Opposition — Williams v. American Airlines, Inc.
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IN THB
Supreme Court of the United States —
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No. 75-1254
MICHAEL W. WILLIAMS, eT AL.,
Petitioners,
VS.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ET AL.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AMERICAN AIRLINES, LNC.
AND TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
H. TEMPLETON BROWN,
BRYSON P. BURNHAM,
Lee N. ABRAMS,
STEPHEN M., SHAPIRO,
Attorneys for Respondents American
Airlines, Inc. and Trans World
Airlines, Inc.
MAYER, BROWN & PLATT,
231 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60604,
312—ST2-0600,
Of Counsel.
April 6, 1976.
Gunthorp-Warren Printing Company, Chicago e “ nancial 6-6565
INDEX
PAGE
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I os rs le eee cubebuent 2
PEE Kh ahecedeccvesecceeseseodseeonceasesyes 2
POE «cc cccvccseccsccevcescocccevecccesseee 13
PPMPPPTTTTTC TT TTT CT TTT TTT TTT 19
PETES BO oo cccccceccicccccccescceteseseceeces Al
p | PPPPPTTITITITTITITT TTT Al4
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301
DD cinesesebeavisdscasenae 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18
Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570
DEED encchecunbesacecedessceuaeesbeesoneess 19
Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938) ..15, 16, 17, 18
Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 430 F. 2d 891 (D. C.
St See CUED cccececesecoesesaces 3, 4, 16, 19
Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 521 F. 2d 298 (D. C.
Se Gee CU ED cccccceceocscasecss 9, 12, 16, 19
Roberts v. American Airlines, 526 F. 2d 757 (7th Cir.
DP: cccpsnceckeasesenebeneesssucdnevens 1,3, 12, 13
Texas & P. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426
SD «oneebnw sun nk6sobneeseeniesedeeeenese 19
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.,
et, © ct ovcececnetecssecousceneas 17, 18
United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S.
et GEE cesweesewtessceescoucesceaseeheseness 19
United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183 (1939)...13, 15, 17
Weidberg v. American Airlines, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 407
COE, BR EB 1972) ccccccccccccccccsccscesccsess 1,6
Statutory Provisions Cited
ee ee es SE ns ov iinekeeneenesteundesdnees 2,3
4g SR PCT TT Te TT 15
ee ee Gt ED «0s cdvdecdccddeneetanusdieewe 4
Gs Ge G. SRD htt ewwddvedensevcsstddecees 4
Miscellaneous
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise .................. 16
IN THE
Supreme Court of the GAnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No. 75-1254,
MICHAEL W. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
vs.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ET AL.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
AND TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 526 F. 2d
757, and a copy of that opinion is attached to the Petition as
Appendix A. The judgment of the District Court dismissing
the action was entered without opinion. An earlier opinion of
the District Court granting defendants’ motion to stay pro-
ceedings in the consolidated damage actions pending determi-
nation of related issues by the Civil Aeronautics Board is
reported at 336 F. Supp. 407 as Weidberg v. American Airlines,
Inc., and a copy of that opinion is attached hereto as Appendix
A. That opinion analyzes in detail the legal principles upon
which the District Court based its subsequent decision dismis-
sing the consolidated damage actions.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
When particular domestic air passenger tariffs have been
invalidated by a Court of Appeals due solely to a procedural
error committed by the Civil Aeronautics Board, but the Civil
Aeronautics Board subsequently has determined (in proceed-
ings conducted in compliance with the order of that Court of
Appeals) that the fares charged pursuant to those tariffs were
not unjust or unreasonable and that the carriers were not un-
justly enriched by collecting those fares, and the Board’s deter-
mination has thereafter been affirmed by that same Court of
Appeals, are the passengers who paid the fares in question pre-
cluded from recovering money damages based on alleged over-
charges?
a. Are the passengers entitled to recover damages even
though they were not injured, and the fares which they paid
were not unreasonable?
b. Are the passengers entitled to recover damages even
though the fares which they paid were established by tariffs
which were legal, valid and binding at the time the fares were
collected—tariffs with which the air cariiers were required by
law to comply?
c. Are the defendant air carriers required to pay damages
even though they have not been “unjustly enriched” by collect-
ing the fares in question?
STATEMENT
The instant case is one of seven damage actions which were
consolidated in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407. District
Judge Hubert L. Will dismissed all seven of those damage
actions on December 10, 1973. The named plaintiffs in four
of those damage actions (including the instant case) appealed
Judge Will’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
3
Circuit; the named plaintiffs in the other three damage actions
did not seek appellate review. The four appeals were consoli-
dated for hearing and disposition, and on December 8, 1975
the Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Will's decision dismissing
the damage actions; as noted above, the opinion of the Court of
Appeals is reported at 526 F. 2d 757, and a copy of that opinion
is attached to the Petition as Appendix A. The instant case
is the only one in which this Court has been asked to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; the
named plaintiffs in the other three damage actions which were
encompassed by that decision have not sought review in this
Court.
Petitioners and the plaintiffs in the companion damage ac-
tions sought to recover alleged overcharges on domestic air
passenger fares which the defendant air carriers had collected
during the period from October 1, 1969 through October 14,
1970. In some of those actions as many as twenty air carriers
were named as defendants, but in the instant case only two air
carriers (respondents here) were named as defendants. The
various damage actions purportedly were brought on behalf of
all persons who purchased domestic air passenger transporta-
tion during the specified time period, but the District Court
did not decide whether any of those suits could properly be
maintained as a class action. The seven damage actions initially
were filed in several different courts, but on February 19, 1971
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, acting pursuant
to 28 U. S. C. § 1407, entered an order consolidating those
actions for pretrial purposes before the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
The seven consolidated cases initially were assigned to Judge
Alexander Napoli of that Court; after Judge Napoli’s death
the cases were reassigned to Judge Hubert L. Will.
The seven damage actions were filed in the wake of Moss v.
Civil Aeronautics Board, 430 F. 2d $91 (D. C. Cir. 1970)
(“Moss I’). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
4
there held that the domestic air carrier tariffs prevailing during
the period from October 1, 1969 through October 14, 1970 were
invalid due to a procedural error committed by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, and remanded the case to the Board for
further proceedings. *
The petitioners in that litigation, Congressman Moss of Cal-
ifornia and a number of other Congressmen (hereinafter re-
ferred to as “Congressman Moss, ef al.”), then requested the
Board to “promptly initiate an adjudicatory proceeding for the
purpose of determining appropriate relief [for alleged rate over-
charges] for the period extending from October 1, 1969 through
the date on which the lawful domestic passenger fares are re-
established”. The Board, after considering briefs filed by Con-
gressman Moss, et al. and a number of air carriers with respect
to that request, concluded that no monetary relief should be
awarded unless the fares in question were “unjust” or “unrea-
sonable”; therefore it deferred its determination as to the “ap-
propriate relief” (if any) pending the outcome of an investigatory
proceeding “to determine whether the passenger fares between
points in the 48 contiguous States and the District of Columbia
in effect during the period October 1, 1969 to and including
*In August 1969, twenty of the principal domestic air carriers
had filed tariffs which increased domestic air passenger fares. On
September 12, 1969, the Civil Aeronautics Board issued Order
69-9-68, Docket 21322, which suspended those tariffs under 49
U. S. C. § 1482(g), on the ground that the tariffs “may be unjust
for] unreasonable”. In that Order the Board (a) stated that the
carriers were in need of additional revenue due to increased expenses;
(b) proposed a fare formula; and (c) announced that it would
accept, without suspension, tariffs which utilized that proposed fare
formula. The carriers then withdrew their suspended tariffs and
filed new tariffs in accordance with the Board’s proposed fare
formula; those new tariffs became effective on October !, 1969,
and during the period from October 1, 1969 through October 14,
1970 the carriers charged the fares which were specified in those
new tarifis. In Moss I the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the Board’s September 12, 1969 order and
the subsequent filing of tariffs by the carriers actually constituted
rate making by the Board under 49 U. S. C. § 1482(d), and that
those tariffs therefore were invalid because the Board had entered
its order without the public hearing provided for in that statute.
5
October 14, 1970 * * * were unjust and unreasonable” (Board
Order 71-2-109, p. 10). That proceeding (CAB Docket No.
23140) was captioned “The Reasonableness of Passenger Fares
Charged by Domestic Trunkline and Local Service Carriers
from October 1, 1969 through October 14, 1970”.*
Shortly after the seven damage actions were consolidated be-
fore the District Court, the defendant air carriers moved to
stay all proceedings in those damage actions pending a
determination by the Civil Aeronautics Board with respect
to the reasonableness of the domestic air passenger fares
in question. In support of that motion, the carriers asserted that
the damage action plaintiffs had suffered no legally compensable
injury—and therefore could not recover any damages-—because
the f --s ii question were not “unjust” and “unreasonable” and
the carriers had not been “unjustly enriched” by collecting those
fares; the carriers also asserted that questions relating to the
reasonableness of domestic air passenger fares were within the
exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The damage action plaintiffs (including petitioners) contended
that they could recover damages whether or not the fares in
question were unjust or unreasonable, and whether or not the
defendant air carriers were unjustly enriched by collecting those
fares. On January 12, 1972, Judge Napoli, after considering ex-
tended briefs filed by the various parties, granted the carriers’
motion to stay all proceedings in the consolidated damage actions
pending the Civil Aeronautics Board’s determination as to the
reasonableness of the fares.
Judge Napoli’s opinion (a copy of which is attached hereto
as Appendix A) analyzed the applicable legal principles in care-
ful detail. Judge Napoli pointed out first that the damage action
plaintiffs could not recover unless the fares which they had paid
were unreasonably high, because “the [Federal Aviation] Act
*The Board’s order instituting that investigatory proceeding
was issued on February 24, 1971—-six days after the Judicial Panel
on Miultidistrict Litigation ordered consolidation of the damage
actions for pretrial purposes.
6
allows reasonable fares and it cannot be doubted that the car-
riers are entitled to a reasonable rate of return” (336 F. Supp. at
411; Appendix A, p. A8). He then emphasized the fact that if
the damage action plaintiffs did not pay unreasonably high fares,
then they were not injured as a result of the Board’s error (which,
as Judge Napoli pointed out, “was of a procedural nature” (336
F. Supp. at 411; Appendix A, p. A8)). He concluded that the
principles enunciated by this Court in Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301 (1935), were “decisive”, stating:
“* * * there is considerable merit in the position that
in weighing the equities of this case, the question of the,
reasonableness of the fares will play an important or even
decisive role. Paraphrasing Cardozo [in the Atlantic Coast
Line decision], in order for plaintiffs to prevail it must ap-
pear that the equities are so in favor of the plaintiffs that
this court is duty bound to make the air carriers pay a
considerable sum as reparations for the blunder of the
C.A.B.” (336 F. Supp. at 410-411; Appendix A, p. A7.)
Judge Napoli also concluded that issues as to the reason-
ableness of the domestic air passenger fares in question were
within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (336 F. Supp. at 409; Appendix A. pp. A4-A5), and
therefore that it was appropriate to defer further proceedings in
the damage actions until the Board decided those issues. Judge
Napoli went on to state:
“Since the question of the reasonableness vel non of the
fares falls within the primary jurisdiction of the C.A.B.,
the plaintiffs in order to avoid a stay must proceed on the
theory either that they have a claim for relief independent of
unjust enrichment, which would rest upon common-law or
statutory construction, or that they are absolutely entitled
to recover due to the declaration of unlawfulness by the
Moss court. At the expense of lengthening this opinion
the court will turn to and examine the pertinent au-
thorities and arguments of the respective parties on these
issues.” (336 F. Supp. at 409-410; Appendix A, p. A5.)
Judge Napoli’s opinion then discussed, and refuted, the various
arguments advanced by the damage action plaintiffs in support
7
of their contention that they could recover even if the Civil
Aeronautics Board determined that the fares in question were
not unjust or unreasonable.
On September 18, 1972, after Judge Napoli’s death, the Ex-
ecutive Committee of the District Court reassigned the con-
solidated damage actions to Judge Hubert Will. On October 5,
1972, Judge Will, after reviewing all of the briefs which had
been filed in those actions and considering oral statements by
counsel, concluded that there would not be any basis for an
award of damages if the Civil Aeronautics Board determined
(in its then-pending investigatory proceeding) that the fares
in question were not unjust or unreasonable, stating:
“I don’t understand how if they [the Civil] Aeronautics
Board] just didn’t dot the ‘i’s’ and cross the ‘t’s’ but nobody
got hurt, how there can be any damages.”
“I don’t think the law redresses the technical imperfec-
tions in conduct which don’t hurt anybody. * * *”
* bd * * *
“T just don’t understand how anybody, how a court can
adjudicate that somebody who hasn’t been hurt should be
paid some money because the wrong oven was used in
producing a perfectly palatable, healthful product.”
8 > od * aw
“As I read all the material last night, trying to get myself
oriented, what struck me was that if in fact it turns out
nobody got hurt, I don’t see how the law responds to that
situation absent some kind of a specific provision penalizing
formal failures; but, that wouldn’t give the plaintiff litigants
the right to enforce that in any event I wouldn’t think,
particularly if you are going to impose a fine on somebody.
You ought to impose it on the CAB.”
* - a aw *
“Ang they [the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in Moss I] made no determination as to the fairness or
reasonabieness of those illegally determined rates. They
simply said the airlines are collecting rates they haven’t been
properly authorized to charge.”
