Opposition — Williams v. American Airlines, Inc.

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IN THB

Supreme Court of the United States —

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-1254

MICHAEL W. WILLIAMS, eT AL.,

Petitioners,

VS.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AMERICAN AIRLINES, LNC.

AND TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

H. TEMPLETON BROWN,

BRYSON P. BURNHAM,

Lee N. ABRAMS,

STEPHEN M., SHAPIRO,

Attorneys for Respondents American

Airlines, Inc. and Trans World

Airlines, Inc.

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT,

231 South LaSalle Street,

Chicago, Illinois 60604,

312—ST2-0600,

Of Counsel.

April 6, 1976.

Gunthorp-Warren Printing Company, Chicago e “ nancial 6-6565

INDEX

PAGE

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POE «cc cccvccseccsccevcescocccevecccesseee 13

PPMPPPTTTTTC TT TTT CT TTT TTT TTT 19

PETES BO oo cccccceccicccccccescceteseseceeces Al

p | PPPPPTTITITITTITITT TTT Al4

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Cited

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301

DD cinesesebeavisdscasenae 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18

Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570

DEED encchecunbesacecedessceuaeesbeesoneess 19

Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938) ..15, 16, 17, 18

Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 430 F. 2d 891 (D. C.

St See CUED cccececesecoesesaces 3, 4, 16, 19

Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 521 F. 2d 298 (D. C.

Se Gee CU ED cccccceceocscasecss 9, 12, 16, 19

Roberts v. American Airlines, 526 F. 2d 757 (7th Cir.

DP: cccpsnceckeasesenebeneesssucdnevens 1,3, 12, 13

Texas & P. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426

SD «oneebnw sun nk6sobneeseeniesedeeeenese 19

United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.,

et, © ct ovcececnetecssecousceneas 17, 18

United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S.

et GEE cesweesewtessceescoucesceaseeheseness 19

United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183 (1939)...13, 15, 17

Weidberg v. American Airlines, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 407

COE, BR EB 1972) ccccccccccccccccsccscesccsess 1,6

Statutory Provisions Cited

ee ee es SE ns ov iinekeeneenesteundesdnees 2,3

4g SR PCT TT Te TT 15

ee ee Gt ED «0s cdvdecdccddeneetanusdieewe 4

Gs Ge G. SRD htt ewwddvedensevcsstddecees 4

Miscellaneous

Davis, Administrative Law Treatise .................. 16

IN THE

Supreme Court of the GAnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-1254,

MICHAEL W. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

vs.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

AND TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 526 F. 2d

757, and a copy of that opinion is attached to the Petition as

Appendix A. The judgment of the District Court dismissing

the action was entered without opinion. An earlier opinion of

the District Court granting defendants’ motion to stay pro-

ceedings in the consolidated damage actions pending determi-

nation of related issues by the Civil Aeronautics Board is

reported at 336 F. Supp. 407 as Weidberg v. American Airlines,

Inc., and a copy of that opinion is attached hereto as Appendix

A. That opinion analyzes in detail the legal principles upon

which the District Court based its subsequent decision dismis-

sing the consolidated damage actions.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

When particular domestic air passenger tariffs have been

invalidated by a Court of Appeals due solely to a procedural

error committed by the Civil Aeronautics Board, but the Civil

Aeronautics Board subsequently has determined (in proceed-

ings conducted in compliance with the order of that Court of

Appeals) that the fares charged pursuant to those tariffs were

not unjust or unreasonable and that the carriers were not un-

justly enriched by collecting those fares, and the Board’s deter-

mination has thereafter been affirmed by that same Court of

Appeals, are the passengers who paid the fares in question pre-

cluded from recovering money damages based on alleged over-

charges?

a. Are the passengers entitled to recover damages even

though they were not injured, and the fares which they paid

were not unreasonable?

b. Are the passengers entitled to recover damages even

though the fares which they paid were established by tariffs

which were legal, valid and binding at the time the fares were

collected—tariffs with which the air cariiers were required by

law to comply?

c. Are the defendant air carriers required to pay damages

even though they have not been “unjustly enriched” by collect-

ing the fares in question?

STATEMENT

The instant case is one of seven damage actions which were

consolidated in the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407. District

Judge Hubert L. Will dismissed all seven of those damage

actions on December 10, 1973. The named plaintiffs in four

of those damage actions (including the instant case) appealed

Judge Will’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh

3

Circuit; the named plaintiffs in the other three damage actions

did not seek appellate review. The four appeals were consoli-

dated for hearing and disposition, and on December 8, 1975

the Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Will's decision dismissing

the damage actions; as noted above, the opinion of the Court of

Appeals is reported at 526 F. 2d 757, and a copy of that opinion

is attached to the Petition as Appendix A. The instant case

is the only one in which this Court has been asked to review

the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; the

named plaintiffs in the other three damage actions which were

encompassed by that decision have not sought review in this

Court.

Petitioners and the plaintiffs in the companion damage ac-

tions sought to recover alleged overcharges on domestic air

passenger fares which the defendant air carriers had collected

during the period from October 1, 1969 through October 14,

1970. In some of those actions as many as twenty air carriers

were named as defendants, but in the instant case only two air

carriers (respondents here) were named as defendants. The

various damage actions purportedly were brought on behalf of

all persons who purchased domestic air passenger transporta-

tion during the specified time period, but the District Court

did not decide whether any of those suits could properly be

maintained as a class action. The seven damage actions initially

were filed in several different courts, but on February 19, 1971

the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, acting pursuant

to 28 U. S. C. § 1407, entered an order consolidating those

actions for pretrial purposes before the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

The seven consolidated cases initially were assigned to Judge

Alexander Napoli of that Court; after Judge Napoli’s death

the cases were reassigned to Judge Hubert L. Will.

The seven damage actions were filed in the wake of Moss v.

Civil Aeronautics Board, 430 F. 2d $91 (D. C. Cir. 1970)

(“Moss I’). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

4

there held that the domestic air carrier tariffs prevailing during

the period from October 1, 1969 through October 14, 1970 were

invalid due to a procedural error committed by the Civil

Aeronautics Board, and remanded the case to the Board for

further proceedings. *

The petitioners in that litigation, Congressman Moss of Cal-

ifornia and a number of other Congressmen (hereinafter re-

ferred to as “Congressman Moss, ef al.”), then requested the

Board to “promptly initiate an adjudicatory proceeding for the

purpose of determining appropriate relief [for alleged rate over-

charges] for the period extending from October 1, 1969 through

the date on which the lawful domestic passenger fares are re-

established”. The Board, after considering briefs filed by Con-

gressman Moss, et al. and a number of air carriers with respect

to that request, concluded that no monetary relief should be

awarded unless the fares in question were “unjust” or “unrea-

sonable”; therefore it deferred its determination as to the “ap-

propriate relief” (if any) pending the outcome of an investigatory

proceeding “to determine whether the passenger fares between

points in the 48 contiguous States and the District of Columbia

in effect during the period October 1, 1969 to and including

*In August 1969, twenty of the principal domestic air carriers

had filed tariffs which increased domestic air passenger fares. On

September 12, 1969, the Civil Aeronautics Board issued Order

69-9-68, Docket 21322, which suspended those tariffs under 49

U. S. C. § 1482(g), on the ground that the tariffs “may be unjust

for] unreasonable”. In that Order the Board (a) stated that the

carriers were in need of additional revenue due to increased expenses;

(b) proposed a fare formula; and (c) announced that it would

accept, without suspension, tariffs which utilized that proposed fare

formula. The carriers then withdrew their suspended tariffs and

filed new tariffs in accordance with the Board’s proposed fare

formula; those new tariffs became effective on October !, 1969,

and during the period from October 1, 1969 through October 14,

1970 the carriers charged the fares which were specified in those

new tarifis. In Moss I the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia held that the Board’s September 12, 1969 order and

the subsequent filing of tariffs by the carriers actually constituted

rate making by the Board under 49 U. S. C. § 1482(d), and that

those tariffs therefore were invalid because the Board had entered

its order without the public hearing provided for in that statute.

5

October 14, 1970 * * * were unjust and unreasonable” (Board

Order 71-2-109, p. 10). That proceeding (CAB Docket No.

23140) was captioned “The Reasonableness of Passenger Fares

Charged by Domestic Trunkline and Local Service Carriers

from October 1, 1969 through October 14, 1970”.*

Shortly after the seven damage actions were consolidated be-

fore the District Court, the defendant air carriers moved to

stay all proceedings in those damage actions pending a

determination by the Civil Aeronautics Board with respect

to the reasonableness of the domestic air passenger fares

in question. In support of that motion, the carriers asserted that

the damage action plaintiffs had suffered no legally compensable

injury—and therefore could not recover any damages-—because

the f --s ii question were not “unjust” and “unreasonable” and

the carriers had not been “unjustly enriched” by collecting those

fares; the carriers also asserted that questions relating to the

reasonableness of domestic air passenger fares were within the

exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board.

The damage action plaintiffs (including petitioners) contended

that they could recover damages whether or not the fares in

question were unjust or unreasonable, and whether or not the

defendant air carriers were unjustly enriched by collecting those

fares. On January 12, 1972, Judge Napoli, after considering ex-

tended briefs filed by the various parties, granted the carriers’

motion to stay all proceedings in the consolidated damage actions

pending the Civil Aeronautics Board’s determination as to the

reasonableness of the fares.

Judge Napoli’s opinion (a copy of which is attached hereto

as Appendix A) analyzed the applicable legal principles in care-

ful detail. Judge Napoli pointed out first that the damage action

plaintiffs could not recover unless the fares which they had paid

were unreasonably high, because “the [Federal Aviation] Act

*The Board’s order instituting that investigatory proceeding

was issued on February 24, 1971—-six days after the Judicial Panel

on Miultidistrict Litigation ordered consolidation of the damage

actions for pretrial purposes.

6

allows reasonable fares and it cannot be doubted that the car-

riers are entitled to a reasonable rate of return” (336 F. Supp. at

411; Appendix A, p. A8). He then emphasized the fact that if

the damage action plaintiffs did not pay unreasonably high fares,

then they were not injured as a result of the Board’s error (which,

as Judge Napoli pointed out, “was of a procedural nature” (336

F. Supp. at 411; Appendix A, p. A8)). He concluded that the

principles enunciated by this Court in Atlantic Coast Line R.

Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301 (1935), were “decisive”, stating:

“* * * there is considerable merit in the position that

in weighing the equities of this case, the question of the,

reasonableness of the fares will play an important or even

decisive role. Paraphrasing Cardozo [in the Atlantic Coast

Line decision], in order for plaintiffs to prevail it must ap-

pear that the equities are so in favor of the plaintiffs that

this court is duty bound to make the air carriers pay a

considerable sum as reparations for the blunder of the

C.A.B.” (336 F. Supp. at 410-411; Appendix A, p. A7.)

Judge Napoli also concluded that issues as to the reason-

ableness of the domestic air passenger fares in question were

within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics

Board (336 F. Supp. at 409; Appendix A. pp. A4-A5), and

therefore that it was appropriate to defer further proceedings in

the damage actions until the Board decided those issues. Judge

Napoli went on to state:

“Since the question of the reasonableness vel non of the

fares falls within the primary jurisdiction of the C.A.B.,

the plaintiffs in order to avoid a stay must proceed on the

theory either that they have a claim for relief independent of

unjust enrichment, which would rest upon common-law or

statutory construction, or that they are absolutely entitled

to recover due to the declaration of unlawfulness by the

Moss court. At the expense of lengthening this opinion

the court will turn to and examine the pertinent au-

thorities and arguments of the respective parties on these

issues.” (336 F. Supp. at 409-410; Appendix A, p. A5.)

Judge Napoli’s opinion then discussed, and refuted, the various

arguments advanced by the damage action plaintiffs in support

7

of their contention that they could recover even if the Civil

Aeronautics Board determined that the fares in question were

not unjust or unreasonable.

On September 18, 1972, after Judge Napoli’s death, the Ex-

ecutive Committee of the District Court reassigned the con-

solidated damage actions to Judge Hubert Will. On October 5,

1972, Judge Will, after reviewing all of the briefs which had

been filed in those actions and considering oral statements by

counsel, concluded that there would not be any basis for an

award of damages if the Civil Aeronautics Board determined

(in its then-pending investigatory proceeding) that the fares

in question were not unjust or unreasonable, stating:

“I don’t understand how if they [the Civil] Aeronautics

Board] just didn’t dot the ‘i’s’ and cross the ‘t’s’ but nobody

got hurt, how there can be any damages.”

“I don’t think the law redresses the technical imperfec-

tions in conduct which don’t hurt anybody. * * *”

* bd * * *

“T just don’t understand how anybody, how a court can

adjudicate that somebody who hasn’t been hurt should be

paid some money because the wrong oven was used in

producing a perfectly palatable, healthful product.”

8 > od * aw

“As I read all the material last night, trying to get myself

oriented, what struck me was that if in fact it turns out

nobody got hurt, I don’t see how the law responds to that

situation absent some kind of a specific provision penalizing

formal failures; but, that wouldn’t give the plaintiff litigants

the right to enforce that in any event I wouldn’t think,

particularly if you are going to impose a fine on somebody.

You ought to impose it on the CAB.”

* - a aw *

“Ang they [the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

in Moss I] made no determination as to the fairness or

reasonabieness of those illegally determined rates. They

simply said the airlines are collecting rates they haven’t been

properly authorized to charge.”

