Petition — City of Glendale v. Glendale City Employees Ass'n

Supreme Court brief1976

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OF THE UNITED

October Term, 1975

CITY OF GLENDALE,

Petitioner,

vs.

GLENDALE CITY EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION, INC., DAVID NORTH,

ROSS D. MITCHELL, E. JIM KOTONIAS,

BOB MEZAK, BOB ARCHAMBEAU, AND

WILLIAM J. EVANS, JR.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD W. MARSTON,

City Attorney

DENNIS H. SCHUCK,

Deputy City Attorney

Counsel for Petitioners

613 East Broadway

Room 220 City Hall

Glendale, California 91205

(213) 956-2080

IN ‘THE

SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1975

CITY OF GLENDALE,

Petitioner,

vs.

GLENDALE CITY EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION, INC., DAVID NORTH,

ROSS D. MITCHELL, &. JIM KOTONIAS,

BOB MEZAK, BOB ARCHAMBEAU, AND

WILLIAM J. EVANS, JR.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD W. MARSTON,

City Attorney

DENNIS H. SCHUCK,

Deputy City Attorney

Counsel for Petitioners

613 East Broadway

Room 220 City Hall

Glendale, California 91205

(213) 956-2080

TOPICAL INDEX

Table of Authorities

INTRODUCTION

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

AND STATUTES INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

TRIAL COURT ACTION

COURT OF APPEAL

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF

THE WRIT

CONCLUSION

APPENDICES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bell v. Hood (D.C, 1947)

71 F.Supp. 813

Calif. State Employees' Assn. v.

State (1973)

32 Cal. App. 3d 103,

108 Cal. Rptr. 60

City Council of City of Santa Barbara

v. Superior Court (1960)

179 Cal. App.2d 389,

3 Cal. Rptr. 796

In re Shear (D.C. Cal. 1956)

139 F.Supp. 217

Johanson v. City Council of City of

Santa Cruz (1963)

222 Cal. App. 2d 68,

34 Cal. Rptr. 798

Kelley v. Aarons (D.C, Cal. 1917).

238 F. 996

Kelly v. Gill,

38 S.Ct. 38, 245 U.S. 116,

62 L.Ed. 185

ii.

Page

Kobilkin v. Pillsbury (C.C.A. Cal. 1939)

103 F.2d 667, cert. granted

60 S.Ct. 97, 308 U.S. 530,

84 L.Ed. , affirmed 60S.Ct.

465, rehearing denied 60 S.Ct.

584

Martin v. County of Contra Costa (1970)

8 Cal. App. 3d 856,

87 Cal. Rptr. 886

Monarch Cablevision v. City Council,

City of Pacific Grove (1966)

239 Cal. App. 2d 206,

48 Cal. Rptr. 550

Nev-Cal Elect. Securities Co. v.

Imperial Irr. District (C.C.A. Cal. 1936)

85 F.2d 886, cert. den. 575S.Ct.

493, 300 U.S. 662, 81 L.Ed. 871

Redding v. City of Los Angeles (1947)

81 Cal. App. 2d 888, 185 p.2d

430, cert. denied 68 S.Ct. 1338,

334 U.S. 825, 92 L.Ed. 1754,

rehearing denied 68 S.Ct. 1511,

334 U.S. 854, 92 L.Ed. 1776

Rupp v. Teets (1957)

48 Cal. 2d 647, 312 P.2d 5,

cert. granted 78 S.Ct. 91,

355 U.S. 854, 2 L. Ed. 2d 62,

affirmed 78 S.Ct. 1263, 357 U.S.

949, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1531, rehearing

denied 79 S.Ct. 13, 358 U.S. 858,

3 L.Ed. 2d 92

iii.

San Francisco Shopping News Co. v.

City of South San Francisco (C.C.A,.

Cal. 1934)

69 F.2d 879, cert. den.

595 S.Ct. 122, 293 U.S. 606,

79 L.Ed. 697

Sladovich v. Fresno County (1958)

158 Cal. App. 2d 230,

322 P.2d 565

Tandy v. City of Oakland (1962)

208 Cai. App. 2d 609,

25 Cal. Rptr. 429

U. S. v. Mock (D,C, Cal. 1956)

143 F.Supp. 661

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Myatt (1899)

98 F. 335

Constitutions and Charters

Californie Constitution,

Article I, Section 1

Article I, Section 15

Article III, Section 3

Article XI, Section 3(a)

Article XI, Section 5(a)

iv.

Article XI, Section 5(b)

Article XVI, Section 18 5, 18,

U.S. Constitution,

Amendment V 5,

Amendment X

Amendment XIV, Section 1 5,

Article I, Section 1 Do,

Article III, Section 1 o,

Glendale City Charter,

Article IV, Section 3 6, 13, 14,

Article VI, Section 6 6,

Article XI, Section 1 6,

Article XI, Section 3 6,

Article XI, Section 4 6, 14,

Article XXIII, Section 13 6,

Article XXIII, Section 27 6,

Ordinances and Statutes

Glendale Ordinance

No. 3921 6, 9,

No. 3936 6, 9, 15,

California Civil Code,

Section 1644 3D,

Section 1546 Do,

Section 1647 Do,

California Government Code,

Section 3500

Meyers-Milias-Brown Act 5, 6,

28 USC Section 1257(3)

vi.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1975

CITY OF GLENDALE,

Petitioner,

vs.

GLENDALE CITY EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION, INC., DAVID NORTH,

ROSS D. MITCHELL, E. JIM KOTONIAS,

BOB MEZAK, BOB ARCHAMBEAU, and

WILLIAM J. EVANS, JR.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner City of Glendale respectfully

prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review

the judgment and opinion of the California

Supreme Court entered in this proceeding on

October 3, 1975.

OPINIONS BELOW

On July 9, 1971, the Superior Court for

the County of Los Angeles, State of California,

filed its judgment (unreported) in Case No.

98894. That judgment granted the wric of man-

date sought by the plaintiffs and ordered re-

spondents "'. . . to proceed at once to provide

salary and wage increases to petitioners [plain-

tiffs] occupying classes of positions which shall

hereinafter be set forth..."

Defendants [petitioners here] then

appealed to the Court of Appeal, Second Appel-

late District. On November 28, 1973, the

Court of Appeal filed its opinion in 2d Civ. No.

40012 reversing the judgment of the Superior

Court. The opinion is unreported. Aftera

rehearing, a second opinion was filed on May

21, 1974, in 2d Civ. No. 40012. The opinion

is unreported. This second opinion reaffirmed

its earlier reversal.

The California Supreme Court granted

a hearing, and on October 3, 1975, filed its

opinion (reported at 15 Cal. 3d 328, Cal.

Rptr. ; P.2d ) (set forth in Appendix

B). That decision reversed the ruling of the

Court of Appeal and directed that the judg-

ment be remanded to the Superior Court

9 . to permit joinder of the appropriate

city officials.'' This was presumably

to enable the Court to order these officials to

pay the judgment.

A petition for rehearing in the California

Supreme Court was timely filed on October 17,

1975. It was denied on October 30, 1975.

JURISDICTION

The judgment, printed in Appendix B

hereto, which is sought to be reviewed is

dated October 3, 1975, and was filed on that

date.

A rehearing by the California Supreme

Court was denied on October 30, 1975.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 USC §1257(3)(1970).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The judgment of the trial court gives

rise to the following questions:

A. Did the State Court deny to peti-

tioner due process of law in granting a writ of

mandate ordering the computation and payment

of salaries to City employees, notwithstanding

the present existence of a salary ordinance as

required by the City Charter and which author-

ized payment of a different amount for salaries ?

B. Did the Court below deny due

process of law to petitioner by construing the

Memorandum of Understanding to be a binding

contract which fixed the compensation for City

employees? If found to be a contract, does

the failure to comply with City Charter and

State law provisions regulating such contracts

preclude the granting of the relief sought ?

C. Was it a violation of due process

and the doctrine of separation of powers for the

Court to compel the payment of employee sal-

aries contrary to the provisions of an existing

salary ordinance and notwithstanding the total

absence of any other corresponding salary

ordinance or appropriation authorizing such pay-

ments? By substituting its own discretion and

interpretation for that of the legislative body,

did the Court encroach unconstitutionally upon

the powers of a coexisting and coequal branch

of the government ?

D. Was it a violation of due process

and separation of powers for the Court to inter-

pret the Memorandum of Understanding to be a

binding contract wherein the Council delegated

its discretionary function to determine employee

salaries, and that all subsequent acts were

ministerial? Would there be a different result

than that of the Court below even under Califor-

nia contract law ?

E. Did the Court below deny Federal

and State due process guarantees to the City of

Glendale by failing to recognize applicable State

and local laws which were in accord and which

were not declared constitutionally invalid ?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

AND STATUTES INVOLVED

The following constitutional provisions,

statutes and ordinances are involved (set forth

in Appendix A):

U.S. Constitution:

Article I, Section 1; Article Lil,

Section 1; Amendment V; Amendment XIV,

Section 1.

California Constitution:

Article I, Sections 1 and 15;

Article III, Section 3; Article XI, Sections 3(a)

and 5(a); Article XVI, Section 18.

California Statutes:

Civil Code: Sections 1644, 1646

and 1647,

Government Code: Section 3500.

Glendale City Charter: , a

= ae TY. Section 3: Article VI this action is based deals with a salary survey.

It states as follows:

Section 6; Article XI, Sections 1, 3 and 4;

Article XXIII, Sections 13 and 27,

Glendale Ordinances:

Ordinance No. 3936, amending

Ordinance No. 3921; Ordinance No. 3921.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to the Meyers-Milias- Brown

Act (California Government Code, Sections

3500, et seq.) the City of Glendale enacted

certain ordinances governing employer-em-

ployee relations. The Glendale City Em-

ployees' Association (hereinafter referred to

as ''the Association") representing the City

employees, and represented by its President,

David North, and a negotiator from the Cali-

fornia League of City Employee's Association,

Phillip Bowers, met and conferred with Charles

Briley, the Assistant City Manager, with regard

to the salaries to be paid to the City employees

for the fiscal year 1970-1971. The result of

these meetings was a negotiated Memorandum

of Understanding concerning salaries and other

matters.

The Memorandum of Understanding con-

tained four provisions, but the one upon which

"The parties hereto will conduct a

joint salary survey and using as

guidelines data secured from the

following jurisdictions, Burbank,

Pasadena, Santa Monica, Long

Beach, Anaheim, Santa Ana,

Los Angeles City and Los Angeles

County. The intent of the survey

will be to place Glendale salaries

in an above average position with

reference to the jurisdictions com-

pared with proper consideration

given to internal alignments and

traditional relationships. The data

used will be that data available to us

and intended for use in fiscal year

1970-71. Adjustments which it is

agreed shall be made will have an

effective date of October 1, 1970.

It is intended that comparisons will

be made on a classification basis

and not title only, and that the classi-

fications shall be determined by pro-

fessional judgment of the highest

qualified personnel people with whom

we would confer in the jurisdictions

with whom which we will compare. "

Pursuant to this agreement, a salary

survey was conducted. Consistent with its

practices since 1953, the City utilized the data

by preparing "'bar charts.

These charts are

long strips of graph paper showing the job

classification on the left side and the salary

range for that classification as represented by

a colored line on the chart. Each jurisdiction

surveyed was represented by a different colored

line. By comparing the lineup of the different

colored lines it was possible to easily visualize

the relationship of Glendale salaries to the other

jurisdictions surveyed. It was agreed that in

making these comparisons the City could be

particularly concerned with the top step (fifth

or E step) of the salary ranges, since the

majority of the Glendale employees were at the

top step of their salary range.

Some classifications had no comparable

position in their jurisdictions and no comparison

was possible. In other cases comparable posi-

tions were found in only one or a few of the

jurisdictions. Data intended for use in 1970-

71 in Santa Monica and Anaheim were not avail-

able at all.

The charts were completed in mid-

September of 1970 so that the City representa-

tives could make recommendations for salary

adjustments in time for them to be effective as

of October 1, 1970. The proposed Glendale

salaries were indicated by a brown line on the

bar charts and were discussed by representa-

tives of both parties. The Association then

obtained a computer analysis of the arithmetical

averages of the salaries surveyed, and took the

position that the City had not complied with the

memorandum of understanding. A salary

ordinance embodying the recommendations of

the City Manager's office was enacted over

objections from the Association. (Ordinance

No. 3936, amending Ordinance No. 3921. )

The Association sought a writ of man-

date from the trial court contending that the

memorandum of understanding had contem-

plated an arithmetical average and that the

memorandum bound the City to pay each class

of employees a salary at least ina salary

range above the average of the surveyed juris-

dictions for the comparable class of position.

TRIAL COURT ACTION

The City defended the action on numer-

Ous grounds, among them that the memorandum

of understanding was not binding upon the City

Council and that mandate was inappropriate to

compel action by the City Council, but also on

the merits that, properly interpreted, the

memorandum of understanding was fully com-

plied with. The trial court received testimony

concerning certain negotiations leading up to

the memorandum of understanding and as to

the meaning of the phrases "above-average

position" and "with proper consideration given

to internal alignments and traditional relation-

ships, '' in the memorandum.

After the trial, the Court concluded that

the average for each of the classes of positions

must be recomputed using the arithmetical

average of the jurisdictions considered plus one

cent, and the trial court entered its judgment

directing that a peremptory writ of mandate

issue. Judgment was filed on July 9, 1971.

The defendants appealed.

COURT OF APPEAL

The Court of Appeal reversed the judg-

ment of the trial court. The Court found that

the City Council could not be compelled by

writ of mandate to adopt an ordinance based on

the terms contained in the Memorandum of

Understanding as construed by the trial court.

The decision was filed on November 28, 1973.

Thereafter, the Association successfully

sought a rehearing in the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal filed its second opinion

on May 21, 1974. This opinion reaffirmed its

reversal of the trial court's judgment.

A second petition for rehearing was denied

on June 19, 1974. Plaintiffs then filed a petition

for hearing in the California Supreme Court, which

was granted on August 28, 1974.

10.

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

In its opinion, filed on October 3, 1975

(reported at 15 Cal.3d 328, Cal. Rptr. ,

P.2d ), the California Supreme Court _

discussed the same legal issues raised in the

petition for hearing in the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court's opinion reversed

the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Among

its findings, it concluded that the Memorandum

became a binding contract upon approval by the

City Council; that the City had failed to comply

with the terms of the contract, as interpreted

by the trial court; that even though the plain-

tiffs filed suit on behalf of the class of City

employees, it found those allegations to be

superfluous; that the administrative remedy

was inadequate, and so plaintiffs' failure to ex-

haust its admininstrative remedies was excused;

and that the approval of the Memorandum of

Understanding itself constituted the legislative

act that fixed employee salaries in accord with

the understanding. In order to mend what it

considered to be a "procedural defect, "' the

Court remanded the judgment back to the trial

court for joinder of the "appropriate city

officials'' entrusted with the administrative

duties of computing and paying salaries.

Defendants filed a timely petition for

rehearing in the California Supreme Court on

October 17, 1975. The petition was denied on

October 30, 1975.

11.

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF

THE WRIT

A. UNDER THE U.S. CON-

STITUTION (AMENDMENT \V;

AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION 1)

AND THE CALIFORNIA CONSTI-

TUTION (ARTICLE I, SECTIONS

1, 15) THE STATE COURT DE-

NIED TO PETITIONER DUE PRO-

CESS OF LAW IN GRANTING A

WRIT OF MANDATE ORDERING

THr COMPUTATION AND PAY-

MENT OF SALARIES TO CITY

EMPLOYEES, NOTWITHSTANDING

THE EXISTENCE OF A SALARY

ORDINANCE AS REQUIRED BY

THE CITY CHARTER AND WHICH

AUTHORIZED PAYMENT OF A

DIFFERENT AMOUNT FOR

SALARIES,

It is no longer the subject of reasonable

debate that mandamus may not be employed to

effect a desired decision contrary to the opinion

of an official or board vested with discretionary

power. Redding v. City of Los Angeles (1947)

81 Cal. App. 2d 888, 185 P. 2d 430, certiorari

denied 68 S.Ct. 1338, 334 U.S. 825, 92 L.Ed.

1754, rehearing denied 68 S.Ct. 1511, 334 U.S.

854, 92 L.Ed. 1776; Rupp v. Teets (1957) 48

12.

Cal. 2d 647, 312 P.2d 5, certiorari granted

78 S.Ct. 91, 355 U.S. 854, 2 L. Ed. 2d 62,

affirmed 78 S.Ct. 1263, 357 U.S. 549, 2 L.Ed.

