafield letter addressed itself to the stat-
utory device of defining the Kennedy-Newark rail links as
airport improvements:
“The terms ‘railroad’ or ‘railroad purposes’ are not
defined in the 1962 legislation. However, the term
‘railroads’ is given a broad definition in the 1921
Compact creating the Authority and reference must
be made to that definition for the purposes of giving
meaning to the term in the 1962 legislation. The
term ‘railroad’ as so defined provides no exceptions
for a railroad facility which might be incidental or
necessary to some other project or program of the
Authority. It seems clear to us that the facility
deseribed above falls within the definition of ‘rail-
roads’ in the 1921 Compact and therefore consti-
tutes a railroad within the meaning of the 1962
legislation. We may add that, in our opinion, any
attempt to limit the definition of ‘railroad’ or ‘rail-
road purposes’ prohibited or restricted by the 1962
legislation by including railroad facilities within
other definitions as suggested in the bills to amend
Ch. 802, Laws of N.Y., 1947 (A6833 and S9480) in-
troduced in the New York Legislature in April,
1970 would be ineffective for the purposes of the
statutory covenant contained in the 1962 legisla-
tion.” (Stip. 236)
The Davis Polk opinion stated that, “. . . the mere re-
definition of ‘air terminals’ by the bill would be ineffective
to remove the facilities of the Project from the ambit of
the Covenant.” (Stip. 238)
Thus, having in 1962 purported to insulate the Port
Authority from further mass transit obligations, the Legis-
latures of New York and New Jersey were effectively
frustrated in their 1971 attempt to get the Port Authority
back into mass transit by redefining railroad lines as air-
port improvements.
In December of 1971 the First Boston Corporation,
which had been commissioned by the Port Authority to
do a Passenger Rail Transportation Study, reported that,
“« .. the 1962 Covenant ‘precludes general credit financing
of any passenger transportation project, no matter how
desirable, for which projects show an operating profit be-
low debt service requirements.’ ” (Stip. 243)
In November 1972 Governors Cahill and Rockefeller and
the Commissioners of the Port Authority announced agree-
ment on a plan for rail mass transportation improvement.
The plan included the extension of P..TH to Newark and
beyond to Plainfield, as well as the creation of rail service
to Kennedy (Stip. 253).
Tn an attempt to effectuate that plan, the 1962 Covenant
was amended in New York and in New Jersey. (Chs.
207 and 208, Laws of New Jersey of 1972, Ch. 1003, Laws
of New York of 1972, Chs. 317 and 318, Laws of New
York of 1973) (N.J.S.A. 32:1-35.55[a]). That amendment
repealed the Covenant but prospectively only. In the light
16
of the fact that bonds already issued would not mature
until 2007, the partial repealer was ineffective in terms
of freeing Port Authority funds from the strictures of the
1962 Covenant until 2007.
The 1972 Annual Report of th® Port Authority an-
nounced the plan of the two Gevernors for the expension
of the Port Authority’s role in mass transit (Stip. 263
et seq.).
Finally, in that cireumstance in which the Port Author-
ity and the States of New York and New Jersey had
agreed upon certain mass transit projects, but neverthe-
less been frustrated by the 1962 Covenant, both States
enacted a repealer (in New Jersey Ch. 25 of the Laws
of 1974).
“This bill is designed to preclude the application
of the 1962 covenant restricting port authority par-
ticipation in mass transit projects. Chapter 208,
P.L. 1972, precluded such application to bonds new-
ly issued after the effective date of that act, but
maintained in status quo the position of holders of
bonds issued between March 27, 1962 and December
28, 1972. Since affected bonds are outstanding un-
til the year 2007, the restrictions imposed by the
covenant effectively preclude sufficient port auwuor-
ity participation in the development of a public
transportation system in the port district. In 1972
the State of New York passed legislation preclud-
ing the application of the 1962 covenant from out-
standing bonds as well as newly issued bonds. It
is the purpose of this act to accomplish effective
repeal of the covenant.” (Stip. 356)
—
17
Governor Wilson said in part that:
“Coupled with action faken by the State of New
Jersey, this bill retroactively repeals the 1962 statu-
tory covenant entered into between the States of
New York and New Jersey and prospective pur-
chasers of bonds of the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey. Pursuant to that covenant,
the Port Authority is prohibited from using its
revenues beyond the existing Port Authority Trans-
Hudson (PATH) System for rail mass transit fa-
cilities unless such facilities would be self-support-
ing.” (Stip. 356)
Governor Byre said that:
“The bill, A-1304, sponsored by Assemblyman Her-
bert C. Klein, D-Passaic, repeals the 1962 covenant
which has effectively precluded the port authority
from becoming involved in mass tyansit projects in
the New York metropolitan area. The covenant
restricts the authority from participation in mass
transit projects which are not self-sustaining.
“‘T hope this bill, coupled with the same legis-
lation in New York State, will clear the way once
and for all for the port authority to fulfill which I
believe was one of its original functions,’ said
Byrne. ‘The authority was created as a transpor-
tation agency and I intend to see that it lives up
to its original promise of assisting in establish-
ment of a quality public transportation system for
the metropolitan region without in any way impair-
ing its fiseal integrity.’” (Stip. 358)
The record in the proceedings below was supplemented
to reflect the fact that on the day following the issuance
18
of the Court’s Opinion (May 14, 1975), the Port Author-
ity announced substantial increases in bridge and tunnel
toll charges. The Authority further announced that the
purpose of such increases was to provide funds for mass
transit. The 1962 Covenant having been repealed, the
Authority, with appropriate financial safeguards, was now
free to respond to the legislative direction of the States
in the field of mass transit; to implement a major element
of the Compact.
The Federal Question Presented is Substantial
This appeal presents a substantial question involving
whether or not the Compact clause of the Constitution has
been violated by the enactment of the 1962 Covenant. At
the outset, it sheuld be noted that this appeal is integrally
related to the appeal to this Court in the cause with which
it has been consolidated, United States Trust Company of
New York, et al. v. The State of New Jersey, et al. hat
ease relates to an attack upon the statute repealing the
contested covenant. The repealer was upheld by the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey. In the event that decision
is reversed by this Court, the validity of the 1962 Cov-
enant will be at issue. This appeal is taken, therefore,
to preserve the issue of the Covenant’s validity in the
event that the repealer is determined to be invalid.
The interpretation and construction of an interstate
compact sanctioned by Congress is a matter of federal
law. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n vy. Col-
burn, 310 U.S. 419 (1940); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Parden v. Terminal
Railway of Ala., State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
The 1962 Covenant constitutes a radical alteration in the
19
substance of the initial agreement between the states, and,
as such, must be approved by Congress. The consent of
Congress is a prerequisite to the validity of such agree-
ments. Howell vy. Port of New York Authority, 34 F.
Supp. 797 (D.C. N.J. 1940). The covenant, in practical
effect, materially altered tic purposes of the original
agreement.
The Covenant was a fundamental impairment of the
Compact in that it effectively made it impossible for the
States legislatively to authorize the Authority to plan,
coordinate or implement plans for mass transit. Thus
it was necessarily in derogation and not in furtherance of
the purposes of the Compact.
The bi-state structure and jurisdiction of the Port Au-
thority—an agency set up by Compact between two states,
with interstate planning, operational and economic respon-
sibilities and powers—underscores the original reason for
and need of Congressional consent.
Since the adoption of the original Compact and the
Comprehensive Plan in 1921 and 1922, respectively, the
states of New York and New Jersey have enacted numer.
ous bills “supplementary to” and “amendatory of” the
original legislation. This legislation granted the Port Au-
thority additional powers, such as the power to condemn,
to construct certain bridges, tunnels, and terminals, to
operate rairports, to pool its finances, ete., but all such
additional responsibilities and powers were consistent with
the purposes of the Compact and specifically in aid of the
Port Authority’s duty to plan and develop a coordinated
system of transportation and terminal facilities.
The covenants must fall ior they constitute agreement
between the states not approved by Congress as required
by the Constitution of the United States.
20
Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution,
provides:
“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress
. enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign power...” (clause
~ 8, the Compact clause).
We are concerned here with an express agreement be-
tween the states not in furtherance of the original pur-
poses of the Compact but in contravention of the Port
Authority’s mandate to plan and develop a coordinated
system of transportation. Its major obligation to plan
was not severable from any particular duty, but was the
glue which bound them together. While the Port Au-
thority increasingly ignored this statutory duty, it was
eapable until 1962 of financing and therefore formulating
and effectuating plans for the coordination and develop-
ment of all forms of transportation. This necessarily in-
cluded mass transportation. The 1962 covenants, as noted,
effectively barred use of Port Authority funds for mass
transportation beyond the Hudson Tubes.
Without the capacity to use its funds for mass trans-
portation, the Port Authority became incapable of formu-
lating and effectuating plans for the coordinated system
of all forms of transportation in the Port District con-
templated by the Compact. In this way the covenants
materially altered the Compact. They were not in “fur-
therance” of the Compact’s purposes but in defiance of
them. Moreover, to the extent that the Port Authority
is relieved of its responsibilities and obligations to mass
transportation, it is able to increase the time and money
it can devote to transportation facilities that produce rev-
enues. In this way, its powers are increased. This has
led to the Port Authority’s excessive support of facili-
21
ties for automobiles creating imbalances in all forms of
transportation—the very opposite effect ®nvisioned by the
Compact.
The Attorney General of New Jersey (F.0. 1957 No.
13) had this to say concerning non-congressional impair-
ment of Compacts:
“As Justice Jones stated in Henderson vy. Delaware
River Joint Toll Bridge Commission, 362 Pa. 475,
66 A.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1949) :
‘It is within the competency of a State, which is
a party to a compact with another State, to legis-
late in respect of matters covered by the compact
so long as such legislative action is in approbation
and not in reprobation of the compact.’ (at pp. 849,
850).
A State statute which is in conflict with an inter-
state compact approved by the Congress is an in-
valid impairment of contract in violation of the
contract clause of the United States Constitution,
Article I, Section X, par. 1; Green v. Biddle, 23
U.S. 1 (1823); Cf. Olin v. Kitzmiller, 259 U.S. 260
(1922); P.J. McGowan & Sons, Inc. v. Van Winkle,
21 F. 2d 76 (D.C. Oreg. 1972), affirmed 277 U. S.
574 (1928). Accordingly, the general contracting
power vested in the Division of Purchase and Prop-
erty cannot constitutionally apply to the Commis-
sion.”
In the final analysis, the question comes down to this:
must a bi-state agreement relating to an agency with bil-
lions of assets, substantial regulatory powers and _ tre-
mendous impact on interstate commerce, be approved by
Congress pursuant to the Compact clause where the ef-
99
Al
fect of the agreement is to exacerbate an already de-
teriorating transportation situation, contrary to the pur
poses the Compact was intended to achieve. We submit APPENDIX A
that the answer is yes.
CONCLUSION Decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
For the reasons stated, probable jurisdiction should
be noted.
Respectfully submitted,
Howarp Stern
125 Ellison Street
Pn, Eee aaneny Se ITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK. AS
. i UNITED ST: U >A? 2 cca
Attorney for Agppenant TRUSTEE FOR *HE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
Daniel M. Gaby AND NEW JERSEY CONSOLIDATED BONDS, FORTIBTIi
Dated: May 1976 AND FORTY-FIRST SERIES; ON ITS OWN BEHALF
: ; AND ON BEHALF OF ALL HOLDERS OF CONSOLIDATED
Of a . BONDS OF THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK
Younsel:
AND NEW JERSEY AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SIT-
UATED, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT,
vy. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; BRENDAN T. BYRNE,
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; AND
WILLIAM F. HYLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-RESPON-
DENTS-CROSS-APPELLANTS.
Treropore W. Kueet, Esa.
DANIEL M. GABY, PLAINTIFF-CROSS-APPELLANT, v. THE
PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, JAMES C. KELLOGG.
Ill, HOYT AMMIDON, GUSTAVE L. LEVY, JAMES G.
HELLMUTH, ANDREW C,. AXTELL, WILLIAM J, RONAN,
W. PAUL STILLMAN, WALTER H. JONES, BERNARD J.
LASKER, PHILIP B. HOFFMAN, AND JERRY FINKEL-
STEIN, COMMISSIONERS OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK
AUTHORITY, AUSTIN J. TOBIN, EXECUTIVE DIREC-
TOR OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, AND
WILLIAM T. CAHILL, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANTS-CROSS-RESPONDENTS,
AND UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW
YORK, ETC., INTERVENOR.
Argued October 7, 1975-—Decided February 25, 1976.
?
A2
SYNOPSIS
Class action on behalf of citizens, residents and taxpayers
srhose occupations were dependent upon the existence of mass
transportation was brought against Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey challenging constitutionality of cove-
nant between the States of New Jersey and New York on one
hand and the holders of bonds issued by the Port .\uthority
on the other hand with respect to the use to which certain
revenues were to be put. After the covenant was repealed by
New Jersey Legislature, trustee for the bonds brought action
challenging the constitutionality of the repealing statute.
The Superior Court, Law Division, 134 N. J. Super. 124,
upheld the constitutionality of the repealer and dismissed the
class action and the parties appealed. The Supreme Court
held that compact which created the Port Authority em-
powered, but did not mandate, the Author:ty to develop a
plan for a particular kind of method of transportation; and
that, since the Authority had exercised its discretion by re-
jecting a policy favoring mass transportation, mandamus did
not lie to compel the Authority to develop a plan for mass
transit even though, by virtue or repeal of the covenant, it
had the funds to do so.
Affirmed.
Pashman, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and
filed an opinion.
A3
Mr. Robert B. Meyner and Mv. Devereux Milburn, of the
New York bar, argued the cause for appellant-cross-respon-
dent-intervenor United States Trust Company (Messrs.
Meyner, Landis and Verdon, ani Messrs. Carter,
Ledyard and Milburn and Hawkins, Delafield and Wood.
of the New York bar, attorneys; Mr. Meyner, Mr. Milburn,
and Wr. Donald J. Robinson, of the New York bar. on the
brief and of counsel).
Mr, Murray J. Laulicht and Mr. Michael I. Sovern, ot the
New York bar, Special Counsel to the Attorney General. ar-
gued the cause for respondents-cross-appellants State of New
Jersey, Brendan T. Byrne and William F. Hyland (Mr.