“Now, we are going to have an adjudication in which,
if I understand it correctly, they [the Civil Aeronautics
Board] are going to consider the question as to whether or
not during that interim period, notwithstanding the formal
defects in their adoption, * * * [the fares] were fair and
reasonable, whether there is any unjust enrichment on the
part of the airlines.”
“T have difficulty seeing, as I repeat, how private litigants
can say they were hurt if they paid just and reasonable
rates simply because those just and reasonable rates were
not formally, properly adopted or approved.”
“You might do some research on it and see, but it seems
to me that is the guts of the case. * * *” Transcript of
Proceedings on October 5, 1972, pp. 8, 10, 11-12.
Certain of the damage action plaintiffs continued to assert
that they would be entitled to recover damages even if the
Board determined that the fares in question were just and rea-
sonable. Consequently, on December 6, 1972, Judge Will re-
quested the parties to submit additional memoranda regarding
the question whether damages could be recovered regardless
whether the fares were unjust or unreasonable, stating:
“It you have got any other theories, get them in now.
I don’t see any reason for waiting [to consider such theor-
ies] until the Board has determined whether or not the
rates are fair and reasonable. If you have got other theories
of damages which are not related to that question, you get
them in now.”
* * * * >
“* * * Assuming the C.A.B. finds the rates to be fair
and reasonable, what basis do you have for damages, or
am I just going to have a third year law school moot court
case in which even if you win you don’t get anything
except the satisfaction of a finding in your favor; because
if there is no basis for monetary recovery, there isn’t any
point in spending your time and money, and my time and
the taxpayers’ money, trying the case.” Transcript of Pro-
ceedings on December 6, 1972, pp. 5-6.
On March 26, 1973, Judge Will, after considering the addi-
tional memoranda submitted by the parties pursuant to his
9
December 6, 1972 request, stated that in his view the plaintiffs
had simply repeated the arguments which Judge Napoli had
considered and rejected, and had failed to advance any new
arguments. He concluded that the plaintiffs had not propounded
any theory which would sustain their damage claims if the
Board determined that the fares in question were not unjust
or unreasonable, and he refused to modify the stay order which
Judge Napoli had entered on January 12, 1972.
The Civil Aeronautics Board’s investigatory proceeding with
respect to the reasonableness of the domestic air passenger fares
in question, which commenced in February 1971, was not con-
cluded until July 1973. In that proceeding, Congressman Moss,
et al. vigorously contested the carriers’ contention that the fares
were not unjust or unreasonable. Evidentiary hearings were
held before an administrative law judge, and the parties sub-
sequently submitted post-hearing briefs to that administrative
law judge. Thereafter, on July 3, 1972, the administrative law
judge issued his initial decision. He held that the fares in ques-
tion were not unjust or unreasonable, that the passengers who
paid those fares were not overcharged, and that the carriers were
not unjustly enriched by collecting those fares. The Board then
reviewed that initial decision, as well as the additional briefs
which the parties submitted, and heard oral arguments on
November 15, 1972. After considering the evidence and the
arguments of the parties, the Board issued its decision on July
11, 1973 (Order No. 73-7-39). In that decision, the Board
adopted the aforementioned findings and conclusions of the
administrative law judge, and held that the domestic air passen-
ger fares in question were not unjust or unreasonable. Con-
gressman Moss, et al. appealed the Board’s decision to the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which affirmed that
decision on October 16, 1975 in Moss v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 521 F. 2d 298 (D. C. Cir. 1975) (“Moss IT’). This
Court denied certiorari in Moss II on March 22, 1976 (.......... "
he , 44 U. S. L. W. 3531, captioned “Roberts v.
10
C. A. B.”). The opinion of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in Moss Ii reviews and analyzes many of the legal prin-
ciples which are controlling in the instant case; a copy of that
opinion is attached hereto as Appendix B.
In July 1973, shortly after the Board issued its decision hold-
ing that the fares in question were not unjust or unreasonable,
the defendants in the consolidated damage actions moved for
summary judgment, seeking dismissal of those actions on the
ground that the Board’s decision precluded the plaintiffs from
recovering any damages. During a status report on September
10, 1973, Judge Will stated to counsel that he was disposed to
grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but at the
request of plaintiffs’ counsel he continued that motion until
December 10, 1973 in order to ascertain what action (if any)
had been taken in the interim by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals with respect to the appeal of the Board's
July 1973 decision.
On December 10, 1973, Judge Will entered an order dis-
missing the seven consolidated damage actions. He stated that
he was dismissing those actions because they were “moot” or
precluded by the holding of the Civil Aeronautics Board, ex-
plaining that his decision rested on the premise that because
the fares in question had been determined to be neither unjust
nor unreasonable, the plaintiffs who paid those fares could
not have suffered any legally compensable injury (since they
were obligated by law to pay “reasonable” amounts for their
air transportation):
“There have been sounds made that there would still be
some sort of cause of action even if the [District of Colura-
bia] Court of Appeals was to affirm [the Board’s decision]
and the rates were found to be fair and reasonable. I don’t
know what, because I don’t know what damages there
could be.”
* * * * *
“Well, noises have been made that we could have some
sort of compensatory or other damages for the fact that
11
the rates were put into effect after an improper procedure
before the CAB.”
“I don’t see how you get any damages, and the Supreme
Court has made it very clear that you don’t get damages
just because the ‘i’ dotting and the ‘t’ crossing was not
correct, if the results were fair and reasonable, and the
results have been found to be fair and reasonable at this
point.”
“I don’t understand on what theory you could have
damages for the collection of fair and reasonable rates
improperly determined.”
“* * * T am simply going to dismiss them on the grounds
that they are moot, and I am available for a motion to
reinstate on any grounds, though the only one I can think
of at the moment is that the CAB has been reversed.”
Transcript of Proceedings on December 10, 1973, pp. 3,
5-6.
“* * * Two years ago there hadn’t been a determination
by the CAB * * * as to whether or not the rates which
were charged were fair and reasonable. You had a deter-
mination that the procedure—a judicial determination that
the procedure by which these rates had been approved was
defective. So the CAB was now back under an appropriate
procedure, a proper procedure reexamining the question
of reasonableness and fairness.”
“Subsequent to that two things have happened. The
CAB has adjudicated and found that the rates were fair
and reasonable, and now there has been an appeal taken
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.”
“So there are two things that are changed. One, you
have a determination by the administrative body charged
with the responsibility which the courts keep talking about
having special knowledge and expertise, et cetera, like the
I.C.C., that the rates were fair and reasonable, which would
moot the case, subject to a reversal by the Court of Appeals
which would unmoot the case.”
“I said if they get unmooted, I will reinstate them, but
there isn’t any point in keeping on the docket seven cases
which have a high probability of never having any vitality
12
when you can resuscitate them very easily. In the event
the Court of Appeals reverses we will put them back on
the docket and go from there: but if the Court of Appeals
affirms, as it is highly probable it will, then these cases
are moot.” Transcript of Proceedings on December 20,
1973, pp. 3-4.
“* * * there is no damage because if these improperly
adopted fares are subsequently determined to be fair and
reasonable, then I don’t know what there is left to litigate,
except to give it to some law school moot court, or put it
on an examination; but, there is nothing more useless than
litigating issues from which there can be no recovery in
the nature of damages or other relief.”
“So, the fact that the * * * [CAB] has now found these
fares to be reasonable, and that is now on appeal, seems
to me means that these cases will all be moot. They are
moot at this point unless that determination is reversed.
Since they are moot, I have dismissed them with the under-
standing that I will reinstate them [if the decision of the
Civil Aeronautics Board is reversed on appeal]; * * *.”
Transcript of Proceedings on January 14, 1974, p. 5.
As noted above, the named plaintiffs in four of the seven
consolidated damage actions (including the instant case) ap-
pealed Judge Will’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. On December 8, 1975, that Court unanimously
affirmed Judge Will’s decision dismissing the consolidated dam-
age actions. In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that
many of the substantive legal issues raised by the appeal before
it had already been decided by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Moss 11, and stated “We think
that Moss II clearly and correctly explicates the earlier decision
[Moss 1] and establishes that the C. A. B. order attacked in
Moss | was voidable rather than void” (526 F. 2d at 760). The
Seventh Circuit went on to conclude that the District Court had
properly dismissed the consolidated damage actions because the
plaintiffs had not been injured by paying the domestic air pas-
senger fares in question, and therefore they were precluded from
recovering money damages by “the fundamental legal premise
13
that mere illegality which causes no injury is not ordinarily
compensable” (526 F. 2d at 760). The Seventh Circuit also
held that it did not have to decide whether Judge Will had prop-
erly used the term “moot” to describe that situation, because
in any event his dismissal order could be treated as a Rule 56(b)
summary judgment in favor of the defendants; as the Court of
Appeals pointed out (526 F. 2d at 761-762 and fn. 2), there
was no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the defendants
therefore were entitled to summary judgment of dismissal as a
matter of law because they were not unjustly enriched by col-
lecting the fares in question, so that restitution was inappropriate.
Petitioners then filed their petition for a writ of certiorari in
this Court, challenging the decision of the Seventh Circuit. As
noted above, none of the named plaintiffs in the other three
damage actions which were encompassed by that decision have
sought review in this Court.
ARGUMENT
Petitioners assert that this Court should review the decision
of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals because that decision
purportedly “has, in effect, decided a federal question in a way
in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court” (Pet. p. 5).
But nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the deci-
sion of the Seventh Circuit (like the decision of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals in Moss II), is expressly premised
upon, and carefully follows the teachings of, this Court’s deci-
sions in two cases which are remarkably similar to the instant
case—A tlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301
(1935), and U. S. v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183 (1939). In those
cases, this Court enunciated the principle that where an admin-
istrative agency has committed a procedural error in establishing
rates, persons who paid those rates can obtain restitution only
if that remedy is necessary to prevent unjust enrichment—which
could not occur unless the rates in question were “unjust” or
14
“unreasonable.” That controlling rule of law, of course, is the
very cornerstone of both the Seventh Circuit decision below and
the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Moss Il.
In the Atlantic Coast Line case, plaintiffs sought restitution
of sums which the defendant railroads had collected pursuant
to an I. C. C. order that subsequently was set aside because the
Commission’s factual findings had been inadequate.* This Court
denied restitution, holding that such relief would be appropriate
only if the freight rates which the railroad had charged under
the later-invalidated I. C. C. order were “unreasonable”, so that
the railroad would be “unjustly enriched” if it were permitted .
to retain the amounts which it had collected. Justice Cardozo,
speaking for the Court, stated that the plaintiffs could obtain
restitution only if they could “show that the money was received
in such circumstances that the possessor will give offense to
equity and good conscience if permitted to retain it” (295 U. S.
at 309). This Court’s opinion went on to conclude that it
would be unjust to punish the railroad for the Commission’s
procedural error in establishing the questioned rates unless it
had been “unjustly enriched” by collecting the amounts in ques-
tion, and that it was appropriate for the I. C. C. to determine
post hoc whether such “unjust enrichment” had occurred (even
though the Commission had no power to grant reparations)
(295 U. S. at 312-314).**
* Petitioners seek restitution of money “had and received” in the
instant case. Their theory of liability thus is identical with the theory
of liability relied on by the plaintiffs in Atlantic Coast Line.
* * This Court’s opinion in Atlantic Coast Line also emphasized
the fact that the defendant railroad was legally required to collect
the questioned fares, even though the I. C. C. order imposing those
fares subsequently was set aside on the ground that it was not su
ported by adequate findings of fact (295 U. S. at 311). Similarly
here, the air passenger tariffs which the carriers filed in October
1969, pursuant to the Civil Aeronautics Board’s September 12, 1969
order, were legal, valid and binding until the Board’s order was
reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
July 1970. Until the October 1969 tariffs were thus invalidated, the
defendant air carriers were legally required to charge the fares
(Continued on next page)
ee
oes = een -
15
This Court expanded upon the Aflantic Coast Line principles
in Morgan, which involved the action of the Secretary of Agri-
culture in prescribing new, lower rates for services rendered in
the Kansas City stockyards. The plaintiff stockyard operators
contended that the new rates were invalid because the Secretary
had promulgated those rates without a full hearing. Pending
judicial determination of the validity of the Secretary’s action,
the sums representing the difference between the old rates and
the new ones were placed in an escrow fund established by the
District Court. This Court sustained plaintiffs’ challenge to the
new rates, holding that the entry of the Secretary’s order without
a full hearing was a denial of the “requirements of fairness which
are the essence of due process” (Morgan v. United States, 304
U. S. 1, 19 (1938)). On remand, the District Court held that
by virtue of this Court’s decision the plaintiff stockyard operators
were automatically entitled to restitution of all of the money
which had been placed in the escrow fund during the pendency
of the litigation. But when the case was appealed for the second
time, this Court held that the stockyard operators could recover
only that portion of the escrow fund which the Secretary deter-
mined to have been collected pursuant to rates that were not
unreasonably high. In reaching that result, this Court con-
cluded that the District Court had erred in failing to apply the
“unjust enrichment” test promulgated in Atlantic Coast Line,
and that the Secretary of Agriculture had the power to determine
the reasonableness of the rates charged during the prior period
(307 U. S. at 195-198).
Petitioners contend that Atlantic Coast Line is not relevant
here because the I. C. C. order involved there was invalidated
because of the inadequacy of the Commission’s findings—which,
according to petitioners, did not constitute a violation of “due
(Continued from preceding page)
specified in those tariffs, because 49 U. S. C. § 1373(b) provides
that “No air carrier * * * shall charge or demand or collect or receive
a greater or less or different compensation for air transportation, or
for any service in connection therewith, than the rates, fares, and
charges specified in its currently effective tariffs * * *.”
