Petition — Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp.

Supreme Court brief1976

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} MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLeRe |

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

ne. 75-1272

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,

Petitioner.

Vs.

CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION,

Responder t.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ALLEN Ek. LOCKERMAN

MICHAEL C, MURPHY

1400 Candler Building

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

MARTIN ROACH

2615-16 Citizens Plaza

Louisville, Kentucky

40202

Counsel for Petitione)

J. KIRK QUILLIAN

RALPH H. GREIL

Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman

& Ashmore

Of Counsel

INDEX

Opinions Below 2

Jurisdiction 2

Questions Presented 2

Statutes Involved 2

Statement of the Case 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ )

Introduction 5

Discussion of Questions S

Conclusion 21

Appendix A—Opinions and Judgments of the

Courts Below A-1

Appendix B—Coal Supply Agreement with

Amendments B-1

Table of Authorities

CASES

Aeronaves de Mewico, S.A. v. Triangle Aviation

Services, lne., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975),

aff'g by mem., 389 F. Supp. 1338 (S.D.N-Y.

1974) 15, 14

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94

S. Ct. 1011, 39 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1974) 10

American Home Assurance Co. v. American Fi-

delity & Casualty Co., 356 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.

1966) 1:

~~

Il INDEX

American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v.

Local 7, International Brotherhood of Opera-

tive Potters, 358 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1966) 16

Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238,

82 S. Ct. 1318, 8 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1962) 10

Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Ross, 155 F.2d 615 (10th

Cir. 1946) 7, 11

El Hoss Engineering & Transport Co. v. Ameri-

can Independent Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837

(1961) 7, 10, 19, 20

John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S.

945, 845. Ct. 909, 11 L. Ed. 2d 898

(1964) 17, 19, 20

Necchi S.p.A. v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales

Corp., 348 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. de-

nied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966) 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16

Prima Paint Corp, v. Flood & Conklin Manufac-

turing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S. Ct. 1801, 18

L. Ed. 2d 1270 (1967)

Strauss v. Silvercup Bakers, Inc., 353 F.2d 555

6, 7, 8, 11, 22

(2d Cir. 1965) + om Be

Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabric, Inc.,

271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959)

United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise

Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct.

1558, 4 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1960)

United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &

Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S. Ct.

1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960) 17,18

11

10

INDEX It

STATUTES

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. $§1-14 as

(1970) 2, 6, 15, 1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Note, The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration

é ’ . : é' -

Clause Under the Federal Arbitration Act, we Ps

Boston U.L. Rev. 571 (1972) 8, 18, 19, 2

Heiner, Express Ewclusiors from Arbitration—

Accommodating the Consensual with the Non-

onsensual, 1 GA. L. REV. 365

(1967) 8. 17, 18, 19, 21

: Tae mn ,

Commercial Arbitration Rules, Nov ember 1,1975 19

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

NO.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vs.

CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

The petitioner, GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,

respectfully petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered in this case on

December 9, 1975.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit (Appendix A, infra, pp. Al-A13)

is reported at 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1975). The opinion

and judgment of the district court in this case (Appen-

dix A, infra, pp. Al4-A24) are not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Sixth Circuit was entered on December

9, 1975 and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

$1254 (1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether a claim arising under a contract which

eXpresses an intent to consider matters at a future

date is a nonjusticiable issue which cannot be the

subject of judicially imposed arbitration?

I]. Whether the parties in this commercial agreement

excluded from arbitration claims arising under

section 26.01, the “gross inequities” provision?

STATUTES INVOLVED

This case involves The Federal Arbitration Act of

1925, 9 U.S.C. $$1-14 (1970), and particularly $2 there-

of, which section is set out below:

A written provision in any maritime transac-

tion or a contract evidencing a transaction involv-

ing commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy

thereafter arising out of such contract or trans-

action, or the refusal to perform the whole or any

.-*

we

part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit

to arbitration an existing controversy arising out

of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be

valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such

grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-

tion of any contract.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On or about February 6, 1969, Petitioner, Georgia

Power Company (“Georgia Power”) and Cimarron

Coal Corporation (“Cimarron”) entered into a long-

term Coal Supply Agreement, (App. B1-B34). This

agreement, as amended, calls for total shipment of ap-

proximately 26,600,000 tons of coal as specified in the

contract. (App. B46). During the period 1970-1974,

several price increases were granted under the cost

escalation provisions in the contract, based on in-

creased costs in production and delivery, so as to In-

sure profitability of the agreement to Cimarron. The

original contract price of $4.05 per ton (App. B2) more

than doubled to $10.41 per ton by November of 1974.

In 1974, Cimarron unilaterally demanded ai in-

crease in the contract price of approximately $17 per

ton for approximately 20 million tons of coal, pursuant

to $26.01 of the agreement, the “gross inequities” pro-

vision. (App. B19). Cimarron claimed a “gross in-

equity” existed, because other suppliers of coal on the

“spot” or “short-term” market were selling coal for as

much as $29 to $32 per ton during that period of the

energy crisis. Cimarron requested that its price de-

mands be arbitrated, but Georgia Power responded

that claims made under $26.01 were not arbitrable, be-

cause the clause was permissive and not mandatory.

4

Cimarron never initiated arbitration proceedings or

court action seeking an order for arbitration. Neither

did the parties ever mutually agree that a “gross in-

equity” existed, or agree to a resolution of Cimarron’s

claimed price increase.

On November 1, 1974, the eve of a national coal

miners strike, Cimarron, a non-union company, issued

an ultimatum that it would cease delivery of coal

under the agreement, unless Georgia Power agreed to

pay a price increase of over $340,000,000 for the total

tonnage to be delivered during the remaining life of

the agreement. Georgia Power refused to pay the de-

manded price increase, and Cimarron ceased delivery

of coal on November 5, 1974.

Georgia Power then initiated a diversity action in

the United States District Court for the Western

District of Kentucky for specific performance of the

contract and for a declaratory judgment on the ar-

bitrability of the demanded price increase under

$26.01. On November 21, 1974, the district court en-

tered a status quo order whereby both parties are

required to continue performance of their respective

obligations under the agreement until the case has

been finally determined on appeal. (App. A23-A24).

After a hearing on the merits, the trial court entered a

judgment which ordered, among other things, the par-

ties (o arbitrate Cimarron’s claim under $26.01, and

which maintained in effect the status quo order pre-

viously entered. (App. A21-A22). The Court also en-

tered an Opinion of Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law. (App Al4-A20).

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for

5

the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

(App. Al-A13).

By application for a Writ of Certiorari, Petitioner

seeks review of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’

decision regarding the arbitrability of Cimarron’s

claim under $26.01 of the agreement.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

INTRODUCTION

This Court should review the decision of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit because

that Court has decided an important question of fed-

eral law which has not, but should be settled by this

Court, and has rendered a decision in conflict with an

earlier decision of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-

peals. The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the district

court’s decision, held that a contract clause which pro-

vides that gross inequities resulting in unusual con-

ditions not contemplated by the parties “may be cor-

rected by mutual consent,”! was arbitrable under a

broad arbitration clause covering “any unresolved

1. § 26.01. Adjustments for Gross Inequities. Any gross

proven inequity that may result in unusual economic condi-

tions not contemplated by the parties at the time of the

execution of this Agreement may be corrected by mutual con-

sent, Each party shall in the case of a claim of gross inequity

furnish the other with whatever documentary evidence may

be necessary to assist in affecting a settlement.

Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as

relieving either the Purchaser or Seller from any of its

respective obligations hereunder solely because of the exis-

tence of a claim of inequity or the failure of the parties to

reach an agreement with respect thereto.

6

controversy ... arising under this Agreement.”? In

so holding the Sixth Circuit extended the types of

matters which are referable to arbitration further

than any other court, including this Court, has ever

done before.

Since the passage of The Federal Arbitration Act,

9 U.S.C. $$1-14 (1970), in 1925, this Court has had

relative few occasions to consider problems arising

under the Act in a commercial context. The last major

statement made by this Court in a commercial arbi-

tration context was the decision in Prima Paint Corp.

v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Corp., 388 U.S. 395

(1967). There the Court established guidelines for de-

termining the arbitrability of the question of whether

a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. The Court held

that under a broad arbitration clause, a claim of fraud

in the inducement of a contract (to be distinguished

from a claim of fraud in the inducement of the arbi-

tration clause) is an issue to be determined by the

arbitrators and not by the judiciary. The Court was

not faced with the question raised by this case of

how courts should construe commercial agreements

to determine whether a particular dispute is arbitrable

under an admittedly valid arbitration agreement.

More particularly, the Court has never ruled on the

question presented by the instant case of whether in

order to exclude a matter from arbitration, specific,

2. $ 20.01. Arbitration. Any unresolved controversy be-

tween the parties, arising under this Agreement shall, at the

request of either party, be submitted to arbitration under the

rules of the American Arbitration Association. The cost and

expense of any arbitration shall be shared equally by the

parties, unless otherwise ordered by the arbitrator.

7

express terms must be used, or whether more general

terms indicating an intention to withhold from arbi-

tration are suitable. See Strauss v. Silvercup Bakers,

Inc., 353 F.2d 555, 557 (2d Cir. 1965); El Hoss En-

gineering & Transport Co. v. American Independent

Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.

837 (1961).

The Sixth Circuit’s decision erroneously permits

a party to obtain a remedy through arbitration which

could not be obtained through judicial proceedings. A

court will not attempt to fashion an agreement where

the parties have agreed that in the future they would

attempt to mutually agree to a price revision. beec/

Aircraft Corp, v. Ross, 155 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1946).

Yet, as a result of the Sixth Circuit’s decision, a non-

justiciable controversy like that produced by the gross

inequity clause is subject to arbitration.

It has been almost ten years since the Supreme

Court last examined the area of commercial arbitra-

tion. In the Prima Paint case the Court considered the

arbitrability of a dispute as to whether a valid agree-

ment to arbitrate was entered into. This case pre-

sents the next step in judicial analysis with respect to

arbitration — whether the dispute between the parties

is legally arbitrable — and provides the Court with an

excellent opportunity to provide much needed judi-

cial guidance in the area of commercial arbitration.

In this case the parties expressed a definite intent to

correct gross inequities through “mutual consent”

rather than through judicial proceedings or arbitra-

tion. If a more specific provision excluding a dispute

from arbitration was needed, and will be needed in

the future to effectuate the intention of the parties,

8

this Court should establish guidelines providing ac-

cordingly.

DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS

I,

A Claim Arising Under a Contract Provision

Which Expresses an Intent to Consider Commercial

Contingencies at a Future Date is a Nonjusticiable

Issue which Cannot be the Subject of Judicially

Imposed Arbitration.

This case presents a question left unanswered by

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing

Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), that is whether parties can

exclude matters from arbitration by contract language

demonstrating an intent to reserve such issues for

resolution by the parties. See id. at 402-403 n.9; Note,

The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration Clause under

the Federal Arbitration Act, 52 Boston U.L. Rev. 571,

495 (1972). The decision by the Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals in the instant case illustrates that courts

have become “‘lost in. the shadow of rigid ‘arbitration

worship’ dicta” of cases proselytizing policy favoring

arbitration in collective bargaining agreements, such

that there has been a dramatic and harmful departure

from the neutral principle that courts can order parties

to arbitrate only matters they have agreed to arbi-

trate. See Heiner, Express Exclusions from Arbitra-

tion—Accommodating the Consensual with the Non-

consensual, 1 GA. L. REV. 363, 368 (1967). There is

a need to refocus on the basic premise that:

The duty to arbitrate being contractual in origin,

the Court must make an effort to construe the ex-

9

tent of the contractual duty, rather than enforce

arbitration even of arbitrability upon parties who

do not bind themselves to such a submission.

Strauss v. Silvercup Bakers, Inc., 353 F.2d 555, 558

(2d Cir. 1965).

The gross inequities clause, $26.01, has a special

purpose in this commercial contract between Georgia

Power, a regulated public utility, and Cimarron, a

coal supplier. At the trial of this case, it was shown

that Georgia Power, like other electric public utilities,

has a fuel adjustment clause in its rate structure that

passes added fuel costs on to the consumer. The gross

inequities clause is merely a written declaration that

the parties to the long-term coal supply agreement

recognize that if unanticipated contingencies occur,

one of the parties may find it in its best interest to

grant the other party relief that is not called for

under the contract. Section 26.01 provides a statement

of policy which will allow the public utility the op-

portunity to grant relief to a troubled coal supplier,

hopefully without incurring the wrath of a public

service commission or the public if it surrenders “too

good a deal” in the public interest. Such a clause was

never intended to require the public utility to enter the

free-wheeling environment of an arbitration proceed-

ing, with a supplier who entered the contract with a

net worth of less than one-half million dollars in 1969

and made a profit of over 3 million dollars in 1974,

in order to defend against an open-ended demand for

a price increase of approximately $340 million.

The language of $26.01 expresses the clear intent

that an unforeseable economic condition may be cor-

.

:

a a a

10

rected by mutual consent of the parties, but it does not

mandate any settlement. Neither a court nor an ar-

bitrator can resolve a claim under $26.01, because that

would constitute “making” the agreement for the

parties. An arbitrator is limited to effectuating the

intent of the parties within the contractual language

of the agreement, and may not impose new terms on

the agreement.? An arbitrator, therefore, cannot make

terms for agreements which the parties never intended

to have made for them by extraneous authority. In

the instant case, the parties clearly and expressly

never intended any change to be made in the contract

pursuant to $26.01, wiless made by mutual consent.

See El Hoss Engineering & Transport Co. v. American

Independent Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.), cert. de-

nied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961).

. The courts, and not the arbitrators, must deter-

mine whether or not a party is bound to arbitrate a

particular dispute, based on the contract entered into

by the parties. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370

U.S, 238, 241 (1962). Section 26.01 clearly does not

provide a justiciable issue for an arbitrator or a court

to adjudicate, and therefore is not arbitrable. There

is no basis for a determination of whether the parties

would have considered Cimarron’s claim to be a “oross

inequity”; or whether the parties would have corrected

3. In the context of a labor agreement, this Court re-

cently said: “As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator’s

task is to effectuate the intent of the parties.” Alevander v.

Gardver-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 56, 53 (1974). “The arbitrator

has authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights,”

a am cannot dispense his own brand of justice. See United

as & ton cor pre a Buterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,

11

such claim; much less an indication of how the parties

would have agreed to correct such claim. Since a court

cannot impose terms of a contract which were not

agreed to by the parties, Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Ross,

155 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1946), a court may not order

an arbitrator to impose such unintended terms on the

parties.

Prior to the decision of the Sixth Circuit in the

instant case, the only Circuit which appears to have

addressed the issue presented by this case was the

Second Circuit. In Necchi S.p.A. v. Necchi Sewing

Machine Sales Corp., 348 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1965),

cert, denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966),! the Court held that

a contractual provision which provided that six months

before the expiration of the agreement the parties

“shall examine the possibility of executing a new and,

it is hoped, long term distributorship agreement for

the same territory and at such terms and conditions as

will be then discussed and defined” was not arbitrable.

