Petition — REA Express, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board

Supreme Court brief1976

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In The Suste

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Supreme Gourt uf the United, States 27 1976

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—_—

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res | MICHAEL RODAK, JR. CLERK

October Term, 1975

No. 75-1238

REA EXPRESS, INC., a Bankrupt,

Petitioner,

vs.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,

Respondent,

AIRLINES PARTICIPATING in AIR EXPRESS SERVICE,

AIR FREIGHT FORWARDERS ASSOCIATION,

AMERICAN RETAIL FEDERATION, BROTHERHOOD of

RAILWAY and AIRLINE CLERKS, NATIONAL SMALL

SHIPMENTS TRAFFIC CONFERENCE, DRUG and

TOILET PREPARATION TRAFFIC CONFERENCE, and

EASTERN INDUSTRIAL TRAFFIC’ LEAGUE, PET

INDUSTRY PARTIES, EMERY AIR FREIGHT,

Intervenors.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ARTHUR M. WISEHART

WISEHART, FRIOU & KOCH

219 East 42nd Street

Sixth Floor

New York, New York 10017

(212) 557-8800

Counsel for Petitioner

(8847)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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Statutory Provisions Involved .........ceceeceeeeeeeeees 3

DURAN GE GD GOD dccccccsccccccacccaccescucenessce 5

Reasons for Granting the Writ ..........cceeeseeeceeees 11

1. The decision below’ conflicts with statutory

requirements and with decisions of other courts in

failing to require findings as to the economic impact

involved in the termination of a public service. .. I]

Il. The CAB’s failure to address itself to the

requirements of the National Environmental Policy

Act in the context of a decision to terminate Air

Express gives rise to a public policy issue of

sufficient importance to warrant review by this

Bs 6 b.00.00000050000600b08eteiSeeendeneséans 15

III. The decision below raises significant and recurring

problems concerning the relationship between the

exercise of jurisdiction by one administrative agency

in such a way as to preclude or frustrate the

jurisdiction of other administrative agencies, or the

EE GATE, occcvescescccccesescesesance 20

I ie a a al he eee ee eS a 28

ii

Contents

Page

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Alaska Airlines v. CAB, 285 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ..... 12

Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945) ........ 15

Atchison Topeka & Sante Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita

Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (1973) ..... cc cece eee 11

Braniff Airways, inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453 (D.C.

PME 2 8n4ud bhuese bus OUSasohncSactek dukes ie eee 15

Brotherhood v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, —— U.S. —— ..........005. 24

Carey v. CAB, 275 F.2d S18 (ist Cir. 1953) ......ccccceces 15

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) .........ccceeceees 27

Harlem Valley Transportation Association v. Stafford,

Be eee SW GH Ge, COPED cc cccccccccvctoccees 16, 18, 19

Kodiak Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 447 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir.

PNG WeKEUESS Shas etucunguseaseeudebasduckescnsds 15

Morse v. United States, 270 U.S. 151 (1926) .............. 2

Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970) .............. 12

iii

Contents

Page

Nebraska Department of Aeronautics v. CAB, 298 F.2d

286 (Sth Cir. 1962) ....cccccceccvcccvcesessceececes 12

Northeast Airlines. Inc. v. CAB, 331 F.2d 579 (Ist

Ce TEED vvcccivccesevecccceccésesesesesscessnces 15

Schaffer Transportation Co. v. United States, 355 U.S.

GOED kdnnescdesvecaccpecvccadecoedsensveveseses 13

Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412 F.2d 926

Oe Te FE coc vcidencccccensectncivcecsessadssees

Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466

(Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) ...... 15

United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964) ....... cece eeees 2

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) ....... eee eee eens 27

Statutes Cited:

OSs die dil 2 sad ceeuneinniaeenies 2

insect udu enennybatewasnsinsweele 3, 25

NR 32 cs lane a eeseeskeaenekin 4,5

I 5 STs el ccc aueenneeeeinen 16

DE UD 2s id ckasbevesdeeceskvedidetuessnne 14

iv

Contents

Page

Other Authorities Cited:

Commoner, “Reporter at Large; Energy — Ill,” The New

Vorker, Feb. 06, O976, o. GO ..ccccccecsenenccesueeas 15

Congressional Record, January 23, 1976, p. H218 ......... 10

2 Davis, Administrative Law, §15.14, p. 432) 2... ccc eee eee 14

Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267

(OFFS) oo vccccccccess0000eee se sh.eu naam 27

Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice, §11.1 (4th ed.

i. MITTS rr 20

Study of REA Express (Staff Study, 1965) .............06. 20

Senate Committee Report %m Commerce, “Federal

Assistance For Carriers oi Express, p. 3 (S. Rep.

No. 92-1196, September 15, 1972) oc ccccnccscenceseun 2

In The

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

@—

October Term, 1975

No.

