Petition — Henritze v. United States
Supreme Court brief1976
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} Supreme Court, tu. ss. 7
| FILED
D&C 27 1975 |
eS
MICHAEL RODAK, JR. cireK |
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OctoBER TERM, 1975
No @5-913 |
Watter M. Hennitze, JR., Petitioner
v.
Unttep STaTEs oF AMERICA
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
WiruaM R. Gienmuiat, III
929 Healey Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Attorney for Petitioner
Press or Byron S. ADAMs PRINTING, INCc., WasHINGTON, D.C.
INDEX
Page
EE ee ee heer Pe ee 1
ID io n:0'5 0055 604d seers cactks cond ennacen 1
Gymeteas FORINWEED oo. ccsccccccccccescccoccccescs 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND Statutory Provisions Invotvep.. 2
I Ud. J ucccicetensedecibncnséveds densehen 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................0-05 9
CS... Uc dace conus ccumeetieekes boas tacatees 17
BEE A i cn doe vecaucansddavedneedadnsoenanesuns la
BEE BO cbbus 6am <i Sb dude ivenseebentikawscducs 3a
I BP iain ends 65-604 ack choses ae haees ue 4a
BE ED 5 6acebecknckndile couch etlbens ceekunsnens 5a
CITATIONS
CASES:
I ee EE, GE g coc ccu cd cn canedsbaaceda 10
BOE G, Wan Ge GE 2 vec cvccccctscvdcceccecss 17
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 ............ 14
Grunewald v. U.S., 353 U.S. SOL... ccc cece cee 11
ee Oe Ws I I ET hoes cewksddccevcccdscves 10, 11
ee Gi Ses. ee EE bc td edu cducescveness 10, 11, 12
I Oe Bias SE ED 6 6s didn Snencncdiecssndee 16
Mancusi v. DeForte, 390 U.S. 364 ................4.5. 13
SS Wi, Wc Se WE GE ond cose cikncsescescecse 13
SD We Wis Ge GN EP cede dcncndccccccccness 13
U.S. v. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86 ... 2... cece cece ceees 14
ee 0 i Oe ss inns otnness of eawneus 14
Index Continued ii
Page
U.S. v. Galvez, 465 F.2d G61... cece ccc cccccccvece 14
U.S. v. Feldman, 366 F.Supp. 356 ..............++. 10, 14
US. v. Jacknom, GOB PBS TRG 2 ccc ccccccescseessess 10
U.S. v. Lember, 319 F.Supp. 356 ............: bite cua 10
U.S. v. Odland, 502 F.Supp. 148 ...............085- 15
U.S. v. McDaniel, 460 F.2d 129 ...............ee0e- 15
US. v. Garme, GOS WBE GIO occccccccccscssessscsse 12, 16
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS:
U. S. Constitution, Amendment IV ................ 2
U. S. Constitution, Amendment VI ................ 3,11
e Serr er eee eee 14
OD We Ge odviwdccdus ckebecechouecuenesuet 2, 3, 4, 10
Bs! ee rr ee 14
Sh WG, BGS cviccccccddvacdscssaccstncaean 4
BD Tis Ge we ccccccccdcccesccusaccaneeteeeesane 2,3
BE WER. GD ose os cvaceccdesddeccanwcevnsases 2, 4, 10
SD De Tee wanncecdssevdcdasuatecesvounuee 2
8, SY SS eee 13
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OctToBeR TERM, 1975
No.
Water M. HEnRITZE, JR., Petitioner
Vv.
UnItTep STATES OF AMERICA
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
The Petitioner, Walter M. Henritze, Jr., defendant
below, respectfully prays that a Writ of Certriorari
issue to review the opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered in this pro-
ceeding on October 21, 1975.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (App. A., in-
fra) and the order denying the motion for rehearing
or rehearing en bane (App. B., infra) are unpub-
lished.
The mandate on the judgment was stayed on Decem-
ber 8, 1975, appellant being given until December 28,
2
1975, to file this writ and notify the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals (App. C., infra). The jurisdiction
of the Court is invoked under 28, U.S.C. 1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether, venue, under 21 U.S.C. 952(a) (im-
portation of marijuana) becomes fixed at the port-of-
entry and discovery ?