William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey. at-
torney; Mr. Laulicht, Mr. Sovern and Mr. Harold Edgar,
of the New York bar, Special Counsel to the Attorney Gen-
eral, on the brief).
Mr. Howard Stern argued the cause for plaintiff-cross-ap-
pellant Daniel M. Gaby (Messrs. Shavick, Stern, Schotz,
Steiger and Croland, attorneys; Mr. Stern on the brief.
Mr. Stern and Mr. Theodore-W. Kheel of the New York
bar and Messrs. Battle, Fowler, Stokes and Kheel of the Xew
York bar, of counsel).
A4
Mr. Francis A. Mulhern argued the cause for Gross-re-
spondent The Port Authority of New York and Newtdersey,
et al. (Mr, Mulhern, attorney and on the brief; Wr. 'Patrick
J. Falvey of the New York bar, Mr. Joseph Lesser of the
New York bar, Ms. Isobel E. Muirhead, Mr. Arthur P. Berg
of the New York bar, and Mr. Vigdor D. Bernstein, of
counsel),
Per CurtAM. The judgment is affirmed, substantially for
the reasons set forth in the opinion of Judge Gelman, 134
N. J. Super. 124 (Law Div. 1975). The observations which
follow are occasioned by Justice Pashman’s suggested remedy
in the Gaby suit.?
Whatever persuasive force might be accorded the argument
that as a matter’of policy the Port Authority should devote
more of its energies and resources to the mass transit field,
the fact remains that the remedy fashioned by our Brother is
neither pressed for by Gaby on this appeal nor within the
powers of this Court to direct and enforce.
Gaby’s class action complaint for a declaratory judgment
that the 1962 Covenant was unconstitutional asked for “multi-
farious relief,” including a request that the Port Authority
be directed “to formulate and submit to the court a plan
for the development of mass transit facilities within the
Port District,” 134 N. J. Super. at 131. However, the trial
judge, having concluded in the United States Trust Co. suit
that “the repeal legislation was a reasonable and hence valid
exercise of the states’ police power which is not prohibited
by the Contract Clause of either the Federal or the State Con-
stitution,” td. at 197, found it unnecessary to reach the issue
of the 1962 Covenant’s asserted invalidity. He therefore dis-
——_— - te
‘Justice Pashman would order tie Port Authority to complete
pending projects and to “formulate and present plans and sugges-
tions for a regional mass transportat'on scheme to the Legislatures
of New York and New Jersey * * * ia an expeditious fashion and
within a fixed period of time.” Post at 288.
A5
missed Gaby’s complaint, id. at 198, without discussing the re-
quested relief of a direction for development of @ mass transit
plan, on which issue there was neither testimony nor argu-
ment at the trial level.
In his brief filed in the Court after direct certification of his
appeal, 68 NV. J. 175 (1975), Gaby conceded his limited pur-
pose in pursuing the appeal as being “to preserve the issue of
the constitutionality of the 1962 Covenant.” The point of this
in turn was, as he put it, to furnish “an alternative ground for
affirming the decision below.”* Whatever issues may have been
preserved by his appeal and whatever desire there may have
been to present “all the issues,” the fact remains that’ Gaby’s
brief raises and discusses only the validity of the Covenant in
constitutional terms. No argument is made there for any
special relief; and, understandably, the Port Authority has
likewise not briefed the question at all in this Court. At oral
argument the subject was adverted to only in a limited fash-
ion.
Ordinarily, we would have no occasion to decide an issue
which, while portentous in itself, has become so remote and
peripheral to the central thrust of this litigation. However,
inasmuch as the minority opinion raises and discusses tn ex-
tenso this question of considerable public significance, namely,
the involvement of the Port Authority in mass transit and
particularly the propriety of this Court ordering as a specific
remedy the submission of a plan for development of mass
transit facilities, we overlook whatever infirmities may exist
in the record before us, compounded by the practical disad-
vantage of not having the views of the partics, and proceed to
address the point. a
[1] The 1921 Compact between the States of New York
and New Jersey, whereby the Port Authority was created,
N. J. 8. A. 82:1-4, envisioned the adoption of a Compre-
hensive Plan for the development of the port. N. J. 9. A.
2Cross Motion for Certification of Plaintiff-Respondent, Daniel
M. Gaby.
AS
32:1-11. Direction was given to the Port Authority in the
Plan itself “to proceed with the development of the port of
New York in accordance with said comprehensive plan * * *.”
N. J. S. A. 32:1-33. That the Authority’s involvement in
transportation matters was contemplated is obvious from a
reading of this and other portions of the Comprehensive Plan
as well as of the Compact; but it requires a quantum leap
to derive therefrom a mandate (as distinguished from the
power) to develop a plan for a particular kind or method of
transportation, to wit, mass transit. It is not without sig-
nificance, for instance, that the legislature has provided that
the Authority may make recommendations for the increase
and improvement of transportation facilities, N. J. S. A.
32 :1-13, which by definition includes railroads and any fa-
cility for the “transportation or carriage of persons or prop-
erty,” N. J. 8. A. 32:1-23; but nowhere is it mandated that
such recommendations be made. A mandate such as that
contemplated by the minority opinion is not something to be
inferred by the courts but rather is a singularly appropriate
subject for specific legislative directive, conspicuously absent
here. Cf. Del. Riv. & Bay Auth. v. N. J. Pub. Emp. Rel.
Comm’n., 112 N. J. Super. 160, 165 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd
o. b., 58 N. J. 388 (1971).
If, then, the Authority is in the position of being em-
powered (as we acknowledge) rather than mandated to act in
the area of mass transit, its exercise of that power becomes
a matter of discretion and judgment. As is made abundantly
clear by the voluminous record in this case, the trial court’s
opinion, and the concurring and partially dissenting opinion
here, the Authority has more than once in recent years
broached the question of whether it should pursue a policy
of encouraging mass transit and has determined that it shall
not. The remedy suggested in the minority opinion is de-
signed to overrule that decision. As such it is in the nature of
the former prerogative writ of mandamus, now invocable un-
der proceedings for relief in lieu of prerogative writs, Rule
4:69.
AZ
[2,3] However, mandamus will not lie if the duty to act
‘8 a discretionary one and the discretion has been exercised.
As Justice Heher explained, in Switz v. Middletown Twp..
23 N. J. 580 (1957), mandamus is “a coercive process that
commands the performance of a specific ministerial act or
duty, or compels the exercise of a discretionary function.
‘but does not seek to interfere with or control the mode and
manner of its exercise or te influence or direct a particular
result.” 23 N. J. at 587. As we have sought to demon-
strate, the circumstances -before us do not at all invite or
accommodate the remedy proposed. This is so because the
Authority (whose function is clearly not ministerial) has in
fact exercised its discretion, even though that exercise has
resulted in the rejection of a policy favoring mass trans-
portation. Being a judgment decision its wisdom may be
‘open to dispute; but as to the propriety of this Court’s re-
fusal to intrude on the underlying policy determination.
there can be no question in the circumstances before us.
And this not as a response {o some procedural deficiency
but because of our respect for the fundamental substantive
principle embodied in mandamus.
Finally, we observe that in this particular area of bi-
state operations, there . close and continuing supervision
of the Port Authority by the other branches of government.
Hence, the proposed remedy would not only tend to usurp
the influence over the Authority vested in the Governors of
the States of New York and New Jersey, but would also in-
trude upon the functions of the legislatures of the respec-
tive States, whose task it is in the final analysis to enact
appropriate legislation and take such other action as may
be required to remedy whatever deficiencies may exist with
respect to mass transit.
Affirmed.
*
PasHMAN, J. (concurring in part and disseating is part).
, é
A8
INTRODUCTION TO GABY COMPLAINT
My Brothers today affirm a lower court decision which was
the product of two separate and distinct actions consolideted
for trial. United States Trust Co. v. State, 134 N. J. Super.
iz4 (Law Div. 1975). In the first action, brought by plain-
tiff United States Trust Company, the tria! court sustained
the State’s repeal of the 1962 statutory covenant (NV. J.
S. A. 32:1-35.55) between the States of New Jersey and
New York and the holders of bonds issued by the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority).
That covenant was concurrently enacted by the legislatures
of New York and New Jersey at the ime of the Port Au-
thority’s acquisition of the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad
Company (H & M), since renamed the Port Authority
Trans-Hudson System (PATH). Intended as a means of
protecting the bondholders’ investments, the covenant pro-
hibited the states and the Port Authority from applying
“any of the rentals, tolls, fares, fees, charges, revenues or
reserves, . . . for any railroad purposes whatsoever other
than permitted purposes.” V. J. S. A. 32:1-35.55. As sub-
sequently detined in the covenant, “permitted purposes”
precluded the establishment, acquisition or construction of
any railroad facility until the Port Authority could deter-
mine that the facility would be self-supporting or would not
produce deficits except within narrowly defined limits.
In dismissing plaintiff’s cause of action, the trial court
found that the 1974 “repealer,” N. J. S. A. 32:1-235.55a,
was immune from constitutionai challenge as an impai:ment
of contractual obligation, a right which is protected by
U.S. Const., Art. I, § X and N. J. Const. (1947), Art. LV,
§ VII, © 3. As a collateral finding, the court determined that
' the attractiveness of Port Authority bonds was not contingent
upon the continued protection of the 1962 covenant, but
rather upon the viability of the Port Authority itself.
AQ
The majority affirms the trial court on these bases and
to this extent, I concur fully and completely with the con-
clusions reached by Judge Gelman in his very enlightened
and comprehensive opinion. My agreement is premised on
the unduly restrictive influence which the covenant exerted
on Port Authority operations in contravention of the
statutory mandates upon which that agency was created in
1921. The paralytic effect of the covenant could be seen in
the Authority’s practical inability and aititudinal reluctance
to’ respond to the mounting needs for rapid transit in the
New York metropolitan area. In light of the limited util-
ity which it continued to serve, the 1962 covenant repre-
sented an artificial obstacle to the affirmative public action
which was necessitated as an alternative to continued and
wasteful reliance solely on the private automobile as the
primary mode of transportation. :
The second action, Gaby v. Port of New York Authority,
et al., was likewise concerned with the repeal of the 1962
covenant, Expanded into a class action on behalf of citizens,
residents and taxpayers whose occupations are dependent
upon the existence of mass transportation, plaintiff cites the
1962 covenant as.an impediment to the improvement and
expansion of these facilities. While the State of New Jersey
sought the repeal of the covenant as an ultimate end in the
(nited States Trust Co. action, plaintiff Gaby visualizes a
repeal as merely @ means to a larger end. This is because
the vindication of Gaby’s interests is only partially depen-
dent on freeing the financial resources from the restrictions
of the 1962 covenant and placing them at the Port Author-
ity’s disposal. More problematical and essential to the relief
which he desires is the necessity to overcome the adminis-
. trative inertia which has characterized the agency’s efforts
in the area of mass transportation. Consequently, Gaby re-
quested in his complaint that the trial court:
. . . {Direct and’ order the Port Authority, its Commissioners,
and its Executive Director to formulate and submit to this Court,
or a Special Master to be appointed by this Court, a plan for the
AlG
development of mass transportation facilities in the Port District.
. . . [Plaintiff Gaby’s complaint at 17)
This action was pretried on February 22, 1973 and oral
arguments were heard on September 26, 1973 on the par-
ties’ respective motions for summary judgment. Judgment
was deferred and arguments were later rescheduled to per-
mit the submission of briefs on additional issues and the
intervention of United States Trust Company as a party
defendant representing the interests of Port Authority bond-
holders. Prior to these arguments, the pendency of legisla-
tion repealing the covensnt reccmmended that the trial court
withhold further review. Accordingly, the proceedings were
stayed to permit consideration of the anticipated legislation.
The statutory repealer which was signed into law by Gov-
ernor Brendan T. Byrne on April 30, 1974 precipitated the
United States Trust Co. action, which was instituted on the
same day. On the basis of common subject matter, this later
action was consolidated on December 10, 1974 with the
previously filed Gaby case by order of the trial court. These
matters then proceeded to trial in February 1975.
The trial was iargely confined to the factual issues of
bondholder reliance on the 1962 covenant and resultént dam-
age to the secondary bond market caused by the repeal of the
covenant. The information which was thus elicited formed
the basis for the trial court’s reported opinion, 134 N. J.
Super. 124, in which the constitutionality of the 1974 re-
pealer was sustained. Although reasons upon which the
court’s decision was grounded were clearly distinguishable
from the constitutional arguments advanced by Gaby, the
court’s ultimate decision — the rejection of the 1962
covenant — coincided with Gaby’s interests. Regardless of
whether that result was achieved by sustaining the 1974 re-
pealer as the trial court did, or whether it was achieved by
tinding the 1962 covenant itself unconstitutional as sug-
gested by Gaby, the result indicated the possibility of grant-
ing the further relief sought by Gaby. A more activist role
All
for the Port Authority appeared to be a reality. Nonetheless,
the court concurrently ordered the dismissal of Gaby’s com-
plaint, thus frustrating the additional relief'which he sought.
134 N. J. Super. at 198. From this disposition, Gaby filed
a cross-motion for direct certification which was granted on
May 28, 1975. 68 N. J. 175 (1975).
Similar to his presentation before the trial court, Gaby’s
arguments are again directed towards a declaration 6f the
unconstitutionality of the 1962 covenant. This is more the
result of strategic considerations, however, than devotion to
substantive principle. Recognizing the limited nature of the
trial court’s factual findings and disposition, Gaby has
taken what appears to be a most advisable legal course. By
preserving the issue of the constitutionality of the 1962
covenant on appeal, he has simultaneously preserved one of
his major contentions should this or any other court reverse
the trial court on the constitutionality of the 1974 repealer.
Furthermore, in his Supreme Court brief, Gaby explained
that his contentions with regard to the 1962 Covenant are
inextricably tied to his request for greater involvement of
the Port Authority in mass transit projects:
The Appellant's Brief of Gaby is concerned with the validity of
the 1962 Covenant (N- J. 8S. A. 32:1-85.50 et seg.). Central to
the iasue of the validity of the Covenant is the question whether
the mass transportation of people within the Port District was one
of the principal activities aythorized by the Compact (N. J. 8. A.
