Petition — Western Airlines, Inc. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1976
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the suited States
OcTOBER TERM 1975
N- TO- 711
WESTERN AIRLINES, INc., Petitioner
Vv.
CONTINENTAL AIR LINES, INc., Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Of Counsel: Emory N. ELLIs, JR.
FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI
FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI .
1140 Connecticut Ave., 1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
N.W. Suite 501
Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036
GERALD P. O’Grapy
Senior Vice President
Legal and Secretary
Western Airlines
P.O. Box 92005
World Way Postal Center
Los Angeles, Calif. 90009
Press or Byron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.
wwe
—
'
INDEX
Page
ES frau ceecodcnctedbasetanneceesueus 1
EE 6 dha Vee ass ond N thao nenskwesneeenece> an 1
NN oss canteen ccncdbeanabeudeuneas 2
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules Involved 2
PEP EeT TTETEPETTTTT TET TT LETTE eee 3
Reasons for Granting the Writ .................... 7
I. The court below has interpreted the Federal
Aviation Act in a novel way, never before passed
upon by this or any other court .............. 7
Bee Ce ED vo cn ccccncescsénecs 8
B. The C.A.B.’s interpretation .....cccesccces 11
II. In deciding this case the lower court usurped
functions which Congress assigned the adminis-
trative agency, and its decision is in conflict with
decisions of this court defining the appropriate
SE ee Ec cbt ccc cuceks db hbausasande tees 20
III. The court below has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings as to require supervision and guidance by
ee I SNE a diceacelceansscsuceccksee 26
SEE bu duanddbencausnacesbeteundenenteee ens 32
p ge re a re ee ee la
SIN ho. 6s peudnadenkeancndhnhasecéeeuewessns 32a
ii
INDEX TO AUTHORITIES
CASES: } Page
Additional Service to San Diego Case, C.A.B. Orders
72-12-29 (1972), 74-30-17 (1974) ........ cc cceeees 16
Alabama Power Co. yv. F.P.C., 450 F.2d 716 (D.C.Cir.
| errr y Pree er rey emer erm Tae 29
American Airlines, Akron Service, 37 C.A.B. 606 (1963) 15
American Export Air., Trans-Atlantie Service, 2 C.A.B.
I en a ee ee 11
American Trucking Ass’n v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 387
OF ee Br rrr Pere 21
Rerlington Truck Lines v. U. S., 371 U.S. 156 (1962) 22
Chrysler Corp. v. Dep’t of Transportation, 472 F.2d
I Nea 30
City of Lafayette, La. v. S.E.C., 454 F.2d 941 (D.C.Cir. -
SUEDE ceteeccascd diane $eeeaieeeceeneeeleean
Colonial Stores, Inc. v. F.T.C., 450 F.2d 733 (Sth Cir.
BD nce knncakke can aedeuneebacas aur eeeus 30
Continental Air Lines, Ine. v. C.A.B., 519 F.2d 944
Ce A ee ss cdbuidaasknens kheseeheeuuaeees 1
Dallas Ft. Worth-Phoenix Nonstop service Case,
CA. Giew G-taiee CHE) cece cccccscccscces 16
Dallas to the West Service Case, Order on Reconsid-
sention. Ge CA Ge CHD 6.6 ccescccccceenscs 13
nvironmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
Dee Ce, EE ccc c edu sineeetsanesaneeeas 29
F.C.C. vy. Pottsville Broadeasting Co., 309 U.S. 134
2 ORS aa cits MRR eS: 22,23, 27, 30
F.P.C. v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952) ...... 22
F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) ....... 22
Great Lakes Area Case, 8 C.A.B. 360 (1947) ........ 12
Great Lakes-Southeast Service Case, 27 C.A.B. 829
PEE. “clcuktien badbidan c4nen ede tennessatnen es 12
Greater Boston Television v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841 (D.C.
i eee ees ceed ae ke 29
Gulf States-Midwest Points Service Investigation,
(.A.B. Orders 69-5-25 (1969), 69-9-18 (1969) ... 16
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
GED CRA, HOOD vw vacccccccccccscccnsssesiss 28
Mohawk Route 94 Realignment, 46 C.A.B. 111 (1967) 15
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458
oe Bgl et Ee errrer rrr rT teens 29
National Air., et al., Daytona Beach-Jacksonville, 1
ss GE CED Sco ccns-cedcceceecsentecesucss 12
Table of Authorities Continued iii
Page
New York-Chicago Service (Northwest Restriction),
eee re er errr rere
New York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94 (1956) ........ 13
New York-San Francisco Nonstop Service Case, 29
ee ede is ieees cas 13
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. F.P.C., 379 F.2d 153
sb Reeser ern re 29
N.L.R.B. v. Food Stores Employees, 417 U.S. 1 (1974)
22, 23
Northwest Air. et al., Additional Service to Canada,
gk G fo. Sree rr eer ere 12
Outagmie County, Wis. v. C.A.B., 355 F.2d 900 (7th
ae ae wade cht eetets 18, 21
Pacific Northwest-Southwest Service Investigation, 46
TE Fs REI er eer eee 15
Pacific Northwest-Southwest Service Investigation,
Reopened, C.A.B. Orders 69-4-11 (1969), 69-10-163
Ss ee eed er eb ae nad wie « 16
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) 21
Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 230 F.2d 204 (D.C.
ee Te ee Dee eee wide oe in 18, 27
Railway Express, Airfreight Forwarder Application,
ee i a ea or. 13
S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)... .22, 23, 27
Service to Albuquerque Case, C.A.B. Orders 69-7-136
a Chak tee teak chen daees 16
Sindicato Puertoriqueno de Trabajadores v. Hodgson,
GES Fe TOSS CIRC LGe, TRUE) ov ccccccccccccense 29
Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation,
C.A.B. Orders 69-7-135 (1969), 69-9-11 (1969) ... 16
Southern Transcontinental Service Case, 33 C.A.B. 701
I Oe el ae ain eee ee ek kee ek kd 13, 14
Southwest-Northwest Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 52 (1955) 13
State Airlines v. C.A.B., 174 F.2d 510 (D.C.Cir. 1949) 28
Syracuse-New York City Case, 24 ©.A.B. 770 (1957).. 13
Trans World Airlines, Service at Reading, 37 C.A.B.
ie eh eh Deere oars 6h e wae eS. 15
Twin Cities-Milwaukee Long-Haul Investigation, C.A.B.
Docket 19097, Order 70-6-36 (June 4, 1970) ...... 16
Union of Concerned Scientists v. A.E.C., 499 F.2d 1069
CE Cod ce eecinieehi eae Sahnennees 29, 30
Why? Ass’n v. Burns, 372 F.Supp. 223 (Conn. 1974).. 30
Wyoming-South Dakota-Chicago Service, 36 C.A.B. 703
DEY Uebisekseiesscak cousvdunbeadanescestasdes 15
iv Table of Authorities Continued
Page
U.S. Sratutes:
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (5 U.S.C. § 551,
et seq.)
Section 10 (5 U.S.C. $ 706) ......cccccccccces 2
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973 .......... 8
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq.)
Section 102 (49 U.S.C. § 1302) .......... 2, 8, 10, 2
Section 401 (49 U.S.C. § 1371) ...........46.. 2
Section 1006 (49 U.S.C. § 1486) .............. 2, 20
28 UBC. 0 TMG oc cccuncecssensucusese eee » fF
MiscELLANEOUS:
Air Carrier Financial Statisties, C.A.B. Bureau of Ac-
counts and Btatistied ....cccscccssesesseuenenes 17, 24
(.A.B. Rules and Regulations (14 C.F.R. $§ 200-399)
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (PSDR-
43, 40 F.R. 37048 (August 25, 1975) ......... 26
Policy Statement § 399.60 (14 C.F.R. § 399.60) 18
Rules of Practice, Rule 24(m) (14 C.F.R. § 302.24
C) er 24
Floor debates on passage of the Civil Aeronauties Act
of 1938, 81, 83 Cong. Ree. (1937-38)........ 8,9, 10, 11
Gardner and Greenberger, Judicial Review of Admin-
istrative action and Responsible Government, 63
Geo. LJ. FT (IBGE) . ocvdccccdscosecsucesuneeee 27, 31
Hearings on S. 2 and S. 1760 Before the Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,
75th Cong., let Sess. (1937) .. ...ccccsccecescces 9
If.R. Rep. No. 911, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) ...... 8
Paper, Judicial Serutiny of the F.C.C.: The Illusion of
Usurpation, 52 Bos.U.L.Rev. 659 (1972) ........ 27
Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action—
Remarks Before the D. C. Cireuit Judicial Confer-
ence, 34 Fed. Bar J. 54 (1974) ............-00-- 27
S. Rep. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) ....... 8
IN THE
Supreme Court of thie United States
OctToBER TERM 1975
No.
WESTERN AIRLINES, INc., Petitioner
Vv.
CONTINENTAL AiR LINES, INc., Respondent
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued
to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia « ireuit entered
in Continental Airlines, Ine. v. Civil Aeronauties
Board on September 22, 1975.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit is printed in Appendix A hereto,
and is reported at 519 F.2d 944 (D.C.Cir. 1975).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, printed in Appendix A here-
9
—
to, was entered on September 22, 1975. Petitioner filed
a motion for stay of the mandate with that court on
October 10, 1975. The Court has not yet ruled on the
motion for a stay of the mandate.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 49
U.S.C. § 1486(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3).
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did the court below erroneously interpret the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 so as to impute an im-
portance to competitive operating authority which the
Congress did not intend?
2. In deciding this ease and in attempting to control
the course of the proceeding before the C.A.B. on re-
mand, did the lower court usurp functions which Con-
cress assigned the administrative agency?
3. Should the Supreme Court exercise its super-
visory powers to review the lower court’s judicial ae-
tivism which is evident in its decision in this case?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED
The principal statute involved is the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, as amended (the Act), 49 U.S.C.
§ 1301 ef seq. Of particular importance are 49 U.S.C.
$1202 (Declaration of Policy), § 1371 (Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity), and § 1486 (Ju-
dicial Review of Orders). Also involved in 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (Scope of Review).
The pertinent text of these provisions is set forth in
Appendix B.
ee
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case began in 1967 with the filing of an applica-
tion to the Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter called
the Board or the CAB) by United Airlines for im-
proved operating authority inte San Diego. After sev-
eral rounds of pleadings and CAB orders, the case was
eventually set for hearing as the Additional Service
to San Diego Case. The issues were limited to the con-
sideration of ‘‘San Diego’s largest east-west long-haul
markets”’ (J.A. 33). The mazkets involved were San
Diego on the one hand, and New York/Newark, Wash-
ington/Baltimore, Chicago, and Denver on the other
hand. In the course of this proceeding the CAB
awarded new nonstop service authority in each of
these markets, by removing operating restrictions from
carriers which already had authority to serve them.
Among other things, the Board authorized Western
Air Lines, Ine. (Western) to provide nonstop service
in the San Diego-Denver market, as recommended by
its Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). However, on a
three to two vote, it disagreed with the ALJ's decision
that Continental Air Lines, Inc. (Continental) should
be given competitive nonstop authority between San
Diego and Denver. The Board found that Western’s
proposed service would be ‘‘entirely adequate to meet
the service needs of the market .. .”’, and expressed
concern that competitive nonstop serv? 2 would have an
adverse financial impact on Western. In view of all the
circumstances the Board found ‘‘.. . it more consistent
with the goal of fostering sound economie conditions in
air transportation—even at the cost of foregoing some
* References to J.A. relate to the joint appendix submitted by
the parties in the Court below.
4
undoubted beyond benefits a second carrier could pro-
vide—to certificate only Western at this time.’’ (J.A.
41)
Although the awards to Western in the San Diego-
Denver market and to another carrier in the other mar-
kets at issue were made final in June of 1970 (J.A.
65), final decision on the need for a second nonstop
carrier between San Diego and Denver was deferred
(J.A. 65).
After further economic study the Board issued, on
March 23, 1971, a Supplemental Order on Reconsidera-
tion (Order 71-3-135, J.A. 67). This order for the first
time attempted a completely new economic evaluation
of the effect on the incumbent, Western, of a Conti-
nental entry into the San Diego-Denver market. It was
later discovered that this analysis contained a major
computational error (J.A. 79). Obviously, the Board
was uncomfortable with the legal posture of the case
at that stage. It remanded the proceeding to the same
Administrative Law Judge who handled the original
phase, expressing the need for more recent factual in-
formation (Order 71-4-112, April 16, 1971, J.A. 79).
The remanded phrase was essentially a new case
focusing entirely on the questions of need for competi-
tive service in the San Diego-Denver market and se-
lection of a carrier.
Another complete hearing was held. The same ALJ
again found that service by an additional carrier was
required, and again selected Continental to provide it.
On review, the Board again voted three to two to re-
verse the ALJ (Order 72-12-29, December 8, 1972, J.A.
83).
Ra ous
4)
The Bosrd’s decision started out with a summary of
the Supplemental I.D. and it then stated the general
theme of the decision as follows:
**... We have concluded that the publie conven-
ience and necessity would be better served at this
time by not authorizing competitive service in this
market [footnote omitted]. Our decision reflects
the belief that during a period of lagging traffe
growth and retrenchment within the industry, and
during the subsequent period of recovery before
an adequate upward trend has been assured (both
generally and in markets which may be at issue),
we must be more than unusually careful to avoid
impeding the industry’s opportunities for full re-
covery.”’
* + +
“There is little question that the San Diego-
Denver route offers a potential for future certifi-
cation of competition. However, in the cireum-
stances of this case—where Western’s service has
been, and appears likely to be, reasonably respon-
sive to the needs of the market, and where the
traftie growth in the local San Diego-Denver mar-
ket, and beyond markets which would support such
local operations, show no strong sign of improve-
ment—we believe it imprudent, on balance, to cer-
tificate a second nonstop carrier where competitive
service is likely to produce, at best, only marginal
financial results.’’ (Order 72-12-29 at 2-3, J.A. 85.