2d 1531, rehearing denied 79 S.Ct. 13, 358

U.S. 858, 3 L. Ed. 2d 92; Bell v. Hood (D.C.

1947) 71 F.Supp. 813; Martin v. County of

Contra Costa (1970) 8 Cal. App. 3d 856, 87 Cal.

Rptr. 886; Johanson v. City Council of City of

Santa Cruz (1963) 222 Cal. App. 2d 68 at 71-72,

34 Cal. Rptr. 798; Tandy v. City of Oakland

(1962) 208 Cal. App. 2d 609, 611, 25 Cal. Rptr.

429,

Ostensibly, the California Supreme

Court ordered the "ministerial" act of paying

employee salaries. Where City officials

refuse to pay salaries as legally required by

a salary ordinance then in existence, such an

order would indeed be compelling a ministerial

act. However, the Court simply ignored the

existence already of a valid salary ordinance,

proclaiming the approval by the City Council

of the Memorandum of Understanding to be a

sufficient "legislative act'’ that fixed employee

salaries.

But not just any legislative act is enough

to fix employee salaries. Article IV, Section

3 of the City Charter of Glendale states:

"All [other] officers, assistants,

deputies clerks and employees

shall receive such compensation

as the council may from time to

time determine by ordinance. "

(Emphasis added. )

13.

Section 4 of Article XI states in part: Council as to how much compensation should

be paid. Such discretion cannot be delegated,

"All demands approved by the proper abrogated or ignored.

board, commission or officer shall

be presented to the city controller,

who shall examine the same; and if

the amount thereof is legally due

and there remains on his books an

unexhausted balance or an appro-

priation against which the same may

be charged, he shall approve such

demand... (Emphasis added. )

We deal here not with the adequacy or

inadequacy of the salary ordinance (No. 3936,

amending Ord. No. 3921) passed by the City

Council on September 29, 1970, but rather our

concern is with the extent to which the State

courts have undertaken to rewrite a new salary

ordinance superimposing their own interpreta-

tion of what constitutes the correct amount of

compensation to City employees.

Section 3 of Article XI states in part:

"All demands against the city shall,

before being paid, be presented to

and approved by the proper commis-

sion or officer, as herein provided.

Demands for which no appropriation

has been made shall be presented to

the council. . ... (Emphasis added. )

The provisions of the Charter are the

law of the State and have the force and effect

of legislative enactments (California Constitu-

tion, Article XI, Section 3(a)). It is therefore

clear that State law, as well as the Charter,

requires that employee salaries be fixed by

ordinance accompanied by all the formalities

and safeguards pertinent thereto. (See City

Charter, Article VI, Section 6. )

Furthermore, Article IV, Section 3

(supra) vests absolute discretion in the City

14, 15.

B UNDER THE U.S. AND mountain to overcome.

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONS .

(CITED SUPRA) THE COURT The Charter prescribes certain pro-

BELOW DENIED DUE PROCESS cedures which must be followed in order to

OF LAW TO PETITIONER BY bind the City to any proposed contract by virtue

CONSTRUING THE MEMORAN- of which any money shall or may become pay-

DUM OF UNDERSTANDING TO able by the City (Article XI, Section 1):

BE A BINDING CONTRACT

WHICH FIXED THE COMPENSA- 1. The proposed contract must be

TION KOR CITY EMPLOYEES: presented to the Controller; and

EVEN IF FOUND TO BE A CON-

inlet om FAILURE TO © 2. The Controller must certify that

COMPLY WITH CITY CHARTER an applicable appropriation of fund exists; and

AND STATE LAW PROVISIONS

REGULATING SUCH CONTRACTS 3. The Controller must certify that

PRECL UDES THE GRANTING OF there remains unexpended and unapplied in the

THE RELIEF SOUGHT City treasury a sufficient balance to pay the

; estimated expense to be incurred; and

. 4. A sufficient appropriation must

The California Supreme Court, in con- be made by resolution of City Council (Article

tradiction of its own opinion, at one point XI, Section 4),

makes reference to the memorandum:

It becomes clear that not only weren't

tat antes meekd thease be in fe- these procedures followed, but the plaintiffs

ducing ‘it to writing, if the terms were put on constructive notice that these pro-

of the contract were of no legal cedures couldn't have been followed. At the

significance?” (Emphasis added. ) time the memorandum was approved, the survey

had not yet been taken, no data had been collected

and no results could have ever been reasonably

predicted. Certainly there was nothing that

could have been presented to the Controller for

certification.

If indeed we are dealing with a contract,

then we are met head on by Article IV, Section

3 of the Charter (supra) which permits employee

compensation to be regulated by ordinance only.

But even if we make believe that Article IV,

Section 3 does not exist, there is still another

16. ° 17.

The Court bypassed this problem by

conveniently vascillating between ''contract”’

and "legislative act'’ as required to reach the

end result.

If the Memorandum of Understanding

represented any kind of agreement at all, it

simply bound the City to take the salary survey,

which it did. To read any more than that into

the memorandum violates common sense and

the plain language of the memorandum.

The above provisions of the Charter

were enacted to protect and benefit the citizens

of the City of Glendale. Its purpose is to

achieve a balanced budget through controlled

spending of tax levy funds. The circumventing

of these Charter requirements in this respect

raises serious and substantial constitutional

questions respecting the rights of taxpayers

for whose benefit these laws were passed. It

is absolutely essential for the continued faith

of citizens in a democratic form of government,

and for the sound, fiscal management of muni-

cipal governments, that legislative enactments,

absent a declaration of unconstitutionality, be

protected from unwarranted and unconstitutional

judicial intrusion.

Article XVI, Section 18 of the California

Constitution states in part:

"No... city... shall incur any

indebtedness or liability in any

manner or for any purpose exceeding

18,

in any year the income and revenue

provided for such year, without the

assent of two-thirds of the qualified

electors thereof, voting at an elec-

tion to be held for that purpose. . ."

(Emphasis added, )

The foregoi*® provision was enacted for

the mutual benefit of all of the taxpayers of the

City of Glendale. It would have been, and

still is, constitutionally invalid for a city to by-

pass such an election and bind themselves to

any type of agreement whatsoever where the

liability pursuant to such an agreement could

potentially exceed the income and revenue of

the city for that year.

Clearly, then, the Council did not there-

after lose its authority, but retained its discre-

tion to determine employee compensation upon

a review of the results from the salary survey.

Only in this way could the purpose and spirit

of Section 18 (supra) have been effectuated;

Only in this way could the memorandum have

remained constitutionally valid at all.

19,

S. IT WAS A VIOLATION OF

DUE PROCESS (U.S. AND CALI-

FORNIA CONSTITUTIONS, SUPRA)

AND THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARA-

TION OF POWERS (U.S. CON-

STITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION

1; ARTICLE III, SECTION 1;

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION,

ARTICLE Ill, SECTION 3) FOR

THE COURT TO COMPEL THE

PAYMENT OF EMPLOYEE SAL-

ARIES CONTRARY TO THE PRO-

VISIONS OF AN EXISTING SAL-

ARY ORDINANCE AND NOTWITH-

STANDING THE TOTAL ABSENCE

OF ANY OTHER CORRESPONDING

SALARY ORDINANCE OR APPRO-

PRIATION AUTHORIZING SUCH

PAYMENT: BY SUBSTITUTING

ITS OWN DISCRETION AND IN-

TERPRETATION FOR THAT OF

THE LEGISLATIVE BODY, THE

COURT ENCROACHED UNCON-

STITUTIONALLY UPON THE

POWERS OF A COEXISTING AND

COEQUAL BRANCH OF THE

GOVERNMENT.

The act of the California Supreme Court,

remanding the case for joinder of the 'appro-

priate city officials'’ and the ''ministerial acts

of computing and paying the salaries as fixed by

the judgment, "' ignores the fundamental structure

20.

of a corporation, municipal or otherwise. A

municipal corporation is a creature of statute.

It acts by statute. It functions by statute. It

has no authority to do, or understanding of, any-

thing other than what it is programmed to do

by statute. The Court's decision also ignores

the theory of separation of powers, a doctrine

conceived at the time of our nation's birth, and

one deeply imbedded in both our federal and

state trifurcated systems of government.

(U.S. and California Constitutions, supra. )

The doctrine precludes a court from

commanding or prohobiting a legislative act at

the local level (or state level). Monarch

Cablevision v. City Council, City of Pacific

Grove (1966) 239 Cal. App. 2d 206, 48 Cal. Rptr.

950; City Council of City of Santa Barbara v.

Superior Court (1960) 179 Cal. App. 2d 389, 3

Cal. Rptr. 796.

It also prohibits judicial interference

with the legislative process. Sladovich v.

Fresno County (1958) 158 Cal. App. 2d 230, 322

P.2d 565.

The Court below attempted, by its deci-

sion, to do more than invalidate the existing

salary ordinance (No. 3936). It endeavored

to redefine and judicially legislate an entirely

brand new ordinance, one which was not in

existence and which was not approved by the

legislative body possessing that power.

21.

Courts have no means, and no power,

to avoid the effects of legislative nonaction.

Therefore, when the legislature fails to make

an appropriation, the courts cannot remedy

that evil. California State Employees’ Assa.

v. State (1973) 32 Cal. App. 3d 103, 108 Cal.R

Rptr. 60.

In the absence of an ordinance and

authorizing appropriation, ministerial City

officials have no authority to pay out any money.

To the contrary, the official who acts in the

absence of such ordinance and appropriation

risks both civil andcriminal penalties. (City

Charter, Article XXIII, Sections 13 and 27.)

The California Supreme Court erred

when it embarked upon "'the murky project of

ordering legislative members to adopt an

ordinance, '' no matter how desirable they

believed the ordinance to be. (Dissenting

opinion of Justice Stanley Mosk. )

22.

D, IT WAS A VIOLATION OF

DUE PROCESS (CITED, SUPRA)

AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

(CITED, SUPRA) FOR THE

COURT TO INTERPRET THE

MEMORANDUM OF UNDER-

STANDING TO BEA BINDING

CONTRACT WHEREIN THE

COUNCIL DELEGATED ITS

DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION

TO DETERMINE EMPLOYEE

SALARIES, AND THAT ALL

SUBSEQUENT ACTS WERE

MINISTERIAL: EVEN AN IN-

TERPRETATION UNDER

CALIFORNIA CONTRACT

LAW WOULD REQUIRE A

DIFFERENT RESULT THAN

THAT ARRIVED AT BY THE

COURT.

The purpose of the Meyers-Milias-Brown

Act (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act") is to

promote full communication between public

employers and their employees. Nothing in the

Act supersedes the provisions of existing State

law and the charters, ordinances, and rules of

local public agencies. California Government

Code Section 3500.

In other words, discretion which was

vested in a legislative body prior to the Act

still remained in that body subsequent to it.

23.

It is incongruous to contend that, by virtue of

any memorandum passed pursuant to the Act, ;

the legislative body delegated or abdicated its

discretion in setting salaries for City employees.

It is equally incongruous to argue that the City

Council would bind themselves and the City toa

contract for employee salaries in an unspecified

amount. The approval of the memorandum did

not constitute an ordinance; the statutory pre-

requisites to any binding contract were totally

- lacking; and it was beyond the power and

authority of the City Council to delegate such

discretionary responsibility in any event.

Section 1644 of the California Civil

Code states:

"The words of a contract are to be

understood in their ordinary and

popular sense... unless a

special meaning is given to them

by usage, in which case the latter

must be followed. (Emphasis added. ) ,

Section 1646 of the same code says:

"A contract is to be interpreted

according to the law and usage of

the place where it is to be per-

formed; or, if it does not indicate

a place of performance, according

to the law and usage of the place

where it is made. (Emphasis added. )

24.

Section 1647 states:

"A contract may be explained by

reference to the circumstances

under which it was made, and the

matter to which it relates.”

(Emphasis added. )

The evidence in the trial court was un-

controverted that the City had never before used

an arithmetical average in computing salary

or wager ates for City employees. Notwith-

standing this fact, the trial court determined

that the City bound itself to pay salaries above

the arithmetical average, a term never even

used in the Memorandum of Understanding.

The memorandum called for acts to be done in

Glendale, and it was signed and approved in

Glendale. The practice of the City with re-

spect to prior salary computations was a

matter of public record. No party to the

memorandum could have contemplated any

specific amount until the results of the survey

had been received, analyzed and interpreted.

The memorandum itself expressly re-

serves the legislative discretion of the Council:

"The items in this agreement are

subject to the approval of the City

Manager and the City Council of

the City of Glendale, and will be

placed into effect upon the taking

of administrative action by the

city manager's office and the

25.

adoption of the necessary ordin-

ances and resolutions by the City

Council if acceptable to them.

(Emphasis added. )

It is paradoxical indeed to contend that

the approval of a memorandum, which express-

ly retains legislative discretion, itself con-

stitutes a relinquishment of that discretion.

It is clear then that at all times, both

prior and subsequent to the approval of the

memorandum, the City Council did not and

could not divest itself of its legal duty and

legislative discretion to determine the compen-

sation to be paid City employees. The Court

below erred in concluding otherwise.

26.

E. THE CITY OF GLENDALE

WAS DENIED BOTH FEDERAL

AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL

GUARANTEES OF DUE PROCESS

BECAUSE THE COURT BELOW

FAILED TO RECOGNIZE APPLIC-

ABLE STATE AND LOCAL LAWS

WHICH WERE IN ACCORD WITH

EACH OTHER AND WHICH THE

COURT BELOW DID NOT DE-

CLARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IN-

VALID.

California has, with the enactment of

Article XI, Sections 3 and 5, of its Constitution,

elected to permit cities to have and adopt

charters by which they may run municipal

affairs:

Section 3(a):

"For its own government...

a city may adopt acharter...

Section 5(a):

"It shall be competent in any city

charter to provide that the city

governed thereunder.may make

and enforce all ordinances and

regulations in respect to munici-

pal affairs subject only to re-

strictions and limitations provided

27.

in their several charters...

City charters adopted pursuant to

this Consitution shall supersede

any existing charter, and with

respect to municipal affairs shall

supersede all laws inconsistent

therewith. (Emphasis added. )

The City of Glendale has adopted such a

charter and is thus subject to home rule in all

municipal affairs.

Section 5(b) of Article XI (California

Constitution) clearly makes the determination

of employee salaries a municipal affair.

"It shall be competent in all city

charters to provide... for...

the terms for which the several

municipal officers and employees

whose compensation is paid by the

city shall be elected or appointed

. » - and for their compensation,

and for the number of deputies,

clerks and other employees that

each shall have, and for the com-

pensation. . . of such deputies,

clerks and other employees. "’

(Emphasis added. )

It is clear, then, that both State and

local law are both consistent with each other:

Both place the source of municipal administra-

tion in the city charter. Both concede that

providing for employee compensation is a

28.

municipal affair and is well within the jurisdic-

tion of the city charter.

It is the province of the judiciary to de-

clare the law as it is, and not as the Court

deems it. Kelley v. Aarons (D.C.Cal. 1917)

238 F.996, affirmed Kelley v. Gill, 38 S.Ct.

38, 245 U.S. 116, 62 L.Ed. 185; Kobilkin v.

Pillsbury (C.C.A. Cal. 1939) 103 F.2d 667,

cert. granted 60 S.Ct. 97, 308 U.S. 530, 84

L.Ed. , affirmed 60S.Ct. 465, rehearing

denied 60 S.Ct. 584; San Francisco Shopping

News Co. v. City of South San Francisco (C.C.

A. Cal. 1934) 69 F.2d 879, cert. den. 55S.

Ct. 122, 293 U.S. 606, 79 L.Ed. 697.

Legislative finds will not be disturbed

by the courts in the absence of a palpable abuse

of discretion. Nev-Cal Elect. Securities Co.

v. Imperial Irr. District (C.C.A. Cal. 1936)

85 F.2d 886, cert. den. 57 S.Ct. 493, 300

U.S. 662, L.Ed. 871; In re Shear (D.C. Cal.

1956) 139 F.Supp. 217; U.S. v. Mock (D.C.

Cal. 1956) 143 F.Supp. 661.

As far back as 1899, due process of law

was defined so as to preclude the exercise by

the courts of those powers constitutionally

vested in the other branches or departments of

government. Western Union Tel. Co. v.

Myatt (1899) 98 F. 335, 354.

The Court below did not declare the

present existing salary ordinance to be so

palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to

29.

amount to a gross abuse of discretion. Neither

did it conclude that the ordinance was constitu-

tionally invalid on any other basis. The Court

sidestepped this problem and then proceeded to

legislate a new and different ordinance. Such

action constitutes an unmistakable denial of

due process to petitioner.

