Petition — Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International v. Wells

Supreme Court brief1976

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IN THE —

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CLERK :

Bil

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER a, 1975

B- 1427

Air Line Piwors Association, INTERNATIONAL,

Petitioner,

—against—

Ratpepu WELLs, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

SaMvuEL J. CoHEeNn

Attorney for Petitioner

605 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10016

Tel. No. (212) 682-6077

Of Counsel:

Couen, WEIss AND Sruion

Rosert S. SaveELson

MicuaeL FE. ABRAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

SI TRRIIINET cccsnsnseintoiticonehdniemersedasennpietsnhananmnennminninedibaign 1

PENI OTE COTE NERC OEn 2

re eee 2

Statutes Involved ...................-.-..:--0+-++- shisianaadimad: nilliteiiecehoseias 3

IE Oe Ge CD ai cess tet achiedatccterntecencnestteninisttbitin 3

BERLIN: Ne ORR a ON 3

BE SSRN aa hot ON RTO ORO OO 4

c) System Board Proceedings ........................--.-++++ 4

FB eiaiesiishiibeicinitindensciniiesorntions 5

e) District Court Proceedings ...........2.....-..-.-.-.0---+ 6

f) Court of Appeals Proceedings ................4........ 6

g) Supreme Court Proceedings ...............................- 7

Reasons for Granting the Writ —............2..--ee eee ceeeeeeee 9

1. The Court of Appeals’ Disposition on Wells’

Petition for Rehearing Is in Conflict With

Applicable Decisions of This Court and the

I Oe BD stnntesenentcenaceichsiteterennee-stinicenios 9

2. Respondent’s Election of Remedies and Agree-

ment That the System Board Award Was a

gk See 12

ERIE a cere ee ee oe ON OR NET TRS 14

il

TaBLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: PAGE

Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972) ... 12

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1967) .........--.-.-.scecceseeee 10

Czosek v. O’Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970) .......2.2.2.....de-eee 9,10

Glover v. St. Louis-S.F.R.R., 393 U.S. 324 (1969) ...... 10, 12

Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d

TET CES GING, TINIE -cncoessschomnsieniiestbindenshebiisintesbiiineditinemabioniiaiaiiie 12

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.. —— U.S. ——,

91 LRRM 2481 (No. 74-1025, March 3, 1976) ....8, 9, 10, 11,

passim

Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) _.......... 8, 9, 10, 11

Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179 (9th Cir.

TUTTE | scvssiscsssncusitinsseliccsshitiegisnestiiinaincaiiieaateriiiahihibasdaiiciiaiadale 11, 12

Richardson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.

TEED siceisusniinnieniniedecineicibiaseaetaeesiianbialansiiiidaealgiiaaiiniiinaaadiiaias 12

Steinman v. Spector Freight System, Inc., 441 F.2d 599

Sy Weis SEED? sccseitinssteieseiinicnmstiasnialeniainteentacnimmacnaiandiialsias 11

Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345

is SEY IID scicsnsschsicisshicnialahinincensocmniatcnianidamiiangsninidettintain 12

Statutes:

Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) 2.0... eee eeeeeeee 2

8 erat tee 2

Railway Labor Act, as amended, 45 U.S.C. $151 et seq.

2, 3, 4

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser Term, 1975

PE distin

Ar Live Pivots Association, INTERNATIONAL,

Petitioner,

—against—

Rautpx WELLS, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT .

Air Line Pilots Association, International (“ALPA”)

respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review

the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Cireuit entered in this proceeding on November 6,

1975, rehearing of which was denied on January 8, 1976.

Opinions Below

The opinion of Arbitrator Harry Platt for the Southern

Airways, Inc. Pilots’ System Board of Adjustment is set

out in the Appendix to this petition, pp. la-24a. The un-

reported findings of fact and conclusions of law of the

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,

Hon. Charles A. Moye, Jr., U.S.D.J., are printed at App.

26a-3la. The per curiam reversal by the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cireuit (Thornberry, Simp-

son and Roney, C.J.J.) is reported at 517 F.2d 132 and

2

set out at App. 32a-35a. The opinion of the Court of

Appeals denying in part Ralph Wells’ petition for rehear-

ing and remanding to the District Court is reported at 522

F.2d 707 and set out at App. 37a-38a. The unreported

order of the Court of Appeals, dated January 8, 1976,

denying ALPA’s petition for rehearing of the remand

order is reproduced at App. 39a.

Jurisdiction

The decision of the Court of Appeals remanding this

case for further proceedings in the District Court on Re-

spondent Ralph Wells’ claim of a breach of the duty of

fair representation was entered on November 6, 1975. The

order of the Court of Appeals denying the petition for

rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc of peti-

tioner Air Line Pilots Association, International with

respect to the Court’s November 6 order was entered on

January 8, 1976. This Court has jurisdiction to review

the remand judgment under 45 U.S.C. §§153(q) and 204,

and 28 U.S.C. §1254(1). Jurisdiction in the District Court

was predicated upon 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1337.

Question Presented

In a lawsuit under the Railway Labor Act by a dis-

charged airline pilot, seeking to set aside the ward of the

Pilots’ System Board of Adjustment which sustained the

discharge as being for just cause, and for reinstatement

and damages on the claim that the discharge was the

result of alleged hostile collusion between the carrier and

labor organization in breach of the duty of fair repre-

sentation, did the Court of Appeals commit clear error

in conflict with Supreme Court and other judicial anu-

thority by remanding the cause to the District Court for

3

proceedings on the claim of wrongful discharge rather

than dismissing the complaint, notwithstanding that a) the

grievant voluntarily elected to submit to the System Board

the very claims and issues on alleged wrongful discharge

which he seeks to advance in District Court upon remand;

b) the Court of Appeals refused to set aside the System

Board award which resolved those claims against the

grievant and held that the award was final and binding

as the product of a fair hearing; and c) the grievant

previously agreed that a decision which sustained the

Board award was a bar to any further claims in the

complaint?

Statutes Involved

The pertinent provisions of the Railway Labor Act, as

amended (the “Act’”), 45 U.S.C. $151 et seq., are set out at

App. 40a-4la.

Statement of the Case

a. Background

In the aspect considered by this petition,* the Court of

Appeals proceedings present for review a sharp new chal-

lenge to the Federal labor policies sustaining the final

and binding character of the awards of labor arbitration

tribunals. The net effect of the proceedings below is to

allow an unsuccessful grievant under the Railway Labor

Act to relitigate the merits of his discharge in Federal

Court although the adverse arbitral award was sustained

by the Court as the product of a full and fair hearing on

all issues. The Court held in effect that the grievant may

* Respondent Ralph Wells filed a petition for a writ of certiorari

to review another aspect of the Court of Appeals decisions. No.

75-6081. Briefs in opposition were filed.

SS

4

secure relitigation by advancing the claim that his dis-

charge was the product of hostile collusion or breach of

the duty of fair representation, by the union and carrier,

notwithstanding that these very issues were voluntarily

tried to the System Board of Adjustment and rejected in

a decision which the Court held was final and binding in

accordance with its terms.

b. Parties

Petitioner Air Line Pilots Association, International

(“ALPA”) is the pilot-representing organization under the

Railway Labor Act on almost all U.S. certified carriers, in-

cluding Respondent Southern Airways, Inc. (“Southern”).

Respondent Ralph Wells is a former airline pilot who was

discharged by Southern in 1969 on grounds of pilot in-

competence. (App. 32a).

ce. System Board proceedings

Following his discharge Wells elected to file a grievance

(App. 33a) through the Southern Pilots’ System Board of

Adjustment (“System Board” or “Board”), established by

the ALPA-Southern collective bargaining agreemnt pur-

suant to requirement of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.

§204 (App. 41a). Under the pilot contract, System Board

awards are final and binding (App. 7a).

On Wells’ hearing, the Board consisted of professional

labor Arbitrator Harry Platt as presiding arbitrator to-

gether with two pilot and two management members.

Wells at his election was represented by his own counsel.

(App. 35a, n.5). In the hearing, Wells took the position

that his discharge was the result of his employment as a

replacement pilot on Southern during a 1960-1962 pilot

strike, and Southern-ALPA collusion to have him dis-

charged because of his role at that time, rather than sub-

5

standard pilot competence. Wells’ counsel objected to the

composition of the Board in his hearing, but made no

other objection to the Board’s capacity to resolve the

issues on the merits. Wells and Southern then stipulated

that the hearing would proceed subject only to Wells’

rese: vation of a right to test the Board composition in a

later Court proceeding, without reservation of other rights.

Wells then voluntarily submitted evidence on all discharge

issues, including his claims of hostile collusion between

ALPA and Southern and of competence as a pilot.

d. System Board Award

Following the three-day Board hearing, Arbitrator Platt

issued an opinion (App. 1a-24a) in which he rejected all

claims that the discharge was the result of any hostility

or collusion on the part of Southern or ALPA and found

that Wells was properly terminated for jusi cause in terms

of competence as a pilot. (App. 22a-24a). With respect

to collusion issues Arbitrator Platt noted, “Assumption is

no substitute for reasonable probability as a measure of

wrongdoing” (App. 23a), adding that “no one, except the

aggrieved, seems seriously to believe that the relations

between ALPA members and non-ALPA members have

been so poor in recent years as to make a conspiracy to

bring about Wells’ discharge a reasonable probability.”

(Id.) On issues of pilot competence, the Arbitrator stated,

in part,

“A pilot entrusted with the lives of numerous pas-

sengers may surely be expected to attain and main-

tain a reasonable degree of proficiency and to exhibit

competence in his flying, demonstrate sound judgment

and utilize equipment to the safe and successful com-

pletion of his flight. What is not expected of such a

pilot are displays of periodic deficiencies in judgment,

6

repeated lack of knowledge, and continued marginal

or substandard proficiency. Wells’ record shows not

only a tendency to deviate from standard flight pro-

cedures but a lack of knowledge of those procedures.”