Speaking through Judge (now Justice) Marshall the

Court said, “Certainly we cannot ask that a renewe!

contract be written for the parties, as it is altogether

too conjectural that the parties would have agreed and

on what terms.” This conclusion was reached even

though the agreement contained an arbitration clause

as broad as the one in this case.

4. The Second Circuit's opinion in Neechi considered

Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabric, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,

410 (2d Cir. 1959), which established the liberal federal poli-

cy toward arbitration, and which was relied upon by the

Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Couklin Mauufae-

turing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967). The Prima Paint de-

cision did not disturb or contradict the holding in Neceli.

eS oe ooo

12

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in this case is in conflict

with the earlier Necchi opinion of the Second Circuit.

Here the contractual provision in question provides

that “Any gross proven inequity that may result in

unusual economic conditions not contemplated by the

parties at the time of the execution of this Agreement

may be corrected by mutual consent.” Like the situa-

tion the Second Circuit faced in Necchi, the gross in-

equity clause in this case presents a situation where

“it is altogether too conjectural that the parties would

have agreed and on what terms.”

The Sixth Circuit distinguished Necchi as involv-

ing a dispute over a provision for renewal of a con-

tract as opposed to a dispute over operations under

an ongoing contract. (App. A7). The attempted dis-

tinction is unpersuasive and is more of an example of

ipse dixit than a decision based on a previously recog-

nized legal principle. In both Necchi and the instant

case, the provision in question did no more than require

the parties to examine the possibility of entering into

a new agreement. Similar to the Necchi situation, in

the absence of a new agreement by the parties on the

adjustments necessary for alleged gross inequities,

there is nothing to be enforced either by arbitration or

judicial proceedings. The Court’s statement that “the

controversy must be settled somehow in the absence

of mutual consent” (App. A&) flies in the face of the

express words of the contract evidencing the intent

of the parties. Mutual consent is required by the con-

tract and forced submission to arbitration does not

provide such consent.

Simply stated, the current dispute does not involve

any agreement which the parties made in the contract,

13

so the current demand for a price increase does not

arise under the agreement. If an arbitration award in

the instant case granted Cimarron its requested price

increase under $26.01, the contract price would be

raised by as much as $340 million. Such a substantial

rewriting of a material term is tantamount to rewrit-

ing the entire contract as bargained for by the parties.

There is no reasonable distinction, for the purpose of

requiring arbitration, whether the remainder of the

contract is distorted beyond, recognition or whether a

renewal agreement is imposed on the parties. Both re-

sults constitute examples of the arbitrator writing the

contract for the parties.

The Court below relies en two subsequent Second

Circuit decisions as supportive of its interpretation of

Necchi. See Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. Triangle

Aviation Services, Inc., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975),

aff'g. by mem., 389 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ;

American Home Assurance Co. v. American Fidelity

& Casualty Co., 356 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1966). These

two cases are clearly distinguishable from Necchi and

the instant case and are not inconsistent with Petition-

er’s contention. Both cases involved clauses which man-

dated, rather than permitted, the parties to finally

resolve certain described future events. In American

Home Assurance Co., the parties agreed that, “there

shall be an adequate amendment” to a reinsurance

agreement in the event that the final loss ratio on the

contract during a specified period exceeds 65% of

gross premium. In Aeronaves, the contract provided

that “an increase in the charges will be negotiated,”

in the event certain described changes in the subject

of the contract occurred during the term of the con-

tract. In both cases the Second Circuit held such pro-

a

14

visions arbitrable, because they mandated a change in

the contract price if an anticipated described commer-

cial contingency occurred. See Aeronaves, supra, 329

F. Supp. at 1390. Also, in both of the latter Second

Circuit cases, the subject of controversy concerned a

commercial contingency previously contemplated by

the parties, whereas in both Necchi and the instant

case, the dispute between the parties concerned con-

tingencies not previously contemplated by the parties.

Section 26.01 could not have been more explicit in

expressing that at the time the contract was executed

the parties did not contemplate what, if any, “gross

proven inequity” would arise during the course of the

agreement. Because such matters were unknown and

not contemplated, the parties reasonably withheld a

commitment to have such matters finally resolved.

Section 26.01 does not provide that any “gross proven

inequity” ‘shall be” or “will be” corrected. Instead

it provides that such conditions, if any, “may” be cor-

rected and that any such correction must be made “by

the mutual consent” of the parties. The plain and

ordinary meaning of that language is that the parties

didn’t know whether any such gross inequity would

occur, or what would constitute a gross inequity, but

that if such condition did occur, then it would be

resolved by the mutual consent of the parties or not

be resolved at all. Such a clause states an intent of

the parties to consider the consequences of unfore-

seeable changes in the economy, but does not bind the

parties to have a resolution to such changes arbitrated.5

5. When this agreement was entered into in 1969, Cim-

arron could reasonably have expected escalating costs of op-

erating their mine, and Georgia Power could have anticipated

15

The provision is no more arbitrable than was the pro-

vision in Necchi requiring the parties to “examine the

possibility of executing a new .. . long term distrib-

utorship agreement... at such terms and conditions as

will be then discussed and defined”? (emphasis added).

Despite the clear and unambiguous language of

$26.01, the Sixth Circuit ruled that Cimarron’s claim

for an adjustment in price was ‘“‘a condition which was

recognized by the parties as a possibility when the con-

tract was entered into.” (App. AT). The Court then

concluded that the claim to a price adjustment “must

be settled somehow in absence of mutual consent.”

(App. A&). Nothing in $26.01 can reasonably be con-

strued to express or imply that Cimarron’s claim was

anticipated or that a resolution of that claim was mai.-

dated in the absence of mutual consent. The provision

makes crystal clear that there is no duty on the pert

of either party to resolve the dispute or to submit it

to an arbitrator for resolution. The second paragraph

of $26.01 provides that nothing contained in that sec-

tion shall relieve either party of its respective obliga-

tions under the contract, even if a claim of inequity

exists and if the parties fail to reach an agreement

with respect thereto.

The Federal Arbitration Act and its attendant na-

tional policy favoring arbitration do not, and cannot,

regulatory restraints on its operating expenses from the

Georgia Public Service Commission, but neither party could

have reasonably contemplated the energy crisis and its effect

on the coal market during the year 1974. Distortions of the

market having unforeseeable consequences on the parties to

the agreement were therefore reserved for consideration by

the parties alone at the time they occurred.

uu

16

mandate an arbitrator to make an agreement for the

parties, Necchi, supra, 348 F.2d at 698. As in other

contracts, the express intent of the parties to reserve

certain matters for mutual resolution in the future

must be respected and not caught up in incantations

of policy favoring arbitration. The Sixth Circuit’s

reasoning in the instant case signals the overreaction

to an arbitration policy which must be tempered and

refocused in order to prevent the destruction of the

agreement between the parties in the instant case, and

to prevent the rule of the Sixth Circuit from being

adopted as a matter of law in subsequent cases.

I.

Section 26.01 of the Agreement Demonstrates an

Intent to Exclude From Arbitration any Claims

for Gross Inequities made Under that Provision.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Cim-

arron’s unilateral claim made pursuant to $26.01 was

arbitrable because of “the absence of language with-

drawing this provision from the arbitration require-

ment.”” (App. A10). In support of that conclusion, the

Court relied upon American Radiator & Standard San-

itary Corp. v. Local No. 7, International Brotherhood

of Operative Potters, 358 F.2d 455, 458 (6th Cir.

1966), a collective bargaining agreement case, which

held that “arbitration should not be denied unless it

may be said with positive assurance that the clause

does not cover the dispute” (emphasis added).

. Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred

in ruling that $26.01 did not state with “positive as-

surance” that claims made thereunder were excluded

from the arbitration clause of the contract, because

17

the provision expressly reserves for the parties alone

the authority to resolve any alleged claim of gross in-

equity by “mutual consent,” or not at all. See Part I,

supra. Petitioner further maintains, however, that

the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of

construction in this case, which has the effect of dis-

torting the federal policy toward arbitration in com-

mercial contracts.

The “positive assurance” rule of construction ema-

nates from cases dealing with collective bargaining

agreements, and has been tailored to effectuate the

strong national policy which is peculiar to the labor

relations field. See United Steelworkers of America v.

Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578

(1960); Heiner, Express Exclusions from Arbitration

—Accommodating the Consensual with the Noncon-

sensual,” 1 Ga. L. REV. 363, 364-368, 379-382 (1967).

That rule is wholly inappropriate when applied to a

commercial contract, such as the one in the instant

case.

This Court has forcefully articulated that the ob-

jectives of a national labor policy are to be effectuated

by using arbitration as “the substitute for industrial

strike” and as “part and parcel of the collective bar-

gaining process itself.” United Steelworkers of Ameri-

ca v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,

578 (1960). In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,

376 U.S. 543, 550-551 (1964), the Court characterized

the peculiarities of arbitration clauses in labor agree-

ments:

While the principles of law governing ordinary

contracts would not bind to a contract an uncon-

senting successor to a contracting party, a collec-

4

)

1

6 i

ee

18

tive bargaining agreement is not an ordinary

contract. “... [I]t is a generalized code to govern

a myriad of cases which the draftsman cannot

wholly anticipate. . . . The collective agreement

covers the whole employment relationship. It calls

into being a new common law — the common law

of a particular industry or of a particular plant.”

Warrior & Gulf, supra, 363 U.S. at 578-579. Cen-

tral to the peculiar status and function of a collec-

tive bargaining agreement is the fact, dictated

both by circumstance, see, id., 363 U.S. at 580, and

by the requirements of the National labor Rela-

tions Act, that it is not in any real sense the simple

product of a consensual relationship.

Consequently, the duty to arbitrate in a labor agree-

ment, while founded on contract, is construed “in the

context of a national labor policy” with considerations

favoring arbitration unique to the labor relations

field. /d.

Contracts in a commercial context, on the other

hand, possess none of the attributes of collective bar-

gaining agreements, especially with regard to the

peculiar role of an arbitration provision, nor are they

governed by express statutory regulation, such as the

National Labor Relations Act. “A commercial arbitra-

tion clause, unlike a labor arbitration provision, serves

predominantly to implement the parties’ intent.” Note.

Lhe Consequences of a Broad Arbitration Clause Under

the Federal Arbitration Act, 52 Boston U.L. Rev.

971, 592 (1972). An arbitration clause contained in a

commercial contract, therefore, should not be con-

strued by the same principles which are tailored for

the peculiarities of collective bargaining agreements.

Rite AE te hell, w

ne ee Ca ag Mel lly A EB te Rat wate mw

19

Id. at 592, 594; John Wiley & Sons, supra, 376 U.S. at

550; Heiner, supra.

There is a federal policy favoring arbitration in

lieu of litigation in commercial agreements subject to

the Federal Arbitration Act, and commercial arbitra-

tion clauses should be construed as raising a presump-

tion that disputes arising under the contract are arbi-

trable. Nevertheless, this presumption may be re-

butted by contract language demonstrating an intent

to exclude certain matters from arbitration, even if

such intent is not “positive assurance” that the clause

was to be excluded. Cf., Heiner, supra, 1 GA. L. Rev. at

382: Strauss v. Silvercup Bakers, lne., 363 F.2d 555,

558 (2d Cir. 1965); El Hoss Engineering & Transport

Co. v. American Independent Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961).

In the instant contract the parties negotiated and

bargained for the sale and purchase of coal, and in-

cluded in that contract a standard arbitration clause,*

intended to avoid litigation regarding general matters

arising under the contract. They also included a pro-

6. Section 20.01 is very similar to the Standard Arbitra-

tion Clause recommended by the American Arbitration Asso-

ciation for general use in commercial contracts:

“Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating

to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be set-

tled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of

the American Arbitration Association, and judgment

upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator(s) may

be entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.”

Commercial Arbitration Rules, Nov. 1, 1975.

Use of such standard clauses has been consistently increas-

ing in commercial contracts. See Note, svpra, 52 Boston U.L.

REV. at 571-572.

20

vision, $26.01, which clearly demonstrates the intent

of the parties to reserve the resolution of certain

unforeseeable matters to the mutual agreement

of the parties only. Section 26.01 provides that reso-

lution of a gross inequities claim shall be by mu-

tual consent of the parties or not at all. Therefore, a

judicial determination of nonarbitrability of Cimar-

ron’s claim would not defeat the policy favoring ar-

bitration in lieu of litigation in the commercial context.

Failure of the parties to mutually consent to a correc-

tion of a claim under $26.01 cannot result in a jus-

ticiable issue, and, therefore, cannot be litigated. See

Part I, supra.

This not being a collective bargaining agreement,

there is no expertise in drafting arbitration clauses to

cover all anticipated circumstances. See John Wiley &

Sons, supra, 376 U.S. at 549-551. The question of in-

tention of the parties is “to be ascertained by the same

tests that are applied to contracts generally.” E/ Hoss

Engineering & Transport Co., supra, 289 F.2d at 350.

Even with a policy favoring a presumption of arbitra-

tion, ‘there is no reason in fact or in law for frustra-

tion of this clearly demonstrated intent” not to ar-

bitrate. /d. at 349. The rigorous standards of construc-

tion applicable to collective bargaining agreements are

not appropriate for commercial agreements. See Note,

supra, 52 BOSTON U.L. REV. at 594-596. The Court of

Appeals, therefore, misapplied a “positive assurance”

standard of construction to $26.01, and erroneously

determined Cimarron’s claim to be arbitrable.

The Court of Appeals also erroneously ruled that

“in the absence of language withdrawing the provi-

sion from the arbitration requirement, it is a duty of

21

the court to resolve any doubts in fa\ or of arbitration”

(emphasis added). (App. A10). There was no evidence

before the trial court as to the intent of the parties

with regard to the arbitration clause, the gross in-

equities clause, or the contract in general. If the Sixth

Circuit had a “doubt” as to the parties’ intent, it

should have remanded the case fer further finding of

fact on that issue, rather than resolving the ‘‘doubts”

on the face of the contract. See Strauss v. Silvercup

Bakers, Inc., supra, 353 F.2d at 558; Heiner, supra,

1 Ga. L. REV. at 379-380.

22

CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully submits that the decisions

of the courts below in this case are erroneous. By al-

lowing for submission to arbitration of a nonjustici-

able controversy, the Courts below have defeated the

express intention of the parties at the time of contrac-

ting and have extended the types of matters referable

to arbitration further than any court has previously

done. This case thus provides the Court an opportunity

to reexamine the law of commercial arbitration and

provide desperately needed guidance in light of the

increased use of commercial arbitration and changed

economic conditions since the Court decided Prima

Paint Corp, v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,

388 U.S. 395 (1967).

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN Ek. LOCKERMAN

MICHAEL C. MURPHY

1400 Candler Building

Atlanta, Georgia 30305

MARTIN ROACH

2615-16 Citizens Plaza

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

Counsel for Petitioner,

Georgia Power Company

J. KIRK QUILLIAN

RALPH H. GREIL

Troutman, Sanders,

Lockerman & Ashmore

Of Counsel

APPENDIX “A”

No. 75-1542

No. 75-1545

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

7 APPEAL from the

Cross-A ppellee,

United States Dis-

v. trict Court for the

Western District

CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION, shag 9

of Kentucky.