This Petitioner has found no cases which

deny the right of due process to a municipal

corporation which attempts to abide by State

and local law, applicable and controlling of

such municipality, where such laws have not

been voided by any court of competent jurisdic-

tion.

The instant case is not an attempt to

invoke the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment "in opposition to the will of its creator, "

but rather to urge recognition by the Court

below of State and local laws which are not in

conflict with each other, and which require

conduct in conflict with that ordered by the

Court.

The California Supreme Court's decision

flies in the face of legal precedent and Federal

and State law. The City of Glendale and its

constituents will be deprived of substantial

property rights by virtue of the judgment below,

since any judgment will, of necessity, be paid

by the taxpapers of the City of Glendale. The

ministerial officers of the City, joined by order

of the Court below, will be placed in the pre-

carious position of being in contempt of court

30.

should they not follow its order, or being in

violation of the lawful provisions of the City's

Charter (cited, supra) if they do.

Under any reasonable interpretation of

the Memorandum of Understanding expressed

by the California Supreme Court, its decision

must yield to State and local law, and the

Federal and State Constitutions.

CONCLUSION

The United States Constitution, as well

as the California State Constitution, defines the

authority, power and limitations of the three

respective branches of government. Each

branch is forbidden to trespass on the constitu-

tional domain of any other branch.

The California Supreme Court had the

judicial power to consider the existing salary

ordinance and pass upon its ability to withstand

constitutional scrutiny. In going beyond this,

and ordering payment of a specific sum other

than that provided for in the existing ordinance,

the Court has migrated into a region entrusted

to the legislative branch of government.

Courts, like municipalities, must look

to higher sources for authority for their actions.

Once those boundaries are traversed, the

31.

Court's actions become null and void.

Whether one adopts the Court's charac-

terization of the Memorandum of Understanding

as acontract, or its later reference to it asa

legislative act, the facts and evidence in this

case overwhelmingly indicate unwarranted and

excessive judicial infringement into the legis-

lative branch of government and the constitu-

tional protections guaranteed by the U.S. and

California Constitutions.

We respectfully request this Court to

grant Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD W. MARSTON,

City Attorney

DENNIS H. SCHUCK,

Deputy City Attorney

Attorneys for Petitioners

32.

APPENDIX A

U.S. CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE I, Section 1

All legislative powers herein granted

shall be vested in a Congress of the United

States which shall consist of a Senate and

House of Representatives.

ARTICLE III, Section 1

The judicial power of the United States

shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in

such inferior courts as the Congress may from

time to time ordain and establish.

AMENDMENT V (Applicable portion)

. . nor shall any person... be

deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law... "'

AMENDMENT XIV, Section I (Applicable portion)

. . nor shall any State deprive

any person of life, liberty or

property, without due process of

Mees”

CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE I, Section 1

All people are by nature free and independ-

ent and have inalienable rights. Among these

are enjoying and defending life and liberty, ac-

quiring, possessing and protecting property,

and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness

and privacy.

ARTICLE I, Section 15

Persons may not. . . be deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law.

ARTICLE III, Section 3

The powers of State government are legis-

lative, executive and judicial. Persons charged

with the exercise of one power may not exercise

either of the others except as permitted by this

Constitution.

ARTICLE XI, Section 3(a) (Applicable portions)

For its own government. .. acity may

adopt a charter by majority vote of its electors

voting on the question. . . The provisions of

a charter are the law of the State and have the

force and effect of legislative enactments.

ARTICLE XI, Section 5(a)

It shall be competent in any city charter

to provide that the city governed thereunder

may make and enforce all ordinances and regu-

lations in respect to municipal affairs, subject

only to restrictions and limitations provided in

their several charters and in respect to other

matters they shall be subject to general laws.

City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitu-

tion shall supersede all laws inconsistent

therewith.

ARTICLE XVI, Section 18 (Applicable portion)

No... city... shall incur any indebted-

@ss or liability in any manner or for any pur-

pose exceeding in any year the income and

revenue provided for such year, without the

assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors

thereof, voting at an election to be held for that

purpose...

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE

Section 1644:

The words of a contract are to be under-

stood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather

than according to their strict legal meaning;

unless used by the parties in a technical sense,

or unless a special meaning is given to them by

usage, in which case the latter must be followed.

A-3

Section 1646:

A contract is to be interpreted according

to the law and usage of the place where it is to

be performed; or, if it does not indicate a place

of performance, according to the law and usage

of the place where it is made.

Section 1647:

A contract may be explained by reference

to the circumstances under which it was made

and the matter to which it relates.

GOVERNMENT CODE

Section 3500. Purpose and Intent

It is the purpose of this chapter to pro-

mote full communication between public em-

pioyers and their employees by providing a

reasonable method of resolving disputes re

garding wages, hours, and other terms and

conditions of employment between public em-

ployers and public employee organizations.

It is also the purpose of this chapter to pro-

mote the improvement of personnel manage-

ment and employer-employee relations within

the various public agencies in the State of

California by providing a uniform basis for

recognizing the right of public employees to

join organizations of their own choice and be

represented by such organizations in their

A-4

employment relationships with public agencies.

Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to

supersede the provisions of existing state law

and the charters, ordinances, and rules of local

public agencies which establish and regulate a

merit or civil service system or which provide

for other methods of administering employer -

employee relations nor is it intended that this

chapter be binding upon those public agencies

which provide procedures for the administration

of employer-employee relations in accordance

with the provisions of this chapter. This

chapter is intended, instead, to strengthen

merit, civil service and other methods of ad-

ministering employer-employee relations

through the establishment of uniform and orderly

methods of communication between employees

and the public agencies by which they are

employed.

GLENDALE CITY CHARTER

ARTICLE IV, Section 3

The members of the council shall each be

paid twenty-five dollars for each meeting of the

council attended, but not exceeding six meetings

in each month. The board of education shall

serve without compensation. All other officers,

assistants, deputies, clerks and employees shall

receive such compensation as the council may

from time to time determine by ordinance,

ARTICLE VI, Section 6 (Applicable portion)

The enacting clause of every ordinance

passed by the council shall be: ''Be it ordained

by the council of the City of Glendale. . ."'

At least five days must elapse between

the introduction and the final passage of any

ordinance. .

A final vote on any ordinance or any vote

on any appropriation must be taken only ata

regular or adjourned regular meeting. Every

ordinance must be signed by the mayor and

attested by the clerk. Notice thereof shall be

published once in a newspaper of general circu-

lation...

In the publication of every ordinance the

advertisement shall contain a statement of the

title, number and date of the ordinance, a brief

statement of the nature of the ordinance, anda

reference to a copy of the ordinance which

shall be on file and available for public inspec-

tion at all reasonable times in the office of the

city clerk.

ARTICLE XI, Section 1 (Applicable portion)

. » The city clerk shall furnish the

controller with copies of all ordinances, resolu-

tions and orders of the council making appro-

priations or authorizing expenditures of money

for any purpose. All... orders or contracts

proposed to be entered into by the city by virtue

of which any money shall or may become payable

by the city. . . the expense of which is to be

paid by assessments upon properties benefited

or affected thereby, shall before becoming

effective, on behalf of the city, be presented to

the controller and have endorsed thereon his

certificate that there remains unexpended and

unapplied in the city treasury as provided by

this Charter, a balance of the appropriation or

fund applicable thereto sufficient to pay the

estimated expense to be incurred during the then

current fiscal year under said order or contract

A-7

as estimated by the board or officer making the

same, or that adequate provision therefor has

been made in the tax levy, or by other revenues

to be received by the city as estimated in the

budgets...

ARTICLE XI, Section 3 (Applicable portion)

All demands against the city shall, before

being paid, be presented to and approved by the

proper commission or officer, as herein pro-

vided. Demands for which no appropriation has

- been made shall be presented to the council...

ARTICLE XI, Section 4 (Applicable portion)

All demands approved by the proper board,

commission or officer shall be presented to the

city controller, who shall examine the same;

and if the amount thereof is legally due and there

remains on his books an unexhausted balance or

an appropriation against which the same may be

charged, he shall approve such demand and draw

and sign his warrant on the treasurer therefor,

payable out of the proper fund. . . Such warrants

when presented to the treasurer shall be paid by

him out of the fund therein designated, if there

be sufficient money in such fund for that purpose.

ARTICLE XXIII, Section 13

Every officer who shall willfully approve,

allow or pay any demand on the treasury not

authorized by law, shall be liable to the city

individually and on his official bond for the

A-8

amount of the demand so approved, allowed or

paid, and shall forfeit such office and be forever

disbarred and disqualified from holding any

position in the service of the city.

ARTICLE XXIII, Section 27 (Applicable portion)

The violation of any provision of this

Charter shall be deemed a misdemeanor. The

council may make the violation of any ordinance

a misdemeanor and fix punishments therefor,

not exceeding a fine of five hundred dollars or

imprisonment not exceeding six months, or

both.

~~ << ee ee ee oe

PAGE 1

ORDINANCE | NO. 3936

AN ORDINANCE E OF THE CITY OF

GLENDALE AMENDING ORDI-

NANCE NO. 3921 RELATING TO

SALARIES.

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE

COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

SECTION 6.1. CLERICAL. FIS-

CAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE.

Code Class Title No.

120 Bookkeeping aenas

Operator ; . we

154 Chief Clerk ...-«-- oeae oon

932 Clerical Aide ...-..-+++ +

Clerk Io .cccecce coves ;

21 Clerk III , o-evaees

244 Clerk-Stenographer o sees

247 oaeee eet Tt I ee eoene

erk-Typis

Duplicating shop Ope Operator

EDP Assistant mmer

Analyst

EDP. Equipment Operator

EDP Senior Equipment

EDP Ope onan os. eseee

324

327

330

331

~ Ss sor

upervi

$36 EDP Programmer Analy st

337 EDP Principal Pragrasnanse

Analyst

338 EDP Systems Analyst

339 EDP Director

507 Key Punch Operator

510 Key Punch Supervisor .«

22 Legal Secretary

743 Secretary-Stenographer I

746 Secretary-Stenographer II

749 Secretary to City Clerk

752 Secretary to City Manager

The letters “EDP used herein

shall be undesstese > mean “Elec-

ic Data Processin

SECTION 2. Section er of Ordi-

nance No. 3921 is amended to read:

SECTION 6.2. CLERICAL. FIS-

CAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE (con

tinued).

Srestssess SF & SS seusseuies

Salary

Range

Code Class Title No.

0%3 Accountant oede ae

ous Administrative “analyst se Tn

Assistant City Clerk ‘

044 Assistant City Contselier

186 City Clerk ;

190 City Controller +. esemeoes

214 City Treasurer

Commercial Representative

Deputy City Clerk .

Deputy City Treasurer I

Deputy City Treasurer pe

License Investigator I

Meter Reader .. on

Parking Attendant

Parking Meter Collector.

Parking Meter Serviceman

Real Property Agent and

Claims Investigator ed

Senior Accountant ‘

Senior Meter Reader ;

Senior Parking Attendant

Special Collector —

ffic and Parking

Foreman

SECTION 3. Section 6.3 of

ce No, 3921 is amended to

mGECTION 6.3. CLERICAL,

Sax

SESB2E2

tle

S3z¢ 35

& gusag enumnaeuand

Code Class Title No.

009 Administrative Intern 250

0:8 Assistant Buyer .

030 Assistant Chief Examiner . 69

062 Assistant City Manager 650

076 Assistant to City Manager =

141 Buyer re a. «

162 Chief Examiner ........... 73

198 City Manager .- . «-«se- 800

220 Civil Defense Property

Officer am &

2333 Commercial Operations»

= mean A 62

315 Director of Purchases ..... 67

440 Executive Assistant ~o

594 Mechanical Stock Clerk 36

630 Personnel Analyst 2.68

633 Personnel Trainee 47

687 Principal Personnel Analyst 60

723 Research and Budget

Gee .- # 4. saeeeses 66

760 Senior Administrative

Analyst 56

804 Senior Personnel Analyst . 61

863 Storekeeper I .... .. «++. 40

866 Storekeeper JI .......+.++. 48

941 Warehouseman . «a

SECTION 4. Section 6.4 of Ordi-

nance No. 3921 is amended to read:

SECTION 6.4 ENGINEERING

AND RELATED TECHNICAL.

Salary

Range

Sate Class Title No.

Assistant Engineering

Technician ice er ae

129 Building Inspector I. 50

130 Building Inspector I .... 383

223 Civil Engineer 7

226 Civil Engineering Assistant 55

2°29 Civil Engineering Associate 61

262 Construction Inspector 53

321 Draftsman a

403 Electrical Inspector s eo oa

429 Engineering Aide >» oo

432 Engineering Technician 49

480 Heating, Ventilating and Air

Conditioning Inspector 50

486 Industrial Waste Inspector §1

498 Instrumentman 49

516 Lath and Plaster Inspector 50

639 Plan Checker 55

642 Planning Assistant ........ 4

645 Planning Associate ........ 52

648 Planner oenecoeeos 56

651 Planning Director .......- 76

654 Plumbing In or ovcon

679 Princi Engineering

Technician —r er

691 Principal Planner SS

72% Right-of-Way Agent .

7 Rodman and Chainman 43

768 Senior Building Inspector . 54

776 Senior Construction

Inspector peeeaoenes 59

780 Senior Draftsman .......-- 4

796 Senior Engineering

Technician , ° 55

806 Senior Planner 6

890 Superintendent of Buildings 70

893 Supervising Civil

Engineering Associate ..... 64

905 Survey Pa Chief —

Zoning Administrator 64

SECTION 5. Section 6.5 of Ordi-

nance No. 3921 is amended to read:

SECTION 65. ENGINEERING

AND RELATED TECHNICAL (con-

tinued).

Salary

Range

- PAGE 2

Cede Class Title Ne 603 Painter . &

048 Assistant City E 71 722 Refuse Collection Foreman 49

064 Assistant General Manager 736 Sanitation Crewman -

and Principal Engineer 7? #7 Sanitation Superintendent .. 66

158 Chief Electric Works 818 Senior Refuse Foreman .. 51

Engineer © scoccceee DH 94 te cco

174 Chief Water Works 830 rintendent 57

er =——t—sést nw we sw ww 7 9845 lant Salasenanse

194 City Engineer scosce TE ee 56

210 City Traffic E . 68 848 Steam Plant Mechanic I 46

3i2 Director of Public Works 84 851 Steam Plant Mechanic I 50

391 Electrical Engineer 68 854 Steam Plant Operation

Electrical Engineering Supervisor 62

Assistemt = =i tete 56 857 Steam Plant Operator a ee ae

399 Electrical Engineering 860 Steam Plant Coesater = - 61

Sesemeee =i ecetcce 62 935 Truck (pesetes 42

419 Electrical Sales $38 Utility elder. 50

Representative “ae 52 989 Yard Attendant. 36

468 General Manager and SECTION 7. Section 6.7 of Ordi-

Chief Engineer = ..«s. 700 mance No. 3921 is amended to read:

573 Mechanical Engineer — SECTION 6.7. LABOR, LABOR

576 Mechanical Engineering SUPERVISION AND SKILLED

Assistant -- 5 TRADES (continued).

579 Mechanical Engineering Salary

Associate coe @ Range

683 Principal Mechanical Code Class Title No.

Paes = —=——tsést nw www wc 72 111 Auxiliary Operator , 39

695 Principal Structural 582 Mechanical Maintenance

Engineer oe and Warehouse

772 Senior Civil En neer 70 Superintendent nee

792 Senior Electri Engineer 71 698 .Pumping Plant Operator. . 4.

824 Senior Water Works 820 Senior Strect Foreman - S

Engineer «e-see T1 827 Sewer Maintenance = —

878 Structural Engineer ..... 66 834 Sign Painter — * ae

881 Structural Engineering 869 Street Foreman. a

8 ee aa 55 872 Street Maintenance Man . 39

884 Structural Engineering 875 Street Superintendent .... 66

Associate sacon =O 924 Traffic Painter ....... 40

896 Supervising Electrical 947 Water Construction

Engineering Associate ..... 68 Supervisor 58

899 Supervising Structural 950 Water Distribution Inspector 43

Engineering Associate ..... 67 %3 Water ForemanI . 47

920 Traffic Engineering 956 Water Foreman I 53

Assistant = = = —aeseses 55 959 Water Meter Repairman I 40

923 Traffic Engineering 962 Watcr Meter RepairmanlIl #4

Associate 61 965 Water Production and

SECTION 6. Section 6.6 of ‘Ordi- Maintenance Supervisor 53

nance No. 3921 is amended to read:

SECTION 6.6. LABOR, LABOR

SUPERVISION AND SKILLED

TRADES.

