Petition — Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International v. Wells
Supreme Court brief1976
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IN THE —
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CLERK :
Bil
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER a, 1975
B- 1427
Air Line Piwors Association, INTERNATIONAL,
Petitioner,
—against—
Ratpepu WELLs, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
SaMvuEL J. CoHEeNn
Attorney for Petitioner
605 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10016
Tel. No. (212) 682-6077
Of Counsel:
Couen, WEIss AND Sruion
Rosert S. SaveELson
MicuaeL FE. ABRAM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
SI TRRIIINET cccsnsnseintoiticonehdniemersedasennpietsnhananmnennminninedibaign 1
PENI OTE COTE NERC OEn 2
re eee 2
Statutes Involved ...................-.-..:--0+-++- shisianaadimad: nilliteiiecehoseias 3
IE Oe Ge CD ai cess tet achiedatccterntecencnestteninisttbitin 3
BERLIN: Ne ORR a ON 3
BE SSRN aa hot ON RTO ORO OO 4
c) System Board Proceedings ........................--.-++++ 4
FB eiaiesiishiibeicinitindensciniiesorntions 5
e) District Court Proceedings ...........2.....-..-.-.-.0---+ 6
f) Court of Appeals Proceedings ................4........ 6
g) Supreme Court Proceedings ...............................- 7
Reasons for Granting the Writ —............2..--ee eee ceeeeeeee 9
1. The Court of Appeals’ Disposition on Wells’
Petition for Rehearing Is in Conflict With
Applicable Decisions of This Court and the
I Oe BD stnntesenentcenaceichsiteterennee-stinicenios 9
2. Respondent’s Election of Remedies and Agree-
ment That the System Board Award Was a
gk See 12
ERIE a cere ee ee oe ON OR NET TRS 14
il
TaBLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: PAGE
Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972) ... 12
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1967) .........--.-.-.scecceseeee 10
Czosek v. O’Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970) .......2.2.2.....de-eee 9,10
Glover v. St. Louis-S.F.R.R., 393 U.S. 324 (1969) ...... 10, 12
Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d
TET CES GING, TINIE -cncoessschomnsieniiestbindenshebiisintesbiiineditinemabioniiaiaiiie 12
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.. —— U.S. ——,
91 LRRM 2481 (No. 74-1025, March 3, 1976) ....8, 9, 10, 11,
passim
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) _.......... 8, 9, 10, 11
Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179 (9th Cir.
TUTTE | scvssiscsssncusitinsseliccsshitiegisnestiiinaincaiiieaateriiiahihibasdaiiciiaiadale 11, 12
Richardson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.
TEED siceisusniinnieniniedecineicibiaseaetaeesiianbialansiiiidaealgiiaaiiniiinaaadiiaias 12
Steinman v. Spector Freight System, Inc., 441 F.2d 599
Sy Weis SEED? sccseitinssteieseiinicnmstiasnialeniainteentacnimmacnaiandiialsias 11
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345
is SEY IID scicsnsschsicisshicnialahinincensocmniatcnianidamiiangsninidettintain 12
Statutes:
Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) 2.0... eee eeeeeeee 2
8 erat tee 2
Railway Labor Act, as amended, 45 U.S.C. $151 et seq.
2, 3, 4
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Octoser Term, 1975
PE distin
Ar Live Pivots Association, INTERNATIONAL,
Petitioner,
—against—
Rautpx WELLS, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT .
Air Line Pilots Association, International (“ALPA”)
respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Cireuit entered in this proceeding on November 6,
1975, rehearing of which was denied on January 8, 1976.
Opinions Below
The opinion of Arbitrator Harry Platt for the Southern
Airways, Inc. Pilots’ System Board of Adjustment is set
out in the Appendix to this petition, pp. la-24a. The un-
reported findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
Hon. Charles A. Moye, Jr., U.S.D.J., are printed at App.
26a-3la. The per curiam reversal by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cireuit (Thornberry, Simp-
son and Roney, C.J.J.) is reported at 517 F.2d 132 and
2
set out at App. 32a-35a. The opinion of the Court of
Appeals denying in part Ralph Wells’ petition for rehear-
ing and remanding to the District Court is reported at 522
F.2d 707 and set out at App. 37a-38a. The unreported
order of the Court of Appeals, dated January 8, 1976,
denying ALPA’s petition for rehearing of the remand
order is reproduced at App. 39a.
Jurisdiction
The decision of the Court of Appeals remanding this
case for further proceedings in the District Court on Re-
spondent Ralph Wells’ claim of a breach of the duty of
fair representation was entered on November 6, 1975. The
order of the Court of Appeals denying the petition for
rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc of peti-
tioner Air Line Pilots Association, International with
respect to the Court’s November 6 order was entered on
January 8, 1976. This Court has jurisdiction to review
the remand judgment under 45 U.S.C. §§153(q) and 204,
and 28 U.S.C. §1254(1). Jurisdiction in the District Court
was predicated upon 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1337.
Question Presented
In a lawsuit under the Railway Labor Act by a dis-
charged airline pilot, seeking to set aside the ward of the
Pilots’ System Board of Adjustment which sustained the
discharge as being for just cause, and for reinstatement
and damages on the claim that the discharge was the
result of alleged hostile collusion between the carrier and
labor organization in breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation, did the Court of Appeals commit clear error
in conflict with Supreme Court and other judicial anu-
thority by remanding the cause to the District Court for
3
proceedings on the claim of wrongful discharge rather
than dismissing the complaint, notwithstanding that a) the
grievant voluntarily elected to submit to the System Board
the very claims and issues on alleged wrongful discharge
which he seeks to advance in District Court upon remand;
b) the Court of Appeals refused to set aside the System
Board award which resolved those claims against the
grievant and held that the award was final and binding
as the product of a fair hearing; and c) the grievant
previously agreed that a decision which sustained the
Board award was a bar to any further claims in the
complaint?
Statutes Involved
The pertinent provisions of the Railway Labor Act, as
amended (the “Act’”), 45 U.S.C. $151 et seq., are set out at
App. 40a-4la.
Statement of the Case
a. Background
In the aspect considered by this petition,* the Court of
Appeals proceedings present for review a sharp new chal-
lenge to the Federal labor policies sustaining the final
and binding character of the awards of labor arbitration
tribunals. The net effect of the proceedings below is to
allow an unsuccessful grievant under the Railway Labor
Act to relitigate the merits of his discharge in Federal
Court although the adverse arbitral award was sustained
by the Court as the product of a full and fair hearing on
all issues. The Court held in effect that the grievant may
* Respondent Ralph Wells filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to review another aspect of the Court of Appeals decisions. No.
75-6081. Briefs in opposition were filed.
SS
4
secure relitigation by advancing the claim that his dis-
charge was the product of hostile collusion or breach of
the duty of fair representation, by the union and carrier,
notwithstanding that these very issues were voluntarily
tried to the System Board of Adjustment and rejected in
a decision which the Court held was final and binding in
accordance with its terms.
b. Parties
Petitioner Air Line Pilots Association, International
(“ALPA”) is the pilot-representing organization under the
Railway Labor Act on almost all U.S. certified carriers, in-
cluding Respondent Southern Airways, Inc. (“Southern”).
Respondent Ralph Wells is a former airline pilot who was
discharged by Southern in 1969 on grounds of pilot in-
competence. (App. 32a).
ce. System Board proceedings
Following his discharge Wells elected to file a grievance
(App. 33a) through the Southern Pilots’ System Board of
Adjustment (“System Board” or “Board”), established by
the ALPA-Southern collective bargaining agreemnt pur-
suant to requirement of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§204 (App. 41a). Under the pilot contract, System Board
awards are final and binding (App. 7a).
On Wells’ hearing, the Board consisted of professional
labor Arbitrator Harry Platt as presiding arbitrator to-
gether with two pilot and two management members.
Wells at his election was represented by his own counsel.
(App. 35a, n.5). In the hearing, Wells took the position
that his discharge was the result of his employment as a
replacement pilot on Southern during a 1960-1962 pilot
strike, and Southern-ALPA collusion to have him dis-
charged because of his role at that time, rather than sub-
5
standard pilot competence. Wells’ counsel objected to the
composition of the Board in his hearing, but made no
other objection to the Board’s capacity to resolve the
issues on the merits. Wells and Southern then stipulated
that the hearing would proceed subject only to Wells’
rese: vation of a right to test the Board composition in a
later Court proceeding, without reservation of other rights.
Wells then voluntarily submitted evidence on all discharge
issues, including his claims of hostile collusion between
ALPA and Southern and of competence as a pilot.
d. System Board Award
Following the three-day Board hearing, Arbitrator Platt
issued an opinion (App. 1a-24a) in which he rejected all
claims that the discharge was the result of any hostility
or collusion on the part of Southern or ALPA and found
that Wells was properly terminated for jusi cause in terms
of competence as a pilot. (App. 22a-24a). With respect
to collusion issues Arbitrator Platt noted, “Assumption is
no substitute for reasonable probability as a measure of
wrongdoing” (App. 23a), adding that “no one, except the
aggrieved, seems seriously to believe that the relations
between ALPA members and non-ALPA members have
been so poor in recent years as to make a conspiracy to
bring about Wells’ discharge a reasonable probability.”
(Id.) On issues of pilot competence, the Arbitrator stated,
in part,
“A pilot entrusted with the lives of numerous pas-
sengers may surely be expected to attain and main-
tain a reasonable degree of proficiency and to exhibit
competence in his flying, demonstrate sound judgment
and utilize equipment to the safe and successful com-
pletion of his flight. What is not expected of such a
pilot are displays of periodic deficiencies in judgment,
6
repeated lack of knowledge, and continued marginal
or substandard proficiency. Wells’ record shows not
only a tendency to deviate from standard flight pro-
cedures but a lack of knowledge of those procedures.”