32 :1-35.50 et seq.) ; whether the insulation of the Port Authority
from that activity was in such derogation of the Compact as to
frustrate its meaning and intent aud so material as to require Con-
gressional approval. [Plaintiff-Cross Appellant’s brief at 3].
The majority today chooses to overlook this relationship
in its reluctance to transcend the judgmental confines of
the trial court and in its affirmation of that court’s dis-
missal of Gaby’s complaint. This disposition, undertaken in
an unusually cavalier fashion, is not a product of some mis-
understanding as to the essential relief which Gaby requests.
On the contrary, the majority recognizes the strategic con-
Al2
siderations implicit in Gaby’s desire to preserve the issue
of the constitutionality of the 1962 Covenant. 1”te (at
261). Nonetheless, in characterizing the constitutional argu-
ments raised by Gaby as exemplifying a “limited purpose
in pursuing the appeal,” the majority misconstrues and
frustrates the true interests of Gaby, and has done so in a
manner which I find most distressing.
The majority justifies its truncated consideration of Gaby’s
plea by veferring to an isolated phrase, taken out of context
from a sentence which Gaby adopted as representative of
his position in his cross-motion for certification. When more
appropriately considered within the sentence in which it
originally appeared, the phrase --- “an alternative ground
for affirming the decision below” — assumes an entirely dif-
ferent meaning from that which the majority attaches to it:
The purposes of this cross motion are identical with those stated
by the State of New Jersey in its cross motion for certification:
a . bring before the Supreme Court all of the issues submitted
to Judge Gelman and to avoid the possibility that some of the issues
submitted to Judge Gelman might have to be determined in the first
instance by the Appellate Division. Because of the urgency and
public importance of this case, it would be most unwise to require
a piecemeal, appellate process, particularly since the [first] issue
presented by this cross motion could be an alternative ground for
affirming the decision below. . . .” [Plaintiff-cross appellant's ap-
pendix at 47a-48a; empbasis supplied).
While the “first issue” refers to the constitutionality of the
1962 covenant, I believe it would be wrong to confuse Gaby’s
real interest in stimulating improvement of urban mass
transportation with his more temporal interest in having the
1962 covenant declared unconstitutional. The majority not
only fails to make this distinction, but fails to do so despite
Gabvy’s expressed desire to present “all of the issues” to this
Court.
This failure is only compounded by the majority’s persistent
willingness to ignore the Gaby complaint and the relief which
it warrants. In spite of plaintiff’s overindulgent concern for
the constitutionality issue, the statement of his case reflects
Al3
more than a limited and perfunctory reference to the subject.
During the course of oral argument, counsel for Gaby spe-
cifically stated :
Yes, as we read the compact between the states, the affirmative
obligation of the Port Authority in this area is to plan. The imme-
diate affirmative obligation . . . and indeed in these briefs and else-
where, there is a suggestion that if the Covenant is invalid or the
repenler upheld, either way, that it would be appropriate for the
Court to direct the Port Authority to study mass transit needs in
the Port Authority area and.make proper proposals. Then when
it comes to implementation, then you're talking about legislation
of the two states, but the affirmative obligation of the Port Au-
thority is to study the problem as it affects the Port area.
It should be noted in passing, that this statement not only
affirms the relief desired by plaintiff, but also embodies a re-
quest for a remedy which parallels that which I suggest be-
low, infra at 287-288.
Therefore, although my Brothers remove the constricting
fiscal shackles of the 1962 covenant, they fail to take the
additional steps which flow as natural concomitants to the
action which they affirm. This failure, as I see it, stems, in
part, from a reluctance to go farther and faster in an area
plagued by administrative inaction and intransigence. It also
constitutes an indulgence in the meaningless gesture of sus-
taining the 1974 repealer without concurrently authorizing
the relief needed to implement the initiative which the Legis-
lature sought to instill in the Port Authority by that repeal.
As I fear, the administrative foot-dragging which was im-
plicit in the 1962°covenant, may be only symptomatic of the
inertia which has characterized the Port ~Authority in the
field of mass transit operations. The majority’s decision can
only serve to perpetuate this sad state of affairs.
In light of the rapidly deteriorating condition of mas«
transit operations in the metropolitan area, this disposition
is most unfortunate. Faced with the ever-increasing deficits
which are inherent in this mode of public transportation, mass
transit operations have been repeatedly shunned by the Port
Al4
Authority in spite of its statutory mandate to the contrary.
As cutbacks in service have been experienced throughout the
Port District; the commuters’ resort to the private automobile
has produced a dysfunctional, volume of traffic congestion
and pollution. The ioll which this coagestion has exacted
has been obvious in the tunnels and on the oridges, whoxe op-
erations Qe Port Authority apparently prefers to maintain.
Unlike today’s majority, I am unwilling to assign plaintiff
Gaby’s case to death or to a peaceful somnambulism. This is
particularly so where within the historical and evidential ma-
terials presented to the trial court reside the seeds for a more
sweeping and effective disposition. I cannot sanction the mere
repeal of the 1962 covenant without a concurrent assurance
that the Port Authority will assume those responsibilities for
which it was created and, which to this point, it has effectively
avoided. The recalcitrance of the Port Authority has not been
‘altered by the trial court’s disposition and will not be altered
by merely affirming that decision. A more effective disposition
is needed.
If
HISTORY OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE PORT
AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE MASS TRANSIT
FACILITIES
In its opinion, the majority grudgingly acknowledges the
Port Authority’s obligation to become involved in mass trans-
portation. After a perfunctory reading of the statutory frame-
work of the Port Authority, the majority concludes that the
existence of such a mandate is “a singularly appropriate sub-
ject for specific legislative Gnatine, conspicuously absent
here.” (At 258).
While specific statutory directives hove served as vehicles
for recent Port Authority projects, N. /. S. A. 32:1-35.20
(authorization for the Port Authority to undertake mass
transportation projects to link the various airports in the
Port District), N. J. 8. A. 32:1-35.21 -tanthorization to
Al5
build railroad lines to and facilities at the various airports in
the Port District), its employment is in its infancy and
affords no insight as to the previously reluctant forays which
the Port Authority has made into the field of mass trans-
portation. A full consideration of the statutory basis of the
Port Authority and the history of its implementation reveals
that the majority’s interpretation of the Authority’s powers
and obligations is both short-sighted and erroneous. For
instance, the statutory creation of the Port Authority evinces
a clear legislative intent to have the Authority become in-
volved in development of mass transportation. The majority
position misconceives the role of the Authority to be a drone-
like entity ultimately dependent upon enabling legislation, ra-
ther than a separate bi-state agency. Similarly, the majority
fails to recogni: ‘he inherent limitations on the knowledge,
information and expertise which are at the disposal of the
New Jersey and New York Legislatures on the subject of mass
transit operations. In light of this fact, the wisdom of relying
upon legislative directives to address the panoply of needs
within the field of mass transportation becomes problematical.
The failure of the majority to account for these factors casts
a large shadow upon the validity of its construction of the
Port Authority’s powers. These inadequacies within the ma-
jority position become apparent upon thorough consideration
of the statutory origins of the Port Authority and the man-
date which was encompassed in its original Compact and Com-
prehensive Plan.
| A. Origins and Early Development ;
Compact and Comprehensive Plan
The Port Authority is a statutory product of a compact
which was entered into by the States of New Jersey and New
York in 1921.’ Modeled efter the recommendations of a joint
1New Jersey approved the compact by L. 1921, c. 151, now con-
tained in N. J. 8. A. 32:1-1 et seg. The comparable New York
Ai6
commission,” the Port Authority represented a response to, the
dysfunctional competition end commercial! disputes which his-
toricaily had plagued the two siates.* As such, it was intended
to meet the needs and interests which the two states shared
with respect to the Port of New York. This was expressly
recognized in the preamble to the 1921 Compact, which stated :
The future development of such terminal, transportation and other
facilities of commerce will require the expenditure of large sume
legislation was adopted in Laws of Vew York 1921, c. 154, now con-
tained in N. Y. Unconsol. Laws, § 6401 et seg. (McKinney 1961).
Congressional consent to the compact was granted by Pub. Rea.
No. 17, 8. J. Res. 88, c. 77, 42 Stat. 174.
At the time of creation, the agency was designated “The Port
of New York Authority.” N. J. 8. A. 32:14. This was amended by
L. 1972, c. 69, §§ 1, 2, contained in N. J. S. A. 32:1-4 and 32:1-4.1,
to the more ecumenical “The Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey.” For the purposes of this opinion, the agency sha!!
be referred to as the Port Authority or just Authority.
2The New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Com-
mission was a body whose representative membership were created
by independent, though concurrently enacted bills which were passed
by the Legislatures of New Jersey and New York in 1917. Composed
of three commissioners from each state, the commission issued a
preliminary report in 1918, New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor
Development Comm'n, Preliminary Joint Report, Transmitted to the
Legislature, February 18, 1918 (1918). This was followed by a prog-
ress report in 1919, and a comprehensive report in 1920, in which
the commission proposed the establishment of a permanent body
with interstate jurisdiction. Joint Report with Comprehensive Plan
and Recommendations (1920). It subsequently submitted the ten-
tative draft of the proposed compact. See Bard, “he Port of New
York Authority, 24-34 (1942).
3The enmity between the two states traces its roots as far back
as the semina! case, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. 8S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 8
L. Ed. 2% (1824). Although it has from time to time received ex-
haustive consideration in the case law, New Jersey v. New York, 28
U. 8. (3 Pet.) 461, 7 L. Ed. 741 (1880); 30 U. 8. (5 Pet.) 284,
8 L. Ed. 127 (1831); 31 U. 8. (6 Pet.) 323, 8 DL. Bd. 414 (1832);
In the Matter of Devoe Mfg. Co., 108 U. S. 401, 406-10, 2 8. C+.
804, 27 L. Ed. 764 (1883) j- State v. Babcock, 30 N. J. L. 29 (Sup.
Ct. 1862); Central RR. of N. J. v. Jersey City, 70 N. J. L. &
(1903), a concise presentation of its history may be found in
Bard, supra, footnote 2, at 5-24. z
Al7
of money, and the cordial co-operation of the states of New York
and New Jersey in the encouragement of the investment of capital,
and in the formulation and execution of the necessary physical
plans... . (N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-1]
While the Compact delineated the framework for the Port
Authority and its operations, the necessity for a more specific
implementation was recognized in Article X, which directed
the state legislatures to adopt “a plan or plans for the compre-
hensive development of the port of New York” “fas soon as
may be practicable.” N. J. 8. A. 32:1-11. The formulation
of this plan was undertaken by the Authority’s initial board
of commissioners, whose Report with Plan for the Comprehen-
sive Development of the Port of New York, December 21.
1921 (1921) was eventually enacted as the Comprehensive
Plan mandated by the Compact.*
This plan envisioned an active and affirmative role for the
Port Authority in the development of the Port District.® Sec-
tion 8 of the Comprehensive Plan provided:
-
The Port of New York Authority is hereby authorized and directed
to proceed with the development of the port of New York in accord-
ance with said comprehensive plan as rapidly as may be economically
practicable and is hereby vested with all necessary and appropriate
powers not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States
or of either state, to effectuate the same, except the power to levy
taxes or assesaments. [N. J. 8. A. 32:1-33; emphasis supplied)
That fultiilment of this statutory mandate contemplated the
involvement of the Port Authority in transportation matters
of the Port District is undeniable. This responsibility, for
«The Comprehensive Plan was enacted in L. 1922, c. 9, now con-
tained in N. J. S. A. 32:1-25 et seg. New York approved the Com-
prehensive Plan in Laws of New York 1922, c. 43, now found in
N. Y. Unconsol. Laws § 6451-68 (McKinney (1961)). Congressional
consent was secured in S. /. Res. of July 1, 1922, c. 277, 42 Stat.
822.
3The metes and bounds of the Port District are defined in NW. J.
8. A. 32:1-3.
Als
exampie, was explicitly mentioned in that portion of the pre-
amble of the Compact cited above. Article XXII of the Com-
pact further clarifies this respoasibility by defining “trans-
portation facility” as including:
. railroads, steam or electric, motor truck or other street or
highway vehicles, tunne!s, bridges, boats, ferries, carfloats, lighters,
tugs, floating elevators, barges, s¢cows or aarbor craft of any kind,
aircraft suitable for harbor service, and every kind of transportation
facility uow in use or hereafter designed for use for the transporta-
tion or carriage of persons or property. [N. J. S. A. 32:1-23; em-
phasis supplied]
The centrality of the railroads to the organizational and co-
ordination schemes of the Port Authority was highlighted by
the separate definition of “railroads.” This was a reflection of
the final report by the New York, New Jersey Port and Har-
bor Development Commission, which in 1920 had recom-
mended the establishment of a bi-state agency with appropri-
ate jurisdiction. See footnote 2, supra. The report, whose
factual findings served as the basis for the Compact and the
Comprehensive Plan, found the commercial inadequacies
of the metropolitan area to be “primarily a railroad problem.”
The absence of railroad coordination and accessibility at many
places within the district consequently required “essentially
a railroad plan.” The Commission summarized its suggestions
in a proposal which entailed the establishment of railroad belt-
line systems between New Jersey and New York, and con-
cluded :
This remodeled terminal railroad system, bringing every railroad
of the Port to every part of the Port, and thus giving every part cf
the Port opportunity to develop and to have the eccnomical trans-
6N. J. & A. 32:1-23 provides:
“Railroads” shall include railways, extensions thereof, tunnels,
subways, bridges, elevated structures, tracks, poles, wires, conduits,
powerhouses, substations, lines for the transmission of power, car
barns, shops, yards, sidings, turnouts, switches, stations and ap-
proaches thereto, cars and motive equipment.
A19
portation service needed for its commercial and industrial growth
and expansion, c nstitutes the comprehensive plan of the Commis-
sion — the plan which the Commission recommends for formal
udoption by the two states. [New York, New Jersey Port and Har-
bor Development Commission, Joint Report, supra footnote 2, at 3]
This statutory responsibility to develop the transportation
facilities of the Port District, and particularly facilities re-
lating to railroad operations, contained an implicit obligation
to foster passenger transportation service. Although the
Port and Development Comimission report concentrated on
the freight shipment needs of the area, it did not preclude a
comparable role for the Port Authority in passenger service.
