Petition — Western Airlines, Inc. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1976

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

IN THE

Supreme Court of the suited States

OcTOBER TERM 1975

N- TO- 711

WESTERN AIRLINES, INc., Petitioner

Vv.

CONTINENTAL AIR LINES, INc., Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Of Counsel: Emory N. ELLIs, JR.

FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI

FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI .

1140 Connecticut Ave., 1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

N.W. Suite 501

Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20036

GERALD P. O’Grapy

Senior Vice President

Legal and Secretary

Western Airlines

P.O. Box 92005

World Way Postal Center

Los Angeles, Calif. 90009

Press or Byron S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

wwe

—

'

INDEX

Page

ES frau ceecodcnctedbasetanneceesueus 1

EE 6 dha Vee ass ond N thao nenskwesneeenece> an 1

NN oss canteen ccncdbeanabeudeuneas 2

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules Involved 2

PEP EeT TTETEPETTTTT TET TT LETTE eee 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ .................... 7

I. The court below has interpreted the Federal

Aviation Act in a novel way, never before passed

upon by this or any other court .............. 7

Bee Ce ED vo cn ccccncescsénecs 8

B. The C.A.B.’s interpretation .....cccesccces 11

II. In deciding this case the lower court usurped

functions which Congress assigned the adminis-

trative agency, and its decision is in conflict with

decisions of this court defining the appropriate

SE ee Ec cbt ccc cuceks db hbausasande tees 20

III. The court below has so far departed from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-

ings as to require supervision and guidance by

ee I SNE a diceacelceansscsuceccksee 26

SEE bu duanddbencausnacesbeteundenenteee ens 32

p ge re a re ee ee la

SIN ho. 6s peudnadenkeancndhnhasecéeeuewessns 32a

ii

INDEX TO AUTHORITIES

CASES: } Page

Additional Service to San Diego Case, C.A.B. Orders

72-12-29 (1972), 74-30-17 (1974) ........ cc cceeees 16

Alabama Power Co. yv. F.P.C., 450 F.2d 716 (D.C.Cir.

| errr y Pree er rey emer erm Tae 29

American Airlines, Akron Service, 37 C.A.B. 606 (1963) 15

American Export Air., Trans-Atlantie Service, 2 C.A.B.

I en a ee ee 11

American Trucking Ass’n v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 387

OF ee Br rrr Pere 21

Rerlington Truck Lines v. U. S., 371 U.S. 156 (1962) 22

Chrysler Corp. v. Dep’t of Transportation, 472 F.2d

I Nea 30

City of Lafayette, La. v. S.E.C., 454 F.2d 941 (D.C.Cir. -

SUEDE ceteeccascd diane $eeeaieeeceeneeeleean

Colonial Stores, Inc. v. F.T.C., 450 F.2d 733 (Sth Cir.

BD nce knncakke can aedeuneebacas aur eeeus 30

Continental Air Lines, Ine. v. C.A.B., 519 F.2d 944

Ce A ee ss cdbuidaasknens kheseeheeuuaeees 1

Dallas Ft. Worth-Phoenix Nonstop service Case,

CA. Giew G-taiee CHE) cece cccccscccscces 16

Dallas to the West Service Case, Order on Reconsid-

sention. Ge CA Ge CHD 6.6 ccescccccceenscs 13

nvironmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d

Dee Ce, EE ccc c edu sineeetsanesaneeeas 29

F.C.C. vy. Pottsville Broadeasting Co., 309 U.S. 134

2 ORS aa cits MRR eS: 22,23, 27, 30

F.P.C. v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952) ...... 22

F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) ....... 22

Great Lakes Area Case, 8 C.A.B. 360 (1947) ........ 12

Great Lakes-Southeast Service Case, 27 C.A.B. 829

PEE. “clcuktien badbidan c4nen ede tennessatnen es 12

Greater Boston Television v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841 (D.C.

i eee ees ceed ae ke 29

Gulf States-Midwest Points Service Investigation,

(.A.B. Orders 69-5-25 (1969), 69-9-18 (1969) ... 16

International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d

GED CRA, HOOD vw vacccccccccccscccnsssesiss 28

Mohawk Route 94 Realignment, 46 C.A.B. 111 (1967) 15

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458

oe Bgl et Ee errrer rrr rT teens 29

National Air., et al., Daytona Beach-Jacksonville, 1

ss GE CED Sco ccns-cedcceceecsentecesucss 12

Table of Authorities Continued iii

Page

New York-Chicago Service (Northwest Restriction),

eee re er errr rere

New York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94 (1956) ........ 13

New York-San Francisco Nonstop Service Case, 29

ee ede is ieees cas 13

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. F.P.C., 379 F.2d 153

sb Reeser ern re 29

N.L.R.B. v. Food Stores Employees, 417 U.S. 1 (1974)

22, 23

Northwest Air. et al., Additional Service to Canada,

gk G fo. Sree rr eer ere 12

Outagmie County, Wis. v. C.A.B., 355 F.2d 900 (7th

ae ae wade cht eetets 18, 21

Pacific Northwest-Southwest Service Investigation, 46

TE Fs REI er eer eee 15

Pacific Northwest-Southwest Service Investigation,

Reopened, C.A.B. Orders 69-4-11 (1969), 69-10-163

Ss ee eed er eb ae nad wie « 16

Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968) 21

Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 230 F.2d 204 (D.C.