2. Whether a search warrant may describe two
premises and either may be searched under the war-
rant.
3. Whether Federal Agents may disregard the stric-
tures of 18 U.S.C. 3109 (announcement of a Federal
Officer’s presence) partially or completely when exe-
euting a search warrant.
4. Whether defendant’s sub-leased office and desk
could be searched without a search warrant.
5. Whether there are any standards of any nature
which are used in the search and seizure of packages
coming into the United States by mail.
6. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain
defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 371 (con-
spiracy) and 21 U.S.C. 952(a) (importation).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATU1 ORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
United States Constitution, Amendment IV, pro-
vides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
3
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment VI, provides
in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall en-
joy the right to trial by an impartial jury of the
state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed. ...
18 U.S.C. 371 provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud
the United States, or any agency thereof in any man-
ner or for any purpose, and one or more of such per-
sons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which
is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only,
the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed
the maximum punishment provided for such misde-
mvanor.
18 U.S.C. 3109 provides:
Breaking doors or windows for entry or exit.—The
officer may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house, or any part of a house or anything
wherein to execute and search warrant, if after notice
of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance
or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aid-
ing him in the execution of the warrant.
4
21 U.S.C. 952(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful to import into the customs
territory of the U.S. from any place outside thereof
(but within the U.S.) from any place outside thereof,
any controlled substance in schedule I or II of title
II, ete.
STATEMENT
After a jury trial in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, petitioner
was convicted of importing a pound of marijuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 952(a) and of conspiring to
commit that offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371.
The court directed a verdict of not guilty as to a
third count under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) (possession
with intent to distribute a controlled substance).
Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for two years
on each count with two years of special parole to fol-
low, both sentences to run concurrently. On appeal
the court affirmed per curiam (App. A) and denied a
motion for rehearing and rehearing en bane (App. 3).
The court stayed the mandate for thirty days pend-
ing the filing of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in
this Court (App. C). This Petition seeks review of
the affirmance of both convictions.
1. The prosecution arose from the following:
On August 8, 1974, Charles Cuccaro, a mail special-
ist working for the customs in New York, opened a
package addressed to June Llewellyn, 2311 Bank of
Georgia Building, Atlanta, Georgia. All packages
from some 20 countries whether first class or not were
opened with the exception of APO packages.
5
He estimated that 99% of all packages coming into
the United States were in fact opened and examined.
Cuccaro, field tested the contents for marijuana and
the test was positive. He wrote a seizure report, ini-
tialed the package, turned the package over to a Drug
Enforcement Administration Officer, who logged it,
resealed the package and sent it on to Atlanta, via
first class regular mail. He, personally, never com-
municated to anyone in Atlanta, though he did include
in the mailing a report on his findings.
Arthur Snitzer, a postal inspector, received the
package on August 20, 1974, in a locked mail bag, with
information that the package contained a controlled
substance.
He informed agent James Williams, of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the arrival on the
same day, the package remained sealed until the day
before delivery, that is the 12th of September, 1974.
Mr. Snitzer had custody of the package until that day,
since the responsibility of the delivery rested with the
case agent for the DEA.
On September 12th, the package was opened with-
out a warrant and tested by Mr. Williams of the DEA
in the presence of United States Postal Inspector
Snitzer, Special Agent Robert Alston, U.S. Customs,
Special Agent James Williems, DEA, Special Agent
George Faz, DEA, and Special Agent Mike Dorsett,
DEA.
Agent Williams then applied for a search warrant
before the Honorable Allen Chancey, United States
Magistrate for the Northern District of Georgia on
the same day. The warrant was issued the same day
by Judge Chancey and the package was resealed.
6
The delay in delivering the package was accounted
for by Agent Williams because the agency lacked
manpower and had a heavy work schedule.