With one notable exception, the Port Authority’s role in
passenger service is confirmed by the early history of the
agency. In this regard, however, even that exception, the
1928 veto message of Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York
which rejected a New Jersey proposal for the development
of a rapid transit system between the states, may be no
more than a personal predilection. 7 See 134 N. J. Super. at
149. Noting that the Port Authority should “stick to this
program . . .[for] the solution of the great freight distribu-
tion problem,” Governor Smith at no time denied the agency’s
power to deal with passenger service, and only suggested a
reordering of its priorities. More importantly, the position
which he advocated was expressly repudiated by the Port
Authority that same year. In a June 11, 1928 resolution
supporting the continuation of a Suburban Transit Engi-
7Governor Smith, in what remains the only major statement ques-
tioning a Port Authority role in passenger traffic, remarked:
I am satisfied that the Port Authority should stick to this pro-
gram, and I am entirely unwilling to give my approval to any
measure which at the expense of the solution of the great freight
distribution problem will set the Port Authority off on an entirely
new line of problem connected with the solution of the suburban
passenger problem.
Veto Message, Public Papers of Governor Alfred E. Smith of 1928,
187-88 (1938).
A20
neering Board,*® the Port Authority recognized that it had
a responsibility to the metropolitan commuter, based on its
broader cuty to develop transportation in the Port District:
The Commissioners of the Port Authority have found in their
studies that no adequate or effective interstate transportation de-
velopment can take place without taking full account of tranmepor-
tation of passengers as well as of freight throughout the Port Dis-
trict. [Emphasis supplied]
B. Port Authority Involvement im the
Area of Mass Transit ;
Reports, Studies and Legislation
Concermng Mass Transit
The continuance of its role in mass transportation has
been reaffirmed by the Port Authority from time to time.
The obligation to provide for passenger service within the
8The Suburban Transit Engineering Board had been created in
response to a Port Authority suggestion in its 1927 Annual Report.
As that report stated:
It is our opinion that, in the long run, the greatest progress will
be attained by having this Engineering Board undertake the re-
sponsibility for the preparation of the engineering section of a
comprehensive suburban transit plan for the entire port district.
The Port of New York Authority, Annual Report for 1927, 56
(Jan. 20, 1928). :
Parenthetically, it should be noted that this body was the intended
recipient of the funds which Governor Smith vetoed. The Port of
New York Authority, Annual Report for 1928, 683 (Dec. 31, 1928).
SA4nnual Report for 1928, supra footnote 8, at 64<%6. The Port
Aucherity answered more directly the fears expressed by Governor
Smith in a subsequent part of its June 11, 1928 resolution:
The Commissioners of the Port Authority are satisfied from the
reports of their staff that continuance of the work of the Suburban
Transit Engineering Board and the participation therein by mem-
bers of the staff of The Port of New York Authority will not at
this time divert any of their efforts away from the effectuation
of the statutory Comprehensive Plan nor from their duties in the
field of protecting the Port nor from any other pending work
of the Port Authority, but on the contrary, the continuance of
such Suburban Transit Engineering Board’s work will facilitate
_ the other work of.the Port Authority. [/é. at 65)
Rete seen 1 ee
A21
Compact’s injunction to the Post Authority has not only
been acknowledged by those whose occupations and interests
are related to the transportation field,’” but by ranking mem-
bers of the Port Authority staff as well. For example, the
following colloquy between Assemblyman J. Edward Crabiel
and the Port Authority’s then Executive Director Austin J.
Tobin occurred at a 1958 legislative hearing:
ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: Mr. Tobin, just to clear my mind
on certain key points — I have been reading your report and lis-
tening to your talk — there is no question that, as far as the com-
pact between the two states is concerned, the Legislatures could
direct the Port Authority to do rapid transit and that thet would
be within their compact.
MR. TOBIN: Yes sir. There's no question about it. [Hearings
on Assembly Bills No. 16 and 115 and Senate Bill No. 50, supre
footnote 10, Nov. 24, 1958, at 44] (emphasis supplied).
The manifestations of this responsibility have been insig-
nificant such as the separate sections which the Authority
devoted to “Suburban Transit” in its earlier Annual Re-
ports (a practice by the way, which has been resumed since
the Port Authority’s acquisition of the H & M railroad in
1962). See T. W. Kheel & R. J. Kheel, “The Port Author-
ity 1962 Covenant — Bar to Mass Transportation,” 27 Rut-
gers L. Rev. 1, 5{ 1973); The Port of New York Authority,
Annual Report for 1923, “Commuter Passenger Traffic,”
35-36 (Jan. 19, 1924); Annual Report for 1924, “Conges-
tion of Passenger-Traffic,” 23-24 (Jan. 24, 1925); Annual
Report for 1929, “Suburban Transit,” 27-28 (Dec. 31,
1930). More indicative, ‘however, of the Port Authority’s
10See Hearings on Assembly Bille No. 16 and 115 and Senate
Bill No. 50 before N. J. Assembly Comm. on Fed. & Interst. Rels.
and Assembly Comm. on Highways, Transp. and Pub. Utilities, Nov.
24, 1958, at 18A (Statement of Augustus 8. Dreier, Counsel, Inter-
Municipal Group for Better Rail Service); Dec. 3, 1968, at 22-A
(Statement of Herman T. Stichman, Trustee, Hudson & Manhattan
Railroad) (hereinafter referred to as Assembly Hearings); Cero,
The Power Broker Robert Moses and The Fall of New York, 922-
23 (1974).
22
role in rapid transit operations have been the infrequent re-
ports which it has issued on this subject.’’ The representa-
tiveness of at least 14 of these reports cannot be premised
on any successful projects which they have stimulated or
realized. As frankly admitted by Edward J. O’Mara, a chair-
man of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission (a Port
Authority-funded investigative agency which itself produced
an unsuccessful series of legislative proposals) :
For at least 35 years, there has been a growing public awareness
of the importance of mass transportation in the metropolitan re-
gion in the State of New Jersey. At least 14 more or less exten-
sive studies have been made of the problem by various committees
and commissions. Nothing has ever come of them, and in the mean-
time the problem has been becoming progressively more acute.
[Assembly Hearings, Nov. 24, 1958, at TOA)
See also 2d Hearing before N. J. Sen. Comm'n (Created un-
11These reports have been conducted on a variety of topics and
in conjunction with various other interested organizations. Some,
though by no means all, of these studies have included a continuing
study begun in 1927 of the suburban transit facilities to relieve
traffic congestion in conjunction with a variety of other groups (pur-
suant to New Jersey legislative authorization, L. 1927, c. 277); a
1937 study entitled “Suburban Transit for Northern New Jersey
(Mar. 1, 1987) concerning interstate and suburban passenger prob-
léms within the Port District and New Jersey in particular (under-
taken pursuant to L. 1936, c. J. Res. No. 6); & continuation of
studies begun in 1987 and the presentation of legislative proposals
for implementing a new transit system (pursuant to L. 1938, c.
J. Res. No. 1); a 1948 study concerning the development of a rapid
transit system in Northern New Jersey which would link Newark
Airport and New York City (undertaken pursuant to a request by
New Jersey Governor Alfred E. Driscoll) ; 1948 study concerning the
development of a north-south transit line in Hudsen County (ini-
tiated at the request of the City of Bayonne); and the creation
in 1952 of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to andertake
a comprehensive study of the transit problems of the Port District
(L. 1962, c. 194). By agreement reached in 1955, the Port Authority
provided $800,000 when this last study was inaugurated. The Com-
mission's report was released in 1958. In addition, the Port Authority
in the early 1960’s conducted a series of studies concerning the
feasibility of its acquiring the operations of the H & M railroad,
and later, the conditions under which the authority would do so.
A23
der Sen. Res. No. 7 (1960) and Reconstituted under Sen. Res.
No. 7 (1961)) to Study the Financial Structure and Opera-
tions of T'he Port of New York Authority, Jan. 27, 1961 (2d-
day), at 64-66 (Statement of Austin J. Tobin, Executive Di-
rector, Port of New York Authority). In this respect, these
studies provide a broad overview of the historic approach of
the Port Authority to the problems of urban mass transit.
This background is particularly important becanse what the
Covrt is truly asked to consider is the manner in which
the Port Authority has dealt with the problems of mass tran-
sit in the Port District, and the attitudinal reluctance which
has characterized its efforts in this area of transportation.
These studies, in conjunction with the annual reports which
are issued by the Port Authority, possess several characteris-
tics worth noting. First, virtually none of the studies resulted
from the Port Authority’s own initiative. Most of the studies
were the product of either legislative or other governmental
requests for pertinent information and proposals. See footnote
11, supra. While the failure to take affirmative administrative
or investigatory action may not necessarily be indicative of an
agency’s abdication of responsibility in the case of the Port
Authority, the failing is particularly suspect. This is because
the duties expressly imposed on the Port Authority by the
1921 Compact were those to “make plans for the development
of said district, supplementary to or amendatory of any plan
theretofore adopted ;”!? and to suggest to the state legislatures
reeommended means to improve Port commerce."
12N. J. 8. A. 32:1-12, which was contained in the original Com
pact as Article XI and which is indica manda ‘
a tive of a statutory te,
proved by the legislatures of the twr ,
upon both states with the same for a.nd effect eor-
porated in this agreement. [ supplied } a
— 8. A. 32:1-13 provides:
The port authority may from time to time make recommenda-
tions to the legislatures of the two states or to the congress of the
7
A24
Second, none of these studies contains an expressed com-
mitment (much less a recommendation of such a commit-
ment) by the Port Authority to undertake the construction or
implementation of a mass transit system. Instead, most of
them recommend the assumption of these obligations by other
governmental or quasi-governmental bodies and agencies. See
The Port of New York Authority, Suburban Transit for
Northern New Jersey, 10 (1937) ; The Port of New York Au-
thority, Annual Report for 1958, 38-42. In conjunction with
this, it should be noted that the Authority was one of the
staunchest supporters of two New Jersey legislative proposals,
S-50 and A-115, which were introduced and discussed in
1958. See Assembly Hearings, supra, Nov. 24, 1958, at 44, 49
(Statements of Austin J. Tobin, Executive Director, Port of
New York Authority). Not surprisingly both of these mea-
sures presented plans for the establishment of an independent
agency to handle matters relating to mass transportation.
Conversely, the Port Authority was strongly opposed to a
companion proposal, A-16, which would have authorized the
agency itself to develop, improve and coordinate the rapid
transit facilities in the Port District. Assembly Hearings,
supra, Nov. 24, 1958, at 18-19 (Statements of Austin J.
Tobin, Executive Director, Port of New York Authoritv)."
United States, based upon study and analysis, for the better con-
duct of the commerce passing in and through the port of New
York, the increase and improvement of transportation and terminal
facilities therein, and the more economical and expeditious handling
of such commerce.
14On this point, a noted transportation expert, Michael N. Daniel-
son, observed :
A good many people in the New York area, particularly in
New Jersey, could see no point in creating another agency, whether
bi-state or tri-state, as long as the Port of New York Authority
apparently possessed both the jurisdiction and financial capacity
to tackle the regional rail problem. Time and again, the Port
Authority fended off these forays, emphasizing that there was an
“absolute incompatibility between railroad deficits and the PNYS’S
contractual limitations with its bondholders . . . and to confine itself
to self-supporting projects.” [Danielszon, Federal-Metropolitan Pol-
itice and the Commuter Crisis, 23 (1965)).
A295
Finally, as previously noted, there has heen a startling ab-
sence of tangible progress resulting from, or attributable to
these investigatory efforts. This is true even though the Vort
Authority has recognized the commuter problems which beset
the New York metropolitan area. As early as 1925, im itz
Annual Report, the Authority observed:
While hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent in urbao
rapid transit during the past decade, no commensurate amounts
have been expended on suburban rapid trauovit, and the commuter
has reached the limit of his endurance where the trunk lines lead-
ing into New York City are.incapable of handling both suburbac
and through traffic. The passenger service of every railroad in the
Port District is taxed to its limit by the requirements vf this ser-
vice. There is barely room during the rush hours for the trains
carrying freight because of the commuter service, while passengers
and freight must both necessarily move during these hours. [The
Port of New York Authority, Annual Report for 1924, 23 (Jan. 2,
1925) ]
See also The Port of New York Authority, Annual Report
for 1927, 10, 53 (Jan. 20, 1928). Over the years, this
recognition has increased with its realization of the expanding
dimensions of commuter congestion and the inability of
private transit facilities to cope with the problem. The Port
of New York and New Jersey, 1972 Annual Repori, 10-15
(1972); 1973 Annual Report, 10-15 (1973); 1974 Annua?
Report, 4-6 (1974).
The Port Authority’s ineffectual investigative efforts can-
not be justified due to a theoretical lack of jurisdiction in mass
transit operations. Such jurisdiction was given to the agency
in the Compact of 1921. Nor is the lack of success due to the
financial inability of the Port Authority to assume additional
obligations. As the triai court found, the \uthority is not
only financially sound, but has suffered no detrimental ef-
fects from the repeal of the protective 1962 Covenant:
Suffice it to say that between 1962 and 1974 the security afforded
bondholders had been substantially augmented by a vast increase in
Authority revenues and reserves, and the Authority’s financial ability
to absorb greater deficits, from whatever source and without ang
A26
significant impairmcac of bondholder security, was correspondingly
increased. [1384 N. J. Super. at 194-95)
Rather, the limited effectiveness of these studies is mereiy
symptomatic of an underlying limitation which the Port Au-
thority has imposed on its own involvement in mass transpor-
tation. This limitation, which is derived from a narrow
construction of its statutory powers, precludes an undertaking
by the Authority unless the relevant project will be financially
self-supporting, or will only generate deficits within con-
servatively defined limits. While the definition of the limita-
tion is presented in purely financial terms, its effect has
been to severely restrict the scope of activities in which the
agency may engage. Because the majority of mass trans-
portation facilities are closely associated with high deficits,
the practical operation of the Port Authority’s self-imposed
restriction has prevented the Authority from fulfilling its
rapid transit obligations.
C. History of the Self-Supporting Concept
While the provisions of the Compact and Comprehensive
Plan sketched a broad authorization in terms of the activities
which were within jurisdiction of the Pot -\uthority, the
powers accorded to it were not commensurate with its tasks.
