Opposition — Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma

Supreme Court brief1976

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Text

Octroper Term, 1975

No. 75-923

Construction INpustRY AssoclATION OF Sonoma COUNTY,

a California non-profit corporation, THE San FRANcIsco,

PENINSULA AND Repwoop Empire Burtpine INpusTRY

AssociaTion, a California non-profit corporation,

PetatumMa Partners, a California limited part-

nership, and Wiri1amM LAWRENCE,

Petitioners,

vs.

Tre Crry or Peratuma, a California Charter City, HELEN

Putnam, Ropert A. Brunner, Jonn W. Cavanaau,

Rosert E. Dary, James L. Harperson, Frep

V. Martret, and Wu.timM A. Perry,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

———[—hBB|

Rosert T. ANpDERSON,

Den-DvuLK, Dovetass & ANDERSON,

The Vintage Building, Suite 310

P.O. Box 918,

Orinda, California 94563

Telephone: (415) 254-7400

Epovarp F. Robert,

133'/p Kentucky Street.

Petaluma, California 94952,

Telephone: | 707) 762-8725

Attorneys for Respondents.

PERNAU - WALSH PRINTING CO.- 562 MISSION STREET - SAN FRANCISCO, CA 84105

Page

NN FR ee eae eS 1

BED 660n cneend ncn ccncéncccncudedsebésectiscbdccias 6

Petitioners have no standing to assert the right to travel 6

IT.

In any event, the right to travel has no application to

land use regulations which give equal treatment to resi-

dents and non-residents alike ................--2.000: 9

ITI.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is in strict accord

Se re GE GD ccvcncccccnccstenessucces 12

IV.

The validity of a local land-use regulation is not deter-

mined by its regional effect. In any event, the Petaluma

plan is in furtherance of the general welfare even if

measured by regional impact ....................5-- 15

CE a a ie are ee a 19

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages

Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 18 L.Ed. 745

CED 6 cnveqescoescucdvedscuuessccousessesacdéacacec 9

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) .. 9

Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941) .. 9

Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 39

SE ED CED voncesnnccucccenscecceesoecstscéeee 9

Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 300, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849) 9

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) 9

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) .......

epbaceedadubbetedketsdbesenbnseneeasneeese 11, 12, 13, 17, 18

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 12

Warth v. Seldin, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (June 25, 1975) ......... 7

Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250

(Othh Cle. 1974) 2. ccccccccccccccccccccccccecescscces 13

In the Supreme Court

Huited States

Octoser Term, 1975

ConstTrucTION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION Or Sonoma CouNTYy,

a California non-profit corporation, THE San FRANCISCO,

PENINSULA AND REpwoop Empire Burtpine INDUSTRY

AssociaTion, a California non-profit corporation,

PETALUMA PARTNERs, a California limited part-

nership, and WILLIAM LAWRENCE,

Petitioners,

vs.

Tue City or Peratvma, a California Charter City, HELEN

PutNaM, Rospert A. BRUNNER, JOHN W. CAVANAGH,

Rospert E. Day, James L. Harperson, FRED

V. Martel, and Wituiam A. Perry,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves the validity of land use regulations

of the City of Petaluma, California. These land use regu-

lations, which were adopted by the City Council in 1971

and 1972, have been collectively referred to throughout

2

this litigation as the Petaluma Plan or the Plan and will

be so referred to herein. Some of the purposes and poli-

cies of the Plan are stated in the portions of the Plan

which are set forth in the Appendix to this Brief.

In early 1971, the City of Petaluma adopted a tempo-

rary freeze on development. The freeze was designed to

give the City an opportunity to evaluate development

trends, ascertain the needs and desires of its citizens, and

develop a coordinated response to a broad range of press-

ing municipal concerns, including the inadequacy of public

facilities (principally water supply and sewage treatment

facilities) to serve a rapidly increasing population, the

adverse environmental impact of urban sprawl and of

expanded residential construction, the imbalance between

single-family and multi-family residential units, the con-

centration of growth in the form of grid-type subdivisions

in the eastern section of the City, and adverse effect of

these trends upon the City’s tax base.