REA Express, Inc., a Bankrupt,

Petitioner, .

vs.

Civil Aeronautics Board,

Respondent,

Airlines Participating in Air Express Service, Air Freight

Forwarders Association, American’ Retail Federation,

Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks, National Small

Shipments Traffic Conference, Drug and Toilet Preparation

Traffic Conference, and Eastern Industrial Traffic League, Pet

industry Parties, Emery Air Freight,

Intervenors.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

The petitioner, REA Express, Inc., a bankrupt (“REA”),

respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

judgment and decision of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit entered on October 6, 1975.

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, reported at 524 F.2d

54, and the related opinions of the Civil Aeronautics Board

(“CAB”), appear in the appendix hereto. Page references to the

appendix are cited with the suffix “a.”

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit was entered on October 6, 1975. A timely

petition for rehearing was denied on December |, 1975, and this

petition for certiorari was filed within ninety days of that date.

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

See Morse v. United States, 270 U.S. 151 (1926); United States

v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 78 (1964).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

|. Whether the decision to terminate Air Express could be

made without a comparative hearing as to (a) the costs to be

borne by the shipping public for alternative services, or (b) a

new service proposed by the Civil Aeronautics Board but not yet

developed.

2. Whether an environmental impact statement or

evaluation was required.

RE EE TN, EO

ee

3

3. Whether a public transportation service may be

terminated without a supplemental hearing with respect to

substantial changes in circumstances including the carrier’s

efforts to reorganize as a “debtor-in-possession” pursuant to

Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1302:

In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties

under this chapter, the Civil Aeronautics Board shall consider

the following, among other things, as being in the public

interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and

necessity:

(a) The encouragement and development of an _ air-

transportation system properly adapted to the present and future

needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United

States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;

(b) The regulation of air transportation in such a manner as

to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the

highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic

conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations

between and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;

(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient

service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust

discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or

destructive competitive practices;

4

(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound

development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to

the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United

States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;

(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and

(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of

civil aeronautics. [Emphasis added.]

Section 1002(e) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.

§1482(e):

In exercising and performing its powers and duties with

respect to the determination of rates for the carriage of persons

or property, the Board shall take into consideration, among

other factors —

(1) The effect of such rates upon the movement of traffic;

(2) The need in the public interest of adequate and efficient

transportation of persons and property by air carriers at the

lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service;

(3) Such standards respecting the character and quality of

service to be rendered by air carriers as may be prescribed by or

pursuant to law;

(4) The inherent advantages of transportation by aircraft;

and

5

(5) The need of each air carrier for revenue sufficient to

enable such air carrier, under honest, economical, and efficient

management, to provide adequate and efficient air carrier

service. [Emphasis added.]

Section 1002(h) provides (49 U.S.C. §1482):

(h) Whenever, after notice and hearing, upon complaint or

upon its own initiative, the Board is of the opinion that the

divisions of joint rates, fares, or charges for air transportation

are or will be unjust, unreasonable, inequitable, or unduly

preferential or prejudicial as between the air carriers or foreign

air carriers parties thereto, the Board shall prescribe the just,

reasonable, and equitable divisions thereof to be received by the

several air carriers. The Board may require the adjustment of

divisions between such air carriers from the date of filing the

complaint or entry of order of investigation, or such other date

subsequent thereto as the Board finds to be just, reasonable,

and equitable. [Emphasis added. ]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The transportation service known as “Air Express” was

originated by REA’s corporate predecessor in 1927, prior to the

passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. From 1927 until

1944, Air Express was the only service under which small

shipments were hauled throughout the United States by

common carriers by air. The air services were performed by the

airlines and REA provided the ground services, including

handling, transfers, routing, billing, and pickup and delivery,

pursuant to a comprehensive agreement. REA was regarded as

6

an “indirect” air carrier. Beginning in 1944, however, the airlines

began to publish their own tariffs and promote their own air

freight businesses. Air freight forwarders developed thereafter.

Despite the competition by the new services, Air Express

retained certain distinctive characteristics. It was the only

“priority” service: the shipments were boarded first after baggage

and mail, and generally on the first flight out of an airport,

regardless of airline. It covered all points in the United States,

knitting the various airlines together into an integrated service.

It specialized in shipments that were small and difficult to

handle. It utilized a single, simplified tariff for all shipments on

all airlines, and to all locations. It provided unusual services,

such as armed guard protection. And, for those small shipments

it was best equipped to handle, it charged less than competing

services.

Since 1929, REA had been owned by the railroads. In 1969,

however, the railroads sold REA in an_ undercapitalized

condition to a group put together by a new management which

the railroads’ voting trustees had recruited.