Without the necessary power, the Authority could not uni-
laterally support its statutory mandates, much less initiate
action in their behalf:
An impressive body of activities was thus laid out wherein the
Port Authority could formulate the needs of the port as a whole
and be vigilant to protect its interests. It would serve as a focus
and agent of the forces of unity within the port. The primary re-
quirement in this field would not be legal power but adequate
funds and continuous application. The Port Authority never lacked
support with respect to the former, and was well conceived to
function with respect to the latter. But success along this line of
endeavor would depend upon cooperation from public agencies and
private interests. Where conflicts developed it could make progress
very slowly, if at all. (Bard, supra, footnote 2, at 58-59]
A27
As a result of setbacks incurred in early legal skirmishes
with the powerful railroads in the 1920’s, the Port Authority
appeared to assume a less assertive role in the port’s develop-
ment than that anticipated by its proponents. Reluctant to
promote otherwise desirable activities within the Port Dis-
trict, the Authority restricted its goals to the dubious task
of maintaining a balanced budget. The difficulty of this ob-
jective was compounded by the fact that under both the Com-
pact and the Comprehensive Plan, the Port Authority had
been denied the power to either levy assessments or pledge
the credit of either state. Annual Report for 1954, vi (1954).
Consequently, to offset the costs and losses which it incurred,
the agency was dependent upon the revenues which it realized
from its various projects and facilities. :
While this new objective in the early years of the Port
Authority was tempered by a “rule of economic practicabil-
ity,” The Port’of New York Authority, Annual Repori for
1926, 5 (Jan. 20, 1927), its importance was later elevated
by the increased emphasis placed on self-sufficiency. In
other words, because the fiscal stability of the Port Author-
ity was dependent upon the revenues of its facilities, it was
necessary for all projects to demonstrate their self-support-
ing capacity before the Authority would undertake their im-
plementation. Thus, James (. Kellogg, III, the then Vice-
Chairman of the Port Authority, read from a prepared state-
ment before a Senate Commission in 1960, as follows:
In order that the Port Authority might carry ont the tremendous
and continuing task of developing the public terminal and trans-
portation facilities of this metrop ‘itan are-, the two Legislatures
clothed it with all necessary and appropriate powers of port and
terminal development, with the important exception of the power
to tax or to levy assessments. This reservation is the key to the
whole concept of the Port Authority, which is that of a self-sup-
porting agency, whose public projects are carried on through the
development of their own revenues and charges, and which im-
poses no burdens on the general taxpayer. [Hearings before N. J.
Sen. Comm'n Created under Sen. Rea. No. 7 (1960) to Study the
Financial Structure and Operations of the Port of New York Aw-
thority, September 27, 1960, 7-8 (Statement of James C. Kellogg,
III, Vice-Chairman of the Port Authority) ].
A28
The objective of a self-supporting authority, while salu- ,
tary in principle, was inconsistent with the Port Authority's
original oojectives and early history. In its annua! report
for 1924, the Authority explicitly rejected the self-support-
ing concept as a basis for its operations:
Preferably, and in the main. therefore, the Port Authority regards
itself rather as the guardian and guide of the Port District, protect-
ing it against attacks both from within and without, and directing
its activities and developments with a view to procuring the great-
est cooperation of existing agencies, the utmost efficiency and the
minimum of cost. If such is to be its primary function it should not
be erpected to be self-aupporting. [The Port of New York Authority,
Annual Report for 1924, 9-10 (Jan. 24, 1925); emphasis supplied]
Moreover, the self-supporting concept as a fundamental pre-
cept of the Port Authority’s financial scheme is belied both
by the projects which it embarked upon after its creation
and by subsequent developments in its financial structure.
‘As the trial court observed, because of the heavy investment
required by these early projects, the Port Authority was
confronted with large deficits from the outset. 134 N. J.
Super. at 140. However, rather than restricting the Author-
itv’s activities, New Jersey and New York encouraged such
projects by advancing funds, transferring control of lucra-
tive facilities (such as the Holland Tunnel) to the Author-
itv, and permitting the Authority to issue “open-ended .
bends. This latter device, in particular, helped free the
Port Authority from absolute reliance on self-supporting
projects. By placing all revenues derived from the sale of
open-ended bonds into a common fund, the Port Authority
was able to free deficit operations from the inadequate sales
of their particular bonds. Goldberg, A History of the Port
of New York Authority Financial Structures, 5 (1964).
The pooling of resources not only permitted the Port Au-
thority to finance debt-ridden facilities through those which
were profitable, but simultaneously afforded bondholders a
certain degree of security regardless of the success or failure
of any given project. The open-ended financing of the Port
A29
Authority, which was originally introduced in the form of
the General Reserve Fund (N. J. 8. A. 32:1-142), literally,
the pool into which all funds were paid, was later expanded
by the Authority’s adoption of the Consolidated Bond Reso-
lution in 1952. This resolution, which abandoned the prac-
tice of earmarking funds for specific projects, authorized
' the issuance of bonds whose revenues would be designated
by the Authority for a given project according to its needs.
As the trial court found, the resolution obviated any further
concern for maintaining the self-supporting concept as a
prerequisite to Port Authority involvement in a project:
With the adoption of the CBR the “self-supporting” facility con-
cept which had governed earlier authority financing ceased to have
the significance previously attached to it; for under the CBR the
Authority’s financial structure is based on a unitary enterprise
concept and all revenues from all facilities are pooled. Individual
facilities are not financed independently of the rest of the Authority.
The facilities contribute their revenues for debt service on ail Au-
thority bonds according to their earning power and without regard
to the amount of bonds issued for the construction of any par-
ticular facility. [134 N. J. Super. at 143]
Enactments such as the General Keseive Fund and the
Consolidated Bond Resolution created the possibility for the
involvement of the Port Authority in traditionally deficit
operations such as mass transportation. Nonetheless, the
translation of this new financial freedom into practical ac-
tion was not forthcoming from the Port Authority:
That cashbox, so long empty, was full now, thanks to the postwar
traffic boom, . .. the Port Authority’s was worth $700,000,000.
Long on cash, moreover, the Port Authority was short on dreams.
The visionaries who bad created it were long gone from its coun-
cils; Julius Henry Cohen had been replaced by money men like
Cullman and Colt and Pope whose eyes were brightened by the
balances in the Authority's ledgers, not by the potentialities for
improving the common weal that those balances represented. The
purpose for which the Authority had been created — the develop-
ment of an overall transportation system to knit together a great
port — had been lost sight of for years. Plans the Authority had
aplenty, of course, but unrelated plans, plans for individual projects,
joined by no link other than the fact that their construction would
return the agency profit. [Caro, supra, footnote 10, at 922-23)
A30
The resultant program which the Port Authority pursued
represented less of an integrated effort to organize and co-
ordinate the commerce of the port of New York, and more
of an administrative mish-mash with little cohesiveness or
relation to the agency’s statutory mandate. Thus, construc-
tion of a World Trade Center, with little or no relation to
the activities for which the Port Authority was created, was
suddenly elevated to an importance which transcended that
of a more traditionally-regarded responsibility of the Author-
ity such as mass transportation.
The underlying rationale for these actions was unmis-
takably attributable to retention of the self-supporting limi-
tation to which the Port Authority had previously adhered.
This was made clear by Executive Director Tobin of the
Port Authcrity when questioned at a 1958 hearing abovt
the manner in which future revenues and reserves would be
committed :
Well, it is closed unless those future bond issues have to do with
projects that can be made self-supporting and in which the Com-
missioners of the Port Authority will not only certify as a matter
of conscience and a matter of record that they believe that
they can be made self-supporting and will add to the gen-
eral credit of the Port Authority; but also if they can demon-
strate arithmetically on sound projections of ita existing net revenues
and its maximum future debt service that those projects will not
hurt this bondholder. That’s all he has. If that bondholder has an
open end bond without those restrictions, he has a piece of paper.
[Assembly Hearings, supra, November 24, 1958, at 38 (Statement
of Austin, J. Tobin, Executive Director, Port of New York Au-
thority); emphasis supplied)
This self-limitation has exacerbated the Port Authority’s
demonstrated lack of initiative. For example, although the
Port Authority in 1955 agreed to provide the Metropolitan
_ Rapid Transit Commission with $800,000 for that body’s
study of a metropolitan scheme of mass transit, the price
which the Authority extracted for its financial support was
a “Memorandum of Understanding” which precluded its
own role in any deficit operations which the Commission
A3l
might recommend. Dantelson, supra at 23; Assembly Hear-
ings, supra, December 3, 1958, at 91-A to 92—A (Statement
of Frank H. Simon, Exécutive Director, Metropolitan Rapid
Transit Commission). More importantly, perhaps, the Port
Authority’s inertia has interjected itself in the relationship
between the agency and the Legislatures which it allegedly
serves. This has been done in an often contradictory fashion
as illustrated by the following discussion between Assembly-
man Crabiel and Executive Director Tobin:
ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: What I’m getting at here is, you're
saying categorically that you cannot take a deficit. Now, I’m raising
the point that as far as the Legislatures of the two states, when
they established the compact there was nothing in the compact
and notbing in the instructions from the Legislatures to the Port
Authority that they could not undertake a deficit operation.
MR. TOBIN: Well, excuse me, sir. I'd say that there was. |
would say that the way the statutes are phrased, it could under-
take nothing except a self-supporting operation. We have no way
of financing anything but a self-supporting operation.
ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: Weill how do you account for the
fact, then, that you have operated deficit operations?
MR. TOBIN: Because the pooled revenues have been sufficient.
Because we believed also, when we went into those, that they could
be self-supporting and we were wrong.
ASSEMBLYMAN CRABIEL: That's what I was pointing up.
[Assembly Hearings, supra, November 24, 1958, at 45]
il
THE ROLE OF THE PORT AUTHORITY
Ultimately, those who are most hurt by the Port Author-
ity’s failure to enter the field of mass transportation are. -
of course, the commuters. Absence of Port Authority initia-
tive in ‘this area is a direct reflection of the deficits which
are inherent in the provision of this public service:
Until the late 1950’s, transit operations in the United States
were generally profitable and, consequently, attractive to investment.
Decline in patronage and increasing labor and equipment costs have
completely reversed this trend to a point where today, public transit
it ite everyday operations in most cities is a losing proposition.
The losses are not as great as sometimes presuméd but, in most
A32
cases, average between 20 and 25 percent annually. Therefore,
public transit — like many other sectors of the transportation in-
dustry, including private automobile transportation — now requires
substantial public support in the form of direct financial subsidies
to be capable of rendering necessary services. [Roeseler and Levi
“State Subsidies for Public Transit: An Overview of Current
Legislation,” 4 Urban Lawyer 59, 60 (1972)]
See also Kueafsey and Edelman, “A Market-Oriented Solu-
tion to the Northeast Railroad Dilemma,” 41 /. C. C. Pract.
J. 1%4 (1973-74). This problem concerning the financial
weaknesses of mass transit facilities has been realized within
the New York metropolitan area. This, no doubt, has re-
sulted from both the unusually heavy demands which have
been placed on these systems in the Port District, and the
lack of a perceived common interest among the District’s
geographic and political components. Danielson, supra, at
21-22.
The Port Authority’s failure to assume an active role in
solving this problem has had a concurrent effect on the
traveling habits of the average commuter. Faced with in-
creasing service cutbacks and escalating fares, the commuter
is left with fewer alternatives to the private automobile.
Grubb, “Urban Transportation .\lternatives to the \uto-
mobile,” 39 J. C. C. Pract. J. 19 (1971-72); Cooper.
“Prospects for a Mass Movement to Public Transit.” 5
Urban Lawyer 679 (1973). Uis inereasing resort to this
mode of transportation in turn has caused a drastic in-
crease in traffic congestion and air pollution which are com-
monly associated with the metropolitan area.
These problems have stimulated legislative responses on
both the federal and state levels. The federal respons? con-
sists primarily of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,"
49 U. S.C. A, § 1601 et seq., which purports to encourage
“the planning and establishment of areawide urban mass
transportation systems needed for economical and desirable
urban development, with the cooperation of mass transporta-
tion companies both public and private.” 49 U. S.C. A., §
1601. See Haley and Watkins, “The Urban Mass Transporta-
————
A338
tion Assistanee Act of 1970 — A Federal Program Comes o!
\eo,? 16 N. V. Law For. 741 (1970). As a corollary to the
urban mass transit crisis, the fede ral rovernment has enacted
,% ‘ F ? , ; _- « » * ° .
the Clean Air Act, 42 V8. ©. A. 8 1857 et seg. Similar
, ° . . .
nsiderations produced comparable legislation in New Jerse
Emergeney Energy Fair Practices Act of 1974. L. 1974
lative (order Ni . ] { } bh. a. j vi 1)
ey i enactments Were most recently recognize
ss t Transportation and Com
4 ‘ | } >
t] . ! r Tes 91 “the W Jerse y Legisiature, i,
Tfhe Sena; / j ‘-PnPral Af 7" TI RSLA) Join 7 “his pol lation
i ;
fy) WIP ULHICALIGANS ( gen j ( { Mis’ ce .LSN¢ molly f on
(ta / Phi gb PS, LF } ] wt 197 4? {) Té iT yf 17 r \ Tile renor?t
The legstation passed by New Jersey during the iast four yeurs
efleets the dererrmination on the part of its officials to direct
wrt Authority towards making a greater financial commitment
iss transit ty rder ‘o letermine whether New Jersey has
wel teented by the Vorr Authority iu a fair and impartial manner
the Committee has investigated the degree of Port Authority re-
opsiveness te meeting the mass transportation needs of the State.
The Committee ~ eooelasion Was suceinet as i Was untorty
hue Committee recognizes that the Dort Authority has aequired
a reputetion for its engineering, planning and management skills
It is the conclusion of the Committee, however, that in the area
of mass transportation the Port Authority's perfomance has not
heen satisfactory. "/d. at 17]
The Committee’s conclusions were premised upon the same
type of factors which I have considered above. While the Com-
mittee wes hopeful that the Port Authority would take its
mass transportation responsibilities “more seriously” in the
future, it nonetheless pledged “its vigilance to see that the
A34
Port Authority completes the mass transportation projects
: ’. 9? + + Bs)
it has promised to complete.” /d. at 18, 19.