86)
In this context, the Board went on to make a de-
tailed point by point analysis of each of the ALJ's
findings and to discuss its disagreement with them.
(J.A. 83-98)
Petitions for reconsideration of the Board’s order
were denied on May 3, 1974 by a two to one vote.
(Order 74-5-17, J.A. 100).
6
Continental then petitioned the court below, pur-
suant to 49 U.S.C. 1486, for judicial review of Orders
72-12-29 (J.A. 83) and 74-5-17/18 (J.A. 125).
On September 22, 1975 the lower court issued its
opinion and judgment, remanding the case to the
Board. In deciding the case the court passed over con-
tentions by Continental that the Board’s findings were
inadequate and that the orders must be set aside for
‘failure to engage in reasoned decision-making.”’
Rather, the court said:
‘‘We believe that this case is most naturally treated
as presenting a question of the existence of sub-
stantial evidence to support the CAB’s rejection
of the statutory interest in the , -omotion of com-
petition.”’ (Appendix A, p. 13a, note 42)
The court construed the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 as mandating the certification of competition
‘‘when sufficient traffie exists to support [it]’’ (Appen-
dix A, p. 19a); and found that the substantial evidence
of record does not support the Board’s finding that
competitive service is not required in the San Diego-
Denver market. The court also concluded that the fail-
ure to authorize competitive nonstop service ‘‘is not
in accord with the publie interest considerations set
forth in § 102 of the Act’’ (Appendix A, p. 4a); and
that ‘‘[t]he record before us contains ample evidence
of, the need for competing nonstop service.’’ (Appen-
dix A, p. 30a) It included a pointed suggestion that
Continental, rather than any other applicant, should be
awarded the authority.
In order to maintain control of further proceedings
the court directed the Board not to reopen the record
for the purpose of taking additional evidence without
-__ oe
7
first petitioning the court to modify its mandate. If
such a petition should be filed, the court specified that
the Board should set forth ‘‘with particularity the
matters involved and their relationship to the desir-
ability and feasibility of implementing competition.”
(Appendix A, p. 30a)
As to selection of carrier for competitive author-
ity, the court directed the Board to review the existing
record and render a supplemental order either adopt-
ing the ALJ’s determination that Continental should
be selected ‘‘or setting torth its separate reasons for
accepting or rejecting the ALJ’s selection.”’ (Appen-
dix A, p. 31) Acceptance of these instructions would,
of course, preclude any further hearing even on new
applications for San Diego-Denver authority.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. The Court Below Has Interpreted the Federal Aviation Act in
a Novel Way, Never Before Passed Upon by This or Any
Other Court.
The lower court’s decision rests entirely on a novel
and erroneous interpretation of the Federal Aviation
Act which no court has adopted before in the 38-vear
history of the Act and its predecessor, the Civil Aero-
nauties Act of 1938. For that reason this court has
never had an opportunity to rule on such an interpre-
tation. If the interpretation is allowed to stand, it will
remove from the CAB power to control its own docket
by requiring that priority of hearing be accorded to
competitive route cases. Of even more significance it
will have a serious impact on the substantive decisions
in such cases by creating an almost unrebuttable pre-
sumption in favor of competition.
8
In essence the court below interpreted the Act to
give ‘‘competition’’ preeminence over the other public
intrest goals listed in section 102 of the Act [49 U.S.C.
1302].° Having established, in effect, a statutory pre-
sumption that competition is required by the public
interest, the court went on to evaluate the evidence of
record in this light, finding that there was not substan-
tial evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of
competition. In short, the court’s interpretation of
Section 102 of the Act is the cornerstone of the entire
decision.
The court below developed its interpretation entirely
from its reading of the legislative history of the Civil
Aeronauties Act and a few early CAB decisions. It
cited no court cases.
a. The Legislative History.
The legislative history of the Act dealing with com-
petition reveals two distinct dialogues.
First, the primary motivating force behind enact-
ment of the Civil Aeronautics Act was the desire of
Congress to stabilize the air transportation industry
by eliminating the unrestrained competition which was
threatening to destroy the svstem at the time.’ Thus,
the regulatory system which Congress established may
be characterized as one which was designed basically
to control competition. We do not understand that the
lower court disagrees with this premise.
?The laneuage of Section 102 has remained unchanged since
1938 although the original Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 has been
reenacted as the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
* See c.g. S.Rep.No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) ; I1.R.
Rep.No. 911, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1937) ; 83 Cong.Ree. 6507
(1938) ; 83 Cong.Ree. 8890 (1937).
9
Second, the legislators were concerned that the en-
tire air transportation system might fall into the hands
of a few monopoly operators. The proposed act in-
cluded a provision for the award of grandfather rights
to the existing mail contract carriers and there was a
fear that this would ‘‘freeze the present air service,”’
and would create ‘‘a monopoly with the present con-
tractors.’’ (Testimony of Mr. Crowley, Solicitor Post
Office Department, Hearings on S. 2 & S. 1760 Before
the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Inter-
state Commerce, 75th Cong., Ist. Sess. 118 (1937)).
There was also a concern that the Act’s provisions,
which exempted air carriers from the formerly ap-
plicable anti-trust laws, would permit monopoly sys-
tems to develop through consolidations or mergers.
(Hearing testimony of Mr. Crowley, supra at 118; Let-
ter from Mr. Farley, Postmaster General, Hearings
on 8.2 & S. 1760, supra at 139; 83 Cong.Rec. 6728-6731
(1938) ). In other words, some congressmen wanted to
insure that the new regulatory statute would not create
an air transportation system consisting of a few large
carriers operating over basically non-competitive route
systems.
This problem produced considerable colloquy in the
debates, and drew several statements by Senator Me-
Carran, the bill’s author, and others to the effect that
no such result was intended, and indeed, that there
had been provisions built into the Act to preclude such
developments. (83 Cong.Rec. 6729 (1938) remarks of
Senator McCarran; 81 Cong.Ree. 9214 (1937) remarks
of Senator Wheeler: 83 Cong.Rec. 6730 (1938) re-
marks of Senator Copeland).
The court below inferred from these broad, general
anti-trust, anti-monopoly expressions of the legisla-
10
tors, a meaning beyond their true intention. It imputed
to them a legislative ‘‘mandate”’ for the authorization
of competitive nonstop service where sufficient traffic
exists on a particular route to support competition on
that route.
We have been able to find only one place in the legis-
lative history of the Act in which a statement was made
as to competition with regard to a particular route.
That is the discussion at 83 Cong. Ree. 6852 (1938)
cited by the lower court where reference is made to
United Air Lines’ service between Salt Lake City and
Chicago (Appendix A, p. 16a). In context, it is obvious
that this statement also arose out of a discussion of the
possibility that the systems of existing carriers would
be frozen by the ‘‘grandfather’’ clause of the Act.
Senator MeCarran was simply assuring Senator King
that under the provisions of the Act there would be no
such result. The ‘‘Authority’’ (the Civil Aeronauties
Board) would be able to investigate the need for serv-
ice on the route, and award competitive authority if it
were required. In other words, the Act did not, by its
terms, freeze a route into a non-competitive mold.
‘we are trying to set up a non-political ageney
that will go into matters such as the one I have
tried to illustrate. ..”’
‘*That is the object and purpose of the entire bill.
Tt is not to say that any line may be ‘frozen’ nor
that any line may be perpetuated, nor that any
monopoly over any terrain may be established to
the exclusion of the necessitv which the public may
present.”’ (83 Cong.Ree. 6852.
With this background it is apparent Congress con-
templated that as to Section 102(d) the emphasis would
be, not on the word ‘‘competition,”’ but rather on the
ome
hte tr cine
11
remainder of the phrase: ‘‘.. . to the extent necessary
to assure the sound development of an air transporta-
tion system properly adapted to the needs of the for-
eign and domestic commerce of the United States, of
the Postal Service, and of the national defense.’’ To
determine what extent is necessary, the CAB was es-
tablished and given a ‘‘high degree of flexibility’’ to
perform its functions under the Act.‘
b. The C.A.B.’s Interpretation.
The court below also purports to find support in
CAB decisions for its position that competition is en-
titled to a preeminent position in the Act’s policy
guidelines. It refers to statements in a few isolated
eases which, by themselves, seem to lend credence to
the findings.
However, when the pattern of Board decisions over
the years is considered, the view is quite different.
There has been overall increase in amount of competi-
tion among the airlines. But there have also been defi-
nite periods of remission of competitive awards as
economie factors have dictated.
In its early years the Board was extremely cautious
about awarding competitive authority, and in some
eases it refused to make a competitive award because
of the existence of adequate service.’
One of the Board’s earliest impressions of its respon-
sibility under the Act to permit competition to the ex-
tent necessary is found in American Export, 2 C.A.B.
*83 Cong. Rec. 6731 (1938).
12
16 at 31, which was cited by the lower court in support
of its position. There the Board said:
‘We conclude that competition in air transporta-
tion is not mandatory, especially when considered
in relation to any particular route or service.
Clearly, Congress has left to the discretion of the
Board the determination of whether or not compe-
tition in a particular area is necessary to assure
the sound development of an appropriate air trans-
portation system. ”’
Under the circumstances of that case the Board
awarded a competitive route; but the underlying theory
of the case was obviously quite different from that im-
puted to it by the court. In another case reported in the
same volume of the CAB Reports (2 C.A.B. 627 at
652) the Board refused to award competitive authority
on another route partly because:
‘* the record does not indicate that the present
service over Route No. 7 is inadequate or that the
present operator thereof is incapable of accommo-
dating the natural growth of air traffic which can
he foreseen at this time. Under these conditions,
the contention that there should be competing,
duplicating services between two points merely to
prevent one Government regulated carrier from
dominating that field is unimpressive.’’
In the economic boom years of the mid 1950’s, the
Board set down a number of major route cases which
were designed to reappraise the entire domestic route
° E.q., National Air., et al., Daytona Beach-Jacksonville, 1 C.A.A.
612 (1940); American Export <Air.. Trans-Atlantic Service, 2
C.A.B. 16, 31 (1940); Northwest Air. et al., Additional Service
to Canada, 2 C.A.B. 627, 652 (1941); Great Lakes ‘Area Case, 8
C.A.B. 360, 382 (1947).
2 he ee oneed ons seein <<
13
system.’ It is to individual cases of this period which
the lower court pointed primarily for statements in
support of its views of the Board’s obligations with
regard to authorization of competitive service (Appen-
dix A, p. 18a, notes 57, 58).
In the early cases in this group the Board indicated
that the certification of significant amounts of new
competition was a departure from the more cautious
approach it had followed earlier. It noted that its new
policy of “‘greater freedom’’ with regard to competi-
live route awards was justified by the general improve-
ment in the overall strength of the industry; but even
so, the Board recognized its obligation to control e.r-
cess competition which could ‘‘ bring uneconomical con-
ditions and jeopardize the development of that sound
system of air transportation which is the ultimate ob-
jective of the Act.’’ Southwest-Northeast Service Case,
22 C.A.B. 52, 75 (1953). It found that the statute does
not insist on competition on all routes or in all services.
Rather, it is in the discretion of the Board to provide
essential competition. Railway Express, Airfreight
Forwarder Application, 27 C.A.B. 500, 534 (1958).
In the late 50’s the Board reverted to a more cautious
approach to competitive service. The Southern Trans-
continental Service Case, 33 C.A.B. 701 (1961) was in-
° E.g., Southwest-Northeast Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 52 (1955):
New York-Chicago Service (Northwest Restriction), 23 C.A.B. 943
(1956) ; Syracuse-New York City Case, 24 C.A.B. 770 (1957) ; New
York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94 (1956): Great Lakes-Southeast
Service Case, 27 C.A.B. 829 (1958); Dallas to the West Service
Case, Order on Reconsideration, 28 C.A.B. 590 (1959) ; New York-
San Francisco Nonstop Service Case, 29 C.A.B. 811 (1959).
14
stituted in 1958 and, at that time it was considered to
be the last major domestic route proceeding. That case
was decided in 1961.
The Board awarded new competitive service in sev-
eral of the larger markets involved in Southern Trans-
continental Case, but it found that no new authority
should be awarded in other markets. It stated:
‘‘In meeting these air service needs, however,
we have done so in a manner which we believe will
adequately meet the present and future air trans-
portation requirements of the area while at the
same time giving full recognition to the effect
which the use of jet aircraft with its greatly ex-
panded eapacity will have on the needs of the in-
dividual markets and limiting duplicating service
to those markets which we fully expect will pro-
duce a volume of traffic sufficient to support more
than one carrier (33 C.A.B. at 710).
Thus, the Board used a major, general economic con-
sideration affecting air transportation for the entire
industry in the early 60’s—the introduction of high
capacity jet aireraft—as a moderating factor on com-
petitive route awards. The Board went om to say:
‘the mere fact that other markets of similar
or even smaller size are authorized to receive serv-
ice by more than one carrier is not dispositive of
whether competitive service is required here. The
extent of competition in any given market neces-
sarily turns upon the facts and circumstances pe-
culiar to that market.’’ (33 C.A.B. at 715.)
From 1961 until 1968 the Beard did not decide a
significant, competitive, domestic route case ( although
it did commence a number of new cases after 1965 as
general economic conditions improved ). Rather, it con-
ee es
15
centrated its efforts on improving efficiency of local
service carriers and on cases involving the authoriza-
tion of first single-plane service,’ in markets which for-
merly had only connecting or equipment interchange
service.