16
process” comparable to that which allegedly occurred when the
Civil Aeronautics Board entered its September 12, 1969 order
(Pet. pp. 6-8). But it is clear from the Atlantic Coast Line
opinion that this Court’s decision there was not affected in
any way by the reason for the invalidity of the questioned
I. C. C. order. Furthermore, the petition here does not even
mention the Morgan case, where this Court held that the prin-
ciples enunciated in Atlantic Coast Line were applicable as
grounds for denying restitution even though the Secretary of
Agriculture had established new rates without a full hearing,
in a manner which this Court had characterized as a denial. of
the “requirements of fairness which are the essence of due
process” (304 U. S. 1, 19).*
Petitioners assert that “this entire case turns upon one ques-
tion of law”— namely, whether the Civil Aeronautics Board’s
September 12, 1969 order was merely voidable (as the Court of
Appeals held), or was void ab initio (Pet. pp. 9-10). Their
theory is that the decision of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in Moss I (430 F. 2d 891) retroactively voided that
Board order and the October 1969 tariffs established pursuant
thereto, thereby reinstating the prior tariffs and entitling peti-
tioners to recover all amounts which they paid for domestic
air transportation in excess of the amounts specified in those
prior tariffs.** This Court, however, rejected that “void ab
* Moreover, although petitioners assert that “the denial of a
hearing granted by statute is a denial of due process of law” (Pet.
p. 6), that principle applies only where persons subject to quasi-
judicial action were deprived of hearing rights in conjunction with
decisions that impinged upon their individual interests. Questions
regarding public participation in rate-making proceedings, on the
other hand, are not of constitutional significance. Professor Davis
affirms this long-established principle, on the basis of numerous well-
known decisions, in his Administrative Law Treatise, § 7.06; see
also, §§ 7.01, 7.02, 7.04 and 7.20 thereof, particularly § 7.04.
* * This “void ab initio” argument is advanced by petitioners in
reliance upon Moss I, even though the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals clearly explained in Moss II that its opinion in Moss I
could not properly afford any basis for such an argument. See, 521
F. 2d 307.309, 314-315; Appendix B, pp. A27 through A31, A42.
17
initio” theory in Atlantic Coast Line and again in Morgan.
In Atlantic Coast Line, this Court held expressly that the
I. C. C.’s failure to make adequate findings in support of its
order did not render that order void ab initio (295 U. S. at 311).
Similarly in Morgan, this Court held that the Secretary of Agri-
culture’s later-invalidated order was voidable, rather than void,
Stating:
“* * * There [in Atlantic Coast Line}, as here, * * *
the higher rates exacted between the date of the first order
and the second were without the sanction of a valid order.
But there, as here, the first administrative order was not
a nullity. * * * Though voidable, it could not be ignored.”
(307 U. S. at 195-196).
And, as noted above, this Court reached that conci:sioa in
Morgan despite the fact that the “first administrative order” in
question there had been entered without a full hearing, under
circumstances which this Court characterized as a denial of
the “requirements of fairness which are the essence of due
process”.
Thus it is clear that the “one question of law” propounded by
petitioners has been answered unequivocally by the controlling
decisions of this Court, and that the Civil Aeronautics Board’s
September 12, 1969 order was not “void ab initio”, but rather
was merely voidable. That fact is unquestionably dispositive
here, because even petitioners have conceded that if that order
was merely voidable, the Board’s subsequent “findings related
to reasonableness and equity [of the fares in question] * * *
would be controlling” (Pet. p. 10).
In an attempt to avoid the effect of Atlantic Coast Line and
Morgan, petitioners contend that the decision in this case should
be governed by United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv-
ice Corp., 350 U. S. 332 (1956) (Pet. pp. 6-7). Petitioners,
however, have failed to disclose several critical facts which ren-
der that decision totally inapposite here. United Gas Pipe Line
Co. was decided under the Natural Gas Act, and the rate pro-
18
visions of that statute ave substantially different from the rate pro-
visions of the Federal Aviation Act, because the Natural Gas
Act contemplates private rate agreements rather than tariffs
which establish uniform rates for all customers (shippers and
passengers). In United Gas Pipe Line Co. this Court held sim-
ply that a natural gas company could not unilaterally change
the terms of its contract to furnish gas to a distributing com-
pany, merely by filing with the Federal Power Commission a
schedule calling for rates higher than those specified in the
contract. Accordingly, this Court’s decision permitting the dis-
tributing company to recover the amounts which it had paid
in excess of the contractual rates manifestly does not support
petitioners’ contention that they are entitled to restitution even
though they suffered no injury by paying the fares in question
(and the defendant air carriers were not unjustly enriched by
collecting those fares). The other cases cited in the Petition are
similarly inapposite, and need not even be discussed here. It
suffices to say that none of the cases cited by petitioners involved
a situation where an administrative agency rate order was set
aside on procedural grounds, and subsequent corrective hearings
held by that administrative agency established that the rates
imposed pursuant to the procedurally defective order were just
and reasonable.
Finally, petitioners contend that it was inappropriate for the
District Court to rely on the determination by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board that the fares were not unjust or unreasonable
(Pet. p. 9). That contention, however, is refuted by Atlantic
Coast Line (where this Court held expressly that the I. C. C. had
the power to determine whether the rates charged pursuant to
its later-invalidated order had been just and reasonable) and by
Morgan (where this Court held that the plaintiffs’ mght to
recover the sums held in the escrow fund established by the Dis-
trict Court depended upon a determination by tht Secretary of
Agriculture as to whether the old rates had been unreasonably
high). Moreover, the Civil Aeronautics Board determined the
|
19
reasonableness of the fares at issue here in a proceeding which
it instituted in response to a complaint filed by Congressman
Moss, ef al. shortly after the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals announced its decision in Moss I reversing the Board’s
September 12, 1969 order and remanding the matter to the
Board “for further proceedings”; the Board’s determination
that those fares were not unjust or unreasonable subsequently was
affirmed by that same Court of Appeals in Moss II. Clearly, then,
it was appropriate for the District Court to rely on the Board’s
determination as to the reasonableness of the fares in question,
because that unquestionably is a matter within the Board’s ex-
clusive primary jurisdiction (for the reasons established by a
long line of this Court’s decisions, beginning with Texas & P.
Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (1907), and
summarized in such cases as Far East Conference v. United
States, 342 U. S. 570, 574-75 (1952), and United States v.
Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1956)).
CONCLUSION
Thus it is clear that the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit is in complete accord with the controlling
principles of law established by this Court’s prior decisions, and
is not in any way inconsistent with those decisions or in conflict
with the decision of any other Court of Appeals. The Seventh
Circuit in its decision below, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals in Moss II, Judge Napoli in his decision staying the
consolidated damage actions pending further proceedings before
the Civil Aeronautics Board, and Judge Will in his order dismiss-
ing these actions, agreed unanimously as to the legal principles
controlling here——principles long established by this Court's
directly relevant decisions in Morgan and Atlantic Coast Line.
Moreover, petitioners have failed to demonstrate any other reason
why this Court should exercise its discretionary powers to
20
review the decision of the Seventh Circuit. Consequently, the
petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
H. TEMPLETON BROWN,
BRYSON P. BURNHAM,
LEE N. ABRAMS,
STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO,
Attorneys for Respondents American
Airlines, Inc. and Trans World
Airlines, Inc.
MAYER, BROWN & PLATT,
231 South LaSaile Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60604,
312—ST2-0600,
Of Counsel.
April 6, 1976.
Al
APPENDIX A.
UNITED STATES DisTRICT COURT,
N. D. Illinois, E. D.
Jan. 12, 1972.
ALAN WEIDBERG, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
No. 70 C 1879 and Related Cases.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.
NAPOLI, District Judge.
This Multidistrict Litigation was transferred to this court for
consolidated pretrial proceedings by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(a),
In re Air Fare Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1013 (1971). The Panel
realized that the seven actions which were filed in the wake of
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 139 U. S. App. D. C.
150, 430 F. 2d 891 (1970) presented our federal judiciary with
the problem of conflicting and overlapping class actions. Under
these circumstances the Panel held that common questions of
fact existed justifying a transfer under § 1407 in regard to the
problem of the makeup, potential overlapping and damages to
A2
the purported classes. Therefore, five actions pending in districts
other than the Northern District of Illinois were transferred to
this district, considered by the Panel to be the most convenient
for all concerned, and have been consolidated with the two
actions currently pending before this court.
The factual situation involved in this litigation is most
thoroughly recited in the Moss opinion at 430 F. 2d 891.
Hence this court will only summarize those facts which are nec-
essary for an understanding of the issues currently before the
court. Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U. S. C.
§ 1301 et seq. (1970), the air carriers must file with the Civil
Aeronautics Board (hereinafter C. A. B. or Board) and keep
open to public inspection tariffs showing their fares for air
transportation; § 1373(a). The carriers are prohibited from
charging or collecting any compensation which varies from the
tariffs on file or from granting rebates or refunds therefrom, with
certain exceptions not applicable here; § 1373(b). The carriers
may change the tariffs by filing with the Board and posting
amended tariffs thirty days before their effective date; § 1373(c).
However, the C. A. B. itself is authorized to prescribe a lawful
rate to be charged when it is of the opinion that the present rate
is unjust or unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, preferen-
tial, or prejudicial; § 1482(d). It must, however, give notice
and conduct a hearing before exercising this power. Subsection
(e) of § 1482 enumerates the substantive standards the Board
is directed to consider in determining rates and subsection (g)
empowers it to suspend any newly filed tariff, pending a hear-
ing regarding the tariffs lawfulness, if it provides the affected
carrier with a statement of reasons therefor.
Petitioners in Moss, some 32 Congressmen, had complained to
the C. A. B. concerning its practice of holding ex parte meetings
with representatives of the carriers. Despite these complaints, the
meetings ripened into new tariffs increasing passenger fares
which were filed by 20 of the main domestic air carriers in
August of 1969.
A3
On September 12, 1969, the Board issued Order 69-9-68,
docket 21322 which suspended the carriers’ tariffs under § 1482
(g) on the grounds that said tariffs “may be unjust [or] unreason-
able.” The Order further found that the carriers were in need
of additional revenue due to increased expenses and proposed
its own fare formula, which would in effect grant a revenue in-
crease of 6.35%, and announced that such tariffs would be ac-
ceptable without suspension. Predictably, the carriers withdrew
their suspended tariffs and filed new tariffs in accordance with
the C. A. B.’s formula all of which became effective on or by
October 15, 1969.
A petition for review of the C. A. B.’s order was filed in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by the Moss
petitioners which resulted in that court holding that the October
1969 tariffs filed by the carriers actually constituted rate making
by the Board under § 1482(d) and that as such the C. A. B.’s
order and rates were invalid and unlawful for failure to com-
ply with that section’s notice and hearing provisions. The court
remanded the case to the C. A. B. for further proceedings. Also,
the Moss petitioners filed a supplemental complaint with the
Board asking that it conduct a proceeding to determine the
appropriate relief for the carriers’ customers who paid the now
uniawful fares. An investigation entitled “Reasonableness of
Passenger Fares charged by Domestic Trunkline and Local
Service Carriers from October 1, 1969, through October 14,
1970”, was initiated by the Board’s Order 71-2-109, docket
23140 in response to these events.
Following the Moss decision, these seven lawsuits were filed,
as hereinbefore mentioned, each claiming to represent the class,
or a part thereof, of the public who paid the alleged over-
charges as a result of the unlawful fares. Following their transfer
to this court, the air carrier defendants have moved to stay the
proceedings herein, pending completion of the C. A. B. investi-
gation. In support of this motion, defendants assert that the
only possible claim for relief of plaintiffs, if any, is upon the
A4+
theory of unjust enrichment which depends upon the reasonable-
ness vel non of the unlawful fares. They also assert that the
issue of reasonableness is the central facet of this case because
the Federal Aviation Act (hereinafter “Act”) makes the im-
plied standards for fares or rates that of justness and reasonable-
ness, as well as the fact that the carriers are undoubtedly en-
titled to a reasonable rate of return for their services. Further,
they claim that the question of the reasonableness of the fares
is a matter within the primary jurisdiction of the C. A. B., hence
these proceedings should be stayed. Plaintiffs in opposition state
that their theory of recovery is not necessarily unjust enrich-
ment, making the question of reasonableness immaterial and
their claim for relief is independent of the Act. They also as-
sert that the C. A. B. has no jurisdiction, primary or otherwise,
over this cause as the issues are questions of law, not fact;
that the C. A. B. has no power to conduct investigations or
determine retroactively, reasonableness of fares; and that it has
no power to award reparations. Finally, plaintiffs charge that the
only currently effective tariffs the carriers could charge under
§ 1373(b) were the original tariffs on file before the carriers
filed their new tariffs in August 1969. Consequently, plaintiffs
believe themselves to be entitled to recover without considera-
tion of the reasonableness of the unlawful fares.
The decisions in the field of administrative law overwhelm-
ingly support the proposition that if the issue in controversy
involves the reasonableness of fares, then that question falls
within the primary jurisdiction of the appropriate administrative
agency and this court should defer to such agency for the initial
determination. See, e.g., Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed 2d 553
(1907); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public
Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 71 S. Ct. 692, 95 L. Ed.