Range

Code Class Title No.

088 Automotive Body

Repairman sees

Automotive Equipment

Painter men

Automotive Serviceman ..

Blacksmith and Welder

Bookmobile rator ;

Building R-pair Foreman

Building Repairman

Carpenter ‘a

Cement Worker Finisher .

Custodial Worker I__......

Custodial Worker = enna

Electrician le newness

Elevator Opera ,

Equipment Miechanic 1

Equipment Mechanic es

tor 0

Equipment yearend

Equipment

Heating and >

Conditioning Sepetemen —

Inspector

Machinist

Maintenance Man

Maintenance Superintendent.

Municipal Bulldings

Mechanic Helper

Mechanical Repair Helper

Mechanical Repairman I

Motor Sweeper Operator

SSSSNSRLISSSSSSERS

S883 334882

e288- ShFS ASRSHRSSSareeBs= 8

SKS8

SSSSSE

968 Water Production and

Storage Foreman fiune &

971 Water Service and

Meter Supervisor ° §1

974 Water Service Investigator . 45

977 Water Superintendent . 6

980 Water System Repairman. 45

983 Water Utilityman I —a

986 Water Utilityman I 43

SECTION 58. ction 6.8 of Ordi-

nance No. 3921 is amended to read:

SECTION 6.8. LABOR, LABOR

SUPERVISION AND SKILLED

TRADES (continued).

Salary

Range

Code Class Title No.

018 Appliance Service Foreman 51

021 Appliance Serviceman

170 Chief Steam Plant Engineer

343 Electric Meters and

Services Supervisor ... . 62

347 Electric Overhead

Supervisor -

Electric Station Foreman.

Electric Station Operator

Electric Test Assistant

Electric Test Foreman

Electric Test Repairman I

Electric Test Repairman II

Electric Unnderground and

Station Supervisor +8

Electric Utilityman I

Electric Utilityman IT

Electric Utilityman III

Electrical Mechanical

ee 6 6—lt—eestie ws ORO

Electrical Mechanical

& Bs

S682 LhRB=82

: PAGE 3

R S « & » seem 47 Code Class Title No.

415 Electrical Mechanical 015 Animal Control Officer 0

Repeirman I 53. 114 Battalion Chief . 6

423 Electrical Superintendent 68 298 Communications Operator . 36

492 Instrument and Labora 302 Deputy Fire Chief : 70

Technician I #4 $=<443 Fire Alarm Technician I 44

495 Instrument and Laboratory 444 Fire Alarm Technician 2. 58O

Technician U0 . 51 447 ‘Fire Ca — 6 « too 1

549 Line Foremanl .... ...«.. SS @O Five Chie nccccce-coce. 78

552 Line Foreman 0 ...... 59 453 Fire Engineer .... ....... 55

556 Lineman seceeeee » S& #9 Fireman —

558 Lineman Helper .......- @ 483 Identification Technician 47

561 Line Truckman a os & = 2 ane oe

nior Electric ° es 8 =—S—=S=sétn vc

a ah. ets . S&S The pameee Animal] Control -

nior Electric _ cer _

~ pare n as | nr "age Technician. =

44 Watch Engin cer .

SECTION pneineet 69 of Ordi- 2 Supervisor of Records and

nance No. 3921 is amended to read: Identification

SECTION 69. PARKS, RECREA- 917 Switchboard Operator 32

TION AND LIBRARIES.

Salary

Title No

Code Class No.

024 Arts and Crafts Attendant 2

066 Assistant Director of

Parks and Recreation ‘ 65

072 Assistant to Auditorium

Supervisor oe

084 Auditorium Superviess S

462 Gardener I chin ae

465 Gardener II ‘6 e@eencsens 6 GE

474 Groundskeeper —....«.-- 40

513 Landscape Architect we

543 Lifeguard I : «eo fn

546 Lifeguard II . somesdamees 250

606 Park Foreman. ....«+--+. 50

609 Park Guard ar - Bo

6% Parks Maintenance

Supervisor ——— «sess 53

710 Recreation Attendant 200

713 Recreation Leader >. a

716 Recreation Supervisor 51

719 Recreation Superintendent 59

816 Senior Recreation Leader 45

911 Swimming Instructor mo

914 Swimming Pool manager 41

926 Tree Trimmer co &

929 Tree Trimmer Crew

Foreman oe aan

932 Tree Trimmer Foreman 51

SECTION 10. Section 6.10 of Ordi-

nance No. 3921 is amended to read:

SECTION 6.10. PARKS, RECREA-

TION AND LIBRARIES (continued).

Range

Code Class Title No.

012 Adult Librarian........ 57

080 Athletic Official . 230

126 Branches and Circulation

Librarian

127 Brand Art Center Librartan 57

147 Catalog Librarian ae 57

166 Chief Librarian Oe,

178 Children’s Librarian ..... 57

268 Cultural Arts Advisor se

309 Director of Parks -—

Recreation 73

318 Display Artist . 2

441 Exhibits Ceoréinater ania 46

§2% Librarian I - « -«e-e- 47

628 Librarian ian " 51

631 $ensy | aa alee =

534 Library :

836 Special Activity Leader 37

887 Student Librarian 245

SECTION 11. Section 6.11 of Ordi-

nance No. 3921 Is amended to read

SECTION 6.11 COM MUNICA-

TIONS. P'/BLIC SAFETY. LEGAL

AND PUBLIC HEALTH

Salary

Range

‘

SECTION 12. Section 6.12 of Ordi-

nance No. 3921 is amended to read:

SECTION _ 6.12. COMMUNICA-

TIONS, PUBLIC SAFETY, LEGAL

AND PUBLIC HEALTH (continued).

Salary

Range

Code Class Title No.

036 Assistant City Attorney. S

182 City Attorney . .......0+.

202 City Nurse , cies cae

206 City Physician . 400

217 Civil Defense Coordinator 61

282 Deputy City Attorney —

306 Deputy Police Chief . . 70

489 Instructor—Civil Cetense 270

501 Jailer I ' os

504 Jailer Il » secetauee es

>} - eee 37

615 Parking Checker ......... 33

657 Police Captain ...... . 67

660 Police Chief ss cen neues —

663 Police Detective ee 54

666 Police Lieutenant 5 eenee 64

669 Policeman | ‘adendbertinies 51

672 Police Sergeant’ ..........

675 Policewoman eae

7 Rangemaster 40

731 Safety and Training Officer 59

732 Safety Inspector es 47

7 Senior Assistant City

Attorney 74

SECTION 13. This ordinance shall

take effect and be in force on the

lst day of October. 1970.

Passed by The Council of the City

of Glendale on the 29th day of Sep

tember, 1970.

WARREN F. HAVERKAMP,

Mayor pro tem.

ATTEST:

JOHN H. WALTERS,

City Clerk.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES =.

CITY OF GLENDALE

I, JOHN H. WALTERS, City ‘Clerk

of the City of Glendale, certify that

the foregoing ordinance was passed

by The Council of the City of Glen-

dale, California, at a regular meet-

ing held on the 29th day of Septem-

ber, 1970. and that the same was

passed by the following vote:

Ayes: Allen, Peters, Watson, Hav-

erkamp.

Noes: None

Absent: Perkins.

JOHN H. WALTERS.

City Clerk.

Oct. 2, 1970.

af sHlyuth .

stl;

PAGE 1

OBDINANCE NO. 3921

AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY

OF GLENDALE PROVIDING FOR

CERTAIN OFFICERS, SUBORDI-

NATE OFFICERS, ASSISTANTS,

PU CLERKS.

TIES, .

PLOYEES OF THE CITY OF

GLENDALE AND FOR THEIR

COMPENSATION.

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE

COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF

GLENDALE:

SECTION 1. CLASSIFICATIONS

AND POSITIONS—CREATED AND

DEFINED. The offices and em-

ployments hereinafter designated in

this ordinance, except insofar as

they are specifically provided for

by The Charter of the City of Glen-

dale, are hereby created.

As used herein, a ‘“‘position’’ shall

be deemed to mean an office or em-

ployment calling for the rendition

of service by one Derson.

As used herein, a ‘‘classification’’

shall be deemed to mean a group

of positions having sufiiciently s.:n-

ilar duties, responsibilities and qual-

ifications to be designated by the

same descriptive title, and as to

which the same salary range may

be made to apply with equity.

As used herein, a ‘‘safety mem-

ber’’ shall be deemed to mean an

employee who is classified as a

“local safety member’ under the

State Em we Retirement Law.

SECTION 2. DESCRIPTIONS OF

CLASSIFICATIONS. The description

of classifications hercin mentioned,

ey as may be otherwise provid-

ed The Charter of the City of

Glen ale, shall be those which are

or may be hereafter determined

by ‘The Classification Plan end

Class Specifications for Glendale,

California,” adopted by the Civil

Service Commission of the City of

Glendale on the 10th day of M ay.

1940, and any amendments thereof.

SECTION 3. As to the persons in

the various classifications herein

mentioned subsequent to the effec

tive date of this ordinance, the in-

creases or decreases in rates of

compensation set forth in this

amending ordinance shal! be effec-

tive July 1, 1970.

SECTION 4 SCHEDULE OF

COMPENSATION RATES. The [fol-

lowing schedule of compensation

rates shows standard salary range

numbers, the salary steps desig-

nated by letters, and unless other-

wise specified, the full-time month-

ly rates (in dollars) for all classifi-

Standard

Salary

1. A B Cc = 5 E

1 307 322 340 359 380

17 313 331 350 370 390

18 322 340 359 380 401

19 331 350 370 390 410

20 340 359 380 41 421

21 350 370 390 410 434

22 359 380 401 421 444

23 370 390 410 434 458

24 380 401 421 444 469

25 390 410 434 458 482

26 401 471 #4444 #+$49 495

77 410 434 458 482 509

23 421 444 469 495 6523

29 434 458 482 509 536

30 444 #469 «#$495 +523 553

31 48 482 SOS 636 567

32 469 49% 523 #553 580

33 482 509 536 567 597

34 49 523 653 580 612

35 509 536 567 597 629

36 523 553 580 612 644

37 536 567 597 629 663

38 553 580 612 644 682

39 567 597 629 663 699

40 580 612 644 682 718

41 597 629 663 699 736

42 612 644 682 718 757

43 629 663 699 736 779

44 644 682 718 757 799

45 663 699 736 779 821

46 682 718 757 799 843

47 699 736 779 821 864

48 718 757 799 843 888

49 736 «779 821 864 913

50 757 799 843 888 938

51 821 864 913 964

52 7 843 888 938

53 821 864 913 964 1016

54 843 888 990 1042

55 864 913 964 1016 1071

56 888 938 990 1042 1100

57 913 964 1016 1071 1130

58 990 1042 1100 1161

59 964 1016 1071 1130 1192

60 999 1042 1100 1161 1223

61 1016 1071 1130 1192 1257

62 1042 1100 1161 1291

63 1071 1130 1192 1257 1326

64 1100 1161 1223 1291 1361

65 1130 1192 1257 1399

66 1161 1223 1291 1361 1438

67 1192 1257 1326 1399 1476

68 1223 1291 1361 1438 1516

69 1257 1326 1399 1476

2085

2031 2142 2260 2384 2513

2085 2200 2321 2447 2583

700 24 2547 2687 2835 2991

SECTION 5. SCHEDULE OF COM-

PENSATION RATES — SPECIAL

RATES. The following schedule of

compensation rates is for classifica-

tions not within the standard salary

ranges set forth in Section 4:

Salary

Range

200 . 2.00

eeeeecesceosoeseed ' per hour

C—O #34 per hour

i e¢eedeseueseoseos 2.63 per hour

MP eccuseseseoecesees 2.74 per hour

Me eeenceeseeeoesesed 2.81 per hour

ccvccececececeoses per hour

a? e9seesses -asennans er per hour

aaa, $3.22 to 14 per hour*

i? seaneseee $5.54 to $6.65 per game*

Ty sevcoceseceseeseed per month

GP eeccceecesecceses per month

Dy eeceseoeceuseeees $1390 per month

Te. eecsvcecoesesess $1608 per month

Gy escetesesesoecsed $1875 per month

GP eeccoceccescccecs $2437 per month

Dt steekenusnecanial $3243 per month

*Rate to be fixed b ye a "ianener.

=e 6. TION

coD AND COMPENSATION

SCHEDULE. The Code number and

the Salary Range number assigned

PAGE 2

to each classification are set forth

in Sections 6.1 to 6.12 inclusive of

this ordinance

SECTION 6.1. CLERICAL, FIS

CAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE.

Salary

Range

Code Class Title No.

120 Bookkeeping Machine

QOMeTRtOF cccccccccecccces 34

154 Chief Clerk ....cseeeseeceee 48

232 Clerical Aide ....-..ses+-- 210

Se GEOR EB cocccccece covceonse 25

; ee ee: ere —

Se Gee Fe cc cccccessesoeeses 36

244 Clerk-Stenographer ........ 32

247 Clerk-Typist 1 ....sceeseees 27

250 Clerk-Typist Il ......eeeees 31

324 Duplicating Shop

eee PPT Tee 39

327 EDP Assistant

Programmer Analyst .. 51

330 EDP Equipment

TTT 42

331 EDP Senior

Equipment Operator Cs)

333 EDP Operations

Supervisor ......-eeceees 54

336 EDP Programmer Analyst 59

337 EDP Principal

Programmer Analyst .... 62

338 EDP Systems Analyst - 59

339 EDP Director ——...s.seee 65

507 Key Punch Operator sceeee 2

510 Key Punch Supervisor ..... 37

522 Legal Secretary : —

7 Secretary -Stenographer I 37

7 Secretary-Stenogra her II 40

749 Secretary to City Clerk =

752 Secretary to City Manager 47

The letters “EDP used herein

shall be understood to mean “‘Elec-

tronic Data Processing.”’

SECTION 6.2. CLERICAL, FIS-

CAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE (con-

tinued).

Salary

Range

Code Class Title No.

003 Accountant .......-.secesee. 48

006 Administrative Analyst .... 51

040 Assistant City Clerk ..... 55

044 Assistant City Comener oo

186 City Clerk Repterin .600

190 City Controller .......... 625

214 City Treasurer : 500

256 Commercial Representative 38

290 Deputy City Clerk +. oo ae

294 Deputy City Treasurer I 38

298 Deputy City Treasurer II 42

537 License Investigator I 41

540 License Investigator II 45

597 Meter Reader ......+e.+. —

612 Parking Attendant ....... 20

621 Parking Meter Collector .. 35

624 Parking Meter Serviceman 39

707 Real Property Agent

and Claims Investigator 50

756 «Senior Accountant....... 56

798 Senior Meter Reader 41

800 Senior Parking Attendant 28

839 Specia) Collector ———

918 Traffic and Parking

Foreman janese. wee

SECTION 6.3 CLERICAL, FIS-

CAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE (con-

tinued).

Salary

Range

Code Class Title No.

009 Administrative Intern 245

028 Assistant Buyer ——

030 Assistant Chief Examiner 68

052 Assistant City Manager 650

076 Assistant to City Manager =

141 Buyer

162 Chief Examiner ........ 4

198

866

941

- So eee 800

Civil Defense Property

er ee 47

Commercial Operations

ae ——

Director of Purchases ..... 67

Executive Assistant . .. 8

Mechanical Stock Clerk —

Personne! Analyst ......... 53

Personnel Trainee ..... -. 290

Principal Personnel

De TTT Te - &

Research and Budget

PE sesheines< 5 Oe —s

Senior Administrative

Pn . csncecheasanmmeane 56

Senior Personnel Analyst 59

EES ee . 39

Storekeeper II ....cecceces 438

Warehouseman__........

SECTION 64. ENGINEERING

AND RELATED TECHNICAL.

lary

Range

Code Class Title No.