In the latter category, the leading case of the period
was probably the Pacific Northwest-Southwest Service
Investigation, 46 C.A.B. 654 (1967), modified 46 C.A.B.
652 (1967). The case was commenced in 1964 but was
not decided until April, 1967. The Board did authorize
competitive service in one market—Denver-Kansas
City—but the basic thrust of its decision was the award
of first through-plane authority in markets which did
not have it before. In overruling the finding of the Ex-
aminer that competitive routings by Braniff and Con-
tinental should be established on the major Pacific
Northwest-Southwest routes at issue in the case, the
Board stated:
‘While we agree that each of these carriers
should be awarded Pacifie Northwest-Southwest
authority, we will establish two non-competitive
routings...
* * *
This noncompetitive two-carrier pattern will in-
sure provision of the needed service and full devel-
opment of the traffic potentjal, but at the same time
it will avoid the risk of so diluting the traffic as to
interfere with the objective of providing on an
economical basis the expedited long-haul services
” See e.g., Mohawk Route 94 Realignment, 46 C.A.B. 111 (1967)
Some of the improvement was accomplished by the elimination of
excess competitive authority. Wyoming-South Dakota-Chicago Serv-
ice, 36 C.A.B. 703, 752-53 (1962); Trans World Airlines, Service
at Reading, 37 C.A.B. 227 (1962); American Airlines. Akron
Service, 37 C.A.B. 606 (1963).
16
which are the primary need shown by this record.”’
(46 C.A.B. at 667-68. )°
The mid-1960’s were again a period of economic
well-being, as the initial break-in period of the jets
came to a close and the carriers began to realize the
benefits of the increased productivity of the new equip-
ment. The Board broke its period of relative in-
activity in the routes area and began setting down a
series of significant domestic route cases which result-
ed in a spate of competitive route awards in the years
1968 through 1970.2 It was in this climate that the
relatively simple Additional Service to San Diego Case,
which is now before the court, was instituted.
By the time the ALJ's decision had been issued in
1969, the tide had already begun to ebb once more. In
1968 the domestic trunklines realized net profits of
—-_—-—_-—_—
‘The Board estimated that Braniff should develop in 1968
123.000 O&D and eonnecting passengers on its route, and that
Continental should obtain 265,000 local and connecting passengers
on its route, (46 C.A.B. at 668.) These markets were potentially as
large or larger than the San Diego-Denver market at issue here.
°The more significant of these cases were: Southern Tier Com-
petitive Nonstop Investigation, C.A.B. Docket 18257, Orders 69-
7-135 (July 24, 1969), 69-9-11 (September 18, 1969); Service to
Albuquerque Case, C.A.B. Docket 18586, Orders 69-7-136 (July 24,
1969), 69-9-10 (September 18, 1969) ; Twin Cities-Milwaukee Long-
Haul Investigation, C.A.B. Docket 19097, Order 70-6-36 (June 4,
1970): Gulf States-Midwest Points Service Investigation, C.A.B.
Dockets 17726 et al., Orders 69-5-25 (May 5, 1969), 69-9-18 (Sep-
tember 3, 1969); Dallas/Ft. Worth-Phoenix Nonstop Service Case,
C.A.B. Docket 18579, Order 69-7-137 (July 24, 1969); Pacific
Northwest-Sodthwest Service Investigation, Reopened, C.A.B. Doek-
ets 15459 et al., Orders 69-4-11 (April 2, 1969), 69-10-163 (October
31, 1969).
4
17
about half the size of their 1967 boom year experience *
and by the end of 1969, after the ALJ’s I.D. in Sep-
tember, the prefit figures had dropped by another 28
percent. In 1970, the year of the Board’s first opinion
and order, the trunkline industry experienced a net loss
of over $100,000,000, the most severe in its history. It
was this change which led the Board to note “the re-
cent lag in nationwide traffic growth’’ (Order 70-4-46
at 4, J.A. 41) as an element which indicated that the
Examiner’s optimism for profitable operations between
San Diego and Denver was unwarranted.
As the Board noted in a later order in this case (Or-
der 74-5-17 at 4-5, J.A. 103, 104) the statement in Order
70-4-46 ‘‘sounded one of [the] earliest notes of caution
with respect to declining traffic growth, the profit pic-
ture within the industry, and the hazards of overeca-
pacity.”’
The discussion above, although somewhat tedious, is
necessary to show that the CAB’s view of its responsi-
bilities with regard to the authorization of competitive
service cannot be determined from separate statements
of policy gleaned from individual cases. It must be
*° The profit information used in this paragraph has been taken
direetly from a publication entitled Air Carrier Financial Statistics
which is prepared by the CAB’s Bureau of Accounts and Statistics.
It listed as one of the items of which the CAB takes official notice
under the provisions of Rule 24(m) of its Rules of Practice (14
C.F.R. § 302.24(m). This publication shows the following net in-
come [losses], after special items, for the domestic trunkline indus-
try in the respective calendar year: 1960; $68,000; 1961, [$34,568.-
000] ; 1962, $8,196,000 ; 1963, $13,117,000 ; 1964, $134,362,000 ; 1965
$221,889,000 ; 1966, $238,636,000; 1967, $244.475,000; 1968, $126,-
521,000; 1969, $90,592,000; 1970, [$100,412,000]; 1971, $48,-
182,000; 1972, $177,154,000; 1973, $142,930,000. igi
18
viewed in the light of the entire history of the Board.
The court below failed to do this.
It was for the very purpose of meeting changing con-
ditions in a rapidly developing airline system that the
Congress gave the CAB a high degree of flexibility and
discretion." Therefore, it is not surprising that the
Board’s view of competition ‘‘to the extent necessary”’
changed from time to time, during the history of the
Act, with the change in economie forces and the suc-
cession of different views which accompanied the de-
parture and arrival of individual Board members.”
We submit that the court below was wrong in its in-
terpretation of the Act to give competition a place of
preeminence among the other policy guidelines.
Moreover, the court’s interpretation, if allowed to
stand, will have a profound effect on the substantive
and procedural aspects of the Board’s activity. Because
of its limited capability to hear all matters submitted
to its attention the Board has always been selective in
setting applications for hearing; setting priorities on
the basis of the general guidelines set forth in section
399.60 of its published Policy Statements [14 C.F.R.
§ 399.60]. Adherence to the theory behind the lower
! Outagmie County v. C.A.B., 355 F.2d 900, 908 (7th Cir. 1966).
1? Judge Prettyman’s insight into the need for flexibility to meet
change as expressed in Pinellas Broadeasting Co. v. F.C.C., 230
F.2d 204, 206 (D.C.Cir. 1956) is particularly applicable here:
‘* it is also true that the Commission’s view of what is best
in the public interest may change from time to time. Commis-
sions themselves change, underlying philosophies differ, and
experience often dictates changes . . . All such matters are for
Congress and the executive and their agencies. They are politi-
cal in the high sense of that abused term. They are not for
the judiciary.’’
eh ee ee eh wa
19
court’s interpretation of the Act in this case could force
the Board to realign its priority system so as to give
preference to cases involving competitive service, even
over cases involving first certificated service, or those
which might reduce federal subsidy payments or in-
crease economy of operations.
Once a competitive route case is set down for hear-
ing, the lower court’s policy interpretation would es-
tablish a presumption favoring competitive service.
This would shift the traditional burden of proof from
the applicant in the case and onto the incumbent. The
whole tenor of the proceeding would change. Instead of,
as now, the applicant being faced with the obligation
of proving that the public convenience and necessity
require competition, and the incumbent having the bur-
den of showing adverse economic impact on its opera-
tions, the incumbent would have to bear the entire bur-
den of overcoming the presumption in favor of eompe-
tition. Presumably, the quality of service provided by
the incumbent would no longer be important. Neither
would the negative impact of the loss of revenues over
the roate at issue on the remainder of the incumbent's
system, since under the court’s interpretation competi-
tion would be mandated ‘‘ when sufficient traffic [in the
relevant market] exists to support competition.”’
These are considerations of great moment which flow
naturally from the lower court’s interpretation of the
Act in this case, and which merit the Supreme Court’s
attention. We respectfully urge the court to grant cer-
tiorari and to provide guidance for the CAB and the
court below in the interests of all concerned with the
area of regulation performed by the Board.
20
2. In Deciding This Case the Lower Court Usurped Functions
Which Congress Assigned the Administrative Agency, and
Its Decision Is in Conflict with Decisions of This Court Defining
the Appropriate Scope of Review.
The scope of review by the lower court is controlled
by section 1006(e) of the Federal Aviation Act [49
U.S.C. § 1486]. The Supreme Court has, in a number
of opinions, specifically defined the scope of review
under these or similar statutes.
The court below chose to test the Board’s decision in
this case on the basis of *‘substantial evidence,’’ rather
than on the adequacy of the findings.
We submit that a careful analysis of the entire opin-
ion reveals that the court chose the ‘‘substantial evi-
denee’’ test because it wanted to control the future
course of the proceeding before the agency and to man-
date a Board decision, without further hearings, favor-
ing the award of competitive nonstop service between
San Diego and Denver, and probably favoring the se-
lection of Continental Air Lines to provide the services.
Thus, the court went well beyond a finding that sub-
stantial evidence does not support the Board’s decision
that competitive service is not required in the market.
It also found that ‘* [t]he record before us contains am-
ple evidence of the need for competing nonstop serv-
ice.”’ (Appendix A, p. 30a). As to selection of carrier
it noted that the issue ‘**. .. has also been fully fleshed
out in the previous hearing,’? (Appendix A, p. 30a)
and that the ALJ had twice selected Continental over
other applicants. Mentioning the advantages of se-
lecting Continental, the court directed the Board to
review the present record and to **.. . render a supple-
mental order either adopting the ALJ’s ishssesbladion
Pe ei ted JOO seen elena ——
21
or setting forth its separate reasons for accepting or
rejecting the ALJ’s selection.’’ (Appendix A, p. 31a).
As to further hearings the court stated:
‘To avoid any unnecessary delay, we note that if
the Board should invoke the procedure of petition-
ing this court to modify its mandate to permit tak-
ing of additional evidence on the pendency of this
appeal, it should set forth with particularity the
matters involved and their relationship to the de-
sireability and feasibility of implementing compe-
tition.’’ (Appendix A, p. 30a)
This statement can only be read as a requirement
that the Board seek court permission before holding
further hearings. It also means that the court is resery-
ing in itself the discretion to deny such permission.
The CAB is one of those administrative agencies es-
tablished by Congress to maintain a regulatory grip on
a dynamic industry.” Therefore, Congress gave it broad
discretionary powers to adapt rules and policies to the
demands of changing circumstances." The flexibility
and adaptability to meet the needs of a volatile and
changing economy is an essential part of the office of a
regulatory agency.” The delegation by Congress of
the authority to act in accordance wit the ‘‘publie in-
terest’? or ‘‘public convenience and necessity’? [49
U.S.C, § 1302] **.. . serves as a supple instrument for
the exercise of « ‘cretion by the expert body which
Congress has charged to carry out its legislative pol-
*® Outagmie County, Wis. v. C.A.B., 355 F.2d at 908.
* Cf. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
** American Trucking Ass'n v. A.T. & S.F.R. Co., 387 U.S. 397,
416 (1967).
22
icy.’’ ** Where a judgment is within an area which Con-
_ gress had determined is best left to the discretion of
an administrative agency, a reviewing court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”
An examination of that lower court’s opinion shows
clearly that the lower court has substituted its judg-
ment for that of the CAB, contrary to applicable de-
cisions of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the court has attempted to dictate the
Board’s decision on remand. This also was in conflict
with applicable decisions of the Supre.ae Court.
The function of a reviewing court ends when an error
of law—in this ease lack of substantial evidence—is laid
bare."* Once a ease is remanded, the agency should have
the flexibility to take such steps as are necessary to
enforce the legislative policy committed to its charge.
“Thus when a reviewing court concludes that an
ageney invested with broad discretion to fashion
remedies has apparently abused that discretion by
omitting a remedy justified in the court’s view by
the factual circumstances, remand to the agency for
reconsideration, and not enlargement of the agen-
ev's order, is ordinarily the reviewing court’s
99 19
proper course.
The reviewing court may not mandate the way in
which an agency performs the legislative function it
6 F.C.C. vy. Pottsville Broadeasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
7S. E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S, 194, 209 (1947) ; Burlington
Truck Lines v. U.S., 371 U.S. 156, 169 (1962).
SF .P.C. vy. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952); F.C.C. v.
Pottsville Broadeasting Co., supra note 16; F.T.C. v. Morton Sait
Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); N.L.R.B. v. Food Store Employees, 417
U.S. 1 (1974).
19 N.L.R.B. v. Food Store Employees, supra, 417 U.S. at 10.
;
:
|
:
:
23 “
has been delegated by Congress.” This holds true even
though delay and hardship may result from the agen-
ey’s procedures.”
sé
... courts are not charged with general guardian-
ship against all potential mischief in the eomplicat-
ed tasks of government. The present case makes
timely the reminder that ‘legislatures are ulti-
mate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people in quite as great degree as the courts’ [cite
omitted]. Congress which creates and sustains
_ these agencies must be trusted to correct whatever
- defects experience may reveal. Interference by the
courts is not conducive to the development of hab-
its of responsibility in administrative agencies.”’
We submit that the action of the lower court here,
however well intentioned, is clearly in conflict with the
Pottsville case and related cases decided by the Su-
preme Court.
While it may be argued that the lower court did not
issue a mandamus as in Pottsville or that it did not ae-
tually modify an agency decision as in Chenery® or
Food Store Employees,* it is apparent that court in-
tends its decision to have that effect, and we must as-
sume that the lower court will take further steps to
impose its will on the agency. At the very least, the
reservation in the court of power to approve or disap-
prove further hearings brings powerful pressures on
the Board to comply with the Court’s wishes.