The senritivity of the stete goverament to the urgent need
for more modern means of public transportation has noi been
confined to the legislative branch. In his recent “State of the
State” address, Governor Byrne not only recognized this prob-
lem, but concurrently cited the Port Anthority’s responsibility
for its solution. Perhaps ever more important, the Governor
indicated hia willingness to impose an afirmative sanction on
the Port Authority should ihe desired action in the area of
mass transit not be forthcoming:
How do we keep the railroads running at a time when the staie
subsidy program costs over $100 mil'ion a year and has been grow-
ing by more than 35 per cent a year? Should there be an overall
operating agency for these lines? What about the communities and
industries served by lines soon to be abandoned? Where can we
find the $255 million required to match federal funding for the
45While the history of the Port Authority’s involvement in mas
transportation has been discouraging, the prospects for renewed ef-
forts by the agency in this area of endeavor are hopeful. In the
above cited report by the Legislature’s Joint Transportation and
Communications Committee, the development of a mages transporta-
tion plan by the Port Authority was noted, Report of the Senate
and General Assembly Joint Transportation and Communications
Committce (Pursuant to Assembly Concurrent Res. No. 211 of 1974,
16-17 (Octcber 4, 1975)). This plen committed the Port Authority
to the provision of additional direct rail service to Penn Station in
New York City for New Jersey commuters, the expansion of the
Midtown Bus Terminal, the construction of a rail link to Kennedy
Airport ard the extension of the PATH system from Newark to
Plainfield. Although the Urban Mass Transportetion Administration
on December 19, 1975 rejected New Jersey’s request for $27%-
million to construct the PATH extension, the State’s expressed in-
tention to reapply for such funds will create the possibility of » con-
tinued role for the Port Authority in mass transportation. The
Sunday Star-Ledger, December 21, 1975, at 1, 8; The New York
Times, December 22, 1975, at ——; The New York Times, January
4, 1976, at 34. This persistence has apparently been successful as
federal approval of a $400-million block grant for the PATH ex-
tension to Plainfield and other mass trans't projects is anticipated.
The Star-Ledger, February 10, 1976, at 1.
:
|
A35
modernization of two major commutes. lines and the extension of
PATH to Plainfield?
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey must increare
it» commitment to these efforts. If it is unwilling to do so, we will
insist that it rescind the toll increases instituted last year for the
specific purpose of funding improvements in the public transporta-
tion system. [Annual Message of Governor Brendan T. Byrne, Jan.
13, 1976, at 19]
I, too, would similarly take this opportunity to demonstrate
the vigilance which has motivated the Joint Committee and
the Governor. The Port Authority has too long neglected the
responsibility with which it was statutorily charged in i921.
In So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 67
N. J. 151, 189 (1975), we recognized the significance of
transportation to the overall development of an urban area.
T would today reaffirm this significance.
IV
CONCLUSION
The relief which I recommend today is intended as an
answer to # problem which has assumed crisis proportions.
The Port Authority is the producer, the director and the
main character of the play known as “The Disease of Mass
Transportation.” This malady has suffered too long from
the benign neglect of public agencies such as the Port Au-
thority, and such neglect has permitted the disease to spread
unattended. The resulting state of affairs may most accurately
he described as one of emergency. While the appellation
“emergency” was at one time reserved for calamitous and
natural occurrences, the inadequate and deteriorating quality
of mass transit in the metropolitan area has had an eroding
effect on the urban environment in which it operates. This
effect has been measurable not only in terms of the unending
lines of commuters who have been inconvenienced by in-
efficient service, but also in terms of traffic congestion with
its attendant pollution as well. The courts of this country
have long recognized that such emergent circumstances may
A36
serve as a mandate to administrative action. “While emer
gency does not create power, emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power.” Home Building & Loun
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26. 54 8. Ct. 231. 235,
78 L. Bd. 413, 422 (1934); Hourigan v. North Bergen Tp.,
113 N. J. L. 148, 148 (EB. & A. 1934).
For an Authority that is long on cash and short on
dreams,’® it is time to respond for those who have long suf-
fered the inconvenience and expense which have resulted from
the Port Authority’s inaction.
I would order the Port Authority, its Commissioners and
its Executive Director to not only complete those projects to
which it is already committed, but io formulate and present
plans and suggestions for a regional mass transportation
scheme to the Legislatures of New York and New Jersey.
Implicit in this would be the requirement that such efforts be
completed in an expeditious fashion and within a fixed period
of time. This injunction is necessary to bring home the im-
portance of Authority action in the face of the current trans-
portation crisis.
In proposing this relief, I should not be understood as ad-
vocating usurpation of the functions of either the executive
or legislative branches of government. The majority’s charac-
terization of my position is in error. (At 259). My dis-
position does not contemplate ordering either the Governors
or the Legislatures of the States of New Jersey and New York
to undertake any particular course or courses cf action. I
would he loathe to intrude upon the relationships which have
developed between these other branches of state government
and the Port Authority. Nonetheless, I am all too aware of
the fact that expertise in the field of mass transit operations
resides in the body which was originally vested with both
power and jurisdiction in that area, namely the Port Au-
thority. By according the Authority a statutory mandate to
16Caro, supra, footnote 10 at 922.
A37
undertake mass transportation projects, it was anticipated
hy both States that the Port Authority would actively re-
search, promote and recommend projects to be authorized and
implemented by the State Legislatures. It is precisely the
Port Authority’s reluctance to utilize its expertise that has
frustrated this basic first step towards the development of a
much-needed integrated mass transportation system in the
metropolitan area. Therefore, I would order the Port Au-
thority to proceed with this initial planning stage. while, at
the same time, acknowledging that ultimate adoption and im-
plementation of the resultant plans remain a legislative and
executive prerogative. The declared willingness of those
branches of government to adopt appropriate measures leaves
me confident that only timely suggestions by the Port Au-
thority are needed to point the direction towards improved
mass transit operations.
Although I am unsure whether it is the perception of my
suggested order as a usurpation of executive and legislative
function which underlies the majority's disagreement with
such relief, I am, nonetheless, clear in my opposition to the
lesson in civil procedure which the majority would impose
on this case. T find that the majority’s exercise of power un-
der a writ of mandamus would ill-befit a remedy with such a
Marshallian association. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. 8. (1
Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). This is a direct result of not
only the restrictive but the erroneous construction which the
majority gives to the powers implicit in a mandamus. The
writ of mandamus is a remedial process whose essential func-
tion is to compel the performance of a ministerial action or the
ecercise of a discretionary function. Roberts v. Holsworth,
10 N. J. 1. 5% (Sup. Ct. 1828); Switz v. Middietown Twp.,
23 N. J. 580 (1957). This mode of relief is particularly ap-
propriate with regard to recalcitrance by public officials or
authorities. Bd. of Taration v. Belleville, 92 N. J. Super.
338, 340-41 (Law Div. 1966). While the court has the power
under a mandamus to compel action, it does not similarly
have the power to control discretion in the performance of
A38
the designated action. Such discretion properly resides in
the functioning authority.
By its construction of the mandamus, the majority would
not only accord the authority discretion in the manner of
performing the compelled action, but would permit the au-
thority discretion as to whether the ordered. action should
be performed at all. Although the majority has recognized
that the Port Authority has resisted efforts to promote its
involvement in mass transportation, it would consider this
to be an exercise of discretion which would preclude a
mandamus or an order similar to the one which I have sug-
gested :
As we have svught to demonstrate, the circumstances before us
de not at all invite or accommodate the remedy proposed. This is
xo because the Authority (whose function is clearly not ministerial)
has in fact exercised its discretion, even though that exercise has
resulted in the rejection of a policy favoring mass transportation.
Being a judgment decision its wisdom may be open to dispute;
hut as to the propriety of this Court’s refusal to intrude on the
underlying policy determination, there can be no question in the
circumstances before us [At 259].
| cannot subscribe to such reasoning, whose circular nature
would undercut the relief which the majority otherwise feels
warranted under the circumstances and which would effec-
tively emasculate the mandamus, or any similar relief, as
a remedy.
I reject the majority’s approach to the problem of this
case within a procedural contexi. We have been taught that
there are no rights without remedies. By stripping us of
our remedies, the majority is most assuredly divesting us
of our rights. Marbury v. Madison, supra, 5 U. 8. (1
(‘ranch) at 163, 2 L. Ed. at 69. Furthermore, we have long
passed the days wherein cases were decided on the niceties
of procedural technicalities. Hodgson v. Applegate, 31 N. J.
29, 43 (1959) ; Edelstein v. Asbury Park, 51 N. J. Super.
368, 385 (App. Div. 1958). There is no need to resurrect
in this case another of these manifestations of by-gone days.
A39
Even if I were to acknowledge the necessity of specifically
resorting to a mandamus or its equivalent, I could not
justify withholding such relief in this case; nor can I pres-
ently understand the distinction which the majority draws
between the mandamus which they recommend and the order
which I propose. Granting that mandamus is an “extraor-
dinary remedial process,” Beronio v. Pension Comm'n of
Hoboken, 130 N. J. L. 620, 623 (E. .& A. 1943), aff’g 129
N. J. L. 557% (Sup. Ct. 1943), I cannot see the unfortunate
plight of the more than 30 million commuters who are de-
pendent upon the Port Authority’s transportation services
annually, nor the Authority’s benign neglect of their plight,
as being anything less than extraordinary. This is particu-
larly so where to adopt the majority’s approach would per-
mit the Port Authority to ignore the statutory responsi-
bilities with which it was charged in 1921.
The majority in Gaby v. Port of New York Authority has
been unwilling to take the action which I regard as impera-
tive. From its disposition I must, therefore, respectfully
dissent.
For affirmadnce—Justices MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN and CLIF-
FORD and Judges ConFrorpD, CARTON and HaLPpERN—6.
Concurring in part and disser‘ing in part—Justice PasH-
MAN—1.
APPENDIX B
A40
Decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, ETC.,
PLAINTIFF, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, &£T AL.,
DEFENDANTS .
DANIEL M. GABY, PLAINTIFF, v. THE PORT OF NEW YORK
AUTHORITY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey
Law Division
Argued April 8, 9, 1975—Decided May 14, 1975.
SYNOPSIS
Consolidated actions were brought concerning constitu-
tional validity of legislation creating, and later repealing,
a covenant between the States of New Jersey and New York
and holders of bonds issued by the Port Authority cf New
‘ York and New Jersey. Defendants filed counterclaim for
declaration of validity of repealing legislation. The Su-
perior Court, Law Division, Gelman, J. S. C., held thac
legislative enactments, such as the 1962 covenant whereby
the States and Authority were precluded from applying Au-
thority revenues and reserves for passenger railroad pur-
poses unless permitted by criteria set forth in the covenant,
can constitute a contract within meaning of the contract
clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, that not
every impairment of a contract obligation or security for its
performance runs afoul of the contract clause, that a State’s
inherent power to protect the public welfare may be validly
exercised under the contract ciause even if it impairs a con-
tractual obligation so long as it does not destroy it, and
that in view of emergent problems of air pollution, crises
in mass transit and energy problems repeal legislation was a
reasonable and valid exercise of the State’s police power
and was not prohibited by the contract clause of either the
Federal or State Constitution.
Complaints dismissed; judgment for defendants on coun-
terclaim.
ee
A4l1
Mr. Robert B. Meyner and Mr. Devereux Milburn (of
the New York Bar) for plaintiff United States Trust Com-
pany (Messrs. Meyner, Lardis & Verdon, attorneys; and
Messrs. Carter, Ledyard & Milburn, attorneys; and Mr.
Donald J. Robinson (of the New York Bar) Messrs. Haw-
kins, Delafield & Wood, attorneys).
Mr. Michacl I. Sovern (of the New York Bar) and Mr.
Murray J. Laulicht, special counsel for defendants (Mr.
William F’. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, attor-
ney; Mr. Harold 8. H. Edgar (of the New York Bar) on
the brief).
Mr. Theodore W. Kheel (of the New York Bar) and Mr.
Howard Stern for plaintiff Daniel M. Gaby (Messrs. Battle,
Fowler, Stokes & Kieel, attorneys, and Messrs. Shavick,
Stern, Schotz, Steiger & Croland, attorneys).
Mr. Joseph Lesser (of the New York Bar) for defendant
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Mr. Francis
A. Mulhern, attorney); and Mr- Patrick J. Falvey (of the
New York Bar). Vs. /subel BE. Muirhead, Mr. Arthur P.
Berg (of the New York Bar), (Wr. Vigdor D. Bernstein,
of counsel).
GELMAN, J. S. ©. These are consolidated actions which
have as their common subject matter the constitutional va-
lidity of legislation of this State creating, and later repeal-
ing, a covenant between the States of New Jersey and New
York and the holders of bonds issued by the Port Author-
ity of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority).' The
—
1Under the terms of the Compact of 1921 creating the Port Author-
ity, N. /. 8S. A. 32:1-1 et seg., legislative action taken by one state
134 N.J.Super.—9
A42
first legislative act in question, chapter 8 of the Laws of
1962, N. J. 8. A. 32:1-35.50 (the 1962 covenant), autbor-
ized the Port Authority to construct the World Trade Cen-
ter and to acquire and operate the Hudson & Manhattan
Railroad Company. As part of the 1962 legislation the two
States enacted a statutory covenant with each other and
with the holders of certain Port Authority bonds whereby
the States and the Port Authority were precluded from ap-
plying the Authority’s revenues and reserves for passenger
railroad purposes unless permitted by the criteria set forth
in the statute. N. J. S. A. 32:1-35.55.
The 1962 covenant was repealed by chapter 25 of the
Laws of 1974.2 The complaint filed by the United States
Trust Company challenges the coustitutionality of the re-
peal act of 1974, and the Gaby complaint attacks the va-
lidity of the 1962 covenant. We turn, then, to the proce-
dural history of these actions and the issues projected by
the respective pleadings.
Procedural History
1. The Gaby Action
On May 16, 1972 plaintiff Daniel Gaby filed a class
action complaint for a declaratory judgment that the 1962
covenant violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The
complaint named as defendants the Port Authority, its com-
missioners and executive director, and the then Governor of
New Jersey, William T. Cahill. On October 25, 1972, on
affecting the powers and duties of the Port Authority is not effective
until concurred in by the legislature of the other. V. J. S. A. 32:1-8.
Statutory citations in this opinion will be limited to the applicable
New Jersey statutes unless the context otherwise requires.
2In 1972 the Legislature had repealed the 1962 covenant as to all
bonds of the Authority issued after the effective date of the act.