Shortly after the imposition of the freeze, the City

established a special Development Policy Advisory Com-

mittee. With the aid of a firm of independent planning

consultants, this Committee prepared a Development Pol-

iey which was reviewed and recommended favorably by

the city planning commission, The city council adopted

the Development Policy in June, 1971. ( Plaintiffs’ Exhibit

No. 1-5, Pages 29-36)

After extensive public hearings and full expression of

views by all segments of the community, including prop-

erty owners and developers, the City Council adopted

Environmental Design Plans in March, 1972 (Plaintiffs’

Exhibit No. 1-5, Page 37), stated the City’s Policy with

3

Respect to Residential Construction and Population

Growth in April, 1972 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-5, Pages

38-40), adopted the Residential Development Control Sys-

tem in August, 1972 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-7), and

adopted the Housing Element of the General Plan in

September, 1972. (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-8)

These five elements, collectively referred to as the Plan,

constitute an interim land use regulation in effect for a

period of five years ending in 1977. The Plan provides for

orderly, manageable and reasonable growth both within

and without the City during its five year duration. The

Plan as adopted and in effect is the sole matter before

the court, not some other or different regulation or plan

about which there may be speculation. It is a growth plan,

not a no-growth plan.

The Plan provides that residential development which

is subject to the Plan shall be limited to about 500 res-

idential units per year, or a total of 2,500 for the five

year period. Residential developments of four dwelling

units or less are excepted from the Plan, and do not count

against the stated numerical limit. Development in Peta-

luma at the rate of 500 dwelling units per year represents

a growth rate of approximately six percent (6%) each

year, even without taking into account the developments

of four units or less; the growth rate in the entire San

Francisco Bay area, in contrast, is approximately one and

one-half pereent (114%) per year.

The Plan provides a system of allocation of the per-

mitted number of dwelling units among applicants engaged

in the business of residential development. An allocation

board makes a preliminary determination upon the basis

4

of several criteria enumerated in the Plan, and the final

allocation determination is made by the City Council. The

allocation procedure is spelled out in detail and includes

provisions for hearings an. appeals.

Allocations are divided between sections of the City

and between single-family dwellings and multiple residen-

tial units. Specific provision is made for low and moderate

income housing: the Council may require that 8-12% of

the dwelling units each year shall be in this category,

and low and moderate income housing is established as

one of the criteria for which allocation points are given.

If all of the allocations for one year are not made, there

are provisions for carryover of the unused allocations to

following years.

This case clearly does not involve racial discrimination,

economic status discrimination or discrimination between

residents and non-residents. In short, it does not invelve

discrimination in any manner, shape or form. This non-

discriminatory feature of the Plan was clearly recognized

by the Court of Appeals:

“Although appellees have attempted to align their

business interests in attacking the Plan with legiti-

mate housing needs of the urban poor and racial

minorities, the Association has not alleged nor can it

allege, based on the record in this case, that the

Plan has the purpose and effect of excluding poor

persons and racial minorities. Cf. Board of County

Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va.

653, 107 S.E. 2d 390 (1959). Contrary to the picture

painted by appellees, the Petaluma Plan is ‘inclusion-

ary’ to the extent that it offers new opportunities,

previously unavailable, to minorities and low and

moderate-income persons. Under the pre-Plan system

4)

single family, middle-income housing dominated the

Petaluma market, and as a result low and moderate

income persons were unable to secure housing in the

area, The Plan radically changes the previous build-

ing pattern and requires that housing permits be

evenly divided between single family and multi-family

units and that approximately eight to twelve per

cent of the units be constructed specifically for low

and moderate income persons.”

(Petition, App. B, at 55 n. 16)

The District Court adjudged the Plan to be invalid

solely on the ground that it violated the constitutional

right to travel. The City secured from Mr. Justice Douglas

a stay of the District Court’s judgment pending appeal.