Defendant-Appellee,

Cross-A ppellant.

Decided and Filed December 9, 1975

Before: PHILLIPS, Chief Judge; MILLER and LIVELY,

Circuit Judges.

LIVELY, Circuit Judge. The issue in this case is

whether a dispute between the parties to a long-term

fuel supply agreement is subject to arbitration. The

coal supply agreement (Agreement) provided that for

a period of ten years beginning January 1, 1970 Cim-

arron would “tender for delivery” and Georgia Power

would purchase quantities of coal set out therein. The

Agreement provided for a base price per ton of coal

of $4.03 as of the date of the Agreement “subject to

adjustment from time to time... .”’ Specific provisions

of the Agreement dealt with the computation of ad-

justments in base price for changes in certain labor

A-2

costs, supplies and changes in “governmental imposi-

tions.” Each such adjustment was to be computed ac-

cording to a formula or method set forth in the Agree-

ment. The Agreement also contained the following

provision:

26.01. Adjustments for Gross Inequities. Any

gross proven inequity that may result in unusual

economic conditions not contemplated by the

parties at the time of the execution of this Agree-

ment may be corrected by mutual consent. Each

party shall in the case of a claim of gross in-

equity furnish the other with whatever documen-

tary evidence may be necessary to assist in af-

fecting a settlement.

Nothing contained in this section shall be con-

strued as relieving either the Purchaser or Seller

from any of its respective obligations hereunder

solely because of the existence of a claim of in-

equity or the failure of the parties to reach an

agreement with respect thereto.

As the parties operated under the Agreement several

increases in base price were made pursuant to the

various provisions for adjustments, including the gross

inequities provision of Section 26.01.

During 1975 and 1974 there was a rapid escalation

in the market price of coal in the United States. Some-

time prior to April 11, 1974 Cimarron requested an

adjustment in the base price under Section 26.01 of

the Agreement, claiming that a gross inequity had

resulted from the disparity between the market price

of coal and the price being paid under the Agreement.

In responding to this request on April 11, Georgia

A-3

Power wrote: “As you are aware, We adamantly re-

jected and disagreed with your request for escalation

based upon Section 26.01 of the Coal Supply Agree-

ment. We did acknowledge, however, that a substantial

(disagreement existed over the interpretation of this

provision.” (P. Exhibit 38). On August 15, 1974

Cimarron requested an additional price adjustment

under Section 26.01, pointing out that the current

adjusted base price under the Agreement was $10.00

per ton while coal of the same quality was selling for

$29.00 to $32.00 per ton on the open market. Because

of ‘‘the very unusual economic conditions existing in

the coal industry at this time. ..,”” Cimarron requested

a change in base price to $16.50 per ton. (P. Exhibit

41). Georgia Power rejected the request, but offered

to meet with Cimarron and discuss the matter. (P.

Exhibit 42). During the succeeding months an adjust-

ment in base price was agreed to by the parties pri-

marily on the basis of increased costs of materials

and supplies, bringing the base price when suit was

filed to $10.41 per ton.

On November 1, 1974, Cimarron notified Georgia

Power that it was increasing the base price for coal

to $27.50 per ton effective November 5, 1974 and that

“[wJe expect to suspend deliveries of coal to you on

November 1, 1974, unless the basic price adjustment

to become effective that day is agreed to or submitted

to arbitration.” (P. Exhibit 48). Georgia Power re-

sponded by telegram November 5, 1974, stating in

part:

In view of the above, if Cimarron ceases ship-

ments on November 5, 1974, as threatened, we

will have to immediately seek judicial enforcement

A-4

of the contract, and you should be governed ac-

cordingly. (P. Exhibit 50).

On November 7, 1974 Georgia Power filed its com-

plaint in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Kentucky where Cimarron is lo-

cated. After reciting the material facts and setting

forth its theory Georgia Power sought a temporary

restraining order to prevent Cimarron from dispos-

ing of coal from the property sybject to the Agree-

ment to any purchaser other than Georgia Power until

the commitments of the contract were fulfilled and

from failing to produce and sell to Georgia Power the

amounts of coal agreed to in the contract. In an

amended and substituted complaint filed on November

3, 1974 Georgia Power also sought a declaratory

judgment that Section 26.01 of the Agreement does

not provide a means for increasing the price of coal

without consent of Georgia Power and that Section

26.01 is not arbitrable, and a further declaration that

Georgia Power had not breached the Agreement by

its refusal to arbitrate the dispute.

The district court declined to enter a temporary re-

straining order, but obtained agreement of the parties

to the entry of a status quo order by which Cimarron

continued to ship to Georgia Power the quantities of

coal provided for in the Agreement at the prices set

therein until a decision on the merits. It further pro-

vided that if it should ultimately be determined that

Cimarron Was entitled to a price increase under Sec-

tion 26.01, such increase would apply to coal shipped

under the status quo order. Thereafter Cimarron filed

an answer in which it contended that Georgia Power

had breached the Agreement by refusing to submit an

A-5

unresolved controversy to arbitration and that by

suing in the district court Georgia Power had waived

its right to arbitration. Cimarron denied that it had

breached the Agreement in any respect and stated

affirmatively that the provision of the contract for

arbitration contains no limitation on the subject mat-.

ter of arbitration. Cimarron also filed a “cross-claim,”

which appears actually to be a counter-claim, in which

it sought damages from Georgia Power for the coal

shipped under the status quo order measured by the

difference between the contract price and the pre-

vailing market price for coal of equal quality at the

time of delivery.

Following a hearing on the merits, the district court

entered a judgment holding that the Agreement be-

tween the parties remained in full force and effect

and directing that “the parties shall proceed without

delay to arbitration of the defendant’s claims asserted

under Section 26.01 of said contract.’ The judgment

also provided that the status quo order should remain

in effect. District Judge James F. Gordon filed a

memorandum opinion containing findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Georgia Power appealed from that

portion of the judgment directing arbitration and from

rulings during the trial of the case in which the district

court declined to admit evidence regarding the finan-

cial condition of the parties. Cimarron has cross-

appealed from that portion of the judgment which

denied it damages as claimed in its “cross-complaint” ;

from the holding that Cimarron had no right to rescind

the contract upon Georgia Power's refusal to arbitrate

and from the court’s ruling that Georgia Power did

not waive its right to seek judicial enforcement of ar-

bitration or a declaratory judgment by reason of its

A-6

refusal to arbitrate. The appeal and cross-appeal were

consolidated for hearing in this court.

Section 20.01 of the Agreement provides:

20.01. Arbitration. Any unresolved controversy

between the parties, arising under this Agree-

ment shall, at the request of either party, be sub-

mitted to arbitration under the rules of the Amer-

ican Arbitration Association. The cost and ex-

pense of any arbitration shall be shared equally

by the parties, unless otherwise ordered by the

arbitrator.

Georgia Power contends that Section 26.01 provides

a purely permissive method of relieving a party from

a gross inequity, but that its language is inconsistent

with a requirement of binding arbitration. This posi-

tion is based on the fact that Section 26.01 provides

relief from gross inequities only “by mutual consent.”

It points to the fact that no criteria for gross inequity

adjustments are contained in the Agreement, contrary

to the provisions for adjustment on account of other

changes in circumstances. Thus Georgia Power basi-

cally argues that a provision of an agreement which

permits modification of any of its terms by mutual

agreement of the parties may only lead to such modi-

fication if the parties do agree. To permit a dispute

under suc’ a provision to be settled by arbitration, it

is argued, would permit the arbitrator to make a new

contract for the parties.

Georgia Power relies principally upon the decision

in Necchi v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 348

F. 2d 693 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909

A-7

(1966). There the court held that a contractual pro-

vision that six months before the expiration of the

agreement the parties ‘shall examine the possibility

of executing a new and, it is hoped, long term dis-

tributorship agreement for the same territory and at

such terms and conditions as will be then discussed

and defined” was not arbitrable. /d. at 698. The court

found that there was no obligation upon Necchi to

renew the distributorship and no provision for relief

if it failed to examine the possibility of renewal. Speak-

ing through Judge (now Justice) Marshall the court

said, “Certainly, we cannot ask that a renewal con-

tract be written for the parties, as it is altogether too

conjectural that the parties would have agreed and

on what terms.” /d. This conclusion was reached even

though the agreement contained a broad provision for

arbitration of ‘“[a]ll matters, disputes or disagree-

ments arising out of or in connection with this Agree-

ment... .” /d. at 695.

The present case is quite different from Neccli.

There the parties sought to enforce a provision for re-

newal which did no more than require the parties to

examine the possibility of entering into a new agree-

ment. The dispute did not concern operations under

the agreement and the language of the renewal pro-

vision presented nothing for the arbitrator, or a court,

to enforce. On the other hand, in the case now under

review a dispute arose during the life of a subsisting

contract with respect to a present adjustment in prices

on the basis of a condition which was recognized by

the parties as a possibility when the contract was en-

tered into. There is a difference between a provision

which requires parties to attempt to agree on a new

contract and one which requires them to attempt to

Se aaa saan ener

A-8

make an adjustment in price under an ongoing con-

tract by mutual consent. Under the former situation

in the absence of a new agreement there is no contract

to enforce either by arbitration or judicial proceedings.

In the latter case the parties remain bound to con-

tinued operations under their contract and the contro-

versy over a claimed right to price adjustment must

be settled somehow in the absence of mutual consent.

In such a case if the contract provides for arbitration,

the arbitrator is only required to resolve a controversy

arising under the agreement of the parties, not write

a new agreement for them.

The mere fact that it provided for correction of gross

inequities by mutual consent did not remove Section

26.01 from arbitrability. The Necchi court has so held

in cases where the fashioning of a renewal was not

involved. In American Home Assurance Co. vy. Ameri-

can Fidelity & Casualty Co., 356 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.

1966), a contractual provision for a reduction of re-

insurance premiums “on a basis to be mutually ar-

ranged” was held to be arbitrable. In Aeronaves de

Mexico S.A. v. Triangle Aviation Services, Inc., 389

F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504

(2d Cir. 1975), a dispute under a provision that in-

creases in charges for servicing airplanes “will be ne-

gotiated to the satisfaction of both parties’? was held

to be arbitrable. Georgia Power’s reliance on Beech

Aircraft Corp. v. Ross, 155 F. 2d 615 (10th Cir. 1946),

is misplaced. The contract under consideration in that

case contained no arbitration provision. Under those

circumstances the court held that a provision for price

changes to be effected “by mutual agreement,” in the

absence of a formula for final revision of prices, did

not provide an acceptable standard by which a court

A-9

could give effect to the intention of the parties. The

reasoning of the court in the beech Aircraft decision

(loes not compel the same result in a case where the

parties have agreed in advance to submit unresolved

controversies to arbitration.

In their briefs both parties have recognized that

there is a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.

This is true in the realm of commercial transactions

as Well as labor relations. Nevertheless, as this court

has held, “. . . arbitration is a matter of contract be-

tween the parties, and one cannot be required to sub-

mit to arbitration a dispute which it has not agreed to

submit to arbitration.” United Steelworkers, Local No.

1617 v. General Fireproofing Co., 464 F.2d 726, 729

(6th Cir. 1972). The language of the arbitration clause

in the Agreement before us is as broad and general as

one can conceive. Though Section 26.01 makes no direct

reference to arbitration, whereas several other provi-

sions of the contract do refer to the requirement of ar-

bitration, nevertheless we conclude that if the parties

had not intended for controversies arising under Sec-

tion 26.01 to be submitted to arbitration the Agreement

would have so provided. The intention of the parties

must be determined from the entire agreement. This

court has stated that “. .. arbitration should not be de-

nied unless it may be said with positive assurance that

the clause does not cover the dispute.”” American Radi-

ator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Local 7, Internation-

al Brotherhood of Operative Potters, AFL-CIO, 358

F.2d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1966). While some of the pro-

visions of the contract make reference to the arbitra-

tion requirement, there is no indication or statement

that any provision of the contract is wholly outside of

the arbitration provision. The gross inequities provi-

A-10

sion deals with a possible adjustment in price which

might be required because of unforeseeable changes in

the economic climate of the coal industry. This provi-

sion lacks the specific details of the-other portions of

the Agreement dealing with price adjustment, but that

arises from the fact that it is something of a “catch-

all” provision designed to take care of the kinds of

changes which cannot be predicted in detail, but which

experience teaches do occur. In the absence of language

withdrawing this provision from the arbitration re-

quirement it is the duty of the court to resolve any

doubts in favor of arbitration. American Radiator v.

Local 7, supra at 458.

When the parties to a contract foresee the possibil-

ity of a change in circumstances which might require

modification of the contractual terms and provide for

modi.ication by mutual consent, and thereafter are

unable to agree upon such modification, the resulting

dispute is subject to a broad arbitration provision

such as that contained in the Agreement now before

the court. The fact that contracting parties agree in

general terms to arbitration of disputes indicates a

determination that their interests will! be better served

by arbitration than by resort to the courts if problems

arise. The nature of a dispute which thereafter actually

occurs is immaterial. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in

Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv-

ice Corp., T0 F.2d 297, 299 (2d Cir. 1934); aff'd., 293

U.S. 449 (1935): “If the clause is general in form, it

makes no difference what may come up under it.”

Georgia power also argues that the Supreme Court

recognized a federal policy in favor of stabilization of

the fuel costs of public utilities in Tampa Electric Co.

A-1l

v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), and that

policy would be violated by permitting arbitration of

a claim for a price increase based on an asserted gross

inequity. The short answer to this contention is that

the Tampa Electric case was not concerned with arbi-

tration or with the application of the gross inequities

provision in the coal contract between Tampa Electric

and Nashville Coal. Tampa Electric was an antitrust

case, and the issues before the Court were entirely

different from those under consideration in the present

case.

The second issue raised by Georgia Power relates to

the refusal of the district court to receive evidence

tendered by Georgia Power relating to the financial

condition of Cimarron. It is the theory of Georgia

Power that it was entitled to show that Cimarron had

not suffered economic hardship by reason of increases

in the market price of coal and that Cimarron had

actually improved its financial condition as a result

of the Georgia Power contract. Georgia Power also

offered evidence designed to show that it was in a

severe financial crisis which would be worsened if

Cimarron should be allowed to raise the price of its

coal above that provided in the contract. Basically,

Georgia Power argues that it was an abuse of equitable

discretion for the district court to refuse to receive this

evidence. The district court properly declined to con-

sider such evidence. The first question before the dis-

trict court on Georgia Power’s complaint after de-

nying the request for a temporary restraining order

was whether the unresolved controversy between the

parties under Section 26.01 was arbitrable. It was not

the duty of the court to decide whether a gross in-

A-12

equity did in fact exist as claimed by Cimarron. The

rejected evidence appears to relate to that issue rather

than the question of arbitrability.

We find no merit to Georgia Power’s arguments

based on the provision of the Agreement that it should

be construed according to Georgia law. In the present

case the district court found that the transaction be-

tween Georgia Power and Cimarron is one involving

commerce Within the meaning of the Federal Arbitra-

tion Act and this finding is not questioned on appeal.