060 Assistant Engineering

ae 42

129 Building Inspector E cccece OO

130 Building Inspector II ...... 53

2 Civil BRGIRSSE .ccccccccce 66

226 Civil Engineering

ONE gy 55

229 Civil Engineering

SS eee 61

262 Construction Inspector .... 53

a Mn «> .wcescuqoneoes 43

403 Electrical Inspector ...... 50

429 Engineering Aide ........ 37

432 Engineering Technician ... 47

480 Heating, Ventilating and

Air Conditioning

~~ eae 50

486 Industrial Waste Inspector 50

498 Instrumentman _ .....eses. 48

516 Lath and Plaster

ee, eee coeee

> Pee Ceeeeee ss. cocccccces 55

642 Planning Assistant ........ 46

645 Planning Associate ........ 51

— eT —=—s—és—ee ee ce 55

651 Planning Director ........ 7

654 Plumbing Inspector ...... 50

679 Principal Engineering

ll 61

691 Principal Planner ........ 66

725 Right-of-Way Agent ...... 56

728 Rodman and Chainman .. 42

768 Senior Building Inspector 54

776 Senior Construction

Inspector i. .meunseeuese 59

780 Senior Draftsman ........ 48

796 Senior Engineering

a 55

806 Senior Planner ....cseceee 61

890 pe of

DEE «ac caaneseceseces 70

893 Supervising Civil

Engineering Associate 64

905 Survey Party Chief ........ 55

992 Zoning Administrator .... 64

SECTION 65. ENGINEERING

AND RELATED TECHNICAL (con-

tinued).

Salary

Range

Code Class Title No.

048 Assistant City Engineer .. 71

064 Assistant General

Manager and

Principal Engineer ...... 79

158 Chief Electric Works

ON Ol 75

174 Chief Water Works

pn TTT ee 75

194 City Engineer = wees. 77

210 City Traffic Engineer . 6&8

312 Director of Public Works 84

PAGE 3

$91 Electrical Engineering .... 68

39 Electrical Engineering

Assistant eee eee ee © 56

Electrical Engineering

Associate ecececcceceee &

419 Electrical Sales

Representative .......... 52

#8 General Manager and

Chief Engineer ...... «+700

673 Mechanical Engineer ..... 66

576 Mechanical Engineering

Assistant -- 55

579 Mechanical Engineering |

SE scntccnene cccoe @

683 Principal Mechanical

cade. seen ees 72

695 Prinal al Structural

Engineer seeeece Ee

772 Senior Civil Engineer ..... 70

792 Senior Electricai Engineer 71

824 Senior Water Works

Engineer seesee Un

878 Structural Engineer venmun 66

881 Structural Engineering

Assistant ...... eee

884 Structural Engineering

Associate 61

896 Supervising Electrical |

mag Associate ... 68

899 Sypecvinas tructural

ngineering Associate ... 67

920 Traffic Engineering

DT <dcce¢eeaesneune 55

923 Traffic Engineering

GED «0600665 e000e0ees 61

SECTION 6.6. LABOR, LABOR

SUPERVISION AND SKILLED

TRADES.

Salary

Range

Code Class Jitle No.

088 Automotive Body

Repairman ....ssssees -» 4

992 Automotive Equipment

,_ i_awno~sseeeee 45

104 Automotive Serviceman 35

117 Blacksmith and Welder ... 45

123 Bookmobile Operator... 38

132 Building Repair Foreman 45

138 Building Repairman ...... 42

| ate 44

150 Cement Worker Finisher .. 44

271 Custodial Worker :_....... 31

274 Custodial Worker II ..... . 35

424 Electrician .........-. — 47

426 Elevator Operator coos

433 Equipment Mechanic I .... 45

434 Equipment Mechanic II 47

435 Eevisenent Operator I .... 39

438 ulpment Operator II .... 45

477 Hoctin and Air

Cond tioning Repairman 47

487 Inspector ..... seuedusonees 43

DO rr ee 45

667 Maintenance Man ....... 34

570 Maintenance Superintendent,

Municipal —_ ings ...... 56

6871 Mechanic Helper .. ...... . 39

685 Mechanical Repair Helper 38

588 Mechanical Repairman I 42

591 Mechanical Repairman II 47

600 Motor Sweeper Operator 44

— Eg reer 44

722 Refuse Collection Foreman 49

736 Sanitation Crewman ..... 36

740 Sanitation Superintendent 66

818 Senior Refuse Foreman ... 51

829 Shop Foreman eS

830 Shop Superintendent ...... 56

845 Steam Plant Maintenance

*Supervisor .. -oe 6S

848 Steam Plant Mechanic I 45

851 Steam Plant Mechanic Il 49

854 Steam Plant Operation

re : . 61

857 Plant Operator ‘I 4

860 Steam pane Operator II 8

935 Truck iy seeseéecse 40

938 Utility Welder PTTTTTITITTTR

Yard At lage sesascoaeens 34

SECTION 6.7. BOR, LABOR

SUPERVISION AND SKILLED

TRADES (continued).

—- Class Title No.

582

Sewer Maintenance Man .. 39

i. $_ereeeeteg

street DD é6seccenee 49

i —, ceeee seocecee @

Water Foreman * socccece @&

Water System Re irman

Water Utiltiy Se © a6ces See

Water Utility 5 fone 43

SECTION 6.8. LABOR, LABOR

SUPERVISION AND SKILLED

TRADES (continued).

Cogs Class Title No,

021

Appliance Service Foreman 50

Appliance Serviceman ....

Chief Steam ‘Plant

Pena eee

Electric Meters and

Services Supervisor .....

Electric Overnead

Supervisor .. peeeseees

Electrig Station Foreman

Electric Station Operator

Electric Test Assistant ....

Electric Test Foreman ....

Electric Test Repairman I

Electric Test Repairman II

Electric Underground and

and Station Supervisor

Electric Utilityman I .....

Electric Utilityman II ....

Electric Utilityman ID ...

Electrical Mechanical

Re ee

Electrical Mechanical

Repairman I. oeee

Electrical Mechanical

Repairman II .... °

Electrical Superintendent.

Instrument and Laboratory

Technician I

Instrument and Laboratory

Technican II

Line Foreman I .....se00.

Line Foreman II ......... 58

Lineman is. eneoee wTTTTTn

Lineman Helper .......... 39

Line Truckman_........ 40

Senior Electric Station

Foreman... .

Senior Electric ‘Station |

ey = §=§»e_—«Coés nee eceece 49

Watch Engineer .........- 56

S28 & 3 6882 S6ee8e2 8 & &

PAGE 4

SECTION 6.9. PARKS, RECREA-

TION AND LIBRARIES.

Salary

Range

Code Clase Title No.

024 Arts and Crafts

Attendant o660eeeess 2

056 Assistant Director of

Parks and Recreation .. 64

072 Assistant to Auditorium

Supervisor sees

084 Auditorium Supervisor .... 4

42 Gardener I ......scccccceee 36

465 Gardener II ...ceseeeeess 41

474 Groundskeeper ....... cocoe @

$13 Landscape Architect ...... 55

543 Lifeguard I ......ssee+e+ 240

646 Lifeguard IT ...ssseesesss 250

606 Park Foreman ...........- 48

609 Park Guard ....... seeqseenl

625 Parks Maintenan

Supervisor .... «+. eneeces 62

710 Recreation Attendant ......200

713 Recreation Leader ........ 32

716 Recreation Supervisor -- 5O

719 Recreation Superintendent 657

816 Senior Recreation Leader 43

911 Swimming Instructor ..... 250

914 Swimming Pool Manager .. 41

926 Tree Trimmer Sr

929 Tree Trimmer Crew

POSGMRGR . cccccccecces o- 6

932 Tree Trimmer Foreman 51

SECTION 6.10. PARKS, RECREA-

TION AND LIBRARIES (continued).

ary

Range

Code Class Title No.

012 Adult Librarian ......... 53

080 Athletic Official

136 Branches and Circulation

eee arr 63

147 Catalog Librarian .......... 53

166 Chief Librarian’ .......... 72

*78 Children’s Librarian ...... 53

268 Cultural Arts Librarian .... 53

309 Director of Parks and

TOSSOROOR §«cccccccececes Ta

318 Display Artist ee

441 Exhibits Coordinator ..... 4

525 Libvrarian I ...... nnaws -. 6

528 Librarian II es

531 Library Monitor ..........260

534 Libra POGR _-ccceccce oo E

836 Special Activity Leader ... 37

887 Student Librarian ...... 220

SECTION 6.11. COMMUNICA-

TIONS. PUBLIC SAFETY, LEGAL

AND PUBLIC HEALTH.

Salary

Kange

Code Class Title No.

015 Animal Control Officer .. #0

114 Battalion Chief . ......... 64

Communications Operator

peputy Fire Chief

259 35

302 . aoe

443 Fire arm Technician I 44

444 Fire Alarm Technician I 50

447 Fire Captain ....... rr

Ge Wee GH sc ccccccecces oo

453 Fire Engineer ......... coe

459 Fireman —

483 Identification Technician .. 47

701 Radio Engineer ..... —

704 Radio Technician ..... 45

764 Senior Anima! Control

Officer ger APS Pree rere 42

812 Senior Radio Technician . 48

842 Special Officer ..... 220

902 Supervisor of Records

and Identification ...... 54

917 Switchboard Operator 30

ON 6.12. COMMUNICA-

SECTI

TIONS, PUBLIC SAFETY, LEGAL

AND PUBLIC HEALTH (continued).

Salary

Range

Code Class Title No.

036 Assistant City Attorney .. 66

182 City Attorney ..... seaees —

S03 City NurSO ..cccccccctccces @

206 City Physician ..... eT

217 Civil Defense

Coordinator ...... ssoees On

282 Deputy City Attorney ..... 60

306 Deputy Police Chief ...... 69

489 Instructor—Civil Defense . 270

GO B scocessecs soose @&

504 Jailer IT ...... necoeeces coos

Bee Ee GEO cccccecccsces coo

615 Parking Checker .......... 38

657 Police Captain ........ coos @

Gp WUD Gee .ccccccccesces FE

663 Police Detective ...... ——

666 Police Lieutenant ........ 61

669 Policeman ......... a |

672 Police Sergeant ........+-+. 57

675 Policewoman —....++--s aco

731 Safety and Training Officer 59

7 Safety Inspector _........ 47

766 Senior Assistant City

Attorney. ; 74

SECTION 7. INCUMBENTS RE-

ie IN EXCESS OF MAXI-

Any person who at the time of the

effective date of this ordinance was

receiving compensation in excess of

the maximum rate for the position

held by him shall continue to receive

such higher coinpensation; provided,

however, that the rate of compen-

sation of a person permanently trans-

ferred or reduced to a classification

with a lower salary range shall be

fixed as provided in Chapter 4 of the

Glendale Muincipal Code, 1964.

SECTIO? 8. REDUCTION OR

SUSPENSION OF COMPENSATION.

Nothing contained in this ordi-

nance shall be construed as prohibit-

ing the reduction of or the suspension

of payment of compensation to any

person when such reduction or sus-

pension is authorized by the provi-

sions of Article XXIV of The Char-

ter of the City of Glendale or the

Rules of the Civil Service Commis-

sion oem pursuant thereto.

SECTION 9. POLICE DIVISION—

FIREARMS TRAINING AND ADDI-

TIONAL COMPENSATON FOR

MARKSMANSHIP.

Employees of the Police Division

who may be called upon to use fire

arms in the performance of the du

ties to which they are or may be as-

signed shall:

(a) As directed by the Police Chief

fire the prescribed combat or target

course once a month for a minimum

of ten months per fiscal year. Any

employee failing to fire as herein

required may be fined one day's pay

upon the recommendation of the

Police Chief and approval of the

City Manager. In addition to the re-

ulred number of courses the Police

lef may require a minimum point

qualification for both combat and

target courses which he deems nec-

essary to insure proficiency of such

employees and may require any

su employee who within the past

year has not attained the minimum

point qualification to take additional

firearms training. This section does

not restrict personnel action by the

Police Chief.

(db) Receive additional compensa-

tlon each month for marksmansh!

as herein provided. Such addition

compensation shall be in the follow-

ing amounts and based upon the

following scale of proficiency as

demonstrated upon the approved

PAGE 5

firearms target type course:

Marksman,

$2.00 per month, 300 to 339

Sharpshooter,

$4.00 per month, 340 to 369

Expert,

$6.00 per month, 370 to 384

Master,

$8.00 per month, 385 to 400

An employee shall receive the addi-

tional compensation only for the 12-

month period immediately following

his demonstration of proficiency as

herein provided to the satisfaction of

the Police Chief and the certifica-

tion of such proficiency to the City

Controller. The City Manager shall

determine the firearms course. The

determination of the Police Chief

on all scoring is final and conclusive.

SECTION 10. PUBLIC SERVICE

DIVISION—SIX-DAY FORTY-HOUR

WEEK—EXTRA PAY FOR UNUS

UAL HOURS.

(a) Employees in the Public Ser-

vice Division who regularly work

a six-day forty-hour week shall re-

ceive ten dollars ($10.00) per month

additional compensation.

(b) Employees in the Public Ser-

vice Division who are assigned to

work a shift which commences at

or after 2:00 p.m. and before 9:00

p.m. shall receive twelve cents ($.12)

per hour extra for each hour worked

on said shift.

vice Division who are assigned to

work a shift which commences at

or after 9:00 p.m. and before 4:00

a.m. of the next ~~ day shall

receive sixteen cents ($.16) per hour

extra for each hour worked on said

shift.

(d) Employees in the Public Ser-

vice Division receiving compensa-

tion for overtime as provided in

Section 457 of the Glendale Munici-

pal Code, 1964, shall not be. entitled

to receive the extra compensation

provided under subsections (Db) and

SECTION 11. POLICE DIVISION

—HAZARD PAY FOR MOTORCY-

CLE DUTY.

Employees of the Police Division

who are ‘‘sefety members” shall

receive additional compensation as

hazard pay in the sum of seventy

dollars ($70.00) per month when

assigned to a two-wheel motorcycle.

SECTION 12. PUBLIC SAFETY

UNIFORM ALLOWANCES.

(a) Employees of the Police Divi-

sion who are ‘‘safety members,"

“safety members of the Bureau of

Fire vention and the Captain in

charge of training in the Fire Divi-

sion,”’ shall receive a uniform al-

lowance in the sum of one hundred

dollars ($100.00) per year; provided,

however, that employees of the Po

lice Division who are Jallers, Park-

ing Checkers, Identification Techni-

cians, or a Supervisor of Records

and Identification shall receive a

uniform allowance in the sum of

fifty dollars ($50.00) per year. Said

uniform allowance shall be paid in

two ual installments, ~~ te first

day July and the first day of

January of each year. New police

men and policewomen shall, in addi-

tion to e above. receive a two

hundred dollar ($200.00) uniform al-

lowance to be paid half on entering

service and half on successfully

completing ‘‘academy” training.

(vb) Employees of the Fire Divi-

sion who are ‘safety members”

shail receive a uniform allowance in

the sum of fifiy dollars ($50.00) per

year, which shall be paid in two

equal installments, on the first day

of July and the first day of January

of each year.

SECTION 13. POLICE DIVISION

Full-time employees in the classi-

fication of Clerks I, UL and II,

Clerk-Typists I and II, and Clerk-

Stenographers occupying positions

in the Police Division in which the

incumbents are required to work a

minimum of three-fourths of a shift

between the periods of 4:00 p.m. and

7:00 a.m. shall receive additional

pay in an equal amount to two sal-

ary ranges as used in Section 4 of

this ordinance.

SECTION 14. POLICE DIVISION

—EXTRA PAY FOR WOMEN AS

SISTING JAILER.

Women, except Policewomen, in

the Police Division shall receive ad-

ditional pay in the amount of two

dollars ($2.00) per work shift when

assigned to assist the Jailer with

women prisoners.

SECTION 15. ANIMAL CONTROL

OFFICERS UNIFORM ALLOW-

ANCE.

Employees who are Animal Control

Officers shall receive a uniform al-

lowance in the sum of one hundred

dollars ($100.00) per year payable

in two equal installments, on the

first day of July and first day of

January of each year.

SECTION 16. PUBLIC WORKS

DIVISION — FORTY-SIX-HOUR

WEEK FOR PARKING ATTEND-

ANTS.

Parking Attendants I and ITI in the

Public Works Division who work a

forty-six-hour week shall receive

compensation at the rate in effect

for the fifth salary range above their

regular salary step.

SECTION 17. EXTRA COMPEN-

SATION FOR BRUSH REMOVAL

WORK.

Full-time employees in the classi-

fications of Tree Trimming Crew

Foreman, Tree Trimmer, Street

Maintenance Man, and Maintenance

Man occupying positions in_ the

Street Section of the Public Works

Division who are assigned to the

brush removal crew shall receive

additional pay in an amount ual

to two salary ranges as used in

tion 4 of this ordinance, which addi-

tional amount shall be id onl

during those periods when suc

employees are actually engaged in

brush clearance work.

SECTION 18. GROUP INSUR-

ANCE BENEFITS.