20 F.C.C. v. Pottsville, su: ra, 309 U.S. at 145.
*1 Td. at 146.
22 Td.
*3S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., supra.
** N.L.R.B. v. Food Store Employees, supra.
24
It seems clear from the opinion that the court would
not permit further hearings on the question of need for
competitive service. We may also assume that the court
would not allow further hearings on selection of car-
rier until the Board complies with the direction to
review the present record and ‘*. .. render a supple-
mental order either adopting the ALJ ’s determination
fon selection of Continental] or setting forth its sep-
arate reasons for accepting or rejecting the ALJ’s se-
lection.’” (Appendix A, p. 31a)
The court’s constraints on additional hearings is par-
ticularly inappropriate in view of the very significant
changes in circumstances which have occurred since
the vear ended June 30, 1971, the base year for traffic
foreeasting in this case, and even since May of 1974
when the most recent Board order in this ease was
issued. While the air transportation industry recovered
briefly from the almost disastrous position it was in in
1970 and 1971, recent results indicate another serious
economie downturn, principally because of rapidly es-
ealating costs. Total operating expenses for the domes-
tic trunkline systems increased by about 42 percent be-
tween calendar vear 1971 and the end of calendar year
1974.*° The inflationary spiral has caused all of the ear-
riers to seek approval from the Board of fare increases
during 1975.”
Cireumstances involved in Continental’s service have
also changed. Footnote 12 of the court’s opinion (Ap-
°° Taken from C.A.B. published Air Carricr Financial Statistics.
These materials are officially noticeable under C.A.B. regulations.
14 C.F.R. § 302.24(m).
*6 The cost inereases are largely attributable to the secondary
effect of actions by the foreign oil cartel which first created the fuel
shortages mentioned by the Board in Order 74-5-17 (J.A. 100, 112).
eS en OP
te oe
25
pendix A, p. 5a) noted several factors cited by the
ALJ as favoring his selection of Continental. The
low fare economy service which the ALJ found attrae-
tive has since been found to be illegal by the Board.
Moreover, Continental no longer offers 3-2 seating in
its economy and coach sections, but has reverted to the
‘less comfortable’’ 3-3 seating.
The court noted Western’s ‘‘brightened”’ financial
situation in May of 1974, accepting a statement in Con-
tinental’s brief that Western’s rate of return for the
preceding year had exceeded ‘‘the 12% level found
‘reasonable’ by the Board in its Domestic Passenger
Fare Investigation.”’ (Appendix A, p. 25a) Western’s
company records for the year ended September 30,
1975 indicate that the carrier’s rate of return has
slipped significantly below the ‘‘reasonable”’ level to
8.9%.
Company records also indicate that traffic in the San
Diego-Denver market for the year ended September
30, 1975 has remained static as compared with the pre-
ceeding year, and that load factors in the market have
declined slightly.
These, of course, are all facts which are relevant to
the present need for competitive service between Den-
ver and San Diego and the issue of selection of ear-
rier; but which are not now in the record.
There was also much controversy in the Board pro-
ceeding about the quality of service in the San Diego-
Denver market as measured by Western’s load factors;
Continental and the ALJ claiming that they were much
too high (J.A. 17-21), and the Board explaining why
26
they were reasonable (J.A. 87-89). All of this discus-
sion is now superfluous because the Board has recently
instituted a rulemaking proceeding for the express
purpose of evaluating a new policy with regard to load
factors in the light of today’s economic climate (Ad-
vance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking PSDR-43, 40
F.R. 37048, August 25, 1975). Although the proceeding
is directed primarily to establishing load factor stand-
ards for ratemaking purposes, there is no doubt that
the result will have a carry-over impact on route pro-
ceedings.
Finally, there have been significant changes in the
Board itself since the last order was issued in this case.
The ALJ has retired. Only two of the Board meni-
bers who participated in the decisions under review re-
main on the Board—one from the majority and one
from the minority. This means that, in order to get a
quorum necessary to carry out; the court ’s mandate to
decide the case on the basis of the existing record, one
er more Board members would be required to qualify
himself by reading an extensive record which is now
over five vears old. Even after reviewing the record,
the new members would apparently not have the pre-
rogatives normally available to them in a case of first
impression. They would be constrained to vote in ac-
cordance with the directions of the court’s mandate.
3. The Court Below Has So Far Departed from the Accepted and
Usual Course of Judicial Proceedings as To Require Super-
vision and Guidance by the Supreme Court.
The lower court’s decision in this case is the most
recent product of several years of ‘judicial activism
by the D.C. Cireuit toward actions of administrative
agencies. This ‘‘activism”’ is well known, and has drawn
27
the attention of several legal scholars.” Some of the
comment is favorable,* and other is adverse; ** but it
cannot be denied that the court’s position has been rec-
ognized as an important phenomenon.
The activist stance is relatively recent and represents
a radical change in the D.C. Circuit’s prior view as to
its relationship with the administrative agencies.
The court’s former view was in line with the Su-
preme Court’s decisions in Pottsville and Chenery to
the effect that the courts must not assume what is essen-
tially a function of the administrative agency. This
view is exemplified by the following quote from J udge
Prettyman’s opinion in Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v.
F.C.C., 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1956) :
‘The controversy is in an area into which the
courts are seldom justified in intruding. The selee-
tion of an awardee from among several qualified
applicants is basically a matter of judgment, often
difficult and delicate, entrusted by the Congress to
the administrative agency. The decisive factors in
comparable selections may well vary; sometimes
one applicant is superior to another in one respect,
whereas in another case one applicant may be su-
perior to its rivals in another feature. And it is
also true that the Commission’s view of what is
best in the public interest may change from time
to time. Commissions themselves change, under-
lying philosophies differ, and experience often dic-
** See e.g., Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Ac-
tion—Remarks Before the D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference, 34
Fed.Bar 54 (1974).
*8 Paper, Judicial Scrutiny of the F.C.C.: The Illusion of Usurpa-
tion, 52 Bos.U.L.Rev. 659 1972).
*° Gardner and Greenberger, Judicial Revicw of Administrative
Action and Responsible Government, 63 Geo.L.J. 7 (1974).
28
tates changes. Two diametrically opposite schools
of thought in respect to the public welfare may
both be rational; e.g., both free trade and protec-
tive tariff are rational positions. All such matters
are for the Congress and the executive and their
agencies. They are political, in the high sense of
that abused term. They are not for the judiciary.”
This should be compared with the court’s more recent
position as expressed by Judge Leventhal in /nterna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648
(D.C.Cir. 1973) :
‘Tt is with even more diffidence that a court con-
cludes that the law, as judicially construed, re-
quires a different approach from that taken by an
official or ageney with technical expertise. Yet this
is an inescapable aspect of the judicial condition,
though we stay mindful of the overreaching con-
sideration that a court’s role on judicial review
embraces that of a constructive cooperation with
the ageney involved in furtherance of the public
interest.’’
The Prettyman court would not have tried to direct
the course of CAB proceedings on remand in a case of
this nature, or to interfere with the Board’s powers to
select a carrier in a route proceeding.” The Leventhal
court in the instant case has found that the substantial
evidence requires competitive service in a specifie mar-
ket: has indieated a strong preference for a particular
airline to provide the competitive service; and has di-
rected the Board to review the existing record and
render a supplemental order either adopting the ALJ’s
4
3° See: State Airlines v. C.A.B., 17
4
1949), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 57
(1950).
F.2d 510, 518 (D.C.Cir.
9
wee ee a ee
AO CR AE tay Nel
?
29
decision that the preferred carrier be selected, or set-
ting forth reasons why not.
The new “activism” is founded on the concept
adopted by Judge Leventhal for the first time in Niag-
ara Mohawk Power Corp. v. F.P.C." Judge Leventhal
expanded on the principle in Greater Boston Television
v. F.C.C.," which has since become the basis for the
development of a substantial body of case law, all in
the District of Columbia Circuit. Although some res-
ervations have been expressed by Judges of the Court
about the propriety and feasibility of the expanded
scope of review,” it is firmly embedded in the ease law
of the Cireuit, and will remain so until review by the
Supreme Court.
Under the D.C. Cireuit’s “‘partnership’’ theory the
court on review is entitled to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency, and that is exactly what has
been done here.
So far as we know, the Supreme Court has not con-
sidered the new activism or the ‘‘partnership”’ theory.
Moreover, we have been unable to uncover any deci-
sions in other circuits which have adopted the “ part-
** 379 F.2d 153, 160 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert.den. 393 U.S. 1085.
444 F.2d 841 (D.C.Cir. 1970), cert.den. 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
* E.g., Alabama Power Co. v. F.P.C., 450 F.2d 716 (D.C. Cir
1971); City of Lafayette, La. v. SE.C. 454 F2d 941 (DC Cir.
1971) ; Natural Resources Defense Co ucil v. Morton. 458 F.2d
827 (D.C.Cir, 1972). See also the dissent of Judze Leventhal in
Sindicato Puertoriqneno de Trabajadores v. Hodgson. 448 F.2d
1161 (D.C.Cir. 1971), cert.den. 404 U.S. 1025, where he arcues for
a more flexible scope of review than adopted by the majority.
** See: Judge Robb’s dissent in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C.Cir. 1971). and statement of
Judge MeGowan in Union of Concerned Scientists v. A.E.C.. 499
F.2d 1069, 1094 (D.C.Cir. 1974). 5
30
nership” theory. In fact, the prevailing law in other
circuits is consistently the view that a court shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”
Since the D.C. Cireuit reviews many more adminis-
trative cases than other circuits, its partnership theory
is bound to be picked up elsewhere as substantive law.
Therefore, the ideal time for review and guidance by
the Supreme Court is now, while the concept resides
wholly in the District of Columbia.
The question is undoubtedly an important one. It is
important from the standpoint of the parties Whose
rights are determined by administrative action. It is
important in terms of the quality of the work per-
formed by the administrative agencies.” But it is also
extremely important in the context of today’s over-
crowded eourt dockets. As Judge MeGowan stated in
Union of Concerned Scientists v. A-E.C., 499 F.2d 1069,
1094 (D.C.Cir. 1974) :
‘it is patent from the foregoing that despite the
procedural nature of the issues raised, we have had
to deal with subject matter ranging far beyond the
* E.g., Colonial Stores, Inc. v. F.T.C., 450 F.2d 733 (5th Cir.
471) ; Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir.
1972); Why? Ass’n v. Burns, 372 F.Supp. 223 (Conn. 1974).
% See Pottsville, 309 U.S. at 146, where the Court said: ‘‘Inter-
ference by the courts is not conducive to the development of habits
of responsibility in administrative agencies.”
oo a
Ve Od We NOL Redes) x Lata prt aid tant
cs
-
.
>
*
A
”
31
normal ken of judges. This case is only one among
many such these days, and thus, suggests the ex-
traordinary tasks that the seemingly endless stat-
utory proliferation of judicial review of agency
action is imposing on the federal courts. How
meaningful judicial review on this scale can be
over any sustained period of time, at least if not
invariably invoked with an acute sense of respon-
sibility and a willingness to recognize that many
of these more esoteric battles must largely be won
or lost at the agency level, is problematic. (empha-
sis supplied )
One commentator points out that, in 1973, the D.C.
Circuit remanded for further proceedings 61 percent
of the administrative cases it reviewed.” It is obvious
that court burden and delay will increase as the court
injects itself more and more into its ‘“‘partnership”’
with the agencies.
The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to exercise
its power of supervision. All of the meaningful deei-
sions on scope of review were issued in the late 1940°s
and early 1950’s shortly after adoption of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. None of them anticipated the
‘broad judicial activism’’ now being practiced in the
D.C. Circuit. The lower court, as well as the courts of
other circuits, needs fresh guidance.
** Gardner and Greenberger, supra note 16, at 37.
32
CONCLUSION
For the reasons aforesaid, petitioner respectfully
requests that this honorable court grant this Petition ,
for Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
“.
Emory N. ELLIs, Jr.
FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI
1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
- {7ERALD P. O’GrRapdy
P.O. Box 92005
World Way Postal Center
Los Angeles, Calif. 90009
APPENDIX
Counsel for Petitioner
Western Air Lines
Pe ae as wag Sam AE Ci BR Lack! |
la
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
No. 74-1651
ConTINENTAL Arr Lives, Inc.
v.
Crvm AERONAUTICS BoarpD
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No 74-1651
ConTINENTAL Arr Lives, Inc., Petitioner,
Vv
Civm ArEronattics Boarp, Respondent,
Western Air Lines, Inc., Hughes Air Corporation, db a
Hughes Airwest United Air Lines, Inc., Trans World
Air Lines, Ine., of Kansas City, Missouri and Chamber
of Commerce of Greater Kansas City, City and County
of Denver, Colorado, Public Utilities Commission of the
State of Colorado, San Diego Unified Port District,
the City of San Diego, San Diego Chamber of Com-
merece, Intervenors.
Argued April 11, 1975
Decided Sept. 22, 1975
2a
Before Wricut and Leventuat, Circuit Judges, and vie
cEL,* United States District Judge for the Northern Dis-
trict of California.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Leventhal
Leventuat, Cireuit Judge:
Continental Air Lines, Ine. petitions for review of two
orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) —— =
the Board’s Additional Service to San Diego pee :
Challenged orders—Order 72-12-29, December 8, 1972, “
Order 745-17, May 3, 1974—rejected the recommenda-
tions of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that —
petitive nonstop authority be certificated between —e
Diego and Denver.’ The ALJ had selected Continental to
provide the competitive service.
