Petition — Bastone v. United States
Supreme Court brief1976
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MAR 2 1976
No. 75-1 239 7
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Su the
Supreme Court of the United States
Octoser Term, 1975
CARMEN BASTONE,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULIUS LUCIUS ECHELES
CAROLYN JAFFE
35 East Wacker Drive
Chicago, Dlinois 60601
Attorneys for Petitioner
ST:
UNITED ST«TES LAW PRINTING CO., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60618 (312) 525-6581
RODAK, JR., CLERK '
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Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved ........
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Reasons for Granting the Writ 0.0000... eeeeeeeeeeeee
There was a prejudicial variance between the in-
dictment, charging a single conspiracy, and the
proof, which at best showed a number of separate,
unrelated conspiracies, at least one of which had
completely terminated prior to petitioner’s alleged
involvement. This resulted in prejudice to peti-
tioner in that the jury was permitted to consider
against him evidence pertaining to conspiracies to
which he was not a party, including acts and dec-
larations of members thereof, and further, because
the indictment did not adequately advise him of the
offense which he was called upon to defend,
At the very least, there was a possibility of mul-
tiple conspiracies; hence, the court’s refusal to in-
struct the jury per defense requests on this issue—
together with its giving a sua sponte instruction
intended to cure the prejudicial effects of possible
variance but clearly insufficient so to do—requires
ED cenuscissiicticataliettannibdtamncietathctilishepinilessasietkissistbbadnede
NESE Se TEE Bes ee ea TAL AS SI
Appendix A—Opinion of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit ................2.....ecc0e00. App. 1
Appendix B—Order denying petition for rehearing
PII is MOE csnstsstiicscnasicccustemacn App. 32
ii
PAGE
Appendix C—Requested defense instructions per-
AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Berenbeim v. United States, 164 F.2d 670 (10 Cir.
SEIT .iecassuaddadsdadabuasansiumioaileedanitiahimnmaeentaeneas 11-12
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947) ... 11
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946) _...... 21
Brooks v. United States, 164 F.2d 142 (5 Cir. 1947) ... 10
Canella v. United States, 157 F.2d 470 (9 Cir. 1946) .... 9
Choy v. Bouchelle, 436 F.2d 319 (3 Cir. 1970) 000. 18
Daily v. United States, 282 F.2d 818 (9 Cir. 1960)
Dennis v. United States, 302 F.2d 5 (10 Cir. 1962) .... 11
Fernandez v. United States, 329 F.2d 899 (9 Cir.
UTE -nusscesisssaticoueiinicidalltemiiiesdiameaiaiaiiies ciatalaieitaes Panic) 10, 13, 18
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) ....3, 8, 9, 11,
20, 21, 22
Morris v. United States, 326 F.2d 192 (9 Cir. 1963) .... 18
Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9 Cir. 1961) .... 10
Stirone v. Unitea States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960) 220... 11
Tinsley v. United States, 43 F.2d 890 (8 Cir. 1930) .... 10
United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179 (2 Cir. 1960) .... 14
United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1975) 1
United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2 Cir. 1964) 13
United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2 Cir. 1964) .... 17
United States v. Braico, 422 F.2d 543 (7 Cir. 1970) .... 11
United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246 (10 Cir. 1974) .. 10
iii
PAGE
United States v. Calabro, 449 F.2d 885 (2 Cir. 1971) .. 12;
17,18
United States v. Cole, 457 F.2d 1141 (9 Cir. 1972) ... 14
United States v. Collier, 313 F.2d 157 (7 Cir. 1963) .... 18
United States v. Ford, 324 F.2d 950 (7 Cir. 1963) ........ 11
United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 ( 1940) a 11
United States v. Griffin, 464 F.2d 1352 (9 Cir. 1972) ... 17
United States v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 730 (7 Cir. 1975) ..9, 16,
17, 19, 20, 22
United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2 Cir. 1965) ...... 17
United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583 (2 Cir. 1971) 14
United States v. MeDaniels, 57 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. La.
eee ee ec 10
United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2 Cir. 1938) ... 11
United States v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598 (3 Cir. 1972) 18
United States v. Russano, 257 F.2d 712 (2 Cir. 1958) ..10, 12
United States v. Torrence, 480 }'.2d 564 (5 Cir. 1973) .. 18
United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7 Cir. 1969) ....9, 17,
19, 22
United States v. Walker, 453 F.2d 1205 (5 Cir. 1972) .. 13
Other Authorities
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment ......... 3
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8 RETIREE Ie me ae ee 2
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In the
Supreme Court of the United States
Octoper Term, 1975
No.
CARMEN BASTONE,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner, Carmen Bastone, prays that a writ of cer-
tiorari be issued to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Opinion Below
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, United States v.
Bastone, reported at 526 F.2d 971, is reprinted as Appen-
dix A, infra.
Jurisdiction
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was entered on
December 8, 1975. Petitioner’s petition for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing in bane, timely filed, was denied
on February 12, 1976. (Appendix B, infra.) The jurisdic-
tion of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(1)
and Rule 22.2 of the Rules of this Court.
Questions Presented
1. Was there a variance between the indictment, charg-
ing a single conspiracy, and the proof, which at best showed
a number of separate, unrelated conspiracies, at least one
of which had completely terminated prior to petitioner’s
alleged involvement?
2. If there was such a variance, was it not prejudicial
to petitioner in that the jury was permitted to consider
against him evidence pertaining to separate conspiracies
to which he was not a party, including acts and declarations
of members thereof, and further, because the indictment
did not adequately advise petitioner of the offense which
he was called upon to defend?
3. May petitioner’s conviction for conspiracy to trans-
port stolen trailers in interstate commerce be upheld where
the Court of Appeals’ rationale for finding a single con-
spiracy—i.e., that ‘‘the single objective of the conspiracy’’
was ‘‘the sale of stolen trailers,’’ without regard for the
federal jurisdictional nexus, and in an evidentiary frame-
work which included purely local transactions?
4. Since there was, at the very least, a possibility of
multiple conspiracies, was petitioner deprived of a fair
trial where the trial court not only refused to instruct the
jury per defense requests on this issue, but gave instead
a sua sponte instruction intended to cure the prejudicial
effects of possible variance but clearly insufficient so to
do?
3
9. Does not the Seventh Circuit’s ruling on the mul-
tiple conspiracies issue conflict with principles announced
by this Court in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
with other Seventh Circuit decisions, and with decisions
from other Circuits, particularly with respect to the neces-
sity of giving thorough, careful cautionary instructions
concerning the possible existence of multiple conspiracies
whenever—as here—the evidence reasonably may so be
construed?
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in pertinent part:
‘*No person shall be held to answer for ain] .. . in-
famous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, ...; nor be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law; .. .’’
The statute for violation of which petitioner was con-
victed is 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy), and the statute, vio-
lation of which was alleged to be the object of said con-
spiracy, is 18 U.S.C. 2314 (interstate transportation of
stolen property). (This petition raises no issues regard-
ing construction or application of these statutes.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Carmen Bastone, was charged in a one-count
indictment (74 CR 383, superseding 74 CR 223) with hav-
ing conspired, with nineteen named co-defendants’ and
' Petitioner and seven others actually went to trial. Tried with
petitioner by a jury were Salvatore Bastone, William Pullia, Vin-
cent McMahon, Warren Eugene Jackson, James Colvett, Arthur
‘eal, and T. G. Grey. Grey was permitted to change his plea dur-
ing trial, and the cases of the remaining defendants were submitted
to the jury. Salvatore Bastone was acquitted; the remaining defen-
dants on trial were found guilty. Only petitioner and Arthur Veal
appealed ; Veal’s conviction was affirmed in the same opinion as was
(Footnote continued)
4
four named but unindicted co-conspirators, and with
others unknown to the grand jury, to transport stolen
semi-troilers in interstate commerce. (R. 1)?
All motions, objections and requests for instructions by
any of the defendants on trial were considered as adopted
by all unless specifically disavowed. (Tr. 35-A, 80, 2228)
Petitioner’s motion for directed verdict at the close of
the government’s case (R. 158) was denied (R. 162), and
his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the
evidence (R. 167), taken under advisement, was denied
(R. 210), together with his post-trial motions in arrest of
judgment (R. 185) and for a new trial (R. 186), after the
jury’s verdict of guilty. (R. 176-77) The court sentenced
petitioner to 5 years imprisonment. (R. 219)
(Footnote continued)
petitioner's. (See App. A.)
Defendant Lonero’s case was severed prior to trial (due to his
illness), (Tr. 3-A), and the remaining defendants all pleaded guilty
prior to trial. Of these, Athas, Murray, Garner, Walley, and
Schoenneman all testified for the prosecution, and Quagliato was
called as a witness on petitioner's behalf. The remaining five de-
ferdants who pleaded guilty prior to triai (Falcione, Boenzi. Para-
dise, Marino and DeRosa) did not testify at trial.
*“R.” refers to the Record on Appeal, and “Tr.” to the Trans-
cript of Proceedings, both on file in the Court of Appeals in No.
75-1417.
The indictment charged that from June 1, 1968 to December
31, 1972, petitioner and the others conspired, “with unlawful and
fraudulent intent to transport and cause to be transported in inter-
State commerce from Chicago, Illinois to locations outside the
State of Illinois, stolen semi-trailers of a total value in excess of
$5,000.00, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully con-
verted and taken by fraud; in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 2314." (R. 1)
5
Statement of Facts
As the presecution’s case developed, the evidence tended
to show a number of separate, unrelated conspiracies, the
only connecting link being Ronald Schoenneman, the prose-
cution’s chief witness.
Schoenneman testified that in 1970 he was introduced to
petitioner, to whom he explained the stolen trailer busi-
ness. According to Schoenneman, petitioner subsequently
arranged for various thieves to steal trailers for hire, with
petitioner to get a percentage of the profits, after ex pendi-
tures to the thieves, for titles, and for having stolen trail-
ers cleaned and altered to reflect serial numbers matching
the titles. Later, per Schoenneman, petitioner assisted
Schoenneman in raising money to finance the operation.
(Tr. 5, 9-11, 24, 45-49, 52-62)
Schoenneman also testified concerning a stolen trailer
operation involving himself, unindicted co-conspirator
Svehla, and co-defendant Murray, which: entirely separate
conspiracy was not aileged to have involved any of the
defendants then on trial. (Tr. 35-40, 49, 11-74) Petitioner’s
motion for mistrial or to strike this evidence as being
fatally variant from the allegations of the indictment (R.