The benefits of group health, med-

ical and accident insurance shall be

provided to all City officers except

members of The Council and to all

City employees compensated on a

monthly basis and for certain de-

pendents of such rsons. Said in-

surance benefits shall be provided

solely by contracts of Insurance ap-

proved by The Council and pur-

chased by the City from time to

time. The City shall pay the cost of

such insurance in the sum of eight

dollars and seventy-seven cents

PAGE 6

($8.77) per month for each such of-

ficer and employee, and further,

shall pay to said contracting insur-

er the sum of six dollars and sixty-

nine cents ($6.69) per month for

employees with one dependent and

eight dollars and fifty cents ($8.50)

per month for employees with more

than one dependent to apply on the

premium for the dependent or de-

pendents of each officer or employee

who desires such insurance cover-

age for said dependents and arranges

to pay the remainder of the premium

due on eccount of his said depend-

ent or Gependents. In no event will

such payment be made directly by

the City to any officer or employee

or the dependent thereof. For the

purposes of this section, the term

dependents shall mean and include

the spouse and minor children of

said employed persons.

The City shall not pay the cost of

such Insurance or any part thereof

for any officer or employee who is

absent on leave without pay for any

entire calendar month, nor shall the

City pay such cost for any officer

or employee who is on military

leave without pay for more than

thirty (30) days.

Notwithstanding the foregoing pro-

visions of this section, the City shall

pay the cost of such insurance in

the sum of five dollars and thirty-

three cents ($5.33) for those officers

and employees who are eligible for

Medicare under Title XVIII of the

United States Social Security Act

and therefore are within the Modi-

fied and Supplementary group in-

Surance coverage, except that the

City shall not pay such cost of in-.

surance for any person who is ab-

sent on leave without pay for any

entire calendar month.

SECTION 19. REPEALING

CLAUSE.

Ordinance No. 3873 as amended

is repealed and each of the ordin-

ances amending said ordinance are

also repealed.

SE ON 20. PROVISIONS SIM-

ILAR TO PRIOR SALARY ORDIN-

ANCE — CONSTRUCTION.

ATTEST:

The provisions of this ordinance

so far as they are —y- x ~y | the

Same as the provisions of the form-

er salary ordinance, Ordinance No.

3873 as amended, must be construed

as continuations thereof and not as

original enactments.

SECTION 21. SEVERABILITY

OF PARTS OF ORDINANCE.

It is hereby declared to be the in-

tention of The Council that the sec

tions, paragraphs, lines, sentences.

clauses and phrases of this ordin-

ance are severable, and if any

phrase, clause, sentence, line, para-

graph or section of this ordinance

shall be declared unconstitutional] by

the valid judgment or decree of a

court of competent jurisdiction such

unconstitutionality shall not affect

any of the remaining phrases. claus-

es, phrases, sentences, lines, para-

graphs and sections of this ordin-

ance.

SECTION 22. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This ordinance shall take effect and

wm force on the Ist day of July,

Vv.

Passed by The Council of the City

aaa on the 30th day June,

Vv.

JAMES W. PERKINS, D.D.S.

Mayor

JOHN H. WALTERS

City Clerk

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (ss)

CITY OF GLENDALE

I, JOHN H. WALTERS, City Clerk

of the City of Glendale, certify that

the foregoing ordinance was passed

by The Council of the City of Glen-

dale, California, at a regular meet-

ing held on the 30th day of June,

1970, and that the same was passed

by the following vote:

Ayes: Allen, Haverkamp, Peters,

Watson, Perkins.

Noes: None

Absent: None.

JOHN H. WALTERS,

City Clerk

July 6, 1970.

Ss hele Ln a 2

tee te ~—wernsl

\PPENDIX B | FILI

OCT3 1975

has)

Ir<

_—

ee ee

~—

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALLFORNIA

GLENDALE CITY EMPLOYEES ASSCCIATION, ,

INC. > et al *>, )

Plaintiffs and Appellants, L.A. 30357

Super. Ct. No. 988 94k

CITY OF GLENDALE et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

With the enactment of the George Brown Act

(Stats. 196], ch. 1964) in 1961, California became one

of the first states to recognize the right of govern-

ment employees to organize collectively and to confer

with management as to the terms and conditions of their

° employment. Proceeding beyond that act the Meyers-

Milias-Brown Act (Stats. 1968, ch. 1390) authorized

labor and management representatives not cnly to confer

but to enter into written agreements for presentation

to the governing body of a municipal government or

otner local apgpency. The present case raises among

lf The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov. Code,

es i ‘ad a). J anne? F hee eae "\—TescteT Te: PL te beh ‘eal al

wh CUNT ARL Ye ei sade de ait's Us st ew at

other issues which we shall discuss the fundamenta)

question unanswered by the literal text of these stat-

utes: whether an agreement entered into under the

Meyerse“iliaseirown Act, once asproved by the Eoverne

ing board of the local entities, binds the public

employer and the public employee organization. We

conclude that the Legislature intended that such an

understanding, once ratified, is indeed binding upon

the parties.

l. Statement of facts.

Pursuant to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act,

negotiators for plaintiff Glendale City Employees'

Association, Inc., the designated representative for

the clty employees, met with Charles Briley, the anssis-

tant city manager, to discuss employee salaries for the

1970-1971 fiscal year. The parties negotiated a memo-

randum of understanding, which they presented to the

§§ 3500-3510) applies to employees of municipalitics

and most other local governmental agencies. Employees

of school districts, however, fall under the Winton

Aet (Ed. Code, §§ 13080-13990) and employers of some

ransit districts come within the scope of special

‘cisiation foverning those districts (see, e.g., Pub.

« Tode, $§ 25051-25057). The George Brown Aci,

now renuicered aes Government Coce sections 3525-35260,

still soverns relations between the state and its

employees.

city council. On June 9, 1970, the council passed a

motion approving the memorandum. The memorandum of

understanding provides for a cost of livins; adjustment,

Sick ieave, incentive pay, and a saiary survey; the

only matter that remains at issue is the survey pro-

—

vision.

The survey provision reads as follows: "The

parties hereto will conduct a joint salary survey and

using as guide lines data secured from the following

Jurisdictions, Burbank, Pasadena, Santa Monica, Long

Beach, Anaheim, Santa Ana, Los Angeles City and Los

Angeles County. The intent of the survey will be to

ef The parties aiso dispute the tcaning, of

lancuayge in the preamble to the memorandum respect iny

the effective date of the understanding. The disputed

language states that "The items in this arreement are

subject to the approval of the City Manarer and the

City Council of the City of Glendale, and will he

placed into effect upon the taking of administrative

action by the City Manager's Office and the adoption

of the necessary ordinances and resolutions by the City

Council if acceptable to them, in accordance with the

terms and conditions hereinafter set forth." Plain-

tiffs maintained that the understanding became effec-

tive upon the council's adoption of a resolution ap-

mrovin, the memcrandum; defendants arrue that it dees

7. tacc effect until the council adorted ordinances

snpiementing ‘ts terms.

Since the city did adopt a salary ordinance

wi tne irteny_ cr implementing, the memorandum, even

under de:endantS' interpretation the agreeuent has

cone into effect.

place Glendale salaries in an above average position

with reference to the jurisdictions compared with

———

proper consideration given to internal siipnmmonts and

traditional relationships. The data usea will be that

data availabie to us and intended for use in fiscel

year 1970-71. Adjustments whith it is agreed shall be

made will have an effective acute of October 1, 1970.

It is intended that comparisons will be made on a class-

ification basis and not title only, and that the class-

ifications shall be determined by professional judgment

or the highest qualified personnel people with whom we

would confer in tlhe jurisdictions with which we will

compare.” (Emphasis added.)

The city conducted the survey. Consistent

with past practice, the city organized the data by pre-

paring, bar graphs comparing Glendale salaries with the

surveyed jurisdiction. Although the graphs show the

entire salary range for each job classification, the

parties are primarily concerned.with the salaries paid

enployees in the top (5th or E) step of each salary

ran¢ since a majority of Glendaie employees are at

’ ‘ .

viewings the bar ;‘raphs, the city mana;jer

aitain a rouyth idea or how Glendale calaries at

each step compared with salaries paid in surveyed jur-

isdictions. On this basis the city manager, in Septem-

ber of 1970, prepared a draft salary ordinance. Plain-

tiff association, using the survey Gata, computed the

arithmetic average of salaries from the surveyed juris-

dictions for the top step of each job classification,

and discovered that in many instances the salary pro-

posed in the draft ordinance was below this average.

Over the objection of the association the city council,

on October 1, 1970, enacted the ordinance (Salary Or-

dinance No. 3936) recommended by the city manager.

On behalf of the class of city employees,

plaintiff association and certain of its members filed

the instant suit against the City of Glendale and its

councilmen. Upholding the binding nature of the memo-

randum of understanding, the trial court admitted parol

testimony of the negotiators to aid in the interpreta-

tion of its provisions. On the basis of that testi-

mony, the court concluded that the city must compute

the arithmetic (mean) average of the salaries paid em-

ployees in the highest step of each comparabiec classi-

fication in the surveyed jurisdictions, and must pay

Glendale employees in the filth step of cach classi-

fication @ s@lary equal to the average from the surveyed

jurisdiction, plus one cent. Salaries of workers in

the lower steps would be determined by the existing

ratio of such salaries to step E salaries, thus pre-

' S nen . ‘ "“ ae - 4 a ~* ™ mn

serving internal clignments” as requirec oy the meno-

randum.

The court concluded that Salary Ordinance No.

3930 did not meet these criteria, and that the failure

of the city to pay salaries in excess of the arithmetic

average of surveyed jurisdictions constituted an abuse

of discretion and a breach both of the memorandum of

understanding and of the city's duty under the Meyers-

Milias-Brown Act. Finally, the court concluded that

Since plaintiffs had no adequate remedy at law, mandam-

is should issue to compel defendants to compute and pay

the trial court also found: (a) that sal-

" inta from Los Angeles City and Los Anrele-: County

culd be included in computing the averare salary, not

merely utilized as "reference points" as the city

Jaimed; (b) that the term "traditional relationships"

referred to the nistorical relationship between salar-

Les paid certain Glendale employees and the salaries

paid employees of other jurisdictions holding compar-

ab} ositions; (c) that the term “interna) alignments"

crred@d to salary relationshins between Glendale em-

’ av ditserent salary steps and classes; (d) that

oViso requiring "pror consideration” for tradi-

t 4. reiationsnips anc internal alicsnments did not

i rize ft LY to rel: ich Tactor to justify

aymert of below-avera;ye salaries,

compensation to city employees in accord with the for-

mula set out in the court's findings and conclusions.

The court directed that 25 percent of all

retroactive calaries and wages recovered should ce pay-

able to plaintifis' counsel as attorneys' feces,

Defendants appealed. They contend that the

memorandum of understanding was not binding, that the

trial court erred in its interpretation of the menoran-

jum, and that in any event the memorandum cannot be ecn-

forced by writ of mandamus. Defendants also argue that

the present suit is not a proper class action, and that

relief is barred by plaintiff's failure to exhaust ad-

ministrative remedies. Plaintiffs filed a cross-

appeal which raises a single limited issuc; plaintiffs

maintain that whenever an employee's salary must he in-

creased to bring it into line with the survey, it

should be increased not only to a figure one cent above

average, Dut to a figure lying on a higher salary ranse.

—

he moemorancum of understanding, once

approved by the city council, is bind-

ing upon tne parties.

she Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, as set forth in

Government Code section 3505.1, provides that after ne-

potiations “If agreement is reached by the representa-

tives of the public agency and a recognized emp loyee

Organization... they shall jointly prepare a written

memorandum of such understanding, which shall not be

binding, and present it to the governing body orits

statutory representative for deternination.~ Acs we

shall explain once the governmental body votes to ac-

cept the memorandum, it becomes a binding agreement.

The historical progression in the legisla-

tive enactments began with the George Brown Act.

4/ Section 3500 of the Meyers-Milias-Brown

Act does not clearly prescribe whether a local agency

may adopt methods of administering employer-employee

relations which differ from those prescribed by the act.

(See discussion in Grodin, Public Erp gee Apa ne

in California: The Meyers-M

TIS”.

Pub] mn a v :

Appellate Courts pres California Public Employee Re-

lations No. 21, p. 2.) We need not reach that question here,

for Glendale has adopted a format for labor-management

relations essentially identical to that set out in the

Meyers-Milias-Brown Act. The city's employee relation

ordinance states that employee organizations shall pre-

sent written proposals on salaries, fringe benefits,

and other conditions of employment to the city manager,

It then provides in language parallel to Government

Code section 3505.1, that f agreement is reached by

the City Manager and the recognized employee represent-

ative, they shall jointly prepare a written memorandum

of such understanding, which shall not be binding, and

present it to The Council by May 1 of each year.

(Ordinance No. 3830, § 11.)

5/ The George Brown Act originally appeared

as Government Code sections 3500-3509. The legislative

revisions of 1905 and 1971 reserved those sections for

the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, and reenacted the George

Brown Act, now limited to the relationship between the

That act sought in general to promote "the improvement

of personnel management and employer-employee relations

+ + « through the establishment of uniform and orderly

metnocs of cocmunication between eaployees anu the pub-

lic agencies by which they are employed." (Stats.

1961, ch. 1464, p, 4141.) It provided, in former sec-

tion 3505, that "The governing body of a public ayency

{or its representatives] shall meet and confer with

representatives of employee organizations upon request,

and shall consider as fully as it deems reasonable such

presentations as are made by the employee organization

on behalf of its members prior to arriving at a deter-

mination of policy y course of action.” (Stats. 1961,

ch. 1904, p. 4142,)

During the years following enactment of the

George Brown Act public employee unions continued to

grow in size and to press their claims that public

State fovernment and state employees, as Government

Code sections 3525-3536.

6/ This provision, reenacted an Government

voae seetion 3530, still governs the reiationship bee

tween the state and state employees organizations.

2 ¥, See East Bay Mun, Emplovees Union v.

County of Alameda (1970) 3 Cal.App. 3d 578, 583, foote

note 7; Fdwards, The Emerging Duty to Barrain in the

ruolic Sector (1073

employees s ould enjoy the same bargaining rights as

private emp oyees s> long as wy rights did not cone

flict with the public service. The George Brown Act,

originally a pioneering piece of legislation, provided

only that management representatives should listen to

and discuss the demands of the unions. Apparently

the failure of that act to resolve the continual cone

troversy between the growing public employces' organ-

izations and their employers led to further legislative

inquiry. Moreover, subsequent enactments of otncr

states, which granted public employees far more exten-

sive bargaining rtanee. further exposed the lirita-

tions of the George Brown Act,

Cognizant of this turn of events the sates 7

lature in 1968 enacted the Meyers~-Milias-Brown Act, '

Expressly intending the new law to strengthen employer-

Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector (1969) 22

Vand, L.nev. 033.

8/ Anderson, The Impact of Public Sector

Bargaining (1973) Wis. L.Rev. YOO, 960.

see authorities cited footnote 4, supra,

a/ os

/ California Senate Select Committee

1 Local Public Safety Employment Practice, To Meet

and Confer: A Study of Public Employee Labor Relations

(1972) pages 2h<"

employee communication, the Legislature provided for

"a reasonable method of resolving disputes regarding

wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of euploy-

ment." (Gov. Code, $ 3500.) The public agency must

not only listen to presentations, but “mect and confer

in good faith" (Gov. Code, § 3505), a phrase statutor-

ily defined to include a free exchange of information,

opinions and proposals, wath the objective of reach-

ing “agreement on matters within the scope of repre-

sentation prior to the adoption by the public agency

of its final budget for the ensuing year," (Ibid.)

Section 3505.1, quoted earlicr, provides that If arrec-

ment is reached it should be reduced to writing and

presented to the governing body of the agency for de-

termination. This statutory structure necessarily

implies that an agreement, once approved by the agency,

will be binding. The very alternative prescribed by

the statute -- that the memorandum "shall not be bind-

ing" except upon presentation "to the governing body

or its statutory representative for detcrnination,” --

manifests that favorable "determination" engenders a

bindings agreement.

Why negotiate an agreement if either party

can disregard its provisions? What point would there

be in reducing it to writing, if the terms of the con-

tract were of no legal consequence? Why subdmi* the

agreement to the governing body for determinsvion, if

its approval were without cignificance? What integrity

would be left in government if government itself couic

attack the integrity of its own agreement? The pro-

cedure established by the act would be meaningless if

the end-product, a labor-management agreement ratified

by the governing body of the agency, were a document

that was itself meaninyiess.

The Legislature designed the act, moreover,

for the purpose of resolving labor disputes. (See Gov.