In its appeal the City was supported by the following

amici:

The Attorney General of the State of California;

Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. and Sierra

Club;

Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachuetts

Institute of Technology and Harvard University;

Environmental Defense Fund;

The County of Marin, California;

The City of Los Angeles;

The following California cities:

Walnut Creek, Burbank, Corona, Norco, Pasadena,

San Diego, Livermore, Pleasanton, Lafayette, Pleas-

ant Hill, Vallejo, Hayward, Richmond, Mountain

View, San Jose, Chico, Sacramento, Santa Ana,

Thousand Oaks, Davis, Concord, Benicia, Fullerton,

Riverside, Irvine, Yorba Linda, Palo Alto, San

Juan Capistrano, McFarland and Tehachapi.

The Court of Appeals, in unanimously reversing the

judgment of the District Court, determined that the Peti-

6

tioners did not have standing to raise the issue of right

to travel, and that the Plan did not violate the due process

or commerce clauses and was therefore valid and con-

stitutional.

ARGUMENT

a.

PETITIONERS HAVE NO STANDING TO ASSERT

THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Petitioners are two trade associations whose members

are real estate developers and homebuilders, one owner

of property outside the City of Petaluma, and an owner

of property substantially all of which is outside the City

of Petaluma. Thus all of the petitioners are persons or

entities engaged in or interested in land development.

Without alleging or establishing any representative or

derivative capacity, petitioners seek to represent unnamed

and unnamedable persons whose right to travel is allegedly

being infringed by the Plan. These people are allegedly

being frustrated in their efforts to move from points

unknown to Petaluma. It is evident that the primary

concern of petitioners, however, is really an alleged “right”

to build residential units wherever and whenever they

choose, regardless of local land use regulations. Petitioners

seek to advance their economic interests by masquerad-

ing under the attempted assertion of a right to travel on

behalf of a group to which petitioners bear no demon-

strable connection. None of the petitioners is in the cate-

gory of persons who may claim a right to migrate and

settle as part of the right to travel, nor have they estab-

7

lished the kind of relationship to such persons that would

permit them to assume representation of the interests

of such persons. Petitioners thus have no standing to

raise the right to travel issue.

This Court’s recent decision in Warth v. Seldin, 45

L.Ed.2d 343 (June 25, 1975) is fully dispositive of the

standing issue. In that case an attack was made by a

group of low-income and minority-group plaintiffs on the

validity of the zoning regulations of the incorporated

municipality of Penfield, a suburb of Rochester, New York,

it being contended that the zoning regulations effectively

prevented minority and low and moderate income people

from living in the town. A home builders association

comprised of firms engaged in residential construction in

the Rochester area, including Penfield, sought to intervene.

An organization known as the Housing Council, made up

of members interested in housing problems, petitioned to

be joined as a party plaintiff. It was alleged that one of

the members of the Housing Council, Penfield Better

Homes Corporation, “is and has been actively attempting

to develop moderate income housing” in Penfield “but has

been stymied by its inability to secure the necessary ap-

provals.” Standing was denied to the low-income and

minority-group plaintiffs, and on the same ground of

lack of standing the petition of the homebuilders associa-

tion to intervene was denied and the Housing Council was

refused permission to be joined as a party plaintiff.

In the Petaluma case, the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Cireuit denied standing to petitioners to raise the

right to travel issue on the direct authority of Warth,

using the following language:

8

“A corollary to the ‘zone of interest’ requirement is

the well-recognized general rule that ‘even when the

plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the “case

or controversy” requirement, ... the plaintiff must

assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot

rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests

of third parties.’ Warth v. Seldin, _. US. —-, —,

slip op. at 8 (1975); accord, United States v. Raines,

362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.

249, 256 (1953). |

“ .. their economic interests are undisputedly out-

side the zone of interest to be protected by any pur-

ported constitutional right to travel. Accordingly,

appellees’ right to travel claim ‘falls squarely within

the prudential standing rule that normally bars

litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests

of others in order to obtain relief from injury to

themselves.’ Warth v. Seldin, U.S. at ..., slip op. at

18.”

(Petition, App. B, at 44-46)

In short, the Court of Appeals gave careful and detailed

consideration to the issue of petitioners’ standing to raise

a right to travel claim, and correctly applied the prior

decisions of this Court in concluding that petitioners

lacked standing. The instant case presents no new con-

siderations which might warrant review by the Court.

9

Il.