144) was denied. (R. 145) There was also evidence of a
separate conspiracy amongst Schoenneman and Murray
involving the use of the O’Rourke Cartage yard at Calu-
met Harbor. (Tr. 168-71, 1123-33)
While the indictment charged a single conspiracy be-
ginning on June 1, 1968 and continuing to December 31,
1972, Schoenneman’s testimony demonstrates a separate
conspiracy which began in 1968-69 involving himself, Gar-
6
ner® and Murray,‘ (Tr. 677), which ended completely in
1969-70, due to ‘‘heat’’ from the authorities; Schoenne-
man therefore went out of the ‘‘trailer business’’ for some
6 months to a year, per his own testimony. (Tr. 559, 678)
Aside from the testimony of Schoenneman, an accom-
plice witness who had received vast benefits from the gov-
ernment in exchange for his testimony,® petitioner was
implicated only by the testimony of co-defendant Athas,
(Tr. 1595-1600), and indirectly by testimony of a Mr. Gor-
bien. (Tr. 1559-72). None of the other prosecution wit-
nesses who testified after pleading guilty implicated pe-
titioner in any way.
* Garner had pleaded guilty prior to trial and testified for the gov-
ernment.
* Murray had pleaded guilty prior to trial and testified for the
government.
*Schonneman in fact had received approximately $33,000.00
from the government (as of the date of petitioner’s motion for new
trial) ; the government had recommended probation in exchange for
his “cooperation” ; because of his “new identity” and secret where-
abouts, in addition to securing the supposed governmental “pro-
tection” from those against whom he testified, he managed to avoid
paying legitimate debts amounting to over $350,000.00: and, al-
though he had filed no federal income tax returns during the indict-
ment period, he apparently was not going to be prosecuted in con-
nection therewith. Nor was he being prosecuted for numerous other
cffenses revealed in his testimony. (Tr. 4, 477-514, 528, 552-75:
see R. 187, p. 4.)
*While prosecution witness Ponzevic testified that petitioner
“may have been’ the man who accompanied Schoenneman (Tr.
1162) in a meeting with the witness wherein the proposed pur-
chase of used trailers (later consummated) was discussed, this pur-
ported identification was tentative at best.
7
Petitioner presented evidence : demonstrating Schoenne-
man’s inaccessibility to service of process for collection of
debts owed by him by virtue of his being in the ‘*protec-
tive custody’’ of the government (Tr. 1814) ; contradicting
Schoenneman on a crucial issue as to petitioner’s alleged-
ly having been present and having participated in an al-
leged conversation with trailer thieves (Tr. 1819-38) ; and
corrovorating his defense theory that his connection with
Schoenneman in the purchase of used trailers was in fur-
therance of a legitimate business enterprise. (Tr. 1839-
42).7
Refused requested defense instructions pertinent to the
‘‘multiple conspiracies’’ issue are reproduced in Appen-
dix C, infra.
* Although petitioner does not attack the legal sufficiency of the
evidence, the posture of the government's case against him certainly
was far from strong, which must be taken into consideration in de-
termining the prejudicial effect upon his trial of the serious error
urged herein.
8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
_ ee
There was a prejudicial variance between the indict-
ment, charging a single conspiracy, and the proof, which
at best showed a number of separate, unrelated conspira-
cies, at least one of which had completely terminated prior
to petitioner’s alleged involvement. This resulted in prej-
udice to petitioner in that the jury was permitted to con-
sider against him evidence pertaining to conspiracies to
which he was not a party, including acts and declarations
of members thereof, and further, because the indictment
did not adequately advise him of the offense which he was
called upon to defend.
At the very least, there was a possibility of multiple
conspiracies; hence, the court’s refusal to instruct the jury
per defense requests on this issue—together with its giving
a sua sponte instruction intended to cure the prejudicial
effects of possible variance but clearly insufficient so to
do—requires reversal.
The Seventh Circuit’s express reason for finding a single
conspiracy is its conclusion that ‘‘the single objective of
the conspiracy’’ was ‘‘the sale of stolen trailers,’’* with-
out regard for the federal jurisdictional nexus—as charged
in the indictment—that defendant conspired with others to
transport stolen trailers in interstate commerce.
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling on the multiple conspira-
cies issue conflicts with principles announced by this Court
in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, with other Sev-
enth Circuit Decisions, and with decisions from other Cir-
cuits, particularly with respect to the necessity of giving
*App. A, p. App. 11, text accompanying fn. 5.
9
thorough, careful, cautionary instructions concerning the
possible existence of multiple conspiracies whenever—as
here—the evidence reasonably may so be construed.
As the prosecution’s case developed, the evidence tended
to show a number of separate, unrelated conspiracies, the
only connecting link being Ronald Schoenneman, the prose-
cution’s chief witness. (See pp. 5-6, supra.)
It is obvious that these various transactions do not evi-
dence a single, unified conspiracy, as alleged in the indict-
ment. The only arguable connection amongst all the activi-
ties is Schoenneman.
This Court has declared that where multiple conspiracies
are shown while a single one was charged, a conviction
cannot stand if the jury may have considered against a
defendant, acts and declarations of others in furtherance
of one or more of the separate conspiracies to which he
was not a party. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 US.
750 (1946). That, we submit, was exactly the case here.
The evidence as outlined above (pp. 5-6, supra),
clearly showed multiple conspiracies, if any, rather than
a single one as alleged in the indictment, under the criteria
set forth in Kotteakos, its progeny, and even its predeces-
sors.
The point was properly raised by appropriate motions
below. (R. 144, 158, 187; Tr. 49, 71-74)
The evidence does not support a finding of one con-
spiracy. Petitioner’s conviction therefore cannot stand.
United States v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 730 (7 Cir. 1975);
Daily v. United States, 282 F.2d 818, 821-22 (9 Cir. 1960) :
Cunella v. United States, 157 F.2d 470, 477-78 (9 Cir.
1946); United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 741-44 (7
10
Cir. 1969); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 551-53
(9 Cir. 1961); Fernandez v. United States, 329 F.2d 899,
904-05 (9 Cir. 1964); Brooks v. United States, 164 F.2d 142
(5 Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Russano, 257 F.2d 712, 715-
16 (2 Cir. 1958); United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246,
1254-57 (10 Cir. 1974); Tinsley v. United States, 43 F.2d
890, 892-93 (8 Cir. 1930); see United States v. McDaniels,
57 F.R.D. 171, 176 (E.D. La. 1972).
‘‘[WJhere one general conspiracy is charged, proof
of several conspiracies constitutes a variance, and
.. . the harmless error rule . . . will not save a re-
versal where it is not made clear that no prejudice
has resulted from the error.’’ Brooks vy. United States,
164 F.2d 142, 142 (5 Cir. 1947) (reversing and re-
manding).
Even if some of the defendants may properly be said
to have participated in a single conspiracy, assuming such
conspiracy existed, there is no evidence that petitioner
was a party to any such conspiracy; at best, the evidence
would tend to connect him with a sub-conspiracy involv-
ing only himself and Schoenneman, together with a few
specified trailer thieves, which does not suffice to prove
him part of any supposed over-all scheme.’
Arguably, petitioner was one of several sources from
whom stolen trailers were obtained for fraudulent resale.
8 “|T]here is proof as to most, if not all, of the appellants
tending to show complicity in one or more illegal enterprises or
ventures having to do with distilled spirits. It is equally clear,
however, that while the proof tends to connect some of the de-
fendants in a common conspiracy, it completely fails to connect
others of the defendants to that conspiracy. On the contrary,
it tends to show the existence of, and to connect some of the
defendants with, entirely separate and distinct conspiracies. .. .
[I]t was reversible error to send them all to the jury under an
indictment in one count charging one general conspiracy.”
Brooks v. United States, supra, at 143.
11
Nothing demonstrates that he received any financial gain
other than that flowing from the sale of trailers allegedly
obtained through him. This does not suffice to hold peti-
tioner criminally liable for the entire venture. United
States v. Braico, 422 F.2d 548, 544 (7 Cir. 1970); United
States v. Ford, 324 F.2d 950 (7 Cir. 1963).
Petitioner cannot stand convicted because the evi-
dence does not permit the conclusion that he was aware
of the scope of the supposed over-all enterprise and know-
ingly participated therein. United States v. Falcone, 311
U.S. 205 (1940); United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2
Cir. 1938); Dennis v. United States, 302 F.2d 5, 12 (10 Cir.
1962).°
Moreover, the variance permits the possibility that peti-
tioner may have been convicted of an offense or offenses
other than that concerning which the grand jury which
returned the indictment heard evidence. This, too, is whol-
ly impermissible. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212
(1960).
That the evidence in the case at bar showed, if anything,
several conspiracies rather than a single conspiracy, is
clear. Compare the facts in Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750 (1946), and in the cases cited at pp. 9-10,
supra, where multiple conspiracies were found to have
been demonstrated, with the facts in Blumenthal v. United
States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947), Berenbeim v. United States,
®In Dennis, the court reversed as to all defendants, remanding
some for new trial, stating:
“Without knowledge, the intent to participate in an established
conspiracy cannot exist, and ‘* * * to establish the intent, the
evidence of knowledge must be clear, not equivocal.’ /ngram Vv.
United States, 360 U.S. 672, 680, 79 S.Ct. 1314, 3 L.Ed.2d
1503.” 302 F.2d at 12.
12
164 F.2d 679 (10 Cir. 1947), and United States v. Gacdbro,
445 F.2d 885, 892-94 (2 Cir. 1971),"" where single conspira-
cies were found to have been proven.
Especially pertinent is United States v. Russano, 257
F.2d 712 (2 Cir. 1958), where the evidence showed that a
nareotics conspiracy which began in 1952 ended late that
year due to arrests, that none of its participants engaged
in the narcotics business during 1953-54, and that some
of the participants were ‘‘back in business’’ in 1955-56.
Upon such evidence, the court reversed convictions for a
single conspiracy alleged to have existed from 1952 to
1956. This closely parallels the facts herein with regard
to Schoenneman’s having gone ‘‘out of the trailer busi-
ness’’ during the indictment period. (Tr. 559, 677-78)
Nor would the fact that petitioner may arguably be said
to have been connected with one or more of the several
conspiracies save the government’s case; for in those cases
affirming despite a showing of multiple conspiracies
wherein a single one had been charged, the courts ex-
plicitly held that in each such case, the defendants clearly
In Berenbeim, while the court affirmed because on the evidence
it found but a single conspiracy, the court noted:
“It is weli settled that where the indictment charges a single
conspiracy and the proof establishes two or more different and
disconnected conspiracies, the variance is fatal and a conviction
cannot be sustained.” 164 F.2d at 683.
'' In Calabro, in direct contrast to the factual posture of the case
at bar, the court concluded that:
“Appellants’ continuous involvement with each other provided
the common thread upon which the jury properly could find the
single conspiracy charged.” 449 F.2d at 893.
No such evidence exists in the case at bar.
13
were demonstrated to have been parties to each of the
separate conspiracies shown.”
Moreover, it has been held that even one who was a
party to all of a number of separate conspiracies could
not stand convicted therefor upon an indictment charging
but a single conspiracy.**
12 See, c.g., United States v. Walker, 453 F.2d 1205 (5 Cir. 1972)
(one conspiracy charged, three shown, defendant connected with all
three separate conspiracies); cf. United States v. Benjamin, 328
F.2d 854, 864 (2 Cir. 1964) (court concluded there was only one
scheme despite contention that two were shown; but even if there
were two, such argument “could not avail Benjamin in any event
since the evidence clearly implicated him in both aspects of the
scheme.’”’).