Petitioner contends that the Board ’s order should be set
aside on the ground that the CAB ‘failed to give adequate
weight to the statutory mandate favoring remaprng’
and ‘failed to engage in reasoned decision-making. -
Board responds that its orders were adequately supporte
by the need for caution at a time when the yess J W
“plagued by retrenchment and lagging traffic growth’’ an
i iminis »] supplies.’’ *
by the ‘‘erucial problem of diminished fuel sup}
We find that, as a general matter, § 102 of the Federal
Aviation Act requires the Board to foster competition as
a means of enhancing the development and oe
of air transportation service on routes generating suffi-
cient traffic to support competing carriers.‘ We are cogni-
* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(d). ,
1 The challenged orders are set forth at JA 83-98 and JA 100-24,
respectively.
2 Brief for Petitioner at 18, 31. ,
* Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at 2, 13, JA 101, 112.
* Sec text accompanying notes 44-61 infra. .
Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970),
3a
zant that in some circumstances the other considerations
set forth in § 102 may conflict with and predominate over
the public interest in competition.’ The Board urges in
effect that here the need to foster sound economic condi-
tions in view of the industry’s financial posture and the
fuel situation overrides the benefits of competition. After
a careful examination of the record, we conclude that the
Board’s position is not supported by substantial evidence
states:
§ 1302. Consideration of matters in public interest by Board.
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under
this chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other
things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the
publie convenience and necessity :
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transporta-
tion system properly adapted to the present and future needs of
the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the
Postal Service, and of the national defense ;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the
highest degree of safety and foster sound economic conditions
in, such transportation, and to improve the relations between,
and coordinate transportation by, air carriers:
(e) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust diserimina-
tions, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States. of the Postal Service, and of the national defense ;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce: and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics, (Pub.L. 85-726, Title I, § 102. Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat.”
740.)
° See United States v. CAB, —~ U.S.App.D.C. ; , 511
F.2d 1315, 1322 (1975) (‘‘the statute would appear to contemplate
that the factor of competition could be outweighed by one or more
of the other factors’’).
4a
and that its rejection of competitive nonstop service in a
San Diego Denver market is not in aceord with the age
interest considerations set forth in § 102 of the Act. Ac-
cordingly, we remand the ease for further proceedings con-
sistent with Part IV of this opinion.
I. Background
We begin with a summary of the seven years of rn
ministrative proceedings culminating in the orders under
review.
The challenge orders are the last of a series of ns
ings entered in the Additional Service to San a _*
That proceeding arose out of an application ec bY
United Air Lines on January 12, 1967, requesting permis-
sion to provide nonstop service in several San vitae
markets.” On May 26, 1967, the CAB issued a show cause
order which rejected United’s San Diego-Denver nonstop
request, but proposed to give United nonstop -pnagroon
for the San Diego-New York and San Diego-C icago
routes.’ In response to the City of Denver s petition for
reconsideration, the Board sua sponte issued a second val
der to show eause why Western Air Lines, the primary
San Diego-Denver carrier, should not be permitted to pro-
vide nonstop service in that market." The Board he
posals prompted numerous objections and competitive -
ings from other airlines. By order of April 3, 1968, the
CAB instituted the Additional Service to San Diego Case,
setting a consolidated hearing on applications for nonstop
© See Initial Decision of Hyman Goldberg, Hearing Examiner,
September 4, 1969, at 2, JA 373.
‘Order to Show Cause, Order No. E-25202, May 26, 1967, at 4,
JA 24.
“Order to Show Cause, Order No, E-25727, September 22, 1967,
atl &n.1,.JA27&n.1.
5a
authority between San Diego and New York/Newark,
Washington/Baltimore, Chicago and Denver.’
Following the submission of briefs by numerous ear-
riers and local groups and three days of hearings, the ALJ
issued his initial decision on September 4, 1969. The ALJ
recommended that competitive nonstop authority be au-
thorized in all four markets under consideration. With
regard to the San Diego-Denver market, he adopted the
Bureau of Operating Rights’ forecast that there would
be ‘‘not less than 100,335 passengers in 1970.’ Based on
this ‘‘conservative’’ estimate he found ‘‘ample traffie to
support two carriers on an economic basis without recard
to the support of through traffie flowin z over the route.’’*
The ALJ selected Western and Continental to provide the
competing nonstop service. Western was a ‘*logie choice”’
because it carried the great bulk of the San Diego-Denver
passengers on its one stop flights routed via Phoenix.”
Continental was chosen ahead of United, TWA and Air
West as the second carrier because of United’s past ‘‘ree-
ord of neglect and indifference’? toward the market and
because of Continental’s superior proposed pattern of
service; attractive fare schedules: substantial beyond mar-
ket benefits; and history as ‘‘an extremely vigorous, ag-
gressive, and efficient carrier.’’ ”
* Order No. E-26608, April 3, 1968, at 4. JA 33.
*° Sce Initial Decision, supra note 6, at 64 & n. 115, JA 435 & n.
115. The ALJ deemed the Bureau’s forecast conservative because
its base year traffie figures did not include ‘on-line connecting
passengers’’ and its stimulation factor—growth attributed to new,
improved service—did not take account of Continental's attractive
fare proposals.
** See id. at 65, JA 436.
*? See id. at 66-76, JA 437-47.
Continental proposed three “‘eonveniently timed’’ round trips a
day and offered ‘‘not only first-class and coach service. at substan-
tial reductions in fares, but also .. . the economy service for which
the carrier is well-known, at considerably reduced fare levels.’ In
6a
The CAB execised its right of discretionary review of
the ALJ initial decision, issuing its opinion on April 9,
1970. The Board adopted the ALJ’s findings regarding
the need for competitive nonstop service in the Chicago,
New York/Newark, and Washington/Baltimore markets
but decided, by a vote of 3-2, to certificate only one non-
stop carrier, Western, in the San Diego-Denver market.
This departure from the ALJ’s determination rested pri-
marily on the majority’s view that ‘‘the examiner s fore-
cast may be too optimistic’? given ‘‘the recent lag in na-
tionwide traffic growth.’’™* Although the CAB noted that
a competitive authorization would provide a spur to bet-
ter service and significant benefits to beyond segment
markets, it concluded that Western’s possible ‘sizable
operating loss if competitive service is instituted’’ in con-
junction with the adequacy of Western’s proposed service
to meet the needs of the market rendered a denial of a
competing nonstop carrier certification ‘more consistent
with the goal of fostering sound economic conditions in
air transportation. .. .’?** The dissenting Board members
contrast to TWA, it offered 3-2 seating in coach | and economy
sections instead of less comfortable 3-3 seating. Continental s selee-
tion would also provide a substantial number of passengers in four
bevond markets either first single-plane or first single-carrier service
—a factor of prime importance. The ALJ considered Continental s
efficiency and agressiveness important in view of W estern s long-
entrenched” position in the market. Finally, in addition to service,
scheduling, and beyond market advantages over TWA, Continental
was given a plus as a far smaller carrier to which the award would
‘‘be more important’’ than to TWA. Air West was passed over
because its shaky financial position made it doubtful that it could
offer Western ‘‘effective, dynamie competition.”’
13 See 14 CFR §§ 385.50-.54 (1975) (delineating the discretionary
review procedure).
4 Opinion 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, at 2, JA 39, 41.
15 Jd. at 4 & n. 6, JA 41 & n. 6. The Board also noted that the
examiner had relied in part on Western receiving new revenue from
7a
emphasized that the projection of 100,335 passengers (275
per day) in 1970 was ‘‘a very conservative estimate”’
which did not include either ‘‘true San Diego passengers
(because they traveled from Los Angeles to San Diego by
surface transportation or intrastate airlines) or ‘‘the sub-
stantial number of passengers carried between these
points who will move beyond Denver to points on the
routes of both Western and Continental.’’ * In addition,
the dissent noted that within the past year the Board had
made grants of competitive nonstop service in a number
of substantially smaller markets.”
A number of parties, including Continental sought re-
consideration of the Board’s determination. Petitioner
claimed that the majority lacked substantial evidence to
support its determination that the traffic forecast of the
ALJ and the Bureau of Operating Rights was too optimis-
tic. It noted that the lag in national traffic had not affected
San Diego-New York/Newark and San Diego- Washington /Balti-
more awards which the Board decided to grant to United. Id. at
Bt
** Coneurring and Dissenting Opinion of Members Murphy and
Minetti in Opinion 70-4-46, at 1, JA 49.
“Td. at 1-2 & n. 1, JA 49-50 & n. 1. A partial list of such
awards showing O & D plus interline connecting traffic projected
for the forecast year included:
Houston-Seattle /Portland 150
Denver-San Antonio 194
Denver-Portland 220
Salt Lake City-Seattle 222
Salt Lake City-Portland 138
Houston-St. Louis 272
San Antonio-Washington 176-224
New Orleans-Tampa (3 carriers) 206
Houston-Miami 280
Dallas-Tampa 158
Albuquerque-Las Vegas 206
Albuquerque-San Francisco 190-330
Memphis-New Orleans 246
8a
the market at issue—the San Diego-Denver market had
grown 34% between 1967 and 1968 and both San Diego
and Denver experienced an increase in total traffic well
in excess of the national average. Continental reinforced
its argument by pointing out that the traffie estimates of
three other carriers paralleled or exceeded the ALJ’s fore-
east and the ALJ’s figure was significantly understated
because of the factors noted by the dissenting members.”
The CAB, by order of June 5, 1970, deferred action on
the petitions to reconsider certification of a second non-
stop carrier between San Diego and Denver. In its Sup-
plemental Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of Mareh
93, 1971, the Board, by an identical 3-2 vote, reaffirmed
its previous denial of competitive service. The majority
conceded that the San Diego-Denver market ‘‘maintained
a healthy growth rate in calendar year 1968,’’ but argued
that 1969 traffic data demonstrated that ‘‘the market is by
no means an exception to the nationwide slowdown.”’ * Us-
ing more recent traffic figures and a 1971 forecast year,
the majority ecaleulated that ‘‘Continental certification
would produce an operating loss of about $84,000 for
Western in 1971... .’’ The Board concluded that harm to
Western ‘‘at a difficult period for the industry as a whole
and Western in particular’’ outweighed the ‘‘significant
1* Petition of Continental Air Lines, Ine., for Reeonsideration of
Order 70-4-46, May 4, 1970, at 2, 5-6, JA 211, 214-15.
Party Annual Daily
Air West 98,870 271
Continental 101,222 277
TWA 117,240 320
Western 94.216 258
Bureau 100,335 275
Since Western's forecast assumed monopoly service, it would have
to be increased to obtain an estimate for the size of a competitive
market.
*° Order 71-3-135, March 23, 1971, at 2, JA 68.
9a
factors’’ favoring certification such as substantial beyond
segment benefits and profitable operation for Continental.”
The dissenters claimed that ‘‘[t]here can be no serious
question . . . that this market is large enough to support
competition,’’ emphasizing that the majority projection
for 1971 yielded a larger traffic volume than the ALJ had
found sufficient to support competition using a 1970 target
year.** They found that the possibility of a temporary
loss by Western in 1971 was overshadowed by public bene-
fits from improved service which Continental's competi-
tive flights would provide in the San Diego-Denver mar-
ket and in other related markets.”
Shortly after issuance of its supplemental opinion, the
Board discovered that its financial caleulations had errone-
ously rested on fiscal rather than calendar 1971 traffie esti-
mates and consequently had underforecast 1971 traffie vol-
ume. Corrected estimates revealed that, in competition
with Continental, Western’s 1971 profits would range from
slightly below to somewhat above the break-even level. The
CAB stated: ‘‘These revised figures render extremely
close the balance of decisional criteria—harm to Western
under existing economic conditions weighed against public
benefit factors favoring competition and improved be-
yond service—in determining whether such competition
should be authorized.’’ Under these circumstances, the
Board, by order of April 16, 1971, remanded the competi-
20 Td. at 4-5, JA 70-71,
*t Dissenting Opinion of Members Murphy and Minetti in Order
71-3-135, at 1, JA 72. The majority forecasted 103,124 passengers
in 1971 as compared with the ALJ's 1970 forecast of 100.335. See
Order 71-3-135, March 23, 1971, Appendix A, at 2, JA 78.
*? Dissenting Opinion, supra note 21, at 4, JA 75. The dissenters
also challenged the majority’s loss projection on the basis of its
underestimation of passengers by ignoring surface and intrastate
Los Angeles-San Diego traffic and using atypical 1969 growth rate
figures and its overestimation of costs.
10a
tion question to the ALJ for an analysis of ‘‘the most
recent traffic and cost data and Western’s actual experi-
ence with nonstop service in the market.’’ *
The remand proceeding culminated in a 92-page Sup-
plemental Initial Decision issued on March 20, 1972. The
decision found a second nonstop earrier warranted by the
size of the market in the 1972 and 1973 forecast years, the
serious deficiencies and omissions in Western’s service,
and Western’s ability ‘‘to achieve a substantial operating
profit’? in each of the forecast years in competition with
another nonstop earrier.** The ALJ accepted as reason-
able the Bureau of Operating Right’s traffic estimate of
118,520 passengers in 1972 and 127,409 in 1973 and its
related projection of an operating profit for Western of
$417,000 in 1972 and $325,000 in 1973.*° The supplemental
decision faulted Western’s San Diego-Denver service for
scheduling inadequacies and high load factors.” The ALJ
selected Continental to compete with Western for sub-
stantially the same reasons contained in his initial deci-
sion.”
The Board, 3-2, again reversed the ALJ and declined
to authorize competitive nonstop service. The majority
2° Order of Remand, Order 71-4-112, April 16, 1971, at 1. JA 79.
2* Supplemental Initial Decision of Hyman Goldberg, Hearing
Examiner, March 20, 1972, at 55, JA 585.
2 Jd. at 56, 75, JA 586, 605.
.