(App. 22a).

e. District Court Pr «

Wells next brought this action in the U.S. District Court,

Atlanta, to set aside the Platt award and for reinstate-

ment, backpay and damages, claiming that he was denied

due process in the Board proceeding, and that his dis-

charge was the product of hostile collusion between South-

ern and ALPA. In the District Court, Wells took the

position that he could not recover on the claims of hostile

collusion and wrongful discharge unless the Platt award

were first set aside as the product of an unfair hearing;

this position was unchanged at any point until after the

initial opinion of the Court of Appeals.* The District

Court found that Wells was denied due process, set aside

the Platt award, ordered the grievance remanded to a

new System Board or other arbitration proceeding, and

deferred decision on any other claims pending the new

arbitration. (App. 31a).

f. Court of Appeals Proceedings

On appeals by Southern and ALPA the Court of Ap-

peals reversed, finding that Wells received a full and fair

_* For example, the District Judge stated at trial without objec-

tion by Wells, “[A]s I see it, if the System Board award stands,

that’s the end of the matter. So before you can go further you

have to get past that hurdle.” (Transeript of trial, p. 80). In his

post-trial brief, Weils stated, “If there had been a proper pro-

ceeding before the system board leading to a valid award, that

award would be an obstacle to plaintiff's action for wrongful dis-

charge. * * * For plaintiff to get relief under either count, it is

necessary that the award of the system board be overturned.” ~

7

Board hearing and decision, including due process and

representation by his own counsel as he elected, creating

a final and binding award as provided in the pilot con-

tract. The Court stated in part:

“Wells received a full hearing before the Board.

He had full opportunity to present his claim that he

was not discharged for incompetence, but for hostile

discrimination against nonunion pilots by the ALPA,

and company acquiescence in that discrimination. The

Board resolved this claim adversely to Wells.” (App.

35a).

Wells then petitioned for rehearing. In his petition,

he claimed for the first time in either the District Court

or Court of Appeals that he was entitled to press his

claim for breach of the duty of fair representation—the

contention that his discharge was the product of hostile

collusion—notwithstanding the final and binding System

Board award. The Court of Appeals denied Wells’ peti-

tion in part, refusing to disturb its position that the Platt

award was final and binding. Notwithstanding, it re-

manded the case to the District Court for further pro-

ceedings on Wells’ claim that there was a breach of the

duty of fair representation. (App. 38a). The sole an-

thority for this action cited by the Court was Czosek v.

O’Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970), although this case only holds

that an employee is not required to exhaust adjustment

board remedies under certain circumstances before filing

a fair representation suit. The Court denied ALPA’s

subsequent petition for rehearing. (App. 39a).

g- Supreme Court Proceedings

Wells has petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review

the holding that he was not denied due process or a fair

proceeding in the System Board, and that he is bound by

8

the Board award; ALPA and Southern have filed briefs

in opposition. No. 75-6081. The present petition seeks re-

view only of the order which remands the case for consid-

eration of Wells’ claim of alleged breach of the duty of

fair representation. It is on this one aspect of the case

that the Court of Appeals’ decision requires review. The

Court’s remand order directly conflicts with the recent

decision of the Supreme Court in Hines v. Anchor Motor

Freight, Inc., -— U.S. ——, 91 LRRM 2481 (No. 74-1025,

March 3, 1976). There this Court reaffirmed the principles

of finality in labor arbitration proceedings and clarified

the limits of the exceptions to finality. The Court held

in accordance with the prevailing lower Court decisions

(91 LRRM 2481, 2487, n.11), that the grievant dissatisfied

by an arbitral award is not bound by “the contractual

protection against relitigating an arbitral decision” where

he successfully asserts “that the process has fundamen-

tally malfunctioned by reason of the bad faith perform-

ance of the Union.” 91 LRRM 2481, 2487. In that case

the employee may join the union and employer as defen-

dants; neither defendant may rely on the arbitral award

as a bar to recovery. Just as clearly, the Hines decision

marks the boundaries for bypassing the award in this

type of case; it contemplates that where the arbitration

has not malfunctioned by reason of the union’s action or

any other denial of due process the grievant is bound by

the contractual finality of the award.

The same principle was clear in Humphrey v. Moore, 375

U.S. 335 (1964), where the Court held that an unsuccessful

arbitration grievant could not set aside the award where

he was not denied a fair hearing or fair representation in

the arbitration itself. The principles of finality in the

absence of proof within the narrow exceptions are even

stronger in the present case than in Hines or Humphrey,

since the Platt award was rendered by a professional arbi-

9

trator on the System Board, an administrative tribunal

established by statutory requirement, in contrast to the

contractual bipartite proceedings in Hines and Humphrey.

Since the essence of Wells’ claim which he voluntarily

submitted to Arbitrator Platt for decision is precisely the

same as any claim for improper discharge which he might

seek to auvance in the District Court upon remand, and

since the Court of Appeals held that Wells received a full

and fair hearing and decision on this claim before Arbi-

trator Platt, there is nothing left for Wells to litigate on

remand in connection with his discharge. The Court of

Appeals’ remand order creates a wholly novel exception

to the principle of finality, to the effect that the grievant

may relitigate the merits of the grievance in Court by as-

serting that his discharge or other grievance claim was

the product of the Union’s breach of the duty of fair rep-

resentation, notwithstanding that the Board award was

upheld as a fair, final and binding decision on the same

issues. Little remains of the finality principles following

the disposition below. For this and other reasons to be

presented, ALPA urges review of the Court’s remand

order.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

1. The Court of Appeals’ Disposition on Wells’ Petition

for Rehearing Is in Conflict With Applicable Decisions

of This Court and the Courts of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ordered this case remanded to the

District Court for consideration of the claim of denial of

fair representation solely on the authority of Czosek v.

O’Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970). The Court read Czosek as

holding that “a claim for the breach of the duty of fair

representation is separate and distinct from plaintiff-ap-

pellee Wells’ claim that the System Board procedure denied

10

him due process.” (App. 38a). Contrary to-the Court,

Czosek v. O’Mara does not hold that an employee has the

right to proceed against either the union or carrier after

voluntary litigation on the same facts and issnes in a full

and fair System Board proceeding where there was no

denial of due process or fair representation. Czosek, like

prior Supreme Court decisions, only held that an employee

is not required to exhaust adjustment board remedies under

certain circumstances before filing a fair representation

suit. For prior Supreme Court decisions see Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1967); Glover v. St. Louis-S.F.R.R.

Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969). For example, in Glover, the Court

held that railroad employees could bring suit against the

union and carrier for hostile collusion without exhausting

the adjustment board remedy against the carrier if plain-

tiff could show that “a formal effort to pursue contractual

or administrative remedies would be absolutely futile.”

393 U.S. at 391. In Czosek, supra, applying the Glover

principle, the Court only held that the union could be sued

for breach of the duty of fair representation without ex-

hausting adjustment board remedies where it was charged

that the union had arbitrarily refused to process plaintiffs’

claims through the adjustment board. Nothing in Czosek

can be read as permitting further proceedings on a fair

representation claim where the employee, with his own

counsel, voluntarily litigated, sought and obtained a deci-

sion on the same collusion issues before a neutral arbitra-

tor, with no denial of due process. This is particularly so

where there was full acceptance of the award as a bar to

further proceedings in the absence of denial of due process.

In contrast to Czosek, both Humphrey v. Moore, supra,

and Ilines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., supra, deal ex-

plicitly with the binding character of arbitral awards ac-

tually rendered. As previously discussed, in Humphrey

11

and Hines this Court has established that the grievant’s

right to proceed against his union or employer in this type

of case after litigation on the same facts and issues in the

arbitration, depends on establishing that he was denied

due process or fair representation in connection with the

arbitration. Otherwise, in the Court’s words in Humphrey,

“The decision of the [arbitration tribunal], reached after

proceedings adequate under the agreement, is final and

binding upon the parties, just as the contract says it is.”

375 U.S. 335, 351. The Court of Appeals held that Wells

received a full and fair hearing and decision on his claim

of improper discharge in the System Board, including full

hearing on the merits of the collusion issue. Wells has not

“ roved his case” (id., 375 U.S. 335, 351) that he was

denied due process and fair representation in the Board,

and his complaint should therefore have been dismissed

in its entirety.

The Court’s disposition on Wells’ petition for rehearing

conflicts with prevailing decisions in the Courts of Appeals.

For example, in Steinman v. Spector Freight System, Inc.,

441 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1971), cited in Hines, supra, 91 LRRM

2481, 2487, n.11, plaintiff lost in the arbitration, then sued

his union and employcr, alleging unfair representation in

the grievance proceeding and breach of contract. The Court

of Appeals reversed dismissal of the complaint, holding

that the arbitration award was not a bar to suit or the

same issues because plaintiff was denied a fair hearing in

the arbitration. 441 F.2d 599, 603. At the same time the

Court pointed out that under Humphrey v. Moore, supra

and other decisions, “plaintiff could not sue if he lost in a

fair arbitration.” 441 F.2d 599, 603.

In Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179, 180, (9th

Cir. 1974), cited in Hines at 91 LRRM 2488, the Court

stated that “ an employee may not attack a final arbitration

12

decision ‘. . . except on the grounds of fraud, deceit or

breach of the duty of fair representation unless the griev-

ance was a “sham, substantially inadequate or substantially

unavailable.”’” (Emphasis in original). The same prin-

ciple appeared to obtain in the Fifth Circuit prior to the

disposition here. See, Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank

Tines, Inc., 487 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1971), cited in

Hines, supra, 91 LRRM 2481, 2488, n.11 and quoted in

Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., supra, 501 F.2d 179, 180. See

also other cases cited in Hines, supra, 91 LRRM 2481,

2487-88, n.11. This Court should exercise its jurisdiction

to eliminate the conflict between the circuits and to restore

the applicable Fifth Cireuit principles to their former

uniformity with the decisions of this Couri and the other

Courts of Appeals.