13 After reversing the convictions of two appellants who were
shown to have been involved, at most, in conspiracies separate from
the single one charged and not knowledgeable of any single conspir-
acy, the court proceeded also to reverse the conspiracy conviction
of the most heavily involved of the defendants, characterized as the
“mastermind,” because of the fatal variance:
“As for Fernandez, there is evidence connecting him with
all of the substantive counts. And to the extent that there was
a conspiracy, or were conspiracies, between two or more persons
in connection with these and similar transactions, he, as the so-
called ‘mastermind,’ was a direct participant therein, knew of
any such conspiracy or conspiracies, and was aware of their
nature and purpose.
“But there is nevertheless wholly lacking any evidence show-
ing that there was a single over-all conspiracy to engage in these
separate and distinct transactions which occurred at different
times and places and involved varying persons and methods of
operation. At most, the evidence establishes several diverse con-
spiracies radiating from Fernandez in all of which he partici-
pated, and in one or two of which Dalgliesh and Pratt partici-
pated. This being true, the conviction on the conspiracy count
cannot stand even as to Fernandez and, on this additional ground,
it cannot stand as to Dalgliesh and Pratt.” Fernandez v. United
States, 329 F.2d 899, 905 (9 Cir. 1964) (footnote omitted ;
emphasis added).
14
As to the extent of petitioner’s non-participation in an
alleged unified conspiracy herein, see United States v.
Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 589-90 (2 Cir. 1971), which de-
scribes a conspiracy similar to that alleged in the case at
bar, and, by way of contrast, demonstrates what is prereq-
uisite to find that one is party to a single conspiracy; the
factual elements held necessary, and found to exist in
Manarite, are utterly lacking in the case at bar.
In several cases wherein defendants claimed on appeal
that one, rather than several, conspiracies had been shown
where it was to defendant’s advantage that only one had
been shown, the courts have found, on facts similar to
those in the case at bar, that multiple conspiracies were
properly found.**
14 For example, in United States v. Cole, 457 F.2d 1141 (9 Cir.
1972), defendant claimed double jeopardy, in that he was convicted
under two indictments for conspiracy—one involving the manufac-
ture of methampheiamine, and one involving its distribution. Noting
that the persons and activities involved in the manufacturing opera-
tion were different from those involved in the distribution, id. at
1144, with the sole exception of defendant, who was common to
both, the court found two conspiracies had been shown and therefore
affirmed, stating:
“The fact that there is one individual common to two separate
criminal enterprises does not constitute them a single opera-
tion.” Jd. at 1145.
Similarly, in United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179, 193-94 (2 Cir.
1960), two defendants (the brothers Lessa) maintained that since
they had already been convicted in another case for participation in
the same conspiracy, the instant conviction constituted double jeop-
ardy. The court disagreed, holding :
“Thus the Lessas, as dealers, simply purchased their narcotics
supplies from two different and separate groups. The mere
fact that several retailers purchase from separate suppliers at
different times does not transform two separate conspiracies
into one.” Jd. at 14.
15
Based upon all the foregoing, petitioner’s conviction
should be reversed for fatal variance between the charge
and the proof.”
The Seventh Cireuit’s express reason for finding but a
single conspiracy on the facts—aside from that set forth
in footnote 15, below—was:
‘{T|he proof here plainly demonstrated one overall
agreement among the various parties to perform dif-
“In the face of petitioner’s argument, the Seventh Court notes
that some of the evidence of other conspiracies was adduced on de-
fense cross-examination, rather than on direct examination by the
prosecution, using this to justify a finding of one conspiracy: “We
do not believe it would be fair to allow the defense to manufacture
a variance through use of cross-examination of the government’s
chief witness.” (App. A, p. App. 12, fn. 7) And in justifying refusal of
requested defense instructions concerning multiple conspiracies, the
court holds them “not appropriate where the defense attempts to
create a variance through cross-examination by bringing in new
conspiracies.” (App. A, p. App. 12)
But the court wholly has overlooked that the very first disclosure
of an unrelated conspiracy came during the very beginning of the
prosecution's case. (Tr. 35-40, 49, 71-74) Defense motions for mis-
trial or to strike this evidence were denied. (R. 144-45) Additional
evidence of an unrelated conspiracy was also adduced by the prose-
cution. (Tr. 168-71)
Clearly, once the prosecution brought out evidence demonstrating
—at the very least—the possibility of multiple conspiracies as op-
posed to the single one as charged in the indictment, petitioner had
a right to cross-examine the government’s chief witness concerning
those additional conspiracies, and indeed, defense counsel had a duty
to his client to pursue this; if yet additional separate conspiracies
thereby were disclosed, that they were disclosed on cross-examination
rather than by the government must not be held to defeat petitioner’s
otherwise valid claim. This was not a situation of the defense, in
bad faith, attempting to structure a case of multiple conspiracies
where the government's proof showed only one; it was during the
government's case that possible multiple conspiracies first were dis-
closed.
16
ferent functions in order to carry out the single objec-
tive of the conspiracy—the sale of stolen trailers.’*
(App. A, p. App. 11) (Emphasis added.)
This completely overlooks the fact that the indictment
charged—as it must, to allege a conspiracy to violate fed-
eral law—that defendants conspired to transport stolen
trailers in interstate commerce.*
The court acknowledges that ‘‘The evidence also showed
a few collateral transactions that were not totally directed
toward the main scheme or conspiracy.’’ (App. A, p. App.
11) But the court goes on to hold that the trial judge’s
instructions were adequate. (App. A, p. App. 11)
They were not.
And therein lies the prejudice.
The instruction cited by the panel as ‘‘adequate’’, (see
App. A, p. App. 11, fn. 6), clearly is inadequate to protect
petitioner from the dangers of having the jury consider
against him acts and declarations made by others in fur-
therance of something other than any conspiracy with
which they might have found him to have been connected;
for the instruction does not, nor do any other of the in-
structions given, allow for the consequences of the possi-
hility that more than one conspiracy was shown.
At the very least, the court should have instructed the
jury as to the necessity of finding a single conspiracy, as
opposed to several, as prerequisite to conviction, rather
than leaving them no option but to find one conspiracy,
if they found any at all; and/or that if they found more
than one, they could attribute as evidence against peti-
tioner only such acts and declarations of others in further-
ance of the same conspiracy or conspiracies of which they
may have found petitioner to have been a member. United
‘6 Such approach is especially erroneous where—as here—there
was substantial evidence of purely local transactions. (£.g., Tr. 105,
195-201, 268, 278, 294, 462-69.)
17
States v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7 Cir. 1975). With-
out such limiting instructions, petitioner was irremediably
prejudiced by the variance between the indictment and
the proof. Indeed, where the evidence is susceptible of an
interpretation that more than one conspiracy may have
been shown while only one was charged, failure to give
such instructions, even in the absence of a specific request
therefor, has been held plain error requiring reversal.”
In Johnson, supra, the court reversed because of the
trial court’s failure to give adequate instructions to pre-
vent prejudice due to proof of multiple conspiracies; in-
structions which failed unequivocally to keep the jury
from considering evidence pertaining to a conspiracy of
which defendant was not a member required reversal.
The trial court refused various defense instructions
aimed at the multiple conspiracy problem, (Def. C. Bas-
tone’s Inst. 18, Def. S. Bastone’s Inst. Q, Def. MeMahon’s
Insts. 42, 43 & 44) (set forth infra, App. C, p. App. 33-34),
and instead gave its own instruction on the subject. (Tr.
17 United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 382-87 (2 Cir. 1964) ;
United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 756-58 (2 Cir. 1965).
See United States v. Griffin, 464 F.2d 1352, 1357-58 (9 Cir.
1972) (affirming despite showing of multiple conspiracies where jury
was given appropriate instructions covering such possibility and at-
tenuating possible prejudice); United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d
735, 746 (7 Cir. 1969) (reversing for showing of multiple conspir-
acies, stating that court should give appropriate instructions “when
the possibility of a variance appears”); United States v. Calabro,
449 F.2d 885, 892-94 (2 Cir. 1971) (affirming because only one con-
spiracy shown despite defense contention that two were demonstrated,
id. at 893, and noting that “|I]t is better practice to instruct the jury
that they must acquit if they find multiple conspiracies when only
one conspiracy is charged... .” Jd. at 894).
18
2370; see Tr. 2290-94) ** Conceding arguendo that the re-
quested instructions may have asked for too much, *” none-
theless the court’s instruction was wholly insufficient be-
cause it did not advise the jury that acts and declarations
of persons in furtherance of a separate conspiracy or con-
spiracies to which petitioner had not been connected could
not be considered against him.
The general cautionary instruction relied on by the court,
(App. A, p. App. 11, fn. 6), was insufficient as well,’* because
8 The Court’s only instruction touching upon the multiple con-
spiracy problem is as follows:
“The indictment in this case charges a single criminal con-
spiracy participated in by the defendants and others within a
specific period of time and for a specific purpose. To prove a
defendant guilty, the Government must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that such defendant knowingly and willfully partici-
pated in this particular conspiracy at some time during the
period alleged.
However, the Government need not prove that all of the de-
fendants participated in the alleged conspiracy or that they all
participated at the same time. Evidence of some other conspir-
acy or some other illegal act does not constitute evidence of the
specific conspiracy alleged in the indictment and is irrelevant to
it.” (Tr. 2370)
1° But see Fernandes v. United States, 329 F.2d 899, 904-05 (9
Cir. 1964), discussed at p. 13, fm. 13, supra. According to Fer-
nandez, the variance itself precludes conviction, as the requested in-
structions would have advised. Accord, United States vy. Calabro,
449 F.2d 885, 894 (2 Cir. 1971).
*° Instructions can be erroneous, requiring reversal, if under the
facts of a particular case they are inadequate, inapplicable or con-
fusing, even though they may correctly state abstract principles of
law. See, ¢.g., United States v. Collier, 313 F.2d 157, 159 (7 Cir.
1963); Morris v. United States, 326 F.2d 192, 194-95 (9 Cir.
1963) ; United States v. Torrence, 480 F.2d 564, 565 (5 Cir. 1973).
Moreover, failure to relate the facts of the case to the law as stated
in the instructions can constitute plain error. See Choy v. Bouchelle,
436 F.2d 319, 325 (3 Cir. 1970), a civil case cited with approval
in United States v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598, 601 (3 Cir. 1972).
19
it did not include any explicit reference to possible multi-
ple conspiracies.