ee Te ee Dee eee wide oe in 18, 27

Railway Express, Airfreight Forwarder Application,

ee i a ea or. 13

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)... .22, 23, 27

Service to Albuquerque Case, C.A.B. Orders 69-7-136

a Chak tee teak chen daees 16

Sindicato Puertoriqueno de Trabajadores v. Hodgson,

GES Fe TOSS CIRC LGe, TRUE) ov ccccccccccccense 29

Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation,

C.A.B. Orders 69-7-135 (1969), 69-9-11 (1969) ... 16

Southern Transcontinental Service Case, 33 C.A.B. 701

I Oe el ae ain eee ee ek kee ek kd 13, 14

Southwest-Northwest Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 52 (1955) 13

State Airlines v. C.A.B., 174 F.2d 510 (D.C.Cir. 1949) 28

Syracuse-New York City Case, 24 ©.A.B. 770 (1957).. 13

Trans World Airlines, Service at Reading, 37 C.A.B.

ie eh eh Deere oars 6h e wae eS. 15

Twin Cities-Milwaukee Long-Haul Investigation, C.A.B.

Docket 19097, Order 70-6-36 (June 4, 1970) ...... 16

Union of Concerned Scientists v. A.E.C., 499 F.2d 1069

CE Cod ce eecinieehi eae Sahnennees 29, 30

Why? Ass’n v. Burns, 372 F.Supp. 223 (Conn. 1974).. 30

Wyoming-South Dakota-Chicago Service, 36 C.A.B. 703

DEY Uebisekseiesscak cousvdunbeadanescestasdes 15

iv Table of Authorities Continued

Page

U.S. Sratutes:

Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (5 U.S.C. § 551,

et seq.)

Section 10 (5 U.S.C. $ 706) ......cccccccccces 2

Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973 .......... 8

Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq.)

Section 102 (49 U.S.C. § 1302) .......... 2, 8, 10, 2

Section 401 (49 U.S.C. § 1371) ...........46.. 2

Section 1006 (49 U.S.C. § 1486) .............. 2, 20

28 UBC. 0 TMG oc cccuncecssensucusese eee » fF

MiscELLANEOUS:

Air Carrier Financial Statisties, C.A.B. Bureau of Ac-

counts and Btatistied ....cccscccssesesseuenenes 17, 24

(.A.B. Rules and Regulations (14 C.F.R. $§ 200-399)

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (PSDR-

43, 40 F.R. 37048 (August 25, 1975) ......... 26

Policy Statement § 399.60 (14 C.F.R. § 399.60) 18

Rules of Practice, Rule 24(m) (14 C.F.R. § 302.24

C) er 24

Floor debates on passage of the Civil Aeronauties Act

of 1938, 81, 83 Cong. Ree. (1937-38)........ 8,9, 10, 11

Gardner and Greenberger, Judicial Review of Admin-

istrative action and Responsible Government, 63

Geo. LJ. FT (IBGE) . ocvdccccdscosecsucesuneeee 27, 31

Hearings on S. 2 and S. 1760 Before the Subcommittee

of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,

75th Cong., let Sess. (1937) .. ...ccccsccecescces 9

If.R. Rep. No. 911, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) ...... 8

Paper, Judicial Serutiny of the F.C.C.: The Illusion of

Usurpation, 52 Bos.U.L.Rev. 659 (1972) ........ 27

Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action—

Remarks Before the D. C. Cireuit Judicial Confer-

ence, 34 Fed. Bar J. 54 (1974) ............-00-- 27

S. Rep. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) ....... 8

IN THE

Supreme Court of thie United States

OctToBER TERM 1975

No.

WESTERN AIRLINES, INc., Petitioner

Vv.

CONTINENTAL AiR LINES, INc., Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued

to review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia « ireuit entered

in Continental Airlines, Ine. v. Civil Aeronauties

Board on September 22, 1975.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit is printed in Appendix A hereto,

and is reported at 519 F.2d 944 (D.C.Cir. 1975).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-

trict of Columbia Circuit, printed in Appendix A here-

9

—

to, was entered on September 22, 1975. Petitioner filed

a motion for stay of the mandate with that court on

October 10, 1975. The Court has not yet ruled on the

motion for a stay of the mandate.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 49

U.S.C. § 1486(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3).

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Did the court below erroneously interpret the

Federal Aviation Act of 1958 so as to impute an im-

portance to competitive operating authority which the

Congress did not intend?

2. In deciding this ease and in attempting to control

the course of the proceeding before the C.A.B. on re-

mand, did the lower court usurp functions which Con-

cress assigned the administrative agency?

3. Should the Supreme Court exercise its super-

visory powers to review the lower court’s judicial ae-

tivism which is evident in its decision in this case?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED

The principal statute involved is the Federal Avia-

tion Act of 1958, as amended (the Act), 49 U.S.C.

§ 1301 ef seq. Of particular importance are 49 U.S.C.

$1202 (Declaration of Policy), § 1371 (Certificate of

Public Convenience and Necessity), and § 1486 (Ju-

dicial Review of Orders). Also involved in 5 U.S.C.

§ 706 (Scope of Review).

The pertinent text of these provisions is set forth in

Appendix B.

ee

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case began in 1967 with the filing of an applica-

tion to the Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter called

the Board or the CAB) by United Airlines for im-

proved operating authority inte San Diego. After sev-

eral rounds of pleadings and CAB orders, the case was

eventually set for hearing as the Additional Service

to San Diego Case. The issues were limited to the con-

sideration of ‘‘San Diego’s largest east-west long-haul

markets”’ (J.A. 33). The mazkets involved were San

Diego on the one hand, and New York/Newark, Wash-

ington/Baltimore, Chicago, and Denver on the other

hand. In the course of this proceeding the CAB

awarded new nonstop service authority in each of

these markets, by removing operating restrictions from

carriers which already had authority to serve them.