2. Respondent’s Election of Remedies and Agreement

That the System Board Award Was a Bar to Further

Relief

The remand order of the Court below is a departure

from the accepted course of judicial proceedings, which

precludes the assertion of a new ground for relief follow-

ing explicit election of remedies and waiver of the right

to proceed in Federal Court on any claim following lack

of suecess on the basis submitted.

Wells “elected to challenge his discharge through the

grievance procedure. ...” (App. 33a) rather than through

the Courts.* In the System Board the only objection made

* At the time of Wells’ discharge there was available a cause

of action for damages based upon claims of unlawful discharge.

See Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S.

653 (1953), since overruled in Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R.,

406 U.S. 320 (1972). Wells might also have elected to commence,

as an alternative to the System Board, a suit alleging carrier-

union conspiracy resulting in his discharge. Glover v. St. Louis

S.F.Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969); Richardson v. Texas & N.O.R.R.,

242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957).

13

by Wells’ counsel to the proceeding was over the composi-

tion of the Board. Respondents Wells and Southern stip-

ulated that the hearing would proceed subject only to

Wells’ reservation of a right to test the Board composi-

tion in a later Court proceeding. Wells voluntarily tried

all issues surrounding his discharge on the basis of that

stipulation. Throughout the District Court proceeding

Wells recognized that the System Board award, if sus-

tained, is an absolute Lar to any further claims. This

position was unchanged in the Court of Appeals—until

that Court sustained the award. Wells then asserted for

the first time that he wished to pursue additional claims

notwithstanding the final and binding Board award.

The Court of Appeals improperly ignored Wells’ volun-

tary election of remedies and waiver of a right to Fed-

eral Court trial on all issues involving the merits of his

discharge if the System Board award was sustained. This

action was a departure from the accepted course of judicial

proceedings which should be corrected in this Court.

14

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals’ decision to remand this case for

further proceedings is a serious erosion of the principles

of finality in System Board proceedings under the Railway

Labor Act, as indeed in labor arbitration generally. For

the reasons stated, it is respectfully requested that a writ

of certiorari issue to review the remand decision, and

that, upon review, the Supreme Court order the complaint

herein dismissed in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

SaMvEL J. CoHEN

Attorney for Petitioner

605 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10016

Tel. No. (212) 682-6077

Of Counsel:

Conen, Weiss anp SIMON

Rosert S. SaveELson

MicHae, E. Asram

APPENDIX

la

SoutHEern Arrways Inc. Sysrem Boarp or ApsJusTMENT

In THE MaTTER oF

THE DiscHarce or Ratpx WELLS

NEUTRAL REFEREE’S OPINION

This appeal protests the discharge of Ralph Wells, a

reserve captain. The appeal is pursuant to the provisions

of the collective Agreement between Southern Airways,

Inc. and the airline pilots in the service of Southern repre-

sented by the Air Line Pilots Association, International.

Section 31(a)7 of the Agreement gives a dismissed pilot

an option of appealing directly to a five-man System Board

of Adjustment, thereby bypassing an appeal to the four-

man System Board sitting without a Neutral Referee.

The aggrieved, having exercised such option, the appeal

was referred to a System Board comprised of the follow-

ing: Harry H. Platt, of Detroit, Michigan, Neutral Referee ;

George M. Gross and W. C. Litty, Carrier members; Yancy

Sims and James Bass, ALPA members. Hearings were

held by the Board on June 3, 25, and 26, 1969 at which the

aggrieved was represented by his counsel, William M.

Pate, of Mitchell, Pate, and Anderson, Attorneys, and the

Carrier by John Bacheller, Jr., of Fisher and Phillips,

Attorneys. Both counsel filed post-hearing briefs which

were received November 28 and November 30, 1969, re-

spectively.

Ralph Wells, the aggrieved, was employed by Southern

on Jannary 17, 1960. Because a pilot strike was then in

progress, Wells and other newly hired pilots started flying

2a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

as captains. At the conclusion of the strike, which lasted

from June 5, 1960 to September 21, 1962, the striking pi-

lots, all members of ALPA, returned to work with full

seniority and those hired during the strike were either

given employment as co-pilots or were furloughed and

placed on a preferential hiring list. Wells, in line with his

seniority, reverted to the status of co-pilot.

During his employment, Wells regularly took flight

checks, once each year as a co-pilot and twice each year

when he flew as captain. He also took trainer checks and

written examinations at irregular periods. In December,

1964, he failed an annual check for the first time but

passed a recheck two days later. In March, 1968 he re-

ceived several unsatisfactory grades on a captain’s recur-

rent flight check and failed to pass it. He failed also to

pass a recheck the next day. After some additional train-

ing on the failed items, he passed a recheck. Apart from

failed checks, Wells was disciplined in March, 1962 for ig-

noring a fire warning light in the cockpit and failing to

discover that a portion of the exhaust collector ring around

the engine had burned and fallen away. For this, he was

demoted from captain to co-pilot for a period of four weeks

and his airline pilot certificate was suspended by the FAA

for the same period. On June 7, 1963 Wells was sus-

pended for five days because he failed to be available for

incidental flying on days when he was scheduled on re-

serve. In September, 1965, he was reprimanded for en-

gaging in an altercation with another pilot while on duty.

On February 7, 1969, Wells was informed by letter that

his employment was terminated effective February 5, 1969.

The letter stated:

Oconee ew hs 3b ee

eee

3a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

February 7, 1969

Mr. Ralph Wells

Box 263

Hapeville, Georgia

Dear Mr. Wells:

This will confirm our conversation whereby you are

terminated effective February 5, 1969.

The reasons for this termination are as follows:

1. Taking off over gross weight at Tallahasse on

January 28, 1969.

2. Unsatisfactory line check by the Atlanta Chief

Pilot on January 31st.

3. Failure to pass a proficiency check on Febru-

ary 4th.

4. Your complete record as a pilot with Southern

Airways.

Would you please return all issued manuals after which

we will make arrangements for your final pay check.

Sincerely,

Sovutnzrn Amways, Inc.

W. Bayne Grubb

Vice President —

Flight Operations

WBG/jmf

ta

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

The aggrieved’s and the Carrier’s positions can be

briefly summarized. Southern maintains that Wells was

discharged for proper cause and its action was not arbi-

trary, unreasonable, or discriminatory. Its position is that

Wells lacked ability to consistently perform his job as pilot

at the level required to meet airline standards and, since

past efforts to bring him up to an acceptable performance

level had failed, the Carrier had no alternative but to dis-

charge him. Southern justifies its action principally on the

grounds stated in the letter of February 7, 1969. First, it

points to an incident which it says reflects not alone a dis-

regard of regulations and standard flying techniques but

poor judgment. The incident involved taking off on a flight

from Tallahassee and flying cross-country nearly 2,500

pounds overweight, thus endangering the safetv of pas-

sengers and crew. Following on the heels of this incident, a

co-pilot scheduled to fly with Wells refused to do so except

under written protest. That led to Wells being given a

flight check by the Chief Pilot to determine if he was

qualified to continue flying — a check which he failed to

pass and which prompted the V. P.—Flight Operations to

give him a special proficiency check. Having failed that

check as well, the V. P.—Flight Operations decided that

Wells ‘‘had retrogressed to the point that he could no

longer be used as a line pilot.’’ Further, Southern main-

tains, Wells’ record in its entirety shows a ‘‘series of mar-

ginal passes, failures and rechecks’’ which illustrate his

deficiencies in judgment, ability, technique, and lack of

knowledge of the essentials required by his duties and

responsibilities as an airline pilot. Finally, Southern denies

that Wells was discharged as a result of its or ALPA’s

hostile discrimination. A contrary claim, it says, ‘‘is sup-

ported only in Wells’ imagination’’, not in any objective

evidence.

da

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

Wells strongly protests his discharge. He contends his

removal from flight duty was without justification and was

arbitrary and lacking in honesty. He denies that his per-

formance has been below the acceptable level of pilot per-

formance. He notes that his abilities were checked and

appraised at regular periodic intervals and that he satis-

factorily met all requirements and was at all times regarded

a standard pilot.

Regarding his performance and ability as a pilot, while

he admits he erred in taking off from Tallahassee over-

weight, Wells claims he did so because fog had set in and

he decided it was safer to leave than to remain. But in any

case, he asserts, the ensuing flight checks by Chief Pilot

Brown and V. P.-Flight Operations Grubb were irrelevant

to the Tallahassee incident since that incident did not bring

into question his ability to operate an airplane. Again,

although conceding there was pilot error in his Birming-

ham landing during the line check by Chief Pilot Brown,

the error was not a major one, in his opinion. Nor did he

commit error in a Meridian landing during the same check,

as claimed by the Chief Pilot. According to Wells, that

entire flight showed minor errors at most. As for the pro-

ficiency check given by V. P.-Flight Operations Grubb,

Wells acknowledges he had difficulty on a takeoff after a

simulated engine loss and that in his effort to keep the

plane fiying he ‘‘had to disregard some more routine pro-

cedures.’’ However, he denies that his takeoffs or holding

patterns on that flight check were substandard.