912 (1951); Civil Aeronautics Board v. Modern Air Transport,
179 F. 2d 622 (2nd Cir. 1950); Lichten v. Eastern Airlines,
189 F. 2d 939 (2nd Cir., 1951); and Tishman & Lipp, Inc. Vv.
AS
Delta Airlines, 275 F. Supp. 471 (S. D. N. Y. 1967), affirmed
413 F. 2d 1401 (2nd Cir. 1969). The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction serves as a flexible guide for the courts in determining
whether it will be more efficacious for the judiciary or an
administrative body to make the initial determination of the
question in issue. Therefore it is not technically a question of
“jurisdiction” but rather a matter of judicial self restraint in
conformance with comity and a healthy respect for the
statutory authority of the administrative agency. The rationale
of the doctrine is a recognition of the need for an orderly co-
ordination of work between the judiciary and administrative
bodivs for the reason that those bodies can apply their knowl-
edge or expertise to the question and thereby aid the court by
laying a foundation for a more intelligent disposition of the
question as well as insuring uniformity of result. See, Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise (West Publishing Co. 1958)
§ 19.01 et seq. As such, this court believes that a stay in pro-
ceedings while this cause is referred to the C. A. B. would be
a matter within its sound discretion. Ratner v. Chemical Bank
New York Trust Co., 309 F. Supp. 983 (S. D. N. Y. 1970).
Since the question of the reasonableness vel non of the fares
falls within the primary jurisdiction of the C. A. B., the plain-
tiffs in order to avoid a stay must proceed on the theory either
that they have a claim for relief independent of unjust en-
richment, which would rest upon common-law or statutory con-
struction, or that they are absolutely entitled to recover due to
the declaration of unlawfulness by the Moss court. At the ex-
pense of lengthening this opinion the court will turn to and
examine the pertinent authorities and arguments of the re-
spective parties on these issues.
The case which presents the most factual similarity to this
litigation is Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Florida, 295
U. S. 301, 55 S. Ct. 713, 79 L. Ed 1451 (1935) and is cited by
defendants for the proposition that the only theory of recovery
is unjust enrichment. In Atlantic Coast the carrier collected a
A6
higher set of rates which had been prescribed by order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission upon its finding that the
original rates were unjustly discriminatory. Previously the
Supreme Court held that the ICC’s order was unlawful for want
of complete and adequate findings of fact. New findings were
subsequently made, supporting the same schedule of rates, and
were upheld by the high Court. Various shippers and the
State of Florida sued to recover the increase in rates collected
before the rate schedule was supported by valid findings.
Mr. Justice Cardozo for the Court considered the action to
be one for money had and received which is founded in equity,
and analogized with an action to recover a satisfaction of
judgment which is later reversed. It was stated:
The claimant, to prevail, must show that the money was
received in such circumstances that the possessor will give
offense to equity and good conscience if permitted to re-
tain it. (Citations omitted). The question no longer is
whether the law will put him in possession of the money
if the transaction were a new one. The question is whether
the law will take it out of his possession after he had been
able to collect it.
295 U. S., at 309-310, 55 S. Ct., at 716-717.
In this type of situation, Cardozo applied the test as follows:
To prevail, the claimants must make out that in the cir-
cumstances here developed a fixed and certain duty has
been laid upon a court of equity to make the carrier pay
the price of the blunders of the commerce board in draw-
ing up its findings.
295 U. S., at 314, 55 S. Ct., at 718.
Thus Atlantic Coast does not adopt any rigid formula for
recovery; rather the equities of the cause as set forth in the
context of the factual circumstances will serve as the polestar for
a court of equity in reaching a decision. In that case, restitution
was ultimately denied due to the inequity of the shippers’ posi-
tion, in that the original rates were so unreasonably low as to
A7 -
be confiscatory. The decisive element in the Court's weighing
of the respective equities appears to have been the reason-
ableness of the schedule of rates. Supporting this interpretation
is Cardozo’s statement in reversing the decree of the district
court that:
The claimants do not sustain the burden that is theirs by
showing that the master set up a reasonable schedule
{allowing partial restitution to the shippers]. They must
show that the other schedule, the one set up by the [Inter-
state Commerce] Commission, is unreasonable. In the ab-
sence of such a showing the carrier does not offend against
equity and good conscience in standing on its possession
and keeping what it got.
295 U. S., at 318, 55 S. Ct., at 720.
This court believes with only the possible reservation to be
mentioned infra that the last quoted passage from Aflantic
Coast is a more accurate description of the holding in that case
than to say that plaintiffs must proceed upon the theory of
unjust enrichment. Defendants can not impose their theory of
recovery upon the plaintiffs’ claim for relief; however, the court
agrees that there is considerable merit in the position that in
weighing the equities of this case, the question of the reasonable-
ness of the fares will play an important or even decisive role.
Paraphrasing Cardozo, in order for plaintiffs to prevail it must
appear that the equities are so in favor of the plaintiffs that this
court is duty bound to make the air carriers pay a considerable
sum as reparations for the blunder of the C. A. B. There is no
question that the air carriers have the right to seek increased
fares, subject to the suspension power of the C. A. B. The Moss
court found the fares to be unlawful not because they were un-
just or unreasonable, or that they violated the substantive rate
making factors contained within § 1482(e) as plaintiffs claim,
but rather for the reason that the C. A. B. failed to give notice
and conduct a hearing in prescribing rates under § 1482(d).
Despite the scathing criticism of the C. A. B. by the Moss
A8
court, this court’s reading of the Moss opinion leads it to the
conclusion that the defect in the administrative proceeding was
of a procedural nature. Thus, the question of the reasonableness
vel non of the unlawful fares becomes particularly appropriate in
weighing the equities of the respective parties.
If a determination of unreasonableness is made, coupled with
the Moss court’s decision holding the C. A. B.’s order and its
fares invalid then there is a basis for finding that the retention
by the air carriers of the increase of the fares would violate
equity and good conscience. The Act implies that fares should
be just and reasonable, as well as not discriminatory, prejudicial
or preferential. If the fares are found to be reasonable, on the
other hand, then the only equity on plaintiffs’ side is the pro-
cedural defect committed by the C. A. B. Since the Act allows
reasonable fares and it can not be doubted that the carriers are
entitled to a reasonable rate of return, plaintiffs would have a
weak case if the fares were reasonable and just. Another factor
to be weighed in this regard is the admonition of § 1373(b)
against a carrier charging any fare other “than the rates, fares,
and charges specified in its currently effective tariffs.” The car-
riers had no way of determining that the C. A. B.’s order and
their fares would be invalidated by the Moss court. They take
the position that it was their statutory obligation to charge the
fares filed with the Board but subsequently found to be defec-
tive. Plaintiffs counter with the argument that the Moss court’s
decision voided these fares ab initio. Since the tariffs filed by the
carriers and suspended by the C. A. B. had thereupon been
withdrawn by the carriers, the only remaining tariffs which
could possibly be the currently effective tariffs were the original,
pre-October 1969 tariffs which the carriers sought to increase.
The plaintiffs then conclude that § 1373(b) forbade the car-
riers from charging any but the 1969 fares and that they are
ipso facto entitled to restitution for violation of the statute. Mr.
Justice Cardozo dealt with a similar issue in Atlantic Coast and
held that an order of an administrative body found to be void
for a procedural defect is only voidable, and he further stated:
A9
The carrier was not at liberty to take the law into its own
hands and refuse submission to the order without the
sanction of a court. It would have exposed itself to suits
and penalties, both criminal and civil, if it had followed
such a path. . . . Obedience was owing while the order was
in force.
295 U. S., at 311, 55 S. Ct., at 717.
This court believes that the same is true under the Act in ques-
tion in this case. Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, supra. The tariffs
filed with the Board but subsequently found to be unlawful were
voidable due to the C. A. B.’s error; until a court of proper ju-
risdiction declared them to be unlawful, however, they were the
only tariffs which were on file with the C. A. B. and were the
only “currently effective” tariffs. Any other result would create
chaos and destroy the purpose of the Act: uniformity of treat-
ment. A contrary holding would allow or compel a carrier to
charge a fare at variance with its filed tariffs on the pretext that
it may be procedurally defective. Under such a situation, plain-
tiffs’ construction of § 1373(b) would in fact undermine and
destroy the very purpose of that section. Therefore, this court
believes that until an order or tariff of the C. A. B. has been
administratively or judicially overturned the carriers are bound
by it. See, Alco-Gravure Div. of Publications Corp. v. American
Airlines, 173 F. Supp. 752 (D. Maryland 1959).
Of course, the respective equities will depend upon the entire
circumstances of the case, of which the question of reasonable-
ness is but one, albeit an important factor to be considered.
As was mentioned earlier in this opinion, the question of the
reasonableness of any fare or tariff is within the primary juris-
diction of the appropriate administrative agency. See, e.g. Texas
& Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., supra. The ration-
ale for this doctrine was said to be in the Abilene case the
policy of the statute providing for uniformity of treatment. It was
thought that such uniformity would be impossible if individual
courts were free to pass on the question of reasonableness—the
Al0
spectre of different juries reaching conflicting results was suffi-
cient to lead the court to decline involvement in the question in
favor of the administrative bodies.
Thus far this opinion has mainly relied upon cases decided
under the Interstate Commerce Act. Since this case will turn on
another statute, the Federal Aviation Act, it is appropriate to
consider whether this analysis will change under the different
act. .
The case of Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F. 2d 939 (2nd
Cir. 1951) is one of the more prominent cises decided under
the Federal Aviation Act dealing with primary jurisdiction.
There, the reasonableness of a tariff containing an exculpatory
clause was challenged. In holding that the question was one
properly for the C. A. B. to handle rather than the court, the
court cited Abilene and emphasized the necessity for uniformity
of decisions on the question. In C. A. B. v. Modern Air Trans-
port, supra, it was also held that the question of reasonableness
is within the primary jurisdiction of the Board, but in that case
the court held that it could interpret the C. A. B.’s regulations
and determine whether or not there had been a violation thereof.
See, also Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, supra, and
Furrow & Co. Vv. American Airlines, 102 F. Supp. 808 (W. D.
Okla. 1952). It should also be noted that the decision in Aflantic
Coast dealt with the theory of recovery when an administrative
body has committed procedural error and was not limited to
interpreting or depending upon the Interstate Commerce Act.
Therefore, the court believes that opinion sufficiently broad in
scope to be applicable to the case at bar.
One problem is presented by two Supreme Court decisions.
In Abilene and T. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S.
464, 79 S. Ct. 904, 3 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1959) it was held for
different reasons that a court had no power to hear a claim for
reparations which was based upon a challenge to the reason-
ableness of tariffs. Abilene was decided under Part I of the Inter-
state Commerce Act which provides for the award by the I. C. C.
All
of reparations and for private cause of action for violation of its
terms. The court held, despite a broad savings clause, that a
common-law cause of action would be “absolutely inconsistent”
with the purpose of the Act, which is to insure uniformity of
rates, and is abrogated by the statutory remedy. 7. J. M. E. was
decided under the Motor Carriers portion of the Interstate Com-
merce Act which at that time did not provide for reparations to
be awarded by the administrative agency nor for a private
cause of action, which in this respect is similar to the Federal
Aviation Act. That court refused to imply a statutory action and
further held that the absence of a reparation provision within
the Act was indicative of a Congressional intent to abrogate any
claims for relief including those at common-law. Thus, if an
analogy can be drawn between the Federal Aviation Act and
these portions of the Interstate Commerce Act, no claim for
relief may exist. However, it is not appropriate at this time to
reach a decision on this question. The investigation of the C. A.
B. into the question of the reasonableness of fares in question
may render moot this difficult problem. Also, the factual situ-
ations and statutes involved in these two cases are different from
those in this litigation and the cases may not be applicable.
Therefore, this court believes that the most expeditious and effi-
cient course of action for this litigation would be to by-pass this
problem, which counsel have not dealt with in depth in their
respective memoranda, since it is an issue collateral to the mo-
tion currently before the court, until a determination of the rea-
sonableness vel non of the fares has been made.
While the main arguments of the plaintiffs have been con-
sidered and dealt with earlier in this opinion, the court will
briefly comment on their remaining issues. Certain plaintiffs
attempt to distinguish the Atlantic Coast decision from Moss
on the ground that the defect in the former was procedural
while in the latter it was a violation of the substantive rate mak-
ing standards contained within the statute. This court can not
agree and reads Moss as invalidating the order and fares of
Al2
the C. A. B. on the grounds that the second tariffs filed by the
Cafriers in response to the C. A. B.’s suggested formula con-
stituted rate making by the Board. As such, a hearing after
due notice was required by the statute and, as admitted by the
C. A. B., was not held. Basically, for the reasons that judicial
review was in this manner frustrated and that the public was
effectively excluded from the decision making process, the
Moss court overturned the increased fares. This, in the court’s
opinion, was a procedural defect, and it believes that the quota-
tions of plaintiffs are taken out of the full context of the Moss
opinion.
Also, plaintiffs contend that the C. A. B. has no power to
grant reparations or to investigate into the past unreasonableness
of a tariff. While the first statement is certainly true, it does
not follow that any action or investigation of the C. A. B. must
prove to be futile for that reason. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is predicated upon the rationale of the administrative
agency laying a foundation for a more informed decision by
the court. Therefore, power to issue a final order adjudicating
the claims or granting relief on the part of the agency is not
necessary before a question can be referred to such an agency.
The Act also grants general investigatory powers to the Board
and the Atlantic Coast decision supports the theory that the
agency may conduct an investigation in these circumstances.