(App. 22a).
e. District Court Pr «
Wells next brought this action in the U.S. District Court,
Atlanta, to set aside the Platt award and for reinstate-
ment, backpay and damages, claiming that he was denied
due process in the Board proceeding, and that his dis-
charge was the product of hostile collusion between South-
ern and ALPA. In the District Court, Wells took the
position that he could not recover on the claims of hostile
collusion and wrongful discharge unless the Platt award
were first set aside as the product of an unfair hearing;
this position was unchanged at any point until after the
initial opinion of the Court of Appeals.* The District
Court found that Wells was denied due process, set aside
the Platt award, ordered the grievance remanded to a
new System Board or other arbitration proceeding, and
deferred decision on any other claims pending the new
arbitration. (App. 31a).
f. Court of Appeals Proceedings
On appeals by Southern and ALPA the Court of Ap-
peals reversed, finding that Wells received a full and fair
_* For example, the District Judge stated at trial without objec-
tion by Wells, “[A]s I see it, if the System Board award stands,
that’s the end of the matter. So before you can go further you
have to get past that hurdle.” (Transeript of trial, p. 80). In his
post-trial brief, Weils stated, “If there had been a proper pro-
ceeding before the system board leading to a valid award, that
award would be an obstacle to plaintiff's action for wrongful dis-
charge. * * * For plaintiff to get relief under either count, it is
necessary that the award of the system board be overturned.” ~
7
Board hearing and decision, including due process and
representation by his own counsel as he elected, creating
a final and binding award as provided in the pilot con-
tract. The Court stated in part:
“Wells received a full hearing before the Board.
He had full opportunity to present his claim that he
was not discharged for incompetence, but for hostile
discrimination against nonunion pilots by the ALPA,
and company acquiescence in that discrimination. The
Board resolved this claim adversely to Wells.” (App.
35a).
Wells then petitioned for rehearing. In his petition,
he claimed for the first time in either the District Court
or Court of Appeals that he was entitled to press his
claim for breach of the duty of fair representation—the
contention that his discharge was the product of hostile
collusion—notwithstanding the final and binding System
Board award. The Court of Appeals denied Wells’ peti-
tion in part, refusing to disturb its position that the Platt
award was final and binding. Notwithstanding, it re-
manded the case to the District Court for further pro-
ceedings on Wells’ claim that there was a breach of the
duty of fair representation. (App. 38a). The sole an-
thority for this action cited by the Court was Czosek v.
O’Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970), although this case only holds
that an employee is not required to exhaust adjustment
board remedies under certain circumstances before filing
a fair representation suit. The Court denied ALPA’s
subsequent petition for rehearing. (App. 39a).
g- Supreme Court Proceedings
Wells has petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review
the holding that he was not denied due process or a fair
proceeding in the System Board, and that he is bound by
8
the Board award; ALPA and Southern have filed briefs
in opposition. No. 75-6081. The present petition seeks re-
view only of the order which remands the case for consid-
eration of Wells’ claim of alleged breach of the duty of
fair representation. It is on this one aspect of the case
that the Court of Appeals’ decision requires review. The
Court’s remand order directly conflicts with the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., -— U.S. ——, 91 LRRM 2481 (No. 74-1025,
March 3, 1976). There this Court reaffirmed the principles
of finality in labor arbitration proceedings and clarified
the limits of the exceptions to finality. The Court held
in accordance with the prevailing lower Court decisions
(91 LRRM 2481, 2487, n.11), that the grievant dissatisfied
by an arbitral award is not bound by “the contractual
protection against relitigating an arbitral decision” where
he successfully asserts “that the process has fundamen-
tally malfunctioned by reason of the bad faith perform-
ance of the Union.” 91 LRRM 2481, 2487. In that case
the employee may join the union and employer as defen-
dants; neither defendant may rely on the arbitral award
as a bar to recovery. Just as clearly, the Hines decision
marks the boundaries for bypassing the award in this
type of case; it contemplates that where the arbitration
has not malfunctioned by reason of the union’s action or
any other denial of due process the grievant is bound by
the contractual finality of the award.
The same principle was clear in Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335 (1964), where the Court held that an unsuccessful
arbitration grievant could not set aside the award where
he was not denied a fair hearing or fair representation in
the arbitration itself. The principles of finality in the
absence of proof within the narrow exceptions are even
stronger in the present case than in Hines or Humphrey,
since the Platt award was rendered by a professional arbi-
9
trator on the System Board, an administrative tribunal
established by statutory requirement, in contrast to the
contractual bipartite proceedings in Hines and Humphrey.
Since the essence of Wells’ claim which he voluntarily
submitted to Arbitrator Platt for decision is precisely the
same as any claim for improper discharge which he might
seek to auvance in the District Court upon remand, and
since the Court of Appeals held that Wells received a full
and fair hearing and decision on this claim before Arbi-
trator Platt, there is nothing left for Wells to litigate on
remand in connection with his discharge. The Court of
Appeals’ remand order creates a wholly novel exception
to the principle of finality, to the effect that the grievant
may relitigate the merits of the grievance in Court by as-
serting that his discharge or other grievance claim was
the product of the Union’s breach of the duty of fair rep-
resentation, notwithstanding that the Board award was
upheld as a fair, final and binding decision on the same
issues. Little remains of the finality principles following
the disposition below. For this and other reasons to be
presented, ALPA urges review of the Court’s remand
order.
Reasons for Granting the Writ
1. The Court of Appeals’ Disposition on Wells’ Petition
for Rehearing Is in Conflict With Applicable Decisions
of This Court and the Courts of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ordered this case remanded to the
District Court for consideration of the claim of denial of
fair representation solely on the authority of Czosek v.
O’Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970). The Court read Czosek as
holding that “a claim for the breach of the duty of fair
representation is separate and distinct from plaintiff-ap-
pellee Wells’ claim that the System Board procedure denied
10
him due process.” (App. 38a). Contrary to-the Court,
Czosek v. O’Mara does not hold that an employee has the
right to proceed against either the union or carrier after
voluntary litigation on the same facts and issnes in a full
and fair System Board proceeding where there was no
denial of due process or fair representation. Czosek, like
prior Supreme Court decisions, only held that an employee
is not required to exhaust adjustment board remedies under
certain circumstances before filing a fair representation
suit. For prior Supreme Court decisions see Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1967); Glover v. St. Louis-S.F.R.R.
Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969). For example, in Glover, the Court
held that railroad employees could bring suit against the
union and carrier for hostile collusion without exhausting
the adjustment board remedy against the carrier if plain-
tiff could show that “a formal effort to pursue contractual
or administrative remedies would be absolutely futile.”
393 U.S. at 391. In Czosek, supra, applying the Glover
principle, the Court only held that the union could be sued
for breach of the duty of fair representation without ex-
hausting adjustment board remedies where it was charged
that the union had arbitrarily refused to process plaintiffs’
claims through the adjustment board. Nothing in Czosek
can be read as permitting further proceedings on a fair
representation claim where the employee, with his own
counsel, voluntarily litigated, sought and obtained a deci-
sion on the same collusion issues before a neutral arbitra-
tor, with no denial of due process. This is particularly so
where there was full acceptance of the award as a bar to
further proceedings in the absence of denial of due process.
In contrast to Czosek, both Humphrey v. Moore, supra,
and Ilines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., supra, deal ex-
plicitly with the binding character of arbitral awards ac-
tually rendered. As previously discussed, in Humphrey
11
and Hines this Court has established that the grievant’s
right to proceed against his union or employer in this type
of case after litigation on the same facts and issues in the
arbitration, depends on establishing that he was denied
due process or fair representation in connection with the
arbitration. Otherwise, in the Court’s words in Humphrey,
“The decision of the [arbitration tribunal], reached after
proceedings adequate under the agreement, is final and
binding upon the parties, just as the contract says it is.”
375 U.S. 335, 351. The Court of Appeals held that Wells
received a full and fair hearing and decision on his claim
of improper discharge in the System Board, including full
hearing on the merits of the collusion issue. Wells has not
“ roved his case” (id., 375 U.S. 335, 351) that he was
denied due process and fair representation in the Board,
and his complaint should therefore have been dismissed
in its entirety.
The Court’s disposition on Wells’ petition for rehearing
conflicts with prevailing decisions in the Courts of Appeals.
For example, in Steinman v. Spector Freight System, Inc.,
441 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1971), cited in Hines, supra, 91 LRRM
2481, 2487, n.11, plaintiff lost in the arbitration, then sued
his union and employcr, alleging unfair representation in
the grievance proceeding and breach of contract. The Court
of Appeals reversed dismissal of the complaint, holding
that the arbitration award was not a bar to suit or the
same issues because plaintiff was denied a fair hearing in
the arbitration. 441 F.2d 599, 603. At the same time the
Court pointed out that under Humphrey v. Moore, supra
and other decisions, “plaintiff could not sue if he lost in a
fair arbitration.” 441 F.2d 599, 603.
In Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., 501 F.2d 179, 180, (9th
Cir. 1974), cited in Hines at 91 LRRM 2488, the Court
stated that “ an employee may not attack a final arbitration
12
decision ‘. . . except on the grounds of fraud, deceit or
breach of the duty of fair representation unless the griev-
ance was a “sham, substantially inadequate or substantially
unavailable.”’” (Emphasis in original). The same prin-
ciple appeared to obtain in the Fifth Circuit prior to the
disposition here. See, Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank
Tines, Inc., 487 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1971), cited in
Hines, supra, 91 LRRM 2481, 2488, n.11 and quoted in
Margetta v. Pam Pam Corp., supra, 501 F.2d 179, 180. See
also other cases cited in Hines, supra, 91 LRRM 2481,
2487-88, n.11. This Court should exercise its jurisdiction
to eliminate the conflict between the circuits and to restore
the applicable Fifth Cireuit principles to their former
uniformity with the decisions of this Couri and the other
Courts of Appeals.