2° See id. at 59-65, JA 589-95. Among the ‘‘many serious inade-
quacies’’ were findings that the carrier did not provide prime time
departures in both directions, that there were significant service
gans, that Western served the market only as part of long-haul
flights, and that load factors indicated ‘‘unresponsive scheduling
on Western's part.’’ Although Western had proposed to provide
three nonstop round trips, it had never flown more than two daily
nonstop round trips.
27 See id. at 77, JA 607-17; note 12 supra.
lla
members expressed concern that, ‘“‘during a period of
lagging traffic growth and retrenchment within the in-
dustry, and during the subsequent period of recovery be-
fore an adequate upward trend has been assured,’’ the
agency ‘‘must be more than usually careful to avoid im-
peding the industry’s opportunities for full recovery.’ *
It concluded that certification of competition would be
imprudent since Western’s service had been ‘‘reasonably
responsive to the needs of the market’’ and since compet-
itive service was ‘‘likely to produce, at best, only mar-
ginal financial results.’’ ** The Board found the ALJ’s and
the Bureau’s traffic forecast ‘‘too optimistic’’ and set forth
a number of adjustments in their growth and stimulation
percentages which reduced the 1973 traffic estimates by
29,000 passengers. Although the Board made no profit
or loss calculations of its own, it concluded that ‘‘the pros-
pect for profitable two-carrier operation is tenuous at this
time.’’ **
Continental’s detailed petition for reconsideration took
issue inter alia with the Board’s adjustments to the ALJ’s
traffic forecast. In particular, it questioned the majority
members’ reliance on experience during recession years
to support its forecast of a 3 percent growth rate for
1972 and 1973, in view of the Board’s earlier finding that
the recession was a ‘‘temporary phenomenon.”’’* As proof
of the Board’s error, Continental noted that, as a result
of substantial growth, Western’s traffic figures revealed
that the market was significantly larger at the end of
*8 Opinion 72-12-29, December 8, 1972, at 2, JA 85.
*° See id. at 3, JA 86.
°° See id. at 8-10, JA 91-93.
* Td. at 8, JA 91.
*? Petition of Continental Air Lines, Ine. for Reconsideration of
Order 72-12-29, January 29, 1973, at 20, JA 313, quoting Domestic
Passenger Fare Investigation, Order 71-4-54, at 28.
l2a
1972 than the Board had predicted it would be a year
later.”
On May 3, 1974, fifteen months after the opinion fol-
lowing the remand, the Board issued an Opinion and Or-
der on Reconsideration reaffirming, by a 2-1 vote, its
denial of a competitive nonstop certification. This final
opinion in these extended proceedings reiterates the
Board's **poliey of caution’? and expresses its ‘resolve
to avoid making unnecessary awards of competitive au-
thority on routes which are adequately served.** Noting
recent traffic growth data, the Board conceded ‘‘that the
prospects for profitable competitive operations are far
stronger than earlier believed’’ and that *‘competitive serv-
ice would be more profitable than originally anticipated—
although not as profitable as Continental ciaims.’’ ** How-
ever, without further explication, it stated that ‘‘the
Board's original decision did not turn on profitability
alone... .’’°* Despite the improved financial outlook for
competition and the benefits it offered, the Board deter-
mined that, given the general state of the industry and
the recent onset of the fuel shortage, ‘‘a competitive au-
thorization is unnecessary and undesirable at this time.’’ *
The dissenting member emphasized that traffie data in-
dicated that the ALJ's 1973 foreeasts ‘‘were on sound
ground, indeed if anything conservative’? and that there
would likely be ‘‘well over 150,000 annual passengers”’
for fiseal 1975, the earliest possible first year of compet-
itive operations."* He commented: ‘Overall, it is hard to
Petition, supra note 32. at 20, JA 313.
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, Order 74-5-17, May 3,
1974, at 2, JA 101.
‘Td. at 3,13, JA 102, 112.
* Td. at 3, JA 102.
* Jd. at 8, JA 107.
%* Dissent of Member Minetti in Order 74-5-17, at 2, JA 121.
13a
avoid the impression that the majority is not really in-
terested in whether competitive service would be profit-
able, and has effectively eliminated this as a decisional
factor.’’** Nor did he find any warrant for a denial of
competitive service in the fuel situation. In view of West-
ern’s scheduled four and a half nonstop roundtrips, the
dissent noted that ‘‘competitive service in this market is
possible today without materially increasing overall jet
fuel consumption or reducing service in other, perhaps
more essential markets.’’ ”
On June 25, 1974, Continental filed a petition for re-
view of the Board’s 1972 order and its 1974 order on re-
consideration."
II. Competition and the Public Interest Standard of the
Federal Aviation Act
Continental urges that the challenged orders must be
set aside in part because the Board failed to give ade-
quate weight to the governing statute’s mandate favoring
competition.” Petitioner’s contention rests both on an as-
°% Jd. at 3n.4, JA 122 n. 4.
*° Td. at 4-5, JA 123-24.
* The following carriers and local representatives intervened in
the action: Western Air Lines, Ine., Hughes Air Corp. d/b/a
Hughes Air West, United Air Lines, Inc., Trans World Airlines.
Ine., City of Kansas City, Missouri and Chamber of Commerce of
Greater Kansas City, City and County of Denver, Colorado, Public
Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, San Diego Unified
Port District, The City of San Diego, and the San Diego Chamber
of Commerce. Western filed a brief in support of the CAB and the
local interests filed briefs urging competitive service. The court
granted leave to the Department of Justice to file an amicus brief.
Amicus supported petitioner’s challenge to the CAB’s order.
*? Brief for Petitioner at 18-31. Petitioner also argued that the
Board’s orders must be set aside for failure to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking. 7d. at 3-48. We believe that this case is most
naturally treated as presenting a question of the existence of sub-
lta
sessment of the general importance of competition in the
statutory scheme and an analysis of the Board’s treatment
of the record in view of that scheme. As shall be seen,
these two aspects of petitioner’s argument implicate dis-
tinct questions of statutory interpretation and substan-
tial evidence. We turn first to an examination of the role
of competition, in order to develop a framework for eval-
uating the record to determine whether the Board’s deci-
sion is supported by substantial evidence and evinces a
‘*fidelity to the functions assigned to the regulatory agen-
ey by the Congress.’’ *
‘*‘Competition to the extent necessary’’ is one of the six
public interest factors set forth in § 102 of the Federal
Aviation Act to guide the CAB ‘‘[i]n the exercise and
performance of its powers and duties.’’** The parties
present divergent interpretations of {102 and its com-
petition subsection, § 102(d). Continental contends that the
Act creates ‘‘a ‘strong presumption’ in favor of compe-
tition.’ * The CAB’s brief argues that the statute ‘‘con-
templates that competition may or may not be ‘neces-
sary’ ’’ and that competition is not per se favored ‘‘where
it endangers other policy goals in the public interest, such
as the achievement of efficient, econon ical service or the
fostering of sound economy of operations.’’“” Intervenor
Western opines that in view of the origin of the Act ‘‘it
is apparent Congress contemplated that as to Section
stantial evidenee to support the CAB’s rejection of the statutory
interest in the promotion of competition.
*8 Nee Public Service Comm'n, State of N.Y. v. FPC (Teras Gulf
Coast Area Rate Cases), 159 U.S.App.D.C, 172, 208-09, 487 F.2d
1043, 1679-80 (1973), vacated and remanded sub nom, Shell Oil
Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 417 U.S. 964, 94 S.Ct. 3166, 41
L.Ed.2d 1136 (1974).
** Section 102 is set forth at note 4 supra.
* Reply Brief for Petitioner at —
* Brief for Respondent at 20, 22.
ee ee eee
loa
102(d) the emphasis would be, not on the word ‘compe-
tition,’ but on the remainder of the phrase: to the extent
necessary to assure the sound development of an air trans-
portation system properly adapted to the needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of
the Postal Service, and of the national defense.’’* An
examination of the origins of the statute and of its ‘‘con-
temporaneous construction’’ by persons ‘‘charged with
the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion’’*
clarifies the intended meaning of §102(d) and the rela-
tionship between competition and the other public interest
factors.
Congress first established a comprehensive system for
regulation of air transportation through the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1958. The legislative history of that act
makes clear that the statute was designed to correct the
abuses of unrestrained competition among carriers. The
Senate Report on the proposed legislation warned that
‘*(ejompetition among air carriers is being carried to an
extreme, which tends to jeopardize and render unsafe”’
air transportation and urged the ‘‘immediate enactment”’
of the bill to ‘‘promote an orderly development of our
Nation’s civil aeronauties’’ and to ‘‘prevent the spread of
bad practices and of destructive and wasteful tacties re-
sulting from the intense competition now existing within
the air-carrier industry.’’ *° In floor debates, Congressman
Randolph cited ‘‘rate war, cutthroat devices, and destruce-
** Brief for Intervenor Western Air Lines at 30.
** Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of
Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408, 81 S.Ct. 1529, 1535. 6
L.Ed.2d 924 (1961), queting Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796
(1933).
#9 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
°° S.Rep.No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938) ; see H.R.Rep.No.
911, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1937).
16a
tive and wasteful practices’’ as evidence that ‘‘[t]he in-
dustry has reached the point where unbridled and unregu-
lated competition is a publie menace.’’™
However, Congress made it clear that while it was mov-
ing to safeguard against the excesses of destructive and
unrestrained competition, it was in favor of the competi-
tive principle and opposed to a policy of monopoly. In the
debates, Senator McCarran stressed that the Act estab-
lished a ‘‘nonpolitical ageney’’ that would focus on the
public interest of avoiding destructive competition where
e. g. United Air Lines already serves Chicago to Salt
Lake City, and the ageney rejects another applicant who
wants to serve the’ route, ‘‘because if you do both lines
will fail... .’’ He added:
[This] is not to say that any line may be ‘‘frozen”’
nor that any line may be perpetuated, nor that any
monopoly over any terrain may be established to the
exclusion of the necessity which the publie may pre-
sent.”?
Other speakers likewise evinced a clear intent to protect
against the evils of monopoly. Senator Borah, for exam-
ple, stated: ‘‘I have no doubt of the intent of the framers
of this proposed legislation to inhibit or prohibit monop-
oly... .’’®* And Senator Copeland, Chairman of the per-
tinent committee, pointed to the ‘‘competition to the ex-
tent necessary’’ language in the declaration of policy sec-
tion—{2 of the 1988 Act which was reenacted in 1958
as {102 of the Federal Aviation Act-—as one of ‘‘five
places in the pending bill where the question of monopoly
is dealt with in one way or another with the view to its
control and prevention.’’ ™*
283 Cong.Ree. 6507 (1938).
83 Cong. Ree. 6852 (1938). Senator McCarran was the author
of the original Senate bill.
°° 83 Cong.Rec. 6730 (1938).
“* Jd. Senator Copeland was chairman of the Senate Commerce
Committee which conducted the hearings on the bill.
17a
The central point is that this was one of an emerging
group of statutes that did not regulate the so-called ‘‘nat-
ural monopolies’’ that identified conventional public util-
ity regulation, but instead called for ‘‘regulated competi-
tion,’’ achieving the benefits of competition without the
evils of unrestrained entry or under-cost rate wars.
It is significant that Congress, addressing itself to the
air transport industry, deliberately fashioned this 1938
law so as to identify competition in express language as
a key element of the public interest. During the Senate
debate it was emphasized that both of the 1938 bills—the
McCarran bill and the Administration substitute—altered
the general declaration of policy contained in earlier bills
to take ‘‘explicit recognition of the importance of compe-
tition to the extent necessary to assure the sound develop-
ment of air transport.’’ *
Numerous early CAB opinions provide insight into the
intended role of competition in the new regulatory scheme.
In one of its first decisions the Board stated: ‘‘Reference
to both the legislative history and to the text of the act
demonstrates the congressional intent to safeguard an in-
dustry of vital importance to the commercial and defense
interests of the Nation against the evils of unrestrained
competition on the one hand, and the consequences of mo-
nopolistie control on the other.’’** The CAB read the in-
clusion of an express reference to competition in §2 to
render inapplicable doctrine developed under other trans-
portation regulatory schemes that competition should not
be authorized where an existing carrier was furnishing
adequate service and stood ready to meet any additional
°° 83 Cong.Rec. 6726 (1938) (comparison of bills submitted by
Senator Truman).
* Acquisition of Western Air Erpress Corp., 1 CAA 739, 749-50
(1940) (a § 408 case), cifed with approval in Additional North-
South California Services Case, 4 CAB 373, 374 (1943) (interpret-
ing § 2 in a route award proceeding).
18a
service needs of the public.” The Board stated explicitly
that when ‘‘competition will be neither destructive not
uneconomical . . . the Board is directed to implement com-
petition’’ because it generally promotes the other publie
interest factors set forth in § 2.° Thus the CAB concluded
in the Additional North-South California Service Case:
While no convenient formula of general applicability
may be available as a substitute for the Board’s dis-
cretionary judgment it would seem to be a sound prin-
ciple that, since competition in itself presents = 4
centive to improved service and technological devel-
opment, there would be a strong, although not pon
clusive, presumption in favor of competition on any
route which offered sufficient traffic to support com-
“T Sec American Export Airlines, Inc., 2 CAB 16, 29-31 (1940).
Snbsequent CAB decisions have firmly established that, in —
sidering the extent to which competition Is necessary to the sounc
development of the air transportation syscem, the Board has not
heen guided by the negative concept of determining first whether
the existing services met minimum standards of legal adequacy.