Plaintiffs cite the cases of J. C. C. v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431 (1913)
and Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245
U. S. 531, 38 S. Ct. 186, 62 L. Ed. 451 (1918). The court
finds that these cases are inapplicable for the reason that in
those instances the appropriate administrative agency had prior
to the litigation considered the reasonableness of the tariffs.
The first case stands only for the proposition that the findings
of the I. C. C. are prima facie correct rather than conclusive.
The latter case held that the party who was charged excessive
freight charges was damaged despite the possibility that it may
Al3
have passed on the overpayments to its customers. Finally, the
case of United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.,
350 U. S. 332, 76 S. Ct. 373, 100 L. Ed. 373 (1956) is also
distinguishable since it was decided under the entirely different
statutory rate making scheme of the Natural Gas Act.
Finally, the court notes that the origin of this litigation
arose with the C. A. B. and the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. That Court reversed the order of the Board
and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. In response
to that remand and the supplemental complaint of the Moss
petitioners, the C. A. B. initiated its present investigation. For
this court to enjoin this investigation as plaintiffs have requested
or to conduct an independent and duplicative determination of
the same or similar question as being considered by the Board
would, in effect, be an infringement upon the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. This court
is unaware of any precedent granting to a district court the
power to interfere with the orders or mandate of a Court of
Appeals of another circuit.
Accordingiy, the defendants’ motion for a stay is granted
and all proceedings in this litigation are ordered to be held in
abeyance until further order of this court. The purpose of
this stay is to await the findings of the C. A. B. on the question
of the reasonableness vel non of the fares charged between
October 1969 and October 1970. The parties are expected to
aid such investigation and are urged to participate therein. The
court also expects liaison counsel for the plaintiffs and defend-
ants to periodically inform the court as to the progress of those
proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Al4
APPENDIX B.
UNITED STATES CoURT OF APPEALS,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Nos. 73-1772, 73-1790.
Oct, 16, 1975.
JOHN E. Moss et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
CrviL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent,
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., TRANS
WorLpD AIRLINES, INC., CONTINENTAL AIR LINEs, INC.,
EASTERN AIR LINEs, INc., DELTA ArR LINES, INC., KEITH
ROBERTS, ALLEGHENY AIRLINES, INC., AND NORTH CENTRAL
AIRLINES, INC., UNITED AIR LINEs, INC., WESTERN AIR
LinEs, INc., HUGHES AIRWEST ef al., BRANIFF AIRWAYS, INC.,
AND NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., INTERVENORS.
KEITH ROBERTS,
Petitioner,
vs.
Crvit AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent,
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., CON-
TINENTAL AIR LINES, INC., EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., DELTA
Ar LINES, INC., ALLEGHENY AIRLINES, INC., AND NORTH
CENTRAL AIRLINES, INC., UNITED Arr LINEs, INC., HUGHES
AIRWEST, FRONTIER, ef al., TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.,
NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC., AND BRANIFF AIRWAYS, INC.,
INTERVENORS.
a eta i tee ck)
Al5
Before J. EDWARD LUMBARD, Senior Circuit Judge for the
Second Circuit, and MCGowan and RoBINsoN, Circuit Judges.
McGowan, Circuit Judge:
This case comes in the aftermath of Moss v. CAB, 139 U. S.
App. D. C. 150, 430 F. 2d 891 (1970), which invalidated cer-
tain airline passenger fares made etfective by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board in violation of Section 1002 of the Federal
Aviation Act. 49 U. S. C. § 1482 (1970). The question now is
whether there is to be a recovery of any part of those unlawful
fares. The Board has denied such relief on the grounds that the
fares in question were not unjust or unreasonable, and, in any
case, resulted in no unjust enrichment of the airlines. We con-
clude that these decisional principles are determinative, and that
they were correctly applied. Accordingly, we affirm.’
I.
The history of this case is quite involved, and may best be
set out chronologically:
August 20, 1969. Petitioners Moss, et al., requested the
Board to suspend a number of proposed fare increases
claimed by the airlines to be necessary to offset sharp in-
flation in their costs and decline in their revenues. Petition-
ers called at the same time for a rulemaking proceeding in
which the Board would undertake a general review of its
ratemaking practices.
1. Two petitions for review of the same Board order have been
consolidated. The first, No. 73-1772, was filed by Congressman
John E. Moss and some twenty-four colleagues. It is they who
instituted the Board proceedings culminating in the challenged order,
as it was they (or a similar group) who secured the ruling of this
court in Moss I. The second petition, No. 73-1790, was filed by
Keith Roberts, a plaintiff in one of several district court suits filed
after Moss I, in which relief was sought directly against the airlines.
Those suits having been continued pending the outcome of the Board
proceedings, petitioner Roberts successfully sought to intervene
before the Board. In addition to filing his own review petition in
this court, Roberts has also intervened in No. 73-1772. Some four-
teen airlines have intervened in both appeals, urging that the Board
be upheld.
Al6
September 12, 1969. The Board issued Order 69-9-68,
in which it suspended the proposed rates. Recognizing an
urgent need for some additional revenue, however, the
Board in the same order identified a formula by which
the airlines could compute rate increases that would not be
suspended. Rate increases of approximately six percent,
as contemplated by the formula, were filed and became
effective as of October 1, 1969.
January 29, 1970. The Board instituted its Domestic
Passenger Fare Investigation, a broad inquiry into various
aspects of airline ratemaking. The DPFI was later divided
into nine separate phases: (1) aircraft depreciation; (2)
leased aircraft; (3) deferred federal income taxes; (4)
joint fares; (5) discount fares; (6) seating configurations
and load factors (subsequently made the subjects of sepa-
rate phases 6A and 6B, respectively); (7) fare levels; (8)
rate of return; and (9) fare structure.
June 19, 1970. The Board announced its intention to
allow the airlines to “round up” their October 1, 1969 fares
to the nearest dollar. The increase took effect July 1, 1970,
and yielded some $50 million in additional airline revenues.
July 9, 1970. This court rendered its decision in Moss I,
invalidating Order 69-9-68 and holding unlawful the fares
computed and charged pursuant to it. It was held that the
Board had “determined” rates within the meaning of
Section 1002(d) and (e) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U. S. C. § 1482(d) and (e) (1970), without complying
with the requirements of those sections that this be done
after notice and hearing, and by reference to statutory
ratemaking criteria. The case was remanded to the Board
for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion.
July 28, 1970. The Board continued the rounded-up
October 1, 1969, fares in effect, declaring that these were
the only ones that could be lawfully charged pending
establishment of new fares. Order 70-7-128. It called in the
same order for carrier filings of new fares to be effective
October 15, 1969, such fares to be “free of any compul-
sion that may have been inherent in the invalid Order
69-9-68.”
a A ae er
Res Ae bat 00 OO Ne al A ON omen
Al7
July 29, 1970. The Board moved this court for a stay
of its mandate in Moss I for ninety days to permit establish-
ment of new fares in the manner described above. The stay
was granted.
September 24, 1970. The Board suspended all new fares
filed pursuant to its July 28 order, except those that re-
established the rounded-up October 1, 1969, fares. These
newly filed, though unchanged, fares were, in the Board’s
view, free of any compulsion from the order invalidated
in Moss I.
October 7, 1970. Petitioners requested this court to stay
its mandate in Moss I for a further period, and thus to
express its disapproval of the manner in which the Board
had re-established the rates. We were further requested to
order the Board to rule promptly on petitioners’ request
for relief from the fares held unlawful in Moss J. Both re-
quests were denied.
February 25, 1971. The Board initiated proceedings to
determine whether the rates charged between October 1,
1969, and October 15, 1970, were “unjust and unreason-
able.” The Board noted the pendency of a number of class
actions brought in district courts against the airlines for
recovery of part of the fares ruled unlawful in Moss I. On
February 19, 1971, these cases had been transferred by
the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation to the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Jn
re Air Fare Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1013 (Jud. Pan.
Mult. Lit., 1971). Partly in order to aid the Northern
District of Illinois to resolve these suits, the Board de-
ferred decision of the question of whether it had power to
grant relief, and proceeded directly to the question of the
reasonableness of the challenged fares. The class action
suits were in fact stayed pending the Board’s resolution
of that question, Weidberg v. American Airlines, 336 F.
Supp. 407 (N. D. Ill., 1972), and the suits were sub-
sequently dismissed on the basis of the Board order now
under review. Weidberg v. American Airlines, No. 70 C
1879 (N. D. Ill, filed Dec. 10, 1973).
April 9, 1971. The Board issued its final decision in
Phase 6B of the DPFI (load factors), and its tentative find-
ings and conclusions in Phase 7 of the DPFI (fare levels).
Al8
The latter proposed a fare level 12% higher than the
unlawful October 1, 1969 rates. After taking interim adjust-
ments into account, this higher level required an increase
of 9% in the then prevailing rates. The Board authorized
an increase of 6% pending its final decision in Phase 7.
(The Board’s final decision, affirming its tentative one,
came on August 11, 1973.)
May 7, 1971. Fare increases of 6%, as provided for in
the Board’s April 9 orders, went into effect. The lawfulness
of these rates has not been challenged by petitioners.
July 11, 1972, The Board issued Order 73-7-39, its final
decision denying relief from the rates found by this court
in Moss I to have been unlawfully “determined.”
July 16, 1973. Petitioners sought direct review in this
court of Order 73-7-39.
The foregoing is an account of three sets of interrelated pro-
ceedings before the Board, dealing with (1) the establishment
of lawful fares in place of those found unlawful in Moss I, (2)
the propriety of relief for the public from those unlawful rates,
and (3) the general matter of how rates were properly to be
set in the future. Since petitioners claim that lawful fares were
not re-established until May 7, 1971, they seek relief from
rates charged during the period running from that date back
to October 1, 1969.” This attempt to establish the unreasonable-
ness of rates charged during that period rests largely on the
retroactive application of standards set in the DPFI.
During the period in which the October 1, 1969, rates were
charged, the airlines did not in fact earn excessive profits from
their passenger operations. The average rate of return on such
2. Br. Petitioners at 9. There is dispute among the parties as to
when lawful passenger fares were re-established. The intervenors
claim, for example, that since petitioners made no attack upon the
boarac’s action in allowing. newly-filed but unchanged fares to go
into effect on October 15, 1970, the latter date marks the end of
the period for which relief could be sought, at least with the aid of
Moss I. Br. Intervenors Braniff Airways, et al. at 10. Since we find
that petitioners have not yet established their entitlement to relief
for any period, we need not resolve this dispute.
Al9
operations for the year ending September 30, 1970, was found
by the trial examiner to have been 3.29 percent in the case of
the trunk line carriers, and —.40 percent in the case of the local
carriers.* Petitioners do not challenge these findings. A fair and
reasonable rate of return had been established by the Board in
1960 in its General Passenger Fare Investigation at 10.5 per-
cent. This was increased in Phase 7 of the DPFI, concluded
in 1971, to 12 percent for the trunk lines and 12.35 percent for
the locals. Assuming, as the Board did, that a fair rate of re-
turn for the period in question lay somewhere between these
two figures, plainly it was not achieved. The poor performance
was nothing new. A return as high as 10 percent had been
achieved by the trunk lines during only two of the ten years
prior to 1970, the average for that decade being 6.2 percent.
App. 522.
Petitioners argue, however, that the absence of excessive
operating profits is not dispositive. They have instead made the
following claims:
(1) The right to recover passenger fares is not dependent on
their having been “unreasonable,” but solely on their having
exceeded the last preceding rates that were lawfully established
(i.e., the pre-October 1, 1969, rates).
(2) Even if recovery of unlawfully established rates is to
be had only to the extent that they exceeded what was “reason-
able,” such an excess existed here because
(a) the rate of return for the period in question should
be recomputed on the assumption that the airlines exper-
ienced the higher load factors which the Board determined
3. Initial Decision of Trial Examiner Ross I. Newmann at 23;
App. 504. The figures were derived by use of the so-called “by-
product” or “revenue-offset” method of allocating the costs of carry-
ing passengers and belly cargo. By this method the cost of belly
cargo is simply equated to the revenue it generates. The trial exa-
miner further found that the more refined “joint product” method, by
which the actual (and greater) costs of belly cargo are sought to be
identified, yielded r~ > figures, 4.19 percent and —.13 percent
respectively. Initial Decision at 23-24; App. 504-05.
A20
in Phase 6A of the DPFI should be the standard for the
future;
(b) the rate of return should be recomputed on the
assumption that all seats had been sold for full fares, with
a reduction or “dilution” on account of discount fares only
to the extent of 12 percent, this figure being regarded by
petitioners as reasonable in light of the Board’s determina
tion in Phase 5 of the DPFI that future fare levels would
be constructed on the assumption that no discounts were
offered at all;
_(c) the airlines’ “indirect” costs (those not directly
associated with the operation of aircraft) should be limited
to 48.4 percent of total costs, this standard also being one
that was allegedly adopted in the DPF!.
(3) Even if the general fare level did not yield profits which,
as properly recomputed, were “unreasonable,” recovery should
be had by those who paid unjustly discriminatory rates during
the period in question.
The Board gave varied responses to these claims.* The first
claim—that for a refund of all amounts charged in excess of pre-
October 1, 1969, rates—the Board dismissed on the basis of
contrary court decisions. The second set of claims—those at-
tempting to establish the unreasonableness of charged rates by
the retroactive application of standards adopted in the DPF/—
the Board turned aside in two ways. It found in some instances
that the fares were not unreasonable even if tested by the ap-
propriate rate making standards. In other instances, however,
it declined to apply those standards retroactively because doing
so would be “inequitable.” The Board’s response to the third
claim—that based on fare structure—was cast even more clearly
in terms of the equity of recovery rather than the propriety of
the fares.