2. Respondent’s Election of Remedies and Agreement
That the System Board Award Was a Bar to Further
Relief
The remand order of the Court below is a departure
from the accepted course of judicial proceedings, which
precludes the assertion of a new ground for relief follow-
ing explicit election of remedies and waiver of the right
to proceed in Federal Court on any claim following lack
of suecess on the basis submitted.
Wells “elected to challenge his discharge through the
grievance procedure. ...” (App. 33a) rather than through
the Courts.* In the System Board the only objection made
* At the time of Wells’ discharge there was available a cause
of action for damages based upon claims of unlawful discharge.
See Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S.
653 (1953), since overruled in Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
406 U.S. 320 (1972). Wells might also have elected to commence,
as an alternative to the System Board, a suit alleging carrier-
union conspiracy resulting in his discharge. Glover v. St. Louis
S.F.Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969); Richardson v. Texas & N.O.R.R.,
242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957).
13
by Wells’ counsel to the proceeding was over the composi-
tion of the Board. Respondents Wells and Southern stip-
ulated that the hearing would proceed subject only to
Wells’ reservation of a right to test the Board composi-
tion in a later Court proceeding. Wells voluntarily tried
all issues surrounding his discharge on the basis of that
stipulation. Throughout the District Court proceeding
Wells recognized that the System Board award, if sus-
tained, is an absolute Lar to any further claims. This
position was unchanged in the Court of Appeals—until
that Court sustained the award. Wells then asserted for
the first time that he wished to pursue additional claims
notwithstanding the final and binding Board award.
The Court of Appeals improperly ignored Wells’ volun-
tary election of remedies and waiver of a right to Fed-
eral Court trial on all issues involving the merits of his
discharge if the System Board award was sustained. This
action was a departure from the accepted course of judicial
proceedings which should be corrected in this Court.
14
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals’ decision to remand this case for
further proceedings is a serious erosion of the principles
of finality in System Board proceedings under the Railway
Labor Act, as indeed in labor arbitration generally. For
the reasons stated, it is respectfully requested that a writ
of certiorari issue to review the remand decision, and
that, upon review, the Supreme Court order the complaint
herein dismissed in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
SaMvEL J. CoHEN
Attorney for Petitioner
605 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10016
Tel. No. (212) 682-6077
Of Counsel:
Conen, Weiss anp SIMON
Rosert S. SaveELson
MicHae, E. Asram
APPENDIX
la
SoutHEern Arrways Inc. Sysrem Boarp or ApsJusTMENT
In THE MaTTER oF
THE DiscHarce or Ratpx WELLS
NEUTRAL REFEREE’S OPINION
This appeal protests the discharge of Ralph Wells, a
reserve captain. The appeal is pursuant to the provisions
of the collective Agreement between Southern Airways,
Inc. and the airline pilots in the service of Southern repre-
sented by the Air Line Pilots Association, International.
Section 31(a)7 of the Agreement gives a dismissed pilot
an option of appealing directly to a five-man System Board
of Adjustment, thereby bypassing an appeal to the four-
man System Board sitting without a Neutral Referee.
The aggrieved, having exercised such option, the appeal
was referred to a System Board comprised of the follow-
ing: Harry H. Platt, of Detroit, Michigan, Neutral Referee ;
George M. Gross and W. C. Litty, Carrier members; Yancy
Sims and James Bass, ALPA members. Hearings were
held by the Board on June 3, 25, and 26, 1969 at which the
aggrieved was represented by his counsel, William M.
Pate, of Mitchell, Pate, and Anderson, Attorneys, and the
Carrier by John Bacheller, Jr., of Fisher and Phillips,
Attorneys. Both counsel filed post-hearing briefs which
were received November 28 and November 30, 1969, re-
spectively.
Ralph Wells, the aggrieved, was employed by Southern
on Jannary 17, 1960. Because a pilot strike was then in
progress, Wells and other newly hired pilots started flying
2a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
as captains. At the conclusion of the strike, which lasted
from June 5, 1960 to September 21, 1962, the striking pi-
lots, all members of ALPA, returned to work with full
seniority and those hired during the strike were either
given employment as co-pilots or were furloughed and
placed on a preferential hiring list. Wells, in line with his
seniority, reverted to the status of co-pilot.
During his employment, Wells regularly took flight
checks, once each year as a co-pilot and twice each year
when he flew as captain. He also took trainer checks and
written examinations at irregular periods. In December,
1964, he failed an annual check for the first time but
passed a recheck two days later. In March, 1968 he re-
ceived several unsatisfactory grades on a captain’s recur-
rent flight check and failed to pass it. He failed also to
pass a recheck the next day. After some additional train-
ing on the failed items, he passed a recheck. Apart from
failed checks, Wells was disciplined in March, 1962 for ig-
noring a fire warning light in the cockpit and failing to
discover that a portion of the exhaust collector ring around
the engine had burned and fallen away. For this, he was
demoted from captain to co-pilot for a period of four weeks
and his airline pilot certificate was suspended by the FAA
for the same period. On June 7, 1963 Wells was sus-
pended for five days because he failed to be available for
incidental flying on days when he was scheduled on re-
serve. In September, 1965, he was reprimanded for en-
gaging in an altercation with another pilot while on duty.
On February 7, 1969, Wells was informed by letter that
his employment was terminated effective February 5, 1969.
The letter stated:
Oconee ew hs 3b ee
eee
3a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
February 7, 1969
Mr. Ralph Wells
Box 263
Hapeville, Georgia
Dear Mr. Wells:
This will confirm our conversation whereby you are
terminated effective February 5, 1969.
The reasons for this termination are as follows:
1. Taking off over gross weight at Tallahasse on
January 28, 1969.
2. Unsatisfactory line check by the Atlanta Chief
Pilot on January 31st.
3. Failure to pass a proficiency check on Febru-
ary 4th.
4. Your complete record as a pilot with Southern
Airways.
Would you please return all issued manuals after which
we will make arrangements for your final pay check.
Sincerely,
Sovutnzrn Amways, Inc.
W. Bayne Grubb
Vice President —
Flight Operations
WBG/jmf
ta
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
The aggrieved’s and the Carrier’s positions can be
briefly summarized. Southern maintains that Wells was
discharged for proper cause and its action was not arbi-
trary, unreasonable, or discriminatory. Its position is that
Wells lacked ability to consistently perform his job as pilot
at the level required to meet airline standards and, since
past efforts to bring him up to an acceptable performance
level had failed, the Carrier had no alternative but to dis-
charge him. Southern justifies its action principally on the
grounds stated in the letter of February 7, 1969. First, it
points to an incident which it says reflects not alone a dis-
regard of regulations and standard flying techniques but
poor judgment. The incident involved taking off on a flight
from Tallahassee and flying cross-country nearly 2,500
pounds overweight, thus endangering the safetv of pas-
sengers and crew. Following on the heels of this incident, a
co-pilot scheduled to fly with Wells refused to do so except
under written protest. That led to Wells being given a
flight check by the Chief Pilot to determine if he was
qualified to continue flying — a check which he failed to
pass and which prompted the V. P.—Flight Operations to
give him a special proficiency check. Having failed that
check as well, the V. P.—Flight Operations decided that
Wells ‘‘had retrogressed to the point that he could no
longer be used as a line pilot.’’ Further, Southern main-
tains, Wells’ record in its entirety shows a ‘‘series of mar-
ginal passes, failures and rechecks’’ which illustrate his
deficiencies in judgment, ability, technique, and lack of
knowledge of the essentials required by his duties and
responsibilities as an airline pilot. Finally, Southern denies
that Wells was discharged as a result of its or ALPA’s
hostile discrimination. A contrary claim, it says, ‘‘is sup-
ported only in Wells’ imagination’’, not in any objective
evidence.
da
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
Wells strongly protests his discharge. He contends his
removal from flight duty was without justification and was
arbitrary and lacking in honesty. He denies that his per-
formance has been below the acceptable level of pilot per-
formance. He notes that his abilities were checked and
appraised at regular periodic intervals and that he satis-
factorily met all requirements and was at all times regarded
a standard pilot.
Regarding his performance and ability as a pilot, while
he admits he erred in taking off from Tallahassee over-
weight, Wells claims he did so because fog had set in and
he decided it was safer to leave than to remain. But in any
case, he asserts, the ensuing flight checks by Chief Pilot
Brown and V. P.-Flight Operations Grubb were irrelevant
to the Tallahassee incident since that incident did not bring
into question his ability to operate an airplane. Again,
although conceding there was pilot error in his Birming-
ham landing during the line check by Chief Pilot Brown,
the error was not a major one, in his opinion. Nor did he
commit error in a Meridian landing during the same check,
as claimed by the Chief Pilot. According to Wells, that
entire flight showed minor errors at most. As for the pro-
ficiency check given by V. P.-Flight Operations Grubb,
Wells acknowledges he had difficulty on a takeoff after a
simulated engine loss and that in his effort to keep the
plane fiying he ‘‘had to disregard some more routine pro-
cedures.’’ However, he denies that his takeoffs or holding
patterns on that flight check were substandard.