Nouthwest Northeast Service Case, 22 CAB 52, 60 (1955). Although
inadequacy of existing service is a factor to be weighed heavily in
assessing the need for a competitive spur, the presence of adequate
service by a monopoly earrier does not supplant the statutory
recognition of the desirability of competition. Se €, €. Oe panes
Passenger-Fare Investigation, Order 71-4-54, April 9, 1971, at 27
(“We have stated that major markets require competition regard-
less of the quality or quantity of service provided by monopoly
carriers. ") ; Syracuse-New York City Case, 24 CAB 170, 190 | 1957)
(**as to the principal criteria for authorizing competing service : the
size, importance, and potential are the prevailing factors—not 4
quacy of service’’); ilawaiian Case, 7 CAB 83, 103 (1946) ; Ae di-
tional North-South California Services Case, 4 © AB 373, 375
(1943).
Nee. ¢. g.. Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Order 71-4-
54, April & 1971, at 27; Seaboard & Western Airlines, Ine., Mail
Authorization, 29 CAB 49, 85 (1999) ; Southern Service to the W est
Case, Reopened, 18 CAB 790, 799-800 (1954) ; Trans-Pacific Air-
lines, Ltd., 122 CAB 900, 901 (1951); TATA Ageney Resolutions
Proceeding, 12 CAB 493, 509 (1951) ; Colonial Airlines, Inc., et al.,
Atlantic Seaboard Operation, 4 CAB 552, 555 (1944).
19a
peting services without unreasonable increase of to-
tal operating cost.
And it further explained in the Hawaiian Case:
The greatest gain from competition ... is the stimu-
lus to devise and experiment with new operating tech-
niq) ©. and new equipment, to develop new means of
acquiring and promoting business, including the rend-
ering of better service to the customer and the Na-
tion. . . . Competition invites comparison as to equip-
ment, costs, personnel, methods of operation, solici-
tation of traffic, all of which tend to assure the devel-
opment of an air transportation system as contem-
plated by the Act.*°
The legislative history and the early CAB decisions in-
dicate that there is no presumption in favor of competi-
tion per se because competition may prove uneconomical
and destructive of the healthy development of the industry
if the relevant market is too small to support competing
carriers. But when sufficient traffic exists to support com-
petition, certification of competing carriers is mandated
by the Act as providing the best means of effectuating the
other public interest goals contained in § 102."
°° 4 CAB 373, 375 (1943).
° 7 CAB 83 103-04 (1946).
** The CAB has repeatedly noted the unique advantages to im-
proved service offered by competition. Sce, e. g.. North Atlantic
Route Case, 6 CAB 319, 326 (1945) (‘‘No effective substitute for
healthy competition as a stimulus to progress and efficiency can
be found in monopoly.’*); Colonial Airlines, Inc., et al., Atlantic
Scaboard Operations, 4 CAB 552, 555 (1944) (‘The improvements
which flow from competitive service cannot be obtained by admin-
istrative fiat. There is no regulation conceivable which could assure
courtesy by a earrier’s employees, for example, and it would be
extremely difficult to attempt to dictate many other matters affect-
ing the quality of service rendered.’’). In the present proceeding,
the Board noted that ‘‘competition ultimately holds the greatest
potential for vigorous development of air transportation.’’ Order
72-12-29 at 3, JA 86.
20a
We place substantial reliance on this view of the role of
competition both because of the particular respect due a
‘‘contemporaneous construction of a statute by men
charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery
in motion’’ and because the Board ‘‘has from the outset
consistently taken’’ that position.®* Although Continental
and the Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, charge
that this ease is indicative of the Board’s recent unan-
nounced abandonment of this view and adoption of a route
freeze policy, we need not address that claim in view of
the Board’s failure to articulate its actions as a funda-
mental change in policy. ‘‘In our reviewing role, it is pe-
culiarly appropriate for us to take the Board at its own
word as to what it was doing, and to scrutinize the result
in terms of that process.’’* We thus proceed to an exam-
ination of the Board’s treatment of the record to deter-
mine whether there is substantial evidence indicating
either that the San Diego-Denver market lacks sufficient
traffic potential for healthy competition or that another
6 Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of
Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408, 81 S.Ct. 1529, 6 L.Ed.2d
924 (1961), quoting Norwegian Products Co. v. United States,
288 US, 294, 315, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933) ; see NRDC
v. Train, —— U.S.App.D.C. —, , 510 F.2d 692, 706 (1974).
°3 Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 12 CAB 900, 901 (1951); see
Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation, Order 69-7-135,
July 24, 1969, quoted in Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 143
US.App.D.C. 330, 338, 443 F.2d 745, 753 (1971) (‘The Board
has always taken the view that competition in markets which can
sustain it is the best guarantee of good service to the traveling
public.’’) ; Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Order 71-4-54,
April 9, 1971, at 27 (‘‘One of our principal policies has been that
the traveling publie is entitled to the benefit of competition when-
ever it is justified by existing and projected market traffc.).
** See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 13-16; Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae at 31-34.
5 (ontinental Air Lines, Inc., supra note 63, at 341, 443 F.2d
at 756.
Ghost Abad
2la
public interest consideration outweighs the significant ben-
efits afforded by competition.”
III. Lack of Substantial Evidence to Support Rejection of
Competition
The post-remand orders under review in this case set
forth two justifications for rejecting the ALJ’s recom-
mendation that competitive nonstop service be certificated
for the San Diego-Denver market—maintenance of the
economic health of the industry and the fuel shortage.
Although a comprehensive analysis would pinpoint a num-
ber of shortcomings in the CAB’s opinions, we find that
a focused examination of the evidence supporting these
two core rationales is entirely sufficient to demonstrate
the lack of substantial evidence to underpin the Board’s
rejection of competition.
A. Promotion of Sound Economic Conditions
In its initial orders culminating in a remand for further
proceedings on the issue of competitive nonstop service,
the Board concentrated on the economic threat to Western
posed by authorization of a competing carrier. Although
the ALJ had found that the market would be large enough
to support competition in 1970, the initial forecast year,
the Board concluded that the projection was too optimistic
‘*{i]Jn view of the recent lag in nationwide traffic growth’’
** The CAB’s counsel at oral argument on appeal stated that
the Board recognized ‘‘the prime value of competition’’ and as-
serted that “‘the Board’s interpretation of the statute would be
that competition would be mandated’’ where two carriers could
achieve a profit and a reasonable return and absorb the new route
without adverse impact on their system-wide operations. Accord-
ingly, Board counsel stated that ‘‘the question would turn on the
evidence in the record as to the projections going to traffic growth
and the projections going to revenues that would be received if
competition were instituted.’’
22a
and credited Western’s ‘‘gloomy forecast’’ of ‘fa sizeable
operating loss if competitive nonstop service 1s institut-
ed.’’ * When Continental petitioned for reconsideration on
the basis that the record showed substantial growth in the
San Diego-Denver market contrary to the national trend,
the Board responded that ‘‘more recent O & D data dem-
onstrates [sic] that the market is by no means an excep-
tion to the nationwide slowdown.’’* The CAB went on to
project an $84,000 operating loss for Western in 1971
under competition with Continental and to conclude that
‘‘Continental’s advantages’’ were outweighed “by the
harm the earrier would cause to Western’s operations .. .
at a difficult period for the industry as a whole and for
Western in particular.’’® When discovery of an error
erased the $84,000 loss projection, the Board altered its
analysis of the competition issue. It remanded the ques-
tion ‘for further proceedings, stating that ‘ [t hese revised
figures render extremely close the balance of decisional
criteria—harm to Western under existing economic con-
ditions weighed against public benefit factors favoring
competition and improved beyond service. . . .’’®
Significantly, by the time of the last CAB order in May,
1974, the Board had abandoned its reliance on the threat
of competition to the profitability of Western’s San Diego-
Denver service. The ALJ and the CAB’s Bureau of Oper-
ating Rights again found that there would be substantial
growth in the market in both the 1972 and 1973 forecast
*t Opinion 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, at 4, JA 41.
°8 Order 71-3-135, March 23, 1971, at 2, JA 68.
6° Td. at 4-5, JA 70-71. The Board relied solely on 1969 growth
figures in projecting 1971 traffic. The CAB did not distinguish
earlier decisions refusing to base determinations on short-term,
recession traffie data. See New York-San Francisco Nonstop Service
Case, 29 CAB 811, 815 (1959).
7 Order 71-4-112, April 16, 1971, at 1, JA 79.
re we _—
I ee ee
So ae
23a
years and projected that both Western and Continental
would achieve sizeable profits in each of those years.”!
The Board again deemed the ALJ and Bureau of Operat-
ing Rights’ traffic forecast ‘‘too optimistic,”’ making nu-
merous downward revisions in the ALJ's forecasting as-
sumptions and concluding that the competitive service was
‘likely to produce, at best, only marginal financial re-
sults.’’** In contrast to its pre-remand orders, the Board
did not make the key bottom line profit and loss caleula-
tion in its 1972 order or include any reference to the
financial status of Western and Continental. Implicit in
the Board’s decision was its belief that any doubts as
to the profitability of competition should be resolved
against certification of a second carrier ‘‘to avoid imped-
ing the industry’s opportunities for full recovery.’’ ”
The CAB argues that its analysis of traffic projections
and balancing of public interest factors involve a ** spe-
cialized task’’ that is ‘‘within the Board’s special prov-
ince’? and that the court should defer to the agency’s
erent
™ See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
* Opinion 72-12-29, December 8, 1972, at 3, 8-12, JA 86, 91-95,
The Bureau’s forecast had used a 7.5% annual growth rate, a 15%
stimulation figure, and estimated that 30° of the San Diezo-Twin
cities traffie would travel on Western via Denver. Using 1968-71
figures, and discounting for presumed stimulation from Western's
eommencement of nonstop flights, the Board selected a 3% growth
rate for 1972 and 1973. Yet, at the time the Board adopted its
3° figure based on recession experience, it had Western’s projec-
tion of a 10% growth rate and Western's traffic data through April,
1972, showing a 12% increase for the first four months of 1972
over the first four months of 1971. See Brief for Petitioner at 39-40.
The Board also failed to note or to explain adequately the result
that its 1973 forecast of 98409 (the ALJ's forecast of 127.409
minus the reduction of 29,000 passengers resulting from the Board's
adjustments; JA 93) was substantially lower than its corrected
projection of 106,851 passengers for 1971,
*§ Opinion 72-12-29, at 2, JA 85.
24a
expertise in these technical matters.”* In response, Conti-
nental identifies a number of danger signals that serve to
alert the court to the Board’s failure to engage in a rea-
soned application of its expertise—a predicate to re-
strained and deferential judicial review of an agency’s
actions.’® It points to the ever-shifting basis of the Board’s
decisions, the inexplicable delay in preparation of agency
orders, and the persistent conservative downgrading of the
ALJ’s and staff’s traffic forecasts in the teeth of data
revealing significant growth as danger signals indicating
that the Board’s adjustments and conclusions are a prod-
uct of ‘‘result-oriented’’ rationalization.”
We are not required to rule on this contention, to eval-
uate the strength of these danger signals or to consider
whether they undereut the deference normally accorded
to agency analyses of technical traffic matters. These mat-
ters have been obviated by the Board’s May, 1974 Opinion
and Order on Reconsideration, which concedes the need
for adjustment of its forecast and states that competition
would be profitable.’ Subsequent additions to the traffic
data that were before the Board prior to its 1972 order
convineingly demonstrated that the majority members se-
verely underestimated the size of the market. Faced with
these figures, the Board acknowledged what could not fair-
ly be denied—‘*the prospects for profitable competitive
™* Brief for Respondent at 22, 38-39.
73 See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 143 U.S.App.D.C.
$83, 393, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923, 91
S.Ct. 2229, 29 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971).
76 See Brief for Petitioner at 16-18, 47-49.
7? See Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at 3, 10, 13, JA 102, 109, 112.
78 Continental's petition for reconsideration pointed to Western’s
traffic data showing a 23.9% growth in the market during the first
eleven months of 1972 over the same period in 1971. See Petition of
Continental Air Lines, Inc. for Reconsideration of Order 72-12-29,
January 29, 1973, Appendix 10, at 1, JA 329.
25a
operations are far stronger than earlier believed’’ and
‘‘competitive service would be more profitable than orig-
inally anticipated.’’
But then the Board brushed these developments aside,
stating that its ‘‘original decision did not turn on profit-
ability alone. ...’’ * Since the profitability of Western was
the crucial reason for the original remand, we do not see
how this fairly could be discarded without explication of
why the change in this factor did not alter the conclu-
sion.’ The only factor identified in the Board’s April,
1971 order authorizing the remand of the competition ques-
tion was profitability—‘‘harm to Western under existing
economic conditions. .. .’’** The March, 1971 Supplemental
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration had pointed to the
related factor of ‘‘a difficult period . . . for Western in
particular,’’ but by May, 1974, Western’s financial situa-
tion had brightened with earnings in excess of the 12%
level found ‘‘reasonable’’ by the Board in its Domestic
Passenger-Fare Investigation. |
The only remaining factor mentioned in the CAB’s prior
decision in this matter was the financial condition of the
industry as a whole. But that consideration had been re-
lied upon solely in terms of justifying a ‘‘more than usual-
ly careful’’ approach to evaluating the competition ques-
tion in the San Diego-Denver market. That approach may
have validity, if not carried to extremes, for it still leads
*® Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at 3, 13, JA 102, 112.
*° Td. at 3, JA 102.
*t See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, su te 5
at 394, 44 F.2d at 852. ——
*? Order 71-4-112, April 16, 1971, at 1, JA 79.
a See Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Order 71-4-58,
April 9, 1971, at 2. Western’s 1973 rate of return was 12.3% and
its profit for the fiseal year ending March 31, 1974 was 14.1%.
See Brief for Petitioner at 15. _
26a
up to an ultimate decision focused on the subject market.
