Memorandum — Environmental Protection Agency v. Duquesne Light Co.
Supreme Court brief1976
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Supreme Court, U. |
FILED
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IN THE DE 19 mas
Supreme Court of the United. States StAURE. ccc |
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NO. 75-736 OCTOBER TERM 1975
EE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioner
Vv.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY, PENNSYLVANIA
POWER COMPANY AND OHIO EDISON COMPANY,
Respondents
On Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS, DUQUESNE LIGHT
COMPANY, ET AL., IN SUPPORT OF IMMEDIATE
CONSIDERATION OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
GRANT OF CERTIORARI, AND ACCELERATED
ARGUMFNT
DAVID MCNEIL OLDS
JOHN MCN. CRAMER
ROBERT M. WALTER
REED SMITH SHAW & MCCLAY
Attorneys for Respondents
747 Union Trust Building
P. O. Box 2009
seamen Pennsylvania 15230
SMITH BROS., Law PRINTERS, 620 SECOND AVENUE. ‘PITTSBURGH, PA. 15219
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CITATIONS
CASES PAGE
Duquesne Light Co., et al. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3rd
RCI SE R Se bee a Ae, B 4,6
St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3rd
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Union Electric Co. v. EPA, No. 74-1542... 6
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Administrative Procedure Act, as amended, 80 Stat.
381 et seq., 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. 2.2... 4
Clean Air Act
$109, as amended, 84 Stat. 1679, 42 U.S.C.
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$110(a)(1), as amended, 84 Stat. 1680, 42
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$110(a) (2), as amended, 84 Stat. 1680, 42
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$304, as amended, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 U.S.C.
RATES OL IT TLE RA TDR ese —
$307(b) (1), as amended, 84 Stat. 1707, 4
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Supreme Court of the United States
NO. 75-736 OCTOBER TERM 1975
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Petitioner
V.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY, PENNSYLVANIA
POWER COMPANY AND OHIO EDISON COMPANY,
Respondents
On Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS, DUQUESNE LIGHT
COMPANY, ET AL., IN SUPPORT OF IMMEDIATE
CONSIDERATION OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
GRANT OF CERTIORARI, AND ACCELERATED
ARGUMENT
OPINION
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals (Petitioner's
Appendix A) is reported at 522 F.2d 1186.
JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional requisites are adequately set
forth in the Petition.
Statute Involved.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Where:the record shows that a state did not give
serious consideration to the technological or economic
feasibility of compliance with an emission limitation
contained in a state implementation plan submitted
under $110(a) (2) of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 84
Stat. 1680, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a) (2), is the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency required
to approve the emission standard without regard to
whether the emission standard is a technically and
economically feasible means of attaining ambient air
quality standards
STATUTE INVOLVED
Section 110(a) (2) of the Clean Air Act, as amended,
84 Stat. 1680, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a) (2), is set forth in
Petitioner’s Appendix B.
Statement.
STATEMENT
Section 109 of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 84
Stat. 1679, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-4, provides that the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency (herein-
after “EPA’’) should promulgate ambient air quality
standards for substances to be determined by him.
Ambient air quality standards are both “primary” and
“ econdary”’. Primary ambient air quality standards are
iutended to be those requisite to protect the public
health; secondary ambient air quality standards are
those necessary to protect the public welfare, in both
cases with an adequate margin of safety. Section 110
(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 84 Stat. 1680,
42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a) (1), provides that each state within
a specified period of time after the promulgation of
ambient air quality standards must submit a plan for
the implementation, maintenance and enforcement of the
ambient standards. These submissions by the states are
commonly referred to as implementation plans. Secticn
110(a) (2) of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 84 Stat.
1680, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a) (2), provides that within four
months after the submission of an implementation plan
the Administrator shall decide whether to approve its
provisions. Upon approval the implementation plan be-
comes enforceable by the federal authorities under
specified conditions. The sanctions include civil and
criminal remedies with fines of up to $25,000 per day.
Also the provisions of approved implementation plans
can be enforced in the federal courts by private individ-
uals and entities under £304 of the Clean Air Act, as
amended, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 U.S.C. 1857h-2.
To guide the states in developing implementation
plans, the Administrator published regulations for their
preparation. 40 CFR Part 51. Appendix B to those regu-
Statement.
lations was titled, “Examples of Emission Limitations
Attainable with Reasonably Available Technology”
(“Examples”).
On January 27, 1972 the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania submitted its implementation plan to the Adminis-
trator. The provision applicable to Respondents here
limited sulfur oxides emissions from the facilities of
Respondents to half the level described in the Examples
referred to above.
On May 31, 1972 the Administrator approved the
Pennsylvania Implementation Plan, thus giving the
Pennsylvania standard in question the force of a sub-
stantive federal regulation. As a result, the Respondents
were exposed to penalties under the Clean Air Act for
violation of the regulation and to citizen suits in the
federal forum to enforce the regulation against them.