On the following day, September 12, 1974, DEA
Agents Dorsett and Faz entered the premises at 2311
Bank of Georgia Building, between 9:56 and 10:00
o’clock. They did not have an arrest or search warrant
on them. Nor did they identify themselves as Law
Enforcement Officers. At the time he (Dorsett) en-
tered, Mrs. Llewellyn was sitting at her desk in the
reception area. The defendant was not visible and
did not come out of his office (which he subleases from
the firm of Gower, Noland and McGuigan) until after
the package was delivered.
Agent Faz, had told the secretary that he was in
trouble and waiting for a lawyer.
Ezekiel McConnell, a letter carrier for the United
States Postal Service, was given the package on Sep-
tember 13, 1974, by Inspector Snitzer. He delivered
the package at 2311 Bank of Georgia Building and
the secretary signed for the package. Mr. Snitzer told
Mr. McConnell to get the registered mail receipt
signed by the secretary. The package was delivered
in the normal way.
Shortly after delivery defendant came out of his
office and talked to Agents Dorsett, Faz and the secre-
tary.
The package, which had been sitting on the secre-
tary’s desk for some 10 or 15 minutes, was shown to
the defendant by the secretary. The defendant glanced
at the package and returned the item to the secre-
tary. Nothing was said between the defendant and the
secretary. Henritze then returned to his office. A few
7
moments later he came back into the reception area
and told the secretary he was going to the United
States Federal District Court. He then left. The pack-
age was still on the secretary’s desk where she had
put it.
Ten to fifteen minutes after Henritze had left, the
secretary picked up the package and placed it in
what was later found to be the defendant’s office.
There it was seized by Agent Williams when he en-
tered with the search warrant. No arrest warrant had
been is.ued or executed in the case. The secretary was,
however, arrested at that time.
In the interim, the defendant had proceeded down
stairs to the lobby of the Bank of Georgia building.
He had been followed down stairs by Agent Williams.
Defendant was searched after being apprised of the
fact that a search warrant was existent. Nothing being
found on him, he left to go to the Federal District
Court.
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and a Motion
for a Bill of Particulars, both were heard on the day
of the trial. The Bill of Particulars was overruled,
subject to certain information being given to the de-
fendant.
The Motion to Suppress was also overruled al-
though the trial judge thought the point was sub-
stantial.
At the trial the Government’s case implicating the
defendant rested primarily on four witnesses.
The first, Ann Hester, a former secretary, testified
that she and Joyce Weldy had lunch with the defend-
ant, on August 5, 1974 at Crowley’s, in Underground
8
Atlanta, where defendant, in the middle of a general
conversation, said he was expecting some hash from
Amsterdam. She also testified that she had never re-
ceived any package from overseas while working for
the defendant for a period of five or six years. She
also testified that in the entire time they had known
each other, this was the only instance where the de-
fendant had ever mentioned this particular subject.
No mention was made where he was to receive the
hash and Mrs. Hester never mentioned it to the au-
thorities until after the delivery of the package.
Mrs. Weldy testified also to the conversation at the
restaurant. She testified that the defendant said he
was getting a shipment of ‘‘hash’’ in the next week.
She also testified that she had had lunch with the de-
fendant only once in her life.
Theresa Moore testified that the defendant came to
her office and told her he had a pound of hash coming.
She couldn’t remember the date when this happened,
and she did not report this conversation to the author-
ities until after the package was delivered. No one else
was present at this conversation and she never men-
tioned the matter again until the package arrived.
June Llewellyn testified that she worked for the
firm of Gower, Noland and McGuigan at 2311 Bank
of Georgia Building and that defendant rented space
from the firm. :
She testified that a package was delivered to her at
that address and she signed for it. The package had
a return address from Holland. Mrs. Llewellyn knew
no one from there. She said that six or eight weeks
after defendant had rented space he told her that if
she received a package addressed to her she should
9
put it on his desk. No mention was made of a foreign
package.
A package arrived in late May or early June and
the secretary put it on his desk.
On cross-examination she stated she had neither
asked the defendant about the contents of the pack-
age nor had she told anyone of its arrival. The de-
fendant never told the secretary he was expecting
another package.
No communications overseas were known to thic
secretary. The defendant did not tell the secretary to
place the package on his desk.
She also testified that the defendant’s comings and
goings were erratic with no set time when she could
predict when he would be in the office.
