Appendix — Western Airlines, Inc. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.

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Supreme Court, U. »

= FILED

3 19/5

IN THE ee

ICHAB RODAK, OX,

Supreme Court of the Anited ——

OctTosEer TERM 1975

No. 75-711

WESTERN AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner

v.

CONTINENTAL AIR LInEs, INc., Respondent

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Of Counsel: Emory N. ELLIs, JR.

Fulbright & Jaworski

1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Suite 501

Washington, D.C. 20036

GERALD P. O’Grapy

Senior Vice President

Legal and Secretary

Western Airlines

P.O. Box 92005

World Way Postal Center

Los Angeles, Calif. 90009

FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI

1140 Connecticut Ave.,

N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Pagss or Brraon S. Apams Paintine, Inc., WasnhincrTon, D. C.

—oeerere

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion and Order on Reconsideration (No. 74-5-17)

CAB Docket No. 18104, Additional Service to San

EE 6 24Uchehenencedécenseesss 37a (J.A. 100)

Opinion and Order (72-12-29) CAB Docket No. 18104,

Additional Service to San Diego Case .. 60a (J.A. 83)

Supplemental Initial Decision of Hyman Goldberg,

Hearing Examiner, CAB No. 18104 et al., Re-

manded Additional Service to San Diego Case,

dated February 22, 1972, and attach-

PE S606 6 00ss daccdecseuscadacecess 74a (J.A.530)

Note: References in petitioner’s brief to these orders and

opinions are made to the joint appendix (J.A.) sub-

mitted by the parties in the Court below. Therefore,

joint appendix page numbers are noted in brackets

at the left margin in the line where such material

begins.

37a

75-5-17

[J.A. 100] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.v.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board at its office in

Washington, D.C. on the 3rd day of May, 1974.

Docket 18104

ADDITIONAL Service To San Dieco Case

(San Diego-Denver)

Opinion and Order On Reconsideration

By tHE Boarp:

By Order 72-12-29, December 8, 1972, the Board issued its

decision in the remanded phase of this case, in which it

denied all applications for additional nonstop San Diego-

Denver authority. Petitions for reconsideration of Order

72-12-29 were filed by Continental Air Lines, Inc.; the City

and County ot Denver and the Public Utilities Commission

of Colorado; Kansas City and the Chamber of Commerce

of Greater Kansas City;' and the San Diego Unified Port

District, the City of San Diego, and the San Diego Chamber

of Commerce. Western Air Lines filed an answer opposing

the petitions for reconsideration and Airwest, Trans World

Airlines, and United Air Lines filed similar answers oppos-

ing reconsideration and generally supporting the Board’s

decision.

Upon consideration of the matters presented, we have

decided to deny the petitions for reconsideration of the

Board’s original decision. We do so essentially for the rea-

sons set forth in that decision and, in addition, because

of the current fuel shortage which has become a significant

*The Board inadvertently omitted refernce to the Kansas City

Parties in its list of those persons filing briefs and participating

in oral argument. However, the Board did consider their argu-

ments presented in their brief and appearance before the Board.

38a

problem since the original decision was issued. In our De-

cember 1972 opinion, the Board emphasized that it must

be more than usually cautious—when the industry is

plagued by retrenchments and lagging traffic growth—

about granting new competitive route awards. Applying

this principle to the case before it, the Board found the

incumbent’s San Diego-Denver service fully met the mar-

ket’s needs. In those circumstances, the Board declined to

authorize additional competition, particularly since profits

for new service could not be predicted with confidence.

The industry continues to falter in its attempts to make

the financial recovery which our policy of caution was de-

signed to assist. This fortifies our resolve to avoid making

unnecessary awards of competitive authority on routes

which are adequately served. Similarly, because of the cur-

rent fuel shortage, the Board must guard against licensing

one carrier to duplicate another carrier’s services to the

detriment of essential services elsewhere.

In reaching our conclusions on reconsideration, we have

also fully evaluated (a) the allegations of error regarding

the Board’s original economic findings and (b) the most

current data available. This evaluation convinces us that

there is no fundamental defect in the Board’s original deter-

mination which requires reconsideration as a matter of law *

{J.A. 101] or that a change in the Board’s original result is

otherwise warranted by the public interest. Specifically, we

find nothing in the petitions to support the claim that one

of the Board’s original findings—t.e., that a competitive

award would lead, at best, to economically marginal operat-

ing results—was either unsupported by the record or con-

stituted an improper exercise of the Board’s discretion. “e

appreciate, of course, that the data which have become avail-

able since the Board’s original decision was reached now

tend to indicate that the prospects for profitable competitive

? Delta Air Lines v. CAB, No. 72-1377 (D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 23,

1973).

39a

operations are far stronger than earlier believed, and we

have carefully considered this change in reaching our de-

cision on reconsideration. However, the Board’s original

decision did not turn on profitability alone, and we be-

lieve, in sum, that the public interest would not be best

served by a change in the Board’s original result.* Our

views with respect to the fuel shortage and our comments

on various matters raised in the petitions for reconsidera-

tion, are discussed below.

[J.A. 103] Recent Precedent and Policy

Petitioners argue that the Board’s action in this proceed-

ing is wholly at odds with decisions over the recent past,

particularly with respect to the awards of competitive au-

thority. We reject this argument. We acknowledge that the

Board has not often set down a route case for hearing and

then decided at the end of the proceeding on the basis of

the record that it was not in the public interest to certificate

new service. However, this proceeding is unusual in that

it involved—at the outset—the basic question of first non-

stop service. Such service was, in fact, authorized and the

Board has declined only to make a competitive award in

the same proceeding. Thus, the case is substantially similar

to the Phoentz-Portland/Seattle Nonstop Case, Order 70-

8-13, August 5, 1970. More importantly, we see nothing in

other cases in which the Board has certificated new com-

petition that requires us to do so in this case. On the con-

trary, the Board remains free, subject to a full explana-

tion of its findings and considerations, to reach a conclusion

on the merits of this case which may vary from the results

reached in other circumstances, in other markets, or in prior

times. The facts of this case persuade us not to authorize

new competition. Our decision is supported by the record

and is in accord with the policy guidelines established by

the Federal Aviation Act.

* See ICC v. City of Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503 (1944).

40a

The route awards chiefly relied on by Continental in urg-

ing reconsideration were made before or during 1970. How-

ever, the economic climate in which these cases were set

down and decided was different from that which has been

evolving since. Indeed, in the original opinion in this very

ease, issued in April 1970, the Board sounded one of its

[.J.A. 104] earliest notes of caution with respect to declining

traffic growth, the profit picture within the industry, and the

hazards of overcapacity. After recognizing that competitive

nonstop service had been authorized in the past in markets

no larger than San Diego-Denver the Board nonetheless

concluded :

... [I]t appears that Western’s proposed service will

be entirely adequate to meet the service needs of the

markets at issue. Under all the circumstances, there-

fore, we find it more consistent with the geal of foster-

ing sound economic conditions in air transportation—

even at the cost of foregoing some undoubted beyond

benefits a second carrier could provided—to certificate

only Western at this time....

Order 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, p.4. See also, by way of exam-

ple, Application of Ozark Air Lines, Order 71-1-78, January

15, 1971, declining to set the local service carrier’s applica-

tion for hearing notwithstanding substantial first single-

plane benefits (including the avoidance of the congested

airport facilities at Chicago); and the Des Moines-Twin

Cities-St. Louis Subpart M Proceeding, Order 70-4-150,

April 29, 1970, establishing new and stricter criteria for the

lifting of certificate restrictions on local service carrier

[ J.A. 105] operating authority in competitive markets.‘ Most

*See also, Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation (Phase 6B—

Load Factors), Order 71-4-54, April 9, 1971, where the Board

adopted load factor standards as a new approach to discouraging

capacity inereases in excess of traffic needs; Piedmont Aviation

Deletion of Elizabeth City, Order 72-4-96, April 18, 1972, and

similar cases, where the Board enunciated principles concerning

|

|

4la

recently, in declining to adopt its tentative decision authoriz-

ing competitive service in the Mohawk Seqments 8 and 9

Renewal Proceeding, Order 73-9-100, September 27, 1973,

the Board stated:

The air transportation system is slowly emerging from

a period of lagging traffic growth and overcapacity and

the Board is now engaged in a long range program

looking toward a rationalization of the existing system

and an improvement in the economic health of the in-

dustry. The earnings prospects of the carriers, how-

ever, still remain uncertain. In such an atmosphere the

Board must be more than usually careful in appraising

all of the various costs and benefits that a route award

might have on air transportation system and on the

public, which, in the end, can only be served by the

maintenance of a healthy industry... .

This approach has been warranted in light of recent experi-

ence. As this experience has taught, an unduly optimistic

anticipation regarding traffic response on the part of car-

rier-applicants or the Board can have unfortunate economic

effects, even for financially healthy carriers. A failure of

traffic to materialize as forecast, after all, can result in

both serious inconvenience to passengers who come to an-

ticipate or rely on newly authorized services, as well as

increased costs to the carrier and, ultimately, the Federal

Treasury or the traveling public in general.°

the elimination of unnecessary services at smaller communities;

and the Flying Tiger Line Inc. Additional Points Case, Order

71-11-33, November 8, 1971, where the Board declined to award

\l-eargo authority at new points.

°In the Service to Omaha and Des Moines Case, Order 70-7-24,

July 6, 1970, to cite a single example, it was concluded that the

Omaha-Chicago market would generate almost 1,000 daily pas-

sengers in 1970, and that such traffic could support nonstop com-

petitive operations. The forecast utilized the historic (1964-1968)

growth rate and also applied the 20 percent figure ordinarily used

42a

[.J.A.] 106 To be sure, certain competitive awards have been

made during the transitional period. In such cases, however,

the records have ordinarily revealed some unique service or

operational consideration, such as substantial deficiencies

in historie or existing service, Southern Airways Route

Realignment Proceeding, Order 73-2-90, Feb. 23, 1973, or

markets located in a fashion which would permit the car-

rier to combine service to several points so as to provide an

economically sound operation, Twin Cities/Milwaukee

Southeast Points Investigation, Order 70-11-6, Nov. 3, 1970,

and Additional Service to Columbia and Augusta Case,

Order 71-7-118, July 21, 1971. Such circumstances are not

present here. Moreover, the Board’s earlier awards were

made at a time when the fuel emergency had not yet become

a major concern.

Specific comparisons have been made between the instant

ease and the Board’s decision in the Southern Tier Com-

petitive Nonstop Investigation (Houston-Miami Phase),

Docket 18257. While the two proceedings have certain sim-

ilarities which, in fact, led four members of the Board to

conclude that similar results would be justified,® the differ-

to measure the stimulative effect of first competitive service. In

fact, however, local O&D and connecting traffic reached only about

500 daily passengers by 1971 with the result that Frontier—the

carrier selected to provide the competitive service—was required

to suspend its Chicago-Omaha operations. See Order 71-1-100, Jan-

uary 28, 1972. While other factors may also have contributed to

the need for suspension, the failure to fully anticipate traffic de-

velopments was clearly an important element. In a related case,

the Board authorized Frontier to provide nonstop competitive

service in the Chicago-Lincoln market (Order 71-4-75) largely to

correct the lag in service benefits (including the lack of com-

muter schedules) which characterized the incumbent's operations.

Such nonstop. competitive service, however, was never instituted.

‘(Chairman Timm and Vice Chairman Gillilland would have

denied competitive authorizations in both cases, Member Minetti

and former Member Murphy would have made competitive awards

in both cases.

a

43a

ences between the two cases are also sufficiently material so

that an award of competitive authority in Houston-Miami

does not mandate an identical result here. To begin with,

the Houston-Miami market was about 20 percent larger in

1972 notwithstanding both markets received the same vol-

ume of nonstop service for much of the year.’ The Houston-

{J.A. 107] Miami market was also forecast to be larger with

new competition in 1973 (almost 420 daily passengers vs.

about 275 daily passengers), and Continental possesses a

more substantial backup system to support its operation.

Furthermore, Western’s existing services between San

Diego and Denver (as well as its historic responsiveness to

the needs of the market) were found to be sufficient although

competition was found required in the Houston-Miami mar-

ket to correct serious deficiencies in the services offered by

the incumbent carrier.* And, finally, the Houston-Miami

award involved the question of continuing service earlier

found to have been required by the public convenience and

necessity and not judicially challenged.’ As such it stands in

a somewhat different posture from the authorization of

wholly new competitive service.”

In the Board’s original decision in this proceeding, it was

concluded, on the basis of the record then before the Board,

that the prospects for successful competitive operations

" Houston-Miami received three daily round trips. San Diego-

Denver received two daily round trips until June, when a third

round trip was added.

* The smaller San Diego-Denver market will receive 50 percent

more nonstop service (3 round trips vs. 2) than the Houston-

Miami market would have received in the absence of competition.

* The court proceeding which resulted in the remand of the

Houston-Miami award concerned only the question of carrier se-

— See Orders 71-3-34, Mareh 5, 1971 and 71-11-17, Nov. 3,

a

*° Cf: Application of American Airlines and Frontier Airlines,

Order 73-6-106, June 27, 1973.

tta

were limited, at best, and that certification of a second

nonstop carrier under all the circumstances would be im-

prudent. While the more recent information now suggests

that the prospect for profitable competitive operations is

improved, we continue to believe that, on balance, a com-

petitive authorization is unnecessary and undesirable at

this time. This conclusion is fully consistent with current

Board precedent and policy.

[J.A.108] Decisional Considerations.

Continental argues that the Board (a) did not consider

the administrative law judge’s evaluation of the record and

(b) gave improper weight to certain decisional considera-

tions—e.g., the use of recent growth rates as opposed to

growth rates premised on longer, prior periods, and the

recognition of service improvements made during the course

of the proceeding. We disagree with these arguments. The

administrative law judge’s material findings were fully

evaluated in the course of the Board’s decision. The fact

that the Board’s opinion does not discuss each of his deter-

minations in terms, or find them persuasive, does not sug-

gest that they were not considered. Indeed, as we read the

petitions for reconsideration, their primary disagreement

is with the Board’s evaluation of the administrative law

judge’s findings and the evidence of record rather than

with any failure to consider such findings and evidence.”

Continental challenges our reliance on Western’s nonstop

operations as violative of a policy against according weight

to an incumbent’s schedule improvements made during the

course of a competitive service investigation. It is unneces-

sary to address ourselves in this case to the present dimen-

"There are frequent references in the petitions to the Board’s

‘“‘errors’’ as to traffic growth, participation, expenses, ete. Such

‘‘errors’’, in fact, largely represent disagreements which the peti-

tioners have with the inferences and determinations which the

Board has drawn from the evidence of record.

eee

45a

sions of such a policy. For, as was noted in the original opin-

ion, the circumstances of this proceeding are unusuul in that

a primary purpose of the remand was to consider the need for

[J.A. 109] an additional award in light of Western’s actual

experience with new nonstop operations. Moreover, as that

earlier opinion made clear, the consideration of Western’s

actual nonstop service (including the addition of the third

nonstop round trip) was a means of reviewing the continu-

ing needs of the market in light of the implementation of

Western’s original service proposal. See Order 72-12-29, at

5, 8. In our judgment, this it quite different from the usual

ease involving the defensive upgrading of schedules by an

incumbent already serving the market.

Further, the somewhat less optimistic forecasting ap-

proach (including a greater focus on existing or near fu-

ture forecasting assumptions) has been characteristic of

recent route determinations. This has been true even in

those situations where the Board has made a competitive

authorization. See, e.g., Additional Service to Columbia and

Augusta Case, supra. As noted above, we believe this gen-

eral approach has been warranted by recent experience—

notwithstanding the particular traffic increase which oc-

curred in the San Diego-Denver market in 1972."

Finally, we reiterate the majority’s earlier view that the

demands of beyond traffic do not justify the award of com-

petitive service in the local San Diego-Denver market.

Forecast for Competitive Operations.

Continental objects to the Board’s failure to set out a full

financial forecast for competitive operations since the case,

in the carrier’s view, turns on the issue of profitability.

Furthermore, Continental argues that the Board’s financial

projections were deficient. To begin with, the Board’s de-

cision does not ‘‘turn on profitability’’ as suggested by Con-

12 We note, by way of comparison, than the San Diego-Kansas

City market showed virtually no traffic growth in calendar 1972.

46a

tinental since profitability is not the sole, controlling criter-

ion for authorizing competition. Further, the Board is not

[J.A. 110] required in every case to make a dollar-for-dollar

analysis with regard to each component of an applicant’s

service proposal. While the Board recognizes its obligation

to evaluate the economics of proposed route awards on the

basis of the evidence cf record, and to bring its judgment to

bear on such evaluation, the Board has seldom found it nec-

essary to publish, in terms, a forecast for each carrier.”

Rather, the Board ordinarily reviews all the estimates of

record and adopts, as it finds appropriate, the forecast of the

administrative law judge, or the Bureau of Operating Rights

or one of the other litigants, spelling out in the text of the

opinion such changes, concerns, or disagreements as the

Board may find necessary. Forecasting, after all, is largely

a matter of attempting to predict an overall future result

(rather than determining whether any particular component

in a forecast is correct or incorrect) and cannot be an exact

science. Nonetheless, the Board explains its forecasting de-

cisions in sufficient detail to enable interested persons to

understand the results.