‘part from questions of qualification, Wells’ position
is that his discharge was improper because it resulted
from hostile discrimination by ALPA and therefore it can-
not stand ‘‘even if the evidence otherwise showed a proper
cause for discharge.’’ He maintains his discharge was
6a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
brought about by ALPA members and by members of
management sympathetic to ALPA and he particularly
blames Chief Pilot Brown for his predicament because
Brown, an active participant in the 1960-1962 strike,
‘‘developed a strong feeling of animosity toward persons
working during the strike and towards Wells in particu-
lar.’? Further, he contends there was continued harrass-
ment of him and other non-ALPA pilots by ALPA mem-
bers after the strike, including being denied opportunities
of making qualifying takeoffs and landings, as required
by FAA regulations. By failing to correct this situation,
he asserts, Southern must be deemed to have ‘* participated
with the ALPA captains in a program designed to place
non-union pilots at a disadvantage.’’ His brief states:
Wells’ discharge resulted from efforts of ALPA
and its members, with the cooperation of members
of management, like Captain Brown, whose main
sympathies were with the union. Other members of
management, if not sympathetic to the union, were
unable or unwilling to resist it. The net result is
that Wells was discharged because ALPA and its
members wanted him to be discharged, a feeling
which resulted from Wells’ failure to support the
strike and his nonmembership in ALPA.
The case is thus one of hostile discrimination by
a statutory bargaining agent toward a member of
the bargaining unit which it represents. It has been
long established that such conduct affords a proper
basis for an action against the union and against
the employer who joins in the discrimination.’
Since Wells’ discharge resulted from these discrim-
inatory practices by the union and the company, it
is likewise not entitled to be sustained in the present
proceeding.
Ta
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
Finally, Wells contends that even if the above position
is not sustained the discharge should not be permitted to
stand because of the disparate treatment accorded him and
some ALPA pilots who committed acts of negligence ana
yet were not discharged.
Reduced to essentials, the issue here is whether the
aggrieved was discharged for lack of qualification, as the
Carrier maintains, or as a result of hostile discrimination
by ALPA, as Wells contends.
It is appropriate to note, in light of the charge of bias
and prejudice against the System Board members, other
than the Neutral Referee, and the charge of hostile dis-
crimination by ALPA and members of management, that
the decision in this case has been arrived at by the Neutral
Referee alone without consultation with any other member
of the Board. Under the parties’ System Board Agree-
ment, if two or more members concur in the Referee’s de-
cision it then becomes a final and conclusive determination.
This Referee and others have had occasion in prior
cases to comment on the difference in degree of proof re-
quired to sustain a discharge of an airline pilot and em-
ployees in most other industries. In other than air pilot
cases, it is generally recognized that the burden of estab-
lishing proper cause for discharge is on the employer and
if he fails to do this by clear and convincing evidence, the
discharge will not be allowed to stand. However, a lesser
degree of proof is generally required to sustain the release
of an airline pilot from duty for lack of qualification. That
of course results from the fact that an air carrier is under
a strict legal obligation to afford protection to the public
in all matters against which human providence and fore-
sight might guard and is under obligation to exercise the
highest degree of practical care and diligence in flight op-
eration. Indeed, its responsibility extends not only to ex-
8a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
ercise of care in the selection and use of equipment and
facilities but to the selection and retention of personnel to
perform the flight service. In this kind of case, a manage-
ment decision that a pilot is unqualified, if made honestly
and in the interest of public safety, is not to be lightly dis-
turbed. For while to be sure, a pilot is entitled to protec-
tion from hostile discrimination and unjust treatment, the
interest of the public in safe air travel is paramount and,
unless the evidence is so clear and convincing as to lead a
reasonably minded person to conclude that reinstatement
would involve no future risk to passengers and to public
safety, reinstatement may not be ordered.
We turn to a consideration of the specific charges and
evidence in this case.
1. Taking off over gross weight at Tallahasse. In the
evening on January 28, 1969, Wells was scheduled to fly as
captaia on a charter flight from Tailahassee, Florida to
Columbia, South Carolina. It was necessary to refuel be-
fore departing and he ordered 850 gallons gasoline and 22
gallons oil to be added. On a charter operation it is the
flight crew’s responsibility to determine the proper fuel
load. In actual fact, the gasoline ordered exceeded the
amount required by 350 gallons, the airplane being certifi-
eated for a maximum weight of 44,900 pounds. As a re-
sult, the airplane, a Martin 404, took off weighing 47,000
pounds, or about 2,500 pounds overweight. The certified
maximum weight is calculated to permit an airplane to take
off in- the event of loss of an engine on takeoff and, once
airborne, to sustain level flight with an engine out. In this
instance, according to Southern’s V. P.-Flight Operations,
had Wells lost an engine on takeoff after reaching V*
speed ‘‘he would have crashed at the end of the runway.’’
(Tr. Vol. I p. 26) Further, according to the same witness,
had Wells lost an engine enroute after takeoff, he would
not have been able to maintain altitude.
9a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
Wells admitted that it was his responsibility to see that
the proper amount of fuel was on board. He claims he ac-
tually ordered the gas to be brought up to 850 pounds ‘‘but
they put on 350 instead of bringing it up to 850.’’ For some
unknown reason, he did not determine from either the air-
craft log, which he was supposed to execute before takeoff,
or from the gauges, which he was supposed to observe dur-
ing the reading of the cockpit checklist, that he was over-
weight. An overweight aircraft handles sluggish during
takeoff and Wells became aware for the first time of the
overweight condition on takeoff when he noticed the air-
plane was heavy on the ‘‘climb out.’’ This was about five
minutes after he was in the air and, he claimed, inasmuch
as fog was setting in at Tallahassee he ‘‘didn’t want to
turn back and hold in that vicinity.’’ Earoute to Columbia
he called Dispatch and was told to “run rich and hold over”’
Columbia until he got down to landing weight. After hold-
ing 40 minutes over Columbia and getting the aircraft
down to 43,000 pounds, he landed.
From the evidence in this case, there can hardly be a
reasonable doubt that Wells’ failure to observe the nu-
merous safeguards which existed for avoidance of a fuel
overload and his actual taking off from Tallahassee over-
weight about 2,500 pounds was gross and inexcusable care-
lessness. Further, there is credible expert testimony which
persuades me that he exercised faulty judgment in leaving
the Tallahassee area and continuing to fly cross-country at
night after he became aware that the aircraft was over-
weight. According to Southern’s V. P.-Flight Operations,
what Wells should have done was circle the Tallahassee
airport and burn off the fuel until he got to his dispatch
weight and then proceed to Columbia under normal flight
plan. In that case, he would have been close enough to the
| (initia ai aetna
10a lla
Neutral Referee’s Opinion Neutral Referee’s Opinion
airport so that if he lost an engine he could have man- The Witness: I obviously felt that way about
euvered in for a landing. The V. P.-Flight Operations tes- this, yes, sir. :
tified: (Tr. Vol. I pp. 77-80). Mr. Pate: I didn’t understand that answer.
Q. Let me ask you this: What if that plane
became airborne as it did and, at that point, the
overload of fuel is discovered and there is also a
fog setting in. Would you say, under those circum-
stances, that the plane ought to remain around
Tallahassee in that fog? A. The pilot has to weigh
this under the circumstances at the time. With the
facilities that Tallahassee has for landing, yes, I’d
take my chances on landing in the fog. * * °
Q. And you can conceive of conditions of weather
at the point where the plane is located, such as
Tallahassee, that would make it a matter of good
judgment to proceed on and go to the destination,
can you not? A. Not overloaded, no, sir.
Q. Do I understand you correctly, that you can-
not conceive of any conditions of weather around
Tallahassee that would make it advisable to proceed
on to Columbia, the destination, rather than to stay
in the weather in Tallahassee? A. No, sir, not at
night; I’d stay there.
Q. Regardless of weather conditions? A. Yes, sir.
Arb. Platt: Regardless of the weather, the
judgment that should be made by the pilot would
be the one which you would make, is to land, rather
than go on.
The Witness: I wouldn’t say I would land,
I would stay in the area. Then, in case I lost an
engine, then I would have some place to land.
~ Arb. Platt: Would you go so far as to say
that some other pilot who did not make the same
judgment was wrong?
Arb. Platt: He said he obviously felt that
way about this, meaning by that his answer to my
question was ‘‘yes.’’ He would feel that a pilot who
made the opposite decision and was to go on was
wrong.
Q. Do you know whether there was fog in Talla-
hassee on this occasion? A. I don’t know; no, sir.
Q. Did you know at the time that Mr. Wells was
discharged whether or not there was fog in that
area? A. I didn’t have the weather report on it; no,
sir.
Q. Did you try to find out what the weather con-
dition was? A. Well, it was my conclusion, without
looking at the weather, that if it was good enough
to take off, it would be good enough to land.
Q. So, the condition of the weather would not
affect, in any way, your appraisal of that situation
down there? A. No, sir; it did not.
Q. And if, in fact, the fog was setting in and he
went on from the Tallahassee area for that reason,
you would still find grounds to criticize his handling
of that sitnation? A Yes sir
2. Unsatisfactory January 31 line check. On January
31, 1969, two days after the Tallahassee incident, Wells
was scheduled to fly to New Orleans with Carey Allen as
co-pilot. On learning that Wells was to be the captain, Allen
told Chief Pilot Brown he would not fly with Wells except
under written protest. This was unsatisfactory to Brown
who decided he would take the flight himself and give Wells
a line check.