‘part from questions of qualification, Wells’ position

is that his discharge was improper because it resulted

from hostile discrimination by ALPA and therefore it can-

not stand ‘‘even if the evidence otherwise showed a proper

cause for discharge.’’ He maintains his discharge was

6a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

brought about by ALPA members and by members of

management sympathetic to ALPA and he particularly

blames Chief Pilot Brown for his predicament because

Brown, an active participant in the 1960-1962 strike,

‘‘developed a strong feeling of animosity toward persons

working during the strike and towards Wells in particu-

lar.’? Further, he contends there was continued harrass-

ment of him and other non-ALPA pilots by ALPA mem-

bers after the strike, including being denied opportunities

of making qualifying takeoffs and landings, as required

by FAA regulations. By failing to correct this situation,

he asserts, Southern must be deemed to have ‘* participated

with the ALPA captains in a program designed to place

non-union pilots at a disadvantage.’’ His brief states:

Wells’ discharge resulted from efforts of ALPA

and its members, with the cooperation of members

of management, like Captain Brown, whose main

sympathies were with the union. Other members of

management, if not sympathetic to the union, were

unable or unwilling to resist it. The net result is

that Wells was discharged because ALPA and its

members wanted him to be discharged, a feeling

which resulted from Wells’ failure to support the

strike and his nonmembership in ALPA.

The case is thus one of hostile discrimination by

a statutory bargaining agent toward a member of

the bargaining unit which it represents. It has been

long established that such conduct affords a proper

basis for an action against the union and against

the employer who joins in the discrimination.’

Since Wells’ discharge resulted from these discrim-

inatory practices by the union and the company, it

is likewise not entitled to be sustained in the present

proceeding.

Ta

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

Finally, Wells contends that even if the above position

is not sustained the discharge should not be permitted to

stand because of the disparate treatment accorded him and

some ALPA pilots who committed acts of negligence ana

yet were not discharged.

Reduced to essentials, the issue here is whether the

aggrieved was discharged for lack of qualification, as the

Carrier maintains, or as a result of hostile discrimination

by ALPA, as Wells contends.

It is appropriate to note, in light of the charge of bias

and prejudice against the System Board members, other

than the Neutral Referee, and the charge of hostile dis-

crimination by ALPA and members of management, that

the decision in this case has been arrived at by the Neutral

Referee alone without consultation with any other member

of the Board. Under the parties’ System Board Agree-

ment, if two or more members concur in the Referee’s de-

cision it then becomes a final and conclusive determination.

This Referee and others have had occasion in prior

cases to comment on the difference in degree of proof re-

quired to sustain a discharge of an airline pilot and em-

ployees in most other industries. In other than air pilot

cases, it is generally recognized that the burden of estab-

lishing proper cause for discharge is on the employer and

if he fails to do this by clear and convincing evidence, the

discharge will not be allowed to stand. However, a lesser

degree of proof is generally required to sustain the release

of an airline pilot from duty for lack of qualification. That

of course results from the fact that an air carrier is under

a strict legal obligation to afford protection to the public

in all matters against which human providence and fore-

sight might guard and is under obligation to exercise the

highest degree of practical care and diligence in flight op-

eration. Indeed, its responsibility extends not only to ex-

8a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

ercise of care in the selection and use of equipment and

facilities but to the selection and retention of personnel to

perform the flight service. In this kind of case, a manage-

ment decision that a pilot is unqualified, if made honestly

and in the interest of public safety, is not to be lightly dis-

turbed. For while to be sure, a pilot is entitled to protec-

tion from hostile discrimination and unjust treatment, the

interest of the public in safe air travel is paramount and,

unless the evidence is so clear and convincing as to lead a

reasonably minded person to conclude that reinstatement

would involve no future risk to passengers and to public

safety, reinstatement may not be ordered.

We turn to a consideration of the specific charges and

evidence in this case.

1. Taking off over gross weight at Tallahasse. In the

evening on January 28, 1969, Wells was scheduled to fly as

captaia on a charter flight from Tailahassee, Florida to

Columbia, South Carolina. It was necessary to refuel be-

fore departing and he ordered 850 gallons gasoline and 22

gallons oil to be added. On a charter operation it is the

flight crew’s responsibility to determine the proper fuel

load. In actual fact, the gasoline ordered exceeded the

amount required by 350 gallons, the airplane being certifi-

eated for a maximum weight of 44,900 pounds. As a re-

sult, the airplane, a Martin 404, took off weighing 47,000

pounds, or about 2,500 pounds overweight. The certified

maximum weight is calculated to permit an airplane to take

off in- the event of loss of an engine on takeoff and, once

airborne, to sustain level flight with an engine out. In this

instance, according to Southern’s V. P.-Flight Operations,

had Wells lost an engine on takeoff after reaching V*

speed ‘‘he would have crashed at the end of the runway.’’

(Tr. Vol. I p. 26) Further, according to the same witness,

had Wells lost an engine enroute after takeoff, he would

not have been able to maintain altitude.

9a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

Wells admitted that it was his responsibility to see that

the proper amount of fuel was on board. He claims he ac-

tually ordered the gas to be brought up to 850 pounds ‘‘but

they put on 350 instead of bringing it up to 850.’’ For some

unknown reason, he did not determine from either the air-

craft log, which he was supposed to execute before takeoff,

or from the gauges, which he was supposed to observe dur-

ing the reading of the cockpit checklist, that he was over-

weight. An overweight aircraft handles sluggish during

takeoff and Wells became aware for the first time of the

overweight condition on takeoff when he noticed the air-

plane was heavy on the ‘‘climb out.’’ This was about five

minutes after he was in the air and, he claimed, inasmuch

as fog was setting in at Tallahassee he ‘‘didn’t want to

turn back and hold in that vicinity.’’ Earoute to Columbia

he called Dispatch and was told to “run rich and hold over”’

Columbia until he got down to landing weight. After hold-

ing 40 minutes over Columbia and getting the aircraft

down to 43,000 pounds, he landed.

From the evidence in this case, there can hardly be a

reasonable doubt that Wells’ failure to observe the nu-

merous safeguards which existed for avoidance of a fuel

overload and his actual taking off from Tallahassee over-

weight about 2,500 pounds was gross and inexcusable care-

lessness. Further, there is credible expert testimony which

persuades me that he exercised faulty judgment in leaving

the Tallahassee area and continuing to fly cross-country at

night after he became aware that the aircraft was over-

weight. According to Southern’s V. P.-Flight Operations,

what Wells should have done was circle the Tallahassee

airport and burn off the fuel until he got to his dispatch

weight and then proceed to Columbia under normal flight

plan. In that case, he would have been close enough to the

| (initia ai aetna

10a lla

Neutral Referee’s Opinion Neutral Referee’s Opinion

airport so that if he lost an engine he could have man- The Witness: I obviously felt that way about

euvered in for a landing. The V. P.-Flight Operations tes- this, yes, sir. :

tified: (Tr. Vol. I pp. 77-80). Mr. Pate: I didn’t understand that answer.

Q. Let me ask you this: What if that plane

became airborne as it did and, at that point, the

overload of fuel is discovered and there is also a

fog setting in. Would you say, under those circum-

stances, that the plane ought to remain around

Tallahassee in that fog? A. The pilot has to weigh

this under the circumstances at the time. With the

facilities that Tallahassee has for landing, yes, I’d

take my chances on landing in the fog. * * °

Q. And you can conceive of conditions of weather

at the point where the plane is located, such as

Tallahassee, that would make it a matter of good

judgment to proceed on and go to the destination,

can you not? A. Not overloaded, no, sir.

Q. Do I understand you correctly, that you can-

not conceive of any conditions of weather around

Tallahassee that would make it advisable to proceed

on to Columbia, the destination, rather than to stay

in the weather in Tallahassee? A. No, sir, not at

night; I’d stay there.

Q. Regardless of weather conditions? A. Yes, sir.

Arb. Platt: Regardless of the weather, the

judgment that should be made by the pilot would

be the one which you would make, is to land, rather

than go on.

The Witness: I wouldn’t say I would land,

I would stay in the area. Then, in case I lost an

engine, then I would have some place to land.

~ Arb. Platt: Would you go so far as to say

that some other pilot who did not make the same

judgment was wrong?

Arb. Platt: He said he obviously felt that

way about this, meaning by that his answer to my

question was ‘‘yes.’’ He would feel that a pilot who

made the opposite decision and was to go on was

wrong.

Q. Do you know whether there was fog in Talla-

hassee on this occasion? A. I don’t know; no, sir.

Q. Did you know at the time that Mr. Wells was

discharged whether or not there was fog in that

area? A. I didn’t have the weather report on it; no,

sir.

Q. Did you try to find out what the weather con-

dition was? A. Well, it was my conclusion, without

looking at the weather, that if it was good enough

to take off, it would be good enough to land.

Q. So, the condition of the weather would not

affect, in any way, your appraisal of that situation

down there? A. No, sir; it did not.

Q. And if, in fact, the fog was setting in and he

went on from the Tallahassee area for that reason,

you would still find grounds to criticize his handling

of that sitnation? A Yes sir

2. Unsatisfactory January 31 line check. On January

31, 1969, two days after the Tallahassee incident, Wells

was scheduled to fly to New Orleans with Carey Allen as

co-pilot. On learning that Wells was to be the captain, Allen

told Chief Pilot Brown he would not fly with Wells except

under written protest. This was unsatisfactory to Brown

who decided he would take the flight himself and give Wells

a line check.