Such procedure was followed in this case. In fact, despite

Continental’s complaint about the Board’s forecasts, the

carrier was able to construct complete forecasts (for itself

and Western) based on the textual comments in the Board’s

opinion. As indicated in that opinion (p. 10), the Board

utilized the Bureau’s forecasts which were adopted as rea-

sonable by Judge Goldberg (I.D. 66, 80) but made adjust-

ments with regard to certain of his forecasting assump-

' Continental asserts that the Board's ‘‘usual practice’’ is to

set forth a profit and loss statement when a decision turns on the

question of profitability. However, one of the two cases cited as

an example of this ‘‘usual practice’’ (Order 70-8-1, Appendix A)

involved only Board adjustments to forecast traffic—but not the

related revenues, or expenses—and is thus virtually identical

(apart from form) to the approach taken in the Board’s original

opinion in the instant case.

~ ee et 8 ee ee ee

47a

[J.A. 111] tions with which it disagreed. Such adjustments

are plainly spelled out at pages 8-12 of the original opinion,

and were sufficient to demonstrate that the prospects for suc-

cessful competitive operations were limited, at best, and that

certification of a second nonstop carrier under all the cir-

cumstances would be imprudent. Under such circumstances,

it was not found necessary to further quantify all potential

adjustments."

Continental acknowledges that under the Board’s pro-

jections there would be losses for both Western and Conti-

nental if competitive service were authorized. However,

Continental challenges the Board’s original finding that a

competitive award would lead—at best—to economically

marginal operating results ; Continental claims, specifically,

that the Board improperly excluded various adjustments to

the forecasts adopted by the administrative law judge and

utilized by the Board which, if made, would result in an

increase in revenues and a reduction in expenses sufficient

to produce large operating profits for both Continental and

Western. The exclusion of these items at the time of the

Board’s original decision was based upon the evidence of

record and nothing in the petitions for reconsideration es-

tablishes that their exclusion at that time was unreasonable.

Nonetheless, in view of Continental’s assertion that these

matters were wholly disregarded by the Board (and the

earrier’s appendices in support of its assertion), it appears

desirable—although not necessary—that each be addressed

in terms. These matters are set forth as Appendix B to

this opinion.

[J.A.112] Finally, we recognize that more recent data not

available at the time of the Board’s original decision suggest

that a few of the requested adjustments might now be appro-

priate and that competitive service would be more profitable

%* See, for example, Order 72-12-29, note 12. This is the same

general approach adopted by Judge Goldberg—albeit with a dif-

ferent ultimate results (1.D. 70).

48a

than originally anticipated—although not as profitable as

Continental claims. However, nothing in the petitions, or in

the recent data, causes us to change our judgment that a com-

petitive award to Continental is unwarranted at this time.

The Current Fuel Shortage

As we have stated in our comparison opinion in the

Remanded Atlanta-Detroit /Cleveland/Cincinnati Investiga-

tion, Docket 20724, the nation in general, and the airlines in

particular, are now confronted with a crucial problem of

diminished fuel supplies. Thus, in the short term, at least,

decisions affecting the level of service in one market will,

more than ever before, directly affect service elsewhere in

the country. This consideration requires that the Board

appraise each individual route authorization with a view to

insuring the maintenance of essential existing services and

providing the public with the best nationwide air service

possible given the limited levels of service necessitated by

the fuel shortage. Concomitantly, it mandates a greater

emphasis on the need to foster ecom my of operation in the

airline industry.

[.J.A. 113] We have considered the petitions for reconsidera-

tion in this context and we believe that denial is more consist-

ent with the nation’s fuel conservation efforts. The San

Diego-Denver market already receives a level of nonstop

service which is reasonably related to traffic demand.” There-

** In this connection, we have reviewed the service needs of the

market in light of more current officially noticeable data and the

data submitted by Western since the issuance of the Board’s origi-

nal decision. While the most recent traffic figures show a sub-

stantial increase in San Diego-Denver traffic during 1972, Western's

load factor data indicate that reserved seat coach load factors have

averaged between the low 40s during the Fall season and the low

60s during the peak Summer season. These data confirm the Board’s

earlier judgment that the addition of a third nonstop round trip

in June 1972 would accommodate traffic increases and that there

would be ample nonstop capacity for existing traffic demand.

Western's load factors reflecting implementation of its third round

trip are set out as Appendix A.

a ee ee es

49a

fore, a grant of competitive authority to Continental would

mainly permit unneeded San Diego-Denver service. Such

service is also likely to be provided at the expense of serv-

ice in other markets—to the overall detriment of the public

interest. Similarly, we have considered the additional bene-

fit which Continental could offer in its beyond markets, par-

ticularly San Diego-Kansas City. Recent data show virtu-

ally no growth in traffic in the San Diego-Kansas City mar-

ket between 1971 and 1972 and we see no reason to alter the

Board’s original judgment that the benefit to beyond pas-

sengers does not outweigh the factors which otherwise mili-

tate against an award of competitive authority to Conti-

nental in the San Diego-Denver market.

Accorpincty, It Is Ornperep Tat:

1. The petitions for reconsideration of Order 72-12-29 be

and they hereby are denied;

[J.A.114] 2. The motions of Continental and Western for

leave to file pleadings in excess of the page limitations set

out in the Rules of Practice be and they hereby are granted;

3. The motion of Continental requesting the Board to

receive certain data, dated September 14, 1973, be and it

hereby is granted; and

4. The motions of Continental requesting the Board to

direct Western to supply load-factor and traffic data, dated

December 12, 1972 and February 27, 1973, be and they here-

by are dismissed as moot.

Timm, Chairman, and GriumLLanp, Vice Chairman, con-

curred in the above opinion and order. Minett1, Member,

filed the attached dissent. West and O’Me.ia, Members, did

not participate.

Epwin Z. Hotianp

Secretary

(SEAL)

[J.A. 115]

50a

APPENDIX A

WESTERN’S COACH LOAD FACTORS

Month

July ’73

June

May

April

March

February

January

December °72

November

October

September

August

July

June

Reserved Seat LF

62.4%

61.3

43.2

53.1

58.1

53.8

51.6

59.8

46.6

41.7

44.6

63.4

58.9

60.7

On Board LF

70.1%

69.1

51.4

62.0

65.6

62.5

57.8

65.9

55.1

50.6

54.6

74.8

67.5

71.3

ee ee en

5la

[J.A. 116] APPENDIX B

FORECAST FOR COMPETITIVE OPERATIONS

The Forecast for Western.

1. The major alterations requested by Continental in its

petition for reconsideration—t.e., revenue increases re-

lated to San Diego-Denver and San Diego-beyond traffic—

were fully evaluated but not adopted in the Board’s origi-

nal opinion. Such alterations constitute about half of the

$2.7 million in potential revenue which Continental claims

was improperly excluded from the Board’s estimate of

Western’s operating results. The basis of Continental’s

claim was a proffer of more recent on-line data submitted

by Western. However, the Board’s general practice is to

rely on changes in the more standardized O&D figures. In

this case, there was no substantial showing that Western’s

on-line data represented a more trustworthy indicator of

changes in local San Diego-Denver traffic patterns so as

to warrant reliance on the on-line data in lieu of the data

utilized in the Board’s projections.’ Consequently, in light

of the limited traffic growth during the 3-4 years prior to

the time of decision, the Board did not agree with the

petitioners that the increase in Western’s on-line traffic

constituted ample proof that the market’s pre-1968 growth

had resumed or that it was certain to be resumed at the

15-20 percent level.

‘For example, Western’s data revealed that the carrier's San

Diego-Denver on-line traffic increased about 17 percent between

1969 and 1970 (from 60,688 passengers to 70,947 passengers) al-

though the Board’s survey of O&D and interline connecting traffic

showed no increase during the same period. The 20 percent increase

in Western’s on-line traffic between 1970 and 1971 was also higher

than the 15.6 percent reflected in the Board’s surveys. The problem

is compounded with regard to the 1972 on-line figures since the

effects of the Northwest strike between June and October 1972

could not readily be quantified.

52a

Similarly the Board’s original 18.4 percent participa-

tion figure was a reasonably reliable guide to the percent-

age of Twin Cities-San Diego traffic which was likely to

flow over Denver. Continental argues in favor of a 40 per-

cent figure and Judge Goldberg employed a 30 percent

figure. However, as noted in the original opinion, the evi-

dence of record indicated that only 6 pereent of the Twin

Cities-San Diego traffic moved via Denver during a period

(such as the forecast period) when Western operated non-

stop San Diego-Twin Cities services, but that 40 percent

of this traffic moved via Denver when no nonstop service

was offered. Use of the 18.4 percent figure for forecasting

[.J.A.117] purposes took into account the fact that West-

ern’s load factors on the nonstop flights were low and that

the carrier could revert to its prior pattern of operating

nonstop flights only during select months of the year.

2. The Board properly rejected Continental’s claim that

Western’s ‘‘other operating revenue’’ should be 8.8 per-

cent of passenger revenue rather than the 5.1 percent em-

ployed in the Bureau's forecast (according to Continental,

such adjustment would add $231,000 in revenues for West-

ern). Continental appears to have relief on an Airwest

assertion that the 5.1 percent figure did not inelude mail

and charter revenues (see also I.D. 70-71). However,

Western pointed out in its original brief to the Board that

the 5.1 pereent figure did, in fact, include such revenues

for the Denver-San Diego nonstop segment, and that it

was merely coincidental that 5.1 percent also represented

Western’s systemwide figure for property revenue only.

On this basis, it was concluded that employment of the

5.1 percent figure was sound.

3. The Board properly concluded that there was no need

to increase the revenues attributable to ‘‘all other beyond

traffic’’ (Continental indicated that such an increase would

add $223,000 to Western’s gross revenues). See I.D. 71.

The argument in favor of an increase in such revenues

53a

apparently rested upon an Airwest exhibit (RW-SR-906)

which attempted to predici beyond traffic in the forecast

year. In so doing, however, the exhibit assumed, among

other things, a blanket 5 percent annual growth rate in

all beyond markets. The officially noticeable data available

at the time of the Board’s decision showed that the growth

rates in the two largest markets set out in the exhibits

(these markets constituted over 65 percent of the total

traffic forecast in the exhibit) were 1.0 percent, and—3.6

percent, respectively, between 1970 and 1971. Thus, there

was no evidentiary support for any increase in revenues

attributable to ‘‘all other beyond traffic.’’

4. Employment of the 18 percent dilution rate as set

forth in the Bureau’s estimate was reasonable. Continental

assumed that Western’s actual experienced dilution rate

of 18.4 percent in 1971 was based on a mix of first class

and coach traffic only, and argued from this that the rate

should be adjusted downward (Continental suggests 12

percent) so as to incorporate Continental’s experience

with ‘‘K’’ fares which Western indicated it would intro-

duce if Continental were also certificated in the market.

See also I.D. 70. (Continental anticipated that such change

would increase Western’s gross forecast revenues by

$667,000.) Contrary to Continental’s assumption, however,

the 18 percent estimate employed in the Bureau's forecast

and adopted by the administrative law judge was based

on a mix of first class, economy, and ‘‘K’”’ fare traffic (see

[J.A.118] WA-R-201). And, while that 18 percent figure

represented, in part, a judgment estimate that 8 percent of

Western’s traffic would travel at ‘‘K’’ fares, there was no

suggestion by Continental that such judgment estimate was

in error.’

*We appreciate that the Board’s decision in Phase 5 of the

DPFI to eliminate certain discount fares might have warranted

a downward adjustment in the dilution rate by some indeterminate

amount. However, there was no evidence in the record upon which

to quantify an appropriate adjustment.

o+a

5. Continental suggests that Western’s operating ex-

penses could have been reduced by about $300,000 if the

carrier substituted B-727-200 aircraft for the B-720B uti-

lized for two of its three daily nonstop around trip flights.

See also I.). 73-74. However, the equipment to be operated

over a particular route at a particular time depends upon

a number of factors, including the availability of other

aircraft and the equipment needs on other parts of a car-

rier’s system. As a general rule, each carrier is given

broad discretion with regard to the employment of its air-

craft. Western argued that it was employing its equip-

ment in the most efficient manner and Continental had not

proven that Western was unnecessarily inflating costs by

operating equipment clearly unsuitable to the particular

route. Thus, predicating Western's operating results on

the actual mix of B-720B and B-727 aircraft then in use

was reasonable and, at the time, more accurate.

6. Finally, adoption of the 3 percent annual escalation

figure by the administrative law judge and the Board was

reasonable. (See 1.D). 72-72.) Continental asserts that em-

ployment of an escalation figure of .5 percent for 1972-

1973 would be more appropriate and would reduce West-

ern’s expense forecast by almost $100,000." Western ar-

gued, on brief to the Board, that its actual expenses in-

creased by just over 7 percent between 197° and 1971.

This assertion strongly suggested that the 3 percent esea-

lation figure originally adopted by the administrative law

judge understated—rather than overstated—actual cost

increases.

[J.A.119] The Forecast for Continental.

All but about $53,000 of the $827,000 alleged by Conti-

nental to have been improperly excluded from its first year

‘Continental did not request any adjustment in the 3 percent

per year figure employed for the 1970-1972 period.

55a

forecast involves traffic in the San Diego-Denver/beyond

markets. The basis for rejecting Continental’s allegations

in this regard was fully explained in the Board’s original

opinivn. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, the validity of

the remaining adjustments which Continental claims are

necessary, this would not have altered the original con-

clusion that an award of competitive authority would pro-

duce—at best—margirally profitable results. However,

Continental’s petition for reconsideration also points to

an increase of $135,000 in gross revenues as a result of a

reduction in its dilution factor to 12 percent from the 16

percent set out in the Bureau’s forecast. The 16 percent

dilution factor was based on Continental’s experience.

(CO-401B) and was thus reasonable and supported by the

record. Adherence to the 16 percent dilution factor turns

Continental’s projected $53,000 profit into a forecast loss.

{[J.A.120] Mrinert1, Member, dissenting

My views on the merits of this case have not changed.’

Accordingly, I would grant the petitions for reconsidera-

tion filed by Continental Air Lines and the San Diego,

Denver, and Kansas City parties and would award Con-

tinental competitive nonstop authority between San Diego

and Denver. In my judgment, each successive considera-

tion of this case has made it clearer that competitive serv-

ice in this substantial market could and undoubtedly would

be conducted on a sound economic basis by both carriers;

that such service is required in the interests of the travel-

ing public; and that the San Diego-Kansas City market

with its significant long-term upward growth trend is en-

titled to the benefits of first single-plane service which

See my earlier dissents with former Member Murphy in Orders

70-4-46 (April 9, 1970); 71-3-135 (Mareh 23, 1971); 71-4-112

(April 16, 1971—order of remand, concurrence in the result) ;

and 72-12-29 (December 8, 1972).

56a

would result from an award to Continental.? At most, the

present fuel shortage would lead me to stay the effective-

ness of Continental’s award for a period.

In calendar 1971 Western carried 85,522 on-line O&D pas-

sengers hetween San Diego and Denver. In 1972 this traffic

(J.A. 121] increased 24 percent to 105,978 passengers. In the

first seven months of 1973 alone, Western’s on-line O&D

traffic increased to 70,501 passengers,’ presaging another

very substantial increase for 1973 as a whole. These traffic

figures do not include any San Diego-Denver passengers

who used carriers other than Western or used connecting

service; any passengers on board Western’s San Diego-

Denver flights who moved beyond San Diego or Denver to

or from other points on Western’s system; or any pros-

pective stimulation from the introduction of competitive

service in the San Diego-Denver market, first single-plane

service in the San Diego-Kansas City market, and first

single-carrier service in other markets on Continental’s

system.

These figures make it clear that Bureau Counsel and the

Administrative Law Judge were on sound ground, indeed

*I do not understand the majority's opinions, either originally

or on reconsideration, as holding that benefits to ‘‘bevyond-market’’

travelers (such as those in the San Diego-Kansas City market)

are not a material factor in determining the public convenience

and necessity for the service in issue, or that revenues to be re-

ceived from such travelers should not be taken into account in

assessing the profitability of proposed competitive operations. Any

such holding, of course, would depart drastically from many years

of Board precedents, and would have to be based on more explana-

tion than a eryptie phrase.

‘Figures brought to the Board's attention by Continental's

motion filed September 14, 1973, based on information furnished

by Western pursuant to the prehearing conference order in this

proceeding. These most recent figures do not form the basis of

my conclusions, but simply serve to confirm conclusions amply

supported by evidence already in the record and the findings of

the Administrative Law Judge.

57a

conservative, in forecasting a traffic flow of 127,000 pas- ,

sengers for 1973 under conditions of two-carrier compe-

tition. For fiscal 1975, which of course would now be the

earliest possible first year of competitive operations under

an award to Continental, a market of well over 150,000 an-

nual passengers would clearly be in prospect, and the po-

[J.A. 122]}tential for profitable operations by both carriers

could hardly be doubted.‘ I consider these more recent traffic

figures a far more reliable indicator of the San Diego-

Denver market’s potential than the depressed statistics

of the 1969-71 era on which my colleagues continue to rely.

I also cannot fail to note the persistence of quite high load

factors on Western’s San Diego-Denver flights,’ as well as

‘Traffic in fiseal 1975, in faet, should be approximately 50 per

cent Ingher than that originally forecast for the first vear of

competitive service by the Admiinstrative Law Judge in the origi-

nal proceeding (Order 70-4-46), on the basis of which he made

a well-substantiated forecast of profitable operations for both

carriers.