“Now, we are going to have an adjudication in which,

if I understand it correctly, they [the Civil Aeronautics

Board] are going to consider the question as to whether or

not during that interim period, notwithstanding the formal

defects in their adoption, * * * [the fares] were fair and

reasonable, whether there is any unjust enrichment on the

part of the airlines.”

“T have difficulty seeing, as I repeat, how private litigants

can say they were hurt if they paid just and reasonable

rates simply because those just and reasonable rates were

not formally, properly adopted or approved.”

“You might do some research on it and see, but it seems

to me that is the guts of the case. * * *” Transcript of

Proceedings on October 5, 1972, pp. 8, 10, 11-12.

Certain of the damage action plaintiffs continued to assert

that they would be entitled to recover damages even if the

Board determined that the fares in question were just and rea-

sonable. Consequently, on December 6, 1972, Judge Will re-

quested the parties to submit additional memoranda regarding

the question whether damages could be recovered regardless

whether the fares were unjust or unreasonable, stating:

“It you have got any other theories, get them in now.

I don’t see any reason for waiting [to consider such theor-

ies] until the Board has determined whether or not the

rates are fair and reasonable. If you have got other theories

of damages which are not related to that question, you get

them in now.”

* * * * >

“* * * Assuming the C.A.B. finds the rates to be fair

and reasonable, what basis do you have for damages, or

am I just going to have a third year law school moot court

case in which even if you win you don’t get anything

except the satisfaction of a finding in your favor; because

if there is no basis for monetary recovery, there isn’t any

point in spending your time and money, and my time and

the taxpayers’ money, trying the case.” Transcript of Pro-

ceedings on December 6, 1972, pp. 5-6.

On March 26, 1973, Judge Will, after considering the addi-

tional memoranda submitted by the parties pursuant to his

9

December 6, 1972 request, stated that in his view the plaintiffs

had simply repeated the arguments which Judge Napoli had

considered and rejected, and had failed to advance any new

arguments. He concluded that the plaintiffs had not propounded

any theory which would sustain their damage claims if the

Board determined that the fares in question were not unjust

or unreasonable, and he refused to modify the stay order which

Judge Napoli had entered on January 12, 1972.

The Civil Aeronautics Board’s investigatory proceeding with

respect to the reasonableness of the domestic air passenger fares

in question, which commenced in February 1971, was not con-

cluded until July 1973. In that proceeding, Congressman Moss,

et al. vigorously contested the carriers’ contention that the fares

were not unjust or unreasonable. Evidentiary hearings were

held before an administrative law judge, and the parties sub-

sequently submitted post-hearing briefs to that administrative

law judge. Thereafter, on July 3, 1972, the administrative law

judge issued his initial decision. He held that the fares in ques-

tion were not unjust or unreasonable, that the passengers who

paid those fares were not overcharged, and that the carriers were

not unjustly enriched by collecting those fares. The Board then

reviewed that initial decision, as well as the additional briefs

which the parties submitted, and heard oral arguments on

November 15, 1972. After considering the evidence and the

arguments of the parties, the Board issued its decision on July

11, 1973 (Order No. 73-7-39). In that decision, the Board

adopted the aforementioned findings and conclusions of the

administrative law judge, and held that the domestic air passen-

ger fares in question were not unjust or unreasonable. Con-

gressman Moss, et al. appealed the Board’s decision to the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which affirmed that

decision on October 16, 1975 in Moss v. Civil Aeronautics

Board, 521 F. 2d 298 (D. C. Cir. 1975) (“Moss IT’). This

Court denied certiorari in Moss II on March 22, 1976 (.......... "

he , 44 U. S. L. W. 3531, captioned “Roberts v.

10

C. A. B.”). The opinion of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals in Moss Ii reviews and analyzes many of the legal prin-

ciples which are controlling in the instant case; a copy of that

opinion is attached hereto as Appendix B.

In July 1973, shortly after the Board issued its decision hold-

ing that the fares in question were not unjust or unreasonable,

the defendants in the consolidated damage actions moved for

summary judgment, seeking dismissal of those actions on the

ground that the Board’s decision precluded the plaintiffs from

recovering any damages. During a status report on September

10, 1973, Judge Will stated to counsel that he was disposed to

grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but at the

request of plaintiffs’ counsel he continued that motion until

December 10, 1973 in order to ascertain what action (if any)

had been taken in the interim by the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals with respect to the appeal of the Board's

July 1973 decision.

On December 10, 1973, Judge Will entered an order dis-

missing the seven consolidated damage actions. He stated that

he was dismissing those actions because they were “moot” or

precluded by the holding of the Civil Aeronautics Board, ex-

plaining that his decision rested on the premise that because

the fares in question had been determined to be neither unjust

nor unreasonable, the plaintiffs who paid those fares could

not have suffered any legally compensable injury (since they

were obligated by law to pay “reasonable” amounts for their

air transportation):

“There have been sounds made that there would still be

some sort of cause of action even if the [District of Colura-

bia] Court of Appeals was to affirm [the Board’s decision]

and the rates were found to be fair and reasonable. I don’t

know what, because I don’t know what damages there

could be.”

* * * * *

“Well, noises have been made that we could have some

sort of compensatory or other damages for the fact that

11

the rates were put into effect after an improper procedure

before the CAB.”

“I don’t see how you get any damages, and the Supreme

Court has made it very clear that you don’t get damages

just because the ‘i’ dotting and the ‘t’ crossing was not

correct, if the results were fair and reasonable, and the

results have been found to be fair and reasonable at this

point.”

“I don’t understand on what theory you could have

damages for the collection of fair and reasonable rates

improperly determined.”

“* * * T am simply going to dismiss them on the grounds

that they are moot, and I am available for a motion to

reinstate on any grounds, though the only one I can think

of at the moment is that the CAB has been reversed.”

Transcript of Proceedings on December 10, 1973, pp. 3,

5-6.

“* * * Two years ago there hadn’t been a determination

by the CAB * * * as to whether or not the rates which

were charged were fair and reasonable. You had a deter-

mination that the procedure—a judicial determination that

the procedure by which these rates had been approved was

defective. So the CAB was now back under an appropriate

procedure, a proper procedure reexamining the question

of reasonableness and fairness.”

“Subsequent to that two things have happened. The

CAB has adjudicated and found that the rates were fair

and reasonable, and now there has been an appeal taken

to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.”

“So there are two things that are changed. One, you

have a determination by the administrative body charged

with the responsibility which the courts keep talking about

having special knowledge and expertise, et cetera, like the

I.C.C., that the rates were fair and reasonable, which would

moot the case, subject to a reversal by the Court of Appeals

which would unmoot the case.”

“I said if they get unmooted, I will reinstate them, but

there isn’t any point in keeping on the docket seven cases

which have a high probability of never having any vitality

12

when you can resuscitate them very easily. In the event

the Court of Appeals reverses we will put them back on

the docket and go from there: but if the Court of Appeals

affirms, as it is highly probable it will, then these cases

are moot.” Transcript of Proceedings on December 20,

1973, pp. 3-4.

“* * * there is no damage because if these improperly

adopted fares are subsequently determined to be fair and

reasonable, then I don’t know what there is left to litigate,

except to give it to some law school moot court, or put it

on an examination; but, there is nothing more useless than

litigating issues from which there can be no recovery in

the nature of damages or other relief.”

“So, the fact that the * * * [CAB] has now found these

fares to be reasonable, and that is now on appeal, seems

to me means that these cases will all be moot. They are

moot at this point unless that determination is reversed.

Since they are moot, I have dismissed them with the under-

standing that I will reinstate them [if the decision of the

Civil Aeronautics Board is reversed on appeal]; * * *.”

Transcript of Proceedings on January 14, 1974, p. 5.

As noted above, the named plaintiffs in four of the seven

consolidated damage actions (including the instant case) ap-

pealed Judge Will’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit. On December 8, 1975, that Court unanimously

affirmed Judge Will’s decision dismissing the consolidated dam-

age actions. In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that

many of the substantive legal issues raised by the appeal before

it had already been decided by the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit in Moss 11, and stated “We think

that Moss II clearly and correctly explicates the earlier decision

[Moss 1] and establishes that the C. A. B. order attacked in

Moss | was voidable rather than void” (526 F. 2d at 760). The

Seventh Circuit went on to conclude that the District Court had

properly dismissed the consolidated damage actions because the

plaintiffs had not been injured by paying the domestic air pas-

senger fares in question, and therefore they were precluded from

recovering money damages by “the fundamental legal premise

13

that mere illegality which causes no injury is not ordinarily

compensable” (526 F. 2d at 760). The Seventh Circuit also

held that it did not have to decide whether Judge Will had prop-

erly used the term “moot” to describe that situation, because

in any event his dismissal order could be treated as a Rule 56(b)

summary judgment in favor of the defendants; as the Court of

Appeals pointed out (526 F. 2d at 761-762 and fn. 2), there

was no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the defendants

therefore were entitled to summary judgment of dismissal as a

matter of law because they were not unjustly enriched by col-

lecting the fares in question, so that restitution was inappropriate.

Petitioners then filed their petition for a writ of certiorari in

this Court, challenging the decision of the Seventh Circuit. As

noted above, none of the named plaintiffs in the other three

damage actions which were encompassed by that decision have

sought review in this Court.

ARGUMENT

Petitioners assert that this Court should review the decision

of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals because that decision

purportedly “has, in effect, decided a federal question in a way

in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court” (Pet. p. 5).

But nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the deci-

sion of the Seventh Circuit (like the decision of the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals in Moss II), is expressly premised

upon, and carefully follows the teachings of, this Court’s deci-

sions in two cases which are remarkably similar to the instant

case—A tlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301

(1935), and U. S. v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183 (1939). In those

cases, this Court enunciated the principle that where an admin-

istrative agency has committed a procedural error in establishing

rates, persons who paid those rates can obtain restitution only

if that remedy is necessary to prevent unjust enrichment—which

could not occur unless the rates in question were “unjust” or

14

“unreasonable.” That controlling rule of law, of course, is the

very cornerstone of both the Seventh Circuit decision below and

the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in

Moss Il.

In the Atlantic Coast Line case, plaintiffs sought restitution

of sums which the defendant railroads had collected pursuant

to an I. C. C. order that subsequently was set aside because the

Commission’s factual findings had been inadequate.* This Court

denied restitution, holding that such relief would be appropriate

only if the freight rates which the railroad had charged under

the later-invalidated I. C. C. order were “unreasonable”, so that

the railroad would be “unjustly enriched” if it were permitted .

to retain the amounts which it had collected. Justice Cardozo,

speaking for the Court, stated that the plaintiffs could obtain

restitution only if they could “show that the money was received

in such circumstances that the possessor will give offense to

equity and good conscience if permitted to retain it” (295 U. S.

at 309). This Court’s opinion went on to conclude that it

would be unjust to punish the railroad for the Commission’s

procedural error in establishing the questioned rates unless it

had been “unjustly enriched” by collecting the amounts in ques-

tion, and that it was appropriate for the I. C. C. to determine

post hoc whether such “unjust enrichment” had occurred (even

though the Commission had no power to grant reparations)

(295 U. S. at 312-314).**

* Petitioners seek restitution of money “had and received” in the

instant case. Their theory of liability thus is identical with the theory

of liability relied on by the plaintiffs in Atlantic Coast Line.

* * This Court’s opinion in Atlantic Coast Line also emphasized

the fact that the defendant railroad was legally required to collect

the questioned fares, even though the I. C. C. order imposing those

fares subsequently was set aside on the ground that it was not su

ported by adequate findings of fact (295 U. S. at 311). Similarly

here, the air passenger tariffs which the carriers filed in October

1969, pursuant to the Civil Aeronautics Board’s September 12, 1969

order, were legal, valid and binding until the Board’s order was

reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in

July 1970. Until the October 1969 tariffs were thus invalidated, the

defendant air carriers were legally required to charge the fares

(Continued on next page)

ee

oes = een -

15

This Court expanded upon the Aflantic Coast Line principles

in Morgan, which involved the action of the Secretary of Agri-

culture in prescribing new, lower rates for services rendered in

the Kansas City stockyards. The plaintiff stockyard operators

contended that the new rates were invalid because the Secretary

had promulgated those rates without a full hearing. Pending

judicial determination of the validity of the Secretary’s action,

the sums representing the difference between the old rates and

the new ones were placed in an escrow fund established by the

District Court. This Court sustained plaintiffs’ challenge to the

new rates, holding that the entry of the Secretary’s order without

a full hearing was a denial of the “requirements of fairness which

are the essence of due process” (Morgan v. United States, 304

U. S. 1, 19 (1938)). On remand, the District Court held that

by virtue of this Court’s decision the plaintiff stockyard operators

were automatically entitled to restitution of all of the money

which had been placed in the escrow fund during the pendency

of the litigation. But when the case was appealed for the second

time, this Court held that the stockyard operators could recover

only that portion of the escrow fund which the Secretary deter-

mined to have been collected pursuant to rates that were not

unreasonably high. In reaching that result, this Court con-

cluded that the District Court had erred in failing to apply the

“unjust enrichment” test promulgated in Atlantic Coast Line,

and that the Secretary of Agriculture had the power to determine

the reasonableness of the rates charged during the prior period

(307 U. S. at 195-198).

Petitioners contend that Atlantic Coast Line is not relevant

here because the I. C. C. order involved there was invalidated

because of the inadequacy of the Commission’s findings—which,

according to petitioners, did not constitute a violation of “due

(Continued from preceding page)

specified in those tariffs, because 49 U. S. C. § 1373(b) provides

that “No air carrier * * * shall charge or demand or collect or receive

a greater or less or different compensation for air transportation, or

for any service in connection therewith, than the rates, fares, and

charges specified in its currently effective tariffs * * *.”