In West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Line Industries,

Tnc., 201 S.E. 2d 452, 453 (Ga. 1973), it was held that

“the state law and policy with respect thereto [arbi-

tration] must yield to the paramount federal law.”

Cimarron contended in the district court and con-

tinues to argue on appeal that Georgia Power breached

the Agreement by refusing to arbitrate Cimarron’s

demand for a price increase under Section 26.01 and

as a result Cimarron was entitled to rescind the con-

tract in its entirety. On this theory Cimarron filed

its “cross-claim” asking damages in an amount equal

to the difference between the contract price at which

it has continued to deliver coal under the status quo

order and the market price. The district court held

that Georgia Power did not breach the Agreement by

declining arbitration and filing this action for a ju-

dicial determination of arbitrability of the contro-

versy, and that Cimarron had no right to rescind. The

record discloses that Georgia Power suggested to

Cimarron that it file suit for an order compelling ar-

bitration under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration

Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4. Cimarron did not follow this course

A-13

of action, nor did it notify the American Arbitration

Association of the existence of the controversy. After

Cimarron declined to seek judicial enforcement of the

arbitration provision under Section 4 and unilaterally

declared the contract rescinded, Georgia Power filed

this suit seeking, among other things, a declaratory

judgment as to the arbitrability of a controversy under

Section 26.01 of the Agreement. Georgia Power con-

tinued to insist on performance of the contract by

Cimarron and submitted the issue of arbitrability to

the district court. A party does not act at its peril in

seeking an initial judicial determination of whether

an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute

arising under an agreement. General Guaranty Insur-

ance Co. v. New Orleans General Agency, Inc., 427 F.2d

924 (5th Cir. 1970). To hold that one who seeks such

a judicial determination has breached the entire agree-

ment out of which the controversy arose would tend

to make parties reluctant to agree to arbitration and

would run counter to the policy in favor thereof. In

Galt vy. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711

(7th Cir. 1967), relied upon by Cimarron, a party was

held to have repudiated its agreement to arbitrate, giv-

ing the other party an election to forego arbitration or

insist upon it. Georgia Power did not repudiate the

Agreement by bringing this action, and Cimarron had

no right to rescind.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed on

appeal and cross-appeal. No costs allowed.

A-14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

AT OWENSBORO

GEORGIA POWER

COMPANY,

Plaintiff, Civil Action

V. >

CIMARRON COAL No. C-74-107-0

CORPORATION,

Defendant, |

MEMORANDUM OPINION __..

OF

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW

This matter came on for trial and judgment on

January 9, 1975, upon the whole record herein.

The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.00,

exclusive of interest and costs, and, further, the

Court has jurisdiction of this action, Title IX, U.S.C.

Section 2, et seq.

The plaintiff is a Georgia corporation engaged in

the business of generating, distributing and selling

electric power, and the defendant is a Tennessee corp-

oration with its principal place of business in Madi-

sonville, Kentucky, and is engaged in the mining of

coal by the strip or open pit method of mining.

On or about February 6, 1969, these parties en-

tered into a long-term coal supply agreement drafted

by the plaintiff. Suffice it to say, said agreement con-

A-15

tained various provisions for the allowance of price

adjustments during the life of the contract resulting

from increases to the defendant in its labor, material,

supply and other types of costs. From time to time,

under the provisions pertinent to the above costs the

contract has been adjusted price-wise per ton of coal

and resulting amendments to the base supply agree-

ment to embrace said adjustments have been made.

The basic coal supply agreement contains an

arbitration clause denominated 20.01, reading as fol-

lows:

“Any unresolved controversy between the

parties, arising under this agreement shall, at the

request of either party, be submitted to arbitra-

tion under the rules of the American Arbitration

Association. The cost and expense of any arbitra-

tion shall be shared equally by the parties, un-

less otherwise ordered by the arbitrator.” (EKm-

phasis ours. )

The coal supply agreement further contains a

clause denominated as 26.01, reading as follows:

“Any gross proven inequity that may result

in unusual economic conditions not contemplated

by the parties at the time of the execution of this

agreement may be corrected by mutual consent.

Each party shall in the case of a claim of gross

inequity furnish the other with whatever docu-

mentary evidence may be necessary to assist in

affecting a settlement.

“Nothing contained in this section shall be

construed as relieving either the purchaser or the

seller from any of its respective obligations here-

A-16

under solely because of the existence of a claim

of inequity or the failure of the parties to reach an

agreement with respect thereto.”

Beginning in early Spring of 1974, Cimarron made

a request for an adjustment in price under paragraph

26.01. Meetings were held, the request was refused

by Georgia, whereupon Cimarron demanded arbitra-

tion which was refused by Georgia, whereupon Cim-

arron gave notice and ceased delivery under the supply

agreement, whereupon the plaintiff sued.

There is no real dispute about the facts, and the

issue before us is whether or not section 26.01 of the

supply agreement, as amended, is arbitrable under

the contract when the parties are unable to agree upon

relief thereunder.

Air Lines v. Louisville Air Board, 269 F.2d 811

stands for the proposition that state prohibitions

against arbitration have been preempted by federal

legislation and that therefore, absent some state law

deficiency as to the validity of the agreement itself,

such as fraud, et cetera, arbitration provisions will be

held valid. There is no contractual defect here under

Georgia law.

It appears to us from a perusal of the federal cases

appearing in the annotations to Title 9, Section 2, Ar-

bitration — such cases as Butler v. Unistrut, 367 F.2d,

733 (note 5-7), — that federal courts now look with

favor upon arbitration as a means of removing conten-

tions from the area of litigation, relieving congested

dockets and as a means of speedy and inexpensive

relief.

A-17

No one quarrels, least of all we, that for a dispute

to be arbitrable there must have been a contractual

agreement to arbitrate; however, the modern ten-

dency seems to be that on the issue of what was

agreed to be arbitrated, if “fairly debatable” or “rea-

sonably in doubt”, then such should go to arbitration.

Butler, supra. Likewise, no one quarrels with the pro-

position, as expressed in the law of Georgia cited by

the plaintiff, and also in the Necchi v. Necchi Sewing,

348 F.2d 693, a contract to make a contract is not en-

forceable, but such is not the case here.

Further, no one seems to disagree with the gen-

eral proposition of the law that though the Court may

not make a new contract for parties, or rewrite the

agreement under the guise of construction, the Court

must look to the instrument as a whole and, if it is not

ambiguous or uncertain, give it enforcement according

to the terms used by the parties in the language they

saw fit to employ. Evans v. Kelley, 214 F. Supp. 951.

In the instant matter, we are handed a contract.

It contains an arbitration clause expressing in sub-

stance that any unresolved controversy arising under

the agreement is subject to arbitration. It does not

except any provisions of the contract from its opera-

tion. Further, included as a part of that contract is the

clause denominated 26.01.

Along with this document, we are given the fact-

ual background that from time to time during the his-

tory of this agreement price adjustments have been

given to Cimarron, partially at least, under paragraph

26.01, when Georgia Power felt that the adjustment

requested was “cost related”, or otherwise beneficial

to it.

A-18

The plaintiff, it seems, would have us read and

interpret the arbitrability of 26.01 removed the con-

tract or in a legal vacuum, so to speak, arguing that

such a reading shows that 26.01 would stand only for

the proposition that “hope” is the only “mother” of

any thought of relief sought thereunder. We recognize

that read in a vacuum, and not with the contract as

a whole, 26.01 would mean nothing as far as arbitra-

bility is concerned as the avenue for denial of relief

thereunder, but we must decline plaintiff’s invitation

to construe it in that narrow light. We see nothing in

the contract that directs us to follow that course of

interpretation.

There is no magic to price adjustments in this

long-term coal contract and certain types of adjust-

ments have been provided under this contract. There

is no claim or argument advanced by plaintiff that the

price adjustments initially provided for, or subse-

quently provided for by amendments under 3.02, 3.03

and 3.04, would not have been subject to arbitration

had the parties been unable to mutually agree there-

on; so it seems to us that the fact of an adjustment

under the gross inequity clause 26.01 not being arbi-

trable, as plaintiff would argue claiming such to be a

rewriting of the agreement, does not hold water —

particularly where this agreement was drafted by the

plaintiff, who, if it was not the intent of the parties

that 26.01 be subject to arbitration, could have simply

provided that 26.01 was not arbitrable. There is no

provision to that effect.

Thus, we hold that 26.01 is arbitrable and with

the Court’s general equitable power a judgment will

be entered without delay directing arbitration of the

A-19

unresolved dispute under 26.01. We express no

opinion as to the merits of Cimarron’s claim of gross

inequity.

(2) We do not find the plaintiff in breach for fail-

ure to arbitrate, for such would be an abuse of equity

and a negation of its historical justness by a technical

overriding by harsh legal doctrine, particularly in view

of the public interest inherent in this proceeding.

(3) As to Cimarron’s claim of breach by plaintiff

for refusal to arbitrate, we hold against Cimarron un-

der the equitable principles of (2) aforesaid, and the

further recognition of the fact that arbitrability here

as to 26.01 is a matter about which reasonable men, in

good faith, could differ, and I believe the plaintiff

had the right to satisfy itself by a judicial determina-

tion.

(4) As to Cimarron’s claim that arbitration was

a condition precedent to legal remedy and that the

plaintiff by seeking such has elected a remedy and

that the plaintiff by seeking such has elected a remedy

and waived arbitration, we hold against Cimarron

under equity principles and by our direction of arbi-

tration of this matter aforesaid.

(5) Plaintiff’s seeking of the declaratory judg-

ment as to arbitrability does not give Cimarron the

unilateral right to terminate.

(6) As to the affirmative defenses of plaintiff

raised in the answer to the counterclaim, we find that

adequate notice by Cimarron for arbitration was suf-

ficiently given and that Cimarron did not waive its

right to arbitrate by the contractual amendments it

was bound to and did execute after the arising of this

controversy.

A-20

The Court will retain this matter upon its docket

and a judgment will be forthwith entered directing

arbitration, there being no cause for delay, and the

status quo order of this Court heretofore entered by

agreement, without prejudice to the rights of the

parties, remains in full force and effect, pending the

outcome of the arbitration herein ordered, or, if ob-

jection is raised to said status quo order upon appeal,

until it is dissolved by an appellate judge of the Sixth

Circuit.

February 10, 1975

JAMES F’. GORDON

United States District Judge

Copies to:

Counsel of record.

A-2]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

AT OWENSBORO

GEORGIA POWER

COMPANY,

Plaintiff, | Civil Action

v. |

CIMARRON COAL | No. C-74-107-0

CORPORATION, |

Defendant, |

JUDGMENT

This matter having come on for trial and upon

the whole case the Court does adjudge as follows:

1. IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the

contract between the parties which is the subject

matter of this litigation is in full force and effect and

binding upon each of the said parties, plaintiff and

defendant.

2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDG-

ED that the parties shall proceed without delay to

arbitration of the defendant’s claims asserted under

Section 26.01 of said contract.

3. ITIS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDG-

ED that the status quo order, without prejudice to the

rights of the parties, heretofore entered hereir pro-

viding for delivery of coal under the contract shall re-

main in full force and effect.

A-22

4. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDG-

ED that each party shall bear its own costs.

January 15, 1975

JAMES F’. GORDON

United States District Judge

Copies to: Counsel of record

A-25

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

OWENSBORO DIVISION

GEORGIA POWER )

COMPANY,

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION

vs. ‘

CIMARRON COAL NO. 74-107

CORPORATION,

Defendant |.

ORDER

This matter came on for hearing on November

21, 1974, and there were present Hon. Martin Roach,

Hon. Michael C. Murphy, Hon. J. Kirk Quillian and

Hon. Allen E. Lockerman on behalf of the plaintiff,

and Hon. W. Stuart McCloy, Sr. on behalf of the

defendant.

The Court ORDERS the defendant Cimarron to

deliver under the contract the contract quantities of

coal at their last agreed contract shipping price per

ton until a decision of this matter on the merits.

Provided: That, if after a hearing on the merits,

this Court finds the dispute under 26.01 to be arbi-

tratable and such determination is supported on

appeal, and

Provided further, that the arbitrator, acting pur-

suant thereto, st id subsequently award the defen-

dant Cimarron 1 .f under 26.01 in its per ton price,

then such award, so given, would be instituted

A-24

retroactively by the plaintiff, so as to include all tons

of coal shipped pursuant to this order.

It being understood, of course, that should this

Court after hearing on the merits determine 26.01 not

arbitratable and such position be upheld on appeal;

or having determined the same to be arbitratable

the defendant Cimarron fails to win the arbitration,

then in such event no additional sum would be owed

the defendant Cimarron for the coal shipped pur-

suant to this order.

November 21, 1974

JAMES F. GORDON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of record

ine

APPENDIX “B”

COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into on

the 6th day of February, 1969, by and between GEOR-

GIA POWER COMPANY, a corporation organized

and existing under the laws of the State of Georgia,

and having its principal office in the City of Atlanta,

Georgia (“Purchaser”), and CIMARRON COAL COR-

PORATION, a corporation organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Tennessee, and having its

chief principal office in the City of Madisonville, Ken-

tucky (‘Seller’).

Purchaser represents and warrants that it owns

and operates power generating stations which require

large quantities of coal to operate.

Seller represents and warrants that it controls

through the instruments identified on Exhibit attached

hereto and made a part hereof certain acreages in Hop-

kins County, Kentucky (“the Cimarron property”),

outlined in red on a map which is attached hereto as

Exhibit 2 and made a part hereof, which contain more

than 20 million tons of coal that can be commercially

mined or recovered by strip, auger or deep mining

methods. Seller further represents and warrants that

it will build prior to the commencement date of this

Agreement fast loading facilities capable of loading

unit trains at the r .te of 3,000 tons per hour.

NOW THEREFORE, Purchaser and Seller agree

as follows:

1.01. Mutual Obligations. Seller agrees to sell

B-2

coal to Purchaser, and Purchaser agrees to buy coal

from Seller on the terms and conditions and in the

quantities set forth below:

2.01. Term of Agreement. The term of this Agree-

ment shall be ten (10) years commencing January 1,

1970. After the expiration of the ten (10) year pri-

mary period of this Agreement, Purchaser shall have

successive options to renew this Agreement for three

periods of five (5) years each. The right to exercise

these options is conditioned upon negotiation of a mutu-

_ ally agreeable base price and upon Seller having suffi-

cient available coal reserves to dedicate for each option

period. Such options shall be exercised by giving Seller

two years’ written notice prior to termination of the

primary period or of the option period then in effect.

Upon receipt by Seller of such notice, Purchaser and

Seller shall proceed in good faith for sixty (60) days

to attempt to negotiate a mutually agreeable base mine

price for the option period involved. If a mutually

agreeable base mine price is negotiated, then Seller

shall promptly proceed to dedicate sufficient reserves to

fulfill its commitment; otherwise the contract shall

terminate and Purchaser shall not have any further

rights hereunder.

3.01. Base Price Perv Ton of Coal. The Base Price

per ton of coal as of the date hereof is $4.03 f.o.b. rail-

road cars at the Cimarron unit train loading facilities.