12a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

Chief Pilot Brown evaluated the line check as unsatis-

factory. Specifically, he found Wells’ ground handling of

the plane rough—‘‘every turn he made, he would over-

control on the steerable nosewheel*** there was no particu-

lar reason for him to do it but it was obvious to me that

he had developed the habit of handling the airplane this

way.’’ Then, he found that on takeoff, Wells ignored pub-

lished procedures and did them in such a way that ‘‘it could

have gotten him in serious trouble.’’ Among other things,

when the wheels were about 50 feet off the ground, Wells

insisted on turning off the ADI and losing the benefit of 700

horsepower which is necessary to have under heavy load

conditions. Also, as soon as he called gear up, he turned off

the auto-feather and turned on a ventillating fan, thus add-

ing an additional hazard and flying in violation of Federal

Air Regulations, which require all takeoffs to be made with

the auto-feather operative. On the cruise part of the flight,

where the procedures call for leaning the engine within

three minutes of attaining assigned altitude, Wells leaned

the engine ‘‘in fifteen seconds and the next time he

wouldn’t lean it one minute the entire leg, thirty-minute

leg, and this kind of thing. Completely inconsistent. He

seemed to have no—he just didn’t comprehend the purpose

of leaning the mixtures, whatsoever.’’ On the use of ra-

dios, the Chief Pilot noted that Wells did not comprehend

all messages, such as approach information and ‘‘on nu-

merous occasions he did not receive the clearance as it

was written, he did not conform to the clearance, primarily

because it became obvious to me that he didn’t understand

the clearance as given.’’ In testing for approach and land-

ing, the Chief Pilot noted two unsatisfactory ILS ap-

proaches, one at Birmingham, Alabama, and one at Merid-

ian, Mississippi. At Birmingham, he said, the weather

was given to them as scattered clouds at 300 feet, broken

13a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

clouds at 600 feet, visibility one mile with light rain, fog

and smoke. They were vectored onto a downwind leg at

3000 MSL and advised 2% miles southwest the outer marker

that they were cleared for an ILS approach to land straight

in on runway 5. He testified: (TR. Vol. II pp. 169-181)

When you get within three to five miles of this

primary fix, this outer marker, you’re suppose to

get your airplane set up and all your check lists run

and ready to tie this ILS down and land, slow your |

airplane down, get it down to the proper speed.

Well, we were cleared from three thousand feet

MSL down to twenty-two hundred, which is a cross-

ing altitude, and he starts to let down, but he does

it in such a manner that he doesn’t drop the landing

gear, he doesn’t put down any flaps at all to slow the

airplane down. So, we come across the outer marker,

when we should come across the outer marker at a

hundred and twenty knots, we come across the outer

marker at exactly a hundred and forty knots.

Q. Should the landing gear be down and should

you be using the flaps at that point? A. Yes, sir.

The landing gear should be down prior to the time

that you get to the outer marker and you should have

the airplane set up in landing configuration and you

should have the landing gear down and extended and

check your green lights and all these check lists, to

see that it’s in a safe condition.

Q. Had he completed the check lists? A. No, sir,

we hadn’t completed the check list at the time we got

to the outer marker. We completed it right at the

outer marker. He dropped the gear right at, just

about the outer marker. * * °

l4a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

So, here we were over the outer marker with im-

proper flap setting and a hundred and forty knots,

instead of a hundred and twenty and virtually no

wind. They were reporting the wind as five knots,

which is considered a calm wind. If it had a real

strong wind on the nose, that would have helped slow

us down. But we continued down in this fashion,

fast and high. And he should have already had down

the second portion of the flaps, which is called ‘‘ap-

proach flaps’’, but we didn’t get these approach flaps

down until much later, when we were about two miles

from the airport, because we had too much speed.

We had a hundred and forty knots and you can’t

extend your flaps to approach speed above a hundred

and thirty knots, because of the structural design

of the airplane.

So, the danger part of it is: Here you’re coming

into Birmingham, Alabama on the instruments. We

were in the clouds at this time. * * *

But here we come down the ILS, into this hole

of Birmingham, where there’s a runway down there

and the ILS glide slope needle was pegged out all the

way up to the top and it stayed there. And he seemed

at a complete loss as to what to do to get it back

down. * * *

The clouds were six hundred feet above the ground

and we are only required to have two hundred feet

clouds, two hundred feet above the ground on this

approach.

Q. And two miles visibility? A. Two miles visi-

bility. That means your forward visibility has to be

at least two miles, so you can at least see the other

end of the runway.

ae ee

CC — — ——————

15a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

In addition to his being high and fast, he’s making

corrections back and forth this way, from a heading

of almost north ten degrees, back and forth, trying to

tie down his localizer.

Now, we continue in this attitude, never tying

down either the localizer nor the glide slope, until

we’re coming down and, at about twelve hundred and

fifty MSL, which is six hundred feet above the

ground—®* * *

So, just about—oh, aproximately a mile from the

end of the runway, we break underneath the clouds

and here’s the airport sitting over here to the left.

We get in there okay, but we weren’t where we were

suposed to be. We weren’t in the position where we

should have been. * * *

And if he had done what was proper and what

the passengers back there would have like for him

to do,* * * he would have executed a missed approach

and gone around. But, instead, he pulls all the power

off the airplane and he calls for landing flaps and he

is still going a hundred and thirty knots. * ° ’

Q. What’s the maximum speed at which you can

—you’re supposed to use landing flaps? A. A hun-

dred and five knots, and he was at one thirty when

he called for them. Whether he knew he was at a

hundred and thirty or a hundred and five, I heven’t

determined, but he called for landing flaps und I

didn’t give it to him.* * °

So, he dives the airplane down and he gets it

down in this hole in Birmingham and the runway

was wet. It had been raining all over the South-east.

And he touches down just about midway down the

airport, which leaves us another five thousand feet

of runway to land. There was never any doubt in

l6a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

my mind we could get the airplane on the ground

and stop. But when we get on the ground he made

a fairly decent landing, because it’s pretty easy to

land on, to make a touch-down smoothly on a wet

runway. It’s after you get on the ground on a wet

runway that you have — Just as soon as he touched

down, he called, ‘‘Lock the controls’’ and I couldn’t

believe it.* * *

He would have had real trouble controlling the

airplane if I had locked the controls when he called

wnt.? °°

Q. Is there a logical reason for him to call for

locking the wheels at that point? A. No, sir.

There’s no reason, whatsoever, and it just indicated

to me that he had in his mind that somewhere in his

procedure the controls were supposed to be locked

and he thought this was about as good a time as any

to lock the controls and get that done and that’s what

he did. That’s what he called for.

So, what he should have done would be just real

—make it real simple. He should have touched down

on that wet runway and eased forward on that yoke

and gotten the airplane in the position where he could

use the available reverse trust.* * * Instead he

didn’t touch the reverse throttles at all.* * °

We broke contact at six hundred feet above the

ground, when we should have been about two to three

hundred feet above the ground that close to the air-

port. So, we’re sitting up here real high and the

airport is down here, and thank goodness there was

a ten-thousand-feet runway. If there hadn’t been,

we couldn’t have, in any way, dived the airplane

down and got it on. You’re not supposed to dive the

Martin, anyway.

l7a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

Chief Pilot Brown found a similar lack of technique in

Wells’ Meridian approach. He reported it as follows:

Approach Control advised us of our radar posi-

tion as being 25 miles northeast of Key Field and to

‘‘expect a vector to an ILS approach to runway

‘‘one’’ with a circle to land on runway ‘‘one-nine’’

(19).

The weather was given to us at that time as ‘‘ceil-

ing measured five hundred overcast, visibility five

miles with fog, wind from 170 degrees at eleven

knots’’. Wells had been reviewing the MEI ILS ap-

proach plate but he did not realize that Key Field

was below circling minimums and the wind was be-

yond limits for a landing straight-in on runway

‘‘one’’. He started his descent upon intercepting the

inbound localizer course but he remained ‘‘two dots’’

to the left of center line all the way down with no real

effort to correct to the center line. I reported to the

tower as we passed the OM inbound and, luckily, the

tower reported the surface wind as having decreased

to 170 degrees at seven (7) knots. Wells told me to

advise the tower that we would plan to land straight-

in on runway one. We broke contact at 800 feet MSL

(500 feet) but at least 200 feet to the left of the

runway.

In summary, Chief Pilot Brown found that Wells’ line

check showed he did not adhere to normal operating pro-

cedures. He concluded the line check was unsatisfactory

‘*based primarily on two unsatisfactory ILS approaches.’’

3. Failure to pass a proficiency check on February 4th.

As a result of the Tallahassee incident and the unsatisfac-

18a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

tory January 31 line check, Wells was given a special pro-

ficiency check by V. P.-Flight Operations Grubb. Grubb

graded the check unsatisfactory because he found Wells’

‘‘proficiency well below minimum’’, his headwork ‘‘very

unreliable’, and his judgment ‘‘erratic’’. Specifically, he

found Wells’ performance unsatisfactory on takeoffs, which

Wells twice aborted when an engine was cut off. The pur-

pose of this maneuver was to check his ability to maintain

directional control and fly the airplane off the ground on

one engine. On a third attempt, he completed the takeoff

but, according to Grubb, when the engine was cut Wells

‘immediately yanked the controls back and got us off the

ground before we had reached safe flying speed, which

caused us to lose directional control and the airplane was

heading for a crash, actually. I had to bring the power back

in to straighten it out ... restore the engine that I had cut

in order to recover from the accident that was immediately

ahead.’’ His performance on approach to stalls was also

unsatisfactory primarily because of mechanical execution,

rough handling, and general lack of technique. On ap-

proach procedures, he was rated unsatisfactory because he

did not adhere to proper speeds and his approach was so

far off that there was full deflection of both the course and

glide slope. Finally, he was rated unsatisfactory in the de-

gree of judgment exercised because, according to Grubb,

‘the didn’t follow proper procedures. His judgment and

decision-making functions were not normal.’’

4. Complete record as a pilot with Southern Airways.

In addition to receiving a disciplinary penalty for ignoring

a fire warning during a flight from Columbus to Atlanta,

Georgia in 1962 and a reprimand for engaging in an alter-

eation with another pilot while on duty in 1965. Wells

failed two checks and had marginal passes on others. Cap-

19a

Neutral Referee’s Opimon

tain Andrew N. Ernst, a former FAA Inspector and pres-

ent Assistant Chief Pilot for Southern, testified that he

was an FAA observer on a co-pilot proficiency check given

to Wells in 1963, when his “main problem was failing to

accomplish procedures, particulariy emergency procedures,

in proper order. This was engine failures, engine fires. In

other words, the procedures, knowledge of procedures was

peor.’ In December, 1965, when he was Assistant Chief

Pilot, Ernst gave Wells a check ride which was unsatis-

factory ‘‘primarily due to the knowledge of the equipment.