4. See generally CAB Order No. 73-7-39, July 11, 1973; App.
732.
A21
Il.
There are a number of vexing questions presented by this
appeal. Is there any right of recovery for previously charged
and properly filed airline iares?® If so, who may grant it: the
Board, this court, a district court, or some combination?® And
what is the standard of recovery, assuming it is the same in the
various forums which may grant it? We need only address the
last of these questions, for we find that the proper standard for
recovery is such as to preclude relief to these petitioners in any
forum—at least at this stage of the proceedings.
As there is scant precedent for the granting or denial of
recovery of unlawful airline fares,’ we begin with a brief review
of the problem as it has arisen in analogous regulatory con-
texts.
5. Compare T.1.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S. 464, 79
S. Ct. 904, 3 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1959) (absence of reparations power
in ICC precludes recovery for unreasonable motor carrier rates),
with Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U. S.
84, 83 S. Ct. 157, 9 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1962) (shippers could recover
for misrouting by motor carriers). These cases are discussed at
greater length below.
6. All four possibilities are presented in this appeal. The district
judge before whom the class actions were consolidated, see, ........
Be ABB. BD. Gy ccescess , 521 F. 2d 301, supra, apparently assumed
that he could grant relief based on a Board finding that the fares in
question were unreasonable. 336 F. Supp. 407 (N. D. Ill. 1972).
The Board itself was of course requested to grant relief. Having failed
in that forum, petitioners now urge that we as an appellate court
exercise an inherent authority to order restitution ourselves, as osten-
sibly we did in Williams v. Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 134
U.S. App. D. C. 342, 415 F. 2d 922 (1968), cert. denied, 393 VU. S.
1081, 89 S. Ct. 860, 21 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1969).
7. The only precedent known to us is Danna v. Air France, 334
F. Supp. 52 (S. D. N. Y. 1971), in which recovery was sought of
allegedly discriminatory passenger fares. The district judge dis-
missed on the ground that 7./.M.E., Inc. v. United States, see note
5 supra, barred any recovery. The judgement was affirmed, but on
the more limited ground that recovery must in any case await a deter-
mination by the Board that the fares in question were indeed unlaw-
fully discriminatory. 463 F. 2d 407 (2d Cir. 1972).
A22
(a) Interstate Commerce Commission.
Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act explicitly imposes upon
subject rail carriers a liability, enforceable either before the
ICC or in a district court, for violation of the Act’s commands,
among them that just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates
be charged.* The standard of recovery is, of course, justness and
reasonableness, a matter within the Commission’s primary
jurisdiction.* There is no comparable right of recovery expressly
given by the Federal Aviation Act for unlawful airline rates.
Still, there is at least one railroad rate case that is highly relevant
to our problem. In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Florida, 295
U. S. 301, 55 S. Ct. 713, 79 L. Ed. 1451 (1935), recovery was
sought of rate increases which the Commission had itself ordered
into effect, assertedly to prevent a discrimination against inter-
state commerce. The Commission’s order was judicially reversed
for lack of adequate factual findings. The Commission sub-
sequently issued new and more ample findings, re-established
exactly the same rates, and was this time upheld in the courts. In
these circumstances, the Commission was thought to be “without
power to give reparation” for the improperly established rates.
295 U. S. at 312, 55 S. Ct. 713. The ratepayers’ only remedy
was for restitution, which Justice Cardozo described as follows:
A cause of action for restitution is a type of the broader
cause of action for money had and received, a remedy
which is equitable in origin and function. . . . The claimant
to prevail must show that the money was received in such
8. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(5), 3(1), 8, 9 (1970). A similar regimen
applies to water carriers subject to Part III of the Interstate Com-
merce Act. See 49 U. S. C. §§ 901 et seg., 908 (1970).
9. Compare Texas & P. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S.
426, 448, 27 S. Ct. 350, 358, 51 L. Ed. 553 (1907) (“a shipper
seeking reparation predicated upon the unreasonableness of the es-
tablished rate must, under the act to regulate commerce, primarily
invoke the redress through the Interstate Commerce Commission”),
with J. C. Famechon Co. Vv. Northern P. R.R., 23 F. 2d 307 (8th
Cir. 1927) (primary resort to Commission not necessary where issue
is legal construction of filed tariff).
A23
circumstances that the possessor will give offense to ec “ty
and good conscience if permitted to retain it.
Id. at 309, 55 S. Ct. at 716. In concluding that equity required
no restitution—not even the partial restitution the lower court
had granted—the Court relied primarily on the fact that follow-
ing its earlier reversal the Commission had made new and proce-
durally adequate findings that the invalidated rates had in fact
been just and reasonable.’°
Interstate motor carriers are now subject to the same express
statutory liability for unreasonable rates as are the railroads."
Prior to 1965, however, the Commission was, with respect to
motor carriers, in the same position as the Board—lacking any
express reparation or refund power. That lack was held by the
Supreme Court in T. J. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S.
464, 79 S. Ct. 904, 3 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1959), to preclude
recovery by the payers of unreasonable motor carrier rates, at
least where the claim was made by way of a defense in an action
by the carrier to collect rates which had been properly filed with,
and not challenged before, the Commission. Three years later,
however, in Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc.,
10. The existence of a judicial power to restore the fruits of a
subsequently invalidated rate order gains further support from Sec-
tion 74 of the ALI Restatement of the Law of Restitution (1937):
JUDGMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED. A person who
has conferred a benefit upon another in compliance with a
judgment, or whose property has been taken thereunder, is
entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set aside,
unless restitution would be inequitable or the parties contract
that payment is to be final; if the judgment is modified, there is
a right to restitution of the excess.
The existence of such power in regulatory agencies themselves ap-
pears to have been recognized by the Supreme Court in United Gas
Improvement Co. Vv. Callery Properties, 382 U. S. 223, 229, 86 S. Ct.
360, 364, 15 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1965), where it was stated that “[a]n
agency, like a court, can undo what is wrongfully done by virtue of
its order.”
11. See Pub. L. No. 89-170, 79 Stat. 651 (1965), as codified, 49
U. S. C. § 304(a) (1970); Land O’Lakes, Inc. v. United Bucking-
ham Freight Lines, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 102 (D. Minn. 1972).
A24
371 U. S. 84, 83 S. Ct. 157, 9 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1962), the
court held, over the objection of T. J. M. E.’s author (Harlan, J.),
that common law remedies against common carriers could
survive the enactment of the statute so long as they were con-
sistent with its regulatory scheme. Such a surviving remedy was
that for misrouting of a shipper’s goods, on which ground the
plaintiff in Hewitt-Robins in fact prevailed.
(B) Federal Power Commission.
The only express reference to recovery of excessive rates in
the Natural Gas and Federal Power Acts is in connection with
the exerc'se by the FPC of its power to suspend rates for five
months pending their investigation. See 15 U. S. C. § 717c(e),
16 U. S. C. § 824d(e) (1970). Suspended rates may go into
effect after that period if the investigation is incomplete, but if
they are later finally determined to be excessive, the Commission
has power to order their refund. Recovery is for the excess of
charged rates over what was just and reasonable, with the price
specified in a seller’s certificate of convenience and necessity
serving as a “refund floor.” See FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391
U. S. 9, 23-24, 88 S. Ct. 1526, 20 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1968).’
Refunds may also be ordered by way of the FPC’s conditioning
the certification of natural gas sales on the refunding of excessive
rates that have previously been charged, either under a tempo-
rary, unconditioned certificate, see, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v.
FPC, 378 F. 2d 510, 530-32 (Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U. S. 917-19, 88 S. Ct. 1801, 20 L. Ed. 2d 655 (1968), or
under a permanent, unconditioned certificate that has subse-
quently been invalidated in the courts. See, e.g., United Gas
Improvement Co. Vv. Callery Properties, 382 U. S. 223, 86 S.
Ct. 360, 15 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1965). Such refunds would again
be limited to the excess of actual over reasonable charges, and
12. See also, In re Hugoton-Anadarko Area Rate Case, 466 F.
2d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 1972) (refunds could be forgiven by the Com-
mission if they would otherwise treat principal seller “unfairly as
compared to the other producers”).
A25
might be even less, since “the issue of a refund in [such] circum-
stances turns upon equitable considerations.” Public Service
Commission of New York v. FPC, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 287,
329 F. 2d 242, 249-50, cert. denied sub nom. Prado Oil & Gas
Co. v. FPC, 377 U. S. 963, 84 S. Ct. 1644, 12 L. Ed. 2d 735
(1964).**
(C) Metropolitan Area Transit Commission.
A third area in which this court in particular has confronted
the problem of public recovery of unlawful rates is in connection
with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission
which for a time oversaw the operations of an independent D. C.
Transit company under a multistate Compact between the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia.** The Compact re-
quired the Commission to establish, and Transit to charge, just
and reasonable rates. There was no provision for recovery or
refund of excessive rates.** Nonetheless, we hel’ Bebchick v.
Public Utilities Commission, 115 U. S. App. D. v. 216, 318 F.
2d 187, 203-04, cert. denied, 373 U. S. 913, 83 S. Ct. 1304,
10 L. Ed. 2d 414 (1963), that where the Commission had im-
properly authorized a fare increase, the amount realized could
not be retained by the company, and even if it could not be
directly refunded, had somehow to be “utilized for the benefit
13. See also Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 401 F. 2d 726, 729 (10th
Cir. 1968) (‘no inequity results” where FPC orders refund of rates
charged in accord with permanent certificate which was later recon-
sidered, seller being “on notice that the allowed rate was subject to
revision”); Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 146 U. S. App. D. C.
287, 450 F. 2d 1334, 1337-38 (1971) (where uncertificated sales
were later determined to have been within FPC jursdiction, it had
“equitable power ‘to regard as being done that which should have
been done’. . . and to order refunds to be paid if necessary to achieve
that goal”).
14. The company’s operations were taken over by the Washing-
ton Metropolitan Area Transit Authority on January 14, 1973. See
National Capital Area Transit Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-517, 86
Stat. 999 (1972).
15. See D. C. Code § 1-1410 (1966).
A26
of the class who paid it.” In Williams v. Washington Metropoli-
tan Area Transit Commission, 134 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 415
F. 2d 922 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1081, 89 S. Ct. 860,
21 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1969), we were more explicit about the
nature and measurement of the public recovery in such a case.
Such recovery was held to be “governed by the equitable con-
siderations which apply to suits for restitution generally.” We
found that in the circumstances of that case these principles
required Transit to “restore the amount realized by the fare in-
crease only to the extent that its actual return is not reduced
to an amount which all parties have agreed would be unrea-
sonably low.” Jd. at 944-46. In Democratic Central Committee
of D. C. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,
158 U. S. App. D. C. 107, 485 F. 2d 886, 913-15 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U. S. 935, 94 S. Ct. 1451, 39 L. Ed. 2d 493
(1974), we again invalidated a Commission-authorized rate in-
crease. Once again we found “the appropriate avenue of relief
. .. to be restitution,” though in this instance we remanded the
case to the Commission for its consideration of what exactly
should be restored.
(D) United States v. Morgan.
We take note, finally, of United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S.
183, 191-98, 59 S. Ct. 795, 83 L. Ed. 1211 (1939), involving
an order of the Secretary of Agriculture reducing stockyard rates
to a just and reasonable level. The order was stayed pending
judicial review, but the amount by which, if valid, it would
reduce the stockyard owners’ receipts was ordered paid into
court. The Secretary’s order was invalidated on procedural
grounds, and the Court faced the question of the fund’s disposi-
tion. The district court was instructed to proceed “in conformity
to equitable principles,” and primarily on the basis of what the
Secretary subsequently determined to have been the just and
reasonable rates for the period.*®
16. See also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 197, 90 S. Ct. 314,
24 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1969) (where the Secretary of Agriculture had
A27
The foregoing brief survey suggests that if there is a remedy
for properly filed airline rates later found to be unlawful, it is of
one of the following kinds: a surviving common law (or con-
ceivably an implied statutory) remedy for unreasonable charges
by a common carrier (analogous to that recognized in Hewitt-
Robins, supra); a right to seek the exercise by the CAB of its
power to condition certificates of convenience and necessity on
the refunding of more-than-reasonable fares (analogous to that
recognized in Continental Oil and Callery, supra); or a right to
have the CAB or the courts order the restitution of amounts
collected by virtue of erroneous orders or judgments (by analogy
to Atlantic Coast Line, Morgan, and this court’s Transit Com-
pany cases).
One right which clearly does not exist is the one petitioners
claim for recovery of all amounts in excess of the last lawfully
established rates. To cite only the most prominent contrary
authority, the Supreme Court in Atlantic Coast Line expressly
rejected the suggestion that where a rate order was procedurally
defective the carriers should restore the excess over the last
lawfully established rate, and thus “pay the price uf the blunders
of the commerce board.” 295 U. S. at 314, 55 S. Ct. at 718.
Significantly, the dissenters in that case would have granted just
the recovery that petitioners now seek. See id. at 318-30, 55
S. Ct. 713.*7 Our holdings in Williams v. Washington Metro-
improperly ordered increase in certain milk prices, the proceeds of
such increase having been held in escrow pending judicial review,
court “struck an equitable balance” in restoring to purchasers only
amounts paid in after District Court reversal of Secretary’s order).