16

process” comparable to that which allegedly occurred when the

Civil Aeronautics Board entered its September 12, 1969 order

(Pet. pp. 6-8). But it is clear from the Atlantic Coast Line

opinion that this Court’s decision there was not affected in

any way by the reason for the invalidity of the questioned

I. C. C. order. Furthermore, the petition here does not even

mention the Morgan case, where this Court held that the prin-

ciples enunciated in Atlantic Coast Line were applicable as

grounds for denying restitution even though the Secretary of

Agriculture had established new rates without a full hearing,

in a manner which this Court had characterized as a denial. of

the “requirements of fairness which are the essence of due

process” (304 U. S. 1, 19).*

Petitioners assert that “this entire case turns upon one ques-

tion of law”— namely, whether the Civil Aeronautics Board’s

September 12, 1969 order was merely voidable (as the Court of

Appeals held), or was void ab initio (Pet. pp. 9-10). Their

theory is that the decision of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals in Moss I (430 F. 2d 891) retroactively voided that

Board order and the October 1969 tariffs established pursuant

thereto, thereby reinstating the prior tariffs and entitling peti-

tioners to recover all amounts which they paid for domestic

air transportation in excess of the amounts specified in those

prior tariffs.** This Court, however, rejected that “void ab

* Moreover, although petitioners assert that “the denial of a

hearing granted by statute is a denial of due process of law” (Pet.

p. 6), that principle applies only where persons subject to quasi-

judicial action were deprived of hearing rights in conjunction with

decisions that impinged upon their individual interests. Questions

regarding public participation in rate-making proceedings, on the

other hand, are not of constitutional significance. Professor Davis

affirms this long-established principle, on the basis of numerous well-

known decisions, in his Administrative Law Treatise, § 7.06; see

also, §§ 7.01, 7.02, 7.04 and 7.20 thereof, particularly § 7.04.

* * This “void ab initio” argument is advanced by petitioners in

reliance upon Moss I, even though the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals clearly explained in Moss II that its opinion in Moss I

could not properly afford any basis for such an argument. See, 521

F. 2d 307.309, 314-315; Appendix B, pp. A27 through A31, A42.

17

initio” theory in Atlantic Coast Line and again in Morgan.

In Atlantic Coast Line, this Court held expressly that the

I. C. C.’s failure to make adequate findings in support of its

order did not render that order void ab initio (295 U. S. at 311).

Similarly in Morgan, this Court held that the Secretary of Agri-

culture’s later-invalidated order was voidable, rather than void,

Stating:

“* * * There [in Atlantic Coast Line}, as here, * * *

the higher rates exacted between the date of the first order

and the second were without the sanction of a valid order.

But there, as here, the first administrative order was not

a nullity. * * * Though voidable, it could not be ignored.”

(307 U. S. at 195-196).

And, as noted above, this Court reached that conci:sioa in

Morgan despite the fact that the “first administrative order” in

question there had been entered without a full hearing, under

circumstances which this Court characterized as a denial of

the “requirements of fairness which are the essence of due

process”.

Thus it is clear that the “one question of law” propounded by

petitioners has been answered unequivocally by the controlling

decisions of this Court, and that the Civil Aeronautics Board’s

September 12, 1969 order was not “void ab initio”, but rather

was merely voidable. That fact is unquestionably dispositive

here, because even petitioners have conceded that if that order

was merely voidable, the Board’s subsequent “findings related

to reasonableness and equity [of the fares in question] * * *

would be controlling” (Pet. p. 10).

In an attempt to avoid the effect of Atlantic Coast Line and

Morgan, petitioners contend that the decision in this case should

be governed by United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv-

ice Corp., 350 U. S. 332 (1956) (Pet. pp. 6-7). Petitioners,

however, have failed to disclose several critical facts which ren-

der that decision totally inapposite here. United Gas Pipe Line

Co. was decided under the Natural Gas Act, and the rate pro-

18

visions of that statute ave substantially different from the rate pro-

visions of the Federal Aviation Act, because the Natural Gas

Act contemplates private rate agreements rather than tariffs

which establish uniform rates for all customers (shippers and

passengers). In United Gas Pipe Line Co. this Court held sim-

ply that a natural gas company could not unilaterally change

the terms of its contract to furnish gas to a distributing com-

pany, merely by filing with the Federal Power Commission a

schedule calling for rates higher than those specified in the

contract. Accordingly, this Court’s decision permitting the dis-

tributing company to recover the amounts which it had paid

in excess of the contractual rates manifestly does not support

petitioners’ contention that they are entitled to restitution even

though they suffered no injury by paying the fares in question

(and the defendant air carriers were not unjustly enriched by

collecting those fares). The other cases cited in the Petition are

similarly inapposite, and need not even be discussed here. It

suffices to say that none of the cases cited by petitioners involved

a situation where an administrative agency rate order was set

aside on procedural grounds, and subsequent corrective hearings

held by that administrative agency established that the rates

imposed pursuant to the procedurally defective order were just

and reasonable.

Finally, petitioners contend that it was inappropriate for the

District Court to rely on the determination by the Civil Aero-

nautics Board that the fares were not unjust or unreasonable

(Pet. p. 9). That contention, however, is refuted by Atlantic

Coast Line (where this Court held expressly that the I. C. C. had

the power to determine whether the rates charged pursuant to

its later-invalidated order had been just and reasonable) and by

Morgan (where this Court held that the plaintiffs’ mght to

recover the sums held in the escrow fund established by the Dis-

trict Court depended upon a determination by tht Secretary of

Agriculture as to whether the old rates had been unreasonably

high). Moreover, the Civil Aeronautics Board determined the

|

19

reasonableness of the fares at issue here in a proceeding which

it instituted in response to a complaint filed by Congressman

Moss, ef al. shortly after the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals announced its decision in Moss I reversing the Board’s

September 12, 1969 order and remanding the matter to the

Board “for further proceedings”; the Board’s determination

that those fares were not unjust or unreasonable subsequently was

affirmed by that same Court of Appeals in Moss II. Clearly, then,

it was appropriate for the District Court to rely on the Board’s

determination as to the reasonableness of the fares in question,

because that unquestionably is a matter within the Board’s ex-

clusive primary jurisdiction (for the reasons established by a

long line of this Court’s decisions, beginning with Texas & P.

Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (1907), and

summarized in such cases as Far East Conference v. United

States, 342 U. S. 570, 574-75 (1952), and United States v.

Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1956)).

CONCLUSION

Thus it is clear that the decision of the Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit is in complete accord with the controlling

principles of law established by this Court’s prior decisions, and

is not in any way inconsistent with those decisions or in conflict

with the decision of any other Court of Appeals. The Seventh

Circuit in its decision below, the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals in Moss II, Judge Napoli in his decision staying the

consolidated damage actions pending further proceedings before

the Civil Aeronautics Board, and Judge Will in his order dismiss-

ing these actions, agreed unanimously as to the legal principles

controlling here——principles long established by this Court's

directly relevant decisions in Morgan and Atlantic Coast Line.

Moreover, petitioners have failed to demonstrate any other reason

why this Court should exercise its discretionary powers to

20

review the decision of the Seventh Circuit. Consequently, the

petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

H. TEMPLETON BROWN,

BRYSON P. BURNHAM,

LEE N. ABRAMS,

STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO,

Attorneys for Respondents American

Airlines, Inc. and Trans World

Airlines, Inc.

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT,

231 South LaSaile Street,

Chicago, Illinois 60604,

312—ST2-0600,

Of Counsel.

April 6, 1976.

Al

APPENDIX A.

UNITED STATES DisTRICT COURT,

N. D. Illinois, E. D.

Jan. 12, 1972.

ALAN WEIDBERG, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 70 C 1879 and Related Cases.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.

NAPOLI, District Judge.

This Multidistrict Litigation was transferred to this court for

consolidated pretrial proceedings by the Judicial Panel on

Multidistrict Litigation pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(a),

In re Air Fare Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1013 (1971). The Panel

realized that the seven actions which were filed in the wake of

the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

in Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 139 U. S. App. D. C.

150, 430 F. 2d 891 (1970) presented our federal judiciary with

the problem of conflicting and overlapping class actions. Under

these circumstances the Panel held that common questions of

fact existed justifying a transfer under § 1407 in regard to the

problem of the makeup, potential overlapping and damages to

A2

the purported classes. Therefore, five actions pending in districts

other than the Northern District of Illinois were transferred to

this district, considered by the Panel to be the most convenient

for all concerned, and have been consolidated with the two

actions currently pending before this court.

The factual situation involved in this litigation is most

thoroughly recited in the Moss opinion at 430 F. 2d 891.

Hence this court will only summarize those facts which are nec-

essary for an understanding of the issues currently before the

court. Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U. S. C.

§ 1301 et seq. (1970), the air carriers must file with the Civil

Aeronautics Board (hereinafter C. A. B. or Board) and keep

open to public inspection tariffs showing their fares for air

transportation; § 1373(a). The carriers are prohibited from

charging or collecting any compensation which varies from the

tariffs on file or from granting rebates or refunds therefrom, with

certain exceptions not applicable here; § 1373(b). The carriers

may change the tariffs by filing with the Board and posting

amended tariffs thirty days before their effective date; § 1373(c).

However, the C. A. B. itself is authorized to prescribe a lawful

rate to be charged when it is of the opinion that the present rate

is unjust or unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, preferen-

tial, or prejudicial; § 1482(d). It must, however, give notice

and conduct a hearing before exercising this power. Subsection

(e) of § 1482 enumerates the substantive standards the Board

is directed to consider in determining rates and subsection (g)

empowers it to suspend any newly filed tariff, pending a hear-

ing regarding the tariffs lawfulness, if it provides the affected

carrier with a statement of reasons therefor.

Petitioners in Moss, some 32 Congressmen, had complained to

the C. A. B. concerning its practice of holding ex parte meetings

with representatives of the carriers. Despite these complaints, the

meetings ripened into new tariffs increasing passenger fares

which were filed by 20 of the main domestic air carriers in

August of 1969.

A3

On September 12, 1969, the Board issued Order 69-9-68,

docket 21322 which suspended the carriers’ tariffs under § 1482

(g) on the grounds that said tariffs “may be unjust [or] unreason-

able.” The Order further found that the carriers were in need

of additional revenue due to increased expenses and proposed

its own fare formula, which would in effect grant a revenue in-

crease of 6.35%, and announced that such tariffs would be ac-

ceptable without suspension. Predictably, the carriers withdrew

their suspended tariffs and filed new tariffs in accordance with

the C. A. B.’s formula all of which became effective on or by

October 15, 1969.

A petition for review of the C. A. B.’s order was filed in the

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by the Moss

petitioners which resulted in that court holding that the October

1969 tariffs filed by the carriers actually constituted rate making

by the Board under § 1482(d) and that as such the C. A. B.’s

order and rates were invalid and unlawful for failure to com-

ply with that section’s notice and hearing provisions. The court

remanded the case to the C. A. B. for further proceedings. Also,

the Moss petitioners filed a supplemental complaint with the

Board asking that it conduct a proceeding to determine the

appropriate relief for the carriers’ customers who paid the now

uniawful fares. An investigation entitled “Reasonableness of

Passenger Fares charged by Domestic Trunkline and Local

Service Carriers from October 1, 1969, through October 14,

1970”, was initiated by the Board’s Order 71-2-109, docket

23140 in response to these events.

Following the Moss decision, these seven lawsuits were filed,

as hereinbefore mentioned, each claiming to represent the class,

or a part thereof, of the public who paid the alleged over-

charges as a result of the unlawful fares. Following their transfer

to this court, the air carrier defendants have moved to stay the

proceedings herein, pending completion of the C. A. B. investi-

gation. In support of this motion, defendants assert that the

only possible claim for relief of plaintiffs, if any, is upon the

A4+

theory of unjust enrichment which depends upon the reasonable-

ness vel non of the unlawful fares. They also assert that the

issue of reasonableness is the central facet of this case because

the Federal Aviation Act (hereinafter “Act”) makes the im-

plied standards for fares or rates that of justness and reasonable-

ness, as well as the fact that the carriers are undoubtedly en-

titled to a reasonable rate of return for their services. Further,

they claim that the question of the reasonableness of the fares

is a matter within the primary jurisdiction of the C. A. B., hence

these proceedings should be stayed. Plaintiffs in opposition state

that their theory of recovery is not necessarily unjust enrich-

ment, making the question of reasonableness immaterial and

their claim for relief is independent of the Act. They also as-

sert that the C. A. B. has no jurisdiction, primary or otherwise,

over this cause as the issues are questions of law, not fact;

that the C. A. B. has no power to conduct investigations or

determine retroactively, reasonableness of fares; and that it has

no power to award reparations. Finally, plaintiffs charge that the

only currently effective tariffs the carriers could charge under

§ 1373(b) were the original tariffs on file before the carriers

filed their new tariffs in August 1969. Consequently, plaintiffs

believe themselves to be entitled to recover without considera-

tion of the reasonableness of the unlawful fares.

The decisions in the field of administrative law overwhelm-

ingly support the proposition that if the issue in controversy

involves the reasonableness of fares, then that question falls

within the primary jurisdiction of the appropriate administrative

agency and this court should defer to such agency for the initial

determination. See, e.g., Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene

Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed 2d 553

(1907); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public

Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 71 S. Ct. 692, 95 L. Ed.