The Ai Express arrangement had previously been

dependent upon agreements negotiated between REA and a

committee representing all of the airlines, subject to the approval

of the CAB. The agreements had a five year term. When REA’s

new management came into the picture in 1969, the Air Express

agreement was about to expire. The new management

discovered that, with the relative growth of the airlines’ separate

air freight businesses, it had become increasingly difficult to

negotiate a satisfactory Air Express agreement with the airlines

as a whole. The new management further discovered that the

—

;

airlines, to encourage the growth of their separate businesses,

were pricing air freight at substantially below cost.' The airlines

received about twice as much per ton mile from their share of

the Air Express divisions as they received from air freight.

Although the airlines did not receive their fully allocated costs

from either service, studies showed that they received a higher

percentage of fully allocated costs from Air Express than they

did from air freight. Finally, it appeared to REA’s new

management that the capital which the company so badly

needed to remain in business would not be forthcoming as long

as its ability to remain in Air Express was dependent upon the

good will of the airlines, who after ail were competitors, in

negotiating an agreement.

Accordingly, on April 9, 1970, REA filed a petition and

complaint with the CAB, asking that the following be

established as the major principles to govern the Air Express

arrangement:

1. The amount which REA pays the airlines

should be fairly related to what other airline

customers pay for air transportation.

2. REA should have the independent right,

subject to Board approval, to develop and revise

tariffs for Air Express service free from the

1. The substance to this contention is indicated by the subsequent finding of an

Administrative Law Judge in a separate proceeding, the Domestic Air Freight Rate

Investigation, Docket 22859. In that case, which is still pending, the Administrative Law

Judge found that, based on 1972 data, air freight rates are unreasonably low and unjustly

discriminatory, and that they should be increased on an average by 38.8%.

power of veto which the air carriers now have.

The Air Express agreement and the tariff

developed thereunder should not, as has been the

case in the past, preclude Air Express customers

from using the service for the long-haul air

market and for a broader range of shipments.

3. The agreement should be permanent and

provide for arbitration in the event that

negotiations are unable to resolve disputes.

However, the CAB dismissed REA’s petition and

complaint, and bifurcated the issues raised therein into twe

Separate proceedings: the Air Express Rates case and the Air

Express Service case. REA promptly, but to no avail, objected to

‘he severing of issues which were inextricably intertwined into

two separate proceedings. The cases were assigned to different

Administrative Law Judges who conducted separate hearings on

separate timetables. And while the Board reached a final

decision in the Air Express Service case, the Air Express Rates

case, from which REA hoped to obtain the economic

wherewithal for its survival, through the CAB’s power (and

statutory duty) to make retroactive determinations with respect

to rate “divisions,”? remains undecided, consigned to some kind

of administrative limbo called informal conferences. Meanwhile

REA, unable to weather the CAB'’s terminal edict for Air

Express, has been adjudicated a bankrupt. Thousands of

employees have been thrown out of work, the interests of

stockholders and thousands of creditors with millions of dollars

in claims wiped out, and shippers throughout the country

deprived of express services.

2. REA’s expert witness calculated that the amount of overpayment to the airlines,

based upon the yields which they were receiving from air freight, would have been in the

approximate amount of one million dollars per month, retroactive to April 9, 1970.

9

Following oral argument in the court below, in an

attempted settlement, REA and the airlines negotiated a new Air

Express agreement which they felt addressed in a constructive

way the Board's reservations about the prior arrangement. The

court remanded the matter so that the CAB could consider the

new agreement. Without further hearing or argument, however,

the Board adhered to its former conclusion, ignoring REA’s

financial plight in the groundless belief that REA’s operation as

a freight forwarder would provide the best opportunity for its

survival. By that time, REA had been compelled to petition for

reorganization under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, and the

Board never stopped to inquire whether REA then had the ways

and means of transforming its Air Express business into air

freight forwarding. REA requested a hearing but in vain.

The CAB’s conclusion about the supposed desirability of

REA's becoming a freight forwarder was thrown into stark

irrationality by the Board’s decision, in yet another docket, to

require the airlines to develop another priority, interline service

for small shipments. REA contended that Air Express should be

kept in existence at least until the new service was developed so

that comparative benefits and costs could be measured, to which

the CAB responded with the contention that what it envisioned

was not a replacement for Air Express. Whether the new service

planned was or was not a replacement for Air Express — a

contention difficult if not impossible to refute because of the

impossibility of knowing precisely what the Board had in mind

— was irrelevant, of course, to the question of why Air Express

could not at-least be retained in existence until the shippers —

those who would actually use the service — could give voice to

their preferences.