He did not know the equipment, the systems operation and

emergency procedures. The flight portion was barely sat-

isfactory ... he was hazy on his procedures, in-flight pro-

cedures. He was rough on the controls and he went below

the glide slope on precision approaches.’’ As a result,

Wells was sent back to ground school for a refresher train-

ing on procedures. On March 19, 1968 Wells was rated

unsatisfactory on another flight check given by Captain

Ernst. Ernst testified concerning it as follows: (Tr. Vol.

pp. 9-13)

A. The initial thing that was unsatisfactory was:

One of the required maneuvers is simulated engine

failure immediately after lift-off and this is a very

precise, exacting maneuver and must be done well

or you lose your airplane.* * *

Mr. Wells allowed the airplane to drift thirty de-

grees off the runway heading, which, if you had an

obstruction out there, you hit it. He didn’t maintain

a proper air speed to get the performance out of the

aircraft. * * * the air speed could be properly referred

to as V-2 that you maintain to at least four hundred

feet or minimum structures.* * * He had a higher air

speed at one point and then, he pulled the nose up

20a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

abruptly and got below V-2. In other words, his air

speed control was erratic and he didn’t execute the

proper procedures as far as assuring that the en-

gine had—the propeller had feathered and he didn’t

have a fire, and so forth.*** Well, we proceeded,

then, to Macon, to start shooting ILS approaches,

* * * the first one, if I recall correctly, we should have

been slowed down to a hundred and twenty knots and

had our landing check list completed prior to the

initial point where you start your descent, and we

came up to the outer marker at about forty knots

fast and then abruptly pulled the power almost com-

pletely off and pulled the nose up to slow the air-

plane down and then, the gear and the flaps were

extended and the power wasn’t put back on. As a

result, the air speed dissipated down to about ten

knots below a safe air speed. And then, we were

below the glide slope and, at minimums, he failed to

turn over the marker beacon, so we didn’t hear the

marker beacon. * * * Mr. Wells did not turn on

the marker beacon receiver.

Q. So he could not receive the signai to go

around; is that correct? A. That’s right. And, at

the same time, you still have your altimeters to tell

you that you are below your safe altitude. He

didn’t recognize that, either, and went below, and

when he finally started to execute his missed ap-

proach,—the initial air speed is a hundred and

eleven knots and my recollection on—he did this two

or three time improperly, but at one point, he had

the airplane at a bank and the air speed was ninety-

five knots and I had to roll the airplane out because

it was too low and too dangerous. * * * Now, this

2la

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

general thing happened several times. I don’t know

whether we tried that approach three or four times,

but he never was satisfactory and I discontinued

his check ride because I saw that he should have

some more training and I took another student.

The next day we went back down to Macon and

tried to run the check again and essentially the same

thing happened. His procedures, he was still hazy

on them. He couldn’t execute an ILS properly.

(Adverse testimony was also given by two co-pilots

who flew with Wells at infrequent times in 1968. However,-

I was not impressed with their testimony and therefore

gave it no weight.)

After careful study of the entire record, I am unable

to find any clear and convincing refutation of the check

results discussed above or of the conclusions reached by

those who conducted those checks. For one thing, I find

no substantial rebuttal of Captain Ernst’s adverse testi-

mony concerning Wells’ 1965 and 1968 failed checks. Nor

was there more than a casual statement by Wells of the

circumstances of the Brown and Grubb checks. Wells did

refer in his testimony to the two landing approaches which

Brown found unsatisfactory. At Birmingham, he said,

an overriding wind took the airplane out of position at

the outer marker and he made a right turn into the wind

in order to get it ‘‘tied down.’’ He acknowledged that he

made a bad ILS approach and consequently ‘‘was high

and fast’’ on his speed and altitude.

At Meridian, he testified, with a seven knot: wind re-

ported, he decided to make an ILS straight-in approach

but the conversation that was going on between Brown and

the control tower diverted his attention so that he ‘‘didn’t

catch it in time’’ and got a little off the runway to the left.

22a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

Regarding the proficiency check he was given a few days

later by Captain Grubb, Wells conceded that on his third

attempted take off the plane was in a semi-stall and in try-

ing to keep it from stalling he was diverted off the ap-

proach line and forgot several procedures he should have

run through.

Based on all the evidence and the record, considered as

a whole, the conclusion is for me inescapable that Wells’

judgment and performance as a pilot were substandard and

that that was the cause for his discharge. A pilot entrusted

with the lives of numerous passengers may surely be ex-

pected to attain and maintain a reasonable degree of

proficiency and to exhibit competence in his flying, demon-

strate sound judgment and utilize equipment to the safe

and successful completion of his flight. What is not ex-

pected of such a pilot are displays of periodic deficiencies

in judgment, repeated lack of knowledge, and continued |

marginal or substandard proficiency. Wells’ record shows |

not only a tendency to deviate from standard flight proce- |

dures but a lack of knowledge of those procedures.

The foregoing conclusion does not, however, completely

resolve the issue. For while it is true, as Company counsel

suggests, that the central issue is Wells’ lack of ability as a

pilot, it is not the sole question. Another is whether the

disckarge was in fact due to his lack of competence and not

to discrimination, caprice or arbitrariness. In this case, the

aggrieved’s heavy reliance has indeed been on the premise

that his discharge was brought about by the hostile attitude

of ALPA and its members and through their collusion with

members of management sympathetic to ALPA.

After a rigorous examination of all the evidence, I must

say that I find nothing in the record to support the charge

that the aggrieved’s termination was the result of hostile

discrimination by ALPA or its members and nothng to

23a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

support the charge that ALPA members and members of

Management conspired to bring about his discharge. As-

sumption is no substitute for reasonable probability as a

measure of wrongdoing. Wells indeed makes much of the

fact that there was a pilot strike at Southern in 1960-1962

during which he and other non-union pilots displaced ALPA

members and which, he asserts, stirred great resentments

and caused strong feelings of animosity to develop among

the striking and non-striking pilots. Undoubtedly, in a

situation like that, resentments and animosities do develop.

And there is not much question that in this case they spilled

over from the strike and affected pilot relations for a time

after the strike. But the passage of time has healed most

of the old wounds and no one, except the aggrieved, seems

seriously to believe that the relations between ALPA mem-

bers and non-ALPA members have been so poor in recent

years as to make a conspiracy to bring about Wells’ dis-

charge a reasonable probabilit: In fact, a witness for the

aggrieved, who was himself hired during the strike and

who now heads the Southern Pilots Association, a non-union

group, stated he was quite pleased with the relationship

between ALPA and non-ALPA members. He testified:

Tr. Vol. III pp. 107-108)

Q. Would it be your judgment that the feelings

had subsided substantially since the strike?

A. I think nothing short of a miracle could have

brought the relationship to where it is today, con-

sidering all the things that have happened.

Q. In other words, you are presently—you are

pleased with the progress that’s been made between

the two groups, considering the feeling that existed

during the strike. -

A. I’m not satisfied with it, but I’m pleased with

it, I mean, it could be better. Is any man satisfied,

well hardly, with anything, until it reaches perfec-

24a

25a

Neutral Referee’s Opinion

tion? But we have demonstrated for a period of four Sovrnzrn Arrways Inc. System Board oF ADJUSTMENT

years, and non-union pilots in supervisory capacity

ran tue Company and, now then, for almost two ry THE MaTTER OF

yeezs, union pilots in a supervisory capacity have THE DiscHaRGE or RaLpH WELLS

been in the driver’s seat. |

But the great thing that has come out of this : =—=@

thing, I think, was we started out as captains here, |

we were demoted back to co-pilots, and we sat with |

our jaws locked and our tongue in our cheek and | © The discharge of Ralph Wells on February 5, 1969 was

said, ‘‘Well, I hope this guy knows how to fly.’’ : ‘ athe Mond

: : din nied.

Well, he was probably thinking the same thing for for proper cause. His grievance 1s accordingly de

two years, while he was out there on strike, because

AWARD OF SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

he felt it was his airplane, I guess. But, at any rate, /s/ Harry H. Puarr

we learned to respect that and, as time went along Harry H. Platt,

and things happened, they learned to respect us, in Neutral Referee

their way. I mean, there’s times when things hap-

pen that it takes two people and when those times | /s/ Georce M. Gross

came up, it was never found lacking, that I know, — Yancy Sims George M. Gross

that a union and non-union pilot failed to make it.

: /3/ W.C. Lirrry

Nor do I find support in the record for the contention | James Bass W. C. Litty

that there was disparate treatment of ALPA members and |

non-ALPA members in disciplinary matters. Since 1962° ALPA Members Carrier Members

four pilots have been discharged by Southern. All four |

were ALPA members. No non-ALPA pilots have been dis- | January 16, 1970

charged. There was no proof that any ALPA pilot de-

served discharge but was not discharged.

Further discussion would unduly prolong this Opinion

and serve no useful purpose. Suffice it to say, that after

painstaking study of all the evidence, I am constrained to

conclude that the aggrieved’s discharge was for proper

cause and not arbitrary or discriminatory.

SS ST

January 7, 1970

/s/ Harry H. Puatr }

Harry H. Platt, Neutral Referee

26a

| IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For tae NorrHern District or Grorcu

Atuanta Drvisi0on

Civil Action No. 13647

,

Ww

Rates WELLS,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

SoutHern Armways, Inc., and Amuing Pots

AssociaTION INTERNATIONAL,

Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Findings of Fact

1. The plaintiff, Ralph Wells, was an airline pilot in

the employ of the defendant carrier, Southern Airways,

Inc., before his discharge on February 4, 1969.

2. Plaintiff was initially employed by the carrier as a

captain in June 1960 at a time when the defendant union

was conducting a pilots’ strike against the carrier. He was

a strikebreaker, and, in the more colorful language of

American industrial relations, a ‘‘scab.’’ (Joint Exhibit 1).