In view of the comments on pp. 12-13 and Appendix B, p. 3

of the maiority’s present opinion, T would note that in June of

1973 Western in fact substituted B-727-200's for B-720B's on

Flichts 603, 543, and 423 (OAG, June 1, 1973). Also, the ma-

jority’s treatment of the fare dilution issue makes no attempt to

quantify the substantially lessened dilution which will unquestion-

ably result from the termination of youth, family and Discover

America fares ordered by the Board in Phase 5 of the Domestic

Passenger-Fare Investigation, as well as from the Board's more

restrictive recent policy towards diseount fares generally, Overall,

it is hard to avoid the impression that the majority is not really

interested in whether competitive service would be profitable, and

has effectively eliminated this as a decisional factor.

‘For a recent six-month period (February through July of

1973) Western's nonstop San Diego-Denver coach load factors

averaged 63.5 percent, and were over 65 percent in three months

out of six, peaking at 70.1 percent in July. Western's eastbound

midday Flight 424 had an average coach load factor of just under

80 percent for the six months, dropping below 75 percent only

in May and peaking at 87 percent in March. Meanwhile, Western's

one-stop flights over Phoenix, referred to earlier by my colleagues

58a

[.J.A. 125] some troublesome gaps in its nonstop schedules.’

These factors, together with the amply documented find-

ings of the Administrative Law Judge, and my own views

previously expressed at the several stages of this long-

drawn-out proceeding, leave me with an abiding convie-

tion that competitive San Diego-Denver service by Con-

tinental is required by the public convenience and necessity.

Like my colleagues, I have taken into account the cur-

rent fuel shortage, but that cireumstance convinces me

neither that the present case was correctly decided at its

earlier stages,’ nor that it ought to be decided differently

under present conditions. While I have joined in the

Board's opinion in the Atlanta-Detroit /Cleveland /Cincin-

nati Investigation, the present case seems to me so clearly

distinguishable, on both procedural and factual grounds,

Quan

as providing convenient back-up service in the market, were

plagued with considerably higher load factors. On the critical

Phoenix-Denver leg, coach load factors averaged 78.4 percent for

the six months, dropping below 75 percent only in May and peak-

ing at 84.6 percent in March. (On the San Diezo- Phoenix leg load

fact rs for the six months averaged a very healthy 65 percent.)

Numerous individual flights showed monthly critical-segment load

factors in the 0's or high 80's, making it abundantly clear that

Passengers in many cases were not being accommodated on the

flight of their choice.

* According to the May 1, 1974, Official Airline Guide, as appears

to be typical of the last vear or two, no westbound nonstop flight

is scheduled to depart until 10:50 am. (arriving 11:50 a.m. PDT)

While no eastbound nonstop flight departs after 3:35 p.m, Thus a

Denver-orizinating passe ver cannot do more than a couple of

hours’ business in San Diego and return home on the same day

In June, for the tirst time, Western proposes to add both an

earlier (9:15a.m.) westbound nonstop and a later (8:00 p.m.)

eastbound nonstop. _

The decision which is here being reconsidered was adopted in

December 1972, many months before the present acute fuel short-

age came into being. The earlier decisions in this case which to

me seem erroneous go back to 1970 (see footnote 1, supra).

in

ee ee ee

ot i clay en Mt a A te A OA OAL LEELA AS

59a

that I do not believe the Atlanta result requires a similar

outcome here. The fact that Western will be able in June

of this year to schedule four and a half nonstop round

trips in the San Diego-Denver market makes it plain, I think,

that competitive service in this market is possible without

[J.A. 124] materially increasing overall jet fuel consumption

or reducing service in other, perhaps more essential mar-

kets. The clearly and repeatedly demonstrated need for

competitive service convinces me that an award to Con-

tinental should be made now. At most, the one concession

to the current fuel shortage which I might be prepared

to consider justified would be to stay the effectiveness of

an award to Continental for some reasonable period, say

six months, or until the recognized end of the fuel short-

age, whichever first occurs.

/s/ G. Josepn Mrvettt

60a

[J.A. 83] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Docket 18104

Appitional. Service to Sax Dirco Case

(San Diego-Denver)

Decided: December 8, 1972

All applications for competitive nonstop authority denied

and investigation terminated.

APPEARANCES:

Same as in the supplemental initial decision, and in ad-

dition the following:

George C. Pendleton, on behalf of the Wichita Parties.

Opinion

[J.A.84] By rue Boarp:

The remanded portion of this proceeding involves the

question of whether the public convenience and necessity

require the award of first competitive nonstop authority

between San Diego, California, and Denver, Colorado

and, if so, which carriers should be selected to provide

the service. In the original phase of this proceeding the

Board, by Order 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, authorized West-

ern Air Lines to provide nonstop service in the San

Diego-Denver market but declined to authorize competi-

tive service at the same time. By Order 71-4112, April

6la

16, 1971, however, the Board reopened and remanded the

proceeding to the administrative law judge specifically

for the purpose of reexamining the issue of the need for

competitive service on the basis of more recent traffic and

cost data, as well as Western’s actual experience with

nonstop service in the market.

Hearings in the reopened phase of the case were held

before Administrative Law Judge Hyman Goldberg and

his supplemental initial decision was issued on March

20, 1972. He found that nonstop competitive service is

warranted and that Continental Air Lines should be

selected to compete with Western. His decision to certi-

ficate a second nonstop carrier was based on three pri-

mary considerations: (1) the market in the forecast

years (1972 and 1973) should be large enough to justify

competitive nonstop service under normal circumstances;

(2) there are serious deficiencies and omissions in the service

operated by Western ir the market; and (3) both carriers

will achieve a substantial operating profit in the forecast

[J.A.85] years, while Western will not suffer harmful

diversion as a consequence of an award of competitive

nonstop authority. The Board granted discretionary re-

view. On brief to the Board, TWA, one of the applicants

for new authority, contends that the record demonstrates

no immediate need for competitive service. Similarly,

United Air Lines concludes that a reasonable forecast of

financial results would show that the costs which would

be incurred by competitive service would not be recovered

by available revenues. All other parties, except Western,

generally approve Judge Goldberg’s need for service

finding.’

’ Briefs to the Board were filed by Western Air Lines, Conti-

nental Air Lines, Hughes Airwest, Trans World Airlines, United

Air Lines, the San Diego Unified Port District, the City of San

Diego and the San Diego Chamber of Commerce, and the Bureau

of Operating Rights, while the City and County of Denver and

62a

Upon careful consideration of the initial decision, the

contentions of the parties, and all the facts of record, we

have concluded that the public convenience and necessity

would be better served at this time by not authorizing

competitive service in this market.’ Our decision reflects

the belief that during a period of lagging traffic growth

and retrenchment within the industry, and during the sub-

sequent period of recovery before an adequate upward

trend has been assured (both generally and in markets

which may be at issue), we must be more than usually

eareful to avoid impeding the industry’s opportunities for

full recovery. An unduly optimistic anticipation regarding

traffic response on the part of carrier-applicants or the

Board can have unfortunate economic effects, even for

[.J.A. 86] financially healthy carriers, to the detriment of the

national air transportation system.’ In each case, of course,

we also bear in mind that the need of the traveling public

for air transportation service is a paramount element of

the puble interest, and that competition ultimately holds

the greatest prospect for vigorous development of air

transportation. In this connection, we fully appreciate that

in other circumstances, and at other times, awards were

made in smaller markets, under more optimistic forecast-

ing assumptions, or with somewhat less consideration of

an incumbent carrier’s scheduling practices during the

pendency of a proceeding.‘ Moreover, we are aware that

the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado adopted

its brief to the administrative law judge as its brief to the Board.

* Except to the extent modified herein, we adopt as our own the

findings and conelusions of the administrative law judge. The

supplemental initial decision is attached as an appendix to this

opinion.

*See. «a, Application of Continental Air Lines, Order 72-5-72,

May 19, 1972.

‘As noted above, however, the circumstances of this reopened

case are highly unusual and an imnortant purpose of our remand

was to examine the need for competitive service in light of West-

ern’s actual experience with nonstop operatioxs.

63a

certain indicators now point to a trend away from the eco-

nomic picture of the recent past. In these circumstances,

we believe we should analyze the unique need of each mar-

ket for service within an atmosphere of caution and re-

straint to insure that a proper balance is struck between

the needs of the traveler or shipper and the effect which

a competitive award might have on the air transportation

system and on the public who in the end can only be served

by the maintenance of a healthy industry.

There is little question that the San Diego-Denver route

offers a potential for future certification of competition.

However, in the circumstances of this case—where West-

ern’s service has been, and appears likely to be, reason-

ably responsive to the needs of the market, and where the

traffic growth in the local San Diego-Denver market, and

the beyond markets which would support much local oper-

ations, show no strong sign of improvement—we believe

it imprudent, on balance, to certificate a second nonstop

carrier where competitive service is likely to produce, at

best, only marginal financial results.°

[J.A.87] Quality of Service

We believe that Western’s historic efforts to satisfy

the demands of the local market have been fairly satisfac-

tory. As Judge Goldberg notes in his supplemental initial

decision (pp. 14-16) the carrier has increased its frequen-

cies, introduced modern equipment, and generally up-

graded its service since it received single-plane authority

at the end of 1957 In reviewing Western’s recent nonstop

performance, however, the initial decision suggests that

local passengers have not received the quality and quantity

of service to which they are entitled, noting (1) high load

factors on certain flights, (2) insufficient frequencies and

*See also Phoenix-Seattle/Portland Nonstop Case, Order 70-8-

13, August 5, 1970, at 3-4; Cf: Service to Salt Lake City Investi-

gation, Order 70-8-1, August 3, 1970, at 7.

64a

undesirable schedule times, and (3) the operation of San

Diego-Denver service as part of a long-haul operation. We

do not share Judge Goldberg’s appraisal of the evidence.

A. Load Factors

Western began its nonstop service with morning and

evening departures in both directions (flight 474 departed

San Diego at 8:05 AM, flight 421 departed Denver at 8

AM, flight 426 left San Diego at 5:15 PM, and flight 425

left Denver at 6:30 PM). As the initial decision recognizes,

however, flights 421 and 426 operated at extremely low

load factors during the first seven months of service ended

December 30, 1970; as a result. oa January 5, 1971, West-

ern replaced them with two m.u-day departures (replace-

ment flight 603 departed San Diego at 3:50 PM and flight

[J.A. 88] 543 left Denver at 11:55 AM). These replacement

flights produced some improvements in load factors but, sig-

nificantly, average load factors (except for the predictable

summertime increase) continued to remain modest. See

I.D. Appendix 6, page 1. In our judgment, the emphasis

in the initial decision on pre-January 1971 schedules to

support the interrelated findings that high load factors on

certain flights indicate substantial passenger inconveni-

ence, while low load factors on other flights indicate poor

scheduling (I.D. 61-64), presents a somewhat unrepresen-

tative picture of Western’s overall nonstop load factor

and scheduling experience. Western’s reserved-seat load

factors for the overall record period June 1970-February

1972 (i.e., including the period followng schedule changes

in January 1971), show that average load factors were

only 43 percent nonwithstanding the schedule changes.°

®In this connection, footnote 35 of the initial decision is some-

what misleading as it suggests that the original flights 426 and

421 had attained overall load factors of 65.7 percent and 65.5

percent (and on-board coach load factors of 69.7 percent and 74.5

pereent) respectively ‘‘when this schedule was changed.’’ Load

factors on these fiights on the January 5 date of the schedule

65a

Similarly, the proper standard for load factor evaluation

is the reserved-seat load factor, not the on-board load fac-

tor, since the purported purpose of standby fares is to fill

otherwise empty seats. In short, we believe that the record

as a whole shows that there has been ample nonstop ca-

pacity for existing traffic demand. The addition of a third

nonstop round trip in June 1972 should accommodate

whatever traffic increases are likely to occur in the near

future.

[J.A.89] We would note, in this connection, that the Board

recently concluded that a reasonable long-range industry

load-factor standard should be at least 55 percent for rate-

making purposes.’ We are not suggesting that such in-

dustry- load-factor standards for rate-making purposes

should determine decisions with regard to competitive route

authorizations in particular markets, or that the same meas-

ure must necessarily govern rate and route questions. Use

of on-board load factors, for example, is more appropriate

for rate-making purposes although reserved-seat load fac-

tors more accurately reflect the true demand for seats in

the context of evaluating the need for service. Nonetheless,

we believe that the exposure to competition should be care-

fully measured where—as here—an incumbent carrier’s

load factors are substantially below the recommended in-

dustry standard.*®

change—reflecting the post New Year traffic surge during the first

few days of January—are not representative of load factors which

might be anticipated for January had a full month’s pattern of

service been operated.

"Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 6B (Load Fae-

tor), Order 71-4-54, April 9, 1971.

* The Board has, on occasion, concluded that competitive service

was warranted notwithstanding modest load factors.

66a

B. Schedules

We are unable to endorse Judge Goldberg’s view that

Western’s nonstop schedules are ill-timed. In the first place,

we believe that his concern that only one flight in each

direction operates at ‘‘prime’* times (1.D. 60) does not

fully consider that the attrac iveness of San Diego-Denver

schedules cannot be measured in terms of what might con-

stitute ‘peak period’? departures in other markets. An

important portion of San Diego-Denver traffic, after all,

consists of non-business travelers. See Brief of San Diego

Parties, pp. 6-7. A significant partion of the traffic also

utilizes the flights for connecting service at Denver. His-

torically, upwards of 25 percent of the market makes inter-

line connections (1.D. Appendix 2.) and an additional per-

centage, of course, makes on-line connections. These factors

[.J.A. 90) are complicated by the fact that San Diego-Denver

flights operate across the time zone between the Rocky Moun-

tains and the Pacifie Coast. Thus, the mid-afternoon east-

bound departure and the mid-afternoon westbound depar-

ture are really more responsive to the needs of the traffic than

so-called ‘‘prime time’’ departures might be. A review (pp.

4-5, supra) of the load factors on Western’s initial evening

‘‘orime hour’’ flight to Denver and the morning ‘‘ prime

hour’’ flight to San Diego constitutes strong evidence of

this fact. Secondly, the indication that there is no eastbound

service ‘‘for a period of 16 hours’? (I.D. 59) is less com-

pelling when it is considered that much of that 4 PM-8 AM

period is during the night, and that any significantly later

departure would not—because of the time change—allow

for reasonable connecting opportunities at Denver. The

valid concern over a lack of westbound service between

11:20 AM and 5 PM (I.D. note 118) has been obviated by

the recent institution of a mid-afternoon westbound non-

stop flight. In short, contrary to the initial decision, we

find that the eurrent scheduling pattern is reasonably well

suited to the needs of the traffic.

67a

C. Long-Haul Service

Finally, we note no significant problems flowing from the

fact that Western operates its San Diego-Denver service

as part of a long-haul pattern. The primary faults with

long-haul service, after all, are usually that local schedule

needs are compromised, that seats are not available for

local traffic, and that there is a potential for disruption in

the operation of flights due to difficulties at distant points.’

Clearly the San Diego-Denver market represents an impor-

tant one for Western so that its schedules, as noted above, are

[J.A.91] geared largely to the needs of passengers travel-

ing over the San Diego-Denver segment. Moreover, non-

stop seats are available. And, lastly, the carrier’s perform-

ance factor and on-time record are good. Few nonstop

flights were canceled (I.D. 16) and Western’s on-time per-

formance is above the trunkline average. (Western's Brief

to the Board, Appendix B.)

Finally, the Board recognizes that Western did not, until

June, 1972, offer the last of the three daily round trips

which it proposed in the original phase of this proceeding.

However, in view of lagging traffic growth generally, and

the modest traffic response to the original two-daily-round-

trip pattern, we do not find that Western’s action warrants

serious criticism.

Traffic Growth and Profitability

We believe that the prospect for profitable two-carrier

operation is tenuous at this time. The administrative law

judge accepted as reasonable the Bureau’s forecast of

127,409 passengers in 1973 (348 per day) and characterized

this projection as sound and conservative.’® The Bureau’s

*See Dallas/Fort Worth-Phoenix Nonstop Service Case, Order

69-7137, July 24, 1969, note 3 and accompanying text.

*° Among the carrier parties, the market size was forecast for

1973 between a low of 101,893 (United) and a high of 132,701

( Airwest).

68a

forecast employed a traffic base premised on Western’s on-

line trafie (rather than O&D and connecting traffic), used

a 7.5-pereent annual growth rate, estimated stimulation at

15 percent on the basis of QST, and assumed that 30 per-

cent of the eurrent San Diego-Twin Cities traffic would

travel on Western’s San Diego-Denver flights and serve

to support Western's service. We believe this forecast is

too optimistic.

To begin with, we would not use the 7.5-percent annual

growth rate. According to the Board’s surveys, the growth

rate since 1968 has been declining, i.e., 7.5 percent for 1968-

(J.A.92] 1969, and 0 percent for 1969-1970, The 1970-1971 in-

crease of 11.6 percent can be attributed to the stimulation of

Western’s new nonstop service, with true growth, for all

practical purposes, again at about 0 percent. Thus, over

the last two years, there has bee: virtualy no true traffic

growth, and only 2.5-percent annual growth since 1968.

Consequently, the Board considers a 3-percent growth rate

for 1972 and 1973 far more realistic.

Moreover, a projection of 15-percent stimulation based

on QSI appears high in light of recent experience in the

market. The Board’s original estimate (based on a Bu-

reau QSI forecast) projected stimulation at 33 percent

for Western’s proposed three-daily-round-trip-nonstop pat-

tern but Western’s new service increased traffic only 15.6

percent. Even adjusting for the two-round-trip-a-day pat-

tern actually operated, the new service should have pro-

duced stimulation in the 20-25-percent range. The Board

is inclined therefore to discount the current prediction of

15-percent stimulation based on a similar QsI estimate

for Continental’s proposed nonstop competitive service.