10

The CAB'’s death knell decision for Air Express had a

predictable effect on REA’s business; Air Express traffic

dropped off markedly, a condition exacerbated by the decision

of affirmance below on October 6, 1975, and on November 6,

1975. REA was adjudicated a total bankrupt.

Meanwhile, the Trustee, C. Orvis Sowerwine, Esq., has

maintained certain of REA’s profitable activities in operation,

and seeks means whereby the company can be rehabilitated and

restored to viability through a sale or other infusion of capital,

in the hope that the value of REA’s rights, of which he regards

Air Express as an important part, can be preserved and realized

upon as assets of the bankrupt estate. Funds potentially may be

available through the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory

Reform Act of 1976, which has just been enacted. That Act

defines “railroad” to include “a common carrier by railroad or

express as defined in section 1(3) of the Interstate Commerce

Act,” a definition which REA, as the historica! express

company, would satisfy. Congressional Record, January 23,

1976, p. H218.

The Trustee regards the decision below as a substantial

impediment to his hopes for rehabilitation and restoration.

Accordingly, the Trustee has sought and obtained permission

from Bankruptcy Judge John J. Galgay, in S.D.N.Y., Dkt. No.

75 B 251. to cause this petition for certiorari to be filed.

The Court of Appeals has granted a stay to prevent

implementation of the CAB’s decision, denied the CAB’s request

to dissolve the stay (3a), and has stayed the mandate pending

determination and final disposition of a petition for certiorari

(Sa), on the basis of REA’s showing of irreparable injury.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The decision below conflicts with statutory requirements

and with decisions of other courts in failing to require findings

as to the economic impact involved in the termination of a

public service.

The Federal Aviation Act requires the CAB to consider “the

need in the public interest of adequate and efficient

transportation of ... property by air carriers at the lowest cost

consistent with the furnishing of such service.” (49 U.S.C.

§1482(e)(1) and (2).) (Emphasis added.)

Such a crucial consideration may not be ignored by the CAB

in making a determination to terminate Air Express. As stated

by this Court in Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.

Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 817 (1973): “Even giving

the Commission's opinion the most sympathetic reading that we

find possible, we cannot discover in it an expressed reason for

permitting the railroads to reduce their services without showing

that the rates they propose to maintain are reasonable rates for

the service they intend to provide.”

By bifurcating the issues raised by REA'’s petition and

complaint filed in 1970, putting the issues in the Service case

ahead of the economic issues raised in the Rates case

procedurally, the Board deprived REA and the shipping public

of important statutory rights to their substantial prejudice.

The decision below is at variance with the decisions of other

circuits indicating that public interest determinations regarding

12

air services must include determination of the economic

consequences. See Alaska Airlines v. CAB, 285 F.2d 672, 674

(D.C. Cir. 1960); Nebraska Department of Aeronautics v. CAB,

298 F.2d 286, 291 (8th Cir. 1962). By terminating a public

service without first making an economic determination of the

costs of the service, the CAB effectively eliminated any

possibility of meaningful public participation in what it might

have to pay for competitive services, a result out of harmony

with the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d

891 (D.C. Cir. 1970). How could the shipping public make a

choice as to which service it would prefer without knowing

ultimately what the cost would be? Nor does the decision below

offer a supportable response to that issue by referring to the

level of rates reflected in the then current tariff (19a). As Moss,

supra, shows, reference to tariff levels is not an adequate means

of discharging the CAB’s statutory economic requirements.

In the Rates case, REA contended that the amounts

received by the airlines for their Air Express divisions were

excessive by approximately one million dollars per month,

compared with their yield from air freight. Had those divisions

been adjusted as requested, REA would have been strengthened

financially and the shipping public would have been the ultimate

beneficiaries of reduced costs. The “hidden cost” of regulation,

when the regulatory agencies, as here, fail to take such

considerations into account, has been the subject of much recent

discussion.

The kind of error which results from the absence of

adequate analysis is exemplified by the general comment of the

court below with respect to recent tariffs (19a-20a). Ignored is

13

the fact that the rates for priority service by individual airlines

have been 130% of their general commodity rates for air freight,

which do not include pickup and delivery. The comment also

does not take into account the fact that in the still-pending

Domestic Air Freight Rate Investigation, Docket 22859, the

CAB’s Administrative Law Judge found that air freight rates

“are unjust and unreasonable” and that the prevailing freight

rate structure is “unjustly discriminatory,” leading to the

conclusion that air freight rates should be increased by an

average of 38.8%. Thus there has been a substantial escalation in

what shippers have to pay for priority service for traffic formerly

moving by Air Express, and further escalation apparently is in

store.

The comparative cost analysis required is a responsibility

imposed upon the administrative agency, see Schaffer

Transportation Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 92 (1957), and

in this case, Air Express was terminated before that analysis ever

reached the point of administrative finality, notwithstanding a

finding by the Administrative Law Judge that “air freight

forwarder service is not endowed with the favorable economics

of a single ground agency concept, and consequently it cannot

develop a rate structure for small shipments commensurate with

air express.” (JA624(a).)