Base Price is subject 'o adjustment from time to time,

and hereafter “Base Price” shall mean Base Price as

adjusted. “Ton” shall mean a ton of two thousand

(2,000) pounds avoirdupois weight.

3.02. Base Price Adjustment. The Base Price per

B-3

ton of $4.03 provided for in Section 3.01 is predicted

in part upon the strip mine wage scale rates, fringe

benefits, welfare payment rates, and working condi-

tions for labor employed in producing, washing and

loading coal prevailing on January 1, 1969 in Hopkins

County, Kentucky, and in part, upon the January 1,

1969 rates and amounts of all taxes and other burdens

(including, but not limited to, coal land reclamation

costs, but not including sales and use taxes paid by

Purchaser under Section 16.01 and income taxes or

taxes based upon income) imposed by any federal or

state statute, regulation or local ordinance on the own-

ership, production or sale of coal under this Agreement

(hereinafter collectively referred to as “government

imposition”) in force and effect on January 1, 1969.

The amounts and rates of said labor costs and

said governmental impositions in effect on January 1,

1969 are set forth in Exhibit 3 attached hereto and

made a part hereof.

3.03. Computation of Adjustment for Changes in

Certain Labor Costs.

(a) In the event and whenever after January 1,

1969 the strip mine wage scale rates for producing,

washing or loading coal sold hereunder shall increase

or decrease over or under the arithmetic average wage

scale of $4.247 (14 wage classifications ranging in rate

from $4.765 to $3.865 giving an arithmetic average of

$4.247, hereinafter referred to as “base average wage

scale rate’), as set forth in item 1 of Exhibit 3, pur-

suant to any collective bargaining agreement lawfully

entered into by Seller, or pursuant to changes in strip

mine wage scale rates for producing, washing or load-

b-4

ing coal which are incurred by Seller at its mines on

the Cimarron property as the result of a change in na-

tional or regional bituminous coal union wage agree-

ments, then during the period any such increase or

decrease is in effect, the Base Price shall be increased

or decreased effective immediately as follows:

Effective with the date of any change in strip

mine wage scale rates referred to in this Section 3.03,

a new arithmetic average wage scale rate (hereinafter

referred to as “new average wage scale rate’’) shall

be determined by the following formula:

Total of Seller’s Wage Scale

Rates for all Production Em-

New Average Wage _ ployees on the Cimarron Prop-

Scale Rate= erty Number of Seller’s Wage

Classifications of Production

Employees on the Cimarron

Property

The new average wage scale rate will be com-

pared with the base wage scale rate and the percentage

increase or decrease computed. The Base Price shall

then be increased or decreased by an amount deter-

mined by multiplying the percentage increase or de-

crease times $0.75, such $0.75 being the total cost of

labor per ton in effect January 1, 1969 on the Cimar-

ron property. ;

A detailed example of how the above escalation

plan is intended to operate is shown in Exhibit 5 which

is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

(b) If after execution of this Agreement it should

become necessary for Seller to enter into a collective

— ee

B-5

bargaining agreement with any union, Purchaser shall

pay one-third (1/3) of the then existing union welfare

fund payment made by Seller during the term of this

Agreement. Purchaser’s responsibility hereunder shall

not include the satisfaction of any part of Seller’s lia-

bility for any previously unfunded welfare fund cre-

ated by virtue of entering into such a collective bar-

gaining agreement.

3.04. Adjustment for Changes in Governmental

Impositions. In the event and whenever after January

1, 1969 any federal or state statute, regulation or

local ordinance or amendment thereto imposes or re-

moves, increases or decreases any governmental im-

positions set forth in items 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Exhibit

3, then during the period when such imposition, re-

moval, increase or decrease is in effect, the Base Price

shall be increased or decreased, as the case may be, by

the amount of such imposition, removal, increase or

decrease applicable to the coal sold to Purchaser here-

under.

Purchaser and Seller shall jointly estimate the

amount of any with the terms of the applicable tariff

as amended, supplemented or replaced. Anything in

this Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, if

the applicable tariff, or such tariff as amended, sup-

plemented or replaced, imposes more onerous car load-

ing terms, conditions or duties on Seller than those

represented by Seller in this Agreement or than those

existing in the applicable tariff on January 1, 1970,

Purchaser shall pay Seller the cost of performing such

more onerous terms, conditions or duties within thirty

(30) days after receipt from Seller of a written state-

B-6

ment itemizing such charges and showing facts neces-

sary to permit Purchaser to verify such charges.

Purchaser and Seller mutually agree that this

Agreement is based on a coal tariff being published

by, or at the direction of, the Louisville and Nashville

Railroad Company which will provide acceptable unit

train rates, and which will permit the delivered cost

of Seller’s coal to Purchaser to be competitive with

other sources of coal, similarly situated, from which

Purchaser receives coal under long term contract. The

S.F.T.B. Freight Tariff 914-B, I.C.C. S-130 (Jaemac,

Georgia) as amended is not to be construed by Pur-

chaser or Seller as being the tariff referred to by this

paragraph.

5.02. Freight Charge and Risk of Loss. Subject

to reimbursement provided by Sections 5.03 and 5.04,

Purchaser shall pay all freight and other charges im-

posed by the tariff applicable to the destination of the

shipment and shall bear the risk of loss of said ship-

ment after each shipment has been loaded on cars

provided by carrier.

5.03. Excess Loading Costs Chargeable to Seller.

If Seller fails to satisfy the loading requirements of

the applicable tariff, as specified by Purchaser if more

than one origin loading time is available, and such

failure is not due to a Section 14.01 force majeure,

Seller shall pay Purchaser any resulting car detention

penalties or charges for cars not loaded to marked

capacity which Purchaser is required by such tariff

to pay carrier.

5.04. Excess Freight Costs Chargeable to Seller.

B-7

If Seller fails to tender sufficient coal to satisfy the

quantity requirements of Section 7.01 and thereby fails

to satisfy the tonnage requirements of the applicable

tariff and such failure is not due to a Section 14.01

force majeure, Seller shall pay Purchaser any resulting

freight charges which Purchaser is required by such

tariff to pay carrier over the amount of such charges

otherwise payable; provided, however, that if under

applicable governmental regulations it is lawful for

Purchaser, in lieu of payment of such excess freight

charges required by the applicable tariff, to pay the

freight charges, at the tariff rate, on the amount of

coal which Seller, under Section 7.01 was obligated to,

but did not, ship for the time period in question, and if

such freight charges on such unshipped coal are less

than the above described excess freight charges, and

if the carrier is willing to accept such freight charges

on such unshipped coal in full settlement of Purch-

aser’s liability under the applicable tariff for the time

period in question, then Seller shall be obligated here-

under only to pay to Purchaser the amount of such

freight charges on such unshipped coal; provided fur-

ther, however, that where the tonnage requirements of

the applicable tariff are to be met in part by Seller and

in part by a supplier or suppliers other than Seller,

Seller shall have no responsibility to Purchaser for any

freight charges where such other supplier or suppliers

and not Seller fail to satisfy the quantity requirements

required of such supplier or suppliers, and Seller’s re-

sponsibility to Purchaser shall be limited to the pay-

ment of such excess freight charges required by such

tariff on the coal shipped by Seller under this Agree-

ment where both Seller and such other supplier or sup-

pliers fail to satisfy the quantity requirements re-

quired of them.

B-8

5.05. Payment of Excess Costs to Purchaser. Any

payments required by Sections 5.03 and 5.04 above

shall be promptly paid on receipt by Seller of a written

statement from Purchaser itemizing such charges. At

Seller’s election such charges may be credited against

amounts owed by Purchaser to Seller hereunder.

6.01. Shipping Notice. Promptly after loading each

shipment Seller shall mail Purchaser a notice of ship-

ment which shall include pertinent information about

such shipment as mutually agreed to by Purchaser and

Seller from time to time.

7.01. Quantity Requirements. Seller will tender

for delivery, and Purchaser will buy the following

quantities of coal:

(a) 1,400,000 tons during the first twelve (12)

month period of the term hereof;

(b) 1,400,000 tons during the second twelve (12)

month period of the term hereof; and

(c) 2,100,000 tons during each of the remaining

eight (8) twelve (12) month periods of the

term hereof.

8.01. Weighing. The weight of coal sold and de-

livered hereunder shall be determined from Seller’s

scales, which scales shall be acceptable to Purchaser

and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and which

shal! be certified by Southern Weighing and Inspection

Bureau. In the absence of scale weights from Seiler,

the Purchaser and Seller will mutually determine by

what means the weight of coal sold, delivered and pur-

chased hereunder shall be determined.

B-9

The aggregate weights determined during any

payment period shall be accepted as the quantity of coal

sold and purchased during such period for which in-

voices are to be rendered and payments to be made.

9.01. Quality Specifications. All coal sold hereunder

shall conform to the following specifications:

(a) Content and Characteristicss

(All percentages shown below are percen-

tages by weight. )

As Received

Ash 9.9%

Fixed Carbon 36.7%

Moisture 8.0%;

Volatile Matter 45.4¢,

100.0°,

Sulphur 3.0%

Calorific Value 12,000 Btu/pound

Ash Fusion Temperature— 2175 Degrees

Softening (H=W) Fahrenheit

(ASTM Designation: D 1857-66 T)

Grindability Hardgrove—

(ASTM Designation

D 409-51 (1961) ) 56

(b) Size and Condition. Crushed and washed run

of mine three inch (3”) maximum size lumps;

no intermediate sizes removed; clean and free

of excess impurities.

10.01. Sampling and Analyses. Seller shall collect

samples of each shipment of coal sold hereunder in ac-

cordance with procedures and methods acceptable to

Purchaser and which meet basic American Society of

—

B-10

Testing Materials (A.S.T.M.) standards, and Pur-

chaser shall analyze such samples in accordance with

the procedures outlined in Exhibit 4 which is attached

hereto and made a part hereof except as hereinafter

provided. Purchaser shall have the right at its option,

however, to contract with an independent, qualified,

commercial testing laboratory to perform, using the

procedures outlined in Exhibit 4, the analysis of the

samples referred to above and to perform or supervise

the sample preparation at Seller’s mine. If Purchaser

so elects to employ an independent, qualified, commer-

cial testing laboratory, Seller shall not be liable for any

costs incurred by Purchaser in use of such laboratory

except as hereinafter provided.

Purchaser may observe any samplings performed

by Seller and Seller may observe any analyses per-

formed by Purchaser or its designated commercial

laboratory.

All samples collected by Seller shall be divided

into at least two parts and put in suitable airtight

containers, the first container in each case to be for-

warded to Purchaser, or its designated commercial

laboratory, the second container in each case to be

held available by Seller for a period of thirty (30) days

from actual date of receipt of coal, by Purchaser

properly sealed and labeled, to be analyzed if a dis-

pute arises between Purchaser and Seller.

If a dispute arises between Purchaser and Seller

over the result or method of such analyses, a further

analysis of Seller’s second container shall be made

using the analytical procedures outlined in Exhibit 4

by an independent, qualified, commercial testing facili-

SS

B-11

ty, and the results of such further analyses shall be

binding upon the parties. The selection of such testing

facility shall be agreed upon by the parties; otherwise,

such selection shall be made by arbitration as provided

in Section 20.01 below. The cost of any independent

analysis shall be borne equally by Seller and Purchaser.

If any dispute arises concerning the method of

sampling used and such dispute is not promptly re-

solved by the parties, such dispute shall be referred

to arbitration as provided in Section 20.01 below.

11.01. Performance Under Contract. If the aver-

ages of the results of the analyses made in accordance

with Section 10.01 during any calendar quarter reveal

that the average percentages of the components of

the coal delivered during that quarter exceed 12‘. for

ash, 9.5°. for moisture, or 3.3‘, sulphur, or if the

average as received calorific value of such coal for

such period shall be less than 11,500 Btu per pound,

Purchaser may advise Seller of such variations; and,

unless the variations are corrected during the next

calendar quarter, Purchaser may suspend deliveries

until Seller gives reasonable assurances that it will

thereafter eliminate such variations. In the event

deliveries should be so suspended as above provided,

Seller shall pay Purchaser any excess freight charges

under the applicable tariff resulting from a failure to

meet the quantity specifications in Section 7.01 hereof.

12.01. Quarterly Premium or Penalty for Vari-

ance in Average As Received Calorific Content. Pur-

chaser shall pay Seller a premium whenever the aver-

age as received calorific value of coal delivered during

any calendar quarter exceeds twelve thousand (12,000)

B-12

Btu per pound. Seller shall pay Purchaser a penalty

whenever the average as received calorific value of

coal delivered during any calendar quarter is less than

twelve thousand (12,000) Btu per pound.

The amount of such premium or penalty per ton

of coal shipped during any calendar quarter here-

under shall be computed after the end of each calendar

quarter of the term of this Agreement and shall equal

the difference between the Base Price of coal delivered

during such calendar quarter and the Base Price of

such coal multiplied by a fraction, the denominator of

which shall be twelve thousand (12,000) and the num-

erator of which shall be the average as received calor-

ific value of the coal delivered during such calendar

quarter expressed in Btu. The average as received

calorific value as used in this Section 12.01 shall be

that abstracted from analyses determined as provided

in Section 10.01 above.

Purchaser shall give Seller written notice of the

amount of such premium or penalty as soon as all

analyses of coal shipped during such calendar quarter

have been completed, but no later than ninety (90)

days after the end of such calendar quarter. Unless

Seller protests the premium or penalty within fifteen

(15) days after receipt of such notice, the premium or

penalty shall be deemed accepted.

If the premium or penalty is not so protested,

Purchaser shall pay such premium, or Seller shall pay

such penalty, on or before the next succeeding payment

day provided by Section 4.01.

If the premium or penalty is so protested within

ott stil inthe

SNe tn a Nal a iy oh a

a :

B-13

such fifteen (15) day period and the parties are un-

able to resolve their dispute within thirty (30) days

following such protest, the parties shall promptly refer

the controversy to arbitration as provided in Section

20.01 below.

13.01. Additional Coal Production. Seller contem-

plates mining from the Cimarron property and selling

other coal over and beyond the requirements of this

contract. With respect to the sale of coal from this

property by contract providing for performance with-

in 365 days or less (“spot coal”), Seller shall offer in

writing to sell such spot coal to Purchaser before of-

fering to sell such spot coal to anyone other than Pur-

chaser, and Purchaser shall have seventy-two (72)

hours after the receipt of such offer to accept such

offer. If such offer is not accepted, Seller shall be free

to offer such spot coal to anyone. With respect to sale

of other than spot coal (‘‘additional coal”), Seller shall

offer in writing to sell such additional coal to Pur-

chaser before offering to sell such additional coal to

anyone other than Purchaser, and shall promptly there-

after undertake in good faith to negotiate terms and

conditions with Purchaser. If Seller and Purchaser do

not execute a letter of intent to sell and purchase such

additional coal within thirty (30) days after Pur-

chaser receives such notice, Seller shall be free to offer

and to sell such additional coal to anyone. Purchaser

shall have no right to spot coal or additional coal or

to prevent Seller from selling spot coal or additional

coal to anyone other than Purchaser’s right.to notice

and to negotiate provided by this Section 13.01. Seller

shall not, however, during the term of this Agreement

authorize or permit disposition of coal from the Cimar-

B-14

ron property to be made to anyone other than the

Purchaser, execpt to the extent Seller may do so with-

out making the economically and commercially re-

coverable balance of coal in the Cimarron property an

amount less than the maximum tonnage to be there-

after supplied to Purchaser hereunder. Spot coal or

additional coal shall not interfere in any manner with

the movement of the coal contracted hereunder.