Among other things, the Board authorized Western

Air Lines, Ine. (Western) to provide nonstop service

in the San Diego-Denver market, as recommended by

its Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). However, on a

three to two vote, it disagreed with the ALJ's decision

that Continental Air Lines, Inc. (Continental) should

be given competitive nonstop authority between San

Diego and Denver. The Board found that Western’s

proposed service would be ‘‘entirely adequate to meet

the service needs of the market .. .”’, and expressed

concern that competitive nonstop serv? 2 would have an

adverse financial impact on Western. In view of all the

circumstances the Board found ‘‘.. . it more consistent

with the goal of fostering sound economie conditions in

air transportation—even at the cost of foregoing some

* References to J.A. relate to the joint appendix submitted by

the parties in the Court below.

4

undoubted beyond benefits a second carrier could pro-

vide—to certificate only Western at this time.’’ (J.A.

41)

Although the awards to Western in the San Diego-

Denver market and to another carrier in the other mar-

kets at issue were made final in June of 1970 (J.A.

65), final decision on the need for a second nonstop

carrier between San Diego and Denver was deferred

(J.A. 65).

After further economic study the Board issued, on

March 23, 1971, a Supplemental Order on Reconsidera-

tion (Order 71-3-135, J.A. 67). This order for the first

time attempted a completely new economic evaluation

of the effect on the incumbent, Western, of a Conti-

nental entry into the San Diego-Denver market. It was

later discovered that this analysis contained a major

computational error (J.A. 79). Obviously, the Board

was uncomfortable with the legal posture of the case

at that stage. It remanded the proceeding to the same

Administrative Law Judge who handled the original

phase, expressing the need for more recent factual in-

formation (Order 71-4-112, April 16, 1971, J.A. 79).

The remanded phrase was essentially a new case

focusing entirely on the questions of need for competi-

tive service in the San Diego-Denver market and se-

lection of a carrier.

Another complete hearing was held. The same ALJ

again found that service by an additional carrier was

required, and again selected Continental to provide it.

On review, the Board again voted three to two to re-

verse the ALJ (Order 72-12-29, December 8, 1972, J.A.

83).

Ra ous

4)

The Bosrd’s decision started out with a summary of

the Supplemental I.D. and it then stated the general

theme of the decision as follows:

**... We have concluded that the publie conven-

ience and necessity would be better served at this

time by not authorizing competitive service in this

market [footnote omitted]. Our decision reflects

the belief that during a period of lagging traffe

growth and retrenchment within the industry, and

during the subsequent period of recovery before

an adequate upward trend has been assured (both

generally and in markets which may be at issue),

we must be more than unusually careful to avoid

impeding the industry’s opportunities for full re-

covery.”’

* + +

“There is little question that the San Diego-

Denver route offers a potential for future certifi-

cation of competition. However, in the cireum-

stances of this case—where Western’s service has

been, and appears likely to be, reasonably respon-

sive to the needs of the market, and where the

traftie growth in the local San Diego-Denver mar-

ket, and beyond markets which would support such

local operations, show no strong sign of improve-

ment—we believe it imprudent, on balance, to cer-

tificate a second nonstop carrier where competitive

service is likely to produce, at best, only marginal

financial results.’’ (Order 72-12-29 at 2-3, J.A. 85.

86)

In this context, the Board went on to make a de-

tailed point by point analysis of each of the ALJ's

findings and to discuss its disagreement with them.

(J.A. 83-98)

Petitions for reconsideration of the Board’s order

were denied on May 3, 1974 by a two to one vote.

(Order 74-5-17, J.A. 100).

6

Continental then petitioned the court below, pur-

suant to 49 U.S.C. 1486, for judicial review of Orders

72-12-29 (J.A. 83) and 74-5-17/18 (J.A. 125).

On September 22, 1975 the lower court issued its

opinion and judgment, remanding the case to the

Board. In deciding the case the court passed over con-

tentions by Continental that the Board’s findings were

inadequate and that the orders must be set aside for

‘failure to engage in reasoned decision-making.”’

Rather, the court said:

‘‘We believe that this case is most naturally treated

as presenting a question of the existence of sub-

stantial evidence to support the CAB’s rejection

of the statutory interest in the , -omotion of com-

petition.”’ (Appendix A, p. 13a, note 42)

The court construed the Federal Aviation Act of

1958 as mandating the certification of competition

‘‘when sufficient traffie exists to support [it]’’ (Appen-

dix A, p. 19a); and found that the substantial evidence

of record does not support the Board’s finding that

competitive service is not required in the San Diego-

Denver market. The court also concluded that the fail-

ure to authorize competitive nonstop service ‘‘is not

in accord with the publie interest considerations set

forth in § 102 of the Act’’ (Appendix A, p. 4a); and

that ‘‘[t]he record before us contains ample evidence

of, the need for competing nonstop service.’’ (Appen-

dix A, p. 30a) It included a pointed suggestion that

Continental, rather than any other applicant, should be

awarded the authority.

In order to maintain control of further proceedings

the court directed the Board not to reopen the record

for the purpose of taking additional evidence without

-__ oe

7

first petitioning the court to modify its mandate. If

such a petition should be filed, the court specified that

the Board should set forth ‘‘with particularity the

matters involved and their relationship to the desir-

ability and feasibility of implementing competition.”

(Appendix A, p. 30a)

As to selection of carrier for competitive author-

ity, the court directed the Board to review the existing

record and render a supplemental order either adopt-

ing the ALJ’s determination that Continental should

be selected ‘‘or setting torth its separate reasons for

accepting or rejecting the ALJ’s selection.”’ (Appen-

dix A, p. 31) Acceptance of these instructions would,

of course, preclude any further hearing even on new

applications for San Diego-Denver authority.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The Court Below Has Interpreted the Federal Aviation Act in

a Novel Way, Never Before Passed Upon by This or Any

Other Court.