3. Plaintiff continued in the employ of the defendant

carrier for the duration of the lengthy strike as a captain,

but when the strike ended in September 1962, the striking

pilots were reinstated with seniority and therefore plaintiff,

by reason of having less seniority, became a co-pilot. He

subsequently attained the posititon of reserve captain,

which position he held at time of discharge.

0 eT ees ee Se nae

27a

District Court Findings and Conclusions

4. Plaintiff never became a member of the defendant

union while employed by the defendant carrier.

d. Plaintiff was discharged by W. Bayne Grubb, de-

fendant carrier’s vice president of flight operations, in

part upon a discharge recommendation of R. T. Brown, the

defendant carrier’s chief pilot.

6. Prior to the circumstances surrounding and immedi-

ately preceding his discharge, plaintiff’s flying record with

the carrier had been satisfactory. He regularly received

the periodic checks that were required by federal regula-

tions and company practice. In the few instances when any

of these checks were not satisfactory, the deficiencies were

promptly corrected.

7. Plaintiff had received such periodic checks in Sep-

tember and November, 1968, and had been found to be fully

qualified to operate aircraft as captain, and he was not due

to receive another check until March of 1969.

8. However, as the result of twe highly unusual com-

plaints by union members (Joint Exhibit 1), solicited by

the chief pilot, a union member, who, before his promotion

to chief pilot, had participated in the pilots’ strike and had

been a leader and spokesman for the striking pilots, the

chief pilot gave plaintiff an out-of-town check which he

found unsatisfactory, and recommended plaintiff’s dis-

charge. At about the same time, plaintiff made a take-off

overloaded with gas. Plaintiff was given another check by

a company official, and discharged.

9. In accordance with the contract between the carrier

and union, plaintiff referred his complaint concerning his

discharge to a five-member system board of adjustment.

10. The union contract provided that such a board of

adjustment should be composed of two members selected

by the carrier, two members selected by the union, and a

fifth member selected by the other four.

28a

District Court Findings and Conclusions

11. The carrier selected as members of the system

board George M. Gross, its vice president and general man-

ager, and W. C. Litty, administrative assistant to the

officer who had discharged plaintiff. Litty, then a pilot, had

been a participant in the strike conducted by the union

against the carrier in 1960-1962, and was a member of the

union.

12. The union selected as members of the system board

James Bass and Yancey Sims. Both were members of the

union and had been active participants in the pilots’ strike

of 1960-1962.

13. At the beginning of the hearing before the system

board of adjustment, plaintiff made timely objection to the

composition of the board, asserting that he intended to

show his discharge resulted from union hostility to him

resulting from his strike-breaker status in 1960-1962—and

the acquiescence of the carrier in the union’s efforts to get

rid of plaintiff since, following the termination of the strike,

the carrier had to get along with the union.

14. The system board did not rule upon the objection

to its composition, but the hearing proceeded with a stipula-

tion that plaintiff was not waiving his objections. All five

members sat on the board during the hearing and partici-

pated in the proceeding. The parties, the union and the

carrier, refused even to entertain the extremely modest sug-

gestion by counsel for plaintiff that the union and the com-

pany could appoint as their designated members of the

board persons who had not taken an active part in the

strike and who might reasonably be expected to have less

pronounced feelings with respect to strikebreakers. This

adamant attitude contrasts sharply with defendants’ pres-

ent contention that the carrier and union designees were

merely dummies. This Court does not credit that testimony,

which was equivocal in any event. The Court finds that the

actions of the carrier and union designees were clearly di-

rected to advising the neutral of their position in the matter.

29a

District Court Findings and Conclusions

15. The board, by decision signed by the neutral and

two carrier members—but not signed by the union members

—upheld plaintiff’s discharge.

16. In the present action, plaintiff asks this Court to

review and set aside the award of the system board vf ad-

justment and to order his reinstatement with back pay,

and to award costs of litigation, including attorneys’ fees

and punitive damages, against both defendants. In the

alternative, plaintiff asks the Court to award him as against

both defendants compensatory damages based on his past

and future loss of earnings, loss of retirement benefits, and

costs of litigation, including attorneys’ fees. As a further

alternative, plaintiff asks the Court to order a new hear-

ing and redetermination of his complaint by a system board

composed only of impartial members, that he be awarded

back pay to the time of such hearing, together with costs

of litigation including attorneys’ fees, and that he be

granted an award of punitive damages against both parties,

or if not granted against both parties, against the defendant

union.

17. It is contemplated in five-man system boards of ad-

justment in the airline industry that the two carrier-

designated members will be partisan for the carrier’s in-

terests; that the two union designees will be partisan for

the union’s interests. Where the grievant is a good union

member this system will work well; when grievant is per-

sona non grata to the union, the system breaks down’ be-

cause the two labor members of the board are selected by

the union not the grievant, and the four industry members

—not the grievant—select the neutral. Thus in the airline

industry professional arbitrators or neutrals, are depend-

ent upon the relative good graces of the companies and

unions for continuing employment opportunities. They

! See Andrews v. L&N R., 406 U.S. 320, 334 (n. 7).

30a

District Court Findings and Conclusions

have no relationship to, or hope for employment from, in-

dividual grievants who may not be union members.

18. While, in view of its present piecemeal disposition

of this case, the Court will not make detailed findings

thereon, the Court does find that plaintiff had more than

adequate basis for claiming an institutional hostility toward

him by the union. The record clearly reveals a shocking

attempt by the union to drum plaintiff out of the company,

finally acquiesced in by the company’s management. For

example, on three successive flights in 1965, a union captain

placed a crash ax in his lap and threatened plaintiff, then

his co-pilot, concerning its use. (It is interesting to note

that the company took no disciplinary action whatever

against thai union captain although no one would dispute

that his actions were far more worthy of immediate dis-

charge for the sake of public safety than those for which

plaintiff ostensibly was discharged.) The union members’

failure to sign the report as to plaintiff’s grievance is

illuminative. If they had signed, they would have created

a precedent supporting discharge for overloaded take-offs

—if they dissented, they would be supporting a strike-

breaker. Inaction was their solution to the dilemma. It is

sufficient to say the record demonstrates factually a con-

tinuing, virulent hostility by numerous union members, col-

lectively constituting the union, towards plaintiff. The

Court finds that there was a deep-seated union institutional

hostility toward plaintiff at the time of the hearing which

dictated and permeated the union’s actions with respect

thereto. Otherwise, the discharge probably could not have

been effectuated. (See p. 95, Vol. 1, Arbitration Hearings.)

B. Conclusions of Law

1. This Court has jurisdiction to review and set aside

the award of the system board of adjustment, and of

plaintiff’s claim against the defendant carrier and

3la

District Court Findings and Conclusions

defendant union for wrongful discharge and unfair

representation.

2. The system board of adjustment which heard and

decided plantiff’s grievance was not properly constituted

in that the two union members were selected by the union,

not the grievant, and were acting in the interests of the

union which had a strong institutional bias against

plaintiff, and contrary to the interest of the plaintiff. Such

attitude could not help but be observed and felt by the

neutral, who would be aware that a decision unfavorable

to grievant was desired by both company and union. While

the Court does not question the integrity of the neutral in

this instance, clearly a person of stature and highly re-

garded, nevertheless the rights of a grievant should not

depend upon whether or not the neutral’s character con-

tains sufficient fortitude to withstand the potentialities for

a biased ruling here presented.

3. Because of this element of lack of fairness or in-

dustrial due process, the award of the system board is set

aside, and the cause remanded for consideration by a

fairly reconstituted system board, or other arbitrational

tribunal, in further proceedings in which the interests of

plaintiff are fairly represented. The parties shall, within

30 days, confer and submit to the Court promptly there-

after their proposals for implementing this direction.

4. The Court retains complete jurisdiction of this

matter except insofar as necessary to accomplish the

remand hereinabove directed, but defers further decision at

this time pending the arbitration hereinabove directed.

5. The parties shall report to the Court with respect to

the results of the arbitration required.

So Orperep, this 20 day of September, 1974.

/s/ Cuartes A. Moye, JR.

United States District Judge

32a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Firta Circuit

No. 74-3706

SUMMARY CALENDAR*

Aug. 11, 1975.

ray

Vv

Rautew WELLs,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SouTHERN Arrways, Inc., and THe Aruwne Pitots

AssociaTION, INTERNATIONAL,

Defendants-Appellants.

APPEALS FROM THE UnNITep Srares District Court FoR THE

NorTHERN District or GEORGIA

ray

Vv

Before:

THOoRNBERRY, Stimpson and Roney, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

On February 5, 1969 Southern Airways terminated

Ralph Wells, a pilot with nine years of service. Pursuant

to the collective bargaining agreement between Southern

and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), Wells re-

ceived a written statement of the reasons for his termina-

* Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Cas-

ualty Co. of New York, et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

33a

Initial Opinion of Court of Appeals

tion.’ He elected to challenge his discharge through the

grievance procedure provided in that agreement.? The five

man System Board found that Southern’s action was justi-

fied because of the past incidents of pilot inconpetence and

the substantial public interest in safe air travel. On April

6, 1970 Wells challenged the System Board determination in

district court. The court upheld Wells’ claim that the Sys-

tem Board procedure denied him due process, and ordered

another hearing. We reverse.*

The district court’s power to set aside the System Board

determination is very limited. The Board’s decision on the

merits is final, and not subject to review. Gunther v. San

Diego & Arizona Eastern Ry. Co., 382 U.S. 257, 86 S.Ct.

368, 15 L.Ed.2d 308 (1965) ; Hall v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,

No. 74-3883, 511 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1975); Giordano v.