Where the evidence discloses multiple conspiracies, at
the very least the court must give careful instructions limit-
ing the use against an individual defendant of acts and
statements of alleged co-conspirators in furtherance of a
conspiracy to which defendant was not shown to have been
a party. No such instructions were given here. Thus, pe-
titioner’s conviction may well be based, at least in part,
upon the jury’s improperly having considered against him
evidence pertaining only to a conspiracy or conspiracies in
which he was not involved. Since such inadmissible evi-
dence may have contributed to petitioner’s conviction, the
conspiracy conviction should be reversed.
Even if multiple conspiracies have not been demonstrat-
ed as a matter of law,” since the evidence admits of the
possibility of multiple conspiracies, the issue as to multiple
or single conspiracies should have been submitted to the
jury under appropriate instructions.
This mandatory procedure not having been followed,
reversal is required.
In the Seventh Circuit’s own language, from United
States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 746 (7 Cir. 1969) :
‘Since the existence of multiple conspiracies is real-
ly a fact question as to the nature of the agreement, it
is for the jury to decide whether there is one agree-
meut or several. ... [citations omitted] Therefore, ...
when the possibility of a variance appears, [the dis-
trict judge} should instruet the jury on multiple con-
spiracies as well.’’
21 Compare United States v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 730, 733, 736 (7
Cir. 1975), where the court held as a matter of law that separate
conspiracies, not the single conspiracy alleged, had been demonstrat-
ed by the evidence.
20
The prejudice herein lies in the realistic probability that
the jury considered against petitioner evidence of acts and
declarations of others in furtherance of a conspiracy or
conspiracies with which petitioner had not been connected;
for the jury was never advised that, if it found more than
one conspiracy, such evidence was not to be considered
against petitioner. This same danger, too, exists with re-
gard to evidence of overt acts.
In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 774 (1946),
this Court stated:
‘“‘The dangers of transference of guilt from one to
another across the line separating conspiracies, sub-
consciously or otherwise, are so great that no one
really can say prejudice to substantial right has not
taken place.’’
Further discussing the specific kinds of prejudice suffered
by a defendant connected with less than all of multiple con-
spiracies under an indictment charging but a single one,
the Court held:
‘‘On these instructions|*] it was competent not only
for the jury to find that all of the defendants were
parties to a single common plan, design and scheme,
where none was shown by the proof, but also for them
to impute to each defendant the acts and statements
of the others without reference to whether they re-
lated to one of the schemes proven or another, and to
find an overt act affecting all in conduct which ad-
mittedly could only have affected some.’’ Jd. at 771.
(Footnote added.)
*2 The instructions the jury had been given in Kotteakos, set forth
in id. at 767-70, are substantially similar to the jury charge in the
case at bar, particularly in their common failure to limit the jury’s
consideration of evidence pertaining to possible separate conspira-
cies. This, too, was the vice requiring reversal of the conspiracy
conviction in Johnson, supra.
21
Evidence of possible separate conspiracies in the case
at bar ** was such as to require the giving of appropriate
jury instructions pursuant to the foregoing authorities.”
While there was some evidence adduced from Schoenne-
man which may be susceptible of an interpretation the *
petitioner was involved in all illegal operations after mid-
1970, the jury was not required to accept such interpreta-
tion or even to believe Schoenneman; and the question was
never resolved under ‘‘appropriate judicial guidance,’’
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946), for
the jury was given no alternatives, nor were they ins‘ruct-
ed regarding the consideration of evidence bearing on less
than all of the possible multiple conspiracies.
Commenting on the need for careful limiting instruc-
tions—such as were omitted from the case at bar—-this
Court, in Kotteakos, supra, held:
‘‘The greater looseness generally allowed [in conspir-
acy prosecutions] for specifying the offense and its
details, for receiving proof, and generally in the con-
duct of the trial, becomes magnified as the numbers
involved increase. . . . [E|xtraordinary precaution is
required not only that instructions shall not mislead,
but that they shall scrupulously safeguard each de-
23 J.¢., the admitted hiatus and cessation of illegal activities by
Schoenneman in 1969-70, (Tr. 559, 678) ; evidence of separate con-
spiracies involving Schoenneman, Garner and Murray in 1968-69
(Tr. 67); involving Schoenneman, Svehla and Murray (Tr. 35-40,
49, 71-74); and involving Schoenneman and Murray in a separate
operation utilizing the O’Rourke Cartage yard at Calumet Harbor
(Tr. 168-71, 1123-33).
24 See also cases cited at p. 17, supra, and at p. 17, fn. 17, supra.
22
fendant individually, as far as possible, from loss of
identity in the mass. Indeed, the imstructions often
become, in such cases, his principal protection against
unwarranted imputation of guilt from others’ con-
duct.’’ Id. at 776-77. (Emphasis added.)
Indeed, it is this very ‘‘greater looseness generally al-
lowed’’ which results in prejudice to a defendant where, as
here, the government chooses to prosecute as a single con-
spiracy a case wherein the evidence demonstrates the pos-
sibility of separate conspiracies. Once trial has been had
upon a single conspiracy theory—where, as here, the evi-
dence is susceptible of demonstrating multiple conspiracies
—the government has accomplished its purpose: to
strengthen the possibility of conviction by exposing the
jury to evidence under the relaxed principles applicable to
conspiracy trials, capitalizing on the possibility that be-
cause of the possibility of multiple conspiracies, evidence
not properly chargeable to a particular defendant will
nonetheless be considered by the jury against him.
In view of the extreme importance of the questions pre-
sented herein to the administration of justice in the federal
courts, and because the Seventh Circuit’s decision conflicts
with principles announced by this Court in Kotteakos v.
United States, supra, with other decisions of the Seventh
Circuit,*> and with decisions from other Circuits**—par-
ticularly regarding the necessity of cautionary instrue-
tions where the possibility of multiple conspiracies exists
—certiorari should be allowed.
25 United States v. Johnson, 515 F.2d 730 (7 Cir. 1975), and
United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7 Cir. 1969).
26 The decision herein conflicts with Second and Ninth Circuit
decisions, cited at p. 17, fn. 17, supra, as to the necessity of giving
appropriate instructions.
23
Because of the prejudicial variance herein, and particu-
larly since the jury may have considered against petitioner
evidence pertaining to separate conspiracies to which he
clearly was not a party, including evidence of acts and
declarations of alleged co-conspirators with whom he was
not in any way connected, and in furtherance of conspira-
cies to which he was not a party, petitioner’s conviction
should be reversed. In the alternative, the conviction
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial at which
petitioner must receive appropriate protection through the
use of careful instructions concerning multiple conspira-
cies and limiting the use of such evidence.
He received no such protection in the case at bar.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Jutius Luctus EcHeies
CAROLYN JAFFE
Attorneys for Petitioner
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
In the
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 75-1417
Unirep States Or America,
Plaintiff -A ppellee,
Vv.
Carmen Bastone and ArtHur VEAL,
Defendants-A ppellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 74 CR 383
Tuomas R. MceMitten, Judge.
ARGUED NOVEMBER 3, 1975—Derctpep DecemBer 8, 1975
Before Hastixcs, Senior Circuit Judge, Pert and Bauer,
Circuit Judges.
Baver, Circuit Judge. Defeudants-appellants Carmen
Bastone and Arthur Veal were charged under 18 U.S.C.
:511, along with eighteen other defendants’, with con-
' Prior to trial one defendant, Daniel Lonero, was severed due to
iliness. Eleven defendants, John Falcione, Patrick Boenzi, William
Paradise, Constantine Athas, Raymond Murray, Charles P. Garner,
Robert Walley, Ronald Schoenneman, Eugene Marino, Robert
Quagliato and Frank DeRosa, pled guilty. One defendant, Salvatore
Bastone, was found not guilty. Five other individuals were named
as co-conspirators but were not indicted: Harry Mizok, John Cre-
diedo, Daniel O'Neill, Clarence White and Donald Svehla.
App. 2
spiracy to transport and cause to be trancported in inter-
state commerce stolen semi-trailers of a tctal value in
excess of $5,000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. $2314. Verdicts
of guilty were returned as to Bastone, Veal and four
others. Bastone was sentenced to five years imprisonment
and Veal received two years imprisonment.
Evidence of the defendants’ conduct and the conspiracy
was presented primarily thireugh Ronaid Schoenneman, an
accomplice witness who received certain benefits from the
government in exchange for his testimony. The evideice
presented showed that Schoenneman met with Carmen
Bastone at a coffee shop in a Chicago suburb during the
summer of 1970 to discuss the business of stealing trailers.
A scheme’ was outlined to Bastone by Schoenneman where-
by forty-foot semi-trailer vans would be stolen from rail-
road yards and truck docks and then taken to so-called
‘‘cleaners’’, who would remove from the trailers all iden-
tifying items such as signs, lettering and public identifica-
tion, in addition to obliterating serial numbers variously
hidden about the trailer. In some cases, the trailers would
218 U.S.C. §2314 states, inter alia:
“Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any
goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of
$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, convert-
ed or taken by fraud... [s]hall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”
’ The indictment alleged an ongoing conspiracy to steal and re-sell
semi-trailers for a period of three and one-half years. Our own
reading of the record indicates an elaborate scheme involving many
parties. However, since this appeal involves only two of the defen-
dants we have recounted only those facts in this opinion which we
believe are applicable to the appeal of Bastone and Veal. Neither
appellant presents a serious challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence presented at trial.
—
“Sar
App. 3
then be further cleaned by an acid wash and, if need be,
repainted. Titles would be obtained and, by fraudulent
applications for new titles, bogus serial numbers would be
imposed on the faces of previcusly legitimate titles. Those
numbers, in turn, would be applied to the trailers to con-
form with the altered titles. Customers would be obtained,
both in Illinois and in other states, the trailers sold, and
the profits split among the various participants. Initially
Schoenneman agreed to pay $900 for each stolen trailer
Bastone provided. Eventually Bastone and Schoenneman
became partners and agreed to divide their expenses
equally.
Schoenneman also met with co-defendant and appellant
Arthur Veal at his Chicago irailer repair shop—Artco—
and obtained Veal’s services as a ‘‘cleaner’’ of the stolen
trailers supplied by Bastone. Veal agreed to perform his
vervices and then drop the trailers, which were to be
marked with a painted ‘‘x’’, in a vacant lot.
Schoenneman next contacted Raymond Murray whose
task it was to find customers for the disguised trailers.
When Murray placed his first order with Schoenneman
both of the defendants were notified that the ‘‘business”’
was underway. Deliveries from Veal’s shop began in
November of 1970. Several of the trailers were sold to
customers in Indiana and Kentucky. Veal received two
as compensation for his services and those remaining were
sold to Mary Ann Bakeries. Sales of trailers to Mary Ann
Bakeries continued throug. 1971 and early 1972. Veal
painted the trailers to match other Mary Ann equipment
and Schoenneman provided bogus serial numbers. In 1971
Veal also stole trailers from General Transport Equip-
ment Co. and cleaned them for resale. He further ar-
ranged to purchase junk trailers from United Parcel Ser-
App. 4
vice in order to obtain title certificates to be used on the
stolen trailers. Old trailers and junk titles were also pur-
chased by Schoenneman and Bastone from Fruehauf
Trailer. The titles were altered and used in the sale of
the stolen and cleaned trailers.