12a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
Chief Pilot Brown evaluated the line check as unsatis-
factory. Specifically, he found Wells’ ground handling of
the plane rough—‘‘every turn he made, he would over-
control on the steerable nosewheel*** there was no particu-
lar reason for him to do it but it was obvious to me that
he had developed the habit of handling the airplane this
way.’’ Then, he found that on takeoff, Wells ignored pub-
lished procedures and did them in such a way that ‘‘it could
have gotten him in serious trouble.’’ Among other things,
when the wheels were about 50 feet off the ground, Wells
insisted on turning off the ADI and losing the benefit of 700
horsepower which is necessary to have under heavy load
conditions. Also, as soon as he called gear up, he turned off
the auto-feather and turned on a ventillating fan, thus add-
ing an additional hazard and flying in violation of Federal
Air Regulations, which require all takeoffs to be made with
the auto-feather operative. On the cruise part of the flight,
where the procedures call for leaning the engine within
three minutes of attaining assigned altitude, Wells leaned
the engine ‘‘in fifteen seconds and the next time he
wouldn’t lean it one minute the entire leg, thirty-minute
leg, and this kind of thing. Completely inconsistent. He
seemed to have no—he just didn’t comprehend the purpose
of leaning the mixtures, whatsoever.’’ On the use of ra-
dios, the Chief Pilot noted that Wells did not comprehend
all messages, such as approach information and ‘‘on nu-
merous occasions he did not receive the clearance as it
was written, he did not conform to the clearance, primarily
because it became obvious to me that he didn’t understand
the clearance as given.’’ In testing for approach and land-
ing, the Chief Pilot noted two unsatisfactory ILS ap-
proaches, one at Birmingham, Alabama, and one at Merid-
ian, Mississippi. At Birmingham, he said, the weather
was given to them as scattered clouds at 300 feet, broken
13a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
clouds at 600 feet, visibility one mile with light rain, fog
and smoke. They were vectored onto a downwind leg at
3000 MSL and advised 2% miles southwest the outer marker
that they were cleared for an ILS approach to land straight
in on runway 5. He testified: (TR. Vol. II pp. 169-181)
When you get within three to five miles of this
primary fix, this outer marker, you’re suppose to
get your airplane set up and all your check lists run
and ready to tie this ILS down and land, slow your |
airplane down, get it down to the proper speed.
Well, we were cleared from three thousand feet
MSL down to twenty-two hundred, which is a cross-
ing altitude, and he starts to let down, but he does
it in such a manner that he doesn’t drop the landing
gear, he doesn’t put down any flaps at all to slow the
airplane down. So, we come across the outer marker,
when we should come across the outer marker at a
hundred and twenty knots, we come across the outer
marker at exactly a hundred and forty knots.
Q. Should the landing gear be down and should
you be using the flaps at that point? A. Yes, sir.
The landing gear should be down prior to the time
that you get to the outer marker and you should have
the airplane set up in landing configuration and you
should have the landing gear down and extended and
check your green lights and all these check lists, to
see that it’s in a safe condition.
Q. Had he completed the check lists? A. No, sir,
we hadn’t completed the check list at the time we got
to the outer marker. We completed it right at the
outer marker. He dropped the gear right at, just
about the outer marker. * * °
l4a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
So, here we were over the outer marker with im-
proper flap setting and a hundred and forty knots,
instead of a hundred and twenty and virtually no
wind. They were reporting the wind as five knots,
which is considered a calm wind. If it had a real
strong wind on the nose, that would have helped slow
us down. But we continued down in this fashion,
fast and high. And he should have already had down
the second portion of the flaps, which is called ‘‘ap-
proach flaps’’, but we didn’t get these approach flaps
down until much later, when we were about two miles
from the airport, because we had too much speed.
We had a hundred and forty knots and you can’t
extend your flaps to approach speed above a hundred
and thirty knots, because of the structural design
of the airplane.
So, the danger part of it is: Here you’re coming
into Birmingham, Alabama on the instruments. We
were in the clouds at this time. * * *
But here we come down the ILS, into this hole
of Birmingham, where there’s a runway down there
and the ILS glide slope needle was pegged out all the
way up to the top and it stayed there. And he seemed
at a complete loss as to what to do to get it back
down. * * *
The clouds were six hundred feet above the ground
and we are only required to have two hundred feet
clouds, two hundred feet above the ground on this
approach.
Q. And two miles visibility? A. Two miles visi-
bility. That means your forward visibility has to be
at least two miles, so you can at least see the other
end of the runway.
ae ee
CC — — ——————
15a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
In addition to his being high and fast, he’s making
corrections back and forth this way, from a heading
of almost north ten degrees, back and forth, trying to
tie down his localizer.
Now, we continue in this attitude, never tying
down either the localizer nor the glide slope, until
we’re coming down and, at about twelve hundred and
fifty MSL, which is six hundred feet above the
ground—®* * *
So, just about—oh, aproximately a mile from the
end of the runway, we break underneath the clouds
and here’s the airport sitting over here to the left.
We get in there okay, but we weren’t where we were
suposed to be. We weren’t in the position where we
should have been. * * *
And if he had done what was proper and what
the passengers back there would have like for him
to do,* * * he would have executed a missed approach
and gone around. But, instead, he pulls all the power
off the airplane and he calls for landing flaps and he
is still going a hundred and thirty knots. * ° ’
Q. What’s the maximum speed at which you can
—you’re supposed to use landing flaps? A. A hun-
dred and five knots, and he was at one thirty when
he called for them. Whether he knew he was at a
hundred and thirty or a hundred and five, I heven’t
determined, but he called for landing flaps und I
didn’t give it to him.* * °
So, he dives the airplane down and he gets it
down in this hole in Birmingham and the runway
was wet. It had been raining all over the South-east.
And he touches down just about midway down the
airport, which leaves us another five thousand feet
of runway to land. There was never any doubt in
l6a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
my mind we could get the airplane on the ground
and stop. But when we get on the ground he made
a fairly decent landing, because it’s pretty easy to
land on, to make a touch-down smoothly on a wet
runway. It’s after you get on the ground on a wet
runway that you have — Just as soon as he touched
down, he called, ‘‘Lock the controls’’ and I couldn’t
believe it.* * *
He would have had real trouble controlling the
airplane if I had locked the controls when he called
wnt.? °°
Q. Is there a logical reason for him to call for
locking the wheels at that point? A. No, sir.
There’s no reason, whatsoever, and it just indicated
to me that he had in his mind that somewhere in his
procedure the controls were supposed to be locked
and he thought this was about as good a time as any
to lock the controls and get that done and that’s what
he did. That’s what he called for.
So, what he should have done would be just real
—make it real simple. He should have touched down
on that wet runway and eased forward on that yoke
and gotten the airplane in the position where he could
use the available reverse trust.* * * Instead he
didn’t touch the reverse throttles at all.* * °
We broke contact at six hundred feet above the
ground, when we should have been about two to three
hundred feet above the ground that close to the air-
port. So, we’re sitting up here real high and the
airport is down here, and thank goodness there was
a ten-thousand-feet runway. If there hadn’t been,
we couldn’t have, in any way, dived the airplane
down and got it on. You’re not supposed to dive the
Martin, anyway.
l7a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
Chief Pilot Brown found a similar lack of technique in
Wells’ Meridian approach. He reported it as follows:
Approach Control advised us of our radar posi-
tion as being 25 miles northeast of Key Field and to
‘‘expect a vector to an ILS approach to runway
‘‘one’’ with a circle to land on runway ‘‘one-nine’’
(19).
The weather was given to us at that time as ‘‘ceil-
ing measured five hundred overcast, visibility five
miles with fog, wind from 170 degrees at eleven
knots’’. Wells had been reviewing the MEI ILS ap-
proach plate but he did not realize that Key Field
was below circling minimums and the wind was be-
yond limits for a landing straight-in on runway
‘‘one’’. He started his descent upon intercepting the
inbound localizer course but he remained ‘‘two dots’’
to the left of center line all the way down with no real
effort to correct to the center line. I reported to the
tower as we passed the OM inbound and, luckily, the
tower reported the surface wind as having decreased
to 170 degrees at seven (7) knots. Wells told me to
advise the tower that we would plan to land straight-
in on runway one. We broke contact at 800 feet MSL
(500 feet) but at least 200 feet to the left of the
runway.
In summary, Chief Pilot Brown found that Wells’ line
check showed he did not adhere to normal operating pro-
cedures. He concluded the line check was unsatisfactory
‘*based primarily on two unsatisfactory ILS approaches.’’
3. Failure to pass a proficiency check on February 4th.
As a result of the Tallahassee incident and the unsatisfac-
18a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
tory January 31 line check, Wells was given a special pro-
ficiency check by V. P.-Flight Operations Grubb. Grubb
graded the check unsatisfactory because he found Wells’
‘‘proficiency well below minimum’’, his headwork ‘‘very
unreliable’, and his judgment ‘‘erratic’’. Specifically, he
found Wells’ performance unsatisfactory on takeoffs, which
Wells twice aborted when an engine was cut off. The pur-
pose of this maneuver was to check his ability to maintain
directional control and fly the airplane off the ground on
one engine. On a third attempt, he completed the takeoff
but, according to Grubb, when the engine was cut Wells
‘immediately yanked the controls back and got us off the
ground before we had reached safe flying speed, which
caused us to lose directional control and the airplane was
heading for a crash, actually. I had to bring the power back
in to straighten it out ... restore the engine that I had cut
in order to recover from the accident that was immediately
ahead.’’ His performance on approach to stalls was also
unsatisfactory primarily because of mechanical execution,
rough handling, and general lack of technique. On ap-
proach procedures, he was rated unsatisfactory because he
did not adhere to proper speeds and his approach was so
far off that there was full deflection of both the course and
glide slope. Finally, he was rated unsatisfactory in the de-
gree of judgment exercised because, according to Grubb,
‘the didn’t follow proper procedures. His judgment and
decision-making functions were not normal.’’
4. Complete record as a pilot with Southern Airways.
In addition to receiving a disciplinary penalty for ignoring
a fire warning during a flight from Columbus to Atlanta,
Georgia in 1962 and a reprimand for engaging in an alter-
eation with another pilot while on duty in 1965. Wells
failed two checks and had marginal passes on others. Cap-
19a
Neutral Referee’s Opimon
tain Andrew N. Ernst, a former FAA Inspector and pres-
ent Assistant Chief Pilot for Southern, testified that he
was an FAA observer on a co-pilot proficiency check given
to Wells in 1963, when his “main problem was failing to
accomplish procedures, particulariy emergency procedures,
in proper order. This was engine failures, engine fires. In
other words, the procedures, knowledge of procedures was
peor.’ In December, 1965, when he was Assistant Chief
Pilot, Ernst gave Wells a check ride which was unsatis-
factory ‘‘primarily due to the knowledge of the equipment.