912 (1951); Civil Aeronautics Board v. Modern Air Transport,

179 F. 2d 622 (2nd Cir. 1950); Lichten v. Eastern Airlines,

189 F. 2d 939 (2nd Cir., 1951); and Tishman & Lipp, Inc. Vv.

AS

Delta Airlines, 275 F. Supp. 471 (S. D. N. Y. 1967), affirmed

413 F. 2d 1401 (2nd Cir. 1969). The doctrine of primary

jurisdiction serves as a flexible guide for the courts in determining

whether it will be more efficacious for the judiciary or an

administrative body to make the initial determination of the

question in issue. Therefore it is not technically a question of

“jurisdiction” but rather a matter of judicial self restraint in

conformance with comity and a healthy respect for the

statutory authority of the administrative agency. The rationale

of the doctrine is a recognition of the need for an orderly co-

ordination of work between the judiciary and administrative

bodivs for the reason that those bodies can apply their knowl-

edge or expertise to the question and thereby aid the court by

laying a foundation for a more intelligent disposition of the

question as well as insuring uniformity of result. See, Davis,

Administrative Law Treatise (West Publishing Co. 1958)

§ 19.01 et seq. As such, this court believes that a stay in pro-

ceedings while this cause is referred to the C. A. B. would be

a matter within its sound discretion. Ratner v. Chemical Bank

New York Trust Co., 309 F. Supp. 983 (S. D. N. Y. 1970).

Since the question of the reasonableness vel non of the fares

falls within the primary jurisdiction of the C. A. B., the plain-

tiffs in order to avoid a stay must proceed on the theory either

that they have a claim for relief independent of unjust en-

richment, which would rest upon common-law or statutory con-

struction, or that they are absolutely entitled to recover due to

the declaration of unlawfulness by the Moss court. At the ex-

pense of lengthening this opinion the court will turn to and

examine the pertinent authorities and arguments of the re-

spective parties on these issues.

The case which presents the most factual similarity to this

litigation is Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Florida, 295

U. S. 301, 55 S. Ct. 713, 79 L. Ed 1451 (1935) and is cited by

defendants for the proposition that the only theory of recovery

is unjust enrichment. In Atlantic Coast the carrier collected a

A6

higher set of rates which had been prescribed by order of the

Interstate Commerce Commission upon its finding that the

original rates were unjustly discriminatory. Previously the

Supreme Court held that the ICC’s order was unlawful for want

of complete and adequate findings of fact. New findings were

subsequently made, supporting the same schedule of rates, and

were upheld by the high Court. Various shippers and the

State of Florida sued to recover the increase in rates collected

before the rate schedule was supported by valid findings.

Mr. Justice Cardozo for the Court considered the action to

be one for money had and received which is founded in equity,

and analogized with an action to recover a satisfaction of

judgment which is later reversed. It was stated:

The claimant, to prevail, must show that the money was

received in such circumstances that the possessor will give

offense to equity and good conscience if permitted to re-

tain it. (Citations omitted). The question no longer is

whether the law will put him in possession of the money

if the transaction were a new one. The question is whether

the law will take it out of his possession after he had been

able to collect it.

295 U. S., at 309-310, 55 S. Ct., at 716-717.

In this type of situation, Cardozo applied the test as follows:

To prevail, the claimants must make out that in the cir-

cumstances here developed a fixed and certain duty has

been laid upon a court of equity to make the carrier pay

the price of the blunders of the commerce board in draw-

ing up its findings.

295 U. S., at 314, 55 S. Ct., at 718.

Thus Atlantic Coast does not adopt any rigid formula for

recovery; rather the equities of the cause as set forth in the

context of the factual circumstances will serve as the polestar for

a court of equity in reaching a decision. In that case, restitution

was ultimately denied due to the inequity of the shippers’ posi-

tion, in that the original rates were so unreasonably low as to

A7 -

be confiscatory. The decisive element in the Court's weighing

of the respective equities appears to have been the reason-

ableness of the schedule of rates. Supporting this interpretation

is Cardozo’s statement in reversing the decree of the district

court that:

The claimants do not sustain the burden that is theirs by

showing that the master set up a reasonable schedule

{allowing partial restitution to the shippers]. They must

show that the other schedule, the one set up by the [Inter-

state Commerce] Commission, is unreasonable. In the ab-

sence of such a showing the carrier does not offend against

equity and good conscience in standing on its possession

and keeping what it got.

295 U. S., at 318, 55 S. Ct., at 720.

This court believes with only the possible reservation to be

mentioned infra that the last quoted passage from Aflantic

Coast is a more accurate description of the holding in that case

than to say that plaintiffs must proceed upon the theory of

unjust enrichment. Defendants can not impose their theory of

recovery upon the plaintiffs’ claim for relief; however, the court

agrees that there is considerable merit in the position that in

weighing the equities of this case, the question of the reasonable-

ness of the fares will play an important or even decisive role.

Paraphrasing Cardozo, in order for plaintiffs to prevail it must

appear that the equities are so in favor of the plaintiffs that this

court is duty bound to make the air carriers pay a considerable

sum as reparations for the blunder of the C. A. B. There is no

question that the air carriers have the right to seek increased

fares, subject to the suspension power of the C. A. B. The Moss

court found the fares to be unlawful not because they were un-

just or unreasonable, or that they violated the substantive rate

making factors contained within § 1482(e) as plaintiffs claim,

but rather for the reason that the C. A. B. failed to give notice

and conduct a hearing in prescribing rates under § 1482(d).

Despite the scathing criticism of the C. A. B. by the Moss

A8

court, this court’s reading of the Moss opinion leads it to the

conclusion that the defect in the administrative proceeding was

of a procedural nature. Thus, the question of the reasonableness

vel non of the unlawful fares becomes particularly appropriate in

weighing the equities of the respective parties.

If a determination of unreasonableness is made, coupled with

the Moss court’s decision holding the C. A. B.’s order and its

fares invalid then there is a basis for finding that the retention

by the air carriers of the increase of the fares would violate

equity and good conscience. The Act implies that fares should

be just and reasonable, as well as not discriminatory, prejudicial

or preferential. If the fares are found to be reasonable, on the

other hand, then the only equity on plaintiffs’ side is the pro-

cedural defect committed by the C. A. B. Since the Act allows

reasonable fares and it can not be doubted that the carriers are

entitled to a reasonable rate of return, plaintiffs would have a

weak case if the fares were reasonable and just. Another factor

to be weighed in this regard is the admonition of § 1373(b)

against a carrier charging any fare other “than the rates, fares,

and charges specified in its currently effective tariffs.” The car-

riers had no way of determining that the C. A. B.’s order and

their fares would be invalidated by the Moss court. They take

the position that it was their statutory obligation to charge the

fares filed with the Board but subsequently found to be defec-

tive. Plaintiffs counter with the argument that the Moss court’s

decision voided these fares ab initio. Since the tariffs filed by the

carriers and suspended by the C. A. B. had thereupon been

withdrawn by the carriers, the only remaining tariffs which

could possibly be the currently effective tariffs were the original,

pre-October 1969 tariffs which the carriers sought to increase.

The plaintiffs then conclude that § 1373(b) forbade the car-

riers from charging any but the 1969 fares and that they are

ipso facto entitled to restitution for violation of the statute. Mr.

Justice Cardozo dealt with a similar issue in Atlantic Coast and

held that an order of an administrative body found to be void

for a procedural defect is only voidable, and he further stated:

A9

The carrier was not at liberty to take the law into its own

hands and refuse submission to the order without the

sanction of a court. It would have exposed itself to suits

and penalties, both criminal and civil, if it had followed

such a path. . . . Obedience was owing while the order was

in force.

295 U. S., at 311, 55 S. Ct., at 717.

This court believes that the same is true under the Act in ques-

tion in this case. Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, supra. The tariffs

filed with the Board but subsequently found to be unlawful were

voidable due to the C. A. B.’s error; until a court of proper ju-

risdiction declared them to be unlawful, however, they were the

only tariffs which were on file with the C. A. B. and were the

only “currently effective” tariffs. Any other result would create

chaos and destroy the purpose of the Act: uniformity of treat-

ment. A contrary holding would allow or compel a carrier to

charge a fare at variance with its filed tariffs on the pretext that

it may be procedurally defective. Under such a situation, plain-

tiffs’ construction of § 1373(b) would in fact undermine and

destroy the very purpose of that section. Therefore, this court

believes that until an order or tariff of the C. A. B. has been

administratively or judicially overturned the carriers are bound

by it. See, Alco-Gravure Div. of Publications Corp. v. American

Airlines, 173 F. Supp. 752 (D. Maryland 1959).

Of course, the respective equities will depend upon the entire

circumstances of the case, of which the question of reasonable-

ness is but one, albeit an important factor to be considered.

As was mentioned earlier in this opinion, the question of the

reasonableness of any fare or tariff is within the primary juris-

diction of the appropriate administrative agency. See, e.g. Texas

& Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., supra. The ration-

ale for this doctrine was said to be in the Abilene case the

policy of the statute providing for uniformity of treatment. It was

thought that such uniformity would be impossible if individual

courts were free to pass on the question of reasonableness—the

Al0

spectre of different juries reaching conflicting results was suffi-

cient to lead the court to decline involvement in the question in

favor of the administrative bodies.

Thus far this opinion has mainly relied upon cases decided

under the Interstate Commerce Act. Since this case will turn on

another statute, the Federal Aviation Act, it is appropriate to

consider whether this analysis will change under the different

act. .

The case of Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F. 2d 939 (2nd

Cir. 1951) is one of the more prominent cises decided under

the Federal Aviation Act dealing with primary jurisdiction.

There, the reasonableness of a tariff containing an exculpatory

clause was challenged. In holding that the question was one

properly for the C. A. B. to handle rather than the court, the

court cited Abilene and emphasized the necessity for uniformity

of decisions on the question. In C. A. B. v. Modern Air Trans-

port, supra, it was also held that the question of reasonableness

is within the primary jurisdiction of the Board, but in that case

the court held that it could interpret the C. A. B.’s regulations

and determine whether or not there had been a violation thereof.

See, also Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, supra, and

Furrow & Co. Vv. American Airlines, 102 F. Supp. 808 (W. D.

Okla. 1952). It should also be noted that the decision in Aflantic

Coast dealt with the theory of recovery when an administrative

body has committed procedural error and was not limited to

interpreting or depending upon the Interstate Commerce Act.

Therefore, the court believes that opinion sufficiently broad in

scope to be applicable to the case at bar.

One problem is presented by two Supreme Court decisions.

In Abilene and T. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S.

464, 79 S. Ct. 904, 3 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1959) it was held for

different reasons that a court had no power to hear a claim for

reparations which was based upon a challenge to the reason-

ableness of tariffs. Abilene was decided under Part I of the Inter-

state Commerce Act which provides for the award by the I. C. C.

All

of reparations and for private cause of action for violation of its

terms. The court held, despite a broad savings clause, that a

common-law cause of action would be “absolutely inconsistent”

with the purpose of the Act, which is to insure uniformity of

rates, and is abrogated by the statutory remedy. 7. J. M. E. was

decided under the Motor Carriers portion of the Interstate Com-

merce Act which at that time did not provide for reparations to

be awarded by the administrative agency nor for a private

cause of action, which in this respect is similar to the Federal

Aviation Act. That court refused to imply a statutory action and

further held that the absence of a reparation provision within

the Act was indicative of a Congressional intent to abrogate any

claims for relief including those at common-law. Thus, if an

analogy can be drawn between the Federal Aviation Act and

these portions of the Interstate Commerce Act, no claim for

relief may exist. However, it is not appropriate at this time to

reach a decision on this question. The investigation of the C. A.

B. into the question of the reasonableness of fares in question

may render moot this difficult problem. Also, the factual situ-

ations and statutes involved in these two cases are different from

those in this litigation and the cases may not be applicable.

Therefore, this court believes that the most expeditious and effi-

cient course of action for this litigation would be to by-pass this

problem, which counsel have not dealt with in depth in their

respective memoranda, since it is an issue collateral to the mo-

tion currently before the court, until a determination of the rea-

sonableness vel non of the fares has been made.

While the main arguments of the plaintiffs have been con-

sidered and dealt with earlier in this opinion, the court will

briefly comment on their remaining issues. Certain plaintiffs

attempt to distinguish the Atlantic Coast decision from Moss

on the ground that the defect in the former was procedural

while in the latter it was a violation of the substantive rate mak-

ing standards contained within the statute. This court can not

agree and reads Moss as invalidating the order and fares of

Al2

the C. A. B. on the grounds that the second tariffs filed by the

Cafriers in response to the C. A. B.’s suggested formula con-

stituted rate making by the Board. As such, a hearing after

due notice was required by the statute and, as admitted by the

C. A. B., was not held. Basically, for the reasons that judicial

review was in this manner frustrated and that the public was

effectively excluded from the decision making process, the

Moss court overturned the increased fares. This, in the court’s

opinion, was a procedural defect, and it believes that the quota-

tions of plaintiffs are taken out of the full context of the Moss

opinion.

Also, plaintiffs contend that the C. A. B. has no power to

grant reparations or to investigate into the past unreasonableness

of a tariff. While the first statement is certainly true, it does

not follow that any action or investigation of the C. A. B. must

prove to be futile for that reason. The doctrine of primary

jurisdiction is predicated upon the rationale of the administrative

agency laying a foundation for a more informed decision by

the court. Therefore, power to issue a final order adjudicating

the claims or granting relief on the part of the agency is not

necessary before a question can be referred to such an agency.

The Act also grants general investigatory powers to the Board

and the Atlantic Coast decision supports the theory that the

agency may conduct an investigation in these circumstances.