The Government also put up a forensic chemist
who testified that the substance was hashish, a mari-
juana derivative.
Defendant took the stand and denied making any
such statements and denied any involvement in the
importation of any drugs.
A witness, Mrs. Kay Dallinger, testified that on the
date mentioned by Hester and Weldy she was at
Crowly’s with the defendant and the following day
she was there with a friend and neither Hester nor
Weldy was present. Nor was the defendant.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Since only a per curiam opinion was written in this
ease it has been necessary to set out the above testi-
mony rather more fully than usual.
10
1. While this Court has passed on the question
of venue vis-a-vis 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy) Hyde
v. U.S., 225 U.S. 347 (Four Judges dissenting) (Jus-
tices Holmes, Hughes, Lurton and Lamar), and Brown
v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392 (same dissenters), it has never
rendered a decision on this new substantive impor-
tation statute 21 U.S.C. 952(a).
The venue of smuggling prosecutions was settled by
this Court some three quarters of a century ago, in
Keck v. U.S., 170 U.S. 434 (1899). The entire court
in Keck agreed that the offense of smuggling or clan-
destinely introducing into the United States was un-
doubtedly completed when the goods arrived at the
port-of-entry, which in the present case was New
York, N. Y. Petitioner does not deny that an indict-
ment could have been returned charging him with
‘facilitating the transportation or concealment of
marijuana after being imported or brought into the
United States, knowing the same to have been im-
ported or brought in contrary to law.’’ The naked fact
is that he was not so charged.
The veuue question as to importation has already
caused a split amongst the Circuits. The Fourth (U.S.
v. Lember, 319 F. Supp. 356), and the Ninth (U.S. v.
Feldman, 366 F. Supp. 346), follow the Keck rule, i.e.
venue at the port-of-entry: The Tenth does not (U.S.
v. Jackson, 482 F.2 1167).
The conflict should be settled by this Court for a
number of reasons. Prior to 1965 the reports are vir-
tually Silent regarding illegal importation by mail.
Since then they have appeared numerous times in all
circuits. A large group is set out in U.S. v. Fel
366 F. Supp. 356. at aes
11
A settlement of this issue will not only protect de-
fendants but help law enforcement.
The Constitutional right under the Sixth Amend-
ment to have a case tried in the state and district
wherein it was committed is sure to be raised again
and again. The particular District Attorney should
have a decision from this Court eliminating doubt and
obviating the necessity of retrials.
Because of the concurrent sentence doctrine the
venue question must also be argued as to the conspiracy
convictions.
Petitioner has set out the testimony in this case at
some length primarily for this reason.
Hyde v. U.S., 225 U.S. 247, stands for the proposi-
tion that venue under the general conspiracy statute
may be had in any district where an overt act occurred
or where the agreement was made.
If the Court accepts Petitioner’s reliance on Keck,
supra, then the overt acts cause no problem. The sub-
stantive crime being complete in New York, N. Y., no
overt act after the completion can be used to give
jurisdiction to the court in the Northern District of
Georgia. Put another way, if a person conspires to
import and does import both the substantive and con-
spiracy crimes are complete at the port-of-entry and
any overt acts alleged or proved after the completion
of the offenses are surplusage. Nor can a theory of
conspiring to conceal the conspiracy be used to give
another court jurisdiction. This proposition was re-
jected in Grunewald v. U.S., 353 U.S. 391.
Therefore if venue is to depend on the conspiracy
charge it must be shown by the situs of the agreement.
12
The problem is that there is no evidence of any
agreement and there is no evidence of defendant’s
ever having committed any of the overt acts. He was
indicted with a person or persons unknown. No tele-
phone conversations or letters at the situs were ever
produced ; in fact the only evidence of his participa-
tion were statements allegedly made about expecting
‘‘hash’”’ from Holland. The agreement, if agreement
there was, could have just as well been in New York
or Amsterdam. He could just as logically have sent
the package himself from Amsterdam.
Even if it were proved that the defendant com-
mitted the overt acts this would not prove the agree-
ment.