IN ANY EVENT, THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL HAS NO APPLICA-

TION TO LAND USE REGULATIONS WHICH GIVE EQUAL

TREATMENT TO RESIDENTS AND NON-RESIDENTS ALIKE.

The Plan, as described above, provides a fair and rea-

sonable system designed to ensure that new housing in

the Petaluma area will be constructed and located in an

orderly and rational manner, thereby promoting and pro-

tecting the health, safety and well being of the citizenry.

The Plan’s regulations and policies apply equally to all

and in no way singles out only those who have traveled.

Yet, in every case in which the Supreme Court has found

a violation of the right to travel, the challenged regulation

has on its face singled out for disadvantageous treatment

only those who have traveled. In the Passenger Cases, 48

U.S. (7 How.) 300, 12 L.Ed. 702 (1849), the statutes in

question imposed a tax on alien passengers landing at

state ports. In Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,

18 L.Ed. 745 (1868), the Court struck down a tax of one

dollar a head imposed on the exit of persons from the

State of Nevada. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,

86 L.Ed. 119 (1941), the challenged statute prohibited the

introduction of indigent persons into the State of Cali-

fornia. And more recently, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394

U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), Dunn v. Blumstein, 405

U.S. 330, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), and Memorial Hospital

v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974),

residency requirements barring new residents from re-

ceiving welfare, from voting, and from receiving free

medical services, were invalidated.

Thus, while many local and state regulations, including

those governing land use, may have an indirect impact on

10

the right to travel in the sense that the restriction of such

regulations may cause some to believe that the city or

state imposing the regulations is a less desirable place to

live, there is no violation of the right to travel unless the

regulations are more restrictive for new residents. This

point was recognized by the Court of Appeals in its

decision in this case:

“The plaintiffs in Belle Terre claimed inter alia that

the ordinance interfered with a person’s right to

travel and right to migrate to and settle within a

state.

The Supreme Court held that since the ordinance

was not aimed at transients, there was no infringe-

ment of anyone’s right to travel. 416 U.S. at 7. Al-

though due to appellees’ lack of standing we do not

reach today the right to travel issue, we note that

the Petaluma Plan is not aimed at transients, nor

does it penalize those who have recently exercised

their right to travel. See CEEED v. California

Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 43 Cal.App.3d

306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 332-334 (1974); ef. Dunn v.

Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).”

(Petition, App. B, at 52-53 n.13).

The Petaluma Plan does not single out newcomers for

special and disadvantageous treatment; both newcomers

and persons residing in Petaluma who are seeking new

housing have equal access to the available housing on the

market. Like virtually all land use regulation, the Peta-

luma Plan’s indirect effect on the production and cost of

housing is felt equally by all, regardless of whether one

is migrating from New York to Petaluma, or only moving

around the corner in search of a larger home for a grow-

ing family.

11

The error inherent in the expansion of the right to

travel into the area of land use regulation, as urged by

petitioners, was underscored by this Court’s flat rejection

of such ar expansion last term in Village of Belle Terre

v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). There a New York village

ordinance which restricted land use to one family dwell-

ings, excluding lodging, boarding, fraternity or multiple

dwelling houses, and defined the word “family” to mean

one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or mar-

riage, or not more than two unrelated persons, living

and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, was

challenged as violating, inter alia, the right to travel. The

Court dismissed this assertion quickly, holding that the

ordinance “involves no ‘fundamental’ right guaranteed

by the Constitution. .. . We deal with economie and

social legislation where legislatures have historically

drawn lines which we respect against the charge of viola-

tion of the Equal Protection Clause if the law be ‘reason-

able, not arbitrary’ and bear ‘a rational relationship to a

(permissible) state objective.’” Belle Terre, supra, 416

U.S. at 7-8 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Moreover, Mr. Justice Marshall, while dissenting on the

grounds that the ordinance burdened the exercise of First

Amendments rights, concurred in this Court’s express

holding that there existed a broadly defined zoning power

wholly free from limitations imposed by the right to

travel:

“T would also agree with the majority that local zon-

ing authorities may properly act in furtherance of

the objectives asserted to be served by the ordinance

at issue here: restricting uncontrolled growth, solving

traffic problems, keeping rental costs at a reasonable

12

level, and making the community attractive to

families.”