He did not know the equipment, the systems operation and
emergency procedures. The flight portion was barely sat-
isfactory ... he was hazy on his procedures, in-flight pro-
cedures. He was rough on the controls and he went below
the glide slope on precision approaches.’’ As a result,
Wells was sent back to ground school for a refresher train-
ing on procedures. On March 19, 1968 Wells was rated
unsatisfactory on another flight check given by Captain
Ernst. Ernst testified concerning it as follows: (Tr. Vol.
pp. 9-13)
A. The initial thing that was unsatisfactory was:
One of the required maneuvers is simulated engine
failure immediately after lift-off and this is a very
precise, exacting maneuver and must be done well
or you lose your airplane.* * *
Mr. Wells allowed the airplane to drift thirty de-
grees off the runway heading, which, if you had an
obstruction out there, you hit it. He didn’t maintain
a proper air speed to get the performance out of the
aircraft. * * * the air speed could be properly referred
to as V-2 that you maintain to at least four hundred
feet or minimum structures.* * * He had a higher air
speed at one point and then, he pulled the nose up
20a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
abruptly and got below V-2. In other words, his air
speed control was erratic and he didn’t execute the
proper procedures as far as assuring that the en-
gine had—the propeller had feathered and he didn’t
have a fire, and so forth.*** Well, we proceeded,
then, to Macon, to start shooting ILS approaches,
* * * the first one, if I recall correctly, we should have
been slowed down to a hundred and twenty knots and
had our landing check list completed prior to the
initial point where you start your descent, and we
came up to the outer marker at about forty knots
fast and then abruptly pulled the power almost com-
pletely off and pulled the nose up to slow the air-
plane down and then, the gear and the flaps were
extended and the power wasn’t put back on. As a
result, the air speed dissipated down to about ten
knots below a safe air speed. And then, we were
below the glide slope and, at minimums, he failed to
turn over the marker beacon, so we didn’t hear the
marker beacon. * * * Mr. Wells did not turn on
the marker beacon receiver.
Q. So he could not receive the signai to go
around; is that correct? A. That’s right. And, at
the same time, you still have your altimeters to tell
you that you are below your safe altitude. He
didn’t recognize that, either, and went below, and
when he finally started to execute his missed ap-
proach,—the initial air speed is a hundred and
eleven knots and my recollection on—he did this two
or three time improperly, but at one point, he had
the airplane at a bank and the air speed was ninety-
five knots and I had to roll the airplane out because
it was too low and too dangerous. * * * Now, this
2la
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
general thing happened several times. I don’t know
whether we tried that approach three or four times,
but he never was satisfactory and I discontinued
his check ride because I saw that he should have
some more training and I took another student.
The next day we went back down to Macon and
tried to run the check again and essentially the same
thing happened. His procedures, he was still hazy
on them. He couldn’t execute an ILS properly.
(Adverse testimony was also given by two co-pilots
who flew with Wells at infrequent times in 1968. However,-
I was not impressed with their testimony and therefore
gave it no weight.)
After careful study of the entire record, I am unable
to find any clear and convincing refutation of the check
results discussed above or of the conclusions reached by
those who conducted those checks. For one thing, I find
no substantial rebuttal of Captain Ernst’s adverse testi-
mony concerning Wells’ 1965 and 1968 failed checks. Nor
was there more than a casual statement by Wells of the
circumstances of the Brown and Grubb checks. Wells did
refer in his testimony to the two landing approaches which
Brown found unsatisfactory. At Birmingham, he said,
an overriding wind took the airplane out of position at
the outer marker and he made a right turn into the wind
in order to get it ‘‘tied down.’’ He acknowledged that he
made a bad ILS approach and consequently ‘‘was high
and fast’’ on his speed and altitude.
At Meridian, he testified, with a seven knot: wind re-
ported, he decided to make an ILS straight-in approach
but the conversation that was going on between Brown and
the control tower diverted his attention so that he ‘‘didn’t
catch it in time’’ and got a little off the runway to the left.
22a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
Regarding the proficiency check he was given a few days
later by Captain Grubb, Wells conceded that on his third
attempted take off the plane was in a semi-stall and in try-
ing to keep it from stalling he was diverted off the ap-
proach line and forgot several procedures he should have
run through.
Based on all the evidence and the record, considered as
a whole, the conclusion is for me inescapable that Wells’
judgment and performance as a pilot were substandard and
that that was the cause for his discharge. A pilot entrusted
with the lives of numerous passengers may surely be ex-
pected to attain and maintain a reasonable degree of
proficiency and to exhibit competence in his flying, demon-
strate sound judgment and utilize equipment to the safe
and successful completion of his flight. What is not ex-
pected of such a pilot are displays of periodic deficiencies
in judgment, repeated lack of knowledge, and continued |
marginal or substandard proficiency. Wells’ record shows |
not only a tendency to deviate from standard flight proce- |
dures but a lack of knowledge of those procedures.
The foregoing conclusion does not, however, completely
resolve the issue. For while it is true, as Company counsel
suggests, that the central issue is Wells’ lack of ability as a
pilot, it is not the sole question. Another is whether the
disckarge was in fact due to his lack of competence and not
to discrimination, caprice or arbitrariness. In this case, the
aggrieved’s heavy reliance has indeed been on the premise
that his discharge was brought about by the hostile attitude
of ALPA and its members and through their collusion with
members of management sympathetic to ALPA.
After a rigorous examination of all the evidence, I must
say that I find nothing in the record to support the charge
that the aggrieved’s termination was the result of hostile
discrimination by ALPA or its members and nothng to
23a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
support the charge that ALPA members and members of
Management conspired to bring about his discharge. As-
sumption is no substitute for reasonable probability as a
measure of wrongdoing. Wells indeed makes much of the
fact that there was a pilot strike at Southern in 1960-1962
during which he and other non-union pilots displaced ALPA
members and which, he asserts, stirred great resentments
and caused strong feelings of animosity to develop among
the striking and non-striking pilots. Undoubtedly, in a
situation like that, resentments and animosities do develop.
And there is not much question that in this case they spilled
over from the strike and affected pilot relations for a time
after the strike. But the passage of time has healed most
of the old wounds and no one, except the aggrieved, seems
seriously to believe that the relations between ALPA mem-
bers and non-ALPA members have been so poor in recent
years as to make a conspiracy to bring about Wells’ dis-
charge a reasonable probabilit: In fact, a witness for the
aggrieved, who was himself hired during the strike and
who now heads the Southern Pilots Association, a non-union
group, stated he was quite pleased with the relationship
between ALPA and non-ALPA members. He testified:
Tr. Vol. III pp. 107-108)
Q. Would it be your judgment that the feelings
had subsided substantially since the strike?
A. I think nothing short of a miracle could have
brought the relationship to where it is today, con-
sidering all the things that have happened.
Q. In other words, you are presently—you are
pleased with the progress that’s been made between
the two groups, considering the feeling that existed
during the strike. -
A. I’m not satisfied with it, but I’m pleased with
it, I mean, it could be better. Is any man satisfied,
well hardly, with anything, until it reaches perfec-
24a
25a
Neutral Referee’s Opinion
tion? But we have demonstrated for a period of four Sovrnzrn Arrways Inc. System Board oF ADJUSTMENT
years, and non-union pilots in supervisory capacity
ran tue Company and, now then, for almost two ry THE MaTTER OF
yeezs, union pilots in a supervisory capacity have THE DiscHaRGE or RaLpH WELLS
been in the driver’s seat. |
But the great thing that has come out of this : =—=@
thing, I think, was we started out as captains here, |
we were demoted back to co-pilots, and we sat with |
our jaws locked and our tongue in our cheek and | © The discharge of Ralph Wells on February 5, 1969 was
said, ‘‘Well, I hope this guy knows how to fly.’’ : ‘ athe Mond
: : din nied.
Well, he was probably thinking the same thing for for proper cause. His grievance 1s accordingly de
two years, while he was out there on strike, because
AWARD OF SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
he felt it was his airplane, I guess. But, at any rate, /s/ Harry H. Puarr
we learned to respect that and, as time went along Harry H. Platt,
and things happened, they learned to respect us, in Neutral Referee
their way. I mean, there’s times when things hap-
pen that it takes two people and when those times | /s/ Georce M. Gross
came up, it was never found lacking, that I know, — Yancy Sims George M. Gross
that a union and non-union pilot failed to make it.
: /3/ W.C. Lirrry
Nor do I find support in the record for the contention | James Bass W. C. Litty
that there was disparate treatment of ALPA members and |
non-ALPA members in disciplinary matters. Since 1962° ALPA Members Carrier Members
four pilots have been discharged by Southern. All four |
were ALPA members. No non-ALPA pilots have been dis- | January 16, 1970
charged. There was no proof that any ALPA pilot de-
served discharge but was not discharged.
Further discussion would unduly prolong this Opinion
and serve no useful purpose. Suffice it to say, that after
painstaking study of all the evidence, I am constrained to
conclude that the aggrieved’s discharge was for proper
cause and not arbitrary or discriminatory.
SS ST
January 7, 1970
/s/ Harry H. Puatr }
Harry H. Platt, Neutral Referee
26a
| IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
For tae NorrHern District or Grorcu
Atuanta Drvisi0on
Civil Action No. 13647
,
Ww
Rates WELLS,
Plaintiff,
Vv.
SoutHern Armways, Inc., and Amuing Pots
AssociaTION INTERNATIONAL,
Defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Findings of Fact
1. The plaintiff, Ralph Wells, was an airline pilot in
the employ of the defendant carrier, Southern Airways,
Inc., before his discharge on February 4, 1969.