If Congress has mandated that a factor be given

consideration in the hearing process, it would make a mockery

of the will of Congress, and due process as well, to permit the

requirement to be side-stepped, as does the decision below,

by stating that there is no “assurance” that the hearing would

yield findings which would require a change in the Board's

14

decision (21a). Either the hearing process as such has integrity or

it does not, and the condition that “assurance” be shown before

even a hearing will be allowed implies a kind of a priori

reasoning which (a) is the antithesis of due process, and (b)

would effectively preclude judicial review. As stated in 2 Davis,

Administrative Law, §15.14, p. 432:

“The eardinal principle of fair hearing

is... that parties should have the opportunity to

meet in appropriate fashion all facts that

influence the disposition of the case. . . . Nothing

short of bringing the facts into the record, so that

an unabridged opportunity is allowed for cross-

examination and for presentation of rebuttal

evidence, will suffice for the disputed adjudicative

facts at the center of the controversy.”

The requirement imposed by Congress that no significant

administrative action can be taken in certain areas without

findings on the environmental impact can not be obviated in

service abandonment cases by a ritualistic recitation that there is

no “assurance” that such findings would produce a different

result, and we submit that Congress has spoken no less plainly in

requiring findings on the economic impact in cases such as the

one here involved.

Besides the overriding requirement that the CAB anchor its

action on the considerations specified by Congress, the

Administrative Procedure Act mandates findings on each of the

statutory considerations to be supported by substantial evidence

on the record, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(E), and the courts in other

15

circuits have not hesitated to reverse CAB action when the

Board has failed to state separate findings on all material issues

presented. See Trailways of New England, Inc. v.CAB,412 F.2d

926, 936 (Ist Cir. 1969); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d

453, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 331

F.2d 579, 588 (Ist Cir. 1964); Carey v. CAB, 275 F.2d 518, 524

(Ist Cir. 1953); Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383

F.2d 466 (Sth Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).

REA also consistently has requested that it be afforded an

Ashbacker-type comparative hearing with regard to the new

priority interline service which the CAB has ordered the airlines

to develop. Only this Court can resolve the important issue of

whether such a hearing is required in the circumstances of this

case by Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), and

we respectfully request that it do so. In rejecting the applicability

of Ashbacker to this case, the court below apparently has

applied a different standard than the District of Columbia

Circuit in Kodiak Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 447 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir.

1971).

Il. The CAB’s failure to address itself to the requirements of the

National Environmental Policy Act in the context of a decision

to terminate Air Express gives rise to a public policy issue of

sufficient importance to warrant review by this Court.

The CAB, regulating an industry with the greatest

environmental impact per ton-mile of freight moved,’ should be

3. Commoner, “Reporter at Large: Energy III.” The New Yorker, Feb. 16, 1976,

p. 64, states

(Cont'd)

16

required to explain to this Court why, six years after passage of

the National Environmental Policy Act, it seeks the destruction

of the service with the least adverse environmental impact

without attempting to address itself to the statutory

environmental requirements (42 U.S.C. §4332).

The fact that the administrative agencies have been laggards

in satisfying the requirements of the National Environmental

Policy Act has already provoked judicial comment with respect

to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Harlem Valley

Transportation Association v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328, 331 (2d

Cir. 1974).

The Harlem Valley case involved local rail abandonment

proceedings; the termination of nationwide Air Express service

has a much greater environmental effect and presents an a

fortiori situation. The adverse consequences are no longer a

matter of speculation. Following the cessation of Air Express

services as a result of REA’s adjudication in bankruptcy, Federal

Express, an air taxi cargo carrier seeking exemption authority to

(Cont'd)

“Transportation dominates the energy picture. It is the largest single

end use of energy. consuming twenty-five per cent of the total

Amencan energy budget.”

“Air pollution from transportation can be judged by the amount of

fuel burned... .~ (p. 69).

“In the last few years, energy productivities have been computed for

all the major modes of intercity transportation.

Railroads... have the highest energy productivity for general

freight: 1,300 ton-miles per million B.T.U.s, compared with 360 for

intercity trucks and 20 for airlines.” (p. 68).

es eet a

ee ete.

Bette

17

use larger aircraft, filed a petition for reconsideration with the

CAB dated January 28, 1976 making the following statement:

“The gap created by the final collapse of

REA’s long-declining Air Express service has had

a particularly significant impact on Federal

Express’ traffic because so few other air freight

carriers offer a system having a geographic scope

comparable to that of REA, particularly at low

density cities.” (pp. 11-12).

The bottom line in environmental terms is the admission

that, because of the large amount added to its nightly volume by

the cessation of Air Express, Federal has had “to add needed

capacity on a grossly inefficient basis — greatly increasing its

cost, wasting scarce fuel, and jeopardizing its service reliability.”