416 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added)

Il.

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN STRICT

ACCORD WITH ALL EXISTING AUTHORITY

In this case the Court of Appeals carefully applied the

test by which the validity of land use regulations has

been measured since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty

Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)—whether the regulations are a

reasonable exercise of the police power. The court stated:

“It is well settled that zoning regulations ‘must

find their justification in some aspect of the police

power, asserted for the public welfare.’ Vilage of

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).

The concept of the public welfare, however, is not

limited to the regulation of noxious activities or dan-

gerous structures. As the Court stated in Berman v.

Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954):

The concept of the public welfare is broad and

inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as

well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It

is within the power of the legislature to determine

that the community should be beautiful as well as

healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as

well as carefully patrolled.

(citations omitted). Accord, Village of Belle Terre

v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6, 9 (1974).

“In determining whether the City’s interest in pre

serving its small town character and in avoiding

uncontrolled and rapid growth falls within the broad

13

concept of ‘public welfare’, we are considerably

assisted by two recent cases. Belle Terre, supra, and

Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d

250 (9th Cir. 1974), each of which upheld as not

unreasonable a zoning regulation much more restric-

tive than the Petaluma Plan, are dispositive of the

due process issue in this case.”

(Petition, App. B, at 51-52)

The court then discussed at length the holdings in Belle

Terre and Los Altos Hills:

“Both the Belle Terre ordinance and the Los Altos

Hills regulation had the purpose and effect of per-

manently restricting growth; nonetheless, the court

in each case upheld the particular law before it on

the ground that the regulation served a legitimate

governmental] interest falling within the concept of

the public welfare: the preservation of quiet family

neighborhoods (Belle Terre) and the preservation of

a rural environment (Los Altos Hills). Even less

restrictive or exclusionary than the above zoning

ordinances is the Petaluma Plan which, unlike those

ordinances, does not freeze the population at present

or near-present levels. Further, unlike the Los Altos

Hills ordinance and the various zoning regulations

struck down by state courts in recent years, the Peta-

luma Plan does not have the undesirable effect of

walling out any particular income class nor any

racial minority group.”

“We conclude therefore that under Belle Terre and

Los Altos Hills the concept of the public welfare is

sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma’s desire to pre-

serve its small town character, its open spaces and

low density of population, and to grow at an orderly

and deliberate pace.”

(Petition, App. B, at 54-55, 57)

14

Petitioners contend that the Petaluma Plan is an “ad-

mittedly exclusionary land-use ordinance.” Nothing of the

sort has even been admitted. In fact, as pointed out above,

the Court of Appeals characterized the Plan as “inclu-

sionary” rather than exclusionary. The Court of Appeals

properly recognized that “Practically all zoning restric-

tions have as a purpose and effect the exclusion of some

activity or structure or a certain density of inhabitants.”

(Page 51) Petitioners apparently have seized upon this

statement of a universally recognized characteristic of

zoning regulations in their attempt to liken the Petaluma

Plan to those local land-use regulations that have been

invalidated by the highest state courts of Pennsylvania

and New Jersey on the ground that they were “exclusion-

ary”. Petitioners clearly misunderstand not only the

intrinsic nature of zoning regulations but also the very

narrow and specialized applicability of the so-called “ex-

clusionary zoning” theory.

The Court of Appeals, recognizing the exclusionary

nature of all zoning regulations, clearly delineated the

province of the court in passing upon the validity of

such regulations:

+

. in reviewing the reasonableness of a zoning

ordinance, our inquiry does not terminate with a

finding that it is for an exclusionary purpose. We

must determine further whether the exclusion bears

any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.

If it does not, then the zoning regulation is invalid.

If, on the other hand, a legitimate state interest is

furthered by the zoning regulation, we must defer to

the legislative act. Being neither a super legislature

nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal court is with-

15

out authority to weigh and reappraise the factors

considered or ignored by the legislative body in pass-

ing the challenged zoning regulation. The reasonable-

ness, not the wisdom, of the Petaluma Plan is at issue

in this sutt.”