2. Plaintiff was initially employed by the carrier as a
captain in June 1960 at a time when the defendant union
was conducting a pilots’ strike against the carrier. He was
a strikebreaker, and, in the more colorful language of
American industrial relations, a ‘‘scab.’’ (Joint Exhibit 1).
3. Plaintiff continued in the employ of the defendant
carrier for the duration of the lengthy strike as a captain,
but when the strike ended in September 1962, the striking
pilots were reinstated with seniority and therefore plaintiff,
by reason of having less seniority, became a co-pilot. He
subsequently attained the posititon of reserve captain,
which position he held at time of discharge.
0 eT ees ee Se nae
27a
District Court Findings and Conclusions
4. Plaintiff never became a member of the defendant
union while employed by the defendant carrier.
d. Plaintiff was discharged by W. Bayne Grubb, de-
fendant carrier’s vice president of flight operations, in
part upon a discharge recommendation of R. T. Brown, the
defendant carrier’s chief pilot.
6. Prior to the circumstances surrounding and immedi-
ately preceding his discharge, plaintiff’s flying record with
the carrier had been satisfactory. He regularly received
the periodic checks that were required by federal regula-
tions and company practice. In the few instances when any
of these checks were not satisfactory, the deficiencies were
promptly corrected.
7. Plaintiff had received such periodic checks in Sep-
tember and November, 1968, and had been found to be fully
qualified to operate aircraft as captain, and he was not due
to receive another check until March of 1969.
8. However, as the result of twe highly unusual com-
plaints by union members (Joint Exhibit 1), solicited by
the chief pilot, a union member, who, before his promotion
to chief pilot, had participated in the pilots’ strike and had
been a leader and spokesman for the striking pilots, the
chief pilot gave plaintiff an out-of-town check which he
found unsatisfactory, and recommended plaintiff’s dis-
charge. At about the same time, plaintiff made a take-off
overloaded with gas. Plaintiff was given another check by
a company official, and discharged.
9. In accordance with the contract between the carrier
and union, plaintiff referred his complaint concerning his
discharge to a five-member system board of adjustment.
10. The union contract provided that such a board of
adjustment should be composed of two members selected
by the carrier, two members selected by the union, and a
fifth member selected by the other four.
28a
District Court Findings and Conclusions
11. The carrier selected as members of the system
board George M. Gross, its vice president and general man-
ager, and W. C. Litty, administrative assistant to the
officer who had discharged plaintiff. Litty, then a pilot, had
been a participant in the strike conducted by the union
against the carrier in 1960-1962, and was a member of the
union.
12. The union selected as members of the system board
James Bass and Yancey Sims. Both were members of the
union and had been active participants in the pilots’ strike
of 1960-1962.
13. At the beginning of the hearing before the system
board of adjustment, plaintiff made timely objection to the
composition of the board, asserting that he intended to
show his discharge resulted from union hostility to him
resulting from his strike-breaker status in 1960-1962—and
the acquiescence of the carrier in the union’s efforts to get
rid of plaintiff since, following the termination of the strike,
the carrier had to get along with the union.
14. The system board did not rule upon the objection
to its composition, but the hearing proceeded with a stipula-
tion that plaintiff was not waiving his objections. All five
members sat on the board during the hearing and partici-
pated in the proceeding. The parties, the union and the
carrier, refused even to entertain the extremely modest sug-
gestion by counsel for plaintiff that the union and the com-
pany could appoint as their designated members of the
board persons who had not taken an active part in the
strike and who might reasonably be expected to have less
pronounced feelings with respect to strikebreakers. This
adamant attitude contrasts sharply with defendants’ pres-
ent contention that the carrier and union designees were
merely dummies. This Court does not credit that testimony,
which was equivocal in any event. The Court finds that the
actions of the carrier and union designees were clearly di-
rected to advising the neutral of their position in the matter.
29a
District Court Findings and Conclusions
15. The board, by decision signed by the neutral and
two carrier members—but not signed by the union members
—upheld plaintiff’s discharge.
16. In the present action, plaintiff asks this Court to
review and set aside the award of the system board vf ad-
justment and to order his reinstatement with back pay,
and to award costs of litigation, including attorneys’ fees
and punitive damages, against both defendants. In the
alternative, plaintiff asks the Court to award him as against
both defendants compensatory damages based on his past
and future loss of earnings, loss of retirement benefits, and
costs of litigation, including attorneys’ fees. As a further
alternative, plaintiff asks the Court to order a new hear-
ing and redetermination of his complaint by a system board
composed only of impartial members, that he be awarded
back pay to the time of such hearing, together with costs
of litigation including attorneys’ fees, and that he be
granted an award of punitive damages against both parties,
or if not granted against both parties, against the defendant
union.
17. It is contemplated in five-man system boards of ad-
justment in the airline industry that the two carrier-
designated members will be partisan for the carrier’s in-
terests; that the two union designees will be partisan for
the union’s interests. Where the grievant is a good union
member this system will work well; when grievant is per-
sona non grata to the union, the system breaks down’ be-
cause the two labor members of the board are selected by
the union not the grievant, and the four industry members
—not the grievant—select the neutral. Thus in the airline
industry professional arbitrators or neutrals, are depend-
ent upon the relative good graces of the companies and
unions for continuing employment opportunities. They
! See Andrews v. L&N R., 406 U.S. 320, 334 (n. 7).
30a
District Court Findings and Conclusions
have no relationship to, or hope for employment from, in-
dividual grievants who may not be union members.
18. While, in view of its present piecemeal disposition
of this case, the Court will not make detailed findings
thereon, the Court does find that plaintiff had more than
adequate basis for claiming an institutional hostility toward
him by the union. The record clearly reveals a shocking
attempt by the union to drum plaintiff out of the company,
finally acquiesced in by the company’s management. For
example, on three successive flights in 1965, a union captain
placed a crash ax in his lap and threatened plaintiff, then
his co-pilot, concerning its use. (It is interesting to note
that the company took no disciplinary action whatever
against thai union captain although no one would dispute
that his actions were far more worthy of immediate dis-
charge for the sake of public safety than those for which
plaintiff ostensibly was discharged.) The union members’
failure to sign the report as to plaintiff’s grievance is
illuminative. If they had signed, they would have created
a precedent supporting discharge for overloaded take-offs
—if they dissented, they would be supporting a strike-
breaker. Inaction was their solution to the dilemma. It is
sufficient to say the record demonstrates factually a con-
tinuing, virulent hostility by numerous union members, col-
lectively constituting the union, towards plaintiff. The
Court finds that there was a deep-seated union institutional
hostility toward plaintiff at the time of the hearing which
dictated and permeated the union’s actions with respect
thereto. Otherwise, the discharge probably could not have
been effectuated. (See p. 95, Vol. 1, Arbitration Hearings.)
B. Conclusions of Law
1. This Court has jurisdiction to review and set aside
the award of the system board of adjustment, and of
plaintiff’s claim against the defendant carrier and
3la
District Court Findings and Conclusions
defendant union for wrongful discharge and unfair
representation.
2. The system board of adjustment which heard and
decided plantiff’s grievance was not properly constituted
in that the two union members were selected by the union,
not the grievant, and were acting in the interests of the
union which had a strong institutional bias against
plaintiff, and contrary to the interest of the plaintiff. Such
attitude could not help but be observed and felt by the
neutral, who would be aware that a decision unfavorable
to grievant was desired by both company and union. While
the Court does not question the integrity of the neutral in
this instance, clearly a person of stature and highly re-
garded, nevertheless the rights of a grievant should not
depend upon whether or not the neutral’s character con-
tains sufficient fortitude to withstand the potentialities for
a biased ruling here presented.
3. Because of this element of lack of fairness or in-
dustrial due process, the award of the system board is set
aside, and the cause remanded for consideration by a
fairly reconstituted system board, or other arbitrational
tribunal, in further proceedings in which the interests of
plaintiff are fairly represented. The parties shall, within
30 days, confer and submit to the Court promptly there-
after their proposals for implementing this direction.
4. The Court retains complete jurisdiction of this
matter except insofar as necessary to accomplish the
remand hereinabove directed, but defers further decision at
this time pending the arbitration hereinabove directed.
5. The parties shall report to the Court with respect to
the results of the arbitration required.
So Orperep, this 20 day of September, 1974.
/s/ Cuartes A. Moye, JR.
United States District Judge
32a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Firta Circuit
No. 74-3706
SUMMARY CALENDAR*
Aug. 11, 1975.
ray
Vv
Rautew WELLs,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SouTHERN Arrways, Inc., and THe Aruwne Pitots
AssociaTION, INTERNATIONAL,
Defendants-Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UnNITep Srares District Court FoR THE
NorTHERN District or GEORGIA
ray
Vv
Before:
THOoRNBERRY, Stimpson and Roney, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
On February 5, 1969 Southern Airways terminated
Ralph Wells, a pilot with nine years of service. Pursuant
to the collective bargaining agreement between Southern
and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), Wells re-
ceived a written statement of the reasons for his termina-
* Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Cas-
ualty Co. of New York, et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
33a
Initial Opinion of Court of Appeals
tion.’ He elected to challenge his discharge through the
grievance procedure provided in that agreement.? The five
man System Board found that Southern’s action was justi-
fied because of the past incidents of pilot inconpetence and
the substantial public interest in safe air travel. On April
6, 1970 Wells challenged the System Board determination in
district court. The court upheld Wells’ claim that the Sys-
tem Board procedure denied him due process, and ordered
another hearing. We reverse.*
The district court’s power to set aside the System Board
determination is very limited. The Board’s decision on the
merits is final, and not subject to review. Gunther v. San
Diego & Arizona Eastern Ry. Co., 382 U.S. 257, 86 S.Ct.
368, 15 L.Ed.2d 308 (1965) ; Hall v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
No. 74-3883, 511 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1975); Giordano v.