‘The agreement in a conspiracy cannot also be an
| overt act, U.S. v. Sarno, 456 F.2 875 at 877. It is not
a question of where the agreement was made, it is a
question of whether there is any evidence to show the
existence of an agreement at all.
It must follow that since no evidence of an agree-
ment was shown to have taken place in the Northern
District, then Keck is applicable and is i
tant pp venue is in New
The Search and Seizure. Appellant will argue the
search and seizure in the order of th
sented. e questions pre-
2. The search warrant and affidavit (App. D) set
out two premises to be searched. The first, a described
box, and the second, a described suite of offices. While
there are many cases dealing with general warrants
no case has been found where this fact situation ex-
ists. Both the affidavit and the warrant itself particu-
13
larly describe a premise (the box), particularly de-
seribe the contraband in the box (marijuana), and then
state that the warrant shall be executed at 2311 Bank
of Georgia Building, Atlanta, Georgia 30303. No con-
traband is described as being on the premises of 2311
Bank of Georgia Building in direct violation of Rule
41 Fed. Rules Crim. Proce.
3 and 4. It is uncontradicted that two agents en-
tered the offices in question without announcing their
presence and without a search or arrest warrant. It
is also uncontradicted that a package addressed to Peti-
tioner’s secretary was delivered some fifteen minutes
later and after another fifteen minutes transferred to
petitioner’s sub-leased office, being placed upon his
desk. It is also uncontradicted that the office and desk
were not visible to the two waiting agents.
The first point is whether any warrant was neces-
sary to enter and search the premises or to search the
package. As to mail it is privileged Olmstead v. U.S.,
2717 U.S. 438. Not only is a person’s office protected
but also his desk. Mancusi v. DeForte, 390 U.S. 364.
Therefore, at least one or both of the premises, i.e., the
whole suite or appellant’s sub-leased office is pro-
tected. If the warrant to be executed at 2311 Bank of
Georgia Building was valid and allowed the officers
to search, then under 18 U.S.C. 3109 they had to an-
nounce their presence. Sabbath v. U.S., 391 U.S. 589.
If somehow or other the officers presence in the ante-
room (though a part of 2311 Bank of Georgia) was
permissible without a warrant and without announce-
ment then it must inexorably follow that Petitioner’s
separate office required a separate warrant for it to
be searched. Mancusi v. DeForte, 390 U.S. 364. Of
course probable cause to search, standing alone, gives
14
no right to search since in that case no warrant would
ever be necessary. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
US. 443.
5. Are there any standards of any nature regard-
ing the searching of packages coming into the United
States from abroad ?
Since the founding of the Republic, Federal Cus-
toms Officers have been authorized to search without
probable cause, persons seeking entrance into the
United States from a foreign country. 1 Stat. 21, 43,
Act of July 31st, 1789. In recent years, however, fed-
eral authorities have expanded their pursuit of po-
tential customs violators by conducting and increasing
number of such searches at locations far removed
from the international boundary. Very little case law
existed as to the search by customs agents of incoming
mail from overseas prior to 1955. However, since then,
United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982, U.S. v. Galvez,
465 F.2d 681, U.S. yv. Beckley, 335 F.2d 86, and U.S.
v. Feldman, 366 F. Supp. 356, have come to the fore.
In Feldman, a collection of these cases is set out.
Since the first border search statute was enacted in
1789, customs officials have been authorized to stop,
search and examine any vehicle or person where they
shall suspect that there is merchandise which is sub-
ject to duty or merchandise which has been introduced
into the United States in any manner contrary to law.
19 U.S.C. Sect. 482, see Act of July 31st, 1789, ch. 5,
sec, 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43; Act of March 13th, 1815, ch. 94,
sec. 2, 3 Stat. 231, Act of J uly 18th, 1869, ch. 201, sect.
3, 14 Stat. 178.
While these words were mentioned in all of the
cases above cited, i.e., reasonably suspect, the concept
15
vanished in United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d oa
In Odland, the court cites U.S. v. McDaniel, 460 F.