This judgment is reinforced by the belief that such bleedoff

traffic as may have oeen appropriately included in the

Board’s original forecast (when only one-stop San Diego-

Denver service was available) has been largely recaptured

since Western inaugurated its nonstop service. A 10-percent

figure would appear more reliable.

69a

(J.A.93] Lastly, we would not employ Western’s Fiscal

1971 traffic figures as a base in constructing the local traffic

forecast. As the Board had occasion to note recently, it has

been our uniform practice to express the primary market

traffic in terms of true O&D and inter-line connecting passen-

gers because these passengers would be more o rless equally

accessible to all carriers operating in the market." Addi-

tional on-line traffic, to the extent it can accurately be

quantified, is more appropriately included as traffic support

for a particular carrier. Thus, we do not find that the use

of O&D and connecting data as a base either ‘‘understates”’

the market or is otherwise less reliable as suggested in the

initial decision (I.D. 56-57). In addition, we believe that

the two remaining reasons advanced by Judge Goldberg

for rejecting the traditional approach in this case—that

Western’s on-line data are more current and that O&D

data include a strike period—have been obviated by our

utilization of calendar 1971 data.

Assuming only the adjustments described above, but

otherwise using the Bureau’s forecast assumptions, there

may well be a reduction of 16,000 passengers for Western

in the local market and a commensurate reduction of anti-

cipated gross revenues (based on a 55:45 split in participa-

tion) of $850,000. Even a modest increase in traffic to re-

flect any additional on-line passengers which might not be

included in the forecast would not substantially alter this

yrospect. Moreover, there is also likely to be a reduction

of 13,000 passengers for Continental and a reduction in

gross revenues of over $750,000.

[J.A.94] A similar—and equally troublesome—picture

emerges in the major beyond markets. A review of the growth

pattern in Western’s primary beyond market, for example

(San Diego-Twin Cities), reveals that since 1969 the total

market has declined every year—from 12,730 O&D and con-

"Cf: Alaska Service Investigation, Order 72-1-94, January 26,

1972, p. 6.

70a

necting passengers in 1969 to 46,970 in 1971. Thus, even the

Bureau's projected 5-percent growth rate is highly doubtful.

Similarly, a review of the O&D surveys for the 1970-1971

period for the beyond markets which Continental proposes

to serve reveals that only Colorado Springs—with 3,690

passengers in 1971 (10 per day)—experienced growth over

calendar 1969 and 1970. Even that growth was a mere 3.7

percent. Moreover, the Bureau’s estimate that 30 percent

of the Twin Cities beyond traffic would travel over Denver

contemplated that no nonstop service would be operated

in the San Diego-Twin Cities market. As the Bureau points

out, Western carried about 40 percent of its Twin Cities

traffic via Denver during the period when no nonstop service

to the Twin Cities was offered, but carried only 6 percent

of such traffie via Denver during the period when it also

operated nonstop service between San Diego and the Twin

Cities. A witness testified that Western would institute and

maintain nonstop service on a more or less indefinite basis

beginning in the middle of 1972 (Tr. 488-489) and the car-

rier, in fact, has done so (see OAG Nov. 1, 1972). Although

we appreciate that Western can climinate that nonstop

service, nonetheless reliance on the Bureau’s 30-percent

figure seems too chancy at this time.

(J.A.95] Assuming only a 3-percent growth rate in the Twin

Cities market, and utilizing (for forecasting purposes) the

18.4-percent Twin Cities participation which the Board pro-

jected in its original order on remand, Western’s beyond

traffic could be reduced by 9,600 passengers and beyond

revenues could be more than half a million dollars below

that predicted by the Bureau, while the Bureau’s estimate

of Continental’s beyond traffic could be overstated by about

7,000 beyond passengers, and its beyond revenues could

be about $700,000 too high. These prospects seriously chal-

lenge the conclusion that two-carrier competition would

be successful.”

17 A number of assumptions made by the Bureau—e.g., stimula-

tion in markets which have service comparable to that which

A ae

ne

——

7la

Other Considerations

We have also examined beyond-segment benefits and the

potential for carrier strengthening or operational flexibility

insofar as these are relevant aspects of the public con-

venience and necessity." As we have noted throughout

this vpinion, boih the loeal aud major beyond markets have

been characterized by a paucity of growth and, with this

backdrop, the Board does not conclude that the potential

first single-plane service for Kansas City-San Diego pas-

sengers (the San Diego-Kansas City market generated 29

passengers per day in each direction in 1971) and addi-

tional single-carrier service outweigh the other considera-

tions detailed above. The Board believes that the demand of

a second market should not be the justification for award-

ing competitive service in the primary market at issue here.

Likewise, the local service carrier applicant cannot offer

any impressive beyond-segment benefits and, overall, we

do not believe that there is any probability of subsidy

reduction.

[J.A.96] Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, and all the

facts of record, we find that:

1. The public convenience and necessity require the denial

of all applications for competitive nonstop authority in the

San Diego-Denver market at this time; and

2. All applications, requests, and motions involved herein

should be denied and the investigation should be terminated.

An appropriate order will be entered.

Browne, Chairman, GrmuiLianp, Vice Chairman, and

Timm, Member, concurred in the above opinion. Minetti and

Murpuy, Members, filed the attached dissent.

Continental would provide—are also subject to question. We find

it unnecessary, however, to attempt to quantify our doubts in

these areas.

** See Chicago-Baltimore Nonstop Service Investigation, Order

71-9-64, September 16, 1971.

72a

{| J.A.97] Mixert1 ann Murpuy, Members, Dissenting:

We cannot agree with the decision of the majority of the

Board. We stated in our dissents to the Board’s previous

decisions (Orders 70-4-46 and 71-3-135) that competitive

nonstop service in the large San Diego-Denver market is

required by the publie convenience and necessity and that

Continental Air Lines should be selected to compete with

Western. The Administrative Law Judge, on the basis of

more recent evidence in the remanded proc-cding, reaches

the same conclusion—so does the Bureau of Operating

Rights. Our own review of the present record on remand

only serves to confirm the position we earlier expressed.

For the reasons stated by the Administrative Law Judge

and those expressed in our previous dissents, we continue to

he of the opinion that Continental should be authorized to

provide nonstop service in the San Diego-Denver market.

/s/ G. Josern MINETTI

/s/ Rosert T. Mvurrery

APPENDIX

[J.A. 98] DOCKET 18104

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S INITIAL DECISION REFERRED

TO HEREIN IS NOT ATTACHED TO THIS COPY BECAUSE OF THE

WIDE CIRCULATION GIVEN AT THE TIME OF ITS RELEASE. THE

INITIAL DECISION IS ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL OF THE BOARD'S

OPINION AND TO THE OFFICIAL COPIES AND TO THE OFFICIAL

COPIES IN THE BOARD’S FILES AND MAY BE EXAMINED THERE.

IT WILL ALSO BE PRINTED AS PART OF THE OFFICIAL ‘‘ CIVIL

AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS.”’

:

:

73a

Order 72-12-29

[J.A. 99} UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board

at its office in Washington, D.C.,

on the 8th day of December, 1972

AppitTionaL Service to San Dieco Case

(San Diego-Denver)

DOCKET 18104

Order

A full public hearing having been held in the above-

entitled proceeding, and the Board having issued its opinion

containing its findings, conclusions, and decision, which is

attached hereto and made a part hereof;

Ir Is Onperep THat:

1. All applications for competitive nonstop authority be

and they hereby are denied;

2. All petitions, motions and other requests involved here-

in be and they are hereby are denied, and this investigation

is terminated.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

Harry J. Zinx

Secretary

(SEAL)

74a

[J.A. 530] UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Remanpep ApprTionaL Service to San Dreco Case

(San Dreco-Denver)

DOCKET 18104 et al.

Certificate of Continental Air Lines, Inc., for route 29,

amended so as to add a new segment extending between

the terminal point Denver, Colo., and the terminal point

San Diego, Calif.

Decision of the Board in Order 70-4-46, April 9, 1970,

to the extent that it denied applications of Hughes Air

Corp. (Air West), Trans World Airlines, Inc., and United

Air Lines, Ine., for certificated nonstop authority between

Denver, Colo., and San Diego, Calif., affirmed.

Except to the extent granted, petitions for reconsidera-

tion of Order 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, which were deferred

in Order 70-6-43, June 5, 1970, denied. This proceeding ter-

minated.

Appearances;

Richard A. Fitzacrald and John W. Simpson for Hughes

Air Corp. (Air West).

Lee M. Huyudeman and James T. Lioyd for Continental

Air Lines, Ine.

Joseph B. Goldman for Frontier Airlines, Inc. (Rule 14

participant).

Edmund E. Harvey for Trans World Airlines, Ine.

William M. Dickson for United Air Lines, Ine. f

Ernest T. Kaufmann and Gilbert L. Amyot for Western

Air Lines, Ine.

75a

Tedford Dees for the city and County of Denver, Colo.,

and the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colo-

rado.

Nordahl E. Holte for the City of Kansas City, Missouri,

and the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas City.

Joseph D. Patello for the San Diego Unified Port Dis-

trict, the City of San Diego, California, and the San Diego

Chamber of Commerce.

J. Michael Roach for the Buerau of Operating Rights,

Civil Aeronautics Board.

(J.A. 531] Supplemental Initial Decision of Hyman Goldberg.

Preliminary Statement

The basic question in this reopened and remanded pro-

ceeding is whether competitive nonstop service should be

certificated between San Diego, Calif.. and Denver, Colo.,

and if so, whether Hughes Air Corp. (Air West), Conti-

nental Air Lines, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Ine., or

United Air Lines, Inc., should be selected for the award.

In his initial decision in the original proceeding, the

examiner concluded, among other things, that two carriers

should be certificated for San Diego-Denver nonstop serv-

ice, that Western Air Lines, Inc., and Continental should

be selected for the nonstop authorizations, and that the

applications of Air West, TWA, and United should be

denied. By Order 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, the Board, inter

alia, sustained the award to Western; however, finding that

the need for a competitive nonstop authorization at the

time had not been demonstrated, the Board denied the

applications of Air West, Continental, TWA, and United."

* Members Minetti and Murphy in their coneurring and dissent-

ing opinion agreed with the examiner that a comp ¢itive authori-

zation was required, that Continental should be granted such

authorization, and that the applications of Air West, TWA, and

United should be denied.

76a

Thereafter, by Order 70-6-43, June 5, 1970, the Board

deferred action on petitions for reconsideration filed by

Air West, Continental, the Denver and Colorado Parties,

and the San Diego Parties, to the extent that these peti-

tions sought authorization of a second unrestricted nonstop

carrier between San Diego and Denver, and allowed West-

ern’s amended certificate for route 35 containing the San

Diego-Denver nonstop award to become effective. By Order

(.J.A. 532] 71-3-135, March 23, 1971, the Board denied the de-

ferred petitions and affirmed its original decision not to au-

thorize competitive San Diego-Denver nonstop service at

that time.? However, by Order 71-4-112, April 16, 1971, acting

upon its own initiative, the Board vacated Order 71-3-135

and reopened and remanded the proceeding to the exam-

iner for a further hearing on the issue of whether the

public corvenience and necessity require competitive non-

stop scivice between San Diego and Denver and, if so,

which carrier or carriers should be selected for such au-

thority.’ The Board further directed the examiner to issue

a supplemental initial decision on the San Diego-Denver

issue.*

Order 71-4-112 was followed by filings by Western *® and

?Members Minetti and Murphy, again dissenting, adhered to

their earlier view that Continental should be certificated for com-

petitive San Diego-Denver nonstop service.

* Members Minetti and Murphy concurred in the result.

‘In addition, the Board ordered that all parties to the original

proceeding shall be parties to the reopened and remanded proceed-

ing. However, by Order 71-6-33, issued by the examiner under

delegated authority on June 7, 1971, participation as parties was

limited to Air West, Continental, TWA, United, Western, the

Denver and Colorado Parties, the City of Kansas City, Mo., the

San Diego Parties, the City and Chamber of Commerce of Witchita,

Kansas, the Department of Defense, and the Bureau of Operating

Rights.

’ Western filed a ‘‘Motion for Modification of the Issues’’ and

a ‘‘Contingent Motion to Consolidate.’’ In the first motion Western

|

:

;

:

;

!

:

:

:

:

-

77a

TWA.* By Order 71-7-34, July 7, 1971, the Board denied

the motions of the two carriers. However, the Board stat-

ed that the parties remained free to introduce evidence

and to argue for or against the imposition upon any award

of restrictions deemed necessary to avoid competitive im-

pact or prejudice to excluded applications.

[J.A.533] After due notice, a prehearing conference and a

public hearing were held. Statements of position and briefs

were submitted by Air West, Continental, TWA, United,

Western, the Denver and Colorado Parties, the Kansas City

Parties, the San Diego Parties, and the Bureau; a brief

was filed by the Wichita Area Chamber of Commerce; and

a statement of position was provided prior to the close

of the hearing by Frontier Airlines, Inc., appearing under

Rule 14 of the Board’s Rules of Practice.’ The positions

set forth in these documents are sutumarized in Appendix

1 attached hereto. This proceeding now stands submitted

to the examiner.

Based upon a consideration of the record and the argu-

ments of the parties, the examiner concludes, as he con-

cluded in the original phase of this case, that the publie

convenience and necessity require the authorization of a

second nonstop carrier between San Diego and Denver

requested the Board to modify the issues in the remanded pro-

ceeding so as to impose a pretrial restriction prohibiting San

Diego-Denver nonstop flights under any new award from also

serving Kansas City or Chicago. In the second motion Western

requested the Board, in the event of denial of the first motion, to

consolidate its concurrently-filed application for nonstop Denver-

Kansas City and Denver-Chicago segments, subject to a San Diego

long-haul restriction (Docket 23441).

°*TWA filed a ‘‘Contingent Motion to Consolidate’’ requesting

the Board, in the event of denial of Western's motion for modi-

fication of the issues, supra, to consolidate TWA’s concurrently.

filed application for a nonstop San Diego-Kansas City segment

(Docket 23484).

"A brief was also filed by Frontier, but such filing is not au-

thorized by Rule 14.

78a

on an unrestricted basis and that Continental should be

selected over Air West, TWA, and United for the addi-

tional nonstop authorization. The examiner further con-

cludes that the amended certificate granted to Continental

for unrestricted San Diego-Denver nonstop service should

carry the usual effective date fixed in route cases rather

than the January 1, 1973 effective date proposed by the

Bureau.

(.J.A.534] The San Diego and Denver Communities

Both San Diego and Denver are large and growing com-

munities. As of 1970, San Diego had a metropolitan area

population of 1,357,854, representing an inerease of 31.4

percent over its 1960 population total as against an in-

crease of 13.3 percent in the nation’s population during

the same decade. San Diego had the 5th fastest growth

rate in the 1960-1970 decade among 24 United States met-

ropolitan areas having a population of over one million

in 1960, and the most rapid growth rate of any of these

metropolitan areas lying in the western third of the United

States. Denver in 1970 had a metropolitan area population

of 1,252,100, and was the largest community in the ecight-

State Rocky Mountain Census Region consisting of Ari-

zona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,

Utah, and Wyoming. The 1970 population total is an in-

crease of more than 30 percent over Denver’s 1960 popu-

lation.

San Diego and Denver are major tourist attractions.

San Diego has the appeal of ideal weather conditions

throughout the year and the proximity of the ocean and

mountains which have produced a steady and rapid growth

in tourist expenditures over the past 20 years. In 1970,

such expenditures in San Diego amounted to $381,827,000,

and approximately 11 percent of the San Diego tourists

came from the mountain states of which Denver is the

major hub. Denver itself is one of the major ski centers of

79a

the nation; with its mountains, winter sports, and scenic

attractions, it is an attraction for visitors from San Diego.

In conjunction with tourist attractions, San Diego has de-

veloped ino a major site for conventions. A total of 551

conventions were held in San Diego in 1970, with 343,825

delegates attending these conventions. The 1972 Republi-

ean National Convention is scheduled to be held in San

Diego.

[J.A.535] Tourism and convention activity have generated

a thriving hotel/motel industry, In 1970 iiere were 25,570

hotel/motel rooms in the San Diego area. Some 30 hotels

comprising 8,737 rooms alone have a combined capacity to

accommodate 20,386 persons for meetings and 15,670 for

banquets; over 5,000 of these rooms were added between

1967 and 1970.

San Diego* and Denver are large air stations. In 1969,

San Diego generated a total of 3,117,002 local O&D pas-

sengers, including 1,825,730 passengers shown by the

Board’s O&D surveys and 1,291,272 PSA passengers; this

passenger generation total made San Diego the 19th rank-

ing city in the United States in terms of production of

O&D traffic. Further, among 22 large hubs in the United

States, San Diego had the second most rapid growth rate

between 1968 and 1969,° with an increase of 12.45 percent;

this compares with an increase of 5.28 pereent for the 22

hubs as a group and an increase of 5.1 percent for the

United States. It further appears that PSA enplanements

*San Diego is currently served by the six Federally certificated

air carriers (Air West, American, Delta, National, United, and

Western) and two air carriers certificated by the State of Cali-

fornia for intrastate service (Pacific Southwest and Air California).

A substantial number of additional air carriers and foreign air

carriers maintain sales offices in San Diego.