The lower court’s decision rests entirely on a novel

and erroneous interpretation of the Federal Aviation

Act which no court has adopted before in the 38-vear

history of the Act and its predecessor, the Civil Aero-

nauties Act of 1938. For that reason this court has

never had an opportunity to rule on such an interpre-

tation. If the interpretation is allowed to stand, it will

remove from the CAB power to control its own docket

by requiring that priority of hearing be accorded to

competitive route cases. Of even more significance it

will have a serious impact on the substantive decisions

in such cases by creating an almost unrebuttable pre-

sumption in favor of competition.

8

In essence the court below interpreted the Act to

give ‘‘competition’’ preeminence over the other public

intrest goals listed in section 102 of the Act [49 U.S.C.

1302].° Having established, in effect, a statutory pre-

sumption that competition is required by the public

interest, the court went on to evaluate the evidence of

record in this light, finding that there was not substan-

tial evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of

competition. In short, the court’s interpretation of

Section 102 of the Act is the cornerstone of the entire

decision.

The court below developed its interpretation entirely

from its reading of the legislative history of the Civil

Aeronauties Act and a few early CAB decisions. It

cited no court cases.

a. The Legislative History.

The legislative history of the Act dealing with com-

petition reveals two distinct dialogues.

First, the primary motivating force behind enact-

ment of the Civil Aeronautics Act was the desire of

Congress to stabilize the air transportation industry

by eliminating the unrestrained competition which was

threatening to destroy the svstem at the time.’ Thus,

the regulatory system which Congress established may

be characterized as one which was designed basically

to control competition. We do not understand that the

lower court disagrees with this premise.

?The laneuage of Section 102 has remained unchanged since

1938 although the original Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 has been

reenacted as the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,

* See c.g. S.Rep.No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) ; I1.R.

Rep.No. 911, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1937) ; 83 Cong.Ree. 6507

(1938) ; 83 Cong.Ree. 8890 (1937).

9

Second, the legislators were concerned that the en-

tire air transportation system might fall into the hands

of a few monopoly operators. The proposed act in-

cluded a provision for the award of grandfather rights

to the existing mail contract carriers and there was a

fear that this would ‘‘freeze the present air service,”’

and would create ‘‘a monopoly with the present con-

tractors.’’ (Testimony of Mr. Crowley, Solicitor Post

Office Department, Hearings on S. 2 & S. 1760 Before

the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Inter-

state Commerce, 75th Cong., Ist. Sess. 118 (1937)).

There was also a concern that the Act’s provisions,

which exempted air carriers from the formerly ap-

plicable anti-trust laws, would permit monopoly sys-

tems to develop through consolidations or mergers.

(Hearing testimony of Mr. Crowley, supra at 118; Let-

ter from Mr. Farley, Postmaster General, Hearings

on 8.2 & S. 1760, supra at 139; 83 Cong.Rec. 6728-6731

(1938) ). In other words, some congressmen wanted to

insure that the new regulatory statute would not create

an air transportation system consisting of a few large

carriers operating over basically non-competitive route

systems.

This problem produced considerable colloquy in the

debates, and drew several statements by Senator Me-

Carran, the bill’s author, and others to the effect that

no such result was intended, and indeed, that there

had been provisions built into the Act to preclude such

developments. (83 Cong.Rec. 6729 (1938) remarks of

Senator McCarran; 81 Cong.Ree. 9214 (1937) remarks

of Senator Wheeler: 83 Cong.Rec. 6730 (1938) re-

marks of Senator Copeland).

The court below inferred from these broad, general

anti-trust, anti-monopoly expressions of the legisla-

10

tors, a meaning beyond their true intention. It imputed

to them a legislative ‘‘mandate”’ for the authorization

of competitive nonstop service where sufficient traffic

exists on a particular route to support competition on

that route.

We have been able to find only one place in the legis-

lative history of the Act in which a statement was made

as to competition with regard to a particular route.

That is the discussion at 83 Cong. Ree. 6852 (1938)

cited by the lower court where reference is made to

United Air Lines’ service between Salt Lake City and

Chicago (Appendix A, p. 16a). In context, it is obvious

that this statement also arose out of a discussion of the

possibility that the systems of existing carriers would

be frozen by the ‘‘grandfather’’ clause of the Act.

Senator MeCarran was simply assuring Senator King

that under the provisions of the Act there would be no

such result. The ‘‘Authority’’ (the Civil Aeronauties

Board) would be able to investigate the need for serv-

ice on the route, and award competitive authority if it

were required. In other words, the Act did not, by its

terms, freeze a route into a non-competitive mold.

‘we are trying to set up a non-political ageney

that will go into matters such as the one I have

tried to illustrate. ..”’

‘*That is the object and purpose of the entire bill.

Tt is not to say that any line may be ‘frozen’ nor

that any line may be perpetuated, nor that any

monopoly over any terrain may be established to

the exclusion of the necessitv which the public may

present.”’ (83 Cong.Ree. 6852.

With this background it is apparent Congress con-

templated that as to Section 102(d) the emphasis would

be, not on the word ‘‘competition,”’ but rather on the

ome

hte tr cine

11

remainder of the phrase: ‘‘.. . to the extent necessary

to assure the sound development of an air transporta-

tion system properly adapted to the needs of the for-

eign and domestic commerce of the United States, of

the Postal Service, and of the national defense.’’ To

determine what extent is necessary, the CAB was es-

tablished and given a ‘‘high degree of flexibility’’ to

perform its functions under the Act.‘

b. The C.A.B.’s Interpretation.