(Petition, App. B, at 51) (lasi emphasis added)

The Ninth Cireuit Court of Appeals decision conflicts

neither with any past decision of the Supreme Court

nor with that of any other circuit. It makes no new law

but rather is entirely consistent with well-established

principles long ago set forth by the Court. These prin-

ciples are sound and make good sense and no justification

for departure from them had been demonstrated.

IV.

THE VALIDITY OF A LOCAL LAND-USE REGULATION IS NOT

DETERMINED BY ITS REGIONAL EFFECT. IN ANY EVENT,

THE PETALUMA PLAN IS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE

GENERAL WELFARE EVEN IF MEASURED BY REGIONAL

IMPACT.

Petitioners continue to assert that the validity of local

land-use regulations must be determined upon the basis

of their regional impact. While it is true that a local

land-use regulation may have an effect upon the surround-

ing region, it does not follow that the constitutional

validity of the regulation is determined upon that basis.

The Court of Appeals clearly stated the law in this

regard:

“Although we assume that some persons desirous

of living in Petaluma will be excluded under the

16

housing permit limitation and that, thus, the Plan

may frustrate some legitimate regional housing needs,

the Plan is not arbitrary or unreasonable. We agree

with appellees that unlike the situation in the past

most municipalities today are neither isolated nor

wholly independent from neighboring municipalities

and that, consequently, unilateral land use decisions

by one local entity affect the needs and resources of

an entire region. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Board

of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E. 2d 491,

334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003

(1972): National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419

Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Note, Phased Zoning:

Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land De-

velopment, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 585, 605 (1974). It does

not necessarily follow, however, that the due process

rights of builders and landowners are violated merely

because a local entity exercises in its own self-interest

the police power lawfully delegated to it by the state.

See Belle Terre, supra; Los Altos Hills, supra. If

the present system of delegated zoning power does

not effectively serve the state interest in furthering

the general welfare of the region or entire state, it

is the state legislature’s and not the federal courts’

role to intervene and adjust the system. As stated

supra, the federal court is not a super zoning board

and should not be called on to mark the point at

which legitimate local interests in promoting the

welfare of the community are outweighed by legiti-

mate regional interests. See Note, supra, at 608-11.”

(Petition, App. B, at 56-57)

It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals

assumed “that some persons desirous of living in Peta-

luma will be excluded under the housing permit limita-

17

tion.” While this assumption may be legitimate, there is

nothing in the record which directly su »ports it. There

are no allegations or proof in this case that there is any

shortage of housing in Petaluma or that any person seek-

ing housing in Petaluma has been unable to find it.

Even if regional impact is adopted as part of the test

to determine the validity of a loca) '‘and-use regulation,

it is submitted that the Petaluma Plan is in furtherance

of the general welfare and therefore valid.

It is a legitimate function of the exercise of the zoning

power to restrict uncontrolled growth and a local govern-

mental entity has broad discretion in selecting the means

to implement such objective. In Belle Terre, Mr. Justice

Marshall dissented from the majority opinion but con-

curred with the Court’s holding that the zoning power is

extremely broad:

“(L)ocal zoning authorities may properly act in fur-

therance of the objectives asserted to be served by

the ordinance at issue here: restricting uncontrolled

growth, solving traffic problems, keeping rental costs

at a reasonable level, and making the community

attractive to families. The police power which pro-

vides the justification for zoning is not narrowly con-

fined. And, it is appropriate that we afford zoning

authorities considerable latitude in choosing the means

by which to implement such purposes.”

416 U.S. at 13-14 (emphasis added)

Any zoning measure which restricts uncontrolled growth

in one community may have an effect on the demand for

growth in another community, but uncontrolled growth

in any community is inimical to the general weifare.

18

While different communities may select different means

to accomplish the same objective, the general welfare is

served where the police power test stated by the court in

Belle Terre is met:

“A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and

motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in

a land-use project addressed to family needs. This

goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker,

supra. The police power is not confined to elimination

of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to

lay out zones where family values, youth values, and

the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make

the area a sanctuary for people.”