In May, 1972 Schoenneman began cooperating with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. From May 19 through
June 20 he made a series of telephone calls to Bastone
and other conspirators during which he discussed the
stolen trailer business. Many of those conversations were
recorded.
I, EVIDENCE OF TAPE RECORDED TELEPHONE
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN CHIEF PROSE-
CUTION WITNESS SCHOENNEMAN AND DE-
FENDANT BASTONE WERE PROPERLY AD.-
MITTED.
Defendant Bastone moved to suppress the use of five
telephone conversations he had with Schoenneman which
were tape recorded. Bastone argued that the recordings
were improper and inadmissible because Schoenneman did
not give his voluntary consent; and, further, that he was
the suspect of an investigation in which Schoenneman was
acting as a government agent. Thus it is his contention
he was entitled to be given the Miranda warnings before
partaking in the telephone conversations. After hearing
the evidence, including testimony of Schoenneman, the
trial court denied the motion to suppress. We believe the
trial court was correct in denying the motion.
it is well established that a party to a telephone con-
versation risks a third party hearing the content of the
conversation with the consent of the second party. In
the federal system if one party consents to the electronic
recording of a conversation it is generally admissible de-
App. 5
spite the other party’s objection. See Rathburn v. United
States, 355 U.S. 107, 111 (1957); Carnes v. United States,
295 F.2d 598, 602 (Sth Cir. 1961); United States v. Martin,
372 F.2d 63, 65 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 919 (1967).
The essential question here is whether or not Schoen-
neman gave his consent to recording the conversations.
The appellant argues that the trial court ignored the reali-
ties of the situation which indicated that Schoenneman
only purported to consent to the interception and record-
ing. He cites the decisions of Weiss v. United States, 308
U.S. 321, 330 (1939); United States v. Laughlin, 233 F.
Supp. 623 (D.C. Cir. 1963); and United States v. Napier,
451 F.2d 552 (Sth Cir. 1971); however, those cases involve
situations where the party’s consent could be seriously
questioned either because of incapacity or government
pressure. On the other hand, the facts in this case belie
the contention that Schoenneman’s consent was involun-
tary.
Schoenneman had not received ‘‘promises’’ of leniency
or of a change in location and new identity prior to his
making the telephone calls. After several weeks of con-
versations elapsed, Schoenneman suggested the taping of
telephone conversations. While there was discussion about
the United States Marshal’s protective custody program
at various meetings, the actual decision to move Schoenne-
man and his family out of town came about one week prior
to his June 22nd departure, well beyond the first telephone
recording of May 19.
During this cooperation with the government, Schoen-
neman was receiving no compensation, lived at his home,
was never arrested, restricted, nor was he under surveil-
lance. Schoenneman was aware that he would not receive
immunity but that his cooperation would be made known
at trial. Finally, the trial court also was made aware of
App. 6
executed advice of rights and consent to monitor forms,
personally executed by Schoenneman before each conver-
sation.
We fully realize that Schoenneman’s cooperation
stemmed from the fact that he believed he would receive
a better deal from the government. Yet that fact alone
does not vitiate his consent or indicate that his actions
were the product of government control. A finding of
involuntariness or coercion should not result simply be-
cause a person has been indicted or is the subject of a
government investigation. United States v. Silva, 449 F.2d
145, 146 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Jones, 443 F.2d
1176, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 950
(1971); also see United States v. Bonanno, 487 F.2d 654
(2d Cir. 1973).
That Bastone was not given Miranda warnings is quite
frankly a weak argument. A person is not entitled to
warnings simply because an investigation has focused
upon him. The test is not focus alone, but rather, focus
plus custodial interrogation. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
The cases cited by Bastone in support of his focus cén-
tention are different in that they deal with tax cases in
which a taxpayer is interviewed after his case has been
presented to the Intelligence Division of the Internal
Revenue Service. In those cases, the putative defendant
clearly faces government compulsion. See United States
v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Turzynski, 268 F.Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United
States v. Wainwright, 284 F.Supp. 129 (D.Col. 1968).
Custodial interrogation means ‘‘questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
App.7
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
a significant way’’ (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). When
Bastone made the admissions during the telephone con-
versation he was neither in custody nor deprived of his
freedom, nor was he being interrogated by law enforce-
ment officers.
Simply because Schoenneman was operating as a gov-
ernment informant does not make the content of the tele-
phone conversations inadmissible. The Fourth Amend-
ment has never been construed to protect a person who
voluntarily confides in another person who is acting as a
government informant or undercover agent. United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1970); Hoffa v. United States,
35u U.S. 292 (1966). In United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d
334 (7th Cir. 1975), a ‘‘cooperating individual’’ apprised
the FBI of Gardner’s attempt to dispose of certain stolen
securities. There, a plan was developed by the FBI by
which agents assumed undercover roles as a bank execu-
tive and an attorney willing to prepare a fraudulent cer-
tifieate of ownership. When the latter agent met with
Gardner, he responded to a question about the origin of
the theft and committed incriminating actions. Citing
Miranda and Hoffa, the court held that Gardner’s admis-
sion and actions were not the consequence of inherent com-
pulsion because the agents had assumed undercover iden-
tities. Therefore, Gardner was ‘‘not confronted with gov-
ernmental authority of which he was aware. . .,’’ and was
not entitled to receive Mirenda warnings. (516 F.2d at
339).
Similarly, in the case at bar, the activities of the FBI
agents when Bastone made these recorded admissions
were a part of the undisclosed investigative process in
which Schoenneman was a voluntary participant, and,
consequently, Bastone was not confronted with govern-
App. 8
mental authority. Therefore Bastone had no right to re-
ceive Miranda warnings at the times in question.‘
Bastone next asserts that even if the telephone conver-
sations were admissible they operated to deny him a fair
trial because the court refused to excise certain prejudi-
cial portions and because Schoenneman was allowed to
testify as to what he himself meant by certain slang words
which he had used in the taped conversations. We think
that the decision not to edit the tapes and to allow expla-
nation of the slang terms was clearly within the purview
of the trial court’s discretion. In such an instance we be-
lieve that a reversal should not occur unless there is mani-
fest error or an abuse of this discretion. In this case the
trial judge was best able to assess the impact that the
tapes and testimony would have upon the jurors. Thus,
now on appeal, we rely heavily upon his judgment and
find no error or abuse of his discretion.
Il. THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL VARIANCE
IN THE INDICTMENT CHARGING A SINGLE
CONSPIRACY AND THE PROOF PRESENTED
AT TRIAL.
The crucial question here is: did the government’s case
show one common scheme, plan or purpose indicating a
conspiracy among the defendants? Or did the evidence
show a number of separate unrelated conspiracies? Both
defendants contend that multiple conspiracies were shown
4 Pastone points out that the government cannot always absolve
itself of official responsibility for the acts of private citizens, citing
United States v. Stein, 322 F.Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1971). In Stein
the government encouraged a private individual’s “irregular acquisi-
tion” of certain evidence rendering the exclusionary rule applicable.
However in this case there is no evidence of government encourage-
ment that is not in accordance with the law.
App. 9
and the jury may have considered against the defendants
evidence pertaining to separate conspiracies to which each
of them was clearly not a party, including evidence of acts
and declarations of alleged co-conspirators with whom
they were not in any way connected. Further, that their
individual cases were substantially prejudiced because the
trial judge failed to give an instruction telling the jurors
that a finding of one single conspiracy was a prerequisite
to convicting the defendants. Veal also claims that it was
error for the court not to give a limiting instruction re-
garding certain evidence.
The benchmark and controlling decision on the question
of a single conspiracy being charged and multiple con-
spiracies being proven is Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239 (1946).
In Kotteakos, thirty-two persons were indicted for a
single conspiracy to induce various financial institutions
to make loans which would then be insured by the Federal
Housing Administration on the basis of fraudulent infor-
mation. Nineteen of these persons were brought to trial
and seven were eventually convicted. The government
admitted that the evidence proved eight or more separate
conspiracies hy separate groups of conspirators which had
little or no connection with each other.
However, by simply charging one conspiracy the gov-
ernment was able to present a mass of evidence which re- -
flected equally on the most culpable to the most innocent
of the defendants. Consequently, the Supreme Court re-
versed stating:
‘*. . . if the practice here followed were to stand, we
see nothing to prevent its extension to a dozen, a
score, or more conspiracies and at the same time to
scores of men involved, if at all, only separately in
them. The dangers of transference of guilt from one
App. 10
to another across the line separating conspiracies,
subconsciously or otherwise, are so great that no one
can really say prejudice to substantial right has not
taken place ... as it [the offense] is broadened to
include more and more, in varying degrees of attach-
ment ta¢the confederation, the possibilities for mis-
carriage of justice to particular individuals becomes
greater and greater.’’
Of course, the Court has also held that not every vari-
ance is fatal. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 53 S.Ct.
629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935); Blumenthal v. United Staates,
332 U.S. 539, 68 S.Ct. 248 (1947). Also see United States
v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972). Recently this
Court set forth the test to distinguish between a single
conspiracy and multiple conspiracies in United Siates v.
Varelli, 407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969), as follows:
‘‘While the parties to the agreement must know of
each other’s existence, they need not know each oth-
er’s identity nor need there be direct contact. The
agreement may continue for a long period of time and
include the performance of many transactions. New
parties may join the agreement at any time while
others may terminate their relationship. The parties
are not always identical, but this does not mean that
there are separate conspiracies.
The distinction must be made between separate con-
spiracies, where certain parties are common to all
and one overall continuing conspiracy with various
parties joining and terminating their relationship at
different times. Various people knowingly joining
together in furtherance of a common design or pur-
pose constitute a single conspiracy. While the con-
spiracy may have a small group of core conspirators,
other parties who knowingly participate with these
core conspirators and others to achieve a common goal
may be members of an overall conspiracy.
In essence, the question is what is the nature of the
agreement. If there is one overall agreement among
App. 11
the various parties to perform different functions in
order to carry out the objectives of the conspiracy,
the agreement among all the parties constitutes a
single conspiracy’? (407 F.2d at 742) (citations
omitted).
The Varelli test is applicable to the case at bar for the
proof here plainly demonstrated one overall agreement
among the various parties to perform different functions
in order to carry out the single objective of the conspiracy
—the sale of stolen trailers.’
The evidence also showed a few collateral transactions
that were not totally directed toward the main scheme or
conspiracy. However, since the trial judge adequately in-
structed the jury,® the admission of such testimony that
5In order to meet a common objective, indispensable functions
were performed by one or more conspirator. Initially, the trailers
were stolen. Bastone clearly had a part in completing this function
by virtue of his obtaining thieves. Next, to avoid detection, the
stolen trailer was “cleaned”, any and ail identifying objects removed.