L. 1972, c. 208; N. J. S. A. 32:1-35.55a. The act became effective
upon the adoption of concurrent legislation by the State of New
York on May 10, 1973. Laws of N. Y. 1973, oc. 318. The validity
of this legislation is not in issue in these proceedings.
. A43
the motion of the Attorney General of New Jersey, the
complaint was dismissed as to former Governor Cahill. The
Attorney General also moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to name as an indispensable party the Port Author-
ity’s bondholders. No disposition appears to have been made
of the motion at that time.
The Gaby complaint alleges, among other things, that
the residents of the State of New Jersey are dependent
upon mass transit facilities and are adversely affected by
the deterioration of such facilities within the District ser-
viced by the Port Authority (the Port District). It is al-
leged that the Port Authority was created by the Compact
of 1921 and consented to by the United States Congress®
to assure “cooperation of the two states in the future develop-
ment” of transportation facilities within the Port District,
and that by virtue of the 1962 covenant, restricting the
Port Authority’s power to acquire or operate passenger rail
transit facilities, the two states entered into a new “Com-
pact” without the consent of Congress and in violation of
U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 10. The complaint further alleges:
that the 1962 covenant constitutes an unconstitutional sur-
render by the State of its sovereign powers “to protect the
health, general welfare and safety of the people,” and that
it has impaired and obstructed existing facilities for the
transportation of goods in interstate commerce, in viola-
tion of U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8.
Gaby asks for multifarious relief. Aside from seeking a
declaration as to the unconstitutionality of the 1962 cov-
enant, he asks the court to declare the covenant to be sub-
ject to repeal, and to direct the Port Authority to formu-
late and submit to the court a plan for the development of
mass transit facilities within the Port District.
The Gaby action was pretried on February 22, 1973, at
which time it was stipulated that the action could proceed
8Pub. Res. No. 17, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. (42 Stat. 174).
.
|
+
Fe aa: ee ee
A44
as a class action without formal notice to the class repre-
sented by plaintiff. Thereafter both sides moved for sum-
mary judgment, and oral argument on the motions was
heard on September 26, 1973. At the conclusion of the ar-
gument the court directed the parties to submit further
briefs on the constitutional issues and on the question
whether the bondholders were necessary parties to the Gaby
action. Following conferences between counsel and the
court, it was agreed the United States Trust Company
should be permitted to intervene in the Gaby action as a
party defendant to represent the interests of the bondholders
in that action. -n order to such effect was entered on De-
cember 18, 1973, and arguments were rescheduled on the
motions for summary judgment.
Prior to the date fixed for the argument the prospects
for the adoption of the repeal act became apparent, and
further action in the Gaby case was stayed pending future
legislative developments.
2, The United States Trust Company Action
The New Jersey Legislature completed action on the
repeal act on April 22, 1974, and Governor Brendan T.
Byrne signed the bill into law on April 30, 1974. On the
same day United States Trust Company (U. S. Trust)
filed its complaint on behalf of itself as the holder of Port
Authority bonds, as trustee for certain designated issues of
Port Authority bonds, and on behalf of all holders of con-
solidated bonds issued by the Port Authority. The com-
plaint names as defendants the State of New Jersey, Gov-
ernor Byrne and the Attorney General of New Jersey, and
seeks a declaratory judgment that the repeal act violated
the Federal and State Constitutions.
U. S. Trust alleges that it is the holder (for its own ac-
count and in a fiduciary capacity) of $96,000,000 of con-
solidated bonds issued by the Port Authority; that the
Port Authority was intended, under the terms of the Com-
pact approved by Congress, to be a self-supporting public
~ nee nD
A45
agency whose obligations were to be and are payable from
its net revenues and certain reserve funds; that the 1962
covenant was enacted to protect the Port Authority’s ex-
isting and future bondholders from the diversion of pledged
revenues and reserves to finance deficit mass transit facili-
ties and further to preserve the Port Authority’s credit
standing; that the Port Authority notified prospective pur-
chasers of its bonds of the existence of the 1962 covenant
and purchasers relied on the covenant in purchasing bonds
issued by the Port Authority, and that the secondary mar-
ket for the Port Authority consolidated bonds has been ad-
versely affected by the repeal act.
The complaint alleges, that the repeal act violates the
“impairment” and “taking” provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10 aud Amends. V and
XIV, and the equivalent provicisus of the New Jersey Con-
stitution, N. J. Const. (1947), Art. TV, § VIT, par. 3;
Art. I, pars. 1 and 20.
The answer filed by defendants asserts several defenses
among which the following may be briefly noted: (1) the
repeal act constitutes a reasonable exercise of the police
power hy the State; (2) the 1962 covenant itself violated
the Federal Constitution because of lack of congressional
consent; (3) the repeal act does not constitute an “im-
pairment” of the contract since the obligation of the Port
Authority to pay its bondholders remains intact; (4) the
hondhoiders were on notices of the reserved powers of the
State to repeal the 1962 covenant, and (5) the repeal act
was adopted as a police power measure to meet a transpor-
tation crisis affecting the health, safety and welfare of per-
sons residing within the District. Finally, the answer as-
serts a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the
repeal act is constitutional.
A consent order was entered pursuant to R. 4:32-1 in
the U. S. Trust action directing that the action be main-
tained and defended as a class action by U. S. Trust on
A46
behalf of all holders of consolidated bonds of the Port Au-
thority, and that notice to the class be deemed to have been
given by means of the media publicity which was dis-
seminated when the action was instituted. 9n December 10,
1974 the Gaby and U. S. Trust actions were consolidated
by order of the court.
The parties to the U. S. Trust action have filed a 366-
page stipulation of facts, accompanied by exhibits covering
all phases of the case with the exception of two issues: (1)
whether the purchasers of consolidated bonds issued by the
Port Authority after the adoption of the 1962 covenant re-
lied in fact upon the existence of the covenant, and (2)
whether the repeal of the 1962 covenant adversely affected
the secondary market for Port Authority bonds. These is-
sues were the subject of a trial on February 4, 5, 6, 7 and
11, 1975, and the court’s findings on the issues will be set
forth infra.
The Formation, Facilities and Financial Structure
of the Port Authority.
1. Formation and Facilities.
In 1917 the States of New Jersey and New York estab-
lished the New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor De-
velopment Commission (the Commission) to study the fa-
cilities and problems of the Port of New York and to rec-
ommend a plan for the future development of the Port.*
The Commission filed its Report’ on December 16, 1920
—
4The enabling legislation directed the commissioners to negotiate
and agree upon a joint report recommending a policy for the states
“to the end that said port shall be efficiently and constructively
organized and furnished with modern methods of piers, rail and water
and freight facilities * * *.” The Commission was to work out “a
comprehensive and adequate interstate and Federal port policy, to
meet commercial needs in times of peace and the protection of the
harbor and adjacent localities in times of war.” L. 1917, ¢. 120.
5Joint Report with Comprehensive Plan and Recommendations,
New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission,
1920 (hereafter cited as the Report).
<a) a eee +
A47
setting forth its findings, conclusions and recommendations.
The core recommendation of the Commission was the cre-
ation by the two states of a common public agency by means
of which the states would cooperate in the future develop-
ment of the facilities of the Port in accordance with the
comprehensive plan recommended by the Commission.* Re-
port at 436. In discussing the legal precedents for the es-
tablishment by the States of an agency having a substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce, the report stated:
Permissive or restrictive, as the case may be, the power of Congress
over the instrumentalities of irterstate traffic is exclusive, when in
a specific case it has been exercised. But this latter limitation,
coupled with the broad police power of the State and its control of
intrastate commerce, has left to New York and New Jersey a broad
field within which they may act without express Federal consent. It
is hoped, of course, by securing congressional approval of any plan
which may be adopted, to avoid future conflict with the Federal
authority over interstate unification and control of the Port. But
for the present the States may act alone. [Report at 446]
Prophetically the Commission noted that
[olur port problem ‘is primarily a railroad problem. * * * There-
fore the comprehensive plan to evolve which this Commission was
created is essentially a railroad plan. With the proper network of
rail facilities, the development of other terminal facilities can follow
along rational lines * * *. A complete reorganization of the railroad
system is the most fundamental physical need of the Port of New
York. [Report at 3}
However, the railroad problem upon which the Commis-
sion focused was not that of passenger transit but the hand-
ling and distribution of freight and cargo into and out of
the Port District, and the comprehensive plan recommended
by the Commission addressed itself exclusively to the trans-
portation and distribution, not of persons but of freight
6The recommendation for a Compact between the States was
originally contained in the Commission's preliminary report sub-
mitted in 1918.
A48
and cargo by rail, and to a lesser extent by ship ana motor
truck. In its 474 pages plus appendices the only signifi-
cant discussion of passenger traffic in the Report is con-
tained in the section dealing with ferries and vehicular tun-
nels. After noting that the bulk of interstate passenger
traffic was accommodated by the Hudson River ferries and
that the impact of the Holland Tunnel (started in 1920)
could not be forecast, the Report opined:
Vehicular tunnels offer little promise as & means of conveying pas-
sengers, and the one rapid-transit facility in existence between the two
States, while operated to near capacity, is not sufficiently profitable
to warrant optimism that others will be built. [Report at 330)
Following the submission of the Commission’s Report,
the Port of New York Authority? was created pursuant to
an interstate compact, signed April 30, 1921, between the
States of New Jersey and New York. N. J. S. A. 32:1-1
et seq. The consent of Congress “to each and every part and
article” of the Port Authority Compact was obtained effec-
tive August 23. 1921. Pub. Res. Vo. 1%, 6%th Cong. Ist
Sess. The preamble of the Port Authority Compact states
that “a better coordination of the terminal, transportation
and other facilities of commerce in, about and through the
port of New York, will result in great economies, benefiting
the nation, as well as the states of New York and New Jer-
sey,” and that “the future development of such terminal,
transportation and other facilities of commerce will require
the expenditure of large sums of money, and the cordial
co-operation of the States of New York and New Jersey in
the encouragement of the investment of capital, and in the
formulation and execution of the necessary physical plans.”
Article I of the Compact contains the agreement and
pledge by the two states of their “faithful co-operation in
1The name of the Port of New York Authority was changed to
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey on July 1. 1972.
N. J. 8. A. 32:1-4.
Gre et ee
* Be ae eC eNO es AL te cer BN aparts Memb Am = =
OA A ame
A49
the future planning and development of the port of New
York, holding in high trust for the benefit of the nation the
special blessings and natural advantages thereof”. Article
II defines the Port of New York District, comprising an
area of about 1500 square miles in both states within a
radius of about 25 miles from the Statue of Liberty. Ar-
ticle I1I establishes the Port Authority as “a body cor-
porate and politic, having the powers and jurisdiction heve-
inafter enumerated, and such other and addiiicuai powers
as shall be conferred upon it by the legislature of either
state concurred in by the legislature of the other, or by act
or acts of congress.” Article VI vests in the Port Author-
ity “full power and authority to purchase, construct, lease
and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility
within [the Port] district’; to make charges for the use
of such facilities, and “to borrow money and secure the
same by bonds or by mortgages upon any property” held by
the Port Authority. Article VII provides that the Port
Authority “shall have such additional powers and duties
as may hereafter be delegated to or imposed upon it from
time to time by the action of the legislature of either state
concurred in by the legislature of the other,” and mandates
that the Port Authority shall not pledge the credit of either
State except with the consent of its legislature. Article XI
requires the Port Authority to make plans for the develop-
ment of the Port District supplementary to or amendatory
of any plan theretofore adopted, and Article XII authorizes
the Port Authority to “make recommendations to the legis-
latures of the two states or to the congress of the United
States, based upon study and analysis, for the better con-
duct of the commerce passing in and through the port of
New York.”
Article XXII of the Compact defines ‘‘transportation fa-
cility” to include “railroads, steam or electric * * * and
every kind of transportation facility now in use or hereafter
designed for use for the transportation or carriage of per-
A50
sons or property”, and defines “railroad” as “includ[ing]
railways, extensions thereof, tunnels, subways, bridges, ele-
vated structures, tracks, poles, wires, conduits, power houses,
substations, lines for the transmission of power, car barns,
shops, yards, sidings, turnouts, switches, stations and ap-
proaches thereto, cars and motive equipment.”
In 1922 the states, with the consent of Congress, adopted
a Comprehensive Plan for the development of the Port of
New York. WN. J. 8. A. 32:1-25 et seq.; Pub. Res. No. 66,
67th Cong., 2d Sess. The Comprehensive Plan sets forth
the development program initially envisioned by the Com-
mission for implementation by the Port Authority.
In the Plan, like the Report upon which it was based,
unification of terminal operations and facilities, consolida-
tion of shipments, adaptation and coordination of existing fa-
cilities, improvement of commercial rail, truck and water fa-
cilities and other freight handling improvements are set
forth as principles to govern the development of the Port
Authority. The Comprehensive Plan proposed to establish
direct rail freight connections between New Jersey and Man-
hattan to furnish “the most expeditious, economical and
practical transportation of freight especially meat, produce,
milk and other commodities comprising the daily needs of
the people.” WN. J. S. A. 32:1-29. Section 8 of the 1922
Comprehensive Plan statute denies to the Authority the
power to levy taxes or assessments, and provides that the
bonds or other securities issued by the Port Authority shall
at all times be free from taxation by either state. VN. J. 8. A.
32 :1-33. Finally, it should be noted that the power was re-
served to the states to add to, modify or change any part of
the Plan. ¥. J. 8. A. 32 :1-26.
Pursuant to the Compact, the Comprehensive Plan and
subsequent amendments and supplements thereto, the Port
Authority operates all of the interstate vehicular tunnels
and bridges in the Port District, which include the Holland
Sa ite Be he a iI! a ne ke
A51
Tunnel®, the Lincoln Tunnel, the George Washington Bridge,
the Bayonne Bridge and the Arthur Kill Bridges. In addi-
tion, the Port Authority owns and/or operates the following
facilities: Newark International Airport, Teterboro Airport,
LaGuardia Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport
and two heliports; Port Newark, the Hoboken Port Author-
ity Marine Terminal, the Elizabeth Port Authority Marine
Terminal, the Columbia Street Marine Terminal, the Erie
Basin Port Authority Marine Terminal and a Mid-Man-
hattan Consolidated Passenger Ship Terminal; the Port
Authority Bus Terminal, the George Washington Bridge Bus
Station and the Newark and New York Union Motor Truck
Terminals; the Port Authority Trans-Hudson system (op-
erated for the Port Authority through its wholly-owned sub-
sidiary, the Port Authority Trans-Husdon Corporation) and
the World Trade Center.