Modern Air Transport/IBT System Bd. of Adjustment, 504

F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1974). A federal court does have power

to set aside the Board’s determination where there is an

absence of fundamental due process. Hall v. Eastern Ait

1 Southern’s notification of termination gave four reasons: (1)

taking off over allowable gross weight from Tallahassee, Florida on

January 28, 1969; (2) failing a line check on January 31, 1969;

(3) failing a proficiency check ride on February 4, 1969; and (4)

an unsatisfactory overall record as a Southern pilot.

2 Wells elected not to bring his grievance before a four man System

Board, consisting of two members designated by the carrier and two

by the union. He proceeded directly to a hearing before a five man

board—essentially the four man board plus a neutral arbitrator.

Section 31(a)(7) of the collective bargaining agreement granted him

this option.

* The district judge ordered a new hearing before an impartially

constituted System Board on Wells’ discharge. Wells here questions

the appealability of that order. We find that the district court’s order

was a final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Hall

v. Eastern Air Lines, No. 74-3883, 511 F.2d 663 (Sth Cir. 1975);

Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 620 (10th Cir.

1973); Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1969), rev’d on other

grounds sub nom. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct.

14-20, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).

34a

Initial Opinion of Court of Appeals

Lines, Inc., supra; Rosen v. Eastern Air Lines, 400 F.2d

462 (Sth Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 959, 89 S.Ct. 1307,

22 L.Ed.2d 560 (1969). But that narrow exception does not

apply in this case.

Wells claimed his discharge resulted from an ALPA

po.icy of discrimination against nonunion pilots, and man-

agement-union collusion in furtherance of that policy. The

neutral arbitrator specifically commented on that charge of

his decision.*

After a rigorous examination of all the evidence, I

must say that I find nothing in the record to support

the charge that the aggrieved’s termination was the

result of hostile discrimination by ALPA or its mem-

bers and nothing to support the charge that ALPA

members and members of Management conspired to

bring about his discharge. Assumption is no substi-

tute for reasonable probability as a measure of

wrongdoing. Wells indeed makes much of the fact

that there was a pilot strike at Southern in 1960-

1962 during which he and other non-union pilots dis-

placed ALPA members and which he asserts, stirred

great resentments and caused strong feelings of ani-

mosity to develop among the striking and non-strik-

ing pilots. Undoubtedly, in a situation like that, re-

sentments and animosities do develop. And there is

not much question that in this case they spilled over

from the strike and affected pilot relations for a time

after the strike. But the passage of time has healed

most of the old wounds and no one except the

* The neutral arbitrator, conforming to standard System Board

practice, wrote his decision without consultation with the other four

members of the Board. The two company designated members

signed the opinion, but the two union designated members returned

the opinion to the neutral unsigned.

30a

Initial Opinion of Court of Appeals

aggrieved, seems seriously to believe that the rela-

tions between ALPA members and non-ALPA mem-

bers have been so poor in recent years as to make a

conspiracy to bring about Wells’ discharge a reason-

able probability.

Wells received a full hearing before the Board. He had

full opportunity to present his claim that he was not dis-

charged for incompetence, but for hostile discrimination

against nonunion pilots by the ALPA, and company acqui-

escence in that discrimination. The Board resolved this

claim adversely to Wells.

The collective bargaining agreement provides for a five

man System Board composed of two company-designated

representatives, two union-designated representatives, and

a neutral arbitrator. All five are charged with the respon-

sibility of impartially deciding the case before the Board.°

The trial court did not find any bias on the part of indi-

vidual members of the Board. No denial of fundamental

due process occurred, making the Board’s decision final.

The district court exceeded its authority when it set aside

the Board’s determination. See Giordano v. Modern Air

Transport/IBT System Bd. of Adjustment, 504 F.2d 882

(5th Cir. 1974).

Reversed.

5 The district court may have misunderstood the role of the

management and labor members of the Board. In Finding of Fact 17,

the court stated: “It is contemplated in five-man system boards of

adjustment in the airline industry that the two carrier-designated

members will be partisan for the carrier's interests; that the two

union designees will be partisan for the union’s interests.” But, as

stated above, all five are charged with the duty of impartially decid-

ing the case.

The union, as the bargaining representative for all employees of

Southern, has a duty to fairly represent Wells. Under the collective

bargaining agreement, the union was obligated to provide representa-

tion for Wells at the grievance hearing. Instead Wells exercised his

option to retain his own counsel.

36a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For Tue Firrsx Circuit

October Term, 1974

No. 74-3706

Summary Calendar

D. C. Docket No. CA-13647

Vv

Ratew WELLs,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SouTHERN Airways, Inc., and THe Arrune Pivots

AssociaTion, INTERNATIONAL,

Defendants-Appellants.

APPEALS FROM THE UnitTep States District Court FoR THE

NorRTHERN District of GEORGIA

ray

Vv

Before:

THORNBERRY, Stmpson and Roney, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the

record from the United States District Court for the North-

ern District of Georgia, and was taken under submission

by the Court upon the record and briefs on file, pursuant

to Rule 18;

On ConsivErRATION WueEreor, It is now here ordered and

adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said Dis-

trict Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, re-

versed ;

It is further ordered that costs are to be taxed one-

third against plaintiff-appellee, Ralph Wells, one-third

against defendant-appellant, Southern Airways, and one-

third against defendant-appellant, Airline Pilots Associa-

tion, International.

August 11, 1975

Issued as Mandate:

37a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Firru Circuit

No. 74-3706

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING

EN BANC

Nov. 6, 1975

——

Vv

Rauteu WELLs,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SouTHERN Airways, Inc., and AIRLINE PiILots

Association, INTERNATIONAL,

Defendants-Appellants.

APPEALS FROM THE Unirep Srates District Court FOR THE

NorTHERN District oF GEORGIA

fy.

Vv

Before:

THORNBERRY, Stmpson and Roney, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Subject to the following, the Petition for Rehearing is

denied and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular

active service on the Court having requested that the Court

be polled on rehearing en banc, (Rule 35, Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Cireuit Rule 12) the

Petition for Rehearing En Banc is denied.

38a

On Petition for Rehearing

Plaintiff-appellee Wells urges in his petition for rehear-

ing that this Court’s reversal of the district court without

providing for remand denied him the opportunity to present

his claim against the union for breach of the duty of fair

representation. Under the rule of Czosek v. O’Mara, 1970,

397 U.S. 25, 90 S.Ct. 770, 773, 25 L.Ed.2d 21, a claim for

breach of the duty of fair representation is separate and

distinct from plaintiff-appellee Wells’ claim that the Sys-

tem Board procedure denied him due process. Accordingly,

and without intending any comment as to the merits of the

fair representation claim, this case is remanded to the dis-

trict court for consideration of that claim.

39a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

Office of the Clerk

January 8, 1976

To ALL CouNsEL or REcorRD

No. 74-3706—Ralph Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc. and

Airline Pilots Association International

Dear Counsel:

This is to advise that an order has this day been entered

denying the petition( ) for rehearing, and no member of

the panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court

having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en

bane (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure;

Local Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the petition( ) for rehearing

en bane has also been denied.

See Rule 41, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for

issuance and stay of the mandate.

Very truly yours,

Epwarp W. WapswortH,

Clerk

By /s/ Susan M. Gravors

Deputy Clerk

/smg

ec: Mr. Robert S. Savelson

Mr. John Bacheller, Jr.

Mr. William M. Pate

40a

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Railway Labor Act, as amended, Section 3(q), 45 U.S.C.

§ 153(q) :

(q) If any employee or group of employees, or

any carrier, is aggrieved by the failure of any divi-

sion of the Adjustment Board to make an award in

a dispute referred to it, or is aggrieved by any of

the terms of an award or by the failure of the division

to include certain terms in such award, then such

employee or group of employees or carrier may file

in any United States district court in which a petition

under paragraph (p) could be filed, a petition for

review of the division’s order. A copy of the petition

shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the

court to the Adjustment Board. The Adjustment

Board shall file in the court the record of the pro-

ceedings on which it based its action. The court

shall have jurisdiction to affirm the order of the

division or to set it aside, in whole er in part,

or it may remand the proceeding to the division

for such further action as it may direct. On such

review, the findings and order of the division shall

be conclusive on the parties, except that the order of

the division may be set aside, in whole or in part,

or remanded to the division, for failure of the

division to comply with the requirements of this

chapter, for failure of the order to conform, or

confine itself, to matters within the scope of the di-

vision’s jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by

a member of the division making the order. The

judgment of the court shall be subject to review

as provided in sections 1291 and 1254 of Title 28.

Railway Labor Act, as amended, Section 204, 45 U.S.C.

Sec. 204. The disputes between an employee or

group of employees and a carrier or carriers by air

4la

Statutory Provisions

growing out of grievances, or out of the interpreta-

tion or application of agreements concerning rates

of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases

pending and unadjusted on the date of approvai of

this Act before the National Labor Relations Board,

shall be handled in the usual manner up to and in-

cluding the chief operating officer of the carrier desig-

nated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach

an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be

referred by petition of the parties or by either party

to an appropriate adjustment board, as hereinafter

provided, with a full statement of the facts and

supporting data bearing upon the disputes.

It shall be the duty of every carrier and of its

employees, acting through their representatives,

selected in accordance with the provisions of this

title, to establish a board of adjustment of jurisdic-

tion not exceeding the jurisdiction which may be

lawfully exercised by system, group, or regional

boards of adjustment, under the authority of section

3, Title I, of this Act.

Such boards of adjustment may be established by

agreement between employees and carriers either on

any individual carrier, or system, or group of car-

riers by air and any class or classes of its or their

employees; or pending the establishment of a perma-

nent National Board of Adjustment as hereinafter

provided. Nothing in this Act shall prevent said

carriers by air, or any class or classes of their em-

ployees, both acting through their representatives

selected in accordance with provisions of this title,

from mutually agreeing to the establishment of a

National Board of Adjustment of temporary duration

and of similarly limited jurisdiction.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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