Code, § 3500.) But a statute which encouraged the

negotiation of agreements, yet permitted the parties

to retract their concessions and repudiate their prome-

ises whenever they choose, would impede efiective bar-

gaining. Any concession by a party from a previously

held position would be disastrous to that rarty if the

mutual agreement thereby achieved could be repudiated

by the opposing party. Successful bargaining rests

upon the sanctity and legal viability of the given worc.

LneC

In applying the Meyers-Millas-Brown Act,

courts have uniformly held that a memorandus of under-

standing, once adopted by the governing body of a public

agency, becomes a binding agreement." (Grodin, Public

Employee Bargaining tn California: The Meyers-Milias-

Brown Act in the Courts (1972) 23 Hastings L.J. 719,

756.) The leading decision, however, 1s one wilch

although decided in 1970 arose under tne earlier George

Brown Act, East Bay Mun. Employees Union v. County of

Alameda, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d 578. Settling a strike

by county hospital employees, Alameda County arreed to

ll/ Professor Grodin's article, published

in March 1972, cites only superior court decisions in

support of his position, but subsequent to that publica-

tion two Court of Appeal decisions have also enforced

agreements reached under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act,

(San Joaquin County Employees' Assn., Inc. v. County of

San Joaquin (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 83, 88-89; Wilson v.

San Francisco Mun. Ry. (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 870,)

These decisions, as well as the Court of Appeal opinion

in the instant case, are analyzed in a second article

by Professor Grodin, California Public Employees Bar-

aining Revisited: The MMB Act In the Appellate Courts

page 2.

Professor Edwards of the University of Mich-

igan Law School summarized the decisions of other

states: "It is increasingly apparent in the developing

case law that once a contract has been signed, the pub-

lic employer must, in effect ‘adopt' the contract and

do everything reasonably within its power to see that

it is carried out.” (Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bar-

rain in the Public Sector (1073; -T RTO TOR RES

-%.) ‘Ine phrase “everything, reasonably within its

wer" refers to the problems, discussed by Edwards,

ilch may arise when a public agency agrees to a con-

ract but must depend on appropriations from another

ney to carry out that contract. Since tne Glendale

y Council has authority to appropriate sums needed

pay the salary increase it agreed to pay, those

problems do not arise in the present case.

7 2) P cezD

reinstate the strikers without loss of any benefits

previously earned by those employees. Upon reinstate-

ment, however, the county classified the strikers as

new eauployees, with resultant loss of seniority, vaca-

tion, sick leave, retirement and other benefits.

Reversing a trial court ruling which declined

to enforce the agreement, the Court of Appcal through

Justice Wakefield Taylor stated that the George Brown

Act “required the public agency to meet and confer and

listen. ... [T]he modern view of statutory provis-

ions similar to the Brown Act is that when a public

employer engages in such meetings with the representa-

tives of the public employee organization, any agree-

ment that the public agency ig authorized to make and,

in fact, does enter into, should be held valid and

binding as to all parties." (3 Cal.App.3d 578, 584.)

If, under the more limited provisions of the George

Brown Act, which does not specifically refer to an

“agreement reached by the representatives of the public

agency and a recognized employer organization," never-

theless the negotiation and agreement by such parties

are “valid and binding," we conclude a fortiori that

the memorandum of understanding reached under the broad-

er Meyers-Milias-Brown Act is indubitably binding.

3. The city has failed to comply with the

terms ot the memorandum of understanding.

Defendants challenge the trial court's find-

ing that the city did not comply with the terms of the

agreement. We have pointed out that the trial judge

found the agreement uncertain in meaning and admitted

parol evidence to aid in its construction. Defendants

do not contend that the evidence reccived was inadmis-

sible under the parol evidence rule, nor that the

evidence so admitted does not support the findings and

conclusions of the trial court. Instead, the defend-

ants argue first, that the city singularly enjoys a

unilateral right to insist upon any reasonable inter-

pretation of the agreement that it chooses, and second,

that the agreement can properly be interpreted to re-

quire only the taking of a salary survey, leaving the

fixing of salary ranges to later administrative deter-

mination.

12/ See Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G.W. Thomas

Drayage etc. Co, (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 40; Tahoe Nation-

al Bank v. Phillips (1971) 4 Cal.3d 11, 22-23; Jones,

Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration: Some Modern

parcl evidence rule on the interpretation of collective

bargaining agreements.

The city's claim to a unilateral right to in-

terpret the memorandum rests upon numerous cases hold-

ing that a city wage ordinance will not be held to con-

flict with charter provisions requiring payzent of

prevailing wages unless the city's action is "so pal-

pably unreasonable and arbitrary as to indicate an

abuse of discretion as a matter of law." (Sanders v.

City of Los Angeles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 252, 261; Walker

v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 639;

City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd (1943) 22 Cal.

2d 685, 690.)~ The city seeks to apply this doctrine

to the present case; it argues that in enacting Salary

Ordinance No. 3936 it attempted to comply with its

duty under the memorandum, and that this ordinance can-

not be set aside unless it is fraudulent or palpably

unreasonable,

This argument, however, misses the point;

the issue here is not the validity of Ordinance No.

3936, but the sufficiency of that ordinance to fulfill

v. City of Alameda (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 518, 532; San-

ders v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 488,

190; Anderson v¥. Board of Supervisors (1964) 229 Cal.

App.ed 796, 798-800; San Bernardino Fire & Police Pro-

tective League v. City of San Bernardino (1962) 199

Cal.App.2d 401, 408,

the city's duty under the memorandum. Although the

cited cases recognize the broad discretion of a city

in interpreting its respective charter's prevalling

wage provisions, and although defendant city here would

analogize the instant issue with such a preva.ling

wage case, defendant's position founders on the rock

of the bilateral nature of the instant memorandum of

understanding. We do not probe the city's interpreta-

tion and application of a prevailing wage ordinance or

even an alleged abuse of discretion by the city in so

applying it; we deal here with a mutually agreed cov-

enant, @ labor management contract. We know of no case

that holds that one party can impose his own inter-

pretation upon @ two-party labor-management contract.

In pre-Wagner Act days some courts considered

collective bargaining agreements to be merely statle-

ments of intention or unilateral memoranda. (See Cham-

berlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Con-

tract (1948) 48 Colum.L.Rev. 829, 832; Annot. (1935)

V5 A.L.R. 10, 34-37.) But all modern California de-

cisions treat labor-management agreements whether in

L4/ 1

public employment or private as enforceable con-

tracts (see Lab. Code, § 1126) which should be inter-

preted to execute the mutual intent and purpose of the

parties.

This principle applies as much to azreements

between government employees and their employers as to

if See East Bay Mun. Employees Un‘on v,.

County of aneda, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d 578, 584; San

Joaquin County Employees' Assn., Inc. v. County of San

Joaquin, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 83, 88-80,

iv See Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Ine. (1961)

56 Cal.2d T0v, 177; McCarroll v. L.A. County etc. Car-

penters (1957) "9 Cal.2d 45, 66-67; Holayter v. smith

(1972) 209 Cal.App.3d 326, 333-334; San Diego etc. Car-

penters v. Wood, Wire, etc. Union (1969) 274 Cal.App.

ed 683, 689; Div. Labor L. Enf. v. Ryan Aero Co, (1951)

106 Cal.App.2d Supp. 833.

16/ Civil Code section 1636 declares that "A

contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to

the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at

the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascer-

tainable and lawful." This section was applied to the

interpretation of private collective bargaining agree-

ments in General Precision, Inc. v. International Asno-

ciation of Machinists (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 744, 746-

747 and McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co, (1952) 110 Cal.

App.2d 672, 676.

In Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc. (1961) 56

Cal.ed 1609, 177, we observed that a collective bargain-

ine agreement "is more than a contract; it ‘s a gener-

allzed code to govern a myriad of cases which the

draftsman cannot wholly anticipate. ... It calls

into being, a new common law -- the common law of the

particular industry.” (56 Cal.2d 169, 177, quoting

United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co,

(1900) 363 U.S. 574, 578-579.)

bept. (1974) 1i Cal.3a 382, 341; San Joaquin Count

ployees' Assn., Inc. v. Coun

17/

private collective bargaining agreements. Agree-

ments reached under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, like

their private counterparts, are the product of negoti-

ation and concession; they can serve as effective ine

struments for the promotion of good labor-manaxsement

relations only if interpreted and performed ina man-

ner consistent with ives expectations of

the parties.

The city raises many other objections to the

trial court's interpretation of the agreement: it con-

tends that the memorandum gave the council discretion

to choose whether to implement the Survey findings;

that the memorandum is but an agreement to agree in

the future concerning new salary ranges; that the tera

“average salaries” in the memorandum does not mean an

arithmetic average but refers to the city's practice

of using bar graphs to visualize an average salary lev-

el; that the phrase “proper consideration [for] internal

17/ Courts have frequently drawn upon pre-e

cesents involving private labor-manaysement relations to

atc in determining the rights of public employee:

, “and

Yon loart.e a“ , \ «rr ty ee ss _

hha SOSy wt vallejo (1974) 12 Cal. da 606, O17; Social

weOrTKOET:, vnion, Local 535 Vv. Alameda Counts We) fare

y Em-

ty of San Joaquin, su

TP) Cal.App. 2a 83, 8. » i , upra,

alignments and traditional relationships” in the memo-

randum authorizes the city to use such alignments and

relationships to justify payment of below average sal-

All the sbdove contentions violate the estad-

lished rule tnat if the construction of a dgscument

turns on the ressSlution of conrilicting extrinsic evi-

dence, the trial court's interpretation will be fol-

lowed if supported by substantial evidence. (See 6

Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) pp. 42-4244 and

“ases there cited.) In light of this rulc, defendants,

in order to overturn the trial court's interpretation,

must demonstrate either that the extrinsic evidence on

which the court relied conflicts with any interpreta-

tion to which the instrument is reasonably susceptible

(Pacitic Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co.,

supra, Ov Cai.2d 33, 40) or that such evidence does not

provide substantial support for the court's interpreta-

tion. Sut defendants present neither contention.

Their argiwrents, based upon an interpretation of the

indunm. on its face without reference to the extrin-

lence or the trial court's findings, pose no

issue coynizable within the scope of our appellate

_- Plaintiff union may maintain tnis action

on Denali ot tne Glendale city employees;

Ailegations that this suit 1: a class

action are superfluous anu do not aifect

the vVa@sidily of the judgment.

Peer htisis”’ COmpPlasSt 21.Gy@S, wis tA. COdre

SOunc, that vlaintists rileas suit on Seaair oF the

Ciass of city empioyees. ve:cndants argue that plaine

tiffs failed t2 provide adequate notice to the members

of the class; | plaintiffs respond that defendants

first raised this issue on appeal. Piaintilrfs' class

aliegations, however, are superfluous; plaintitf asso-

clation, as the recognized representative of city er-

ployees, may sue in its own mame to enforce the memo-

randum of understanding. (See Professional Fire

Fignters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (143) £0 Cal.?d

276, 263-20.) Since the ciass action format adds

Mothing to the rights or liabilities of the paties,

18/ The record indicates only that plaintiff

union posted notice of the action on various bulletin

boards. After the court found in favor of plaintiffs,

the union posted a second notice advising employees

that their counsel would request an award of attorn-

eye’ fees, and the manner in which employees could ap-

pear in order to be heard in opposition to that award.

T - “* - P . , *

}iay It is not necessary to rind thas suit a

- . - . ~* ~ ‘ aya a . aArmatia ¢is nare ft ar PT

overt iass action in orde ; iphold the portion :

tne udgment awarding counse -or a,.@intiffs 2 pere

ent of all retroactive salaries anid waves reccived.

. award may be sustained under tne rule that a lite

the issue of notice to the members of the class is im- tained, the instant complaint as one brought by the

material. union as an entity." (59 Cal.2d at pp. 608-609, )

The instant case in this respect closely ree In accord with Daniels, we conclude that tho

Squee

- es Daniels v. Sanitarium assn., Inc. “25) 49 unnecessary Gilesacions anc Cliacings wher. ine suit is

"Ql1.26 Oe, 1a which we first conrirmedc the ri;ht ' @ aclass action do not detract from ihe merits of!

union to sue as a legal entity. In Daniei:, tne union plaintiff association's suit as the recopnized repre-

vice-president sued as a “representative” of the union; sentative of the city employees. “Superfluidity does

we held that the suit should have been filed by tne not vitiate." (Civ. Code, § 3537.)

union directly. We stated, nowever, that “we do not De Plaintiffs’ action is not barred for

tailure to exhaust administrative

remedies.

believe the form in which the action is

fed

“4

crucial. Here Daniels sued ‘in a representative Defendants contend that this suit is barred

“apacity for and on behalf of' the union. ... but by plaintiffs' fatlure to exhaust administrative rem-

the union, as we have pointed out, may sue as an entity edies. Defendants refer to the grievance procedure es-

the wrong done to itself: such an action is not a tablished by Ordinance No. 3530, enacced in 1905, Sec-

la: xction but a direct one by the union. Hence tne tion 9 of this ordinance provides that an aggrieved em-

better and simplest form of procedure would be the suit ployee, whose dispute relates to "the interpretation or

—_

in the name of the union as such. Since the matter | application of this Ordinance, an ordinance resulting,

e procedural only, however, we have considered, and sus- from a@ memorandum of understanding, or of rules or rege

slations governing personnel practices or working con-

‘ant wk reates a fund in which others enjoy benefi- iitions” should first consult informally with his sup-

i “Quire th nenef'claries to pay

mr f the ex»cnse , litigation. (See rVicser se ,i that consultation coes not resolve the

PAu » a Snic Nat'l Ban« ‘ 307 U.S. lvu.; ESe

} ca. o si, 132: Estate of licpule, Lhe erployee may tiie @ crievance form with

a Q@.e:d Uv, - .in wv. narsid

e Perrussa rp. (104 a » Pf; Parmwers the ipervisor, who wmuct enter nis cecision and reasons

‘ce, Nat. Ua V Lverson zie 601, 207

WON, \ Inve : tc: Attorneys Yee: and return the Yorn to tne n.oyee. If dissatisficd

ee ——_- -—- — ~ -

‘ AarVves NOV. °)

with the supervisor's response, the employee may for-

ward the form to the division head; if dissatisfied

with the division head's response, he may forward tne

form to tno city méenager, Wiose Gecics.on ia sindl.

Plaintiffs did not foliow tnis proceaure Serore insi.-

tuting the present action.

The requirement of exhaustion of administra-

tive remedies does not apply if the remedy is inade-

yuate. (Ogo Associates v. City of Torrance (1')/") 3%

————

Cal.App.3d 830, 834; Diaz v. Quitoriano (1969) 268 Cal.

App.2d 807, 812; Comment, Exhaustion of Administrative

Remedies in California (1968) 56 Cal.L.Rev. 1061, 1079-

80.) The city's grievance procedure is inadequate to

ne resolution of the present controversy in two

respects.

First, the pertinent portion of Ordinance No,

3830 provides only for settlement of disputes relating

to the “interpretation or application of . . . an ord-

inance resulting from a memorandum of understanding."

imphasis added.) The crucial threshold issue in the

sen ontrovercy -=- whether tne ratified memorancum

nderstandiny: itself is binding upon the parvies --

> ; se , "w r . ~ . ‘

es not invo.ve an “ordinance” ana nence does not tail

within the sce of grievance resolucion.

—_——_

Second, the city's procedure is tailored for

“oer nat

the settlement of minor individual grievances. A pro-

cedure which provides merely for the submission ofa

grievance form, wiisout the taning of ccsvitiony, tne

submission of legal briefs, or resolution vy an it.pare

tial finder of fact is manifestiy inadequate to handle

disputes of the crucial and complex nature of the in-

‘tant case, which turns on the effect of the underly-

ing, memorandum of understanding itself. (Cf. Martino

v. Concord Community Hosp. Dist. (1905) 233 Cal.App.ed

0. Mandamus lies to enforce the memorandum

of uncerslanding.

The usual remedy for failure in employer

to pay wages Owing to an employee is an action for

breach of contract; if that remedy is adequate, mandate

will not lie. (See Elevator Operators etc. Union v.