Excluding the 1921 Compact and the 1922 Comprehensive
Plan, the Legislatures of New Jersey and New York have
adopted 39 separately enacted, concurrent statutes authoriz-
ing the construction and financing of the foregoing facilities,
the issuance of bonds and notes by the Authority, the regula-
tion of suits against it, and the establishment of a general re-
serve fund for the payment of the Authority’s obligations.
None of these 39 statutes received specific Congressional con-
sent.
2. The Financial Structure of the Port Authorily
Under the terms of the Compact the power to levy taxes
or to pledge the credit of either state was expressly withheld
from the Authority. From its inception, with the exception
of monies advanced as loans by the states, the Authority was
8The Holland Tunne! had been constructed by state commissions
pursuant to a compact between the states which received the con-
sent of Congress. In 1930 the Holland Tunnel was transferred to
the Port Authority in order to enable it to honor its obligations to
bondholders in the face of deficits incurred in connection with the
Arthur Kill, George Washington and Bayonne Bridges. L. 1930,
c. 247.
A52
required to finance its facilities solely with money borrowed
from the public and to be repaid out of the revenues derived
from its operations. By reason of these financial limitations
two concepts initially emerged which have played an im-
portant role in the realization of the purposes for which the
Authority was created: first, the specific projects under-
taken by the Authority should be self-supporting, t. e., the rev-
enues of each should be sufficient to cover its operating ex-
penses and debt service requirements; and second, since the
Authority is a public agency over which its creditors have no
direct control, the bondholders should be protected by
covenants with the Authority and with the states which have
ultimate control over its operations.
The first facilities constructed by the Authority were ve-
hicular spans linking Siaten Island and New Jersey — the
Arthur Kill Bridges — which were opened to traffic in 1928.
A third Staten Island-New Jersey crossing, the Bayonne
Bridge, was placed in operation in 1931. In that same year
the George Washington Bridge was opened to traffic. With
respect to each of these facilities the Port Authority was au-
thorized to and did issue bonds in separate series to pay for
the cost of acquisition of lands and construction. The reve-
nues and tolls from each facility were statutorily pledged as
security for the repayment of the series bonds issued in con-
junction with the specific facility involved. N. J. 8. A. 32 :1-
39, 62, 86. The States of New Jersey and New York advanced
additional moneys to pay for the costs of construction, and
the funds so advanced were accorded a subordinated status
to the funds raised by the Authority from the sale of its own
bonds to the public. NW. J. 8S. A. 32:1-60, 63, 81, 87. The
statutory authorizations for each project and its funding
were declared to be “a contract or agreement between the two
states for the benefit of those lending money to the port au-
thority.” N. J. 8S. A. 32:1-65, 89.
The first bonds issued to the public by the Authority were
“closed-end” bonds based on the estimated costs of eaci
facility, and the Authority was prohibited from issuing more
petal tile A ANOE t + Mrnte P We os RP cE i ES ROMO OD Me Ca NS
—
|
A53
bonds than the amount initially authorized for the project.
See Goldberg, A History of the Port of New York Authority
Financial Structure (1964), at 3 (hereafter cited as Gold-
berg). The gross revenues from each bridge were applied
first to the payment of expenses of operation and maintenance
of the bridge, then to the payment of debt service on its
bonds, and the surplus, if any, was to be deposited in a
separate reserve fund available only to the bondholders of
that series. Goldberg, at 4.
As noted earlier, the initial facilities were not self-sustain-
ing, and in 1930 the states transferred the control, operation
and the revenues of the Holland Tunnel! to the Port Au-
thority to help place the Port Authority on a self-sustaining
basis. N. J. 8. A. 32:1-119. Simultaneously, the states en-
acted legislation, commonly called the General Reserve id
Act, N. J. 8. A. 32:1-142, and by the terms of that aci the
surplus revenues derived by the Authority from all facilities
built with the proceeds of sale of its bonds are pooled so as to
create a general reserve fund in an amount equal to 10%
of the par value of all bonds issued by the Authority. The
act pledges the general reserve fund as security for the
payment of interest and principal on all bonds theretofore or
thereafter issued by the Authority. Surplus moneys of the
Authority in excess of the general reserve fund requirements
may be used for any purpose authorized by the states.
The general reserve fund thus becomes available to bond-
holders to pay the debt service requirements of facilities which
were not self-supporting. By this device the surplus revenues
of the Holland Tunnel were used to pay the debt service re-
quirements of the Arthur Kill and Bayonne Bridges and the
George Washington Bridge. The general reserve fund was
also envisioned as a security device to induce the public
to invest in future facilities such as the then contemplated
Lincoln Tunnel project. See Goldberg, at 7.
Following the enactment of the General Reserve Fund Act
the Port Authority issued additional series of bonds to finance
the construction of the Inland Terminal Building and to repay
A54
the states for the amounts expended by them to construct
the Holland Tunnel. Goldberg, at 5. In 1935 the Authority
commenced the issuance of a new series of bonds, known as
general and refunding bonds, the proceeds of which were used
to refund all of the original bridge bonds issued by the Au-
thority and to finance the initial construction of the Lincoln
Tunnel. These bonds were secured by a pledge of the net
revenues of all of the Authority’s then existing facilities and
by the general reserve fund. Under the terms of the resolu-
tion authorizing the issuance of general and refunding bonds
the Authority also contracted to create a special reserve fund
into which would be paid all net revenues in excess of those
required to pay the operating expenses of the Authority’s fa-
cilities, the debt service requirements for the general and re-
funding bonds, and to maintain the general reserve fund at
its prescribed level. oldberg, at 11. The authorizing resolu-
tion imposed limitations on the use of the specia! reserve fund
for the benefit of the bondholders.
In 1947 the Authority commenced the issuance of air
terminal and marine terminal bonds, the proceeds of which
were used for the acquisition and construction of various
airport and marine terminal facilities. These bonds were
secured by a pledge of the revenues of the specific facilities
financed thereby, as well as by a call upon the general re-
serve fund to the extent that revenues from the facilities were
insufficient to pay operating expenses and debt service re-
quirements. As in the case of the general and refunding
bonds, the air and marine terminal bond resolutions provided
for their own special reserve funds for the benefit of the bond-
holders of each of these series.
In 1952 the Commissioners of the Port Authority embarked
upon @ new scheme for future financing which abandoned
the practice o. earmarking specific facility revenues as se-
curity for its bonds. On October 9, 1952 the Authority adop-
ted the Consolidated Bond Resolution (the CBR), authoriz-
ing the issuance of consolidated bonds to serve as the medium
for financing its activities in furtherance of any purpose for
<< a ID CN tal ttt Al lala
— = a
es at elle Cette ms ele
A55
which the Authority is authorized to issue bonds secured by
a pledge of the general reserve fund.? Consolidated bonds con-
stitute general obligations of the Authority, and all such
bonds are equally and ratably secured by a pledge of the net
revenues of all existing facilities and any additional facilities
which may be financed in whole oi in part by the issuance of
consolidated bonds.?°
With the adoption of the CBR the “self-supporting” fa-
cility concept which had governed earlier authority financing
ceased to have the significance previously attached to it; for
under the CBR the Authority’s financial structure is based
on a unitary enterprise concept and all revenues from all fa-
cilities are pooled. Individual facilities are not financed ip-
dependently of the rest of the Authority. The facilities con-
tribute their revenues for debt service on all Authority bonds
according to their earning power and without regard to the
amount of bonds issued for the construction of any particular
facility.
While some facilities may not yield sufficient revenues to
pay operating expenses and/or debt service requirements,
what is uf paramount concern to bondholders under the CBR
is whether the total revenues of the Authority are sufficient to
satisfy all of its obligations to bondholders. And in order
to ensure that the abandonment of the “facility-by-facility”
approach would not lead to a dilution of pledged revenues
and reserves, the CBR contains covenants with the bondhold-
evs with respect to future operations and activities of the Au-
thority and the issuance of bonds secured by a pledge of its
revenues and reserves.
9The Authority covenanted, by the CBR, that no additional general
and refunding, air terminal or marine terminal bonds shall be issued.
10As noted infra, although general and refunding, air and
terminal bonds are still outstanding, the Authority has fully
its obligations to those bondholders and the consolidated
presently have a first call upon al! revenues of the Authority.
A56
One of the principal protections afforded bondholders by
the CBR is the so-called “1.3 test” contained in section 3."
The 1.3 test prohibits the issuance of new consolidated bonds
unless the best one-year net revenues of all of the Port Au-
thority’s facilities equal or are greater than 1.3 times the
prospective debt service for the calendar year during which
the debt service of all outstanding and proposed new bonds
secured by a pledge of the general reserve fund would be at a
maximum.'* The 1.3 test is thus an equation in which one
component consists of the Authority’s net revenues from all
facilities, and the other component is the maximum annual
debt service required to be paid on al! Autiority bonds, in-
cluding the new bonds to be issued. The maximum annua!
debt service component is readily calculable from the require-
ments set forth in the resolutions authorizing the bond issues.
[1] The annual net revenue component of the equation con-
sists of the Authority’s historical net revenues from existing
facilities’? plus the estimated average annual net revenues of
the facility to be acquired or constructed with the issuance
11While section 3 of the CBR provides alternate conditions for the
issuance of consolidated bonds, in practice the 1.3 test described
above is the least restrictive and has been the only one employed by
the Port Authority since the adontion of the CBR. Goldberg, at 19.
12There is a dispute between the parties to this litigation whether
a projected operating deficit of a facility to be acquired by the issu-
ance of consolidated bonds must be deducted from net revenue for the
purpose of determining whether the 1.3 test has been met. Under
the terms of the CBR, if the facility to be acquired has been in op-
eration for at least 36 months prior to the issuance of consolidated
bonds, the annual operating deficit of the facility would be deducte:
from historical Authority net revenues in applying the 1.3 test. How-
ever, according to an Authority witness, if the facility to be ac-
quired has not been in operation for at least 36 months, its projected
operating deficit can be ignored. This view is contrary to tie posi-
tion of the Authority in statements made and testimory given to
the Farley Committee. See infra, pages 152, 155-156.
18For this purpose the Authority is permitted to select any ¢een-
secutive 12-month segment out of the 36-month period preceding the
date of issuance of new consolidated bonds.
hel. sais AA
A57
of new bonds.'* While the 1.3 test speaks only of estimated
net revenues and not of “deficits,” it is evident from the pur-
pose of the 1.3 test as well as Authority practice in arriving
at historical net revenues that the estimated average annual
deficits of a new facility must be charged against historical
revenues in determining whether the 1.3 test has been met.
The purpose of the 1.3 test is to protect existing bondholders
against dilution of pledged revenues and reserves; if consol-
idated bonds are issued to acquire or construct a substantial
deficit operation whose drain on Authority revenues is not in-
cluded in the earning’s component, the 1.3 test would be
meaningless. Further, it is to be noted that in calculating
historical net revenues of existing facilities the Authority
arrives at one pooled figure which takes into account the defi-
cits of such facilities.
Section 5 of the CBR directs the application of the pledged
revenues to the payment of debt service upon all consolidated
bonds, with the remaining balance to be paid into the con-
solidated bond reserve fund except to the extent necessary to
be paid into the general reserve fund to maintain it at the
level prescribed by statute.
Section 6 of the CBR provides that the payment of debt
service upon all consolidated bonds “sha!! be further secured
~ equally and ratably by the General Reserve Fund.” Moneys in
the general reserve fund may not be used for any purpose
if there are other moneys of the Port Authority available
for that purpose, unless there are sufficient funds available to
the general reserve fund to pay debt service upon outstanding
bonds during the ensuing 24 months, in which event such ex-
cess moneys could be used for any purpose permissible under
the Gereral Reserve Fund Act, whether or not other moneys
were available for that purpose.
Section 7 of the CBR establishes a consolidated bond re-
serve fund into which all net revenues pledged as security
14The estimated average annual net revenue is based on estimated
revenues for the first 36 months of operation of the new facility.
134 N.J.Super.—10
A58
for consolidated bonds (after payment of debt service on all
consolidated bonds and of amounts necessary to bring the
general reserve fund to its statutory level) are required to be
paid. The moneys in the consolidated bond reserve fund
may be used only for the payment of: (a) consolidated
bonds at maturity, retirement or redemption; (b) debt ser-
vice upon outstanding consolidated bonds; (c) the deficit of
any facility the net revenues of which were pledged as
security for consolidated bonds, and (d) “any other addi-
tional purposes for which the Authority is now or may
hereafter be authorized by law to expend the revenues
of its facilities.” The pledge of the net revenues of the
Authority and of the moneys in the Consolidated bond re-
serve fund is subject to the right of the Authority to apply
the revenues and the reserve fund as provided in section 7,
and the right to issue bonds, other than consolidated bonds,
secured by the reserve fund if such other bonds “are issued
solely to fulfill obligations to or for the benefit of the hold-
ers of consolidated bonds and if such other bonds are also
secured by a pledge of the General Reserve Fund.”
Since the adoption of the CBR, capital expenditures of
the Authority have been financed by the issuance of 41
series of consolidated bonds and short term notes. New
facilities and improvements to existing ones have been
funded without regard to the individual project’s ability
to generate income. This has enabled the Port Authority
to undertake projects which would not be financially fea-
sible alone but are possible because of the surplus revenues
generated by its other facilities..° New projects undertaken
since 1952 include the acquisition and/or construction
of two heliports, the Brooklyn, Erie Basin, Elizabeth and
Hoboken Marine Terminals, the Port Authority Trans-Hud-
15For the calendar year 1973, of the 22 facilities operated by the
Authority, 14 were operated at a deficit, i.e., the gross revenues were
not sufficient to cover operating expenses and debt service require-
ments.
A59
son (PATH) System, a bus terminal and the World Trade
Center.
With respect to each series of consolidated bonds issued,
the Authority adopts an authorizing resolution. Section 7
of each series resolution prohibits the issuance of any ad-
ditional consolidated bonds or any ‘other bonds to be secured
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