416 U.S. at 9

Moreover, virtually every modern case relied upon by

petitioners to support their vague assertion that regional

needs are the touchstone for review of local land use

regulation, involved the exclusion from a community of

a particular type of land use—whether low or moderate

income housing, small lot development, apartments or

mobile homes—all of which the Petaluma Plan actively

encourages.

To suggest, as petitioners do here, that the proper

manner of resolution of possible conflicts between regional

and local needs in land use planning is the blunt instru-

ment of constitutional law is to belie the enormous com-

plexity of the task the federal courts are being invited

to assume. Local government has no authority over re-

gional problems, yet it is asserted that they are constitu-

tionally mandated to solve them. Moreover, regional needs

may be defined differently by different localities. Most

19

importantly, regions have a variety of needs, only one of

which is housing, and all of which may conflict. To place

the Federal courts in the position of arbiter of these

conflicts is to make the courts not just a zoning board

of appeals, but a legislature.

CONCLUSION

The Petaluma Plan is an effort by a relatively small

community to manage its anticipated residential growth

in a reasonable, well-balanced, non-chaotic manner. It is

not an attempt to curtail or limit growth necessarily,

but rather to provide some order to the amount of growth

that could be reasonably anticipated from previous ex-

perience. The number of residential units permitted to be

built annually under the Petaluma Plan is substantially

the same as the average annual rate for the five year

period 1967-1971. Thus the number used has a sound basis

and is not an arbitrary or unreasonable figure.

It is inherent in the very concept of land use regula-

tion that there will be an incidental effect of reducing

the amount of residential construction to less than market

demand (although respondents submit that petitioners

have not proven this to be the case with respect to

Petaluma. )

The Court of Appeals has held that the Plan is a rea-

sonable and legitimate exercise of the City’s police power

and is therefore valid and constitutional. The decision of

20

the Court of Appeals is in accord with all authority and

should stand; the petition for a writ of certiorari should

be denied.

Dated, January 26, 1976.

Respectfully submitted,

Rospert T. ANDERSON,

Den-DuLk, Dovctass & ANDERSON,

Epovarp E. Rosert,

By Rosert T. ANDERSON,

Attorneys for Respondents.

(Appendix Follows)

APPENDIX

Appendix

DEVELOPMENT POLICY.

“A. In order to protect its small town character and

surrounding open space, it shall be the policy of

the City to control its future rate and distribu-

tion of growth. A five-year development strategy

is feasible and shall be based on the following

criteria:

1. Development rate shall be tied to school and

utility capacity and the balance or imbalance

shall be constantly monitored and adjusted.

2. A growth rate of about 500 dwelling units

anually shall be the City’s growth policy.

3. The County is hereby solicited to ensure that

all urban and suburban development in the

vicinity of Petaluma is approved by and is

acceptable for annexation to the City without

exception.

4, An east-west balance shall be encouraged in

considering new development.

B. It shall be the policy of the City to provide a

wide choice in types of dwellings and environ-

ments consistent with Petaluma’s essentially sub-

urban character.

C. It shall be the policy of the City to ensure a per-

manent greenbelt of open hills and marshlands

together with open space for recreation and for

definition of urban form.

D. It shall be the policy of the City to protect and

enhance those elements which add beauty and

character to the community.

“TI. Poxuictes Arrectinc RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT

It shall be the policy of the City to improve sub-

divisions and zoning regulations and others con-

trols over development to implement both the

broad policies of growth and environmental qual-

ity and variety in residential areas.

A.

1.

Proper planning and zoning will require En-

vironmental Design Plans, Planned Commu-

nity Districts, and Planned Unit Development

procedures to gain the best design possible

from large-scale land development.

The strategy for the next five years shall be

to redress the present deficiency in multi-

family units in Petaluma, and the zoning or-

dinanece will include bonus allowances +t»

encourage better apartment design and site

planning.

The zoning ordinance will provide for variety -

in densities and building types and thus, wide

ranges of prices and rents. Acceptable qual-

ity shall be maintained at all levels through

good site and architectural design and maxi-

mum use of available Federal subsidies, as

local conditions warrant.

All available laws will be used to ensure that

schools, parks, and greenbelts are provided

as part of the residential development process.

iii

5. Historically important structures shall be pro-

tected.