129, 132, for the proposition that any person or 1
coming into the United States is subject to search y
that fact alone, whether or not there by any suspicion
of illegality directed to the particular person or em
to be searched. While the gist of this opinion, t
anyone for any reason may be searched coming across
the border is debatable, nevertheless, Odland set yo
the proposition that the government is free to PO
check incoming international mail at the port-of-
entry, or to inspect all such mail, or to inspect any
such mail which attracts the inspector’s attention.
This is being done.
In the case at bar, evidence shows that all mail com-
ing into the United States from some 20 countries be
being opened and searched. If the court upholds t -
border search it must, in essence, say that no stand-
ards whatsoever exist in border searches. The govern-
ment witness does not even contend or imply that any
standards of any sort are in use. He flatly states, that
all packages coming in from sonie 20 designated
countries are opened. We have come full circle. It is
an almost unbearable irony, that the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Constitution was primarily placed within
that constitution because of the hatred of the early
American Colonists for the searches of British Cus-
tom officials with their nctorious writs of assistance
and now, our own customs officials may search any-
thing coming into the United States without reason.
For all of the above reasons Henritze would re-
i tion to
tfully ask that the order denying the mo
cuanaen reversed and that the case be reversed
for further proceedings pursuant to that order.
16
Insufficiency of the Evidence.
6. In order to convict any defendant under the
smuggling and the general conspiracy statutes, the
government must prove knowledge, agreement and
intent. Three witnesses testified that some thirty days
before delivery, Petitioner told them he was expect-
ing a shipment of hash from Holland. He did not say
it was coming to him personally or to his office or
anything else.
There must be an agreement, Luteran v. U.S., 93
F.2d 395 at 399, to uphold a conspiracy count. The
record is simply nonexistent as to any agreement. The
overt acts mentioned in this indictment (the mailing,
ete.) cannot be used as the basis of an agreement.
U.S. vy. Sarno, 456 F.2d 875 at 877.
Proof of the corpus delicti is not proof of any de-
fendant’s guilt. While it is necessary to prove the
corpus delicti, i.e, smuggling and conspiracy, it is
essential to prove the defendant’s participation in the
chain of events. That a package containing contra-
band was mailed in Holland and delivered to the ad-
dressee (Appellant’s secretary) in Atlanta proves the
corpus delicti of the substantive crime not Henritze’s
participation nor can it be used as a basis of the agree-
ment in a conspiracy charge, Luteran v. U.S., 93 F.
2d 395.
There was no proof that the defendant committed
any of the overt acts alleged in the indictment which
is absolutely essential for conviction. U.S. v. Sarno,
456 F.2d 875 at 877.
The government must also prove intent as to the
substantive crime. The statements allegedly made by
17
the defendant may show knowledge or intent, they
cannot show both.
The evidence is all circumstantial. In a circum-
stantial evidence case one inference cannot be
founded upon another to sustain a conviction. Byrth
v. U.S., 327 F.2d 917. From Petitioner’s statements,
one may infer knowledge or intent but the jury can-
not infer one and then bootstrap the second inference
upon the other.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, it is respect-
fully submitted that the Petition for-a Writ of Cer-
tiorari should be granted.
WituiaM R. Gientuat, IIT
Attorney for Petitioner
929 Healey Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 524-7714
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
la
APPENDIX A
In tHe Untrep States Court or APPEALS
For tHe Fierrs Cracuir
No. 75-1963
Unrtep States or America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
Watters M. Hewnirze, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE Unitep States District Court
FOR THE NorkTHERN District or GEoRGIA
(October 21, 1975)
Before Bett, THornserry and Morean, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Walter M. Henritze appeals from his conviction under
18 U.S.C. $371 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 952(a) for con-
spiracy to import hashish and importation of hashish.
Alleging several points of error, appellant argues (1)
that venue was improper in the Northern District of
Georgia, (2) that conviction on both the substantive and
conspiracy counts constitutes double jeopardy, (3) that
the three searches conducted by the government violated
the Fourth Amendment and should have been suppressed,
(4) that inflammatory remarks delivered by the prosecu-
tor in his closing argument deprived appellant of a fair
trial, and (5) that the evidence was insufficient to support
a verdict of guilty.