*From 1,433,570 enplaned passengers (including 578.848 PSA

passengers) in 1968 to 1,612,095 enplaned passengers (including

645,636 PSA passengers) in 1969.

80a

at San Diego exceed those of any other carrier serving

San Diego, with PSA generating 40.0 percent of the total

San Diego enplanements in 1969.'° Apparently, also, all

of the seven San Diego carriers (including PSA) expe-

rienced increases in San Diego enplanements between 1968

and 1969, ranging from National's high of 65.9 percent to

United's low of 6.5 percent. Other data which include sched-

uled intrastate operations at San Diego show that there were

(.J.A. 536] 3,341,291 San Diego passengers in 1970, which

was an increase of 0.6 percent over 1969; that between

1965 and 1970 the compound annual growth rate was 15.4

percent; and that in the first siv months of 1971, San Diego

generated 1,611,948 passengers compared to 1,567,927 in

the first six months of 1970, which was an increase of

2.8 percent."' Additional data indicate that scheduled do-

mestic and international enplanements at San Diego

rose from 856,000 in 1968 to 998,000 in 1970, or a two-ytar

gain of 16.6 percent and an annual gain of 8.0 percent;

similar enplanements of 11 trunks and nine local service

mainland airlines increased from 147,997,000 in 1968 to

154,466,000 in 1970, or a two-vear increase of 4.4 percent

and an annual growth of 2.2 percent.

On the other hand, based upon the Board’s traffie sur-

veys, San Diego's total O&D and connecting passengers de-

clined 0.8 percent from 2,284,250 passengers in fiseal year

1969 to 2,266,320 in fiseal year 1970, and declined 6.5 per-

cent from the first six months of 1969 (1,103,870 passen-

United 347,105 enplanements (21.5 percent), American 266,-

796 (16.6 percent), Western 229,245 (14.2 percent), Delta 47.792

(3.0 percent), National 41,225 (2.6 pervent), and Air West 34,296

(2.1 percent).

" Exeluding passengers enplaned by the California intrastate

carriers, the record shows that passengers enplaned by the trunk

carriers at San Diego inereased 0.2 percent from 933,000 in 1969

to 935,000 in 1970, and that there was a decrease of 4.4 percent

between the first six months of 1970 (436,000 passengers) and the

same period of 1971 (417,000 passengers).

8la

gers) to the first six months of 1970 (1,032,410 passen-

gers), as compared to a domestic industry gain of 2.3 per-

cent between fiscal 1969 and fiseal 1970 and a loss of 1.8

pereent between the first six-month periods of 1969 and

1970. Also, based upon CAB Form 41 data, San Diego’s

domestie scheduled passenger enplanements increased 13.4

percent between 1968 (853,018 passengers) and 1969 (967,-

109 passengers), but declined 0.2 pereent between 1969 and

1970 (965,015 passengers), 2.9 percent between the year

ended March 31, 1970 and the year ended Mareh 31, 1971,

and 1.6 percent between the year ended June 30, 1970 and

the year ended June 30, 1971.

[J.A.537] Finally, as to San Diego’s traffie-generating ca-

pacity, there is evidence indicating that the Board’s O&D

traffic surveys underestimate actual San Diego traffic. Ap-

parently, some San Diego passengers travel by intrastate air

carriers to Los Angeles for flights and others proceed by

surface transportation to Los Angeles, and are reflected

in the Board’s surveys as Lés Angeles passengers rather

than San Diego passengers. However, the record does not

quantify the volume of such ‘‘lost’’ traffic.

As for Denver, that community ranks first among air

stations in the 8-State Rocky Mountain region in all the

usual indicators of station size, including O&D passengers

and passenger-miles, enplaned domestic passengers, and

aircraft departures. In 1969, Denver generated 3,850,450

O&D passengers, which gave it a ranking of 15th among

U.S. cities in local O&D passenger production. Among 22

large hubs in the United States, Denver had the fastest

growth rate between 1968 and 1969—14.01 percent mea-

sured in terms of enplaned passengers." In fiscal year

1970, Denver generated a total of 3,860,420 O&D passen-

gers, representing 1.74 percent of the U.S. total, and its

percentage of the U.S. O&D passenger total has risen stead-

"? From 2,936,123 enplaned passengers in 1968 to 3,347,514 in

1969.

82a

ily sinee 1950. Denver's domestic enplaned passengers in

fiscal vear 1970 totalled 3,517,428, or 9.6 percent greater

than in fiscal year 1969 (3,208,136); its domestic enplaned

passengers in the first six months of 1971 (1,801,819) was

5.9 pereent greater than in the comparable period of 1970

(1,700,810). Other data show that Denver’s scheduled pas-

senger enplanements increased from 2,936,000 in 1968 to

3,610,000 in 1970, which is a two-year growth of 23.0 per-

cent or 10.9 percent annually.

[.J.A. 538] Additionally, the Board’s traffic surveys indicate

that Denver's total O&D and connecting passengers grew

from 5,717,840 in fiscal year 1969 to 5,956,650 in fiseal year

1970, or 4.2 percent; and that there was a decline of 1.3 per-

cent in such traffie from the first six months of 1969 (2,804,-

480) to the same period of 1970 (2,766,650). CAB Form 41

data show that Denver's passengers enplaned by trunk car-

riers in scheduled service grew from 2,765,000 in 1969 to 2,-

860,000 in 1970, or 3.4 percent; and that there was a growth

of 4.9 percent in such traffic from the first six months of

1970 (2,328,000) to the comparable period of 1971 (1,393,-

000).

Furthermore, upon the basis of 1969 CAB survey data,

Denver is the sixth largest interline transfer point of

domestic passengers in the United States, producing 1,661,-

050 interline connecting passengers; Denver in this re-

spect is exceeded only by Chicago, Atlanta, Dallas, Los

Angeles, and Washington, D.C., and exceeds New York,

St. Louis, San Francisco, and Pittsburgh, among other

major hubs.’ Denver also has the 4th highest ratio of

domestic interline connecting passengers to true O&D pas-

sengers, namely, 43 percent (in 1969), with only Atlanta,

Dallas, and Chicago having larger ratios." Thus, airline

‘Denver ranked 7th each year from 1959 through 1968, and

advanced to 6th place, ahead of New York, in 1969.

'* Denver's ranking in terms of this ratio has been 4th continu-

ously each year beginning in 1964.

ese. Bee orem

ee

83a

services at Denver draw connecting traffic support from

Denver connections in larger numbers than all but five sta-

tions in the country and in larger proportions than all but

three stations in the country.

[J.A. 539] The San Dieqo-Denver Market:

Traffic and Service Data

1. General. The San Diego-Denver market, nonstop, is

840 miles long, and onestop via Phoenix, 894 miles. West-

ern is the only carrier certificated to serve the market

nonstop, having inaugurated such service on June 8, 1970

pursuant to its award in the initial phase of this ease.

Western is also certificated to serve the market onestop

via Phoenix, and does so under an award in the Service

to Phoenix Case in 1957."* United is the only other carrier

authorized to operate single-plane service in the market,

which it can do via a mandatory stop at Los Angeles by

tacking of two certificated authorizations.

Based upon fiseal year 1970 local O&D passenger data,

the San Diego-Denver market is San Diego’s ninth largest

market and its largest market without nonstop competi-

tion; it is Denver’s 21st ranking market and the largest

Denver market without competitive nonstop authority. The

evidence further shows that the San Diego-Denver market

is Western’s largest monopoly market, and that it is larg-

er in passenger volume than the San Diego-Washington,

D.C./Baltimore market which was certificated for compet-

itive nonstop service in the original phase of this ease."

[J.A.540] 2. C.A.B. Passenger Survey Data. In fiscal year

1970, as shown by the Board's traffic surveys, the San Diego-

*° 25 C.A.B. 647.

** According to fiscal year 1970 data. the San Diego-Denver mar-

ket generated 70,430 O&D and connecting passengers compared to

70,040 such passengers moving in the San Diego-Washington, D.C./

Baltimore market.

84a

Denver market generated a total of 70,430 passengers (193

passengers per day), consisting of 50,840 local O&D and

19,590 connecting passengers. This total represents a slight

increase over the total of 69,520 passengers (48,560 local

O&D, 20,960 connecting) or 190 passengers per day gen-

erated in calendar year 1969." It further appears that in

fiseal 1970, as in calendar 1969, Western carried approxi-

mately 80 percent of the total market and United approxi-

mately 1214 percent.’* Western’s share of online passen-

gers moving in the market was even larger, 86.1 percent

in fiscal 1970 and 86.3 percent in calendar 1969." In the

second quarter of calendar 1970, when the market gener-

ated 16,970 online passengers, Western’s share mounted

to 91.0 percent (15,450 passengers).

(.J.A.541] A breakdown of San Diego-Denver local O&D

passengers by quarter, March 1968 through June 1970, is set

forth in Appendix 2 attached hereto.” This breakdown

shows that the market generated 38,180 local O&D passen-

vers in the nine months ended June 30, 1969, representing

an inerease of 5,090 passengers or 15.4 percent.” Since

‘7 See Appendix 2. page 1, attached hereto for a breakdown. year

by vear. of local O&D and connecting traffic, calendar 1966-fiscal

1070. It shonld be noted that there was a Western strike in the

third quarter of 1969 (from July 29 to August 15), thus affect-

ing the market traffie totals in calendar 1969 and fiseal 1970.

‘See Appendix 2, page 2, attached hereto. Western’s share of

the total market declined somewhat in these years from its historic

share in the 1964-1968 period, apparently because of a strike in

the third quarter of 1969. In the second quarter of 1970, Western

carried 87.0 percent of the total market and United 8.2 percent

‘total market 17,750 passengers, Western 15,450 pasengers, and

United 1,450 passengers).

See Appendix 2. psge 3, attached hereto. United's share of

the total online traffic wes 13.6 percent in fiscal 1970 and calendar

1969,

7° At page 4.

*\ The comparison is made on a nine months’ basis rather than

a fiscal year basis in order to exclude the third quarter of 1969

when Western was on strike.

85a

Western did not commence nonstop operations between

San Diego and Denver until June 8, 1970, these data for

all practical purposes do not reflect any significant stimu-

lative effect due to Western’s nonstop service.

As indicated by the Board’s traffic surveys, the San

Diego-Denver market generates a large number of inter-

line connecting passengers, and the ratio of such passen.-

gers to local O&D passengers over the years has been

substantial.” In fiscal year 1970 the ratio was 38.5 percent;

for calendar 1969, chere was a ratio of 43.2 percent.

3. Western’s Passenger Data. Attached as Appendix 3™

is a table showing, on a monthly basis, the mumber and

class of San Diego-Denver online O&D passengers Western

has carried since January 1969. According to this table,

Western carried 60,688 such passengers in 1969 (its opera-

tions were suspended July 29-August 15 due to a strike),

74,114 in 1970, and 70,150 in the first 10 months of 1971

(on an annualized basis, 84,180). First-class and coach

traffic represented 5.6 percent and 94.4 percent, respective-

ly, in 1970, and 4.4 percent and 95.6 percent, respectively,

in the first 10 months of 1971.

(J.A.542] It further appears from the table that there was

an increase of 22.1 percent in Western’s online passengers

from 1969 ‘a strike year) to 1970; from 1970 to 1971 (10

months, annualized), the increase was 13.6 percent. On a fiseal

year basis, there was an increase of 34.5 percent, from 60,939

passengers in fiscal 1970 (a strike year) to 81,969 passen-

gers in fiscal 1971. Looking at the latest 12-month periods

for which duta are available, there was a smaller increase,

namely, 18.0 percent, from 71,296 passengers in the 12-

months ended October 31, 1970 to 84,096 passengers in the

12-months ended October 31, 1971. Comparing periods in

1970 and 1971 in which Western operated nonstop service

7? See Appendix 2, page 5, attached hereto.

7 At page 1.

86a

throughout, there was still a smaller increase—7.5 percent,

from 29,321 passengers in the 4-month period July-October

1970, to 30,447 passengers in the July-October period of

1971.

Focusing on the period since Western’s 1969 strike and

comparing online passenger totals by month in 1969, 1970,

and 1971," there was an increase in every instance between

September 1969 and October 1971. However, the size of

the monthly inerease dropped to a level below 10 percent

beginning with July 1971 and continuing through October

1971 as compared with the comparable months of 1970.”

(.J.A. 543] Comparing Western’s online passenger data with

the single-carrier data shown for Western in the Board’s

traffic surveys, it appears that the Board’s reported passen-

ger data are understated.” Thus, the latter passenger total

apparently was understated by 9.5 pereent in calendar

1969, by 8.5 percent in fiseal 1970, and by 10.3 percent in

the six quarters ended June 30, 1970.

Continental made an analysis of Western's reported on-

line O&D passengers and reserved seat load factor data for

the earrier’s San Diego-Denver nonstop flights, for the pe-

riod June 1970-May 1971, on a monthly basis. Continen-

tal's analysis shows that in June 1970 when Western in-

augurated nonstop service, 43 percent of the carrier’s San

Diego-Denver passengers used nonstop or connecting serv-

ices; and that beginning with July 1970 through May 1971,

** See Appendix 3, page 2, attached hereto.

~The San Diego Parties point out that Western's online O&D

passengers inereased 24.5 percent from the 10-month period Sep-

tember 1969-June 1970 to the comparable period September 1970-

June 1971: and that the inerease from the 8-month period Sep-

tember 1969-April 1970 to the comparable period September 1970-

April 1971 was 26.8 percent as against a decline of 2.1 percent in

total U.S. domestic enplanements.

** See Appendix 3, page 3, attached hereto.

87a

the percentage of Western’s online passengers employing

onestop or connecting services ranged from a low of 7 per-

cent in February 1971 to a high of 36 percent in September

1970.

Air West also made an analysis of Western’s reported

online O&D passengers and reserved seat load factors for

its nonstop flights, covering the months of August and

November 1970 and February and May 1971. From this

analysis, Air West concludes that the number of Western’s

San Diego-Denver passengers not on board the nonstop

flights ranged from a low of 6.9 percent in February 1971

to a high of 30.3 percent in August 1970, with an average

of 22.4 percent for the four months covered.

[J.A.544] 4. San Diego-Denver Service Data. Western is

the exclusive carrier operating single-plane and nonstop

service in the San Diego-Denver Market.” The carrier’s

single-plane service authority dates back to 1957 when it was

authorized to provide such service via a mandatory inter-

mediate stop at Phoenix. Western’s nonstop service au-

thority stems from an award in the initial phase of this

proceeding which became effective on June 8, 1970.

Western inaugurated San Diego-Denver single-plane

service in December 1957, on two daily round trips employ-

ing DC-6B equipment. Since then, the carrier has contin-

** While United holds authority, by tacking, to provide single-

plane service in the market with a stop at Los Angeles, the carrier

has not operated such service for a few years. The carrier, aceord-

ing to the Official Airine Guide, Quick Reference Edition, for

November 1971, offered daily one-carrier connecting services, three

eastbound and four westbound ; however, the December 1971 Quick

Reference Edition indicates that United discontinued these one-

carrier connecting services. As of December 1, 1971, other than

Western’s schedules, only two-carrier connecting services on a one-

stop basis (almost exclusively via Los Angeles) were available.

See Appendix 4 attached hereto.

* Service to Phoenix Case, 25 C.A.B. 647 (1957).

88a

ously upgraded its service by offering an increasing num-

ber of schedules, introducing more modern equipment, and

eliminating the Phoenix stop on several frequencies. Thus,

the record shows that in June 1968,Western provided four

daily flights each way with B-720B fan jet aircraft. Be-

tween January 1, 1969 and June 7, 1970, the carrier sched-

uled four daily frequencies eastbound and five westbound,

using B-720B and B-737-200 equipment.”

[J.A.545] On June 8, 1970, immediately upon the effective

date of its certificate for nonstop operations, Western inaug-

urated nonstop service between San Diego and Denver. The

carrier at the outset offered two daily nonstop frequencies In

each direction, with B-720B and B-737-200 equipment from

San Diego to Denver and with B-720B and B-727-200 air-

craft in the opposite direction. In addition, there were

three daily onestop schedules eastbound (two with B-737-

900 aircraft and one with a B-727-200) and four onestop

flights the other way (three with B-737-200’s and one with

a B-727-200). The B-737-200’s were operated all-coach, and

the other aircraft in a dual first-class/coach configuration.

The evidence shows that Western operated this pattern of

schedules (including equipment) a year later, in June 1971,

and in July 1971; and further shows that a pattern of five

easthound frequencies and six westbound schedules was in

effect as of December 1, 1971, with the nonstops in both

directions employing B-720B aircraft in dual configura-

tion.*°

2? At the beginning of this period, B-720B aircraft were em-

ployed on two easthound flights and three westbound schedules,

and B-737-200 aircraft were utilized for two eastbound frequencies

and two westbound services. At the close of the period, Western

was conducting an all B-737-200 operation eastbound on its four

daily flights; westbound, the carrier was employing B-720B equip-

ment on two flights and B-737-200 aircraft on the other three

schedules.

© See Appendix 5 attached hereto for a summary of Western's

December 1, 1971 schedules.

89a

As of December 1, 1971, the San Diego departure times

of Western’s eastbound schedules were spread between

8:10 A.M. and 3:50 P.M.; westbound, the departure time

spread at Denver was from 9:20 A.M. to 8:00 P.M. West-

ern’s one-way fares were first-class $79.63 and coach $62.04.