Therefore, on June 26, 1972, the Respondents filed a
Petition for Review in the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit pursuant to §307(b) (1) of the Clean Air Act, as
amended, 84 Stat. 1707, 42 U.S.C. $1857h-5(b) (1), with
regard to the action of the Administrator in approving
the provision of the Pennsylvania Implementation Plan
in question.
On November 14, 1972 the Respondents filed a Mo-
tion to Remand the matter to the EPA for a hearing
because of the failure of EPA to comply with the require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act, as amended,
80 Stat. 381 et seq., 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., and procedural
due process in approving the Pennsylvania Implementa-
tion Plan. On January 22, 1973 the Court of Appeals
entered its order remanding the matter to EPA. There-
after EPA filed a motion for clarification of the scope
of the remand. On June 5, 1973 the Court of Appeals in
an opinion reported as Duquesne Light Co., et al. v. EPA,
-
Statement.
481 F.2d 1, (‘“‘Duquesne I”) gave EPA instructions either
to stay the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania Implementa-
tion Plan as a federal regulation while the Respondents
exhausted their state remedies or to conduct hearings, in
which Pennsylvania and the Respondents would partici-
pate, with regard to the technological and economic
feasibility of the provisions of the Pennsylvania Imple-
mentation Plan in question. The EPA chose to hold its
own hearings and did so on November 26, 1973 and Jan-
uary 16, 1974. Contrary to the procedure contemplated
by the order of the Court of Appeals, Pennsylvania did
not actively participate. On March 29, 1974 EPA filed a
decision holding that the provisions of the Pennsylvania
Implementation Plan in question were economically and
technologically feasible. The Respondents sought a
further remand on the ground that EPA in its adminis-
trative decision relied on materials which had not been
available at the time of the hearing and upon which the
Respondents had no opportunity to comment. The Court
of Appeals granted the request of the Respondents for a
second remand and a further hearing was held before
EPA on July 30, 1974. On September 17, 1974 EPA
rendered its second administrative decision holding the
provisions of the Pennsylvania Implementation Plan in
question technically and economically feasible. The Re-
spondents sought further review of this decision in the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which on August
21, 1975 issued its decision holding that the conclusion
of EPA that the provisions of the Pennsylvania Imple-
mentation Plan in question were technologically and
economically feasible on the basis of the record before
the EPA was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of
Appeals remanded the matter to EPA for further hear-
ings. It is this decision which is the subject of the
present Petition for Certiorari.
Argument.
ARGUMENT
The Court should not defer consideration of the
Petition for Certiorari in this matter. Instead the Court
should grant the Petition of the Solicitor General for
Certiorari and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. We respectfully suggest that the
Court should either consolidate this case for argument
with the case of Union Electric Co. v. EPA, No. 74-1542,
Petition for Certiorari granted October 6, 1975, or ad-
vance this case ahead of the Union Electric case on the
Court’s argument list.
The Court should grant certiorari in this matter
because it has previously granted certiorari in Union
Electric Co. v. EPA, No. 74-1542, where one of the prin-
cipal grounds advanced for granting certiorari in the
Petition was the conflict with the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Duquesne Light Co.., et al.
v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1973) (“Duquesne I” and
St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3rd Cir.
1975). The present case (‘Duquesne II’’) is based on the
same interpretation of the Clean Air Act as the prior
decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
The Court should consolidate the present case for
argument with the Union Electric case or advance it
ahead of the Union Electric case for argument because
the record in the present case is much more complete
than Union Electric. In the Union Electric case the Court
of Appeals noted the complete absence of an agency
record. In Duquesne Light II there is an extensive ad-
ministrative record which shows the role the EPA allo-
cated to considerations of technological and economic
feasibility. The record will also assist the Court in
evaluating the practical implications of the alternatives
Argument.
with regard to the construction of the Clean Air Act
which are at issue here. In addition, in a case where the
Court is being asked to choose between the interpreta-
tions of the Clean Air Act by the Eighth Circuit or the
Third Circuit or to choose still another course, it will be
helpful to the Court to have the benefit of argument
from counsel involved in the Third Circuit proceedings.
In his Petition for Certiorari the Solicitor General
has argued that the outcome of the present case would
be controlled by Union Electric if Union Electric were
decided first. Thus if the present case is not considered
at the same time as Union Electric, Respondents will
be deprived of the opportunity to present their con-
tentions with regard to the proper construction of the
Clean Air Act to this Court.
In order to expedite this matter so that it can be
consolidated with the Union Electric proceeding without
undue delay, we have filed this response prior to the time
by which it is required under the Rules of this Court.
S
Conclusion.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons consideration of the Petition
for Certiorari should not be deferred. On the contrary
certiorari should be granted promptly. The present case
should be considered on the merits at the same time as
or prior to the Union Electric case, and the opinion of
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID MCNEIL OLDS
JOHN MCN. CRAMER
ROBERT M. WALTER
REED SMITH SHAW & MCCLAY
Attorneys for Duquesne Light Company,
Pennsylvania Power Company and
Ohio Edison Company
Dated: December 18, 1975
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