This was the work of .--. Veal and others. Next, there had to be
acquisition of titles which were forged to evidence a phony serial
number. Thereafter, the phony serial number was placed upon the
trailer by the “cleaners”. After the trailer was prepared, customers
were obtained. After the siie was consummated, the trailers were
delivered with titles and the payment therefor returned to the ad-
ministrator, Schoenneman, for distribution to each of the above-
named participants. Finally, when capital was low, loans were given
to keep the various participants content. This, too, was a major role
played by Bastone.
® The trial judge stated in part as follows:
“In determining whether a conspiracy existed, the jury should
consider the actions and declarations of all the alleged partici-
pants. However, in determining whether a particular defendant
was a member, of the couspiracy, if any, the jury should consid-
er only his acts and statements. He cannot be bound by the
acts and declarations of other participants until it is established
that a conspiracy existed and that he was one of the members.
App. 12
did not support a continuous single conspiracy was harm-
less. In addition the collateral activities, denoted as sepa-
rate conspiracies by the appellants, did not really deal
with Veal or Bastone.’
We believe that under United States v. Johnson, 515
F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1975) the trial court could have left
up to the jury the decision of whether the government
presented evidence of one conspiracy or multiple con-
spiracies. But, it is quite clear that the trial judge did
not have to give the instruction submitted by the defense
which stated ‘‘If you [jurors] find that there were a num-
ber of separate and distinct conspiracies or enterprises
in which some but not all of the defendants or others were
involved, you must find the defendants not guilty.’’ Clear-
ly this instruction could be proper in some conspiracy
eases. However, it is not appropriate where the defense
attempts to create a variance through cross-examination ,
by bringing in new conspiracies. Here the court’s own
instruction was more neutral and advised simply that the
jury must find that the defendants knowingly and willfully
participated in the single, particular conspiracy charged.
Finally on this point Bastene correctly cites the case of
Tinsley v. United States, 48 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1930) for
the proposition that a conspiracy cannot occur where the
defendants were not working together towards a common
7™The so-called additional conspiracies inclided the following:
Schoenneman’s hiatus and cessation of illegal activities; the stolen
trailer operation which involved only Svehla and Murray; the sep-
arate operation involving Schoenneman and Murray which used the
O’Rourke Cartage yard at Calumet Harbor. Also much of this evi-
dence was brought out on cross-examination of Schoenneman. We
do not believe it would be fair to allow the defense to manufacture
a variance through use of the cross-examination of the government's
chief witness.
App. 13
goal. Our reading of Tinsley discloses that factually the
decision represents ‘‘a horse of a different color’’, the
mutual understanding shown here was wholly lacking in
the facts presented there.
Bastone argues that a defendant should not stand con-
victed in a case where the evidence does not permit the
conclusion that he was aware of the scope of the overall
enterprise and knowingly participated therein, citing
United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938) ; United
States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940); Dennis v. United
States, 302 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1962). The fact that the de-
fendants may not have known all the particulars of the
total scope of a conspiracy does not bar a conviction.
Blumenthal v. United States, supra, at 557 (1947); United
States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 945 (2d Cir. 1961). As
Judge Learned Hand cogently stated in United States v.
Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944) at p. 507:
‘It is true that a party to a conspiracy need not
know the identity, or even the number, of his con-
federates; when he embarks upon a criminal venture
of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its con-
tent and membership, so be it if they fall within the
common purposes as he understands them.’’
Ill. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUS.
LY LIMIT THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT OF
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
Under the Sixth Amendment every defendant is given
the right to confront those witnesses presented against
him. Bastone states that the trial court inhibited his con-
stitutional right by prohibiting proper defense attempts
to expose to the jury various facts concerning prosecution
witnesses Garner, Murray, Ponzevic, and especially,
Schoenneman. We think the key phrase in this argument
App. 14
is ‘‘proper attempts’’. A review of the record indicates
that the defense attorneys, in their zealous attempts to
bring out the nefarious activities of the government’s wit-
nesses, chose to ignore the rules of evidence. We will con-
sider the defense arguments on an individual witness
basis.
First, defendants claim that the trial court erred in
preventing questioning aimed at disclosing Schoenne-
man’s state of mind (i.e., did he believe the government
wanted some one higher up; did he think he would get a
better ‘‘deal’’ for himself if he implicated defendant; was
he not giving the government what he thought it wanted
for his own benefit; and the like). The government’s re-
sponse is simply that the defense failed to ask the right
questions. It is clearly within the trial court’s discretion
to permit testimony as to promises made by the govern-
ment in exchange for favorable testimony. DeMarcé v.
United States, 415 U.S. 449 (1974); United States v. Rod-
riguez, 439 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Greenberg, 423 F.2d 1106, 1108 (Sth Cir. 1970); Grant
v. United States, 368 F.2d 658, 661 (Sth Cir. 1966) ; United
States v. Masino, 275 F.2d 129, 131-1382 (2d Cir. 1960).
Whether or not to permit further testimony as to the wit-
ness’ state of mind or motivation has been approved by
the Supreme Court in certain cases. Cf. Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 315-318 (1974). However, in this case the
trial court, in its discretion, may have properly assumed
that further cross-examination into the witness’ subjective
thoughts would not be meaningful in light of the exami-
nation conducted previously which clearly showed that the
witness gained a great deal by becoming a witness for the
App. 15
government.* The trial court has broad discretion in de-
termining probative value. United States v. Kissane, 478
F.2d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Braasch,
505 F.2d 139, 149 (7th Cir. 1974).
Second, defendants complain of the court’s limitation
of cross-examination of witness Ponzevic in that it pre-
vented the defense from demonstrating that this witness
had tailored his testimony to make it conform to an erro-
neous document. As a general rule a witness can be ques-
tioned about inconsistent testimony and the court may
allow the use of extrinsic evidence to impeach the witness.
United States v. Braasch, 365 F.2d 395, 401 (2d Cir. 1966) ;
Umited States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964);
United States v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1974). In
addition a reviewing court will closely scrutinize contra-
dictory testimony by an accomplice witness who would
have reason to commit perjury. United States v. Persico,
305 F.2d 534, 537-540 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Har-
ris, 462 F.2d 1033, 1035 (10th Cir. 1972). At trial witness
Ponzevic was questioned as to whether he was trying to
8 Schoenneman’s devastating cross-examination showed that he
had previously been investigated by the FBI regarding stolen trail-
ers; that he had been in the phony title and stolen trailer business
in the late 1960's; that he had debts of more than $300,000; that he
obtained a bank loan to pay off certain debts by using stolen, ficti-
tious titles to support his application; that the loans which he had
obtained were, in some cases, the subjects of civil suits, and, in any
event, were not paid since his cooperation with the government ; fur-
ther, that he was afraid he might get ten years incarceration for bank
fraud; that he had filed no tax returns and paid no income tax for
any fiscal year from 1968 to the present, despite making money in
the stolen trailer business; that he had received no tax bills from the
government and was never charged with failing to file, though an
IRS criminal investigation was pending; that lie was in the juice
loan business, engaged in a stolen stocks and securities deal and
fenced stolen merchandise.
App. 16
make his testimony conform to certain documents. The
witness responded ‘‘It could be.’’ Defense counsel pur-
sued the issue. An objection was eventually made and the
judge responded that an inquiry into the circumstances
was proper but the manner in which counsel was doing it
was objectionable. After some further questioning and
objections, counsel stated ‘‘I have no further questions,
Judge. I just cannoi seem to get the right one out.’’ Thus
this reviewing court is presented with a situation where
the court stated it would allow impeachment of the witness
but trial counsel abandoned the issue. As a consequence
the argument that the court erroneously limited the cross-
examination and refused extrinsic evidence is meritless.
Third, the defendants contend that it was error for the
court to rule that it could bring out the fact of witness
Garner’s prior felony convictions but not the fact that
one of the convictions was for rape or to otherwise de-
scribe the nature of the prior conviction. The court did
allow use of a theft conviction to show the witness’ pro-
pensity to be dishonest. While not in effect, the new Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence would have barred the use of the
rape conviction because it occurred twenty-two years ago.°
® Rule 609(b) provides:
“(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule
is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed
siiice the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is
the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than
10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evi-
dence,”
App. 17
In the words of now Chief Justice Burger in his opinion
in Gordon vy. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
the issue for the trial judge was whether he ‘‘believes the
prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the pro-
bative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of
eredibility’’ (383 I°.2d at 939). That test was adopted by
this Court in United States v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d 670, 677
(7th Cir. 1973), and, when applied to this record shows
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in making
his ruling.”
10 The trial judge also cautioned the jurors about the credibility
of testimony of witnesses who had prior convictions or expectations
of favors from the government for giving testimony. The instruc-
tion stated :
“It is the province of the jury to determine the credibility, if
any, to be given the testimony of a witness who has been im-
peached.
The testimony of a witness may be discredited or impeached
by showing that the witness has been convicted of a felony, that
is, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years.
Prior conviction does not render a witness incompetent to tes-
tify, but is merely a circumstance which you may consider in
determining the credibility of the witness.
It is the province of the jury to determine the weight to be
given to any prior conviction as impeachment.
An accomplice is one who voluntarily participates in the com-
mission or the planning of a crime.
Certain witnesses called by the Government in this case have
testified that they did criminal acts. The testimony of those wit-
nesses must be considered with caution because those witnesses
are accomplices.
The testimony of a witness who provides evidence against a
defendant for a promise or favor from the Government, or for
other personal advantage or vindication, must be examined and
weighed by the jury with caution.
The jury must determine whether the witness’ testimony has
been affected by interest, or by prejudice against a defendant.”
App. 18
IV. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR SEVERANCE.
In order to obtain a severance the moving party must
show prejudice, i.e., ‘‘that he will be unable to obtain a
fair trial without severance, not merely that a separate
trial will offer a better chance of acquittal.’’ United States
v. Blue, 440 F.2d 300 at 302 (7th Cir. 1971); Tillman v.
United States, 406 F.2d 930 (Sth Cir. 1969); United States
v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 838 (7th Cir. 1967); Oden v. United
States, 410 F.2d 103 (Sth Cir. 1969).
On this point defendant Veal cites Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968) contending he
was prejudiced when his codefendant McMahon took the
witness stand, testified that he had never seen Veal before
coming to court, and, then, was cross-examined by the
government. Included in the questions asked by the gov-
ernment was the query: ‘‘ Did you [McMahon] tell the FBI
on January 12, 1973, that you picked up trailers from
Arteo, a trailer repair shop?’’ McMahon answered in the
negative. Judge MeMillen ruled that the government
would not be allowed to call the FBI agent who inter-
viewed MeMahon to testify in rebuttal to the statment.
Bruton is inapplicable because no confession was admitted
in the government's case in chief and no rebuttal evidence
was tendered on this point. MeMahon’s testimony was
actually favorable to Veal, and he was available for cross-
examination by Veal’s counsel. Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 US.