The seating capacity of Western’s aircraft in San Diego-

Denv-r service was as follows: B-737-200 (95 seats), B-727-

200 (122 seats), and B-720B (120 seats).™

(J.A.546] Western furnished performance factor data for

its San Diego-Denver scheduled services, nonstop and one-

stop, by flight, by direction, and by month, for the period Jan-

uary 1969 through October 1971: These data show that in the

period July 1970-October 1971 when nonstop service was

operated, the eastbound nonstop flights 474 and 426/603

had performance factors of 100 percent in 11 months and

10 months, respectively, out of the 16 months involved;

and that the westbound nonstop fl&chts 425 and 421/543 had

100 percent performance factors in 11 and 9 months, re-

spectively. Further, according to Western’s evidence, its

experienced dilution factors for the San Diego-Denver non-

stop segment in March 1971 were: first-class 12.4 percent,

coach 18.9 percent, and overall 18.4 percent.

In 1970 (including the pre-inaugural period), Western’s

advertising and sales promotion expenditures for the San

Diego-Denver nonstop route amounted to $100,000. The ear-

rier estimates that in 1971 these expenditures will increase

to $127,000. Western also observes that it has prepared

extensive, imaginative and effective advertising for use on

local radio, television, and in many newspapers; that it is

** Western's evidence indicates that in July 1971 the carrier

offered a total of 1,176 seats daily on its 11 nonstop and onestop

schedules in the San Diego-Denver market (eastbound, 527 seats,

and westbound, 649 seats). It further appears that as of Septem-

ber 1971, Western had 70 aircraft in its fleet, including 25 B-

720B’s, 6 B-727-200's and 30 B-737-200’s; and that the carrier

had 3 B-727-200's on order and 3 on option.

90a

continuously promoting the market through its various

sales and publie relations efforts; that it is featuring San

Diego as a stopover point for those passengers traveling

from Denver and the Rocky Mountain area to Hawaii; and

that it is offering a new low tour basing fare from Denver

io Southern California via San Diego.

Western supplied information respecting its extra-section

activity over the San Diego-Denver segment. The carrier

states that it operated one extra section and one charter

over the segment during the first year of nonstop opera-

tions: that it was booking two extra sections to be oper-

ated during the 1971 Thanksgiving holiday; that two extra

sections and three charters were scheduled for the Decem-

ber 12-15, 1971 weekend to accommodate a professional

football game between the Denver and San Diego teams;

and that additional extra sections were scheduled over the

Christmas and New Year’s holidays.

[.J.A.547] 5. Western’s San Diego-Denver Load Factors.

Western submitted load factor data respecting its nonstop

and one-stop San Diego-Denver services, both on a total on-

board basis (that is, including standby traffic) and on a re-

served seat basis (that is, excluding standby traffic).** It ap-

pears from these data that Western’s on-board load factor

for its nonstop services” averaged 45.2 percent for the period

June-December 1970 and 47.6 percent for the 12 months

ended June 30, 1971, and that in the period June 1970-June

1971 the on-board load factor ranged between a low of 36.5

percent in October 1970 and a high of 55.3 percent in June

1971. During July and August 1971 the onboard load factor

mounted to 60.9 percent and 66.9 percent, respectively, but

declined to 52.7 percent and 45.8 percent in September and

October 1971, respectively.

‘See Appendix 6 attached hereto for details of the load factor

data.

* See Appendix 6, page 1 attached hereto.

9la

Western’s on-board coach load factors for its nonstop

services were higher than the carrier’s overall load fac-

tors.* Thus, in the June-December 1970 period the coach

load factor averaged 48.9 percent, with a low of 39.2 per-

cent in October and a high of 58.8 percent in August; in

the January-October 1971 period the coach load factor

ranged between a low of 45.9 percent in May and a high

of 69.6 percent in August.**

[J.A.548] An analysis of the nonstop services on a flight-

by-flight basis discloses substantial variations in monthly on-

board coach load factors as between nonstop flights in the

17-month period June 1970-October 1971. The variations

are reflected in the following table: *

** See Appendix 6, page 1 attached hereto. In contrast, the on-

board first-class load factors on the nonstop flights were signifi-

cantly lower than the overall load fa-tors. In the June-December

1970 period the average first-class load factor was 17.3 percent,

with a low of 14.5 percent in October and a high of 23.1 percent

in December; in the January-October 1971 period, the low first-

class load factor was 23.0 percent in June and the high was 35.6

percent in March and August.

** Throughout the June 1970-October 1971 period Western oper-

ated a pattern of nonstop flights bearing the same flight numbers,

except that on January 6, 1971 the earrier discontinued flights

426 and 421 and inaugurated flights 603 and 543. When this sehed-

ule change was made, flights 426 and 421 had attained on-board

coach load factors of 69.7 pereent and 74.5 pereent, respectively,

- ala load factors of 65.7 percent and 65.5 percent, respee-

tively.

** For details, see Appendix 6, page 2 attached hereto.

92a

cas Eastbound Flights Westbound Flights

~~ Flight Flights Flight Flights

$74 426/603 425 21/543

; : 58.8% 79.5% 55.8%

High monthly coach 88.9% 58.8% 9.5% ;

load factor (Aug. 1971) (Aug. 1971) (Aug. 1971) (Aug. 197")

5 : 55.4% 16.4%

Low monthly coach 51.2% 27.1% 5

load factor (Nov. 1970) (Jan. 1971) (Oct. 1970) (Oct. 1970)

No. of months: .

Under 20% — - a= ;

20-29% _ 2 _— -

30-39% — 5 —_ :

40-49% _ 8 - :

50-59% 4 2 5 *

60-69% 4 — 7 >

70-79% 6 _ 5 i

Over 80% 3 om a

Turning to the on-board load factors on Western’s one-

stop services in the San Diego-Denver market,” it appears

that in calendar 1970, the San Diego-Phoenix segment had

an average overall on-board load factor of 53.6 percent,

with a range between a high of 64.2 percent in August and

a low of 45.2 percent in April; and that the on-board coach

load factor averaged 55.6 percent, with a range between

a high of 66.9 percent in August and a ww of 47.8 percent

in April. The monthly on-board coach load factor was be-

(J.A. 549] tween 40 and 49 percent twice, in the 50-59% range

7 times, and over 60 percent in 3 months. On the Phoenix-

Denver sector of the onestop services, the average overall

load factor in calendar 1970 was 68.9 percent, with a range

between a high of 80.3 percent in August and a low of 58.9

percent in April; the on-board coach load factor averaged

70.7 percent, the high being 82.99 percent in August and

the low being 60.3 percent in April. The monthly on-board

coach load factor on the Phoenix-Denver sector in 1970 was

between 60 and 69 percent 6 times, in the 70-79 percent

range in 5 months, and over 80 percent once.

3* See Appendix 6, page 3 attached hereto.

Oh a ae tt te Cy 2 VE the Ns hs A Se we

ee ee ee ee

|

93a

There were significant variations in the monthly on-

board coach load factors on the onestop services as between

flights. In the January-October 1971 period for which West-

ern supplied load factor data, the carrier operated three

daily eastbound flights.** Flight 700 had monthly coach load

factors ranging between 87.2 percent (August) and 70.7

percent (January) on the San Diego-Phoenix segment, with

the monthly factor being in the 70-79 percent range in 7

months and over 80 percent 3 times; on the Phoenix-Denver

sector, flight 700’s monthly coach load factor ranged be-

tween 96.6 percent (April) and 70.5 percent (September),

with the monthly factor being in the 70-79 percent range

in 4 montls, between 80 and 89 percent, 4 times, and over

90 percent twice. Eastbound flight 476 had a range in its

monthly coach load factor on the San Diego-Phoenix seg-

ment between 77.8 percent (September) and 49.5 percent

(October), with the monthly factor being under 50 percent

once, between 50 and 59 percent 4 times, in the 60-69 per-

cent range in 4 months, and over 70 percent once; on the

Phoenix-Denver sector, flight 476 achieved a high monthly

coach load factor of 91.5 percent (March) and a low of 68.7

[ J.A. 550] percent (May), with the coach factor being under

70 percent once, in the 70-79 percent range twice, between 80

and 89 percent 6 times, and over 90 percent in one month.

The remaining eastbound flight—flight 216—had monthly

on-board coach load factors on the San Diego-Phoenix seg-

ment ranging between 63.3 percent (April) and 45.2 per-

cent (September), with the load factor being in the 40’s

twice, in the 50’s five times, and over 60 percent in one

month; on the Phoenix-Denver sector, flight 216 had a

range in its monthly on-board coach load factor between

79.9 percent (April) and 63.4 percent (September), with

the load factor being in the 60’s 4 times and in the 70’s

6 times.

*8 See Appendix 6, page 4 attached hereto.

94a

Western operated four daily westbound flights in the

January-October 1971 period.*® Flight 215 had a monthly

on-hoard eanech load factor on the Denver-Phoenix sector

ranging between 95.7 percent (February) and 69.9 percent

(September), with the factor being under 70 percent once,

in the 70-79 pereent range twice, between 80 and 89 per-

cent in 4 months, and over 90 percent in three months; on

the Phoenix-San Diego sector, the monthly on-board coach

load factor ranged between 76.2 percent (January) and

54.4 percent (October), with the factor being under 60 per-

cent twice, in the 60-69 percent range in 2 months, and over

70 percent in 6 months. The monthly on-board coach load

factor on flight 417 over the Denver-Phoenix segment

ranged between 84.3 pereent (February) and 71.5 percent

(May), and was in the 70’s 6 times and the 80’s in 4

months; over the Phoenix-San Diego sector, flight 417’s

eoach load factor had a range of 89.2 (Mareh)—75.2 (Oc-

tober), and the coach load factor was in the 70’s twice and

the 80’s in six months. Flight 479’s monthly on-board coach

load factor Denver-Phoenix ranged between 82.6 percent

[.J.A.551] (August) and 60.7 percent (May), with the load

factor being in the 60’s once, in the 70-79 percent range 95

times, and the 80’s in 4 months; on the Phoenix-San Diego

sector, fight 479 had a monthly on-board coach load factor

ranging between 81.3 percent (August) and 57.0 percent

(March), and the coach load factor was in the 50’s once, be-

tween 60 and 69 percent 4 times, in the 70-79 percent range in

4 months, and over 80 percent once. Flight 701 over the

Denver-Phoenix sector, had a high monthly on-board coach

load factor of 90.7 percent (February) and a low of 59.7

percent (September, October), with the coach load factor

being in the 50’s twice, the 60’s 4 times, the 70’s once, the

80's twice, and the 90’s once; on the Phoenix-San Diego

sector, flight 701 had a monthly coach load factor with a

high of 53.0 percent in January and a low of 35.5 percent

** See Appendix 6, page 5 attached hereto.

a ln ats a at ne ER ee

95a

in September, with the coach load factor being in the 30’s

in two months, in the 40’s 7 times, and in the 50’s once.

6. Western’s San Diego-Denver Capacity Data. Western

furnished data respecting the capacity flown and unused on

its nonstop services.*® Such data show that in fiscal 1971

Western offered a total of 162,213 nonstop seats, or an

average of 444 seats per day. The empty seats flown on the

nonstop service in fiscal 1971 averaged 233 per day (266

per day excluding standby passengers). The average num-

ber of empty seats flown, excluding the peak months of Au-

gust, December, April, and June, was 247 seats per day

(278 per day without standby traffic).

[J.A.552] Western further notes that effective September

8, 1971, it increased its San Diego-Denver nonstop capacity

by 25 seats daily, or 99,125 seats annually, by substituting

one 120-seat B-720B aircraft for a 95-seat B-737-200 aircraft

(employed on flight 474). On the other hand, as observed

by Continental, subsequent schedules indicate that Western

plans to change the equipment on flight 474 back to a B-737-

200 on December 15, 1971 and thus will eliminate the pre-

viously adde? nonstop seat capacity.

In addition, Western points out that its two daily non-

stop round trips are supplemented by its daily onestop

flights via Phoenix, three eastbound and four westbound.

The carrier asserts that through a combination of the non-

stop and onestop flights there is an abundance of capacity

in the market.

Western’s San Diego-Denver Service Plans

Western states that while the use of equipment may vary

from time to time due to routing and equipment mainte-

nance requirements, it intends to continue serving the non-

stop market with B-720B and B-727-200 aircraft. According

to the carrier, these aircraft are better suited for the stage

*° See Appendix 7 attached hereto.

96a

length involved than Western’s B-737-200 aircraft which

it asserts are designed to serve shorter-haul markets. Fur-

ther, Western observes that the B-737-200 aircraft lacks the

capacity of the B-720B and the B-727-200. However, testi-

mony of Western’s witness as to the equipment to be oper-

ated in 1972 expressly indicates that the equipment plans

has not been firmed up.

Western additionally states that it plans to introduce a

third daily nonstop round trip in the San Diego-Denver

market some time before the summer of 1972, adding that the

nonstop services will continue to be supplemented by numer-

(.J.A. 553] ous onestop frequencies via Phoenix. The carrier

comments that the introduction of the third nonstop round

trip (two daily flights at 120 seats per flight) will add a

total of 87,600 seats annually in the market, so that, for a

time, demand should be exceeded by a comfortable margin.

However, Western’s witnesses were unable to give any indi-

eation as to the routing of the future schedules and stated

that none of the carrier’s 1972 schedules had been finalized.

With respect to extra-section activity, Western expects

an inerease in business of this nature as the market con-

tinues to develop. The carrier states that it plans to oper-

ate extra section flights to San Diego in August 1972 in

connection with the Republican National Convention, and

anticipates that other peak periods such as Easter and

heavy summer weekend traffic will require additional extra

sections.

Proposals of the Carrier-Applicants

Four carriers—Air West, Continental, TWA, and

United—-submitted proposals to serve the San Diego-

Denver nonstop market in competition with Western. A

summary of the proposed service of each carrier, together

with its forecasts of traffic and financial results, follows.

97a

1. Atr West, which has a station at San Diego, proposes

to establish a new station at Denver,” and to operate two

nonstop round trips between San Diego and Denver. One

round trip, which would be operated daily, would consist of a

midday departure originating at San Diego and proceeding

[J.A. 554] to Denver, and an early evening departure f rom

Denver to San Diego which would continue on to Santa

Ana,** 76 miles from San Diego. The second round trip

would be operated six days a week, daily except Saturday

eastbound and except Sunday westbound; this round trip

would consist of a schedule originating at Santa Ana, de-

parting San Diego in the evening for Denver, and leaving

Denver in the morning for San Diego.“ The San Diego-

Santa Ana portions of the two round trips would operate

over Air West’s existing system, and the San Diego-Denver

portions would be new flight mileage. The proposed serv-

ices would be provided with DC-9-30 aircraft, 98 seats, in

standard class configuration, with 3-and-2 abreast seating."

The carrier proposes to offer an ‘‘S’’ class fare equal to

the San Diego-Denver coach fare of $62.04 and to ecommon-

rate the San Diego-Denver and Santa Ana-Denver markets.

According to the carrier, it will operate the same pattern

of service in 1973 as in 1972.

1 Air West does not expect that it will acquire any new ground

equipment at Denver because it will probably contract with an-

other carrier to conduct Air West’s ground servicing operations

at Denver. 7

*? The aircraft flown on these schedules would turn around at

Denver.

e Apparently, the aircraft employed on these schedules would

overnight at Denver.

** Air West states that the additional aircraft hours required

by the proposed San Diego-Denver flights involve less than one

aircraft, and anticipates that no additional aircraft will be re-

quired. However. if such is not the case, the carrier states that

z will acquire the necessary aircraft through either purchase or

ease.

98a

Air West forecasts that the San Diego-Denver market

will amount to 120,637 passengers in 1972 and 132,701 in

1973. The base of Air West’s forecast is Western’s re-

ported online O&D passengers in fiscal year 1971—81,969

passengers. Estimating the ratio of Western’s online O&D

passengers to total online O&D passengers at 95 percent

and again estimating the ratio of total online O&D passen-

gers to true O&D and connecting passengers at 95 percent,

Air West constructs a fiscal year 1971 total of 90,824 true

[J.A.555] O&D and connecting passengers. Applying a 10

percent per year growth factor * and a 15 percent stimula-

tion factor for first competitive nonstop service,“* Air West

predicts a total 1972 market of 120,637 passengers after its

entry and a total 1973 market of 132,701 passengers.

Air West further estimates that it will carry 46,415 San

Diego-Denver passengers in 1972 and 51,057 in 1973. These

estimates are derived as follows: First, the carrier fore-

casts that of the total market after Air West’s entry, 95

percent will be single-carrier passengers on the services of

Air West and Western (114,605 in 1972 and 126,066 in

1973), and that 90 percent of the single-carrier passengers

will be nonstop passengers (103,145 in 1972 and 113,459

in 1973).*7 Then, Air West estimates its participation in

** Air West claims that this growth rate is conservative, taking

into account the historic growth of San Diego-Denver traffie in

the 1964-1969 period, the strong growth of San Diego and Denver

traffic during a period when the industry as a whole has remained

relatively static, and the strong growth trend in Western's San

Diego-Denver traffic even when full allowance is made for stimu-

lation due to inauguration of nonstop service. Air West asserts

that if the New Economie Program is successful, the actual growth

rate should be substantially greater than 10 percent.

‘© This is based upon the Bureau's Q.S.I. traffic forecasting tech-

nique and Air West's addition to the market of two nonstop

round trips operated with jet aircraft.

* Air West states that this makes allowance for the fact that

United will continue to carry some online traffic between San

99a

the nonstop traffic at 45 percent “ to obtain its estimates

of 46,415 passengers in 1972 and 51,057 in 1973.