Plaintiffs cite the cases of J. C. C. v. Louisville & Nashville

R. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431 (1913)

and Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245

U. S. 531, 38 S. Ct. 186, 62 L. Ed. 451 (1918). The court

finds that these cases are inapplicable for the reason that in

those instances the appropriate administrative agency had prior

to the litigation considered the reasonableness of the tariffs.

The first case stands only for the proposition that the findings

of the I. C. C. are prima facie correct rather than conclusive.

The latter case held that the party who was charged excessive

freight charges was damaged despite the possibility that it may

Al3

have passed on the overpayments to its customers. Finally, the

case of United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.,

350 U. S. 332, 76 S. Ct. 373, 100 L. Ed. 373 (1956) is also

distinguishable since it was decided under the entirely different

statutory rate making scheme of the Natural Gas Act.

Finally, the court notes that the origin of this litigation

arose with the C. A. B. and the Court of Appeals for the Dis-

trict of Columbia. That Court reversed the order of the Board

and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. In response

to that remand and the supplemental complaint of the Moss

petitioners, the C. A. B. initiated its present investigation. For

this court to enjoin this investigation as plaintiffs have requested

or to conduct an independent and duplicative determination of

the same or similar question as being considered by the Board

would, in effect, be an infringement upon the jurisdiction of

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. This court

is unaware of any precedent granting to a district court the

power to interfere with the orders or mandate of a Court of

Appeals of another circuit.

Accordingiy, the defendants’ motion for a stay is granted

and all proceedings in this litigation are ordered to be held in

abeyance until further order of this court. The purpose of

this stay is to await the findings of the C. A. B. on the question

of the reasonableness vel non of the fares charged between

October 1969 and October 1970. The parties are expected to

aid such investigation and are urged to participate therein. The

court also expects liaison counsel for the plaintiffs and defend-

ants to periodically inform the court as to the progress of those

proceedings.

It is so ordered.

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APPENDIX B.

UNITED STATES CoURT OF APPEALS,

District of Columbia Circuit.

Nos. 73-1772, 73-1790.

Oct, 16, 1975.

JOHN E. Moss et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

CrviL AERONAUTICS BOARD,

Respondent,

NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., TRANS

WorLpD AIRLINES, INC., CONTINENTAL AIR LINEs, INC.,

EASTERN AIR LINEs, INc., DELTA ArR LINES, INC., KEITH

ROBERTS, ALLEGHENY AIRLINES, INC., AND NORTH CENTRAL

AIRLINES, INC., UNITED AIR LINEs, INC., WESTERN AIR

LinEs, INc., HUGHES AIRWEST ef al., BRANIFF AIRWAYS, INC.,

AND NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., INTERVENORS.

KEITH ROBERTS,

Petitioner,

vs.

Crvit AERONAUTICS BOARD,

Respondent,

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., CON-

TINENTAL AIR LINES, INC., EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., DELTA

Ar LINES, INC., ALLEGHENY AIRLINES, INC., AND NORTH

CENTRAL AIRLINES, INC., UNITED Arr LINEs, INC., HUGHES

AIRWEST, FRONTIER, ef al., TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,

NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., AND BRANIFF AIRWAYS, INC.,

INTERVENORS.

a eta i tee ck)

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Before J. EDWARD LUMBARD, Senior Circuit Judge for the

Second Circuit, and MCGowan and RoBINsoN, Circuit Judges.

McGowan, Circuit Judge:

This case comes in the aftermath of Moss v. CAB, 139 U. S.

App. D. C. 150, 430 F. 2d 891 (1970), which invalidated cer-

tain airline passenger fares made etfective by the Civil Aero-

nautics Board in violation of Section 1002 of the Federal

Aviation Act. 49 U. S. C. § 1482 (1970). The question now is

whether there is to be a recovery of any part of those unlawful

fares. The Board has denied such relief on the grounds that the

fares in question were not unjust or unreasonable, and, in any

case, resulted in no unjust enrichment of the airlines. We con-

clude that these decisional principles are determinative, and that

they were correctly applied. Accordingly, we affirm.’

I.

The history of this case is quite involved, and may best be

set out chronologically:

August 20, 1969. Petitioners Moss, et al., requested the

Board to suspend a number of proposed fare increases

claimed by the airlines to be necessary to offset sharp in-

flation in their costs and decline in their revenues. Petition-

ers called at the same time for a rulemaking proceeding in

which the Board would undertake a general review of its

ratemaking practices.

1. Two petitions for review of the same Board order have been

consolidated. The first, No. 73-1772, was filed by Congressman

John E. Moss and some twenty-four colleagues. It is they who

instituted the Board proceedings culminating in the challenged order,

as it was they (or a similar group) who secured the ruling of this

court in Moss I. The second petition, No. 73-1790, was filed by

Keith Roberts, a plaintiff in one of several district court suits filed

after Moss I, in which relief was sought directly against the airlines.

Those suits having been continued pending the outcome of the Board

proceedings, petitioner Roberts successfully sought to intervene

before the Board. In addition to filing his own review petition in

this court, Roberts has also intervened in No. 73-1772. Some four-

teen airlines have intervened in both appeals, urging that the Board

be upheld.

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September 12, 1969. The Board issued Order 69-9-68,

in which it suspended the proposed rates. Recognizing an

urgent need for some additional revenue, however, the

Board in the same order identified a formula by which

the airlines could compute rate increases that would not be

suspended. Rate increases of approximately six percent,

as contemplated by the formula, were filed and became

effective as of October 1, 1969.

January 29, 1970. The Board instituted its Domestic

Passenger Fare Investigation, a broad inquiry into various

aspects of airline ratemaking. The DPFI was later divided

into nine separate phases: (1) aircraft depreciation; (2)

leased aircraft; (3) deferred federal income taxes; (4)

joint fares; (5) discount fares; (6) seating configurations

and load factors (subsequently made the subjects of sepa-

rate phases 6A and 6B, respectively); (7) fare levels; (8)

rate of return; and (9) fare structure.

June 19, 1970. The Board announced its intention to

allow the airlines to “round up” their October 1, 1969 fares

to the nearest dollar. The increase took effect July 1, 1970,

and yielded some $50 million in additional airline revenues.

July 9, 1970. This court rendered its decision in Moss I,

invalidating Order 69-9-68 and holding unlawful the fares

computed and charged pursuant to it. It was held that the

Board had “determined” rates within the meaning of

Section 1002(d) and (e) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49

U. S. C. § 1482(d) and (e) (1970), without complying

with the requirements of those sections that this be done

after notice and hearing, and by reference to statutory

ratemaking criteria. The case was remanded to the Board

for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion.

July 28, 1970. The Board continued the rounded-up

October 1, 1969, fares in effect, declaring that these were

the only ones that could be lawfully charged pending

establishment of new fares. Order 70-7-128. It called in the

same order for carrier filings of new fares to be effective

October 15, 1969, such fares to be “free of any compul-

sion that may have been inherent in the invalid Order

69-9-68.”

a A ae er

Res Ae bat 00 OO Ne al A ON omen

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July 29, 1970. The Board moved this court for a stay

of its mandate in Moss I for ninety days to permit establish-

ment of new fares in the manner described above. The stay

was granted.

September 24, 1970. The Board suspended all new fares

filed pursuant to its July 28 order, except those that re-

established the rounded-up October 1, 1969, fares. These

newly filed, though unchanged, fares were, in the Board’s

view, free of any compulsion from the order invalidated

in Moss I.

October 7, 1970. Petitioners requested this court to stay

its mandate in Moss I for a further period, and thus to

express its disapproval of the manner in which the Board

had re-established the rates. We were further requested to

order the Board to rule promptly on petitioners’ request

for relief from the fares held unlawful in Moss J. Both re-

quests were denied.

February 25, 1971. The Board initiated proceedings to

determine whether the rates charged between October 1,

1969, and October 15, 1970, were “unjust and unreason-

able.” The Board noted the pendency of a number of class

actions brought in district courts against the airlines for

recovery of part of the fares ruled unlawful in Moss I. On

February 19, 1971, these cases had been transferred by

the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation to the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Jn

re Air Fare Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1013 (Jud. Pan.

Mult. Lit., 1971). Partly in order to aid the Northern

District of Illinois to resolve these suits, the Board de-

ferred decision of the question of whether it had power to

grant relief, and proceeded directly to the question of the

reasonableness of the challenged fares. The class action

suits were in fact stayed pending the Board’s resolution

of that question, Weidberg v. American Airlines, 336 F.

Supp. 407 (N. D. Ill., 1972), and the suits were sub-

sequently dismissed on the basis of the Board order now

under review. Weidberg v. American Airlines, No. 70 C

1879 (N. D. Ill, filed Dec. 10, 1973).

April 9, 1971. The Board issued its final decision in

Phase 6B of the DPFI (load factors), and its tentative find-

ings and conclusions in Phase 7 of the DPFI (fare levels).

Al8

The latter proposed a fare level 12% higher than the

unlawful October 1, 1969 rates. After taking interim adjust-

ments into account, this higher level required an increase

of 9% in the then prevailing rates. The Board authorized

an increase of 6% pending its final decision in Phase 7.

(The Board’s final decision, affirming its tentative one,

came on August 11, 1973.)

May 7, 1971. Fare increases of 6%, as provided for in

the Board’s April 9 orders, went into effect. The lawfulness

of these rates has not been challenged by petitioners.

July 11, 1972, The Board issued Order 73-7-39, its final

decision denying relief from the rates found by this court

in Moss I to have been unlawfully “determined.”

July 16, 1973. Petitioners sought direct review in this

court of Order 73-7-39.

The foregoing is an account of three sets of interrelated pro-

ceedings before the Board, dealing with (1) the establishment

of lawful fares in place of those found unlawful in Moss I, (2)

the propriety of relief for the public from those unlawful rates,

and (3) the general matter of how rates were properly to be

set in the future. Since petitioners claim that lawful fares were

not re-established until May 7, 1971, they seek relief from

rates charged during the period running from that date back

to October 1, 1969.” This attempt to establish the unreasonable-

ness of rates charged during that period rests largely on the

retroactive application of standards set in the DPFI.

During the period in which the October 1, 1969, rates were

charged, the airlines did not in fact earn excessive profits from

their passenger operations. The average rate of return on such

2. Br. Petitioners at 9. There is dispute among the parties as to

when lawful passenger fares were re-established. The intervenors

claim, for example, that since petitioners made no attack upon the

boarac’s action in allowing. newly-filed but unchanged fares to go

into effect on October 15, 1970, the latter date marks the end of

the period for which relief could be sought, at least with the aid of

Moss I. Br. Intervenors Braniff Airways, et al. at 10. Since we find

that petitioners have not yet established their entitlement to relief

for any period, we need not resolve this dispute.

Al9

operations for the year ending September 30, 1970, was found

by the trial examiner to have been 3.29 percent in the case of

the trunk line carriers, and —.40 percent in the case of the local

carriers.* Petitioners do not challenge these findings. A fair and

reasonable rate of return had been established by the Board in

1960 in its General Passenger Fare Investigation at 10.5 per-

cent. This was increased in Phase 7 of the DPFI, concluded

in 1971, to 12 percent for the trunk lines and 12.35 percent for

the locals. Assuming, as the Board did, that a fair rate of re-

turn for the period in question lay somewhere between these

two figures, plainly it was not achieved. The poor performance

was nothing new. A return as high as 10 percent had been

achieved by the trunk lines during only two of the ten years

prior to 1970, the average for that decade being 6.2 percent.

App. 522.

Petitioners argue, however, that the absence of excessive

operating profits is not dispositive. They have instead made the

following claims:

(1) The right to recover passenger fares is not dependent on

their having been “unreasonable,” but solely on their having

exceeded the last preceding rates that were lawfully established

(i.e., the pre-October 1, 1969, rates).

(2) Even if recovery of unlawfully established rates is to

be had only to the extent that they exceeded what was “reason-

able,” such an excess existed here because

(a) the rate of return for the period in question should

be recomputed on the assumption that the airlines exper-

ienced the higher load factors which the Board determined

3. Initial Decision of Trial Examiner Ross I. Newmann at 23;

App. 504. The figures were derived by use of the so-called “by-

product” or “revenue-offset” method of allocating the costs of carry-

ing passengers and belly cargo. By this method the cost of belly

cargo is simply equated to the revenue it generates. The trial exa-

miner further found that the more refined “joint product” method, by

which the actual (and greater) costs of belly cargo are sought to be

identified, yielded r~ > figures, 4.19 percent and —.13 percent

respectively. Initial Decision at 23-24; App. 504-05.

A20

in Phase 6A of the DPFI should be the standard for the

future;

(b) the rate of return should be recomputed on the

assumption that all seats had been sold for full fares, with

a reduction or “dilution” on account of discount fares only

to the extent of 12 percent, this figure being regarded by

petitioners as reasonable in light of the Board’s determina

tion in Phase 5 of the DPFI that future fare levels would

be constructed on the assumption that no discounts were

offered at all;

_(c) the airlines’ “indirect” costs (those not directly

associated with the operation of aircraft) should be limited

to 48.4 percent of total costs, this standard also being one

that was allegedly adopted in the DPF!.

(3) Even if the general fare level did not yield profits which,

as properly recomputed, were “unreasonable,” recovery should

be had by those who paid unjustly discriminatory rates during

the period in question.