14.01. Force Majeure. “Force Majeure” as used

herein shall mean a cause beyond the control of the

Seller (its contractors and subcontractors) or Pur-

chaser, as the case may be, which wholly or partially

prevents the mining, loading or delivery of coal at or

from the Cimarron property, or the receiving, trans-

porting or delivering of coal by the railroads, or the

unloading, storing or burning of coal by Purchaser

at its destination. Examples( without limitations) of

force majeure, but only if beyond the control of Seller

(its contractors and subcontractors) or Purchaser, as

the case may be, are the following: Acts of God, acts of

the public enemy, insurrections, riots, strikes, labor

disputes, labor or material unavailability, fires, ex-

plosions, floods, breakdowns of or damage to plants,

mines equipment or facilities, faults in coal seams, in-

terruptions to or contingencies or facilities, faults in

coal seams, interruptions to or contingenies of trans-

portation, embargoes, orders or acts of civil (includ-

ing, without limitation, a city or county ordinance or

regulation, an act of a state legislature and an act of

the United States Congress) or military authority, and

material reduction in the Purchaser’s customers’ de-

mand for power. If because of force majeure either

Purchaser or Seller is unable to carry out its obligation

under this Agreement, and if such party promptly

B-15

gives the other party hereto written notice of such

force majeure, the obligations and liabilities of the

party giving such notices and the corresponding obli-

gations of the other party shall be suspended to the

extent made necessary by and during the continuance

of such force majeure; provided, however, that the

disabling effects of such force majeure shall be elimi-

nated as soon as and to the extent possible.

In the event that during the continuance of this

Agreement, any legal restrictions are imposed which

restrict Purchaser from burning the coal to be supplied

by Seller under this Agreement, any such restriction

shall be deemed to be an event of force majeure under

this Agreement unless its effect can reasonably be

avoided as hereinafter provided. If any such restric-

tion is imposed, Purchaser shall promptly consider

what steps can be taken in the handling and combus-

tion of coal at Purchaser’s plants to avoid such rstric-

tion, and if such steps are reasonable available, which

in Purchaser’s judgment are feasible and will not result

in unreasonable expense to Purchaser, Purchaser shall

promptly take such steps, and such event of force

majeure shall be deemed eliminated. If no such steps

are available or if Purchaser in its judgment deter-

mines such steps are not reasonable or will result in

unreasonable expense to Purchaser, Purchaser shall

so advise Seller. Thereupon Purchaser and Seller shall

promptly consider what steps can be taken in the min-

ing and preparation of coal at Seller’s mine to avoid

such restriction, and if in Purchaser’s judgment such

steps are available at a reasonable expense, such steps

will be taken and the Base Price shall be increased to

compensate Seller for any such additional expense in-

curred by it in taking such steps. No expense contem-

B-16

plated by this paragraph shall be deemed reasonable

if it would result in a delivered price of coal in excess

of the delivered price of competitive fuels or sources

then available to Purchaser.

Any deficiencies in the production or sale of coal

hereunder caused by force majeure shall not be made

up except by mutual consent nor shall the term of this

Agreement be extended by a force majeure. In the

event force majeure reduces Purchaser’s obligation to

purchase coal hereunder, except where Seller does not

offer coal which avoids the restriction referred to in

the preceding paragraph, the minimum quantity of

coal to be sold to Purchaser hereunder shall be that

percentage of Purchaser’s total requirements of rail

delivered coal (as reduced by reason of force majeure)

which equals Seller’s percentage hereunder of the total

requirements of rail delivered coal under all Pur-

chaser’s contracts (having a term of more than three

(3) years) for the purchase of coal in effect immedi-

ately before the taking effects of such force majeure.

Notwithstanding the definition of the term force

majeure above, no cause shall excuse Purchaser or

Seller from full performance insofar as its obligations

under Sections 5.03 and 5.04 unless the cause is one

which is determined by the Louisville and Nashville

Railroad Company to be an event of force majeure

under the provisions of the applicable tariff and ap-

plicable supplements thereto. The construction, inter-

pretation and application of the applicable tariff force

majeure provisions made by the responsible Louisville

and Nashville Railroad Company official shall be bind-

ing upon the parties for this purpose.

B-17

15.01. Assumption of Risks. Any party to this

Agreement, whose agent or property shall go or be

placed on the premises of the other party in order to

implement the terms of this Agreement, assumes the

risk of injury or death to such agent and damages to

such property, and will indemnify and hold the other

party harmless against all loss or liability from what-

ever source, including the sole or joint negligence of

the other party, arising on account of any such injury,

death or damage.

16.01. Sales and Use Taxes. Purchaser shall pay

all sales or use taxes applicable to the sale or use of

coal sold hereunder.

17.01. Construction of Railway Track. Both par-

ties shall use their best efforts to encourage carrier to

complete construction of railway track from its exist-

ing track to the unit train loading facility, by October

1, 1969. Such track extension shall be made at no cost

to Purchaser.

18.01. Binding Effect. This contract shall bind and

inure to the benefits of the parties, their successors and

assigns under Section 19.01.

19.01. Assignments. Neither party may assign

this contract or any rights or obligations hereunder

without the prior written consent of the other party,

but such consent shall not be reasonably withheld.

20.01. Arbitration. Any unresolved controversy

between the parties, arising under this Agreement

shall, at the request of either party, be submitted to

arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitra-

B-18

tion Association. The cost and expense of any arbitra-

tion shall be shared equally by the parties, unless other-

wise ordered by the arbitrator.

21.01. Waiver. The failure of either party to in-

sist on strict performance of any provisions of this

Agreement, or to take advantage of any right here-

under, shall not be construed as a waiver of such pro-

vision or right.

22.01. Remedies Cumulative. Remedies provided

under this Agreement shall be cumulative and in addi-

tion to other remedies provided by law, provided all

such remedies shall be subject to the preceding require-

ment of arbitration.

Seller shall, within 24 hours of the receipt thereof

by Seller, mail Purchaser (at Purchaser’s address as

set forth in Section 23.01) a copy of any notice of de-

fault by Seller in the observance or performance of

Seller’s convenants and obligations (or any of them)

under any of the leases identified on Exhibit 1; upon

receipt of any such copy, Purchaser shall have the

right (but not the obligation) to correct for the ac-

count of Seller any default contained in such notice

and to deduct from amounts due or to become due to

Seller hereunder the cost of correction thereof together

with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent (6° )

per annum.

23.01. Notices. Any notice, request, protest, con-

sent, demand, report or statement given by one party

to the other shall be in writing and deemed duly re-

ceived seventy-two (72) hours after it is deposited

sn,

B-19

in the United States mail, postage prepaid, and proper-

ly addressed as follows:

(1) If to Purchaser,

Mr. E. I. Hatch, President

Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, Georgia 30302

(or to such other person or address as Seller shall

have designated by due notice to Purchaser.

(2) If the notice is to Seller,

Mr. Robert Anderson, Jr.

Cimarron Coal Corporation

P. O. Box 89

Madisonville, Kentucky 42431

(or to such other person or address as Seller shall

have designated by due notice to Purchaser).

24.01. Captions. The captions to sections hereof

are for convenience only and shall not be considered

in construing the intent of the parties.

25.01. Applicable Law. This Agreement shall be

construed under the laws of the State of Georgia.

26.01. Adjustments for Gross Inequities. Any

gross proven inequity that may result in unusual eco-

nomic conditions not contemplated by the parties at the

time of the execution of this Agreement may be cor-

rected by mutual consent. Each party shall in the case

of a claim of gross inequity furnish the other with

whatever documentary evidence may be necessary to

assist in affecting a settlement.

B-20

Nothing contained in this section shall be con-

strued as relieving either the Purchaser or Seller from

any of its respective obligations hereunder solely be-

cause of the existence of a claim of inequity or the

failure of the parties to reach an agreement with re-

spect thereto.

27.01. Replacement Coal. In the event Seller fails

to produce and tender for delivery coal from the re-

serves dedicated herein an amount of coal sufficient to

meet the delivery requirements hereunder for the pri-

mary period, or any applicable option period, Seller

will supply coal of equal quality from other sources and

upon the same terms and conditions herein.

Seller agrees to notify Purchaser in writing of its

intention to supply coal from other sources. Purchaser

shall have the right to approve the proposed substitu-

tion, but approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.

Any coals substituted hereunder shall be priced

such that the delivered-to destination-cost per million

Btu to Purchaser shall not exceed the then existent

delivered-to destination-cost per million Btu of the coal

most recently supplied to Purchaser by Seller from the

Cimarron property. “Destination” for the purpose of

this paragraph only shall mean Purchaser’s generat-

ing station now under construction on the Etowah

River near Cartersville, Georgia.

28.01. Entire Agreement. This instrument con-

tains the entire agreement between the parties, and

there are no represetntations, understanding or agree-

ments, oral or written, which are not included herein.

ee

B-21

This Agreement cannot be changed except by duly

authorized representatives of both parties in writing.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have

caused this Agreement to be executed by their duly

authorized officers.

GEORGIA POWER

COMPANY

By: H. L. BOowEN

Vice President

CIMARRON COAL

CORPORATION

By: ROBERT ANDERSON, JR.

President

ATTEST:

C. L. RATTERREE

Asst. Secretary

ATTEST:

WILLIAM E. LEGHON

Asst. Secretary

B-22

EXHIBIT 1

A. POND RIVER - FIES PROPERTIES

1. Lease by Diamond Trust to Cimarron Coal Cor-

poration dated January 27, 1969, covering fol-

lowing properties:

(a) Property acquired by Diamond Trust from

Island Creek Coal Company by Deed dated June

28, 1968, and recorded in Book 319, Page 555,

Hopkins County Clerk’s office.

Tracts identified on Island Creek property map

D-11 as:

Tract 250 — Todd

Tract 251 — Todd

Tract 252 — Todd

Tract 253 — Slayton

Tract 254 — Smith

Tract 255 — Cavanah

Tract 256 — Hanner

Tract 257 — Parker

Tract 266 — Slaton

Tract 267 — Short

Tract 268 — Browder

Tract 269 — Slaton

Tract 270 — Fugate

Tract 271 — Browder

Tract 408 — Slaton

(b) Easements acquired by Diamond Trust from

Island Creek Coal Company by conveyance dated

September 27, 1968, and recorded ir Book 321,

Page 109 Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office

applicable to the following tracts identified on

Island Creek property map D-11 as:

B-23

Tract 254-A — Smith

Tract 257 — Parker

Tract 267 —Short

Tract 266 —Slaton

Tract 271 — Browder

(c) Property acquired by Diamond Trust from

L. R. Slayton, et ux., by Deed dated January 3,

1969, and recorded in Book 322, Page 492, Hop-

kins County Court Clerk’s office.

(d) Property leased by Diamond Trust from

Neva Sisk and husband, Ed Sisk, under lease

dated September 10, 1968.

(e) Property acquired by Diamond Trust from

Peabody Coal Company by Deed dated January

22, 1969, and recorded in Book 323, Page 78,

Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office.

. Quitclaim Deed by Badgett Mine Stripping Cor-

poration to Cimarron Coal Corporation dated

January 1, 1969, covering property conveyed by

Sherman Littlepage, et ux., to Badgett Mine

Stripping Corporation by Deed dated June 2,

1965, and recorded in Book ., Page __, Hop-

kins County Court Clerk’s office.

. Quitclaim by Rogers Badgett, et ux., to Cimar-

ron Coal Corporation dated January 1, 1969,

and recorded in Book .., Page _, Hopkins

County Court Clerk’s office covering property

conveyed by Jessie Noble Slaton to Rogers Bad-

gett by Deed dated October 24, 1964, and record-

ed in Book 293, Page 396, Hopkins County Court

Clerk’s office.

B-24

B. CIMARRON (Trust No. 1)

Lease by Russell Badgett, Jr., Trustee to Cimarron

Coal Corporation dated August 28, 1967, and re-

corded in Book , Page _., Hopkins County

Court Clerk’s office covering property conveyed to

Russell Badgett, Jr., Trustee by Island Creek Coal

Company by Deeddated ..—=—-—_._,19 ,and

recorded in Book 289, Page 416, Hopkins County

Court Clerk’s office.

C. WHITE PLAINS (Trust No. 2)

1. Lease by Russell Badgett, Jr., Trustee, to Cimar-

ron Coal Corporation dated January 1, 1969,

and recorded in Book ., Page __, Hopkins

County Court Clerk’s office covering the follow-

ing property:

(a) Property conveyed to Russell Badgett, Jr.,

Trustee, by Island Creek Coal Company by Deed

dated... _..,19..., and recorded in Book

317, Page 548, Hopkins County Court Clerk’s

office.

(b) Property leased by Russell Badgett, Jr.,

Trustee from Dow Mercer, et ux., under lease

dated April 24, 1968, recorded in Book 86, Page

155, Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office.

2. Property subleased to Cimarron Coal Corpor-

ation by Rogers Badgett, et ux., by sublease

dated January 1, 1969, recorded in Book ‘

Page _, Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office

covering property leased by Harlan R. Allen, et

ux., et al., by lease dated November 9, 1967, and

recorded in Book 83, Page 561, Hopkins County

Court Clerk’s office.

ee ee ae

B-25

3. Property quitclaimed to Cimarron Coal Corpora-

tion by Badgett Mine Stripping Corporation by

Quitclaim Deed dated January 1, 1969, recorded

covering the property conveyed by Virgil D.

Scott, et ux., et al., by Deed dated August 28,

1964, and recorded in Book 293, Page 16, Hop-

kins County Court Clerk’s office.

EXHIBIT “3”

CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION

ITEM

1. Wage Rates - Production Employees -

January 1, 1969

Wage Classification Straight Time Per Hour

Shovel and Dragline Operator (1) $4.765

4-8Cu Yd.

Shovel and Dragline Oiler (1) $4.215

Over 2 1/2 Cu. Yd.

Bulldozer Operators (1) $4.415

Over D-6 or Equivalent

Grader Operator (1) $4.415

Overburden & Coal Driller (1) $4.065

& Shooters

Pit Mechanic (First Class) (1) $4.415

Pit Mechanic (Second Class) (1) $4.265

Pit Welder (1) $4.265

Tractor - Truck Driver (1) $4.165

7 Tons & Over

Tipple Mechanic (First Class) (1) $4.415

Tipple Mechanic & Welder (1) $4.065

Tipple Operator (1) $4.065

B-26

Tipple Loading Boom Operator (1) $4.065

Car Cleaner, Car Dropper, (1) $3.865

Load Rider | _

14 $59.460

Arithmetic Average

Wage Scale Rate = $59.460 — $4.247

14

Note: Extra per hour for second shifts eight cents and

for third shift ten cents.