The court below also purports to find support in

CAB decisions for its position that competition is en-

titled to a preeminent position in the Act’s policy

guidelines. It refers to statements in a few isolated

eases which, by themselves, seem to lend credence to

the findings.

However, when the pattern of Board decisions over

the years is considered, the view is quite different.

There has been overall increase in amount of competi-

tion among the airlines. But there have also been defi-

nite periods of remission of competitive awards as

economie factors have dictated.

In its early years the Board was extremely cautious

about awarding competitive authority, and in some

eases it refused to make a competitive award because

of the existence of adequate service.’

One of the Board’s earliest impressions of its respon-

sibility under the Act to permit competition to the ex-

tent necessary is found in American Export, 2 C.A.B.

*83 Cong. Rec. 6731 (1938).

12

16 at 31, which was cited by the lower court in support

of its position. There the Board said:

‘We conclude that competition in air transporta-

tion is not mandatory, especially when considered

in relation to any particular route or service.

Clearly, Congress has left to the discretion of the

Board the determination of whether or not compe-

tition in a particular area is necessary to assure

the sound development of an appropriate air trans-

portation system. ”’

Under the circumstances of that case the Board

awarded a competitive route; but the underlying theory

of the case was obviously quite different from that im-

puted to it by the court. In another case reported in the

same volume of the CAB Reports (2 C.A.B. 627 at

652) the Board refused to award competitive authority

on another route partly because:

‘* the record does not indicate that the present

service over Route No. 7 is inadequate or that the

present operator thereof is incapable of accommo-

dating the natural growth of air traffic which can

he foreseen at this time. Under these conditions,

the contention that there should be competing,

duplicating services between two points merely to

prevent one Government regulated carrier from

dominating that field is unimpressive.’’

In the economic boom years of the mid 1950’s, the

Board set down a number of major route cases which

were designed to reappraise the entire domestic route

° E.q., National Air., et al., Daytona Beach-Jacksonville, 1 C.A.A.

612 (1940); American Export <Air.. Trans-Atlantic Service, 2

C.A.B. 16, 31 (1940); Northwest Air. et al., Additional Service

to Canada, 2 C.A.B. 627, 652 (1941); Great Lakes ‘Area Case, 8

C.A.B. 360, 382 (1947).

2 he ee oneed ons seein <<

13

system.’ It is to individual cases of this period which

the lower court pointed primarily for statements in

support of its views of the Board’s obligations with

regard to authorization of competitive service (Appen-

dix A, p. 18a, notes 57, 58).

In the early cases in this group the Board indicated

that the certification of significant amounts of new

competition was a departure from the more cautious

approach it had followed earlier. It noted that its new

policy of “‘greater freedom’’ with regard to competi-

live route awards was justified by the general improve-

ment in the overall strength of the industry; but even

so, the Board recognized its obligation to control e.r-

cess competition which could ‘‘ bring uneconomical con-

ditions and jeopardize the development of that sound

system of air transportation which is the ultimate ob-

jective of the Act.’’ Southwest-Northeast Service Case,

22 C.A.B. 52, 75 (1953). It found that the statute does

not insist on competition on all routes or in all services.

Rather, it is in the discretion of the Board to provide

essential competition. Railway Express, Airfreight

Forwarder Application, 27 C.A.B. 500, 534 (1958).

In the late 50’s the Board reverted to a more cautious

approach to competitive service. The Southern Trans-

continental Service Case, 33 C.A.B. 701 (1961) was in-

° E.g., Southwest-Northeast Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 52 (1955):

New York-Chicago Service (Northwest Restriction), 23 C.A.B. 943

(1956) ; Syracuse-New York City Case, 24 C.A.B. 770 (1957) ; New

York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94 (1956): Great Lakes-Southeast

Service Case, 27 C.A.B. 829 (1958); Dallas to the West Service

Case, Order on Reconsideration, 28 C.A.B. 590 (1959) ; New York-

San Francisco Nonstop Service Case, 29 C.A.B. 811 (1959).

14

stituted in 1958 and, at that time it was considered to

be the last major domestic route proceeding. That case

was decided in 1961.

The Board awarded new competitive service in sev-

eral of the larger markets involved in Southern Trans-

continental Case, but it found that no new authority

should be awarded in other markets. It stated:

‘‘In meeting these air service needs, however,

we have done so in a manner which we believe will

adequately meet the present and future air trans-

portation requirements of the area while at the

same time giving full recognition to the effect

which the use of jet aircraft with its greatly ex-

panded eapacity will have on the needs of the in-

dividual markets and limiting duplicating service

to those markets which we fully expect will pro-

duce a volume of traffic sufficient to support more

than one carrier (33 C.A.B. at 710).

Thus, the Board used a major, general economic con-

sideration affecting air transportation for the entire

industry in the early 60’s—the introduction of high

capacity jet aireraft—as a moderating factor on com-

petitive route awards. The Board went om to say:

‘the mere fact that other markets of similar

or even smaller size are authorized to receive serv-

ice by more than one carrier is not dispositive of

whether competitive service is required here. The

extent of competition in any given market neces-

sarily turns upon the facts and circumstances pe-

culiar to that market.’’ (33 C.A.B. at 715.)

From 1961 until 1968 the Beard did not decide a

significant, competitive, domestic route case ( although

it did commence a number of new cases after 1965 as

general economic conditions improved ). Rather, it con-

ee es

15

centrated its efforts on improving efficiency of local

service carriers and on cases involving the authoriza-

tion of first single-plane service,’ in markets which for-

merly had only connecting or equipment interchange

service.