The Board gave varied responses to these claims.* The first

claim—that for a refund of all amounts charged in excess of pre-

October 1, 1969, rates—the Board dismissed on the basis of

contrary court decisions. The second set of claims—those at-

tempting to establish the unreasonableness of charged rates by

the retroactive application of standards adopted in the DPF/—

the Board turned aside in two ways. It found in some instances

that the fares were not unreasonable even if tested by the ap-

propriate rate making standards. In other instances, however,

it declined to apply those standards retroactively because doing

so would be “inequitable.” The Board’s response to the third

claim—that based on fare structure—was cast even more clearly

in terms of the equity of recovery rather than the propriety of

the fares.

4. See generally CAB Order No. 73-7-39, July 11, 1973; App.

732.

A21

Il.

There are a number of vexing questions presented by this

appeal. Is there any right of recovery for previously charged

and properly filed airline iares?® If so, who may grant it: the

Board, this court, a district court, or some combination?® And

what is the standard of recovery, assuming it is the same in the

various forums which may grant it? We need only address the

last of these questions, for we find that the proper standard for

recovery is such as to preclude relief to these petitioners in any

forum—at least at this stage of the proceedings.

As there is scant precedent for the granting or denial of

recovery of unlawful airline fares,’ we begin with a brief review

of the problem as it has arisen in analogous regulatory con-

texts.

5. Compare T.1.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S. 464, 79

S. Ct. 904, 3 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1959) (absence of reparations power

in ICC precludes recovery for unreasonable motor carrier rates),

with Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U. S.

84, 83 S. Ct. 157, 9 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1962) (shippers could recover

for misrouting by motor carriers). These cases are discussed at

greater length below.

6. All four possibilities are presented in this appeal. The district

judge before whom the class actions were consolidated, see, ........

Be ABB. BD. Gy ccescess , 521 F. 2d 301, supra, apparently assumed

that he could grant relief based on a Board finding that the fares in

question were unreasonable. 336 F. Supp. 407 (N. D. Ill. 1972).

The Board itself was of course requested to grant relief. Having failed

in that forum, petitioners now urge that we as an appellate court

exercise an inherent authority to order restitution ourselves, as osten-

sibly we did in Williams v. Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 134

U.S. App. D. C. 342, 415 F. 2d 922 (1968), cert. denied, 393 VU. S.

1081, 89 S. Ct. 860, 21 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1969).

7. The only precedent known to us is Danna v. Air France, 334

F. Supp. 52 (S. D. N. Y. 1971), in which recovery was sought of

allegedly discriminatory passenger fares. The district judge dis-

missed on the ground that 7./.M.E., Inc. v. United States, see note

5 supra, barred any recovery. The judgement was affirmed, but on

the more limited ground that recovery must in any case await a deter-

mination by the Board that the fares in question were indeed unlaw-

fully discriminatory. 463 F. 2d 407 (2d Cir. 1972).

A22

(a) Interstate Commerce Commission.

Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act explicitly imposes upon

subject rail carriers a liability, enforceable either before the

ICC or in a district court, for violation of the Act’s commands,

among them that just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates

be charged.* The standard of recovery is, of course, justness and

reasonableness, a matter within the Commission’s primary

jurisdiction.* There is no comparable right of recovery expressly

given by the Federal Aviation Act for unlawful airline rates.

Still, there is at least one railroad rate case that is highly relevant

to our problem. In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Florida, 295

U. S. 301, 55 S. Ct. 713, 79 L. Ed. 1451 (1935), recovery was

sought of rate increases which the Commission had itself ordered

into effect, assertedly to prevent a discrimination against inter-

state commerce. The Commission’s order was judicially reversed

for lack of adequate factual findings. The Commission sub-

sequently issued new and more ample findings, re-established

exactly the same rates, and was this time upheld in the courts. In

these circumstances, the Commission was thought to be “without

power to give reparation” for the improperly established rates.

295 U. S. at 312, 55 S. Ct. 713. The ratepayers’ only remedy

was for restitution, which Justice Cardozo described as follows:

A cause of action for restitution is a type of the broader

cause of action for money had and received, a remedy

which is equitable in origin and function. . . . The claimant

to prevail must show that the money was received in such

8. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(5), 3(1), 8, 9 (1970). A similar regimen

applies to water carriers subject to Part III of the Interstate Com-

merce Act. See 49 U. S. C. §§ 901 et seg., 908 (1970).

9. Compare Texas & P. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S.

426, 448, 27 S. Ct. 350, 358, 51 L. Ed. 553 (1907) (“a shipper

seeking reparation predicated upon the unreasonableness of the es-

tablished rate must, under the act to regulate commerce, primarily

invoke the redress through the Interstate Commerce Commission”),

with J. C. Famechon Co. Vv. Northern P. R.R., 23 F. 2d 307 (8th

Cir. 1927) (primary resort to Commission not necessary where issue

is legal construction of filed tariff).

A23

circumstances that the possessor will give offense to ec “ty

and good conscience if permitted to retain it.

Id. at 309, 55 S. Ct. at 716. In concluding that equity required

no restitution—not even the partial restitution the lower court

had granted—the Court relied primarily on the fact that follow-

ing its earlier reversal the Commission had made new and proce-

durally adequate findings that the invalidated rates had in fact

been just and reasonable.’°

Interstate motor carriers are now subject to the same express

statutory liability for unreasonable rates as are the railroads."

Prior to 1965, however, the Commission was, with respect to

motor carriers, in the same position as the Board—lacking any

express reparation or refund power. That lack was held by the

Supreme Court in T. J. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S.

464, 79 S. Ct. 904, 3 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1959), to preclude

recovery by the payers of unreasonable motor carrier rates, at

least where the claim was made by way of a defense in an action

by the carrier to collect rates which had been properly filed with,

and not challenged before, the Commission. Three years later,

however, in Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc.,

10. The existence of a judicial power to restore the fruits of a

subsequently invalidated rate order gains further support from Sec-

tion 74 of the ALI Restatement of the Law of Restitution (1937):

JUDGMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED. A person who

has conferred a benefit upon another in compliance with a

judgment, or whose property has been taken thereunder, is

entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set aside,

unless restitution would be inequitable or the parties contract

that payment is to be final; if the judgment is modified, there is

a right to restitution of the excess.

The existence of such power in regulatory agencies themselves ap-

pears to have been recognized by the Supreme Court in United Gas

Improvement Co. Vv. Callery Properties, 382 U. S. 223, 229, 86 S. Ct.

360, 364, 15 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1965), where it was stated that “[a]n

agency, like a court, can undo what is wrongfully done by virtue of

its order.”

11. See Pub. L. No. 89-170, 79 Stat. 651 (1965), as codified, 49

U. S. C. § 304(a) (1970); Land O’Lakes, Inc. v. United Bucking-

ham Freight Lines, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 102 (D. Minn. 1972).

A24

371 U. S. 84, 83 S. Ct. 157, 9 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1962), the

court held, over the objection of T. J. M. E.’s author (Harlan, J.),

that common law remedies against common carriers could

survive the enactment of the statute so long as they were con-

sistent with its regulatory scheme. Such a surviving remedy was

that for misrouting of a shipper’s goods, on which ground the

plaintiff in Hewitt-Robins in fact prevailed.

(B) Federal Power Commission.

The only express reference to recovery of excessive rates in

the Natural Gas and Federal Power Acts is in connection with

the exerc'se by the FPC of its power to suspend rates for five

months pending their investigation. See 15 U. S. C. § 717c(e),

16 U. S. C. § 824d(e) (1970). Suspended rates may go into

effect after that period if the investigation is incomplete, but if

they are later finally determined to be excessive, the Commission

has power to order their refund. Recovery is for the excess of

charged rates over what was just and reasonable, with the price

specified in a seller’s certificate of convenience and necessity

serving as a “refund floor.” See FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391

U. S. 9, 23-24, 88 S. Ct. 1526, 20 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1968).’

Refunds may also be ordered by way of the FPC’s conditioning

the certification of natural gas sales on the refunding of excessive

rates that have previously been charged, either under a tempo-

rary, unconditioned certificate, see, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v.

FPC, 378 F. 2d 510, 530-32 (Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391

U. S. 917-19, 88 S. Ct. 1801, 20 L. Ed. 2d 655 (1968), or

under a permanent, unconditioned certificate that has subse-

quently been invalidated in the courts. See, e.g., United Gas

Improvement Co. Vv. Callery Properties, 382 U. S. 223, 86 S.

Ct. 360, 15 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1965). Such refunds would again

be limited to the excess of actual over reasonable charges, and

12. See also, In re Hugoton-Anadarko Area Rate Case, 466 F.

2d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 1972) (refunds could be forgiven by the Com-

mission if they would otherwise treat principal seller “unfairly as

compared to the other producers”).

A25

might be even less, since “the issue of a refund in [such] circum-

stances turns upon equitable considerations.” Public Service

Commission of New York v. FPC, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 287,

329 F. 2d 242, 249-50, cert. denied sub nom. Prado Oil & Gas

Co. v. FPC, 377 U. S. 963, 84 S. Ct. 1644, 12 L. Ed. 2d 735

(1964).**

(C) Metropolitan Area Transit Commission.

A third area in which this court in particular has confronted

the problem of public recovery of unlawful rates is in connection

with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission

which for a time oversaw the operations of an independent D. C.

Transit company under a multistate Compact between the Dis-

trict of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia.** The Compact re-

quired the Commission to establish, and Transit to charge, just

and reasonable rates. There was no provision for recovery or

refund of excessive rates.** Nonetheless, we hel’ Bebchick v.

Public Utilities Commission, 115 U. S. App. D. v. 216, 318 F.

2d 187, 203-04, cert. denied, 373 U. S. 913, 83 S. Ct. 1304,

10 L. Ed. 2d 414 (1963), that where the Commission had im-

properly authorized a fare increase, the amount realized could

not be retained by the company, and even if it could not be

directly refunded, had somehow to be “utilized for the benefit

13. See also Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 401 F. 2d 726, 729 (10th

Cir. 1968) (‘no inequity results” where FPC orders refund of rates

charged in accord with permanent certificate which was later recon-

sidered, seller being “on notice that the allowed rate was subject to

revision”); Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 146 U. S. App. D. C.

287, 450 F. 2d 1334, 1337-38 (1971) (where uncertificated sales

were later determined to have been within FPC jursdiction, it had

“equitable power ‘to regard as being done that which should have

been done’. . . and to order refunds to be paid if necessary to achieve

that goal”).

14. The company’s operations were taken over by the Washing-

ton Metropolitan Area Transit Authority on January 14, 1973. See

National Capital Area Transit Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-517, 86

Stat. 999 (1972).

15. See D. C. Code § 1-1410 (1966).

A26

of the class who paid it.” In Williams v. Washington Metropoli-

tan Area Transit Commission, 134 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 415

F. 2d 922 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1081, 89 S. Ct. 860,

21 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1969), we were more explicit about the

nature and measurement of the public recovery in such a case.

Such recovery was held to be “governed by the equitable con-

siderations which apply to suits for restitution generally.” We

found that in the circumstances of that case these principles

required Transit to “restore the amount realized by the fare in-

crease only to the extent that its actual return is not reduced

to an amount which all parties have agreed would be unrea-

sonably low.” Jd. at 944-46. In Democratic Central Committee

of D. C. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,

158 U. S. App. D. C. 107, 485 F. 2d 886, 913-15 (1973),

cert. denied, 415 U. S. 935, 94 S. Ct. 1451, 39 L. Ed. 2d 493

(1974), we again invalidated a Commission-authorized rate in-

crease. Once again we found “the appropriate avenue of relief

. .. to be restitution,” though in this instance we remanded the

case to the Commission for its consideration of what exactly

should be restored.

(D) United States v. Morgan.

We take note, finally, of United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S.

183, 191-98, 59 S. Ct. 795, 83 L. Ed. 1211 (1939), involving

an order of the Secretary of Agriculture reducing stockyard rates

to a just and reasonable level. The order was stayed pending

judicial review, but the amount by which, if valid, it would

reduce the stockyard owners’ receipts was ordered paid into

court. The Secretary’s order was invalidated on procedural

grounds, and the Court faced the question of the fund’s disposi-

tion. The district court was instructed to proceed “in conformity

to equitable principles,” and primarily on the basis of what the

Secretary subsequently determined to have been the just and

reasonable rates for the period.*®

16. See also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 197, 90 S. Ct. 314,

24 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1969) (where the Secretary of Agriculture had

A27

The foregoing brief survey suggests that if there is a remedy

for properly filed airline rates later found to be unlawful, it is of

one of the following kinds: a surviving common law (or con-

ceivably an implied statutory) remedy for unreasonable charges

by a common carrier (analogous to that recognized in Hewitt-

Robins, supra); a right to seek the exercise by the CAB of its

power to condition certificates of convenience and necessity on

the refunding of more-than-reasonable fares (analogous to that

recognized in Continental Oil and Callery, supra); or a right to

have the CAB or the courts order the restitution of amounts

collected by virtue of erroneous orders or judgments (by analogy

to Atlantic Coast Line, Morgan, and this court’s Transit Com-

pany cases).

One right which clearly does not exist is the one petitioners

claim for recovery of all amounts in excess of the last lawfully

established rates. To cite only the most prominent contrary

authority, the Supreme Court in Atlantic Coast Line expressly

rejected the suggestion that where a rate order was procedurally

defective the carriers should restore the excess over the last

lawfully established rate, and thus “pay the price uf the blunders

of the commerce board.” 295 U. S. at 314, 55 S. Ct. at 718.

Significantly, the dissenters in that case would have granted just

the recovery that petitioners now seek. See id. at 318-30, 55

S. Ct. 713.*7 Our holdings in Williams v. Washington Metro-

improperly ordered increase in certain milk prices, the proceeds of

such increase having been held in escrow pending judicial review,

court “struck an equitable balance” in restoring to purchasers only

amounts paid in after District Court reversal of Secretary’s order).