After lengthy consideration of the briefs, record, and
oral argument in this case, this court is of the opinion
that the numerous points of error raised are without
merit and that appellant’s conviction should be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
2a
Unttep States Court or APPEALS
For tHe Firrx Crecvit
October Term, 1975
No. 75-1963.
D.C. Docket No. CR 74-470-A
Untrep States or America, Plaintiff-A ppellee,
versus
Water M. Hewnirtze, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia
Before Bett, THornBerry and Morcan, Circuit Judges.
Judgment
This case came on to be heard on the transcript of
the record from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia, and was argued by
counsel ;
On ConsmperaTIon Wuereor, It is now here ordered
and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the
said District Court in this cause be, and the same is
hereby, affirmed. .
October 21, 1975
Issued as Mandate:
ahh CNA Ee OO ell
APPENDIX B
Denial of Motion for Rehearing
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APPENDIX B
—
Unrrep States Court or APPEALS
Firtx Crecvuit
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
November 28, 1975
To Att CounseL or Recorp
No. 75-1963—U.S.A. vs. Wlater M. Henritze, Jr.
Dear Counsel:
This is to advise that an order has this day been
entered denying the petition( ) for rehearing, and no
member of the panel nor Judge in regular active service
on the Court having requested that the Court be polled
on rehearing en bane (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the
petition( ) for rehearing en banc has also been denied.
See Rule 41, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
for issuance and stay of the mandate.
Very truly yours,
Epwarp W. WapswortH, Clerk
by Susan M. Gravois
Deputy Clerk
/smg
ec: Mr. William R. Gignilliat, IIT
Mr. Steven W. Ludwick
APPENDIX C
Stay of Mandate
fa
APPENDIX C
[Filed: December 8, 1975]
Unrrep States Court or APPEALS
For tHe Firtxs Circuit
No. 75-1963
Unrrep Srates or America, Plaintiff-A ppellee,
versus
Water M. Hewnirze, Jr., Defendant-A ppellant.
On CoNnsIDERATION OF THE AppLicaTion of the appellant
in the above numbered and entitled cause for a stay of
the mandate of this Court therein, to enable appellant
to apply for and to obtain a writ of certiorari frem the
Supreme Court of the United States. Ir Is Orperep that
the issuance of the mandate of this Court in said cause
be, and the same is stayed to and including December
28, 1975, the stay to continue in force until the final
disposition of the case by the Supreme Court, provided
that within the period above mentioned there shall be
filed with the Clerk of this Court the certificate of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court that certiorari petition has
been filed. Ir Is FurrHer Orperep that the Clerk shall
issue the mandate upon the filing of a copy of an order
of the Supreme Court denying the writ, or upon the
expiration of the stay granted herein, unless the above
mentioned certificate shall be filed with the Clerk of this
Court within that time.
/s/ R. Morean
R. Morgan
United States Circuit Judge
APPENDIX D
Search Warrant
5a
APPENDIX D
Untitep States District Court
FOR THE
NortTHERN District or GEORGIA
Magistrate’s Docket No. M 74
Case No. 1230 A
SEARCH WARRANT
United States of America
vs.
One brown wrapped cardboard box having approximate
dimensions of 12” x 914” x 5”, having a gross weight of
2 Ibs. 3 ozs. addressed to June Llewelyn, 2311 Bank of
Georgia Building, Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A., 30303, bearing
return address of S. T. Van Heusn, 36 Louis Davidstraat,
Zandvoort, Netherlands
To James Williams, Special Agent, Drug Enforcement
Administration, and/or any other Special Agents of the
Drug Enforcement Adm. Affidavit having been made be-
fore me by Special Agent James Williams, Drug Enforce-
ment Administration that he is positive’ that on the
premises know as one brown wrapped cardboard box
having approximate dimensions of 12” x 914” x 5”, having
a gross weight of 2 lbs. 3 ozs. addressed to June Llewelyn,
2311 Bank of Georgia Building, Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A.
30303, bearing return address 8S. T. Van Heusn, 36 Louis
Davidstraat, Zandvoort, Netherlands, bearing a customs
declaration describing the contents of the box as ‘‘1 box
of Dutch chocolates,’’ which arrived in Atlanta, Georgia
6a
from New York, N.Y. on August 19, 1974, and is sched-
uled to be delivered to the addressee on September 13,
1974 in the Northern District of Georgia there is now
being concealed certain property, namely approximately
15 ozs. of hashish, a Schedule 1 controlled substance as
defined in 21 U.S.C. 812 and a contraband item.