In the latter category, the leading case of the period

was probably the Pacific Northwest-Southwest Service

Investigation, 46 C.A.B. 654 (1967), modified 46 C.A.B.

652 (1967). The case was commenced in 1964 but was

not decided until April, 1967. The Board did authorize

competitive service in one market—Denver-Kansas

City—but the basic thrust of its decision was the award

of first through-plane authority in markets which did

not have it before. In overruling the finding of the Ex-

aminer that competitive routings by Braniff and Con-

tinental should be established on the major Pacific

Northwest-Southwest routes at issue in the case, the

Board stated:

‘While we agree that each of these carriers

should be awarded Pacifie Northwest-Southwest

authority, we will establish two non-competitive

routings...

* * *

This noncompetitive two-carrier pattern will in-

sure provision of the needed service and full devel-

opment of the traffic potentjal, but at the same time

it will avoid the risk of so diluting the traffic as to

interfere with the objective of providing on an

economical basis the expedited long-haul services

” See e.g., Mohawk Route 94 Realignment, 46 C.A.B. 111 (1967)

Some of the improvement was accomplished by the elimination of

excess competitive authority. Wyoming-South Dakota-Chicago Serv-

ice, 36 C.A.B. 703, 752-53 (1962); Trans World Airlines, Service

at Reading, 37 C.A.B. 227 (1962); American Airlines. Akron

Service, 37 C.A.B. 606 (1963).

16

which are the primary need shown by this record.”’

(46 C.A.B. at 667-68. )°

The mid-1960’s were again a period of economic

well-being, as the initial break-in period of the jets

came to a close and the carriers began to realize the

benefits of the increased productivity of the new equip-

ment. The Board broke its period of relative in-

activity in the routes area and began setting down a

series of significant domestic route cases which result-

ed in a spate of competitive route awards in the years

1968 through 1970.2 It was in this climate that the

relatively simple Additional Service to San Diego Case,

which is now before the court, was instituted.

By the time the ALJ's decision had been issued in

1969, the tide had already begun to ebb once more. In

1968 the domestic trunklines realized net profits of

—-_—-—_-—_—

‘The Board estimated that Braniff should develop in 1968

123.000 O&D and eonnecting passengers on its route, and that

Continental should obtain 265,000 local and connecting passengers

on its route, (46 C.A.B. at 668.) These markets were potentially as

large or larger than the San Diego-Denver market at issue here.

°The more significant of these cases were: Southern Tier Com-

petitive Nonstop Investigation, C.A.B. Docket 18257, Orders 69-

7-135 (July 24, 1969), 69-9-11 (September 18, 1969); Service to

Albuquerque Case, C.A.B. Docket 18586, Orders 69-7-136 (July 24,

1969), 69-9-10 (September 18, 1969) ; Twin Cities-Milwaukee Long-

Haul Investigation, C.A.B. Docket 19097, Order 70-6-36 (June 4,

1970): Gulf States-Midwest Points Service Investigation, C.A.B.

Dockets 17726 et al., Orders 69-5-25 (May 5, 1969), 69-9-18 (Sep-

tember 3, 1969); Dallas/Ft. Worth-Phoenix Nonstop Service Case,

C.A.B. Docket 18579, Order 69-7-137 (July 24, 1969); Pacific

Northwest-Sodthwest Service Investigation, Reopened, C.A.B. Doek-

ets 15459 et al., Orders 69-4-11 (April 2, 1969), 69-10-163 (October

31, 1969).

4

17

about half the size of their 1967 boom year experience *

and by the end of 1969, after the ALJ’s I.D. in Sep-

tember, the prefit figures had dropped by another 28

percent. In 1970, the year of the Board’s first opinion

and order, the trunkline industry experienced a net loss

of over $100,000,000, the most severe in its history. It

was this change which led the Board to note “the re-

cent lag in nationwide traffic growth’’ (Order 70-4-46

at 4, J.A. 41) as an element which indicated that the

Examiner’s optimism for profitable operations between

San Diego and Denver was unwarranted.

As the Board noted in a later order in this case (Or-

der 74-5-17 at 4-5, J.A. 103, 104) the statement in Order

70-4-46 ‘‘sounded one of [the] earliest notes of caution

with respect to declining traffic growth, the profit pic-

ture within the industry, and the hazards of overeca-

pacity.”’

The discussion above, although somewhat tedious, is

necessary to show that the CAB’s view of its responsi-

bilities with regard to the authorization of competitive

service cannot be determined from separate statements

of policy gleaned from individual cases. It must be

*° The profit information used in this paragraph has been taken

direetly from a publication entitled Air Carrier Financial Statistics

which is prepared by the CAB’s Bureau of Accounts and Statistics.

It listed as one of the items of which the CAB takes official notice

under the provisions of Rule 24(m) of its Rules of Practice (14

C.F.R. § 302.24(m). This publication shows the following net in-

come [losses], after special items, for the domestic trunkline indus-

try in the respective calendar year: 1960; $68,000; 1961, [$34,568.-

000] ; 1962, $8,196,000 ; 1963, $13,117,000 ; 1964, $134,362,000 ; 1965

$221,889,000 ; 1966, $238,636,000; 1967, $244.475,000; 1968, $126,-

521,000; 1969, $90,592,000; 1970, [$100,412,000]; 1971, $48,-

182,000; 1972, $177,154,000; 1973, $142,930,000. igi

18

viewed in the light of the entire history of the Board.