{J.A.556] In addition, Air West expects to carry 8,448

Santa Ana-Denver passengers in 1972 and 8,870 such pas-

sengers in 1973. Total Air West passengers under its service

proposal would therefore amount to 54,863 in 1972, and

59,927 in 1973. The carrier predicts a passenger load factor

of 42.1 percent in 1972 and 46.0 percent in 1973.

Air West’s net passenger revenues (after dilution at 15

percent) are es imated at $2,892,926 in 1972 and $3,159,951

in 1973. Including non-passenger revenues at 5.5 percent

of passenger revenues (based upon Air West’s experience

for the year ended March 31, 197 modified to exclude char-

ter revenues), the carrier expects to realize total revenues

of $3,052,037 in 1973 and $3,333,748 in 1973 under its

service proposal.

The local service carrier submitted two estimates of its

expenses in connection with the proposed services, one em-

ploying standard Subpart K costing and the second using

a modified Subpart K technique involving Air West’s ‘‘Sub-

part K’’ unit costs for direct operating expenses and local

service industry average costs for indirect (servicing) ex-

penses. This produces the following financial results for the

carrier’s service proposal:

Diego and Denver and that some traffic will move via two-carrier

connecting services for reasons of its own.

a Air West observes that its ultimate participation factor is

approximately 39 percent of the total San Diego-Denver market

before allowance for passengers who would not use single-carrier

service and single-carrier passengers who would not move on non-

stop services.

100a

Standard Modified

Subpart K Method Subpart K Method

Item 1972 1973 1972 1973

Total menial $3,052,037 $3,333,748 $3,052,037 $3,333,748

88

irec ses 1.189.988 1.189.988 1,189,988 1,189.9

stax Gael 1.397.453 1,506,686 1,131,478 1,219,994

2.587.441 2,696,674 2,321,466 2,409,982

Indirect expenses

Total expenses

Operating profit 464,596 637,074 730,571 923,766

Return and tax 557.336 557 336 557,336 557 336

Subsidy reduction $92,740) $79,738 $173,235 $366,430

{J.A. 557] Thus, Air West estimates that it will obtain an

operating profit in 1972 and 1973 under either costing _

nique ; that it will suffer a subsidy increase of $92,740 in 1972

and achieve a subsidy reduction of $79,738 in 1973 under

standard Subpart K; and that it will produce subsidy reduc-

tions in both forecast years under the modified costing tech-

niques ($173,235 in 1972 and $336,430 in 1973).

In preparing its estimates of financial results, Air West

made no specific allowance for cost inflation. It omitted

doing so, the carrier states, because (1) Air West’s unit

costs have been going down rather than up, and the San

Diego-Denver route, representing a significantly longer

length of hop and length of haul than Air West’s historic

system average, would produce significantly lower unit

costs, ( 2) Air West assumed that any future wage and price

increases which can not be offset by technological improve-

ments or productivity increases will be offset by increases

in fares, and (3) the Nixon Administration has taken dra-

matie action to curb inflation.

Under its financial forecast for 1972, Air West calculates

that under the standard Subpart K costing method it would

have to carry 40,879 passengers to break even and would

have a breakeven passenger load factor of 31.4 percent.

Under the modified Subpart K technique favored by Air

10la

West, the breakeven number of passengers would be 35,483

and the breakeven passenger load factor 27.2 percent, ac-

cording to the carrier. Air West’s estimate of preoperating

expenses for its San Diego-Denver route proposal shows

a total of $990,000, including $75,000 for advertising and

sales promotion and $15,000 for route proving flights.

[J.A.558] Air West states that it will not suffer any self-

diversion under an award to it of competitive nonstop au-

thority. Recognizing that in 1969 it participated in the ear-

riage of 250 true O&D Denver-San Diego passengers and 550

true O&D Denver-Santa Ana passengers for part of their

trip, Air West submits that even if it is granted a nonstop

award, these passengers would continue to move via similar

indirect routings in the future.

Air West furnished two estimates of diversion from

Western resulting from the award of competitive nonstop

authority to the local service carrier. Based upon Western’s

1969 online O&D passenger total and using Air West’s

passenger forecasting method, Air West indicates that in

1972 Western would carry 68,190 passengers in competi-

tion with Air West, exceeding Western's 1969 total of

60,688 passengers and would therefore suffer no passenger

loss. Based upon Western’s fiscal year 1971 total of 81,969

online O&D passengers and using Air West’s forecasting

technique, Air West indicates that in 1972 Western in com-

petition with Air West would carry 68,190 passengers and

would therefore suffer a loss of 13,779 passengers amount-

ing to a loss of $735,842 in net passenger revenues.

2. Continental, which has a station at Denver, would

have to establish a station at San Diego. Under its San

Diego-Denver proposal, the carrier proposes an initial pat-

tern of two daily nonstop round trips in the market * which

* Continental states that as the economy recovers and traffic

growth returns to a more normal rate, it would increase its flight

frequency, and indicates that with a return to a healthy economy,

102a

[J.A. 559] would be operated San Diego-Denver-Kansas City

eastbound and Kansas City-Denver-San Diego westbound.

In an eastbound direction Continental would offer a noon”

and an early evening (5:15 p.m.) departure * from San

Diego: westbound, the flights from Kansas City would de-

part Denver at 9:15 a.m.” and 3:00 p.m.” The San Diego-

Denver portion of the four flights would be extensions of

existing Denver-Kansas City schedules.

All of Continental’s San Diego-Denver schedules would

he operated with 110-seat B-727-200 equipment - offering

three classes of services and three-and-twe seating in the

coach and economy classes.** The total capital requirement

the third frequeney should be economically practicable by at least

mid-197%, although no decision has been made as to exactly when

the third round trip would be instituted. However, the carrier

mentions that the third frequency would probably be added when

the load factor on its operations was in the 55-70 percent range,

and adds that. in all probability, the third frequency would te

a San Diego-Denver-Kansas City service.

°° This schedule would offer connections at Denver for Oklahoma

City, Wichita, Tulsa, and Colorado Springs.

*! Connections would be offered at Denver for Colorado Springs.

‘? With connections at Denver from Colorado Springs, Tulsa,

Wichita, and Oklahoma City.

°? There would be connections at Denver for Colorado Springs,

Tulsa. and Wichita.

“* Continental also presented a proposal involving the substitu-

tion of a larger B-707 aireraft during peak summer months (June,

July. August) which it claims would relieve high load factor

flights and yield an operating profit of $2,559,000 in 1973 as com-

pared to a profit of $2,964,000 with an all-B-727-200 operation.

~ Continental has on hand, as of September 1, 1971, a total of

60 aireraft, including 19 B-727-200's. Eight DC-10’s are on order,

deliveries to start in 1972, and eight such aircraft are on option,

which has not yet been exercised. Continental states that it will

have aircraft on hand in 1972 available for use under its pro-

posed schedules, especially after delivery of the DC-10's starts,

and will not have to purchase aircraft for the proposed services.

103a

for Continental’s proposal is estimated at $7,438,000," in-

cluding flight equipment at $6,323,000," and ground equip-

ment at $331,000. Also included is $700,000 for pre-operat-

ing expenses ($150,000 for training and $550,000 for ad-

vertising and promotion).

(J.A. 560] Continental’s basic fares would be $79.63 and

$62.04 for first-class and coach service, respectively, in the

San Diego-Denver market, and $54.63 for economy class

service. The carrier also proposes to introduce or match

various promotional fares in the market,” including a round

trip tour basing fare at 70 percent of the basic coach fare;

and would bring to the market the benefits of its Director of

Passenger Services program.

Continental forecasts that the 1972 San Diego-Denver

market, after growth and stimulation, will amount to 103,-

932 passengers, and the 1973 market to 111,727 passen-

gers. The carrier uses as the base traffic for its forecasts

the true O&D and connecting passengers in the market in

fiscal year 1970 as shown in the Board’s surveys, amount-

** Continental indicates that it would obtain any necessary funds

for capital requirements from debt finaneing, equity financing, or

internal operations, depending upon the conditions prevailing at

the tame such funds are required.

** While its capital requirements contemplate one additional

B-727-200 aircraft, Continental states that. for the forecast year,

it has the necessary fligit time from its existing fleet.

** Continental notes that through adjustments to the fare struc-

ture arising from various Board-approved fare increases, the econ-

omy fare is presently set at 90 percent of the coach fare. The

carrier states that it is its position and intent that the economy

fare be set at 85 percent of the coach fare, and that it is sup-

porting this proposal in Phase 9 of the Domestic Passenger Fare

Investigation, Docket 21866-9.

** Continental indicates that some of the promotional fares would

not be available under the initial schedule proposal, but would be

made available as soon as schedules are introduced which permit

their use.

104a

ing to 65,120 passengers (50,840 true O&D and 14,280 un-

duplicated connecting passengers). This total is expanded

to a 1972 level by using a 7.5 percent annual growth rate,

{ J.A. 561] and employing a 33 percent stimulation factor for

first nonstop service by Western and first competitive non-

stop service by Continental. To reach a 1973 forecast total

of 111,727 San Diego-Denver passengers, Continental ap-

plies a 7.5 percent annual growth factor to the estimated

1972 total of 103,932 passengers.

Continental further forecasts that it will carry 40 per-

cent of the San Diego-Denver traffic in 1972 (41,573 pas-

sengers) and 45 percent in 1973 (50,277 passengers), with

Western’s share amounting to 50 percent in 1972 and 45

percent in 1973 and 10 percent of the market moving over

services other than nonstops in each year.*®* Continental

bases the 40:50 split in 1972 on Western’s advantages of

existing identity in the market and its existing onestop

*° Continental states that while analysis of the Board’s O&D

survey data shows an understatement of about 10 percent as com-

pared to Western's actual experience, it has made no upward

adjustment to compensate for this understatement. Continental

further states that it has made no upward adjustment in its base

to account for the San Diego-Denver traffic moving over the Los

Angeles gateway which travels via PSA over the San Diego-Los

Angeles leg and does not show up in the Board's surveys.

* Continental notes that this is the San Diego-Denver O&D pas-

senger growth rate for fiseal years 1969 and 1970, both recession

periods, as shown by the Board's traffic surveys. The carrier states

that it employed this growth rate in order to present a conservative

forecast, and that it has no doubt that the market will resume its

strong growth pattern when the national economy fully recovers.

*2 Continental bases the use of a 33 percent stimulation Saoter

on the Board’s Order 71-3-135 (Appendix A), dated March 23,

1971. The same stimulation factor is employed in Order 71-4-112

(Appendix A), dated April 16, 1971.

63 ontinental cites Order 71-3-135 (Appendix A) as the basis

for the 10 percent factor.

105a

authority via Phoenix. Continental believes that by 1973

its promotional efforts will enable it to achieve an even

split of the nonstop traffic.

In addition to San Diego-Denver passengers, Continent-

al estimates that it will carry beyond-passengers in 1972

and 1973 in various markets, as shown in the following

table:

Between

San Diego 1972 1973

and:

Colorado Springs 3,856 4,144

Kansas City 36,578 38,919

Oklahoma City 4,104 4,410

Tulsa 2,818 3,030

Wichita 6,631 7,128

Total 53,987 57,733

[J.A. 562] Overall, Continental expects to carry, under its

service proposal, 95,560 passengers in 1972 and 108,010 pas-

sengers in 1973.

Continental estimates its net passenger revenues at

$6,297,000 in 1972 and $7,030,000 in 1973 after allowing

for dilution at 16 percent.* With cargo revenues estimated

at 7 percent of net passenger revenues, Continental ex-

pects to realize total operating revenues of $6,738,000 in

1972 and $7,525,060 in 1973.

Continental submitted estimates of the operating results

of its service proposal for 1972 and 1973. The carrier

** This represents Continental's experienced dilution for the 12

months ended March 31, 1971. The carrier states that dilution

will be less than this experienced factor due to the decrease in pro-

motional fare discount rates and coverage introduced earlier in

1971, but that this decrease should be offset by the increased use

of economy fare service.

106a

expects to obtain an operating profit of $7,835,000 in 1972

and $2,964,000 in 1973, as summarized in the following

table:

“Item 1972 1973

Total revenues $6,738,000 $7,525,000

Direct expenses 1,940,000 2,029,000

Indirect expenses 2,963,000 2,532,000

Total expenses 4,903,000 4,561,000

Operating profit 1,835,000 2,964,000

According to Continental, expenses are based on the car-

rier’s actual experience. It further states that it has used

escalation factors based on actual labor contracts now in

existence and on experienced escalation in other expense

[ J.A. 563] items.** Continental plans to spend 5 percent of its

estimated passenger revenues for advertising and promotion

of the San Diego-Denver market; this amounts to $315,000

in 1972 and $352,000 in 1973."

Continental has calculated self-diversion for 1972 and

1973 under its service proposal.” However, the carrier did

not exclude self-diversion from its profit and loss state-

ment. On the contrary, it showed the total revenues avail-

able to support its San Diego-Denver proposal, basing its

ae

°° Continental estimates its average annual cost escalation factor

to 1973 at 5.8 percent.

°*(ontinental states that it has allocated an initial promotional

budwet of 300,000 at San Diego, $100,000 at Denver, and $25,000-

$50.000 for each beyond city to promote the inauguration of the

new services. After the initial program, tied to inauguration of

service, Continental plans to continue strong promotional efforts

in all the markets.

®? Self-diversion is estimated at 19,463,000 R.P.M.’s in 1972 and

0.777.000 R.P.M.’s in 1973. No computation of self-diversion in

terms of passengers and passenger revenues Was submitted.

en etree el ees ee tre et oe

ae Taos

107a

decision to do so on Appendix A to Orders 71-3-135 and

71-4-112.

Continental submitted an estimate of diversion from

Western and other carriers in 1972 under its service pro-

posal. Starting with its estimate of the number of passen-

gers it expects to carry in the San Diego-Denver and

beyond markets in 1972, Continental offsets the number

of passengers that the nonstop services of both Western

and Continental would generate, in order to arrive at the

number of diverted passengers. Continental then allocates

diversion on the basis of fiscal year 1970 participation.”

On this basis, Continental submits that no earrier would

be seriously affected by Continental’s certification.”

[J.A. 564] 3. TWA has a station at Denver, but not at San

Diego, and would therefore have to establish a new station

at the California city if granted a San Diego-Denver nonstop

award. Under its service proposal, TWA in 1972 would

offer two daily round trips between San Diego and Denver

with B-727-100 equipment in a seating configuration of 24

first-class and 69 coach seats. In an eastbound direction

the carrier would provide a morning (9:15 a.m.) and a

** Continental proceeds on the theory that this is not a new route

case, but a remanded phase of an earlier proceeding designed to

examine the need for nonstop competition in the San Diego-Denver

market ; that had two nonstop carriers been authorized originally

diversion from Western would have been based on the traffic it

then carried on its onestop services reduced by growth offset; and

that the remand of the issue of a second nonstop carrier does not

mean that Western is entitled to take credit for traffie gained

from its nonstop services in the interim between June 1970 and

the forecast year.

** Continental’s estimate of diversion is expressed in terms of

revenue passenger miles. According to Continental, carriers prin-

cipally affected by an award to Continental would be Western

(San Diego-Denver market), United (San Diego-Denver market )

TWA (San Diego-Oklahoma City), and American (San Diego-

Oklahoma City and San Diego-Tulsa). Diversion would oceur only

in the San Diego-Denver/Oklahoma City/Tulsa markets.

108a

midday (12:15 p.m.) departure from San Diego; west-

bound, there would be a mid-morning (10:15 a.m.) and

evening (7:50 p.m.) departure from Denver. The routings

would be as follows:

Eastbound:

San Diego-Denver-St. Louis-Cincinnati-Philadelphia

San Diego-Denver-St. Louis-Cleveland

. Westbound:

Cineinnati-St. Louis-Denver-San Diego

Philadelphia-St. Louis-Denver-San Diego

The San Diego-Denver portions of the flights would be

new mileage, and the carrier proposes to make adjustments

in its present eastbound and westbound schedules in order

to operate the proposed services. San Diego-Nenver one-

way fares would be $79.63 first-class and $62.04 coach class,

as at the present time.

(J.A. 565] TWA estimates that in 1972 the San Diego-Den-

ver market, after growth and stimulation, will total 96,830

passengers. Under its forecasting technique, TWA employs

as a base fiscal year 1970 passenger data from the Board’s

traffic surveys, showing 70,430 O&D, and connecting pas-

sengers. TWA then expands this total for growth (zero

growth from fiscal 1970 to calendar 1971, and 10 percent

growth 1971-1972) and stimulation (at 15 percent) for

Online connections would also be available at Denver and St.

Lonis to such points as Indianapolis, Dayton, Cleveland, [Louis-

ville. New York, Hartford, Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and Pitts-

burgh. In addition, there would be an opportunity for single-car-

rier service between San Diego and Europe via Denver, since

TWA currently provides Denver with single-plane service to Paris

and Rome with connecting service to London. According to TWA,

as traffic develops and TWA’s service increases, the opportunities

for improved San Diego transatlantic service will be expanded.

109a

institution of first nonstop service by Western, yielding a

total of 88,030 San Diego-Denver passengers, before non-

stop competition. With stimulation at 10 percent for

TWA’s nonstop services, the carrier arrives at a 1972 total

market of 96,830 passengers in 1972. Employing a 15 per-

cent growth factor 1972-1973, TWA predicts a total 1975

market of 111,355 passengers.