17. Another express rejection of petitioners’ theory appears in

Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 146 U.S. App. D. C. 287, 450

F. 2d 1334 (1971), supra note 13. At issue there was the FPC’s

power to order refunds for uncertificated sales that were only later

determined to be within the Commission’s jurisdiction. We endorsed

the principle (applied by the Commission to some of the uncertificated

sales) that since it lacked cost-of-service information for the period,

it wculd consider rates that were “in line” with those prevailing in

the region to be in compliance with the Act. We disapproved the

principle (applied by the Commission to other uncertificated sales)

that refunds were required simply because the charged rates were not

on file with the Commission. See id. at 1336-39.

A28

politan Area Transit Commission, 134 U. S. App. D. C. 342,

415 F. 2d 922 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1081, 89 S.

Ct. 860, 21 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1969), and Democratic Central

Committee of D. C. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Commission, 158 U.S. App. D. C. 107, 485 F. 2d 886 (1973),

cert. denied, 415 U. S. 935, 4 S. Ct. 1451, 39 L. Ed. 2d 493

(1974), both discussed supra, are also inconsistent with peti-

tioners’ claim.

We find no support for petitioners’ “last lawful rate” theory

in the two cases on which they primarily rely, Middlewest Motor

Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F. 2d 212 (6th Cir.

1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 999, 91 S. Ct. 2169, 29 L. Ed.

2d 165 (1971), and Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. R. R.

v. Alouette Peat Products, 253 F. 2d 449 (9th Cir. 1957).

The former is a case in which the last lawfully established rate

happened also to be the just and reasonable one. An ICC order

cancelling a proposed rate increase had been stayed pending

review. When the stay was later lifted, recovery was sought of

the amounts which, because of the stay, were charged in viola-

tion of the ICC’s by-then-vindicated cancellation order. The

rate-payers prev: ‘led, not because the lower rates were the last

lawfully established rates, but because the Commission had

correctly found that they were the highest rates that could justly

and reasonably be charged. See 433 F. 2d at 229-32. Alouette

is distinguishable as a case in which the full amount of a rate

increase was restored, even though at least part of that increase

appeared just and reasonable, because the increased rates were

not properly on file with the Commission.’* We have not dis-

cussed the matter of “overcharges,” or charges in excess of

18. Railroad rate increases are normaly to be effective only on

thirty days’ notice. The Commission made an exception to this rule,

and allowed five days’ notice for increases of certain rates of six

cents or twenty percent, whichever was less. The carrier put into

effect, on five days’ notice, a twenty per cent increase, which ha

pened to be more than six cents. The new rates were held not to

lawfully on file with the Commission, and the full amount of the

increase was ordered restored.

A29

properly filed rates. Manifestly, the case for a strict rule of

recovery is far stronger in that context.’®

We have concluded that the Board correctly focused on the

equity of restitution and not just the reasonableness of past

rates. Reasonable rates, in this regulated industry as in others,

are those which are as low as possible but still allow the in-

dustry to provide “adequate and efficient service” and earn a

reasonable rate of return, thus assuring its ability to attract

necessary capital in the future. The just and reasonable rate, in

short, is the rate at which, under a given set of economic cir-

cumstances, the industry will perform efficiently as that term is

defined by the statute.

There are distinct equitable considerations which may prevent

a recovery even where fares had been found to exceed what

19. We may also pass quickly over petitioner Roberts’ claim

that the Board was without power to inquire into the justness and

reasonableness of past rates. It is true that the Board cannot make

rates retrospectively, see, e.g., Williams v. Metropolitan Area Transit

Commission, 134 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 415 F. 2d 922, 940 (1968),

but chis is not the same thing as inquiring into the propriety of relief

and into any issue on which relief turns. See Adaniic Coast Line

R. R. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301, 312, 55 S. Ct. 713, 718, 79 L. Ed.

1451 (1935) (Interstate Commerce Commission was without repara-

tions power but “not without power to inquire whether injustice had

been done and to report accordingly.”) Even assuming that the

Board could not itself order recovery, we have seen that the pro-

priety of recovery may turn on the reasonableness of rates. The

Board’s primary jurisdiction over that question strongly argues for

its power to furnish a retrospective answer to it; even if it is doing

so merely as a prelude to action by the courts. In fact the power to

do so seems amply embraced within the Board’s powers to “conduct

such investigations . . . as it shall deem necessary to carry out the

provisions of . . . this chapter,” 49 U. S. C. § 1324(a) (1970), and,

upon “complaint in writing with respect to anything done .. .

in contravention of . . . this chapter, . . . to investigate the matters

complained of.” Id. § 1482(a). The Supreme Court in United States

v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 198, 59 S. Ct. 795, 803, 83 L. Ed. 1211

(1939), held that the very similar statutory powers of the Secretary

of Agriculture enabled him to investigate the reasonableness of past

rates where his doing so would “afford an appropriate basis for

action in the district court in making distribution af the [escrow]

fund in its custody.” .

A30

was just and reasonable. It might be thought, to take the facts

of our case as an example, that the reasonable rate for a past

period was one which paid for a far more modest service than

was actually provided, but that since a lavish service was in

fact provided, with apparent Board blessings, there is no equity

in extracting profits which never existed. Other circumstances

can be imagined which might have already denied the airlines

the fruits of their unreasonable prices, and thus make it in-

equitable to require them to be disgorged. The excessiveness

of prices, perhaps in combination with an unexpected economic

downturn, might itself have caused a ruinous decline in the

volume of air travel, with consequent losses to the airlines. Even

if excessive profits were made in a given period, there may be

inequity in trying to recover them, particularly if large classes

of people are involved. As to who receives relief, it may be

impossible to reimburse those who actually paid the unreasonable

rates, so that the best that can be done is to establish a fund

on the carrier’s books to be applied for the benefit of future fare-

payers.”° As to who provides relief, past stockholders may have

reaped the benefits of the unreasonable fares and departed the

scene, leaving future stockholders to be adversely affected by

the recovery. The bite which is effectively taken from future

earnings by a recovery fund may in turn impair the health of

the industry, to the disadvantage of the fare-payers themselves.

The facts of our case are illustrative. The excess profits sought

to be recovered were not in fact earned but must be hypothesized

by a recomputation of costs and revenues. A substantial fare-

payer recovery on this theory would in practical effect mean

that an airline industry which had performed badly in the past

(from the investors’ point of view) would be all the more likely

to perform badly in the future. The equitable aspects of refund-

ing past rates are as inextricably entwined with the Board’s

20. This is the form of recovery ordered in Bebchick v. Public

Utilities Comm'n, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 216, 318 F. 2d 187, cert.

denied, 373 U. S. 913, 83 S. Ct. 1304. 10 L. Ed. 2d 414 (1963),

and also the form which petitioners propose in this case.

A3l

normal regulatory responsibility, as such refunds may substan-

tially affect the future rates, performance, and health of the in-

dustry. The statutory scheme thus seems to require that the

Board pass in the first instance not only on the reasonableness

of past rates, but on the equity of any recovery where such rates

are found to have been unreasonable. Cf. Democratic Central

Committee of D. C. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Commission, 158 U.S. App. D. C. 107, 485 F. 2d 886 (1973),

cert. denied, 415 U. S. 935, 94 S. Ct. 1451, 39 L. Ed. 2d 493

(1974).

Il.

The Board’s approach to its task of determining whether the

airlines had been unjustly enriched was to look first at their

actual rate of return during the period in question, calling this

“the best overall index of the reasonableness . . . of passenger

fares,” App. 501, and upon finding it inadequate, as it undis-

putedly was, to assess petitioners’ specific arguments as to why

and how that rate of return should be readjusted. We turn now

to those arguments.

(A) Load Factors.

A load factor is simply an expression of how full airplanes are.

It is the ratio of the number of miles flown during a given period

by revenue-paying passengers, to the number that could have

been flown had every available seat been filled. Before 1971,

it had been the Board’s practice to accept for ratemaking pur-

poses the load factors that the airlines actually experienced,

i. e., to determine revenue needs and the fares necessary to

meet them on the assumption that the flights an airline pro-

posed to offer would be only as full as past experience sug-

gested. In 1971, however, the Board came to the conclusion in

Phase 6B of its DPFI that this policy had fostered overcapacity

in the industry. Barred from price competition, the airlines vied

for the available traffic by scheduling more and rore flights,

which were more and more empty and required higher and

A32

higher fares to pay for them. The higher prices depzessed the

volume of air travel, further aggravating the overcapacity prob-

lem. To break the cycle the Board proposed standard load fac-

tors which would in the future be assumed when calculating

the revenue that a proposed flight would generate. Actual load

factors would of course vary, but by making rates with reference

to the assumed factors the Board would insure that earnings,

rather than fares, would fluctuate with load factors. The airlines

would thus have a strong incentive to reduce overcapacity. See

generally Order 71-4-54; App. 182.

The last point is critical. The Board disavowed any intent

in adopting the load factors standards to force the airlines into

particular scheduling molds. Its purpose was to force an ad-

justment by the airlines to its new load factor constraints, but

exactly what the adjustment would be, the airlines themselves

were to decide. Jd. at 190. The policy was thus entirely prospec-

tive in nature, as is borne out by the Board’s adoption, for the

trunklines, of an interim standard substantially lower than that

to which it would hold the airlines in the long run.

The long run factors adopted by the Board were 55 percent

for the trunklines, 44.4 percent for the local lines, and 54.1

percent for the industry as a whole; the interim trunkline factor

was 52.5 percent.” During the period in which the challenged

rates were charged, the trunk airlines actually experienced a

load factor of only 48.9 percent, and the locals one of 43.2 per-

cent.”? Petitioners would recalculate the airlines’ earnings on the

basis of the 54.1 percent figure.*

21. Jd. at 228. The interim trunkline standard was adopted in

Phase 7 of the DPFI, in which the Board considered the question of

what changes in the fare level were dictated by the load factor and

other newly adopted rate making standards. See Order No. 71-4-59;

App. 283.

22. Exhibit BE-19; App. 38.

23. Actually, petitioners offered a recalculation of the trunklines’

rate of return only, omitting the local carriers’ rate of return and

contenting themselves with a statement in their brief that their com-

putations must understate the excess profits for the industry as a

A33

The Board’s answer was, first, to entertain for the trunklines

only the interim factor as a possible basis for retroactively com-

puting reasonable rates. Petitioners’ contention, that the higher,

permanent factor must be applied to the earlier period, appears

to rest on the assumption that that figure represents an ideal

load factor—then and now. They overlook the fact that one

of the circumstances of which a regulatory agency may take

account is past regulation. The Board’s own past policies of

restricting price competition and allowing service competition to

flourish may be partly to blame for overcapacity in the industry.

However the airlines came to their present pass, it was the

Board’s obligation to bring them through it with a minimum of

disruption. In short, what is just and reasonable encompasses

not only what is ideal, but what approaches it in an orderly and

reasonable fashion. Hence the interim standard. Under the

circumstances the Board might well have abused its discretion

had it ignored that standard in favor of the permanent one.

The Board expressed doubt as to the reasonableness—or at

least the equitableness—of applying even the 52.5 percent

figure retroactively. It also found, however, that a 52.5 per-

cent load factor produced a rate of return of only 6.13 percent

for the trunklines, while a 44.4 percent factor produced a .65

percent return for the local carriers.** Neither earned unrea-

sonable rates of return, therefore, even if the appropriate load

factors were applied retroactively. We have seen no plausible

attack on this calculation, or on the inadequacy of the rate of

whole, the locals being unaccounted for. Br. Petitioners at 52. There

is of course no necessary logic in this position. Indeed, the locals

maintain that even the full retroactive application of petitioners’

load factor, dilution, and indirect cost standards leaves

them far short of an adequate return. The claim appears to be un-

contested either before the Board or this court, and therefore gives

further support to the Board’s result.

24. See Exhibits BE-21, 22, 25, 26; App. 39-42.

A34

return which it yields. We uphold the Board in its conclusion

that thus far no unreasonableness had been established.*

(B) Dilution.

The term refers to the loss of revenues, expressed as a per-

centage, from selling seats at less than full fares. There are any

number of ways in which such sales are made—youth fares,

military fares, family fares, excursion fares, standbys, and so

on. Such discount fares work an obvious discrimination against

full fare passengers and are therefore facially inconsistent with

“rule of equality” contained in § 404(b) of the Federal Avia-

tion Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1374(b) (1970). They have nonetheless

been tolerated by the Board on the theory that they could

benefit the full fare passenger, first, by stimulating new and in-

creased demand, and thus paving the way for long run economies

of scale (e.g., larger, more economical aircraft); and, second,

by filiing seats that would otherwise be empty, and thus allowing

the full fare passenger to subsidize those seats partly rather

than fully.”

On such reasoning the Board in 1965 approved the use of

military standby and youth standby and reservation fares.”

On review the Fifth Circuit remanded the matter of the youth

fares for further consideration, see Transcontinental Bus System,

Inc. v. CAB, 383 F. 2d 466 (Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied,

390 U. S. 920, 88 S. Ct. 850, 19 L. Ed. 2d 979 (1968). Such

consideration ultimately took the form of Phase 5 of the DPFI,

25. In fact the Board found that even if the long term industry-

wide factor of 55 percent were applied retroactively, it would produce

a rate of return of only 8.83 percent for the trunklines. Board De-

cision at 17 n. 39; App. 749. Petitioners have not attacked any of

these calculations, but rest their hopes on the retroactive application,

in addition to the load factors, of dilution and indirect cost standards.