6. Petaluma will encourage the continued con-

struction of apartments designed for families

with children and pets.

7. The ordinance will provide for both mobile

homes and modular housing, will distinguish

between the two and avoid any tendency for

manufactured units to be clustered in any one

section of the City.

B. The following steps are deemed to be effective to

encourage appropriate location of needed multi-

family development.

1. A limited amount of high density housing will

be encouraged near the Central Business Dis-

trict and above commercial uses.

2. Remodeling of old single-family houses to

apartments in close-in areas will respect his-

toric character of such houses and special zon-

ing regulations will ensure that any new

apartment buildings will be compatible with

older structures.

3. Apartments will be encouraged on the east

side as well as the west side of Petaluma to

provide more variety of population and en-

vironment.”

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-5, at 31-33)

iv

ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN PLANS.

“Five years is a suitable time period for strategic

planning. It assumes that the City should and can

control its short-range future since it can foresee with

reasonable assurance what its problems are and how

much growth it can accommodate while maintaining

an adequate level of public service and a good en-

vironment. Since 500 dwelling units annually is pretty

close to the City’s average during the past decade,

neither the adopted policy statement nor the Environ-

mental Design Plan actually will arrest Petaluma’s

growth. Nor do these plans really restrict the op-

portunity of private property owners to develop their

land. Even without guidance from a five year En-

vironmental Design Plan, very little subdivision ac-

tivity has occurred except adjacent to existing

development. As this report makes clear, it is the

magnitude of the market for developed real estate

in Petaluma’s vicinity that drastically reduces the

likelihood that any particular parcel outside the City

will be developed in the next five years. The Environ-

mental Design Plans have the sole purpose of con- —

tributing to Petaluma’s future welfare by ensuring

that development in the next five years, will take place

in a reasonable, orderly, attractive manner, rather

than in a completely haphazard and unattractive man-

ner’ (emphasis added)

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-5, at 1)

HOUSING ELEMENT OF THE GENERAL PLAN.

“. . . the recommended Residential Development

Program is a response to the City’s desire to formu-

late and adopt policies and plans which will orient

future residential development in Petaluma in ac-

cordance to public choice. Jt is, in effect, an effort to

allow the City to control its growth im a manageable

and environmentally conscious manner rather than

simply reacting to unimpeded development. (emphasis

added)

“The Environmental Design Plans serve the pur-

pose of providing a functional framework for the

overall development of Petaluma during the next five

years. The Housing Element must in turn extract

guideline policies for residential construction during

the period 1973-1977 . . .”

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-8, at 18)

RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT CONTROL

SYSTEM.

“It is the adopted policy of the City of Petaluma

to establish control over the quality, distribution,

and rate of growth of the City in the interest of:

Preserving the quality of the community;

Protecting the green open-space frame of the City;

Insuring the adequacy of City facilities and ser-

vices within acceptable allocation of City and

school tax funds;

Insuring a balance of housing types and values in

the City which will accommodate a variety of

families including families of moderate income

and older families on limited, fixed incomes, and

Insuring the balanced development of the City east,

north, and west of the central core.

“These policies are more completely set forth in

the Official Statement of Development Policy for the

City of Petaluma, adopted by the City Council, Reso-

lution No. 5760 N.C.S., June 7, 1971.

“The policies of the City are given increasingly

specific form in three documents:

1. The Petaluma General Plan adopted March 5,

1962, and as subsequently amended from time

to time.

2. The Petaluma Environmental Design Plans

adopted March 27, 1972.

3. The Housing Element of the General Plan

adopted

“The General Plan establishes long-range general

development policy. The Environmental Design Plan

establishes medium-range and more specific and de-

tailed development policy directed to the develop-

ment period 1973-1977. The Housing Element of the

General Plan defines the housing policy goals of the

City and establishes a proposed Residential Develop- ~

ment Program 1973-1977 as set forth in page 24 of

the Housing Flement.

“It is the purpose of this Residential Development

Control System to implement the policies of the

City of Petaluma as recorded in the Development

Policy Resolution and the three official documents re-

ferred to above .. .”

(Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-7, at 1)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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