2. Fringe Benefits

Hospitalization Insurance—$32.91 average per em-

ployee. Selective Incentive Bonus based on 10c¢/ton

mined.

3. Welfare Payment Rates

None

4. Federal Insurance Contributions Act and State and

Federal Unemployment Tax Acts

Federal Insurance Contributions Act—4.8% of each

employee’s gross pay up to $7,800.00 per year.

State Unemployment Tax—2.7% of each employee’s

gross pay up to $3,000.00 per year.

Federal Unemployment Tax—0.40% of each em-

ployee’s gross pay up to $3,000.00 per year.

5. Workmen’s Compensation

Classification Rates Per $100 of Wages

Clerical 0.04

Surface Mining 2.58

6. Working Conditions

None

B-27

7. Property Taxes

(Based on an assessment equal to 100% for fair

market value)

County Tax Per $100 of Assessment

Hopkins County $1.09

8. Severance County

None

9. Other Taxes or Burdens

Gross Reclamation cost per ton—$0.07

* * * *

The listing of the Classification in item 1 above is

not intended to preclude or limit the addition of em-

ployees in a new job Classification or different Job

Classification not so listed.

If any labor cost or governmental imposition is in

existence as of January 1, 1969 but is not included in

the above schedule, discovery of such cost or imposition

shall not vary the Base Price per ton except to the

extent of any increase or decrease of such cost or im-

position occurring after January 1, 1969.

EXHIBIT “4”

LABORATORY PROCEDURES

(A) Air Drying—Laboratory Sample

The sample (including container with lid and

pan) will be weighed on a balance with a sensitivity of

not less than 0.5 gram. The coal will be spread out in

a non-corroding pan and of sufficient size that the

depth is not more than one inch, the pan with the coal,

container and lid will be placed in an air-drying oven —

B-28

with a temperature of 0-15°C above room temperature

and will be air-dried until the loss in weight is not

more than 0.1% in one hour. Before final weight is

taken, air will be circulated through the oven with heat

turned off for at least two hours and the coal then re-

moved to the sample preparation area so that the

temperature and condition of the coal will be in equili-

brium with the air in the room where further sample

preparation is to be done. The weight of the coal plus

pan plus container and lid will be recorded and the air-

drying loss will be calculated as follows:

~ Air Drying Loss = W: — W: x 100

W: — W:

Where W: = Wet weight of coal + pan + con-

tainer + lid

W: = Air dry weight of coal + pan +

container + lid

W: = Weight of empty pan + container

+ lid

(B) Residual Moisture

A residual moisture sample of from 50 to 100

grams will be divided out by riffling, using an enclosed

riffle, with 24 three-eights inch divisions, from the air-

dried U.S. No. 8 coal. This will be placed in an air-

tight bottle and mixed on wheel mixer. As an alternate

to rifling, the 50 to 100 gram sample will be secured

by taking small spoonsful from the air-dried coal

spread out over the pan.

The residual moisture in the air-dried coal will be

B-29

determined by weighing on an analytical balance ap-

proximately 10 grams of coal to an accuracy of + 1

Mg. into a tared aluminum box (approximately 75 mm

in diameter and 19mm in height) which has been pre-

viously dried, cooled in dessicator and then tared. This

will be placed in a box type forced air oven, similar to

Theleco Oven Model No. 18, Fisher Isotemp or equiva-

lent, maintained at a temperature of 104-110°C for a

period of one and one-half hours. The lid will be placed

on the box, removed from the oven and placed in a des-

sicator containing indicating grade aluminum oxide

for about thirty minutes or until cool before weighing

on an analytical balance. The percent loss in weight

will be the residual moisture.

(C) Total Moisture Calculation

% Total Moisture —

(100-“,, Air Drying Loss( »x Residual Moisture

100

+ Air Drying Loss

(D) Pulverizing—Laboratory Sample

The entire sample left after the residual moisture

has been removed will be reduced in an enclosed pul-

verizer, (Holmes design or equivalent) to approximate-

ly U.S. No. 60. The sample will be divided to a mini-

mum of 50 grams by riffling using an enclosed riffle

with 24 three-eights inch divisions. The minimum of

50 grams will be screened on a U.S. No. 60 Sieve, any

oversize will be crushed in an agate mortar or equiva-

lent to pass the U.S. No. 60 Sieve and will be put back

with that passing the No. 60 Sieve. The sample will be

placed in an airtight bottle and mixed for a minimum

B-30

of fifteen minutes on a wheel mixer. The sample will

then be ready for the laboratory determinations.

(E) Moisture—U.S. No. 60 Sample

The moisture in the U.S. No. 60 coal will be de-

termined on approximately one gram in a porcelain

capsule 7/8” in depth and 1-3/4” in diameter. A well

fitting aluminum cover will be provided for covering

the capsule during weighing and after drying. Ap-

proximately one gram of coal wi!l be weighed to an

accuracy of + 0.5 Mg. in the capsule which has been

previously dried, cooled in dessicator and then tared.

The capsule (with lid off) containing the coal will be

dried in a box type oven with forced air circulation,

similar to Theleo Oven Model 18, Fisher Isotemp or

equivalent, maintained at a temperature of 104-110°C

for one hour. The lid will be placed on the capsule, the

covered capsule will be removed from oven and placed

in a dessicator containing indicating grade aluminum

oxide for about 30 minutes, or until cool before weigh-

ing. The percent loss in weight will be the percent

moisture in the U.S. No. 60 Coal.

(F) Ash

For the ash determination, the porcelain capsules

containing the dried coal from the 60 mesh moisture

determination will be placed in a cold electric muffle

furnace and the temperature gradually raised to 700-

750°C at a rate to avoid mechanical loss from too rapid

expulsion of volatile matter. The ignition will be

finished to constant weight (+ 0.001 g) at a tempera-

ture of 700-750°C. The cansule containing the ash will

be placed in the dessicator and weighed as soon as cold.

B-31

(G) Volatile Matter

Volatile matter, when required, will be deter-

mined by the method in ASTM Designation D271-64

paragraphs 16, 17 and 18. The Fieldner electric type

furnace will be used.

(H) Calorific Value

The gross calorific value (gross heat of combus-

tion) in British thermal units (Btu) will be deter-

mined using a calorimeter for which radiation correc-

tions are determined or the Parr Adiabatic Calori-

meter or equivalent as given in ASTM Designation

D271-64 paragraphs 51 to 55 and ASTM Designation

D2015-66.

(1) Sulfur

Sulfur will be determined using t._ &schka meth-

od or the bomb washing method as given in ASTM

Designation D271-64 paragraphs 21-26 inclusive.

(J) Ash Softening Temperature

The ash softening temperature, when required,

will be determined by the methods given in ASTM

Designation D1857-66T.

(K) Calculations

Calculations of ash, volatile matter, Btu and sul-

fur will be made as follows:

Dry Basis =

Uncorrected (as weighed U.S. No. 60 Sample) Results « 100

100—(% Moisture in U.S. No. 60 Cample)

As Received Basis =

(100-% ‘Total Moisture) « (% Dry Basis)

100

B-32 | B-33

EXHIBIT “5” On October 1, 1968 Seller notifies Purchaser of wage

| escalation as a result of U.M.W.A. Wage Agreement.

SAMPLE CALCULATIONS , Seller provides Purchaser with the following wage clas-

CHANGE IN WAGE SCALE RATES sifications and new wage scale rates:

(All figures shown are hypothetical and have no iis dinates Wage Scale Rates (October 1, 1968)

particular significance to the parties to this contract.) . lane eben ade vrvthuapd

1. Shovel Runner $4.56 $33.03

Wage Scale Rates (April 1, 1966) 2. Electrician $4.28 $31.04

Wage Classifications Per Hour Per Day 3. Electrician Helper $ 4.17 $30.20

1. Shovel Runner $4.10 $29.73 4. Truck Mechanic $4.28 $31.04

2. Electrician $3.85 $27.90 5. Welder $4.28 $31.04

3. Truck Mechanic $3.85 $27.90 6. Bulldozer Operator $4.17 $30.24

4. Welder $3.85 $27.90 7. Motor Grader Operator $4.17 $30.24

5. Bulldozer Operator $3.75 $27.19 8. Front End Loader Operator $4.17 $30.24

6. Craneman $3.73 $27.07 9. Washerman $4.03 $29.20

7. Fireman $3.61 $26.18 10. Driller $4.04 $29.31

8. Washerman $3.57 $25.86 11. Jack Hammer Operator $4.04 $29.31

9. Rock Driller $3.56 $25.79 12. Oiler $4.08 $29.61

10. Jack Hammer Operator $3.56 $25.79 | 13. Tractor Operator $3.99 $28.95

11. Oiler $3.55 $25.74 14. Driver—Large Truck $4.03 $29.23

12. Tractor Operator $3.51 $25.48 | 15. Groundman—Shovel $4.20 $30.42

13. Driver—Large Truck $3.51 $25.48 | 16. Groundman—Shovel $3.98 $28.84

14. Ground Shovel $3.50 $25.39 17. Jigman _: $3.95 $28.66

15. Jigman $3.47 $25.15 | 18. Tippleman $3.94 $28.54

16. Tippleman $3.45 $24.98 19. Barge Loader $3.94 $28.54

17. Rock Driller Helper $3.45 $24.98 20. Driller Helper $3.94 $28.57

18. Truck Driver—less than $3.43 $24.85 21. Truck Driver— $3.91 $28.35

8-ton capacity 8 ton or less

| 22. Coal Auger Operator $4.05 $29.33

The wage classifications are 18 in number ranging 23. Coal Auger Helper $3.93 $28.51

from $4.10 h 24. Shooter $4.04 $29.31

.10 per hour to $3.43 per hour and average 25. Cable Puller 0

arithmatically $3.53 per hour—Base Average Wage - Cable Puller Operator $4.17 $30.24

Scale Rate. Seller represented $0.75/ton labor com- The wage classifications effective October 1, 1968 are

ponent in Base Price of coal under contract. | 25 in number ranging from $4.56 per hour to $3.91

B-34

per hour and average arithmetically $4.09 per hour—

New Average Wage Scale Rate.

New Average Wage Scale Rate $4.09

Base Average Wage Scale Rate $3.63

Difference $0.46 (increase)

$0.46 — $3.63 = 12.67‘. increase

0.1267 « $0.75 = $0.09525 or $0.10 per ton increase

Base Price specified in Contract f.o.b. mine $4.03/ton

Increase—effective October 1, 1968 $0.10

New Price f.o.b. Mine $4.13

a er ——

B-35

AMENDMENT TO COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT

THIS AMENDMENT is made and entered into

as of the lst day of January, 1973, by and between

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, a corporation organ-

ized and existing under the laws of the State of Geor-

gia, and having its principal office in the City of

Atlanta, Georgia (‘‘Purchaser”’), and CIMARRON

COAL CORPORATION, a corporation organized and

existing under the laws of the State of Tennessee, and

having its principal office in the City of Madisonville,

Kentucky (“‘Seller’’).

WITNESSETH:

In consideration of the mutual convenants con-

tained herein, the parties hereby amend the Coal Sup-

ply Agreement entered into by the parties on the 6th

day of February 1969 as follows:

1. Section 2.01 of the Coal Supply Agreement is

amended by deleting the first sentence of said section

and substituting in the place thereof the following:

“Except as the term hereof is extended to

provide for coal shipments in 1980 pursuant

to Section 7.01, as amended, the term of this

Agreement shall be ten (10) years commenc-

in January 1, 1979.”

2. Section 7.01 of the Coal Supply Agreement is

amended by deleting the section in its entirely and

B-36

substituting in its place a new Section 7.01 which

shall read as follows:

“Quantity Requirements. Seller will tender

for delivery, and Purchaser will buy the fol-

lowing quantities of coal:

(a) 1,400,000 tons during the calendar year

of 1970;

(b) 1,400,000 tons during the calendar year

of 1971;

(c) 1,400,000 tons during the calendar year

of 1972;

(d) 1,600,000 tons during the calendar year

of 1973, provided that either party, upon

ninety (90) days written notice may require

shipments for the remainder of the calendar

year at an annual rate of 2,100,000 tons;

(e) 2,100,000 tons during each of the calen-

dar years 1974 through 1979,

(f) 700,000 tons during the calendar year

of 1980 plus an additional amount equal to

the difference between 2,100,000 and the num-

ber of tons actually shipped during 1973.”

Except as provided herein, the Coal Supply Agree-

ment executed by the parties on February 6, 1969 is

not otherwise modified or amended.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have

—— a So a sb

ati

B-37

caused this Amendment to be executed by their duly

authorized officers, as of the date and year first above

written.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

By: R. W. SCHERER

Vice President

CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION

By: ROBERT ANDERSON, JR.

President

Attest:

C. L. RATTERREE

Assistant Treasurer

Attest:

EMMITT D. ANDERSON

AMENDMENT TO COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT

This Amendment executed this 20th day of No-

vember, 1973, to the Coal Supply Agreement dated

February 6, 1969, as amended January 1, 1973, by and

between Cimarron Coal Corporation (Seller) and

Georgia Power Company (Purchaser)

WITNESSETH:

For and in consideration of the benefits set forth

herein and the mutual promises of the parties hereto,

Seller and Purchaser do hereby agree to further amend

said Coal Supply Agreement as follows:

1. By adding a new section thereto which will pro-

vide as follows:

3.07. Adjustments for Changes in Cost of Sup-

plies. Adjustments for changes in the gross cost of sup-

plies used in the production of coal for delivery under

this Agreement shall be made in the following manner:

Any changes in the base price of supplies shall be

made by determining periodically the percentage

change which shall have occurred since July, 1973, ina

composite of the following price indices published by

the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics in the

following respective relative weights:

BLS Code Relative

Commodity Number Weight

Construction Machinery & Equipment 112 50.0

Petroleum Products—Refined 057 10.0

B-39

Electric Power 054 10.0

Explosives 0679-02 15.0

Tires and Tubes 0712 8.0

Wire and Cable 1026 7.0

100.0

Any changes on or after January 1, 1974, in the

base price of supplies shall be based on changes in a

composite index number for January and July of each

calendar year during the life of this Agreement. The

percentage change in said index from 128.5 (the level

of such index for July, 1973 on the basis that the year

1967 = 100) shall be determined semi-annually to be

effective January 1 and July 1 and shall be applied to

$1.50, such $1.50 being the per ton amount of the

supplies cost component of the Base Price for purposes

of this Section 3.07. The resulting amount, less pre-

vious adjustments made under this section, shall be

added to or substracted from, as the case may be, the

Base Price in effect in the beginning of the month for

which the composite index number is computed, and

shall govern until the beginning of the next succeeding

January or July, as the case may be.

In the event of a published change or revision in

the base for any of the components of said indices or

if a new base is adopted, the revised or new index shall

be adjusted to said base of 1967 equals 100. If such

index is discontinued or otherwise becomes unavailable,

the parties shall utilize a mutually satisfactory sub-

stitute method of price adjustment for materials and

supplies.