(p. 3).

Nor does the simplistic solution proposed by Federal —

letting it use larger aircraft — address itself to the underlying

problem.

Air Express is the least costly and most efficient method of

moving small shipments by air because of the shared use of

equipment and facilities. For the same reason, the environmental

consequences are less. As the Administrative Law Judge found,

80% of Air Express shipments were carried in the cargo space of

combination aircraft, space which in recent years, with the

advent of wide bodied aircraft, has been greatly underutilized

(JA626(a)). As these aircraft carry passengers also, they would

be operating in any event, and the environmental impact of Air

18

Express carried in that way therefore was minimal. In contrast,

only 42% of air freight forwarder traffic moves on combination

aircraft; the rest moves on specialized all-cargo aircraft, a

condition of imbalance which the ALJ found would be

exacerbated by the shift of Air Express to forwarder operations.

Noise is a further environmental factor because of the emphasis

placed by forwarders on all-cargo night operations, and the

potential effect on day/night operational patterns.

The lack of an environmental! impact statement was raised

in but ignored by the court below (REA Br. 45, fn.). The point

was not raised directly in the administrative hearing because of

the following factors: (a) REA was not seeking termination of

Air Express but its continuation, (b) testimony regarding the

greater efficiency of Air Express was introduced, (c) the

proponents of the termination of Air Express, if anyone, had the

primary responsibility for justifving the environmental

consequences of the change which they sought, (d) the Harlem

Valley and other cases make it clear that the burden of assuring

compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act falls

upon the agency itself, (e) at the time of the hearing, the CAB’s

definitive environmental regulations [promuigated in September

1975] were still several years from being written, and (f) the

Administrative Law Judge held that Air Express should be

continued, in part because of its greater efficiency of operation,

so at the time of review by the CAB, REA had no basis for

objecting to the lack of an environmental assessment nor was it

aware of the substantial nature of point until later, when the

great expansion in operations by Federal Express took place.

toe

*

ee ee

es

19

When Federal Express applied for an exemption to allow it

to operate larger aircraft, REA opposed the application and

moved to have the application consolidated withthe Air Express

Service case and the CAB’s priority service docket so that a

comparative hearing could be held on environmental and other

aspects. We also pointed out that Federal’s operation was

inherently wasteful, whether it used large or small aircraft,

because of its specialized nature and the circuity involved,

causing unnecessary air and noise pollution, and that

“The increase in the use of special purpose

aircraft, while the regulated air carriers are

operating combination aircraft with only a

fraction of their belly capacity filled with cargo

would constitute a major federal action having a

substantial impact upon the environment.”

Request for Hearing and Motion, Oct. 14, 1975,

p. 9.

The CAB ignored the environmental aspect and dismissed

REA’s motion as moot on the ground that it had denied the

application for other reasons. CAB Order 75-12-38, Dec. 8,

1975. However, the environmental point was not moot; it was

intensified as a result of the cessation of Air Express and

continued operations by Federal, as demonstrated by the

statements quoted above from Federal’s_ petition for

reconsideration.

The CAB may contend that REA could raise the same issue

in the District Court by bringing an unusual action in the nature

of mandamus, as in Harlem Valley, supra. But neither REA nor

20

the judicial system has the time nor resources to afford that kind

of redundancy. The CAB’s undeniable neglect in addressing air

cargo environmental concerns generally and in the context of

this proceeding particularly, we submit is a subject well worthy

of this Court’s attention. Cf. Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court

Practice §11.1 (4th ed. 1969).

Ill. The decision below raises significant and recurring problems

concerning the relationship between the exercise of jurisdiction

by one administrative agency in such a way as to preclude or

frustrate the jurisdiction of other administrative agencies, or the

Bankruptcy Court.

Air Express accounted for approximately 30% of REA’s

total revenues. The rest was derived from surface express,

operated under certificates of public convenience and necessity

issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission and various

State agencies. By placing the continuation of REA’s unique

surface express operations in extreme jeopardy, the CAB has

brought havoc to a sector of the public interest with respect to

which it has no jurisdiction.

For over one hundred years, express operations have been

cnaracterized by their inter-moda! nature. This was so significant

a factor in REA’s situation that a tripartite group with

representatives of the CAB, the Federal Maritime Commission

and the Interstate Commerce Commission worked together to

produce a comprehensive Study of REA Express (Staff Study)

in 1965. This Study pointed out that regulation of REA by the

different agencies “...is by virtue of various statutory

provisions which leave unanswered some questions of lines of

demarcation among the several agencies, and also of coverage of

Ce POA RE net a be aN

21

all REA activities,” and that “the impact of competition goes

beyond the areas in which a single agency may exercise its

authority.” (p. 3).