Newnan (1947) 30 Cal.2d 799, 808 and cases there cited. )

But often the payment of the wages of a public employee

requires certain preliminary steps by public officials;

uch instances, the action in contract is tnadeocuate

ind tandate is the appropriate remecy. (See Tevis Vv.

ity & County of San Francisco (iyo) %> Cal.2d 190

v. Board of Education (1912) 18 Cal.App. 222 (mandate and that mandamus will not issue to compel action lying

to compel officials to approve payment), cf. Flora within the scope of agency or official discretion, or

Crane Service, Inc. v. Ross (1904) "1 Cal.2¢ 117) (ean to compel performance of a legisiative act —

jate to cocnea C roller 3 Cestiiy vive “ » Duvendasts! contontion roosts upon the ise

been appropriates).) The superior ccury in wc — taken impression that the trical court manuatca the en-

case concluded that since “enrorcement 3: tne rignts of attment of & new salary ordinance. The trial court's

plaintiffs] requires obtaining tne officias coopera= judgment, however, proceeded upon the theory that the

tion necessary to implement the application of tile council's approval of the memorandum of understandinr,

rormusa agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding. in itself constitut e act that fixed

. « « [Plaintifss] do not have a speedy or adequare employee salaries in accord with that understanding.

remedy at law to prevent tne —e of Sheer The writ, therefore, did not command the enactment of

rights other than by mandamus." a new salary ordinance, but directed the non-legisla-

Althourh defendants co not challenge the tive and ministerial acts of computing and paying, the

court's conclusion that plaintiffs nave no other ade- salaries as fixed by the memorandum and judgment.

tuate remedy, they nonetheless urce that. the remed, nf ata

mandamus is not available, Defendants conven ae 21/ See % Witkin, California Procedure (20

adoption of a salary ordinance constitutes a lecisla- ed. L971) page 3651 and cases there cited.

| o2/ Part ) of the trial court judgment pro-

tive act within the discretion of the city councis, : vides “That a peremptory writ of mandate issues direct-

ing the respondents . . . to proceed at once to provide

salary and wage increases . . . in accordance with the

following standard: . . ." The judgment then sets out

/ plaintiffs ajso sougnt declaratory Fer in detail the formula by which the wage increase for

‘ a@ Undoubtedly estadiished a controversy Skee *" each step of each job classification must be computed.

just! - hat remecy. (See Walker v. ~~ Part ot the Judement then orovides that “When tne

An ima) 5 Cal.cd 6°60, 03060354; en eee oreroine computacions have been made, respondents care

Fire & Police Protective iva ce *. ty yp Bagg OO irther direetea to proceed at once to pay the difrer-

: no, tty 169 Careanpecs “Ol, Face) cae evs ‘ntiai sum due each said employee sor the period 9c.o-

w . "trae am action in cet.arevory < scipg) to Ta ber 1, 1970 through June 30, i971, together with incer-

ses not oreve she use of mandate. ock V. Supe est as provided cy law... ."

print court (195?) 109 Cal.App.cd Sii+, C03-

The use of mandamus in the present case thus falls

within the established principle that mandamus may

issue to compel the performance of a mi terial duty

nis

2h/

or to correct an abuse of discretion.

"The critical question in determining i- an

act required by law is ministerial in character is

whether it involves the exercise of judgment and dis-

cretion.” (Jenkins v. Knight (1956) 4» Cal.@d °G,

223-224.) %In the present case, the city entered into

an understanding which, we have held, became a valid

and binding agreerent upon approval by resolution of

;

tre council. That agreement, as interpreted by the

‘2/ See People ex rel. Younger v. County of

FI Dorads TI9: 'l) 5 Cal.3d 480, 491; Jenkins v. Knight

1956) 46 Cal.2d 220; California Civil Writs (Cont.Ed.

Bar 19% 0) sections 5.25-5.20.

24/ “While mandamus will not iie to control

the discretion exercised by a public officer or board

. « « it will lie to correct an abuse of discretion by

such officer or board," (Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp.

vy. Superior Court (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 803, 823; see

Walker v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 55 Cal.2d 676,

2); Cal. Civil Writs (Cont.Ed.Bar 0) §§ 5.33-

Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) pp. W53-

. Contrary to the claim of the concurring and dis-

renting. opinion (see infra at np. P »* appellate

! } thi state have on numerous oeeanions mandated

erislative vodies to enact salary ordinances. (Sec,

wey OANdErS ¥. City of Los Angeles (1970); 3 Cal.ja

62, Ono2; Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 95 Cal.

od 620, 039; Sanders v. City of Los Angeles (196/) Lu

Cal.App.od GOB; accord Griffin v. Bourd of Supervisors

l'#)93) 00 Cal.i'd 418 (mandate directing board of sup-

ervisors to reapportion county).)

®Concurrine and dissenting opinion, pages °=-3.

trial court, is definitive, and admits of no discretion.

The findings and judgirent establish precise

mathematical standards which, applicd to the survey

Gata, yield tne exact sums due, The triai court, in

fact, awarded plaintiffs prejudgment interest on thc

Ground that the action was one "to enforce an underly-

ing, monetary obligation the amount of which was certain

or could have been made certain by calculation." (im-

phasis added.) Unquestionably the negotiation and

approval of the understanding involved the cxereise of

discretion by city officials. (San Joaquin County kn-

ployees' Assn., Inc. v. County of San Joaquin, supra,

39 Cal.App.3d 83, 87-88.) But in approving; the under-

standing, the city exhausted that discretion; the duty

of its officials to carry out its obligations is of

ministerial character,

7. The cause must be remanded for joinger

oi e city oificers c arhe W ee

uty of computing anc paying wares “ia

GS2iarics oi city employees.

AS we have noted, the trial court mandated

perfornance of the ministerial acts of computing and

paying; the oalaries as fixed by the judgment. The

court's writ, however, was dlreetecu only to the cits

and its councilmen; plaintiris falled to join as addi-

tional defendants the city officials entrusted with the

administrative duties of computing and paying salaries,

The trial court judgment and randate thus suffer from

@ procedural defect similar to that discussed by tac

Court of Appeal in Martin v. County of Contra Costa

(1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 856.

In Martin, plaintiffs sued the county and its

board of supervisors to mandate payment of uniform al-

lowances. The trial court rendered judgment only

against those named defendants, and not against the

county officers responsible for payment of the allow-

ances. In remanding the cause for further proceedings,

the Court of Appeal stated that “The only defect in

proceedings and judgment is the failure to join the

proper ministerial officers of the county government.

Plaintiffs should be permitted to join the proper par-

ties. . .. Since the county is the real party in in-

terest and has been represented throughout, those min-

isterial officers should not be permitted to assert any

laches or limitations upon being joined, but should be

bound by the findings made against the county and its

voard of supervisors which have been approved in this

opinion.” (8 Cal.App.3c at p. bof.)

rollowing tne reasoning of the Court of Ap-

peal, we hold that the present judgment in favor of

plaintiffs must be reversed and remanded to permit

joinder of the appropriate city officials. These mini-

sterial officers should not be permitted to assert any

defense of laches or limitations, and wili be bound dy

the findings of the trial court made against the city.

8. Plaintiffs' cross-appeal is not meritorious.

The City of Glendale bas traditionally deter-

mined employee salaries by establishing a five-step

salary range for each job classification. The trial

court directed that whenever Glendale's salary for the

fifth step of a salary range was less than the average

salary from the surveyed jurisdictions, the city must

raise the fifth step salary to an amount equal to that

average plus one cent; it further directed that sal-

aries for steps one through four be raised proportion-

ately to the fifth step salary.

Plaintiffs argue on their cross-appeal that

the trial court, instead of directing payment of fifth

step salaries equal to the survey average plus one

cent, should have ordered the city to provide salary

increases to the closest fifth step of a higher range

above the average. We believe, however, that the court

did exactly that which plaintiffs now request; in fixe

ing step five salaries at the average plus one cent, and

increasing step one through four salaries proportionate-

ly, the court in effect established a new salary range

at a level sufficient to assure plaintiffs a salary

above the averace from the Surveyed jurisdiction. Al-

though plaintiffs would prefer a raise to a salary range

which exceeded that average by more than the one cent

differential established by the trial court, they point

to nothing in the memorandum of understanding or the

evidence which bars the creation of new salary ranges

so long as they yield an above-average wage.

9. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is

reversed, and the cause remanded for further procecd-

ings in accord with the views expressed in this opinion,

Fach side shall bear its own costs on appeal,

TOBRINER, J,

WE CONCUR:

WRIGHT, C.J.

McCOMB, J.

SULLIVAN, J,

CLARK, J.

RICHAKDSON, J.

he)

GLENDALE CITY EMPLOYEES ASSN. v. CITY OF GLENDALE

L.A. 30357

CONCURRING ANN DISSENTING OPINION RY FOSK, J.

IT concur ir, the reversal of the jurirment, bdut I

dissent from the directions riven upon remand.

The majority make out a persuasive case for Clodiin

that a memorandum of understandinr rerardine municipal emplovee

Salaries was reached and that the city should in good con-

Science honor its arreement. From that moral readinr, how-

ever, the majority leap to a leral conclusion which results in

Judicial invasion of the legislative process, and the matter

is returned to the trial court for issuance of an order which

cannot, or should not, be enforced.

The posture in which tnis case comes to us is of

Sipnificance. [first of all, the plaintiffs sued no minis-

terial officers; they sued the City of Glendale and five indi-

viduals identified as “the duly elected councilmen,” members

of the "roverninr body” of the City of Glendale. tio other

persons, particularly none with ministerial as distinguisned

from lerislative duties, appeared in the action at any time.

Secondly, the trial court issued a writ of mandate

“directing the respondents and each of them [i.e., the city

ele

and the duly elected councilmen) to proceed at once to pro-

vide salary and ware increases to petitioners... . .

And finally, in their petition for hearinr the

petitioners seek mandate to enforce a menoranduy “executed

by the City of Glendale,” not mere performance of a duty by

an identified ministerial public servant.

The majority have cited no authoritative cases in which

a city and its legislative body have been mandated to adopt an

ordinance, relating to salaries or to any other subject. The reason

there are no such appellate cases is clementary: adoption or

rejection of an ordinance has always been recornized as an act

of lerislative discretion and courts may not interfere with

that lepislative function. fach councilman has his electors:ly

bestowed right to vote “aye” or "nay" on any proposal rendin=

before the body. Perhaps, as here, the city and its rovern-

ine lerislators should have honored an obliration, Dut they

cannot be compelled to do so by mandate of a court.

Let us review the cases cited by the majority to pur-

portedly support their conclusion that a city and its council-

men may be ordered to enact a specified ordinance. in Tevis

v. City and County of San Francisco (1954) 43 Cal.2d 199, 194,

members of a commission, the secretary of the civil service

commission and the controller “were directed to certify and

approve payrolic.” his was clearly a ministerial act, but,

the court continued at pare °%), city officiais “may not be

compelled to authorize the payment of compensation or issuer a

warrant when funds are lacking [i.e., umappecrrtaved..” Thic

court expressed the hope the city would mare funds available,

but there war no order for it to do so. Ross v. Hoard of

Education (1912) 18 Cal.App. 2227, involved an order directinr

members of a board to pay £100 due on an emnloyment contract.

Flora Crane Service, ‘nc. v. Toss (176%) €1 Cal.2d

199, concerned mandate arainst the city controller because

he had failed to perform what the court found to be a minis-

terial duty (id. at p. 204). To the same effect is San

Francisco v. Boyd (1941) 17 Cal.2d 606: Involvinr an employ-

ment contract, the mandate suit was not directed to the city

or its legislative body, but arainst the controller, a minis-

terial officer. Similarly in Ackerman v. ‘ioody (1918) 35

Cal.App. 461, the city auditor, not the City of San Diero or

its council, was ordered by mandate to certify a recall election.

The majority, in footnote 24, desperately attempt

te find some authority for courts to mandate lerislative

veodies. They miss the target. Sanders v. City of Los Anreles

(1970) 3 Cal.3d 252, and Sanders v. City of Los Angeles (19f7)

252 Cal.App.2d 486, arose out of the same circumstances. ihe

courts found that a ministerial officer had failed to perform

his charter-required function. "As the adviser of the

committees and the council and as the responsible official

of the city, the City Administrative Officer falled utterly

to perform his duties.” (Id. at p. 493 of 52 Cal.App.2d.)

de, and several administrative departments--recreation and

parks, library, retirement system, pensions--were then

directed to perform their ministerial duties.

o In Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d

626, 632, the court declared that the Board of Supervisors

failed to perform its duty, but found only that the board has

"a quasi-judicial, non-lerislative, fact-findinr function

preceding the performance of the indicated lerislative act.”

(Italics added.) It was that nonlerislative function the

board was mandated to perform.

It is true that we ordered the Board of Supervisors

to redistrict supervisorial districts in riffin v. Board of

Supervisors (1963) 60 Cal.2d 318. I point out, however,

that this court obviously has had sccond thourhts about the

propriety of such an order, for it was not repeated in sub-

sequent reapportionment cases. We never arain mandated a

legislative body to pass a reapportionment act; we indicated

thet if 1% did not do so by a specified tire, the court

woula undertake the task. And we did. (Olilver v. Brown

(1965) G3 Cal.2d 279, 281; Lerislature v. “Yeinecke (1972)

6 Cal.% 595, 693; Legislature v. Reinecke (1972) 7 Cal.7%d 22,

7; Lemislature v. Reinecke (1°72) 10 Cal.i3ad 396.)

Thus it is abundantly clear that appellate courts

do not order a political subdivision as an entity, or its

legislative body, to act or to refrain from acting in any

specified manner.

Tandy v. City of Oakland (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 609,

is a case in point. Plaintiffs sought to mandate the city

council to rezone tneir preperty on a theory that the current

zoning ordinances were unconstitutioral as applied. The ceust

held tnat such ordinances “are entirely within the d!secret'or

of the municipal lerislative hody”" and tnat "a court cannct

Substitute its judrment for that of the municinality” (id. at

p. 612). To the identical effect is Johanson v. City Counc!l

(1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 68, 72

The majority seem to assume that a mere ministerial

net, rerformed bv unidentified “appropriate city offictals”

(ante, p. ___"), will provide the petitioners with the remedy

they seek. The assumption is unjustified.

As alleged in the complaint and as found hy the

trial fudre, on Jentember 29, 1970, the city couned] adonted

salary ordinance jo. 3921, which, said the trial court, “id

net provice tnereases in salaries and wares” based unen tie

rurportedc formula. The adoption of tnat ordinance was clearly

Multilith opinion, pare 31.

a lerislative act, 25, indeed, is the passare or rejection of can the ministerial officers secure enactment of a county

ary ordinance. If there are to be any other or different ordinance as prayed? The lartin court rives us ne clue, nor

salary provisions, ordinance Wo. 32971 rust be repealed by the do the majority advise us here how the unidentified ministerial]

city council ar nother ordinance aconte in its stead. Cc officers, at this late date to be arenced inte the case, are ic

action wi a] e strictly lerislative in character undertake the lerislative task of repealine ordinance fio. 3321

hat brinres us back to square one: there is no and adrting another measure in its place.

authority for this court or any court, to direct how th

———$— OO nn O ———————

— TT

ity councilmer individually or collectively, ure to vote ‘ 1} :

: at Pin nally, I am compelled to make an embarrassinr inquiry.

on nv easure propo: 1 to repeal ordinance on, 39). Poamrseasent .

ow do my learned collearues propose to enforer their order

t 1 bar ined understandinre, the councilmen may be under a

naturally it is to be hoped that ll rood eitizen:

moral obliration to adopt a new salary ordinance. ‘iowever,

will accept a final judicial determination of their rirhts

the question before us is not the existence of a prior conmit-

anc uties. But let us assume arruendo that the “Glendale

ment, but whether a court may compel a lerislative result. ;

- a se — City uneciimen aie intransirent, that thev steadfast) yv Pp.

The procedure erploved by the Court of Appeal in = s

Posey t¢ nen ry eal ordinance ‘Io. 299} ard to adon?t ane ther

Martin v. County of Contra Costa (1979) ® Cal.App.i% °56,

Salary ordtr -e in its stead. Are my collearurs prerared

and adopted oy the mafority here, is untenable. The court

to cite the entire lerislative tody for conterrt of their order?

there conceded “the reneral princinie that the courts have

a (See, e.7., City of Vernon v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2¢

no power to compel the performance of 2 lerislative act” and

909, 519-520.) I would hope not. Yet the potential need to

that the netitioners asked for mandate to compel the city “to

GO SO demonstrates one of the ritfalls when the tudiciary at-

r . an ordinance which compensates and provices benefits

termnts In manner te dictat how the acie itive Nerocece fe

‘erHar- ic. at p. 845). It then proceeded to

1d to function

or r *“ sinistertal officers. Ow, It must he asked,

1 the final analysis, this is not a labor or

Salary case nor is it litigation over a contract. This is

’

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separat On

————

upper _ uw

Upon a 1 Y

1r ‘mone

’ Wa - |

has ‘ a

project o

e, no matter how

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.