which are hashish, a Schedule 1 controlled substance as
defined in 21 USC 812 and a contraband item.
and as I am satisfied that there is probable cause to
believe that the property so described is being concealed
on the premises above described and that the foregoing
grounds for application for issuance of the search warrant
exist.
You are hereby commanded to search forthwith the
place named for the porperty specified, serving this war-
rant and making the search in the daytime and if the
property be found there to seize it, leaving a copy of
this warrant and a receipt for the property taken, and
prepare a written inventory of the property seized and
return this warrant and bring the property before me
within ten days of this date, as required by law. This
search warrant must be executed between the hours of
8 am. & 12 noon 9/13/74 at 2311 Bank of Ga. Bldg.,
Atlanta, Ga. 30303.
Dated this 12th day of September, 1974 at —— p.m.
Auten L. Cuancey, Jr., U.S. Magistrate
Appendix ‘‘B”’
7a
Appendix ‘‘B”’
Unitep States District Court
FOR THE
NorTHEERN District or GEORGIA
Magistrate’s Docket No. M 74
Case No. 1230 A
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
United States of America
vs.
One brown wrapped cardboard box having approximate
dimensions of 12” x 914” x 5”, having a gross weight of
2 lbs. 3 ozs., addressed to June Llewelyn, 2311 Bank of
Georgia Bldg., Atlanta, Ga., U.S.A. 30303, bearing return
address of S. T. Van Heusn, 36 Louis Davidstraat,
Zandvoort, Netherlands.
Berore Auten L. Cuancey, Jr., Atlanta, Georgia
The undersigned being duly sworn deposes and says:
That he is positive’ that on the premises known as
one brown wrapped cardboard box having approximate
dimensions of 12” x 914” x 5”, having a gross weight of
2 lbs. 3 ozs., addressed to June Llewelyn, 2311 Bank of
Georgia Bldg., Atlanta, Ga., U.S.A. 30303, bearing return
address of S. T. Van Heusn, 36 Louis Davidstraat,
Zandvoort, Netherlands, bearing a customs declaration
describing the contents of the box as ‘‘1 box of Dutch
chocolates’’, which arrived in Atlanta, Ga., from New
York, N.Y. on 8/19/74, and is scheduled to be delivered
to the addressee on 9/13/74,
8a
in the Northern District of Georgia
there is now being concealed property, namely approxi-
mately 15 ounces of hashish,
which are hashish, a Schedule I controlled substance as
defined in 21 U.S.C. 812, and a contraband item.
And that the facts tending to establish the foregoing
grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are as follows:
On 8/19/74, Postal Inspector Schnetzer received the above
described box from New York, N.Y., with information
which stated that the box contained approximately 15
ounces of hashish, a controlled substance. The contents
of the box had been previously field tested and showed
a positive reaction for hashish in New York. On 9/12/74,
the above described box was opened in the office of U.S.
Postal Inspector Schnetzer in the presence of SA Robert
Alston, U.S. Customs, Postal Inspector Schnetzer, SA
James Williams, DEA, SA George Faz, DEA, and SA
Mike Dorsett, DEA. On 9/12/74, a field test for hashish
was conducted on the contents of the above described
box in the Office of Postal Inspector Schnetzer. The test
results were positive for the presence of hashish in the
contents of the box. After the test was concluded, the
contents of the above described box were weighed, and the
box was re-sealed by SA Williams and SA Alston. The
above described box is scheduled for delivery to 2311
Bank of Georgia Bldg., Atlanta, Ga., on 9/13/74.
James WILLIAMS
Drug Enforcement Administration
Sworn to before me, and subscribed in my presence,
September 12, 1974
Appendix ‘‘A’’
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.