17. Another express rejection of petitioners’ theory appears in
Plaquemines Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 146 U.S. App. D. C. 287, 450
F. 2d 1334 (1971), supra note 13. At issue there was the FPC’s
power to order refunds for uncertificated sales that were only later
determined to be within the Commission’s jurisdiction. We endorsed
the principle (applied by the Commission to some of the uncertificated
sales) that since it lacked cost-of-service information for the period,
it wculd consider rates that were “in line” with those prevailing in
the region to be in compliance with the Act. We disapproved the
principle (applied by the Commission to other uncertificated sales)
that refunds were required simply because the charged rates were not
on file with the Commission. See id. at 1336-39.
A28
politan Area Transit Commission, 134 U. S. App. D. C. 342,
415 F. 2d 922 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1081, 89 S.
Ct. 860, 21 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1969), and Democratic Central
Committee of D. C. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Commission, 158 U.S. App. D. C. 107, 485 F. 2d 886 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U. S. 935, 4 S. Ct. 1451, 39 L. Ed. 2d 493
(1974), both discussed supra, are also inconsistent with peti-
tioners’ claim.
We find no support for petitioners’ “last lawful rate” theory
in the two cases on which they primarily rely, Middlewest Motor
Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F. 2d 212 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 999, 91 S. Ct. 2169, 29 L. Ed.
2d 165 (1971), and Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. R. R.
v. Alouette Peat Products, 253 F. 2d 449 (9th Cir. 1957).
The former is a case in which the last lawfully established rate
happened also to be the just and reasonable one. An ICC order
cancelling a proposed rate increase had been stayed pending
review. When the stay was later lifted, recovery was sought of
the amounts which, because of the stay, were charged in viola-
tion of the ICC’s by-then-vindicated cancellation order. The
rate-payers prev: ‘led, not because the lower rates were the last
lawfully established rates, but because the Commission had
correctly found that they were the highest rates that could justly
and reasonably be charged. See 433 F. 2d at 229-32. Alouette
is distinguishable as a case in which the full amount of a rate
increase was restored, even though at least part of that increase
appeared just and reasonable, because the increased rates were
not properly on file with the Commission.’* We have not dis-
cussed the matter of “overcharges,” or charges in excess of
18. Railroad rate increases are normaly to be effective only on
thirty days’ notice. The Commission made an exception to this rule,
and allowed five days’ notice for increases of certain rates of six
cents or twenty percent, whichever was less. The carrier put into
effect, on five days’ notice, a twenty per cent increase, which ha
pened to be more than six cents. The new rates were held not to
lawfully on file with the Commission, and the full amount of the
increase was ordered restored.
A29
properly filed rates. Manifestly, the case for a strict rule of
recovery is far stronger in that context.’®
We have concluded that the Board correctly focused on the
equity of restitution and not just the reasonableness of past
rates. Reasonable rates, in this regulated industry as in others,
are those which are as low as possible but still allow the in-
dustry to provide “adequate and efficient service” and earn a
reasonable rate of return, thus assuring its ability to attract
necessary capital in the future. The just and reasonable rate, in
short, is the rate at which, under a given set of economic cir-
cumstances, the industry will perform efficiently as that term is
defined by the statute.
There are distinct equitable considerations which may prevent
a recovery even where fares had been found to exceed what
19. We may also pass quickly over petitioner Roberts’ claim
that the Board was without power to inquire into the justness and
reasonableness of past rates. It is true that the Board cannot make
rates retrospectively, see, e.g., Williams v. Metropolitan Area Transit
Commission, 134 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 415 F. 2d 922, 940 (1968),
but chis is not the same thing as inquiring into the propriety of relief
and into any issue on which relief turns. See Adaniic Coast Line
R. R. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301, 312, 55 S. Ct. 713, 718, 79 L. Ed.
1451 (1935) (Interstate Commerce Commission was without repara-
tions power but “not without power to inquire whether injustice had
been done and to report accordingly.”) Even assuming that the
Board could not itself order recovery, we have seen that the pro-
priety of recovery may turn on the reasonableness of rates. The
Board’s primary jurisdiction over that question strongly argues for
its power to furnish a retrospective answer to it; even if it is doing
so merely as a prelude to action by the courts. In fact the power to
do so seems amply embraced within the Board’s powers to “conduct
such investigations . . . as it shall deem necessary to carry out the
provisions of . . . this chapter,” 49 U. S. C. § 1324(a) (1970), and,
upon “complaint in writing with respect to anything done .. .
in contravention of . . . this chapter, . . . to investigate the matters
complained of.” Id. § 1482(a). The Supreme Court in United States
v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 198, 59 S. Ct. 795, 803, 83 L. Ed. 1211
(1939), held that the very similar statutory powers of the Secretary
of Agriculture enabled him to investigate the reasonableness of past
rates where his doing so would “afford an appropriate basis for
action in the district court in making distribution af the [escrow]
fund in its custody.” .
A30
was just and reasonable. It might be thought, to take the facts
of our case as an example, that the reasonable rate for a past
period was one which paid for a far more modest service than
was actually provided, but that since a lavish service was in
fact provided, with apparent Board blessings, there is no equity
in extracting profits which never existed. Other circumstances
can be imagined which might have already denied the airlines
the fruits of their unreasonable prices, and thus make it in-
equitable to require them to be disgorged. The excessiveness
of prices, perhaps in combination with an unexpected economic
downturn, might itself have caused a ruinous decline in the
volume of air travel, with consequent losses to the airlines. Even
if excessive profits were made in a given period, there may be
inequity in trying to recover them, particularly if large classes
of people are involved. As to who receives relief, it may be
impossible to reimburse those who actually paid the unreasonable
rates, so that the best that can be done is to establish a fund
on the carrier’s books to be applied for the benefit of future fare-
payers.”° As to who provides relief, past stockholders may have
reaped the benefits of the unreasonable fares and departed the
scene, leaving future stockholders to be adversely affected by
the recovery. The bite which is effectively taken from future
earnings by a recovery fund may in turn impair the health of
the industry, to the disadvantage of the fare-payers themselves.
The facts of our case are illustrative. The excess profits sought
to be recovered were not in fact earned but must be hypothesized
by a recomputation of costs and revenues. A substantial fare-
payer recovery on this theory would in practical effect mean
that an airline industry which had performed badly in the past
(from the investors’ point of view) would be all the more likely
to perform badly in the future. The equitable aspects of refund-
ing past rates are as inextricably entwined with the Board’s
20. This is the form of recovery ordered in Bebchick v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 216, 318 F. 2d 187, cert.
denied, 373 U. S. 913, 83 S. Ct. 1304. 10 L. Ed. 2d 414 (1963),
and also the form which petitioners propose in this case.
A3l
normal regulatory responsibility, as such refunds may substan-
tially affect the future rates, performance, and health of the in-
dustry. The statutory scheme thus seems to require that the
Board pass in the first instance not only on the reasonableness
of past rates, but on the equity of any recovery where such rates
are found to have been unreasonable. Cf. Democratic Central
Committee of D. C. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Commission, 158 U.S. App. D. C. 107, 485 F. 2d 886 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U. S. 935, 94 S. Ct. 1451, 39 L. Ed. 2d 493
(1974).
Il.
The Board’s approach to its task of determining whether the
airlines had been unjustly enriched was to look first at their
actual rate of return during the period in question, calling this
“the best overall index of the reasonableness . . . of passenger
fares,” App. 501, and upon finding it inadequate, as it undis-
putedly was, to assess petitioners’ specific arguments as to why
and how that rate of return should be readjusted. We turn now
to those arguments.
(A) Load Factors.
A load factor is simply an expression of how full airplanes are.
It is the ratio of the number of miles flown during a given period
by revenue-paying passengers, to the number that could have
been flown had every available seat been filled. Before 1971,
it had been the Board’s practice to accept for ratemaking pur-
poses the load factors that the airlines actually experienced,
i. e., to determine revenue needs and the fares necessary to
meet them on the assumption that the flights an airline pro-
posed to offer would be only as full as past experience sug-
gested. In 1971, however, the Board came to the conclusion in
Phase 6B of its DPFI that this policy had fostered overcapacity
in the industry. Barred from price competition, the airlines vied
for the available traffic by scheduling more and rore flights,
which were more and more empty and required higher and
A32
higher fares to pay for them. The higher prices depzessed the
volume of air travel, further aggravating the overcapacity prob-
lem. To break the cycle the Board proposed standard load fac-
tors which would in the future be assumed when calculating
the revenue that a proposed flight would generate. Actual load
factors would of course vary, but by making rates with reference
to the assumed factors the Board would insure that earnings,
rather than fares, would fluctuate with load factors. The airlines
would thus have a strong incentive to reduce overcapacity. See
generally Order 71-4-54; App. 182.
The last point is critical. The Board disavowed any intent
in adopting the load factors standards to force the airlines into
particular scheduling molds. Its purpose was to force an ad-
justment by the airlines to its new load factor constraints, but
exactly what the adjustment would be, the airlines themselves
were to decide. Jd. at 190. The policy was thus entirely prospec-
tive in nature, as is borne out by the Board’s adoption, for the
trunklines, of an interim standard substantially lower than that
to which it would hold the airlines in the long run.
The long run factors adopted by the Board were 55 percent
for the trunklines, 44.4 percent for the local lines, and 54.1
percent for the industry as a whole; the interim trunkline factor
was 52.5 percent.” During the period in which the challenged
rates were charged, the trunk airlines actually experienced a
load factor of only 48.9 percent, and the locals one of 43.2 per-
cent.”? Petitioners would recalculate the airlines’ earnings on the
basis of the 54.1 percent figure.*
21. Jd. at 228. The interim trunkline standard was adopted in
Phase 7 of the DPFI, in which the Board considered the question of
what changes in the fare level were dictated by the load factor and
other newly adopted rate making standards. See Order No. 71-4-59;
App. 283.
22. Exhibit BE-19; App. 38.
23. Actually, petitioners offered a recalculation of the trunklines’
rate of return only, omitting the local carriers’ rate of return and
contenting themselves with a statement in their brief that their com-
putations must understate the excess profits for the industry as a
A33
The Board’s answer was, first, to entertain for the trunklines
only the interim factor as a possible basis for retroactively com-
puting reasonable rates. Petitioners’ contention, that the higher,
permanent factor must be applied to the earlier period, appears
to rest on the assumption that that figure represents an ideal
load factor—then and now. They overlook the fact that one
of the circumstances of which a regulatory agency may take
account is past regulation. The Board’s own past policies of
restricting price competition and allowing service competition to
flourish may be partly to blame for overcapacity in the industry.
However the airlines came to their present pass, it was the
Board’s obligation to bring them through it with a minimum of
disruption. In short, what is just and reasonable encompasses
not only what is ideal, but what approaches it in an orderly and
reasonable fashion. Hence the interim standard. Under the
circumstances the Board might well have abused its discretion
had it ignored that standard in favor of the permanent one.
The Board expressed doubt as to the reasonableness—or at
least the equitableness—of applying even the 52.5 percent
figure retroactively. It also found, however, that a 52.5 per-
cent load factor produced a rate of return of only 6.13 percent
for the trunklines, while a 44.4 percent factor produced a .65
percent return for the local carriers.** Neither earned unrea-
sonable rates of return, therefore, even if the appropriate load
factors were applied retroactively. We have seen no plausible
attack on this calculation, or on the inadequacy of the rate of
whole, the locals being unaccounted for. Br. Petitioners at 52. There
is of course no necessary logic in this position. Indeed, the locals
maintain that even the full retroactive application of petitioners’
load factor, dilution, and indirect cost standards leaves
them far short of an adequate return. The claim appears to be un-
contested either before the Board or this court, and therefore gives
further support to the Board’s result.
24. See Exhibits BE-21, 22, 25, 26; App. 39-42.
A34
return which it yields. We uphold the Board in its conclusion
that thus far no unreasonableness had been established.*
(B) Dilution.
The term refers to the loss of revenues, expressed as a per-
centage, from selling seats at less than full fares. There are any
number of ways in which such sales are made—youth fares,
military fares, family fares, excursion fares, standbys, and so
on. Such discount fares work an obvious discrimination against
full fare passengers and are therefore facially inconsistent with
“rule of equality” contained in § 404(b) of the Federal Avia-
tion Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1374(b) (1970). They have nonetheless
been tolerated by the Board on the theory that they could
benefit the full fare passenger, first, by stimulating new and in-
creased demand, and thus paving the way for long run economies
of scale (e.g., larger, more economical aircraft); and, second,
by filiing seats that would otherwise be empty, and thus allowing
the full fare passenger to subsidize those seats partly rather
than fully.”
On such reasoning the Board in 1965 approved the use of
military standby and youth standby and reservation fares.”
On review the Fifth Circuit remanded the matter of the youth
fares for further consideration, see Transcontinental Bus System,
Inc. v. CAB, 383 F. 2d 466 (Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U. S. 920, 88 S. Ct. 850, 19 L. Ed. 2d 979 (1968). Such
consideration ultimately took the form of Phase 5 of the DPFI,
25. In fact the Board found that even if the long term industry-
wide factor of 55 percent were applied retroactively, it would produce
a rate of return of only 8.83 percent for the trunklines. Board De-
cision at 17 n. 39; App. 749. Petitioners have not attacked any of
these calculations, but rest their hopes on the retroactive application,
in addition to the load factors, of dilution and indirect cost standards.