§22, 629-30, 81 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971); United
States v. Clark, 480 F.2d 1249, 1253 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied
414 U.S. 978 (1973); United States v. Marine, 413 F.2d
214, 217 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. dented, 396 U.S. 1001 (1970).
Government of Virgin Islands v. Ruiz, 495 F.2d 1175 (3d
Cir. 1974). As Professor Moore states:
App. i$
‘*. . . when the witness repudiates his pretrial in-
culpatory statement, however, or denies making it,
there is no real opportunity for the defense to cross-
examine with respect to that statement, and Bruton
is arguably violated. Normally, the prosecution in
this situation will use the earlier statement for pur-
poses of impeachment, and the defense will be satis-
fied to rely on the witness’ trial testimony and forego
cross-examination. Nonetheless, there is no Bruton
violation where the codefendant takes the witness
stand and thereby makes himself accessible to cross-
examination.’’ Moores Federal Practice, Rules of Cri-
minal Procedure, Vol. 8, §14.04[2][e].
V. THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE VALUE
OF THE STOLEN GOODS EXCEEDED $5,000.
Defendants were indicted under 18 U.S.C. §2314. An
essential jurisdictional prerequisite under §2314 is that
the stolen goods that are being transported exceed $5,000
in value. United States v. Nall, 437 F.2d 1177, 1184 (5th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Barker, 313 F.Supp. 987 (D.
Del. 1970). Value as used in $2314 is defined in 18 U.S.C.
£2311 as the aggregate value of all goods referred to in a
single indictment. In this case the defendants point out
that no distinction was drawn between stolen trailers in
Illinois which never left the state, and stolen trailer deals
which involved the interstate transportation of trailers
stolen and cleaned in Illinois and sold out of state. Defen-
dants contend it was prejudicial error to permit a cumula-
tion of interstate and intrastate sales in order to meet the
jurisdictional prerequisite.
We must reject the defendant’s argument. The evi-
dence, independent of local sales, showed that proof of
value in excess of $5,000 was abundant. Twenty-three
trailers were sold to purchasers ig New Jersey and thirty-
five trailers were sold to buyers in Indiana, Kentucky, and
App. 20
Georgia. Typical insurance claims paid on three stolen
trailers which were sold interstate amounted to $4,000,
$4,500, and $4,700.
Although certain stolen trailers were delivered locally
at O'Hare Airport to Schulman Air Freight, Inc.," the
real owner and purchaser of the trailers was Ardmore
Leasing Corp. of Cherry Hill, New Jersey. The titles to
the trailers were transferred to Ardmore and checks re-
ceived in payment for the trailers were drawn on the ac-
count of Ardmore at the Continental Bank in Norristown,
Pennsylvania. Finally, the jury was properly instructed
that in determining aggregate value consideration should
only be given to trailers sold across state lines. The court
instructed:
‘Tt is not necessary for the government to prove
that a specific defendant personally transported any
trailers or knew that any trailers would be trans-
ported in interstate commerce. It is sufficient if he
willfully and knowingly conspired with one or more
persons to eause or induce the transportation of
stolen trailers and that thereafter certain trailers of
2 total value of more than $5,000 were transported
across state lines pursuant to the conspiracy.’’
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS
RULING ON THE TESTIMONY OF VARIOUS
WITNESSES.
Basione and Veal both allege that they were denied a
fair trial beeause of various prejudicial statements made
‘ Twenty-three of the twenty-four trailers sold to Shulman (Ard-
morte) were shipped interstate to New Jersey. In addition to the
local sales involving Olympic Freight Ways (Mary Ann Bakeries),
Myillins, Svehla, Liberty and Totoni, and the interstate sales involv-
‘iy Stulman (Ardmore), there were additional interstate sales to
Cumberland Wooden Chairs Co., Somerset, Ky., and G.M. Leasing
Co., Tucker, Georgia.
:
App. 21
by certain witnesses. Initially we note that a reviewing
court normally allows a certain amount of discretion to
the trial court. The trial judge is in the best possible po-
sition to observe the events of the “living courtroom’’,
the demeanor of witnesses, the strategy of counsel, the
impact of certain testimony on the jury due to the sur-
rounding circumstances.
The defendants initially sought a mistrial because
Schoenneman testified that he was in the protective cus-
tody of the government. However, this fact was brought
out by the defense and was neither elicited nor suggested
by the government. T).ere appeared no prosecutorial in-
tent to prejudice the case against the defendant.
Next, Dean Athas testified that Bastone threatened to
break his legs should he tell anyone else about his work-
ing arrangement. This statement was admitted as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule because it was a statement by
a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, i.e., to
keep the conspiracy concealed by avoiding conversations.
Co-conspirator statements made in furtherance of the
conspiracy are generally admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69
S.Ct. 716 (1949); United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970); United
States v. Kahn, supra. We are not convinced that this
statement was properly admitted under the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule. But the government offers
alternative theories for admissibility, specifically that the
threat showed a criminal motive or evidenced a tendency
to commit similar acts or crimes, citing United States v.
HIutul, 416 F.2d 607, 624 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Marine, supra; United States v. Campagna, 146 F.2d 524,
530 (2d Cir. 1945). We believe that this statement was
App. 22
admissible. The question of admissibility is really aca-
demic because the defense did not make a timely objection
to the testimony and in fact used this subject matter as a
basis for a somewhat successful impeachment of the wit-
ness.”
After the government presented its case, co-defendant
Jackson took the stand. On cross-examination by the gov-
ernment he denied that he carried a gun all his life. This
statement was in contradiction to a previous, tape re-
corded statement made by Jackson and presented by the
government earlier in the trial. Counsel for both defen-
dants objected to this testimony and made motions for
mistrial and severance on the basis that this testimony
about a co-defendant clearly showed the prejudicial effect
of the joinder of all defendants.
Recently the court faced the same problem in United
States v. Robinson, 503 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1974) wherein
the defendant alleged error in denial of his severance
motion and asserted prejudice from his co-defendant’s
impeaching testimony on cross-examination pertaining to
the witness’ prior felony convictions and narcotics ac-
tivity. Nevertheless, the court held no showing of preju-
dice was made to warrant severance. We stated:
‘‘Robinson’s allegation that the testimony relating
to Taylor’s criminal record and narcotics activity
prejudiced him is not sufficient to make out a showing
of prejudice warranting severance. Indeed, Robin-
12Athas’ credibility as to this statement was substantially im-
peached when he admitted on cross-examination that, although he
had many previous and lengthy interviews and interrogations with
federal agents, he never mentioned defendant’s alleged threat to him
until several weeks before trial. Despite this effective impeachment
the defendants maintained that the jurors heard Athas’ testimony
and that they were prejudiced by it.
App. 23
son’s allegation is no more than a claim that a sepa-
rate trial would have created a stronger probability
for his acquittal. The mere assertion that the impact
of impeachment evidence pertaining to Taylor may
carry over to Robinson thereby prejudicing him is
not enough to meet the difficult burden imposed on a
party secking to establish prejudicial joinder’’ (503
F.2d at 215).
The trial court was cognizant of the potential problem
created hy this testimony. The judge instructed the jury
that the conversation was to be considered only against
the speaker when it was first introduced and again during
the final instructions.”
Probably the most significant issue raised on appeal
involving witness testimony arises out of two references
to Veal being in trouble with the authorities.** Veal chal-
18 The court stated:
“T have instructed the jury not to consider it with respect to
any other defendant.
* * &
The jury will be instructed again, and they have been in-
structed that this particular evidence is only admissible against
the defendant who is on the stand. They will be instructed to
only admit conversations between a defendant and someone else
if they were in furtherance of an alleged conspiracy as far as any
other defendant is concerned.
14The statements made by the witnesses are as follows:
“Q. Just prior to your meeting with Grey, Carmen and Sal-
vatore did you have a conversation with Art Veal?
[Answers by witness Schoenneman]}
Yes, I did,
When, approximately, was that?
This was in the summer of 1971.
Where did that conversation take place?
I called Grey at his place of business.
(Footnote continued)
POP?PoO>
App. 24
lenges this testimony as being tantamount to remarks
concerning a prior criminal record which was not an issue
properly before the jury. Veal’s counsel did not object
to Schoenneman’s testimony but he did make a motion for
a mistrial. However, the court did instruct the jury to
disregard the testimony.
It is well established that a defendant in a criminal trial
is protected under the Fifth Amendment from the prose-
(Footnote continued)
Q. Are you talking about Grey or Veal at this point?
A. I mean Veal, I am sorry. I called Art Veal at his place
of business.
Q. Would you relate that telephone conversation.
A. Art Veal told me that he had some heat around his place.
I asked him if things were bad, if we would have to stop doing
business. He said, no, not at this time, the heat wasn’t te. bad.”
The colloquy involving Murray occurred as follows: .
“Q. What was said during this conversation?
[Answers by witness Murray]
A. I asked Mr. Schoenneman who I should see at the place,
this place called Artco, in regard to getting minor repairs done
on the trailers I was picking up. A tire would be flat, a lens
missing from a light or something. I wanted to know who to
see there to take care of these things so I could pull them on
the road. Mr. Schoenneman told me that the place was run by
a colored fellow who was getting into some trouble and I should
stay away from him. There was no one there to authorize to
perform any type of repairs.
MR. ROTENBERG: _ I object to this conversation and
move for a mistrial.
THE COURT: I do not see how this could be in further-
ance of any conspiracy. I will strike the answer.
MR. ROTENBERG: And instruct the jury to disre-
gard it? :
THE COURT: I will instruct the jury to disregard the
answer, the conversation with Mr. Schoenneman. It is not
proper testimony.”
~~ 4 mone
owe
MP
App. 25
eution inquiries into his prior criminal record as long as
he does not testify on his own behalf or cause the jury to
discover his past convictions through his own actions at
trial. United States v. Marringion, 490 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
1973); United Siates v. Panczko, 429 F.2d 683, 686 (7th
Cir. 1970). In this case it was not proper for the govern-
ment to elicit this type of testimony because it tends to
reflect negatively upon the defendant’s character which is
not at issue. But, clearly, the testimony does not consti-
tute reversible error.
First of all, the statements do not refer to a past crimi-
nal conviction of the defendant. They merely indicate
surveillance by the authorities. Second, the testimony was
presented in a nebulous form and the individual jurors
may have drawn different interpretations. It is quite pos-
sible that the jury inferred that Veal’s troubles stemmed
from a government surveillance that led to his present
indictment rather than any past criminal conduct. In the
one instance where an objection was made, the court prop-
erly instructed the jury to disregard the statement. United
States v. Fonseca, 490 F.2d 464, 469 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
419 U.S. 1072 (1974); United States v. Roland, 449 F.2d
1281, 1282 (Sth Cir. 1971); United States v. Panczko,
supra.