Modern Air Transport/IBT System Bd. of Adjustment, 504
F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1974). A federal court does have power
to set aside the Board’s determination where there is an
absence of fundamental due process. Hall v. Eastern Ait
1 Southern’s notification of termination gave four reasons: (1)
taking off over allowable gross weight from Tallahassee, Florida on
January 28, 1969; (2) failing a line check on January 31, 1969;
(3) failing a proficiency check ride on February 4, 1969; and (4)
an unsatisfactory overall record as a Southern pilot.
2 Wells elected not to bring his grievance before a four man System
Board, consisting of two members designated by the carrier and two
by the union. He proceeded directly to a hearing before a five man
board—essentially the four man board plus a neutral arbitrator.
Section 31(a)(7) of the collective bargaining agreement granted him
this option.
* The district judge ordered a new hearing before an impartially
constituted System Board on Wells’ discharge. Wells here questions
the appealability of that order. We find that the district court’s order
was a final judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Hall
v. Eastern Air Lines, No. 74-3883, 511 F.2d 663 (Sth Cir. 1975);
Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 620 (10th Cir.
1973); Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1969), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct.
14-20, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).
34a
Initial Opinion of Court of Appeals
Lines, Inc., supra; Rosen v. Eastern Air Lines, 400 F.2d
462 (Sth Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 959, 89 S.Ct. 1307,
22 L.Ed.2d 560 (1969). But that narrow exception does not
apply in this case.
Wells claimed his discharge resulted from an ALPA
po.icy of discrimination against nonunion pilots, and man-
agement-union collusion in furtherance of that policy. The
neutral arbitrator specifically commented on that charge of
his decision.*
After a rigorous examination of all the evidence, I
must say that I find nothing in the record to support
the charge that the aggrieved’s termination was the
result of hostile discrimination by ALPA or its mem-
bers and nothing to support the charge that ALPA
members and members of Management conspired to
bring about his discharge. Assumption is no substi-
tute for reasonable probability as a measure of
wrongdoing. Wells indeed makes much of the fact
that there was a pilot strike at Southern in 1960-
1962 during which he and other non-union pilots dis-
placed ALPA members and which he asserts, stirred
great resentments and caused strong feelings of ani-
mosity to develop among the striking and non-strik-
ing pilots. Undoubtedly, in a situation like that, re-
sentments and animosities do develop. And there is
not much question that in this case they spilled over
from the strike and affected pilot relations for a time
after the strike. But the passage of time has healed
most of the old wounds and no one except the
* The neutral arbitrator, conforming to standard System Board
practice, wrote his decision without consultation with the other four
members of the Board. The two company designated members
signed the opinion, but the two union designated members returned
the opinion to the neutral unsigned.
30a
Initial Opinion of Court of Appeals
aggrieved, seems seriously to believe that the rela-
tions between ALPA members and non-ALPA mem-
bers have been so poor in recent years as to make a
conspiracy to bring about Wells’ discharge a reason-
able probability.
Wells received a full hearing before the Board. He had
full opportunity to present his claim that he was not dis-
charged for incompetence, but for hostile discrimination
against nonunion pilots by the ALPA, and company acqui-
escence in that discrimination. The Board resolved this
claim adversely to Wells.
The collective bargaining agreement provides for a five
man System Board composed of two company-designated
representatives, two union-designated representatives, and
a neutral arbitrator. All five are charged with the respon-
sibility of impartially deciding the case before the Board.°
The trial court did not find any bias on the part of indi-
vidual members of the Board. No denial of fundamental
due process occurred, making the Board’s decision final.
The district court exceeded its authority when it set aside
the Board’s determination. See Giordano v. Modern Air
Transport/IBT System Bd. of Adjustment, 504 F.2d 882
(5th Cir. 1974).
Reversed.
5 The district court may have misunderstood the role of the
management and labor members of the Board. In Finding of Fact 17,
the court stated: “It is contemplated in five-man system boards of
adjustment in the airline industry that the two carrier-designated
members will be partisan for the carrier's interests; that the two
union designees will be partisan for the union’s interests.” But, as
stated above, all five are charged with the duty of impartially decid-
ing the case.
The union, as the bargaining representative for all employees of
Southern, has a duty to fairly represent Wells. Under the collective
bargaining agreement, the union was obligated to provide representa-
tion for Wells at the grievance hearing. Instead Wells exercised his
option to retain his own counsel.
36a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For Tue Firrsx Circuit
October Term, 1974
No. 74-3706
Summary Calendar
D. C. Docket No. CA-13647
Vv
Ratew WELLs,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SouTHERN Airways, Inc., and THe Arrune Pivots
AssociaTion, INTERNATIONAL,
Defendants-Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UnitTep States District Court FoR THE
NorRTHERN District of GEORGIA
ray
Vv
Before:
THORNBERRY, Stmpson and Roney, Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the
record from the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Georgia, and was taken under submission
by the Court upon the record and briefs on file, pursuant
to Rule 18;
On ConsivErRATION WueEreor, It is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said Dis-
trict Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, re-
versed ;
It is further ordered that costs are to be taxed one-
third against plaintiff-appellee, Ralph Wells, one-third
against defendant-appellant, Southern Airways, and one-
third against defendant-appellant, Airline Pilots Associa-
tion, International.
August 11, 1975
Issued as Mandate:
37a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Firru Circuit
No. 74-3706
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING
EN BANC
Nov. 6, 1975
——
Vv
Rauteu WELLs,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SouTHERN Airways, Inc., and AIRLINE PiILots
Association, INTERNATIONAL,
Defendants-Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE Unirep Srates District Court FOR THE
NorTHERN District oF GEORGIA
fy.
Vv
Before:
THORNBERRY, Stmpson and Roney, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Subject to the following, the Petition for Rehearing is
denied and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular
active service on the Court having requested that the Court
be polled on rehearing en banc, (Rule 35, Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Cireuit Rule 12) the
Petition for Rehearing En Banc is denied.
38a
On Petition for Rehearing
Plaintiff-appellee Wells urges in his petition for rehear-
ing that this Court’s reversal of the district court without
providing for remand denied him the opportunity to present
his claim against the union for breach of the duty of fair
representation. Under the rule of Czosek v. O’Mara, 1970,
397 U.S. 25, 90 S.Ct. 770, 773, 25 L.Ed.2d 21, a claim for
breach of the duty of fair representation is separate and
distinct from plaintiff-appellee Wells’ claim that the Sys-
tem Board procedure denied him due process. Accordingly,
and without intending any comment as to the merits of the
fair representation claim, this case is remanded to the dis-
trict court for consideration of that claim.
39a
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Office of the Clerk
January 8, 1976
To ALL CouNsEL or REcorRD
No. 74-3706—Ralph Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc. and
Airline Pilots Association International
Dear Counsel:
This is to advise that an order has this day been entered
denying the petition( ) for rehearing, and no member of
the panel nor Judge in regular active service on the Court
having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en
bane (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure;
Local Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the petition( ) for rehearing
en bane has also been denied.
See Rule 41, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for
issuance and stay of the mandate.
Very truly yours,
Epwarp W. WapswortH,
Clerk
By /s/ Susan M. Gravors
Deputy Clerk
/smg
ec: Mr. Robert S. Savelson
Mr. John Bacheller, Jr.
Mr. William M. Pate
40a
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Railway Labor Act, as amended, Section 3(q), 45 U.S.C.
§ 153(q) :
(q) If any employee or group of employees, or
any carrier, is aggrieved by the failure of any divi-
sion of the Adjustment Board to make an award in
a dispute referred to it, or is aggrieved by any of
the terms of an award or by the failure of the division
to include certain terms in such award, then such
employee or group of employees or carrier may file
in any United States district court in which a petition
under paragraph (p) could be filed, a petition for
review of the division’s order. A copy of the petition
shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the
court to the Adjustment Board. The Adjustment
Board shall file in the court the record of the pro-
ceedings on which it based its action. The court
shall have jurisdiction to affirm the order of the
division or to set it aside, in whole er in part,
or it may remand the proceeding to the division
for such further action as it may direct. On such
review, the findings and order of the division shall
be conclusive on the parties, except that the order of
the division may be set aside, in whole or in part,
or remanded to the division, for failure of the
division to comply with the requirements of this
chapter, for failure of the order to conform, or
confine itself, to matters within the scope of the di-
vision’s jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by
a member of the division making the order. The
judgment of the court shall be subject to review
as provided in sections 1291 and 1254 of Title 28.
Railway Labor Act, as amended, Section 204, 45 U.S.C.
Sec. 204. The disputes between an employee or
group of employees and a carrier or carriers by air
4la
Statutory Provisions
growing out of grievances, or out of the interpreta-
tion or application of agreements concerning rates
of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases
pending and unadjusted on the date of approvai of
this Act before the National Labor Relations Board,
shall be handled in the usual manner up to and in-
cluding the chief operating officer of the carrier desig-
nated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach
an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be
referred by petition of the parties or by either party
to an appropriate adjustment board, as hereinafter
provided, with a full statement of the facts and
supporting data bearing upon the disputes.
It shall be the duty of every carrier and of its
employees, acting through their representatives,
selected in accordance with the provisions of this
title, to establish a board of adjustment of jurisdic-
tion not exceeding the jurisdiction which may be
lawfully exercised by system, group, or regional
boards of adjustment, under the authority of section
3, Title I, of this Act.
Such boards of adjustment may be established by
agreement between employees and carriers either on
any individual carrier, or system, or group of car-
riers by air and any class or classes of its or their
employees; or pending the establishment of a perma-
nent National Board of Adjustment as hereinafter
provided. Nothing in this Act shall prevent said
carriers by air, or any class or classes of their em-
ployees, both acting through their representatives
selected in accordance with provisions of this title,
from mutually agreeing to the establishment of a
National Board of Adjustment of temporary duration
and of similarly limited jurisdiction.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.