In its annual report for fiscal year 1974. the ICC expressed

concern about the effect of the CAB'’s ruiing regarding Air

Express (p. 54): “A December [1973] ruling by the Civil

Aeronautics Board affecting the operational status of REA

Express, Inc. (REA) may have serious bearing on the company’s

capability to maintain a financially viable posture.” It adds (p.

55): “Whether REA has the capability to continue as a viable

transporation entity im ight of the CAB order remains to be

seen.” In addition, the ICC’s annual report states (ibid. ):

‘In light of these circumstances and the special

status which REA enjoys under the Interstate

Commerce Act in the conduct of its express

service, a joint hearing of the Senate

Subcommittees on Air and Surface

Transportation was held in executive session on

June 10, 1974, to investigate the situation

involving REA. The Commission presented

testimony at these hearings concerning the

current operations of REA. The conclusions of

the hearing have not as yet been made public.”

And the Senate Committee on Commerce in its Report

entitled “Federal Assistance For Carriers of Express” (S. Rep.

No. 92-1158, September 15, 1972) stated (p. 3):

22

“REA has long provided service for such unique

and sometimes undesirable and troublesome

items as corpses, blood, valuables, live animals,

ornamental crops, fresh fruits and vegetables,

shoes, drugs, medicines, coffee, typewriters,

furniture, flagpoles and the occasional household

items, steamer truck or camp baggage. Generally

speaking, REA is a carrier of small shipments.

Reportedly half its shipments weigh less than 50

pounds, almost three of every four are under 100

pounds and only 1/20 of REA’s traffic 1s

shipments weighing 1,000 pounds or more.

Currently the company employs some 16,000

employees.”

“The Committee is concerned about the possible

loss of REA’ Express service which the

Committee deems to be important even though

other companies in some instances may provide

similar service. The need for small shipments

service is of such that the loss of a significant

competitor for small shipments traffic could

conceivably reduce substantially the quality of

service for small parcels. Indicative of potential

difficulties are the problems which reportedly

face the pet industry, many breeders and dealers

(of dogs and birds especially). Some are

considering institution of proprietary service, and

others the formation of a shipper’s association.

;

;

ee

23

Many others, however, are too smail to engage in

such operations. Their potential problems are

most serious.”

As noted in the Statement of the Case, supra, Congress has

just enacted the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform

Act of 1976, containing provisions for financial assistance for

express companies like REA. The trustee is very desirous of

finding a successor who will rehabilitate the Express Company.

Thus the CAB’s decision to terminate Air Express places a

serious obstacle in the path of rehabilitation, and raises

important public policy considerations which do not lie within

the jurisdiction of the CAB exclusively.

Approximately two-thirds of REA’s revenues derive from

surface express operations regulated by the Interstate Commerce

Commission and the regulatory agencies of the various states

throughout the United States. To permit an agency which has an

impact upon substantially less than half of the total of the

operation conducted in the public interest to have a veto power

over the possibility of rehabilitating the Express Company

would be to undercut the regulatory authorities and

responsibilities of the other agencies affected in a way which

Congress could not have intended.

The court below said it saw no “need” for the CAB to

postpone its decision until it has finally determined the issues in

the Rates case or put into effect a new high-priority service (20a-

21a). We suggest that the burden should be just the opposite: in

view of the important public policy considerations pointed out

above, what was the Board’s “need” to implement its decision

24

before those additional events take place? A good and faithful

servant of almost fifty years standing is entitled to no less

consideration.

Further, there is a substantial question whether REA was

accorded procedural and substantive due process by the C AB as

it struggled for survival. On February 18, 1975, REA was forced

to seek reorganization under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.

This presented an opportunity to submit new operational plans

which would reduce costs and give the company an opportunity

to straighten out its financial affairs. The creditors were

cooperative. However, the existing labor agreements constituted

a serious impediment to success, and REA succeeded in an

action to have them rejected as onerous and burdensome by the

Bankruptcy Court. In Brotherhood v. REA Express, Inc., 523

F.2d 164, 170 (2d Cir. Aug. 27, 1975), cert. denied, — U.S.

, the court said:

“When REA, after going into Chapter Xl

proceedings, was authorized to operate as a

debtor-in-possession, it acted as a newjuridical

entity.”

It was treated as a “new employer” which, the court

emphasized, “. . .must be granted certain prerogatives at the outset

in making changes in the method of operation, business

structure and labor arrangements of a venture. Otherwise, the

free flow of capital and efforts to revive or expand a weak

enterprise might be frustrated.” (/bid.)