TWA further estimates that the 96,830 passenger total

for 1972 will break down as follows: TWA 40 percent

(38,730 passengers), Western 55 percent (53,260 passen-

gers) and other 5 percent (4,840 passengers). TWA antici-

pates that it will also.carry 18,130 San Diego-St. Louis

passengers and 5,310 San Diego-Cincinnati passegers in

1972, for an overall total of 62,170 passengers." For 1973,

the carrier predicts that it will carry 71,500 passengers,”

consisting of 44,540 San Diego-Denver, 20,850 San Diego-

St. Louis, and 6,110 San Diego-Cincinnati passegers.

[.J.A.566}] TWA'’s estimate of passenger revenues in 1972

shows a total of $4,561,775, composed of $3,304,412 from the

new route and $1,257,364 from Denver-East passengers. For

1973, the carrier estimates its passenger revenues at $9,-

246,548, consisting of $3,800,342 for San Diego-Denver ‘St.

Louis ‘Cincinnati passengers and $1,446,206 for Denver-

East passengers. Total revenues are forecast at $4,789,865

in 1972 and $5,508,875 in 1973."

TWA estimates that the San Diego-Denver route will

result in a system profit of $123,859 in 1972 and $764,490

™! The carrier estimates that this total will consist of 12,430 first-

class and 49,740 coach passengers.

72 The carrier estimates that this total will consist of 14,300 first-

class and 57,200 coach passengers.

"> Mail revenues are computed at 1.9 percent of passenger reve-

nues, and cargo revenues at 3.1 percent of passenger revenues,

based upon TWA’s domestic experience for combination aircraft

for the year ended March 31, 1971.

110a

in 1973 after taking net self-diversion into account, as re-

flected in the following table :"

1972 1973

7 = New Denver- New Denver-

Item Route East Total Route East Total

Revenues $3,469,633 $1,320,232 $4,789,865 $3,990,359 $1,518,516 $5,508,875

Expenses 4,048,546 248,589 4,297,135 4,037,710 285,923 4,323,633

Operating

profit (or

loss ) (578,913) 1,071,643 492,730 (47,351) 1,232,593 1,185,242

Net self-

diversion 365,871 365,871 420,752 20,752

System

profit (or

loss ) $ (578,913) $795,772 $ 126,859 $ (47,351) $811,841 $ 764,490

[J.A.567} TWA points out that the new route, by itself,

would show an operating loss in each of the forecast years,

and that it is only after the operating results of Denver-East

traffic are taken into account that there would be an overall,

but modestly profitable result.

The estimate made by TWA of the capital and promo-

tional requirements of the San Diego-Denver route amounts

to $540,000. This consists of $400,000 for advertising and

promotion, and $140,000 for station provisioning-capital

items and for terminal facilities. TWA indicates that no

** TWA’'s unit costs and ratio of direct expense to indirect ex-

pense reflect the carrier's experience for the year ended March 31,

1971. In addition, the carrier applied to the estimates of expenses

‘exeluding depreciation) for 1972 and 1973 an expense escalation

factor of 5 percent, based upon a 4.7 percent increase in TWA’s

B-727-100 direct costs for the first six months of 1971 over the

prior period; for 1972, it estimates expense escalation at $187,361,

and for 1973, at $188,668. TWA’s estimate of 1972 net self-diver-

sion represents the revenues of St. Louis and Cincinnati passengers

to Los Angeles, less related expense; for 1973, the carrier adds

15 percent for 1972-1973 growth.

lila

capital outlay will be required for the additional B-727-100

aircraft required by its service proposal.

The passenger load factor predicted by TWA for the new

route is 45.7 percent in 1972 (first-class 35.4 percent and

coach 49.2 percent) and 52.7 percent in 1973 (first-class 40.8

percent and coach 56.8 percent). The breakeven passenger

load factor is forecast at 53.1 percent and 53.2 percent in

1972 and 1973, respectively.

TWA made an estimate of diversion from other carriers

in 1972. The carrier forecasts diversion of 2,597 San Diego-

Denver passengers and $1,445,874 in passenger revenues

from Western and total diversion of 3,993 passengers and

$1,668,984 in passenger revenues in the San Diego-Denver

market. Diversion from American in the San Diego-St.

Louis/Cincinnati markets is estimated at 1,239 passengers

and $1,353,498 in passenger revenues. Gross revenue diver-

sion for all markets embraced by TWA’s proposal comes

to $3,123,447 and net diversion (after subtracting related

expenses) to $2,562,922.

{[J.A.568] 4. United, having stations at San Diego and Den-

ver, would not be obliged to establish a new station if award-

ed a San Diego-Denver nonstop route.* Under its service

proposal, United would operate two daily round trips be-

tween San Diego and Denver, including, eastbound, San

Diego departures in the morning (8:30 a.m.) and mid-after-

noon (2:30 p.m.), and westbound, Denver departures at mid-

morning (10:00 a.m.) and evening (7:00 p.m.) The sched-

ults would be routed as follows:

> United makes the point that it could operate its proposed

service with little or no increase in ground equipment and per-

sonnel and with an enhanced utilization of existing equipment and

productivity of its existing complement of personnel. (United, as

of December 31, 1970, had 187 employees in San Diego and 2,945

in Denver; its 1970 payroll was $1,806,000 at San Diego and

$39,980,000 at Denver.

112a

Eastbound:

San Diego-Denver-Omaha ™

San Diego-Denver-Milwaukee ”

Westbound:

Milwaukee-Denver-San Diego ™

Omaha-Denver-San Diego ”

In addition to the proposed nonstop services San Diego-

Denver and the proposed single-plane and single-carrier

connecting services San Diego-beyond Denver points,

United observes that the Denver gateway would serve as an

[.J.A. 569] online connecting point for such other cities as

Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City,*° New

York, Philadelphia, Rochester, Washington, D.C., and Balti-

more.

United’s proposed schedule pattern would be operated

with 98-seat B-727-100 aircraft in dual configuration having

20 first-class and 78 coach seats.*! The carrier would offer

This flicht would offer single-carrier connecting services at

Denver for Milwaukee, Des Moines, and Moline.

This flight would offer single-carrier connecting services at

Denver for Lincoln, Des Moines, Omaha, and Cedar Rapids.

"* This flight would offer single-carrier connecting services at

Denver for San Diego passengers from Lincoln, Cedar Rapids, and

Omaha.

"* This flight would offer single-carrier connecting services at

Denver for San Diego passengers from Moline, Des Moines, and

Milwaukee.

*° ['nited comments that it is certificated to serve both San Diego

and Kansas City, but is prohibited from serving both cities on the

same flight; and that it would possess certificate authority to pro-

vide single-carrier service between San Diego and Kansas City via

Denver if awarded the San Diego-Denver nonstop route.

‘' [nited estimates that one B-727-100 aircraft would be required

for its service proposal. As of July 31, 1971, the carrier had on

hand a total of 378 aireraft, including 86 B-727-100's, and an addi-

1i3a

one-way first-class fares of $79.63 ($86 after tax) and coach

fares of $62.04 ($67 after tax) in the San Diego-Denver

market, as are presently offered; in addition, it would make

available various promotional fares, including an individual

inclusive tour basing fare and a nonaffinity group fare for

groups of 25 or more passengers. Pre-operating expense

for United’s proposal is estimated at $42,000 (advertising

$38,000 and sales and sales promotion $4,000).

United stresses that its continuing promotion of Denve-

over the years is well known, and that it conducts extensive

advertising of San Diego as a destination area. The carrier

states that the inauguration of San Diego-Chicago/Wash-

ington, D.C./New York service pursuant to its award in the

original phase of this case was accompanied by highly in-

tensified destination advertising of San Diego, and that

United’s 1971 TV and newspaper advertising expenditures

in Chicago, New York, Washington, D.C., and Honolulu sell-

ing San Diego as a destination amounted to $230,000 as

compared to a 1970 total of $100,000.

[J.A.570] United forecasts that the San Diego-Denver

market, after growth and stimulation, will amount to 97,041

passengers in 1972 and 101,893 passengers in 1973. In mak-

ing its forecast United builds upon a base representing West-

ern’s online O&D passengers during the year ended June 30,

1971, totalling 81,969 passengers. The carrier expands this

total to 1972 (and 1973) at an annual growth rate of 5 per-

cent, yielding 88,219 passengers in 1972, and then applies a

stimulation factor of 10 percent for first competitive nonstop

service to arrive at a total 1972 market of 97,041 passengers.

United predicts that, of this total, 90 percent or 87,337

passengers will travel on the nonstop services, and that

tional 23 aircraft were on order for @clivery in 1971, 1972, and

1973. The carrier's nonstop proposal would involve a total aircraft

and ground investment of $6,094,741, including an aircraft invest-

ment of $4,975,299.

ll4a

United will carry 45 percent of the nonstop passengers, or

39,302 passengers,” with Western carrying the remaining

55 pereent or 48,035 passengers.” In addition, United ex-

peets to obtain 19,651 online passengers coming, for the

most part, from Milwaukee, Omaha, Lincoln, Des Moines,

Cedar Rapids, and Moline as well as other points east of

Chicago. On this basis, United forecasts its overall 1972

passenger total at 58,953 passengers and 1973 total at 61,901

passengers.

United computes its passenger revenues (after dilution

and allocating passengers 15 percent first-class and 85 per-

cent coach) at $3,137,479 in 1972 and $3,294,371 in 1973.

Adding mail, express, and freight revenues (on the basis of

its 1970 cargo yields for scheduled nassenger aircraft), the

carrier predicts its total revenues in 1972 at $3,299,141 and

in 1973 at $3,464,388 under its service proposal.

{J.A.571] United’s estimates of financial results for its

proposal shows that it expects to incur an operating loss of

225,455 in 1972 and of $248,273 in 1973. These estimates in-

clude an allowance for escalating costs at 4.2 percent per an-

num “* as applied to the carrier’s historie costs for calendar

year 1970; the escalation allowance amounts to $259,044 for

1972 and $404,778 for 1973. On the other hand, United’s

estimates do not make allowance for self-diversion, on the

asserted basis that the service proposal is costed on a

fully-allocated basis, with both full costs and full revenues

assigned to the San Diego-Denver segment.

United caleulates that under its service proposal it would

have a passenger load factor of 42 percent in 1972 (first-

“? Similarly, for 1973, United estimates nonstop passengers at

91,704 (90 percent of the total market of 101,893 passengers), with

its share at 41,267 passengers.

*?In 1973, Western’s share would also be 55 percent, or 50,437

nonstop passengers.

“This factor is derived from United's exhibits in Phase 7 of

the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, Docket 21866-7.

1l5a

class 31 percent and coach 45 percent) and that in 1973 the

passenger load factor would be 44 percent (first-class 32

percent and coach 47 percent). The carrier additionally

estimates that it would divert total revenues of $1,651,985

from Western in 1972 and $1,734,585 in 1973. Passenger

diversion from Western is computed at 30,480 passengers

in 1972 * and at 32,004 in 1973."*

[J.A.572] Western’s Passenger Forecast and Estimates

of Operating Results and Diversion

Western forecasts that in 1972, after growth and stimula-

tion, the San Diego-Denver market will total 101,800 pas-

sengers. Western uses as a base its fiscal year 1971 total

of 81,969 online O&D passengers, increases this total to

calendar 1971 by a 5 percent growth factor based upon its

1969-1971 experience, and further expands the total to cal-

endar 1972 by a 7.5 percent growth factor, producing a

1972 total of 92,500 passengers before stimulation for com-

petition.”” The carrier then applies a stimulation factor of

10 percent for competitive nonstop service, stating that the

stimulative effects of its own nonstop service are already

** United projects that Western’s online O&D passengers in 1972,

with no change in route authority in this remanded case, would

total 88,219 passengers; that its pasengers after a route award to

United would total 57,739 passengers (including 48,035 nonstop

passengers and 9,704 other pasengers); and that Western would

suffer a loss of the difference, or 30,480 passengers.

** United estimates that in 1973 Western with no change in au-

thority in this case would carry 92,630 online O&D passengers,

representing a growth of 5 percent over 1972; that with the grant

of United’s application Western would carry 60,626 passengers

(50,437 nonstop passengers and 10,189 other passengers) ; and that

Western would incur a loss of 32,004 passengers, representing the

difference between 92,630 and 60,626.

*' On brief, Western indicates that it applied an average annual

growth factor of 6.75 percent, to reach the 1972 forecast year.

ll6a

included in the base year traffic total.“* In this method,

Western arrives at its 1972 total of 101,800 O&D and con-

necting passengers.

Western further estimates that 90 percent of the total

market, or 91,620 passengers, would move on nonstop serv-

ices, and that the remaining 10 percent would travel on

the carrier’s onestop services. In the event of an award to

Air West, Western expects to carry 61,100 passengers (or

f0 percent of the total market), consisting of 50 percent

on the nénstops and 10 percent on the onestops; Air West

would obtain a 40 percent share of the total market, or

40,700 passengers. According to Western, it would suffer

diversion of 31,400 passengers (the difference between the

92,500 passengers Western would carry in 1972 before Air

West*s competition and the 61,100 passengers Western

would carry after competition from Air West), which

would amount to a loss of $1,716,073 in total revenues.

(J.A.573] Additionally, assuming certification of Air West

and the operation of two daily nonstop round trips by each

carrier, Western predicts that Western’s San Diego-Denver

nonstop operations in 1972 would produce a net loss of $560,-

609.°* Western projects that it would carry 70,500 passengers

(50,900 San Diego-Denver nonstop passengers * and 19,600

heyond passengers), earn total operating revenues of $3,-

“On brief, Western explains that it in effect applied a 30-35

percent stimulation factor; that the stimulative effects of its fir'st

nonstop service, estimated at 20-25 percent, are included in West-

ern's base year traffic; and that an additional 10 percent is allowed

for first competitive nonstop service.

** The net loss in 1973 is estimated at $523,410, based upon oper-

ating revenues of $4,237,927 (at 10 percent above those for 1972),

operating expenses of $4,686,347, an operating loss of $448,410,

and an adjustment of $75,000 for nonoperating revenues and

expenses.

This represents 50 percent of the total market of 101,800 pas-

sengers.

1l7a

852,670 (after dilution at 18 percent), incur expenses of

$4,332,279 and suffer an operating loss of $479,609; an ad-

justment of $81,000 for nonoperating revenue and expense

increases the loss to $560,609."

In the event of an award to Continental, Western antici-

pates that it would carry 56,000 San Diego-Denver passen-

gers (or 55 percent of the total market of 101,800 passen-

gers), consisting of 45,800 nonstop passengers (50 percent

of the total of 91,600 nonstop passengers) and 10,200 one-

stop passengers (10 percent of the total market); Conti-

nental is expected to carry 45,800 passengers on its nonstop

services (50 percent of the total of 91,600 nonstop passen-

gers). According to Western, it would suffer diversion of

36,500 passengers, representing the difference between the

92,500 passengers it would carry in 1972 before Continen-

tal’s competition and the 56,000 passengers who would

travel on Western after competition by Continental; West-

ern estimates that the loss of 36,500 passengers would

mean a loss of $1,994,798 in total revenues.”

{J.A.574] Moreover, with Continental certificated for San

Diego-Denver nonstop service, and each carrier operating

two daily nonstop round trips, Western forecasts that in

1972 Western’s San Diego-Denver nonstop operations would

suffer a net loss of $838,704. Western projects that it

would carry 64,900 passengers (45,800 San Diego-Denver

* Western assumes it would operate a pattern of one B-727-200

flicht and three B-720B flights daily, which was the pattern oper-

ated at the time the exhibits were submitted.

°*? Western states that TWA or United would cause revenue di-

version of approximately the same amount in 1972. Western esti-

mates revenue diversion in 1973 at the 1972 level plus 10 percent.

*? Western estimates the net loss in 1973 at $839,274, based upon

operating revenues of $3,863,490 (at 10 percent over those for

1972), operating expenses of $4,627,764, an operating loss of

$764,274, and an adjustment of $75,000 for nonoperating revenues

and expenses.

118a

nonstop passengers * and 19,100 beyond passengers), earn

total operating revenues of $3,512,264 (after dilution at 18

percent), incur expenses of $4,269,968, and have an operat-

ing loss of $757,704, which, after adjustment for nonoperat-

ing revenues and expenses at $81,000, yields a net loss of

$838,704."

Western also ecaleulated revenue diversion under the

‘growth offset’? methodology. Using calendar 1969 as the

base traffic year, Western estimates it would suffer diver-

sion in 1972 of 10,960 San Diego-Denver passengers and

$613,804 in total revenues. The diverted passengers repre-

sent the difference between Western’s 66,950 online O&D

passengers in calendar 1969 (normalized to account for a

strike) and 55,990 passengers that Western expects to carry

in calendar 1972 assuming nonstop competition (45,800

nonstop passengers and 10,190 onestop passengers).”

{J.A.575] Western also made an estimate of operating re-

sults for 1973, assuming that Western and Continental would

each operate three daily round trips by mid-1973 and that the

San Diego-Denver market growth rate from 1972 to 1973

amounted to 20 percent, or ¢ -uble the rate expected by the

carrier. On this basis, Western projects a total San Diego-

Denver market of 122,200 passengers, with Western carry-

ing 45 pereent of the nonstop passengers, or 55,000 passen-

gers. Overall, the carrier estimates that it would carry

" This represents 50 percent of the total of 91,620 nonstop pas-

sengers.

The loss is computed on the assumption that Western would

operate a pattern of one B-727-200 flight and three B-720B flights

that was in effect at the time the estimate was made.

“Ising

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