The court below failed to do this.

It was for the very purpose of meeting changing con-

ditions in a rapidly developing airline system that the

Congress gave the CAB a high degree of flexibility and

discretion." Therefore, it is not surprising that the

Board’s view of competition ‘‘to the extent necessary”’

changed from time to time, during the history of the

Act, with the change in economie forces and the suc-

cession of different views which accompanied the de-

parture and arrival of individual Board members.”

We submit that the court below was wrong in its in-

terpretation of the Act to give competition a place of

preeminence among the other policy guidelines.

Moreover, the court’s interpretation, if allowed to

stand, will have a profound effect on the substantive

and procedural aspects of the Board’s activity. Because

of its limited capability to hear all matters submitted

to its attention the Board has always been selective in

setting applications for hearing; setting priorities on

the basis of the general guidelines set forth in section

399.60 of its published Policy Statements [14 C.F.R.

§ 399.60]. Adherence to the theory behind the lower

! Outagmie County v. C.A.B., 355 F.2d 900, 908 (7th Cir. 1966).

1? Judge Prettyman’s insight into the need for flexibility to meet

change as expressed in Pinellas Broadeasting Co. v. F.C.C., 230

F.2d 204, 206 (D.C.Cir. 1956) is particularly applicable here:

‘* it is also true that the Commission’s view of what is best

in the public interest may change from time to time. Commis-

sions themselves change, underlying philosophies differ, and

experience often dictates changes . . . All such matters are for

Congress and the executive and their agencies. They are politi-

cal in the high sense of that abused term. They are not for

the judiciary.’’

eh ee ee eh wa

19

court’s interpretation of the Act in this case could force

the Board to realign its priority system so as to give

preference to cases involving competitive service, even

over cases involving first certificated service, or those

which might reduce federal subsidy payments or in-

crease economy of operations.

Once a competitive route case is set down for hear-

ing, the lower court’s policy interpretation would es-

tablish a presumption favoring competitive service.

This would shift the traditional burden of proof from

the applicant in the case and onto the incumbent. The

whole tenor of the proceeding would change. Instead of,

as now, the applicant being faced with the obligation

of proving that the public convenience and necessity

require competition, and the incumbent having the bur-

den of showing adverse economic impact on its opera-

tions, the incumbent would have to bear the entire bur-

den of overcoming the presumption in favor of eompe-

tition. Presumably, the quality of service provided by

the incumbent would no longer be important. Neither

would the negative impact of the loss of revenues over

the roate at issue on the remainder of the incumbent's

system, since under the court’s interpretation competi-

tion would be mandated ‘‘ when sufficient traffic [in the

relevant market] exists to support competition.”’

These are considerations of great moment which flow

naturally from the lower court’s interpretation of the

Act in this case, and which merit the Supreme Court’s

attention. We respectfully urge the court to grant cer-

tiorari and to provide guidance for the CAB and the

court below in the interests of all concerned with the

area of regulation performed by the Board.

20

2. In Deciding This Case the Lower Court Usurped Functions

Which Congress Assigned the Administrative Agency, and

Its Decision Is in Conflict with Decisions of This Court Defining

the Appropriate Scope of Review.

The scope of review by the lower court is controlled

by section 1006(e) of the Federal Aviation Act [49

U.S.C. § 1486]. The Supreme Court has, in a number

of opinions, specifically defined the scope of review

under these or similar statutes.

The court below chose to test the Board’s decision in

this case on the basis of *‘substantial evidence,’’ rather

than on the adequacy of the findings.

We submit that a careful analysis of the entire opin-

ion reveals that the court chose the ‘‘substantial evi-

denee’’ test because it wanted to control the future

course of the proceeding before the agency and to man-

date a Board decision, without further hearings, favor-

ing the award of competitive nonstop service between

San Diego and Denver, and probably favoring the se-

lection of Continental Air Lines to provide the services.

Thus, the court went well beyond a finding that sub-

stantial evidence does not support the Board’s decision

that competitive service is not required in the market.

It also found that ‘* [t]he record before us contains am-

ple evidence of the need for competing nonstop serv-

ice.”’ (Appendix A, p. 30a). As to selection of carrier

it noted that the issue ‘**. .. has also been fully fleshed

out in the previous hearing,’? (Appendix A, p. 30a)

and that the ALJ had twice selected Continental over

other applicants. Mentioning the advantages of se-

lecting Continental, the court directed the Board to

review the present record and to **.. . render a supple-

mental order either adopting the ALJ’s ishssesbladion

Pe ei ted JOO seen elena ——

21

or setting forth its separate reasons for accepting or

rejecting the ALJ’s selection.’’ (Appendix A, p. 31a).

As to further hearings the court stated:

‘To avoid any unnecessary delay, we note that if

the Board should invoke the procedure of petition-

ing this court to modify its mandate to permit tak-

ing of additional evidence on the pendency of this

appeal, it should set forth with particularity the

matters involved and their relationship to the de-

sireability and feasibility of implementing compe-

tition.’’ (Appendix A, p. 30a)

This statement can only be read as a requirement

that the Board seek court permission before holding

further hearings. It also means that the court is resery-

ing in itself the discretion to deny such permission.

The CAB is one of those administrative agencies es-

tablished by Congress to maintain a regulatory grip on

a dynamic industry.” Therefore, Congress gave it broad

discretionary powers to adapt rules and policies to the

demands of changing circumstances." The flexibility

and adaptability to meet the needs of a volatile and

changing economy is an essential part of the office of a

regulatory agency.” The delegation by Congress of

the authority to act in accordance wit the ‘‘publie in-

terest’? or ‘‘public convenience and necessity’? [49

U.S.C, § 1302] **.. . serves as a supple instrument for

the exercise of « ‘cretion by the expert body which

Congress has charged to carry out its legislative pol-

*® Outagmie County, Wis. v. C.A.B., 355 F.2d at 908.