The latter arguments are discussed, and rejected, below.
26. See Order No. 72-12-18 at 11-12; App. 543-44.
27. Order F-22186 Dockets 15845 et al. (May 20, 1965);
Order F-23138, Docket 16826 (Jan. 20, 1966).
A35
in which a number of discount fares were re-evaluated. Some
of these the courts had ordezed the Board to reconsider (e.g.,
family fares, see Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412
F. 2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969)), and some it had not, but all had
apparentiy had the Board’s previous approval. See Order No.
70-12-18; App. 537-39.
The Board in Phase 5 concluded that in general the bases
on which the discriminatory discount fares had been justified
were not sound. Little additional traffic had been generated, and
the potential cost savings to be realized from traffic increases
were found to be slight in any event. More important, the fares
were not filling seats that would otherwise be empty; instead, new
capacity was being added to accommodate the discount pas-
sengers. In essence the Board recognized that it was facing
another aspect of the same problem that concerned it in DPFI
Phase 6B dealing with load factors: If the airlines, barred from
price compstition, tended to compete by increasing their capacity,
and if this tendency was made chronic by their ability to pass the
cost of overcapacity along to the fare-payers, it did not help
to allow the airlines to discriminate among those fare-payers;
indeed, it only made matters worse for those discriminated
against. Put another way, a limitation on dilution is a necessary
complement of the load factor standards, for the burden of over-
capacity on the full fare passenger is not substantially lessened
if, while requiring that only 45 percent of an average flight's
seats be empty, the Board allows another 20 percent (let us
say) to be half empty in the sense of being filled by passengers
who do not pay full fares. ©
The Board therefore resolved in Phase 5 to tolerate only cer-
tain kinds of discounts which were shown to have the potential
of enhancing an airline’s short run profits, i. e., for filling flights
that were alreacy scheduled to fly and would otherwise fly empty.
To insure that the discounts would not remain in effect, and be-
come a burden on the full-fare passenger in the way we have
A36
described, the Board limited the duration of the discounts to
eighteen months, and also announced a powerful disincentive to
their use, namely, it would in future fare proceedings assume
zero dilution. It would assume, in other words, that all seats were
sold for full fares.**
It is on this basis that petitioners insist that the airlines’ rev-
enues for the period in question be recomputed to allow a dilu-
tion of only 12 percent of what full fare receipts would have been.
The 12 percent figure was proposed by their sole expert witness,
who testified that discount traffic accounting for smaller amounts
of dilution tended to be carried by existing capacity, but that
when such traffic took a larger bite from revenues, it tended to
be accommodated by capacity increases.
The Board responded in several ways. It stated that there was
no evidence to support the 12 percent figure (as indeed there ap-
pears to be none”), and that a percentage standard was in any
case “faulty in concept” (as appears to be true, the effect of a
discount upon capacity being much more a matter of its timing
than the amount of traffic it generates).*° We may assume, with-
out deciding, that these attacks on petitioners’ proposed dilution
standard would be inadequate without some consideration by
the Board of whether some other standard would be more ac-
ceptable. In the event, the Board went on to reject the retroactive
28. See generally Order No. 72-12-18; App. 529.
29. Petitioners’ expert witness himself admitted that “we have
arbitrarily, if I may use that word in a mathematical sense as it was
used this morning, drawn that line temporarily at 12 percent.” Tr.
641; App. 641. The only justification given for it was that certain
evidence adduced in Phase 9 of the DPFI tended to show that dilu-
tion traffic was accommodated by added capacity only in the long
haul markets, and only in these markets did dilution exceed 12 per-
cent. See Tr. 651-54; App. 74-77.
30. Thus, a sharp discount offered on short notice for flights
already scheduled could generate a large amount of additional traffic
but no additional capacity, while a less attractive discount planned
longer in advance could cause the airline to schedule additional
- flights to accommodate the expected traffic increase, even though it
was very slight.
A37
application of any dilution standard. It stated that the dilution
policy of Phase 5
was intended to provide the carriers with an “incentive to
make sound pricing decisions which will take into account
both the long-term and short-term factors.” Manifestly, this
policy was designed to provide incentives for the future, and
was not intended to be applied retroactively.
Board Decision at 25; App. 757.
While this appears to represent a conclusion by the Board that
the computation of just and reasonable rates for the period in
question need not incorporate a limit on the use of discount fares,
that conclusion was clearly alloyed with a concern over the in-
equity of a retroactive dilution adjustment. The sentences quoted
above were followed in the Board opinion by its statement that
“[flor the reasons previously given, such a retroactive application
would be highly arbitrary and inequitable.” Id. (Emphasis sup-
plied.) The “reasons previously given” included the fact that,
up to and including the period in question, the various discounts
were approved by the Board.
The Board’s conclusion that retroactive adjustment for dilution
would be “arbitrary and inequitable” seems to us persuasive,
particularly when viewed in the broader context of airline rate-
making. The laws of supply and demand operate in the airline
industry as elsewhere. Different fare structures and schedules
will generate different amounts of traffic, and different rates of
return. The number of solutions to the supply-demand equation
is infinite. The Board’s approach has not been to choose a par-
ticular solution, but to impose constraints on the solutions the
airlines may choose (i.e., that those sciutions must entail a rea-
sonable rate of return, 55 percent fu'l airplanes, no discrimina-
tion, etc.). The benefits of innovation and competition are thus
to some extent preserved by allowing the airlines to devise their
own solutions, and then to out-perform those solutions by operat-
ing more efficiently (and more profitably) than had been as-
sumed.
A38
In this context it does indeed seem “faulty in concept” to im-
pose a particular ratemaking constraint upon a prior period
during which, of course, the private initiative which it was in-
tended to elicit never occurred. And it is certainly inequitable by
such retroactivity to deprive the carriers of the chance to make
a profit from operations conducted within that constraint. The
inequity is greater when inadequate profits were made by the
carriers even under the constraints then applicable. Petitioners
are in the position of claiming that profits which never existed
should be disgorged because they would have existed had the
proper regulatory guidelines been in force, when in fact there is
no way to know whether such profits would have been earned or
not. The Board’s rejection of this position as “arbitrary and
inequitable” seems to us completely sound.
(C) Indirect Costs and Costs Generally.
Petitioners also claim that during the period in question the
airlines experienced excessive indirect costs, or costs not related
to the actual operation of aircraft. The claim has undergone
something of an evolution. Before the Commission it was argued
that ratemaking standards adopted in the, DPFI required that
indirect costs for the period be limited to 48.4 percent of direct
costs. The Commission pointed out in response that the 48.4
percent figure had been employed in Phase 7 of the DPFI (that
concerned with fare levels) solely for the purpose of forecasting
indirect costs. In the Commission’s words, “[i]t is not a Board
standard, nor does it have any relevance to the past period.”
Board Decision at 19; App. 751. The Board also observed that
the indirect costs actually experienced during the period in ques-
tion amounted to only 47.7 percent of direct costs, so that the
airlines did not exceed the limit of 48.4 percent, even assuming
it was properly regarded as such.
In their brief to this court petitioners appear to accept the
Board’s disposition of their argument based on the 48.4 percent
figure. They now claim that it was not enough for the Board
A39
merely to turn that particular argument aside, but that an in-
dependent assessment of the reasonableness of carrier costs,
direct and indirect, was required. Democratic Central Committee
of D. C. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,
153 U. S. App. D. C. 107, 485 F. 2d 886 (1973), cert. denied,
415 U. S. 935, 94 S. Ct. 1451, 39 L. Ed 2d 493 (1974), is
cited for support, and particularly our holding in that case
that
The Compact placed an obligation upon the Commission
to develop the record on important matters when it was
unsatisfied with the record produced by the parties. The
Commission, like other agencies charged with the protection
of the public interest, was not created simply to “provide
a forum for the” proceeding.
Id. at 905.
We find no error in the Board’s methodology. Democratic
Central Committee involved a different statute, a different regu-
latory agency, and a different regulated industry. As we ex-
plained at some length, the transit company was a monopoly,
the purpose of regulation was to afford the consumer the
benefits of competition, and one of these was efficiency, which
non-competitive firms tend not to achieve.
The airlines, by contrast, are in many respects highly com-
petitive. Indeed it is partly to hold destructive competition in
31. A related claim is that petitioners were erroneously assigned
the burden of —_— as to the reasonableness of the unlawfully estab-
lished fares. This appears not to be the case. The Board began its
investigation by observing that “the carrier parties . . . propose to
show the fares accord with all of the substantive standards of the
Act just as in any other rate p i § involving a past period,”
Order 71-2-109, App. 484; and it concluded its investigation with
the statement that “[tJhe carriers have abundantly satisfied the evi-
dentiary burden cast on them in this pr ing as to the reason-
ableness of the fares.” Board Decision at 28; App. 760. Nor can
we find fault with the merits of the latter conclusion. The airlines
established, with the aid of some thirty witnesses and 3500 pages
of written exhibits, that their earnings os the period in question
were woefully inadequate, even when analyzed according to the
appropriate guidelines developed in the DPFI. As stated in text,
that was enough to establish the reasonableness of the fares.
A40
check that the CAB exists; price competition, for example, is
effectively prevented. Other kinds of competition flourish, how-
ever. It is on this assumption that the Board accepts industry cost
averages for rate making purposes. It is assumed that the carriers
will compete to reduve costs below those averages and so make
a larger profit.** To be sure, the load factor and dilution
standards adopted in the DPFI represent efforts by the Board
to control costs which competition has failed to control, but the
failure derives more from an excess of competition than a dearth
of it. The duties of the Board with respect to investigating
carrier costs may thus be quite different from those discussed in
Democratic Central Committee. They may well be discharged
by the Board’s simply inquiring into whether the applicable
industry-wide cost guidelines of the DPFI have been exceeded.
That is what the Board did in this case. It agreed with peti-
tioners that “the reported operating results of the carriers under
the fares in question should not be accepted [but] must be ad-
justed to conform to [DPF/] standards.” It concluded, however,
that “the data supplied for this period conform to the Board s
conclusions in the DPFI with respect to Treatment of Flight
Equipment Depreciation and Residual Values for Rate Purposes,
.. . Treatment of Leased Aircraft for Rate Purposes, . . . and
Treatment of Deferred Federal Income Taxes for Rate Pur-
poses.” Board Decision at 13-14; App. 745-46. The remaining
DPFI standards for load factor and dilution were given more
extensive consideration, owing to the stress placed on them by
petitioners. The Board’s cursory discussion of DPFI guidelines
on which petitioners placed no emphasis seems to us acceptable
under the circumstances. Whereas in Democratic Central Com-
mittee we were reviewing a prospective rate making decision of
the Commission, we are here reviewing the Board’s conclusions
as to whether there has been unjust enrichment.** At least where
32. See, e.g., Order No. 72-8-50 (DPFI Phase 7; Fare Level)
at 46; App. 527.
33. This question, significantly, we remanded to the Commission
in Democratic Central Committee.
i oem
A4l
this is the question, and where the background to it is a period
of low actual profitability for the airlines, the Board need not
have given more than summary consideration to arguments the
petitioners had not specifically advanced.
(D) Discrimination.
The claim for recovery on the ground that the fare structure
was discriminatory is allied to that based on dilution, but dis-
crimination in favor of the discount passenger is, however, only
one of the unjust discriminations alleged to have taken place.
Others include discrimination between (1) short and long haul
travellers (the latter being allegedly the victims of mileage
formulae which did not take account of the higher per mile
cost of short flights), (2) travellers using congested and those
using non-congested airports (again because mileage formulae
did not reflect actual costs), and (3) travellers paying a single
or through fare and those who must pay multiple fares (a
fixed terminal charge being included in each of the latter).
As the Board noted, however, these characteristics of the
fare structure had been in lawfully filed and effective tariffs for
many years without Board interference. Indeed, the immediate
tariffs in question, filed in response to what the Board indicated
it would accept, effectively initiated a significant lessening of
the discrimination of which petitioners now complain.** Thus
the fare structure in effect during the period in question was
directly responsive to what the Board considered and represented
to be lawful. And the carrier, as a practical matter, had no
choice but to file the tariffs they did.
34. The formula unlawfully promulgated by the Board in Order
No. 69-9-68 decreased the discounts available to youth standby,
youth reservation, and family fare passengers. The same Order ad-
vised the carriers that their formula-developed fares, which were to
expire in January of 1970, would be renewed only if progress had
been made, as assertedly it was, in the publication of additional joint
fares and in making long and short haul fares more reflective of
actual costs. Board Decision at 30-32; App. 762-64.
A42
Where, as here, recovery can only be had in terms of restitu-
tion grounded in equitable considerations, the circumstances
just described are not such as to mandate recovery; and we leave
undisturbed the Board’s action in this regard. This conclusion is
fortified by, although not dependent upon, the finding that the
carriers did not receive excessive and unreasonable returns from
the fare level involved here, and that there is no fund of net
enrichment from which restitution could appropriately be made.
Assuming arguendo that restitution in respect of discriminatory
fares may conceivably be appropriate where a carrier knows
or should have known that such fares existed in an otherwise just
and reasonable fare level, the facts here do not admit of the
attribution to the carrier of the requisite guilty knowledge. The
fares in question were charged by the carriers in reasonable
reliance on the Board’s explicit approval of them. To the
extent that the Board was mistaken about the lawfulness
of the filing, the consequences of that mistake should not be
visited upon the carriers, certainly absent any actual unjust
enrichment.
The order appealed from is affirmed in all respects.
It is so ordered.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.