25

No single factor led to a greater degree of frustration of the

efforts to revive or expand REA as a Chapter XI debtor-in-

possession than the CAB’s inflexibility. When so extreme an

action as the rejection of collective bargaining agreements as

onerous and burdensome may be justified to satisfy the

objectives of the Bankruptcy Act, do not those same objectives

require the CAB at least to consider the possibility of some

accommodation? The Federal Aviation Act itself specifies that

the CAB shall consider “The regulation of air transportation in

such a manner as to... foster sound economic conditions in,

such transportation ... .” (49 U.S.C. §1302(b).)

Despite the extremity of REA’s situation, and its status as a

new “juridicalentity,” the CAB was unwilling even to accede *o

its request for a hearing following the filing of its petition for

reorganization under Chapter XI. In its request for such a

hearing, REA stated that, “Fairness alone would dictate that, if

the Board is unwilling to approve the new Air Express

agreement in its present form, it should indicate what terms and

conditions it would approve so the continuity of employment

could be assured.” Hence, REA’s request was that the CAB

should “either approve the new Air Express agreement or order

a hearing in which an evidentiary record is made concerning the

new circumstances involving REA and Air Express.”4

At that stage of its existence REA had long passed the point

of ideology regarding Air Express, and was simply and humbly

seeking the opportunity to survive. The CAB turned a deaf ear,

4. Petition for Reconsideration, April 29, 1975, pp. 13-14. The Board denied this

request in its order dated May 23, 1975. REA did not file a separate petition to review as

the Second Circuit had retained jurisdiction over the matter.

26

denied a hearing on what the possibilities might be, and the

court below converted CAB’s non-consideration of the subject

into what is merely a speculation, unsupported by record

evidence, namely that “... the Board, apparently recognizing

employee welfare as a factor to be considered in deciding what

course would be in the public interest... granted air freight

forwarder authority to REA specifically on the ground that its

operation as a freight forwarder would provide the best

opportunity to benefit its employees.” (2la-22a).

We respectfully disagree with that conclusion even based

upon the record as it was presented in a hearing which ended in

1971.5 But as applied to a situation which existed in 1975,

following substantial and profound changes of circumstances,

not made the subject of a hearing before the Board, we submit

that the application of a false premise, namely that air freight

forwarding will be of benefit, when in fact the effect of such a

decision would be to wipe out the company, its jobs, and the

public services it performs, represents a denial of due process in

a very basic way. REA, its management, its employees, its

creditors, and its customers, all of whom had the greatest and

most direct interest in the survival of the company and its

services, and with no motive whatsoever for seeing the wrong

choice made, all believed that the forced conversion of the

company into air freight forwarding would be not “REA’s best

opportunity,” but a disaster:

As shown in an affidavit submitted by REA, such a

conversion would involve substantial changes in operations, in

5. The decision below errs in indicating that dual authority to provide both Air

Express and air freight forwarding service was a primary objective of REA. Dual

authority was requested only as an alternative position if other improvements in Air

Express — primarily reduction of costs and rates — were not made.

|

27

facilities, in marketing approach, in customers, in employee

practices and training requirements, which REA was unable to

make. Thus, in the changed circumstances, the decision to

terminate Air Express became a corporate death sentence.

Lad

. . some kind of hearing is required at some time before a

person is finally deprived of his property interests.” Wolff v.

McDonneil, 418 U.S. 539, 557-8 (1974). We submit that such a

“hearing” must take place with respect to the factual situation as

it eXists in some proximate time relationship to the period in

which the deprival of property interests occurs. In the

approximately four vears following the hearing in the Air

Express Service Investigation, there have been significant

developments involving REA, other carriers, and in the industry

itself. There is a fundamental question of how “stale” a record

may be and still justify “substantial evidence” reliance thereon

within the context of the constitutional guarantee of due

process.

Even the termination of welfare benefits without a hearing

has been held to infringe upon due process, see Goldberg v.

Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and the termination of a pioneering

public service should be given no less consideration. In a

constitutional scale of values, “there is a human difference

between losing what one has and not getting what one wants,” a

distinction which “is valid in economic regulation,” also, because

“capital has been expended, investor expectations have been

aroused, and people have been employed.” See Friendly, Some

Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1296 (1975), and

discussion therein.

7 Finally, “The required degree of procedural safeguards

varies directly with the importance of the private interest

28

affected .. .” \article cited supra, at 1278), and the importance

and magnitude of the public and private interests affected in this

litigation are substantially greater than those in many of the

cases in which this Court has taken for review to consider the

applicability of the due process requirements. (/bid.)

CONCLUSION

So that the decision below will not constitute a further

obstacle to hopes and efforts for the rehabilitation and

restoration of express services for the shipping public, a writ of

certiorari should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the

Second Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

Arthur M. Wisehart

WISEHART, FRIOU & KOCH

219 E. 42nd Street

Sixth Floor

New York, New York 10017

Counsel for Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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