One final contention made by Veal and Bastone in re-
gards to witness testimony is that their constitutional
rights to confront witnesses presented against them and
a fair trial were violated by the admission of certain hear-
say evidence. It is questionable whether the testimony
cited amounts to hearsay, but assuming arguendo that it
is hearsay it falls under the exception to the rule as state-
ments of a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Krulewitch v. United States, supra,
App. 26
VII. THE COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
JURY WERE PROPER.
The question of whether to give the jury a cautionary
instruction addressed to the intrastate transactions de-
pends on one’s interpretation of the evidence. Defendant
Veal contends that the local transactions were relevant
only as prior, concurrent, or subsequent similar acts. On
the other hand the government argues that the local trans-
actions were overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
A review of the evidence discloses that certain transac-
tions Veal disputes were in fact interstate. The testimony
dealing with the local sales was proper because it showed
the identity of the parties in the conspiracy, its funding,
and its operation by which the trailers were stolen,
cleaned, retitled, and sold. Thus it was admissible to dem-
onstrate the existence and operation of the conspiracy.
Contemporaneous overt acts not charged in the indict-
ment may be shown if they are performed in connection
with the named acts, and, are done to further the conspir-
acy. United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 705-07 (7th Cir.
1966); United States v. Ardmore, 363 F.2d 385, 490 (2d
Cir. 1966).
It is important to note that Veal failed to offer an in-
struction on the basis of a similar acts theory. Conse-
quently we will not reverse unless there is a showing of
plain error. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 30 and
52(b). See United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 346
(7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Demopoulos, 506 F.2d
1171, 1180 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lisowski, 504
F.2d 1268, 1272-74 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. How-
ard, 433 F.2d 505, 508-12 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
App. 27
Next, Bastone states that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in failing to give a portion of an instruc-
tion which he offered. Bastone’s instruction No. 17 read:
‘*You are instructed that mere knowledge, approval
of or acquiescence in the object or purpose of a con-
spiracy, without an intention and agreement to co-
vperate in the crime is not sufficient to make one a
conspirator.’’
The trial court gave this instruction except for the
words ‘‘or acquiescence in’’ which it deleted, stating:
‘Tl think the word ‘acquiescence’ is maybe a little
bit ambiguous for the jury. Let’s say ‘the mere knowl-
edge or approval of the object or purpose’, and I
think that will cover the matter.’’
A defendant in a criminal trial is always entitled to
have the jury instructed on his theory of defense if it is
properly presented and has some basis in the evidence
presented. In this case the other instructions given to the
jurors adequately told them what type of involvement was
necessary to find the defendants guilty of conspiracy.
The trial judges’ editing of the instruction appears to
be an attempt to clarify and elucidate. It is the duty of
the trial judge to avoid instructions which are confusing
and would tend to direct the jury’s attention away from
the issues they are called upon to decide. United States v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d
174, 189 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. dented 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
The deletion was certainly within the court’s discretion
and, in light of the other instructions, does not constitute
error.
Turning to the other instructions Veal maintains that
the instructions on the issues of withdrawal and the ad-
missibility against him of post-withdrawal conversations
App. 28
of co-conspirators were insufficient. In order to withdraw
from a conspiracy one must take an affirmative step to
disavow or defeat the purpose of the conspiracy. United
States v. Crillo, 468 F.2d 1233, 1239 (2d Cir. 1972) ; United
States v. Chester, 407 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1968); Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1911). In this case there
is no evidence that Veal took an affirmative step to with-
draw from the conspiracy. To the contrary, his cessation
of activity with the other indicted co-conspirators was due
to the fact that he was having ‘‘troubles’’ with law en-
forcement officials and thus was required to ‘‘lay low’’ for
awhile. The cases cited by Veal in support of his claim
that the jury should have been instructed to disregard
certain conversations are clearly inapplicable. They in-
volved situations wherein the conspiracy was already over
and thus the declarations made could not be in furtherance
of the scheme. Furthermore, the court instructed the jury
at the close of one witness’ testimony as follows:
‘(T]he jury is not to consider the evidence if they
find that the individual, any individual, including Mr.
Veal, had withdrawn from the conspiracy at the time
of the occurrences that were testified to.’’
App. 29
VIII. THE DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL WAS NOT VIOLATED BY THE
PROSECUTION’S FINAL ARGUMENT.
In final argument counsel for the government com-
mented upon the failure of the defense to call certain wit-
nesses.” The prosecutor’s rebuttal argument was justi-
fied because counsel for Bastone continuously went out-
15 By Mr. Burns, the prosecutor:
“It was also stated that the Government failed to call certain
individuals. I guess they were inferring that had we called
them, those people would have testified differently and said this
simply didn’t happen. Well, I think they mentioned Vince
Auriemma. Well, Vince Auriemma is Carmen Bastone’s friend.
He could have called him just as easy as we could. Harry Mi-
zok, he is an unindicted co-conspirator—
MR. COLLINS [attorney for defendant C. Bastone}: Ob-
jection, your Honor. The defendants are not required by law
to call any witnesses.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. BURNS: Your Honor, I submit that the defendants
have the same subpoena power and I am allowed to argue that.
MR. COLLINS: I object.
MR. BURNS: That is an invited response.
MR. COLLINS: Motion for mistrial.
THE COURT: Well, there has been no evidence as to
whether this man is even alive. I will sustain the objection.
MR. BURNS: I believe there was also mention of a man
named Joe DeVita. Well, I would state on that they could have
subpoenaed Joe DeVita just as easy as we could.
MR. COLLINS: Objection, your Honor. We are not re-
quired to subpoena anybody.
THE COURT: Sustained. There has been no evidence of
where these peopie are.
MR. BURNS: Well, your Honor, you let him argue and
this is simply invited response.
THE COURT: I am sustaining his objection.
MR. BURNS: All right, I am sorry.”
“ee, ent
App. 30 7 App. 31
side the record in his closing argument referring to wit- this trial tactie despite government objection. Bastone’s
nesses the government failed to call.* He persisted in counsel necessitated a response by government counsel
seeking to fairly explain the alleged weaknesses in the
16 Counsel for Bastone made the following arguments: government’s case. Under this circumstance, where there
“What independent evidence is there? Well, they started
talking about the meeting that is supposed to have happened
where Carmen Bastone and a man named Auriemma were sit-
ting around and talking and Ron Schoenneman was there and
is an invited response, such comments have been previous-
ly approved by this court. United States v. Nowak, 448
F.2d 134, 140-141 (7th Cir. 1971) ; United States v. Lawlor,
there was some evidence, although it wasn’t mentioned in argu- 413 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Wright, 309
ment, about some other fellow named Lew. Well, they didn’t F.2d 735, 736-9 (7th Cir. 1962).
call those people to testify. They could have been, the Govern-
nent has the right to call anybody they want to and it is their ‘ Accordingly the defendants’ convictions are affirmed.
burden of proof.
* * * AFFIRMED.
Tr) t sawee ? 1 ° ) ° ° *
Who were the thieves: Quagliato and Marino Did Marino A true Copy:
testify? Do you remember seeing him? He wasn’t here. He is Teste:
under indictment in this very case, but was he here? No. aad
* * me Ho Neen eee ccewmeerseenessceeweeesceeseeeees creer sewesscseseceseoeeeseces:
The Government can call anybody they want to this stand. Clerk of the United States Court of
Nobody told the Government that they cannot do anything. Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
They can listen to your phone calls, they can serve subpoenas,
they can do anything they want to do. They never called John
Falcione to the stand to say ‘Yes, Carmen and me, we went to
do the Shulman deal.’ They never called him.
MR. BURNS: Your Honor, I will object to this line of ar-
gument of Mr. Collins.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. COLLINS: If the Court please—well—
The prosecutor had this Mr. T. G. Grey and they claim Car-
men went out there once. Mr. Grey didn’t come in and say that.
The only person who said that was Ron Schoenneman, that is
the only one who said it. They had all of these different points
where there were people who could testify to it if it were true,
other people, third party people, people like Mr. Loman, people
like Bobby Quagliato, people who could say, ‘Yeah, I saw Car-
men there, he did it.’
* * *
The Government mentioned in this case a Harry Mizok who
was charging three percent for cashing big checks. That would
be $90 for a $3,000 check. They didn’t call him to the stand,
but Schoenneman said that this is what he did and he is a de-
fendant.
App. 32
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
February 12, 1976.
Before
Hon. JOHN S. HASTINGS, Sr. Cireuit Judge
Hon. WILBUR F. PELL, JR., Cireuit Judge
Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
Nos. 75-1417, 75-1429
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff- Appellee,
vs.
CARMEN BASTONE and ARTHUR VEAL,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
(74 CR 383)
On consideration of the petition for rehearing and
suggestion that it be reheard en bane filed in the above-
entitled cause, no judge in active service having requested
a vote thereon, nor any judge having voted to grant the
suggestion, and all of the members of the panel having
voted to deny a rehearing,
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing in the
above-entitled cause be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.
App. 33
APPENDIX C
Requested Defense Instructions Pertaining to
Multiple Conspiracies Issue
‘*The Defendants are accused of conspiracy to trans-
port in interstate commerce stolen trailers of a value
of $5,000 or more. That conspiracy is charged by the
indictment to have started in 1968 and to have con-
tinued to December, 1972. That is the only charge
for which the Defendants are on trial. You should
not convict these Defendants, or any of them, if such
a conspiracy is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
(Def. C. Bastone’s Inst. 18)
‘* By the Indictment and Bills of Particulars filed by
the Government in this case, the Government charges
that a single criminal conspiracy existed among all de-
fendants and alleged unindicted co-conspirators.
The Court instructs the Jury that if the Govern-
ment fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt by
credible evidence the existence of the single criminal
conspiracy charged, or if you find that there were a
number of separate and distinct conspiracies or enter-
prises in which some but not all of the defendants or
others were involved, you must find the defendants not
guilty.
Proof of separate, distinct and independent con-
spiracies involving various of the defendants or proof
of separate, distinct and independent conspiracies in-
volving various of the alleged objects of the specific
conspiracy charged is not proof of the single criminal
conspiracy charged. The period of the existence of
the single criminal conspiracy charged, if you find that
it existed is to be determined from the evidence.’’
(Def. S. Bastone’s Inst. Q)
‘‘This indictment charges one single conspiracy.
If you find on all of the evidence that one single con-
spiracy has not been proved, but instead the evidence
Pe ee
App. 34
shows two or more separate, distinct and independent
conspiracies, or separate independent crimes without
mutual agreement of the charged defendants and named
co-conspirators, then in that event you must find that
the indictment has not been proved and that all of the
defendants are not guilty.’’ (Def. McMahon’s Inst. 42)
‘*Tf the evidence shows that some of the defendants
were engaged only in one conspiracy while other defen-
dants were engaged only in another conspiracy, then
you must acquit all deefndants.’’ (Def. McMahon’s
Inst. 43)
‘*All of the defendants must be acquitted if more
than one conspiracy has been proven.’’ (Def. Mc-
Mahon’s Inst. 44)
It should be noted that requested defense instructions
were mutually cross-adopted. (Tr. 2228)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.