But we are unable to discern on what basis the Board can
glean any support from this factor of general conditions
onee it has recognized, as it now apparently has, that the
particular market will sustain competition and _ still be
profitable. If an air transport market is substantial and
thriving, we do not see how the fact that other markets
are over-served, can justify leaving this market under-
served, or depriving it of the public-interest benefits of
competition.
Is the Board obliquely saying that monopoly profits are
needed in this market to sustain overall industry earnings
when shaky?
This would not only raise serious questions of Con-
gressional intent, and adequacy of articulation of reason-
ing, but present the question whether there is evidence to
show that competition in this market will not maintain
overall profits,* by enhancing efficiency, quality of service,
and the size of this and connecting-beyond markets. In
the end we are left with the conviction that the Board’s
reference to general industry conditions is ‘‘local color’’
“Inder previous Board opinions, the important issue is not
maintenance of existing profit levels but the more fundamental
concern that carriers derive some profit from the market. See
Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation, Order 73-2-89,
February 23, 1973, at 7-8 (The Board noted that, onee applicants
‘can be expected with reasonable assuranee to operate their pro-
posals at a profit,’’ ‘*{t}he relative profitability of their various
operations is therefore not nearly as important a decisional factor
as the public benefits they can provide.’’). In the present case, the
ALJ noted that the Board ‘‘traditionally does not look beyond
the estimated onerating profit or loss en a proposed operation’’ to
consider rate of return. Supplemental Initial Decision, supra note
24. at 80 n. 140, JA 610 n. 140.
* The Board in 1971 had viewed the prospect of new profitable
operation by Continental in the instant and connecting beyond
segments as a “‘significant’’ positive factor. See Order 71-3-135, .
March 23, 1971, at 4, JA 70.
27a
to gain an atmosphere of acceptability for the result, rath-
er than a novel, independent ground of decision resting on
substantial evidence.
We have not ignored the passage, in the Board’s opin-
ion denying reconsideration, which says that the indus-
try’s faltering in its effort to achieve recovery ‘‘fortifies
our resolve to avoid making unnecessary awards of com-
petitive authority on routes that are adequately served.’’ ~
The structure of this sentence suggests that the general
faltering of industry factor (which we have already dis-
cussed and found wanting) was taken in conjunction with,
and as fortifying, a separate regulatory notion that compe-
tition is ‘‘unnecessary’’ when existing (monopoly) service
is ‘‘adequate.’’ Such a concept would not only constitute
a fundamental change in doctrine that requires a more
direct address and reasoned analysis than this elliptical
reference * but more important would cencict with the in-
tent of Congress as we discern it.*
B. The Fuel Shortage
We come, finally, to the fuel shortage issue to which the
Board referred in ultimately denying reconsideration. The
onset of the oil embargo in late 1973 diminished the fuel
supplies available for air transportation. The Board’s
May, 1974 opinion grasped the fuel problem as an inde-
pendent reason for rejecting competitive service.” As the
86 Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at 2, JA 101.
®* See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, supra note 75,
at 394, 44 F.2d at 852; Northeast Airlines, Inc. y. CAB, 331 F.2d
579, 589 (1st Cir. 1964) (Aldrich, J., concurring).
88 We approve the initial construction of the Act adopted by the
Board concerning the relevance of the monopolist’s service to the
need for competition. Sce text accompanying note 57 and note 57
supra.
°° See Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at 1-2, 13, JA 100-01, 112;
Brief for Respondent in No. 74-1664, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
CAB, at 24.
28a
Justice Department brief remarks, since fuel shortages
are a permanent fixture of American life, this is tanta-
mount to writing § )2(d) out of the Act.” Moreover, the
Justice Department aptly comments that there is no sup-
port for the Board s alleged fear that certificating com-
petitive service would increase fuel consumption at the
expense of more ‘‘essential service elsewhere’’ to the
‘‘overall’’ detriment of the public interest.’’** The crisis
of late 1973 may have justified temporary orders to pre-
serve the status quo pending analysis, but not an indefinite
abdication by CAB.” We have recently noted in another
context that the existence of an energy crisis does not
excuse a regulatory agency’s ‘‘failure to seek answers’’
pertinent to the exercise of its duties or its “abdication of’
its duty to ‘indicate fully and carefully the methods by
which, and the purposes for which, it has chosen to
act.’ 99 93
'
The CAB contends that its reference to the Remanded
Atlanta/Detroit/Cleveland/Cincinnati Investigation was
sufficient since ‘‘there was no reason for the Board to
repeat in this case what it had already said in a compan-
ion case issued on the same day.’’ * However, in the com-
panion ease the Board found that the proposed competi-
tive flights ‘‘would consume well over 10 million gallons
of fuel annually.’’ In addition, it noted that the markets
under consideration there were experiencing load factors
‘‘only moderately if at all above the Board’s rate-making
” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 31 n. 16.
"' Id. at 30; Dissent of Member Minetti on Order 74-5-17, May 3,
1974, at 4-5, JA 123-24.
* See United States v. CAB, —— U.S.App.D.C. ——, —— , 511
F.2d 1315, 1325-27.
°° See Public Service Comm’n v. FPC, —— US. App.D. C.—,
, 511 F.2d 338, 346 (1975).
* Brief for Respondent at 36.
29a
standard of 55 percent.’’** Here, by contrast, additional
fuel was not required to institute competition. At the time
of the final order, Western was planning to run four and
a half nonstop trips in the San Diego-Denver market. This
exceeded the two round trip flights each which the carriers
had proposed to institute in the remand proceedings.”
Moreover, the monthly on board coach load factors on
Western’s San Diego-Denver flights were repeatedly well
in excess of the 55% level during the 14 months ending
with July, 1973." In this context, the Board’s bare refer-
ence to the fuel shortage rationale set forth in the Atlanta-
Detroit case is not sufficient to constitute reasoned decision-
making for the disparate conditions of the San Diego-
Denver market.
Section 102 sets forth six public interest factors to guide
the CAB in the exercise of its statutory duties. We are
cognizant that in reviewing agency orders ‘‘[t]he court’s
responsibility is not to supplant the [Board’s] balance of
of these interests with one more nearly to its liking,’’*
but the state of the record establishes that the Board re-
cited the public benefits to be derived from competition,
and did not itself accord them any real weight in the
balance, dismissing them, in effect, as overborne by con-
siderations, of the health of the industry and the fuel sit-
* Opinion 74-5-18, May 3, 1974, at 4 & n. 6, JA 129 E& n. 6.
°° See Supplemental Initial Decision, supra note 24, at 28, 43 n.
9, JA 558, 573 n. 91.
** See Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at Appendix A, JA 115 (6
months with load factors in excess of 60° and 3 additional months
with load factors in excess of 70).
We express no opinion on the merits of the petition to review
the companion case relied on by the CAB in the instant proceeding.
That case pending in this court, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB,
No. 74-1664 (D.C.Cir., filed June 28, 1974).
% See Permian Basin Arca Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792, 88
S.Ct. 1344, 20 L.Ed.2d 312 (1968).
30a
uation, which lacked any support in substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the challenged orders are set aside and the
record is remanded for further proceedings.
IV. Remand Proceedings
The agency proceedings eventuating in Continental’s
petition for review were commenced over 812 years ago.
Two complete evidentiary hearings have been conducted
and the ALJ has issued two thorough initial decisions
detailing the characteristics of the market, analyzing traf-
fic forecasts, and compairing the strengths of carriers seek-
ing certification. The record before us contains ample evi-
dence of the need for competing nonstop service. We agree
with Intervenor Western Air Lines that ‘‘[p]ublic policy
dictates that the case be brought to an end.’’*” We thus
contemplate that the CAB will proceed expeditiously on
remand with selection of a competing nonstop carrier.
To avoid any unnecessary delay, we note that if the Board
should invoke the procedure of petitioning this court to
modify its mandate to permit taking of additional evidence
on the pendency of this appeal, it should set forth with
particularity the matters involved and their relationship
to the desirability and feasibility of implementing compe-
tition.
Turning finally to the question of carrier selection, we
note that this issue has also been fully fleshed out in the
previous hearings. The ALJ has twice selected Continental
over the other carriers seeking nonstop authorization to
compete with Western. The Board has repeatedly noted
the substantial beyond market benefits offered by Conti-
nental and has spoken in terms of the advantages pro-
vided by Continental in addressing the related competition
question. Nonetheless, as Intervenor United Air Lines,
points out, the Board has not squarely examined the ALJ’s
findings on the carrier selection issue. On remand the CAB
*” Brief for Intervenor Western Air Lines at 25.
3la
should review the record and render a supplemental order
either adopting the ALJ’s determination or setting forth
its separate reasons for accepting or rejecting the ALJ's
selection. In view of the comprehensive record before the
agency and the public interest in a prompt determination,
we trust that the Board will proceed with expedition in
completing carrier seiection.
The case is remanded for further proceedings in ac-
cordance with this opinion.
So ordered. -
32a
APPENDIX B
Federal Aviation Act of 1958
[49 U.S.C. § 1302, § 1371. § 1486, and 5 U.S.C. § 706]
DecLARATION OF Poticy: THE Boarp
See. 102 [49 U.S.C. Code 1302]. In the exercise and per-
formance of its powers and duties uuder this Act, the
Board shall consider the following, among other things,
as being in the public interest, and in accordance with
the public convenience and necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-trans-
portation system properly adapted to the present and
future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of
the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the nation-
al defense;
(b) The regulation of air trausportation in such mar-
ner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages
of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster
sound economie conditions in, such transportation, and to
improve the relations between, and coordinate transporta-
tion, by air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and effi-
cient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, with-
out unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advan-
tages or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of an air-transportation system prop-
erly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and
of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encocragement, and development of
civil aeronautics.
33a
CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY
CERTIFICATE REQUIRED
Sec. 401 [49 U.S. Code 1371]. (a) No air carrier shall
engage in any transportation unless there is in force a
certificate issued by the Board authorizing such air carrier
to engage in such transportation.
IsSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE
(d) (1) The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing
the whole or any part of the transportation covered by the
application, if it finds that the application is fit, willing,
and able to perform such transportation properly, and to
conform to the provisions of this Act and the rules, regu-
lations, and requirements of the Board hereunder, and
that such transportation is required by the public conve-
nience and necessity; otherwise such application shall be
denied.
Avtnority To Mopiry, Suspenp, or RevoKe
(g) The Board upon petition or complaint or upon its
own initiative, after notice and hearings, may alter, amend,
modify, or suspend any such certificate, in whole or in
part, if the public convenience and necessity so require,
or may revoke any such certificate, in whole or in part,
for intentional failure to comply with any provision of
this title or any order, rule, or regulation issued here-
under or any term, condition, or limitation of such certifi-
cate: Provided, That no such certificate shall be revoked
unless the holder thereof fails to comply, within a reason-
able time to be fixed by the Board, with an order of the
Board commanding obedience to the provision, or to the
order (other than an order issued in accordance with this
proviso), rule, regulation, term, condition or limitation
found by the Board to have been violated. Any interested
34a
person may file with the Board a protest or memorandum
in support of or in opposition to the alteration, amend-
ment, modification, suspension, or revocation of the certifi-
eate.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ORDERS
Orpers or Boarp aNp ADMINISTRATOR SUBJECT TO Review
See. 1006 [49 U.S. Code 1486]. (a) Any order, affirma-
tive or negative, issued by the Board or Administrator
under this Act, except any order in respect of any foreign
air carrier subject to the approval of the President as
provided in section 801 of this Act, shall be subject to
review by the courts of appeals of the United States of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
hia upon petition, filed within sixty days after the entry
of such order, by any person disclosing a substantial in-
terest in such order. After the expiration of said sixty
days a petition may be filed only by leave of the court upon
a showing of reasonable grounds for failure to file the
petition theretofore.
VENUE
(b) A petition under this section shall be filed in the
court for the cireuit wherein the petitioner resides or has
his principal place of business or in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Notice To Boarp ok ADMINISTRATOR; FILING oF TRANSCRIPT
(c) A copy of the petition shall, upon filing, be forth-
with transmitted to the Board or Administrator by the
clerk of the court, and the Board or Administrator shall
thereupon file in the court the record, if any, upon which
the order complained of was entered, as provided in see-
tion 2112 of title 28, United States Code. [Subsection (c)
as amended by Public Law 86-546, 86th Congress, 2d Ses-
sion, approved June 29, 1960, 74 Stat. 255. |
35a
Power or Court
(d) Upon transmittal of the petition to the Board or
Administrator, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to affirm, modify, or set aside the order complained of, in
whole or in part, and if need be, to order further proceed-
ings by the Board or Administrator. Upon good cause
shown and after reasonable notice to the Board or Admin-
istrator, interlocutory relief may be granted by stay of
the order by such mandatoy or other relief as may be
appropiate. [subsection (d) as amended by Public Law 87-
225, 87th Congress, 1st Session, approved September 13,
1961, 75 Stat. 497.]
Fixpincs or Fact Concivsive
(e) The findings of facts by the Board or Administrator,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.
No objection to an order of the Board or Administrator
shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall
have been urged before the Board or Administrator or,
if it was not so urged, unless there were reasonable
grounds for failure to do so. /
CERTIFICATION OR CERTIORARI /
(f) The judgment and decree of the court affirming,
modifying, or setting aside any such order of the Beard or
Administrator shall be subject only to review by the Su-
preme Court of the United States upon certification or
certiorari as provided in section 1254 of title 28, United
States Code.
Score or Review
[5 U.S. Code 706]. To the extent necessary to decision
and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or appli-
36a
eability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing
court shall—
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or un-
reasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusions found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, priv-
ilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(P} without observance of procedure required by
law ;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a
case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of
an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that
the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a par-
ty, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial
error. Pub.L. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 393.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.