The latter arguments are discussed, and rejected, below.

26. See Order No. 72-12-18 at 11-12; App. 543-44.

27. Order F-22186 Dockets 15845 et al. (May 20, 1965);

Order F-23138, Docket 16826 (Jan. 20, 1966).

A35

in which a number of discount fares were re-evaluated. Some

of these the courts had ordezed the Board to reconsider (e.g.,

family fares, see Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412

F. 2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969)), and some it had not, but all had

apparentiy had the Board’s previous approval. See Order No.

70-12-18; App. 537-39.

The Board in Phase 5 concluded that in general the bases

on which the discriminatory discount fares had been justified

were not sound. Little additional traffic had been generated, and

the potential cost savings to be realized from traffic increases

were found to be slight in any event. More important, the fares

were not filling seats that would otherwise be empty; instead, new

capacity was being added to accommodate the discount pas-

sengers. In essence the Board recognized that it was facing

another aspect of the same problem that concerned it in DPFI

Phase 6B dealing with load factors: If the airlines, barred from

price compstition, tended to compete by increasing their capacity,

and if this tendency was made chronic by their ability to pass the

cost of overcapacity along to the fare-payers, it did not help

to allow the airlines to discriminate among those fare-payers;

indeed, it only made matters worse for those discriminated

against. Put another way, a limitation on dilution is a necessary

complement of the load factor standards, for the burden of over-

capacity on the full fare passenger is not substantially lessened

if, while requiring that only 45 percent of an average flight's

seats be empty, the Board allows another 20 percent (let us

say) to be half empty in the sense of being filled by passengers

who do not pay full fares. ©

The Board therefore resolved in Phase 5 to tolerate only cer-

tain kinds of discounts which were shown to have the potential

of enhancing an airline’s short run profits, i. e., for filling flights

that were alreacy scheduled to fly and would otherwise fly empty.

To insure that the discounts would not remain in effect, and be-

come a burden on the full-fare passenger in the way we have

A36

described, the Board limited the duration of the discounts to

eighteen months, and also announced a powerful disincentive to

their use, namely, it would in future fare proceedings assume

zero dilution. It would assume, in other words, that all seats were

sold for full fares.**

It is on this basis that petitioners insist that the airlines’ rev-

enues for the period in question be recomputed to allow a dilu-

tion of only 12 percent of what full fare receipts would have been.

The 12 percent figure was proposed by their sole expert witness,

who testified that discount traffic accounting for smaller amounts

of dilution tended to be carried by existing capacity, but that

when such traffic took a larger bite from revenues, it tended to

be accommodated by capacity increases.

The Board responded in several ways. It stated that there was

no evidence to support the 12 percent figure (as indeed there ap-

pears to be none”), and that a percentage standard was in any

case “faulty in concept” (as appears to be true, the effect of a

discount upon capacity being much more a matter of its timing

than the amount of traffic it generates).*° We may assume, with-

out deciding, that these attacks on petitioners’ proposed dilution

standard would be inadequate without some consideration by

the Board of whether some other standard would be more ac-

ceptable. In the event, the Board went on to reject the retroactive

28. See generally Order No. 72-12-18; App. 529.

29. Petitioners’ expert witness himself admitted that “we have

arbitrarily, if I may use that word in a mathematical sense as it was

used this morning, drawn that line temporarily at 12 percent.” Tr.

641; App. 641. The only justification given for it was that certain

evidence adduced in Phase 9 of the DPFI tended to show that dilu-

tion traffic was accommodated by added capacity only in the long

haul markets, and only in these markets did dilution exceed 12 per-

cent. See Tr. 651-54; App. 74-77.

30. Thus, a sharp discount offered on short notice for flights

already scheduled could generate a large amount of additional traffic

but no additional capacity, while a less attractive discount planned

longer in advance could cause the airline to schedule additional

- flights to accommodate the expected traffic increase, even though it

was very slight.

A37

application of any dilution standard. It stated that the dilution

policy of Phase 5

was intended to provide the carriers with an “incentive to

make sound pricing decisions which will take into account

both the long-term and short-term factors.” Manifestly, this

policy was designed to provide incentives for the future, and

was not intended to be applied retroactively.

Board Decision at 25; App. 757.

While this appears to represent a conclusion by the Board that

the computation of just and reasonable rates for the period in

question need not incorporate a limit on the use of discount fares,

that conclusion was clearly alloyed with a concern over the in-

equity of a retroactive dilution adjustment. The sentences quoted

above were followed in the Board opinion by its statement that

“[flor the reasons previously given, such a retroactive application

would be highly arbitrary and inequitable.” Id. (Emphasis sup-

plied.) The “reasons previously given” included the fact that,

up to and including the period in question, the various discounts

were approved by the Board.

The Board’s conclusion that retroactive adjustment for dilution

would be “arbitrary and inequitable” seems to us persuasive,

particularly when viewed in the broader context of airline rate-

making. The laws of supply and demand operate in the airline

industry as elsewhere. Different fare structures and schedules

will generate different amounts of traffic, and different rates of

return. The number of solutions to the supply-demand equation

is infinite. The Board’s approach has not been to choose a par-

ticular solution, but to impose constraints on the solutions the

airlines may choose (i.e., that those sciutions must entail a rea-

sonable rate of return, 55 percent fu'l airplanes, no discrimina-

tion, etc.). The benefits of innovation and competition are thus

to some extent preserved by allowing the airlines to devise their

own solutions, and then to out-perform those solutions by operat-

ing more efficiently (and more profitably) than had been as-

sumed.

A38

In this context it does indeed seem “faulty in concept” to im-

pose a particular ratemaking constraint upon a prior period

during which, of course, the private initiative which it was in-

tended to elicit never occurred. And it is certainly inequitable by

such retroactivity to deprive the carriers of the chance to make

a profit from operations conducted within that constraint. The

inequity is greater when inadequate profits were made by the

carriers even under the constraints then applicable. Petitioners

are in the position of claiming that profits which never existed

should be disgorged because they would have existed had the

proper regulatory guidelines been in force, when in fact there is

no way to know whether such profits would have been earned or

not. The Board’s rejection of this position as “arbitrary and

inequitable” seems to us completely sound.

(C) Indirect Costs and Costs Generally.

Petitioners also claim that during the period in question the

airlines experienced excessive indirect costs, or costs not related

to the actual operation of aircraft. The claim has undergone

something of an evolution. Before the Commission it was argued

that ratemaking standards adopted in the, DPFI required that

indirect costs for the period be limited to 48.4 percent of direct

costs. The Commission pointed out in response that the 48.4

percent figure had been employed in Phase 7 of the DPFI (that

concerned with fare levels) solely for the purpose of forecasting

indirect costs. In the Commission’s words, “[i]t is not a Board

standard, nor does it have any relevance to the past period.”

Board Decision at 19; App. 751. The Board also observed that

the indirect costs actually experienced during the period in ques-

tion amounted to only 47.7 percent of direct costs, so that the

airlines did not exceed the limit of 48.4 percent, even assuming

it was properly regarded as such.

In their brief to this court petitioners appear to accept the

Board’s disposition of their argument based on the 48.4 percent

figure. They now claim that it was not enough for the Board

A39

merely to turn that particular argument aside, but that an in-

dependent assessment of the reasonableness of carrier costs,

direct and indirect, was required. Democratic Central Committee

of D. C. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,

153 U. S. App. D. C. 107, 485 F. 2d 886 (1973), cert. denied,

415 U. S. 935, 94 S. Ct. 1451, 39 L. Ed 2d 493 (1974), is

cited for support, and particularly our holding in that case

that

The Compact placed an obligation upon the Commission

to develop the record on important matters when it was

unsatisfied with the record produced by the parties. The

Commission, like other agencies charged with the protection

of the public interest, was not created simply to “provide

a forum for the” proceeding.

Id. at 905.

We find no error in the Board’s methodology. Democratic

Central Committee involved a different statute, a different regu-

latory agency, and a different regulated industry. As we ex-

plained at some length, the transit company was a monopoly,

the purpose of regulation was to afford the consumer the

benefits of competition, and one of these was efficiency, which

non-competitive firms tend not to achieve.

The airlines, by contrast, are in many respects highly com-

petitive. Indeed it is partly to hold destructive competition in

31. A related claim is that petitioners were erroneously assigned

the burden of —_— as to the reasonableness of the unlawfully estab-

lished fares. This appears not to be the case. The Board began its

investigation by observing that “the carrier parties . . . propose to

show the fares accord with all of the substantive standards of the

Act just as in any other rate p i § involving a past period,”

Order 71-2-109, App. 484; and it concluded its investigation with

the statement that “[tJhe carriers have abundantly satisfied the evi-

dentiary burden cast on them in this pr ing as to the reason-

ableness of the fares.” Board Decision at 28; App. 760. Nor can

we find fault with the merits of the latter conclusion. The airlines

established, with the aid of some thirty witnesses and 3500 pages

of written exhibits, that their earnings os the period in question

were woefully inadequate, even when analyzed according to the

appropriate guidelines developed in the DPFI. As stated in text,

that was enough to establish the reasonableness of the fares.

A40

check that the CAB exists; price competition, for example, is

effectively prevented. Other kinds of competition flourish, how-

ever. It is on this assumption that the Board accepts industry cost

averages for rate making purposes. It is assumed that the carriers

will compete to reduve costs below those averages and so make

a larger profit.** To be sure, the load factor and dilution

standards adopted in the DPFI represent efforts by the Board

to control costs which competition has failed to control, but the

failure derives more from an excess of competition than a dearth

of it. The duties of the Board with respect to investigating

carrier costs may thus be quite different from those discussed in

Democratic Central Committee. They may well be discharged

by the Board’s simply inquiring into whether the applicable

industry-wide cost guidelines of the DPFI have been exceeded.

That is what the Board did in this case. It agreed with peti-

tioners that “the reported operating results of the carriers under

the fares in question should not be accepted [but] must be ad-

justed to conform to [DPF/] standards.” It concluded, however,

that “the data supplied for this period conform to the Board s

conclusions in the DPFI with respect to Treatment of Flight

Equipment Depreciation and Residual Values for Rate Purposes,

.. . Treatment of Leased Aircraft for Rate Purposes, . . . and

Treatment of Deferred Federal Income Taxes for Rate Pur-

poses.” Board Decision at 13-14; App. 745-46. The remaining

DPFI standards for load factor and dilution were given more

extensive consideration, owing to the stress placed on them by

petitioners. The Board’s cursory discussion of DPFI guidelines

on which petitioners placed no emphasis seems to us acceptable

under the circumstances. Whereas in Democratic Central Com-

mittee we were reviewing a prospective rate making decision of

the Commission, we are here reviewing the Board’s conclusions

as to whether there has been unjust enrichment.** At least where

32. See, e.g., Order No. 72-8-50 (DPFI Phase 7; Fare Level)

at 46; App. 527.

33. This question, significantly, we remanded to the Commission

in Democratic Central Committee.

i oem

A4l

this is the question, and where the background to it is a period

of low actual profitability for the airlines, the Board need not

have given more than summary consideration to arguments the

petitioners had not specifically advanced.

(D) Discrimination.

The claim for recovery on the ground that the fare structure

was discriminatory is allied to that based on dilution, but dis-

crimination in favor of the discount passenger is, however, only

one of the unjust discriminations alleged to have taken place.

Others include discrimination between (1) short and long haul

travellers (the latter being allegedly the victims of mileage

formulae which did not take account of the higher per mile

cost of short flights), (2) travellers using congested and those

using non-congested airports (again because mileage formulae

did not reflect actual costs), and (3) travellers paying a single

or through fare and those who must pay multiple fares (a

fixed terminal charge being included in each of the latter).

As the Board noted, however, these characteristics of the

fare structure had been in lawfully filed and effective tariffs for

many years without Board interference. Indeed, the immediate

tariffs in question, filed in response to what the Board indicated

it would accept, effectively initiated a significant lessening of

the discrimination of which petitioners now complain.** Thus

the fare structure in effect during the period in question was

directly responsive to what the Board considered and represented

to be lawful. And the carrier, as a practical matter, had no

choice but to file the tariffs they did.

34. The formula unlawfully promulgated by the Board in Order

No. 69-9-68 decreased the discounts available to youth standby,

youth reservation, and family fare passengers. The same Order ad-

vised the carriers that their formula-developed fares, which were to

expire in January of 1970, would be renewed only if progress had

been made, as assertedly it was, in the publication of additional joint

fares and in making long and short haul fares more reflective of

actual costs. Board Decision at 30-32; App. 762-64.

A42

Where, as here, recovery can only be had in terms of restitu-

tion grounded in equitable considerations, the circumstances

just described are not such as to mandate recovery; and we leave

undisturbed the Board’s action in this regard. This conclusion is

fortified by, although not dependent upon, the finding that the

carriers did not receive excessive and unreasonable returns from

the fare level involved here, and that there is no fund of net

enrichment from which restitution could appropriately be made.

Assuming arguendo that restitution in respect of discriminatory

fares may conceivably be appropriate where a carrier knows

or should have known that such fares existed in an otherwise just

and reasonable fare level, the facts here do not admit of the

attribution to the carrier of the requisite guilty knowledge. The

fares in question were charged by the carriers in reasonable

reliance on the Board’s explicit approval of them. To the

extent that the Board was mistaken about the lawfulness

of the filing, the consequences of that mistake should not be

visited upon the carriers, certainly absent any actual unjust

enrichment.

The order appealed from is affirmed in all respects.

It is so ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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