An example of how the provisions of this section

are intended to operate is shown in Exhibit 6 attached

hereto and made a part hereof.

B-40

2. By adding a new section thereto, which shall

provide as follows:

3.08. Computation of Adjustment for Changes in

Supervisory Labor Cost. Adjustments for change in the

cost of supervisory labor at the mine shall be made in

the following manner:

If after July 1, 1973, any revision in the base

price as results from any collective bargaining agree-

ment lawfully entered into by Seller or pursuant to

changes in national or regional bituminous coal union

wage agreements is made relative to Section 3.03 here-

under, then beginning with the effective date of such

revision, the base price shall be further increased or

decreased, as the case may be, by an amount deter-

mined by multiplying that percentage change in the

average wage scale rate, when compared to the base

wage scale rate* as calculated for hourly employees

under Section 3.03, times $0.152, such $0.152 being

the total per ton cost of supervisory labor in effect

July 1, 1973. (*Base wage scale rate as used in this

Section 3.08 shall mean the average wage scale rate

for producing, washing or loading coal sold hereunder

on the effective date of the last adjustment.)

Under no circumstances shall Purchaser be re-

quired to compensate Seller for any increase which

exceeds that percentage increase in daily wage rates as

results from the change in national or regional bitumi-

nous coal union wage agreements.

The job classifications used in said supervisory

labor cost in effect on July 1, 1973, are set forth in

Exhibit 7 attached hereto and made a part hereof.

B-41

3. Section 7.01 of the Coal Supply Agreement is

amended by deleting the section in its entirety and sub-

stituting in lieu thereof the following:

7.01. “Quantity Requirements.” Seller will tender

for delivery, and Purchaser will buy the following

quantites of coal:

(a) 1,400,000 tons during the calendar year of

1970;

(b) 1,400,000 tons during the calendar year of

1971;

(c) 1,400,000 tons during the calendar year of

1972;

(d) 1,600,000 tons during the calendar year of

1973;

(e) 1,600,000 tons during the calendar year of

1974, provided that either party upon ninety

(90) days written notice may require ship-

ments for the remainder of the calendar year

at an annual rate of 2,100,000 tons;

(f) 2,100,000 tons during each of the calendar

years 1975 through 1979;

(g) 1,200,000 tons during the calendar year of

1980 plus an additional amount equal to the

difference between 2,100,000 and the number

of tons actually shipped during 1974.

4. Except as provided herein and in the Amend-

ment to Coal Supply Agreement executed January 1,

1973, the Coal Supply Agreement dated February 6,

1969, is not otherwise altered or modified as is in all

respects ratified and affirmed.

B-43

B-42

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In Witness Whereof, the parties have caused this

Amendment to their Agreement to be duly executed

and attested in several counterparts, under their re-

spective corporate seals and by their respective cor-

porate officers thereunto duly authorized, all on the

date first mentioned above.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

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Executive Vice President

CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION

Date Executed November 20, 1973

By:

ROBERT ANDERSON, JR., President

Chief Executive Officer

Date Executed December 26, 1973

(Seal)

ATTEST

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8-46

AMENDMENT TO COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this

19th day of , 1974, by and between

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, a corporation or-

ganized and existing under the laws of the State of

Georgia, and having its principal office in the city of

Atlanta, Georgia (“Purchaser”) and CIMARRON

COAL CORPORATION, a corporation organized and

existing under the laws of the State of Tennessee, and

having its chief principal office in the city of Madison-

ville, Kentucky (‘Seller’),

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the Purchaser and Seller have here-

tofore entered into a Coal Supply Agreement dated

February 6, 1969, which was subsequently amended

as of January 1, 1973, and November 20, 1973, (here-

inafter the Agreement’), whereby Seller dedicated

certain acreages in Hopkins County, Kentucky, con-

taining more than 20,000,000 tons of economically re-

coverable coal to the fulfillment of said Agreement;

WHEREAS, Seller represents and warrants that,

through the instruments identified on Exhibit “1A”

attached hereto and made a part hereof, it has acquired

control of additional acreages in Hopkins County, Ken-

tucky, which contain more than 7,000,000 tons of coal

that can be economically recovered by surface mining

methods; and

WHEREAS, the parties desire to modify and

amend the Agreement hereinafter provided;

BAT

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the

premises and the mutual covenants hereinafter set

forth, it is hereby agreed that the Agreement be modi-

fied and amended in the following respects:

1,

The Agreement is amended by adding after the

third paragraph on Page 1 a new paragraph which

provides as follows:

‘Seller represents and warrants that it con-

trols, through the instruments identified on Ex-

hibit “1A” attached hereto and made a part

hereof, certain additional acreages in Hopkins

County, Kentucky, which contain more than

7,000,000 tons of coal that can be economically re-

covered by surface mining methods and which

Seller dedicates to the fulfillment of this Agree-

ment,”

2.

The Agreement is further amended by attaching

thereto as Exhibit “1A” the exhibit designated “1A”

which is attached to this Amendment and made a part

hereof,

3.

Section 2.01 of the Agreement is amended by de-

leting the section in its entirety and inserting in lieu

thereof the following:

“Term of Agreement. The term of this Agree-

ment shall extend until all mineable and mer-

chantable coal on the property identified on Ex-

hibits 1” and “1A” has been mined, removed and

sold to Purchaser,

B48

4,

Section 7.01 of the Agreement is amended by

deleting the section in its entirety and substituting in

lieu thereof the following:

“Quantity Requirements. Seller will tender

for delivery and Purchaser will buy the following

quantities of coal:

(a) 2,100,000 tons during each of the calendar

years 1974 through December 31, 1980;

(b) 2,100,000 tons during each of the calendar

years during the remainder of the term of

this Agreement; or so much thereof as is

merchantable and economically recoverable

from the reserves dedicated to this Agree-

ment,”

The annual tonnage requirements as provided by

this Section 7.01 hereof, shall be delivered by Seller

and accepted by Purchaser in approximately equal

monthly quantities or as otherwise mutually agreed

to by the parties hereto,

5,

Except as herein provided, the Coal Supply Agree-

ment dated February 6, 1969, as amended as of Janu-

ary 1, 1973, and November 20, 1973, is not otherwise

altered or modified and is in all respects ratified and

affirmed,

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have

caused this Amendment to the Coal Supply Agree-

ment to be duly executed and attested in several coun-

terparts, under their respective corporate seals and

\

Bed)

by their respective corporate officers thereunto duly

authorized, all on the date first mentioned above.

(Seal)

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

By: R. W. SCHERER

Executive Vice President

Date Executed 9-19, 1974

CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION

By: ROBERT ANDERSON, JR.

President

Date Executed 9-23, 1974

ATTEST:

By: C, L. RATTERREE

Assistant Secretary

(Seal)

ATTEST:

By: EMMETT D, ANDERSON

Secretary

EXHIBIT “1A”

A. POND RIVER — FIES PROPERTIES

1. Property acquired by Diamond Trust from Pea-

body Coal Company dated September 18, 1972,

covering property conveyed to Peabody from Ter-

teling Brothers by Deed dated May 22, 1953, and

record in Book 220, Page 592, Hopkins County

Court Clerk’s office.

(a) Property leased by Diamond Trust from W.

8.50

B, Dozier and Lulu Hickman under lease dated

July 7, 1971,

(b) Property acquired by Diamond Trust from

Island Creek Coal Company by Deed dated

August 80, 1971, and recorded in Book 840,

Page 184, Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office,

. Property acquired by Diamond Trust from William

C, Davis dated March 4, 1972, and covering prop-

erty conveyed by Ervin Sheets to William C, Davis

by Deed dated November 17, 1966, and recorded

in Book 308, Page 157, Hopkins County Court

Clerk’s office,

. Property leased by Diamond Trust from Russell

Badgett, Sr., covering property conveyed to Russell

Badgett, Sr., from Badgett Mine Stripping Corpo-

ration dated June 15, 1970, covering property con-

veyed to Badgett Mine Stripping Corporation from

West Kentucky Coal Company, (Newcoal Farm),

dated July 31, 1968, and recorded in Book 289,

Page 409, Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office,

B, CIMARRON (Trust No, 1)

1, Property acquired by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from Lawrence Springfield by Deed dated July

22, 1969, and recorded in Book 326, Page 57, Hop-

kins County Court Clerk’s office,

. Property acquired by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from T, Gardiner Slaton by Deed dated July 22,

1969, and recorded in Book 326, Page 59, Hopkins

County Court Clerk’s office,

3, Property acquired by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from Ek, KE. Wilson by Deed dated July 22, 1969,

and recorded in Book 826, Page 61, Hopkins

County Court Clerk’s office.

ee

10,

11,

12.

13,

14,

B51

. Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from L, R, Slaton, et ux., under lease dated June

23, 1969,

Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation

L. R, Slaton et ux., under lease dated June 23,

1969,

Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from C, W. and W, C, Gatlin under lease dated

January 22, 1972,

Property acquired by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from James E. Slaton by Deed dated July 22,

1969, and recorded in Book 326, Page 63, Hopkins

County Court Clerk’s office.

Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from Than G, Rice, et ux., under lease dated July

30, 1969,

Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from Fletcher Slaton under lease dated July 30,

1969,

Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from W. B, Dozier and Lulu Hickman under lease

dated August 12, 1969,

Coal leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation from

James G, Baker, et ux., under lease dated August

12, 1969,

Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from EF, E, Steff under lease dated August 24,

1969,

Mining lease by Cimarron Coal Corporation from

I, E. and Nora Winstead under lease dated June

19, 1970,

Property acquired by Cimarron Coal Corporation

from Raymond Winstead by Deed dated June 19,

1970, and recorded in Book 331, Page 233, Hop-

kins County Court Clerk's office.

B-52

P, EXHIBIT 52

AMENDMENT TO COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT

THIS AMENDMENT executed this first day of

January, 1974, to the COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT

dated Febraury 6, 1969, as amended January 1, 1978,

November 20, 1973, and January 14, 1974, by and be-

tween Cimarron Coal Corporation (Seller) and Geor-

gia Power Company (Purchaser),

WITNESSETH:

For and in consideration of the benefits set forth

herein and the mutual promises of the parties hereto,

Seller and Purchaser do hereby agree to further amend

said Coal supply Agreement as follows:

1, Modify Section 3.07 to read as follows:

8.07, Adjustments for Changes in Cost of

Supplies. Adjustments for Changes in Cost of sup-

plies used in the production of coal for delivery

under this Agreement shall be made in the follow-

ing manner:

Any changes in the Base Price of supplies

shall be made by determining periodically the per-

centage change which shall have occurred since

July, 1978, in the average monthly price paid by

Seller for Ammonium Nitrate and Diesel Fuel,

and in a composite of the following price indices

published by the United States Bureau of Labor

Statistics and having the following respective

weights:

—— <b ewe et ee e e

B-53

BLS Code

Commodity Number Weight

Construction Machinery

& Equipment 112 50

Petroleum Products - Refined 057 .03

Electric Power 054 10

Explosives 0679-02 .03

Tires and Tubes 0712 .08

Wire and Cable 1026 07

Any changes on or after January 1, 1974, in

the Base Price of supplies shall be based on

changes in the average monthly price paid by Sel-

ler for Ammonuim Nitrate and Diesel Fuel, and in

a composite index number for January and July of

each calendar year during the life of this Agree-

ment. The percentage change in Ammonium Ni-

trate from $2.90 per hundred pounds (the average

price paid for Ammonium Nitrate for the month

of July, 1973) shall be determined semi-annually

to be effective January 1 and July 1 and shall be

applied to $.18. The percentage change in Diesel

Fuel from $.170 per gallon (the average price

paid for Diesel Fuel for the month of July, 1973)

shall be determined semi-annually to be effective

January 1 and July 1 and shall be applied to $.105.

The percentage change in the said composite index

from 103.6 (the level of such index for July, 1973,

on the basis that the year 1967 = 100) shall be

determined semi-annually to be effective January

1 and July 1 and shall be applied to $1.215. The

resulting amounts, less previous adjustments made

under this section, shall be added to or substracted

from, as the case may be, the Base Price in effect

at the beginning of the month for which the above

calculations are made, and shall govern until the

B-54

beginning of the next succeeding January or July,

as the case may be.

In the event of a published change or revision

in the basis for any of the components of said in-

dices or if a new basis is adopted, the revised or

new index shall be adjusted to said basis of 1967

= 100. If such index is discontinued or otherwise

becomes unavailable, the parties shall utilize a

mutually satisfactory substitute method of price

adjustment for materials and supplies.

An example of how the provisions of this

section are intended to operate is shown in Ex-

hibit 6 attached hereto and made a part hereof.

2. Except as provided herein and in the Amend-

ments to Coal Supply Agreement dated January 1,

1973, November 20, 1973, and January 14, 1974, the

Coal Supply Agreement dated February 6, 1969, is not

otherwise altered or modified and is in all respects

ratified and affirmed

In Witness Whereof, the parties have caused this

Amendment to their Agreement to be duly executed

and attested in several counterparts, under their re-

spective corporate seals and by their respective cor-

porate officers thereunto duly authorized, all on the

date first mentioned above.

ATTEST GEORGIA POWER COMPANY

By: By R. W. SCHERER

Secretary Executive Vice President

Date Executed October 31, 1974.

ATTEST CIMARRON COAL

By EMMETT D. CORPORATION

ANDERSON By ROBERT ANDERSON, JR.

Secretary Chief Executive Officer

Date Executed 12-26, 1974

EXHIBIT 6

Illustration of Price Change as Referred to in Section 3.07

Index

Weighted Number

Base

July 1973 Jan. 1974

Base

Index

July 1973

Weight

BLS

Code

Number

Commodity

Construction Machinery

5.0

67.8

13.8

135.6

166.4

137.5

3.9

65.7

12.9

131.3

129.1

129.0

50

03

10

11.2

05.7

05.4

and Equipment _____.___-----

Petroleum Products — Refined __

Electric Power ________________

B-55

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i

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i i !

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i I 1

! j I

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110.0

103.6

—_ -- —— —d

110.0

103.6

a

Index Number January 1974

Base Index July 1973

Increase in Index

6.4

Percent of Increase in Index

6.18%, X $1.215 per ton = $.0751 increase per ton

Percent of Increase — Ammonium Nitrate

6.4 = 103.6 — 6.18%

$2.90

Price Per Hundred Pounds Bulk Ammonium Nitrate

Average Price for the Month of July, 1973

B-56

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served copies

of this Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari upon ’oun-

sel for Respondent by depositing same in the United

States Mail with adequate postage thereon in envelopes

addressed as follows:

W. STUART McCCLoy, Esq.

McCloy, Dudley, Yawn & McCloy

1701 First National Bank Building

Memphis, Tennessee 38103

anc

JOHN Scott MCGAW, Esq.

Moore, Morrow, Frymier & McGaw

Kentucky Bank and Trust Building

P. O. Box 695

Madisonville, Kentucky 42431

This day of March, 1976.

MICHAEL C. MURPHY

Counsel for Petitioner,

Georgia Power Company

Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman

& Ashmore

1400 Candler Building

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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Petition — Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp. · 425 U.S. 952 | Frix