* Cf. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).

** American Trucking Ass'n v. A.T. & S.F.R. Co., 387 U.S. 397,

416 (1967).

22

icy.’’ ** Where a judgment is within an area which Con-

_ gress had determined is best left to the discretion of

an administrative agency, a reviewing court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”

An examination of that lower court’s opinion shows

clearly that the lower court has substituted its judg-

ment for that of the CAB, contrary to applicable de-

cisions of the Supreme Court.

Moreover, the court has attempted to dictate the

Board’s decision on remand. This also was in conflict

with applicable decisions of the Supre.ae Court.

The function of a reviewing court ends when an error

of law—in this ease lack of substantial evidence—is laid

bare."* Once a ease is remanded, the agency should have

the flexibility to take such steps as are necessary to

enforce the legislative policy committed to its charge.

“Thus when a reviewing court concludes that an

ageney invested with broad discretion to fashion

remedies has apparently abused that discretion by

omitting a remedy justified in the court’s view by

the factual circumstances, remand to the agency for

reconsideration, and not enlargement of the agen-

ev's order, is ordinarily the reviewing court’s

99 19

proper course.

The reviewing court may not mandate the way in

which an agency performs the legislative function it

6 F.C.C. vy. Pottsville Broadeasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).

7S. E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S, 194, 209 (1947) ; Burlington

Truck Lines v. U.S., 371 U.S. 156, 169 (1962).

SF .P.C. vy. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952); F.C.C. v.

Pottsville Broadeasting Co., supra note 16; F.T.C. v. Morton Sait

Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); N.L.R.B. v. Food Store Employees, 417

U.S. 1 (1974).

19 N.L.R.B. v. Food Store Employees, supra, 417 U.S. at 10.

;

:

|

:

:

23 “

has been delegated by Congress.” This holds true even

though delay and hardship may result from the agen-

ey’s procedures.”

sé

... courts are not charged with general guardian-

ship against all potential mischief in the eomplicat-

ed tasks of government. The present case makes

timely the reminder that ‘legislatures are ulti-

mate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the

people in quite as great degree as the courts’ [cite

omitted]. Congress which creates and sustains

_ these agencies must be trusted to correct whatever

- defects experience may reveal. Interference by the

courts is not conducive to the development of hab-

its of responsibility in administrative agencies.”’

We submit that the action of the lower court here,

however well intentioned, is clearly in conflict with the

Pottsville case and related cases decided by the Su-

preme Court.

While it may be argued that the lower court did not

issue a mandamus as in Pottsville or that it did not ae-

tually modify an agency decision as in Chenery® or

Food Store Employees,* it is apparent that court in-

tends its decision to have that effect, and we must as-

sume that the lower court will take further steps to

impose its will on the agency. At the very least, the

reservation in the court of power to approve or disap-

prove further hearings brings powerful pressures on

the Board to comply with the Court’s wishes.

20 F.C.C. v. Pottsville, su: ra, 309 U.S. at 145.

*1 Td. at 146.

22 Td.

*3S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., supra.

** N.L.R.B. v. Food Store Employees, supra.

24

It seems clear from the opinion that the court would

not permit further hearings on the question of need for

competitive service. We may also assume that the court

would not allow further hearings on selection of car-

rier until the Board complies with the direction to

review the present record and ‘*. .. render a supple-

mental order either adopting the ALJ ’s determination

fon selection of Continental] or setting forth its sep-

arate reasons for accepting or rejecting the ALJ’s se-

lection.’” (Appendix A, p. 31a)

The court’s constraints on additional hearings is par-

ticularly inappropriate in view of the very significant

changes in circumstances which have occurred since

the vear ended June 30, 1971, the base year for traffic

foreeasting in this case, and even since May of 1974

when the most recent Board order in this ease was

issued. While the air transportation industry recovered

briefly from the almost disastrous position it was in in

1970 and 1971, recent results indicate another serious

economie downturn, principally because of rapidly es-

ealating costs. Total operating expenses for the domes-

tic trunkline systems increased by about 42 percent be-

tween calendar vear 1971 and the end of calendar year

1974.*° The inflationary spiral has caused all of the ear-

riers to seek approval from the Board of fare increases

during 1975.”

Cireumstances involved in Continental’s service have

also changed. Footnote 12 of the court’s opinion (Ap-

°° Taken from C.A.B. published Air Carricr Financial Statistics.

These materials are officially noticeable under C.A.B. regulations.

14 C.F.R. § 302.24(m).

*6 The cost inereases are largely attributable to the secondary

effect of actions by the foreign oil cartel which first created the fuel

shortages mentioned by the Board in Order 74-5-17 (J.A. 100, 112).

eS en OP

te oe

25

pendix A, p. 5a) noted several factors cited by the

ALJ as favoring his selection of Continental. The

low fare economy service which the ALJ found attrae-

tive has since been found to be illegal by the Board.

Moreover, Continental no longer offers 3-2 seating in

its economy and coach sections, but has reverted to the

‘less comfortable’’ 3-3 seating.

The court noted Western’s ‘‘brightened”’ financial

situation in May of 1974, accepting a statement in Con-

tinental’s brief that Western’s rate of return for the

preceding year had exceeded ‘‘the 12% level found

‘reasonable’ by the Board in its Domestic Passenger

Fare Investigation.”’ (Appendix A, p. 25a) Western’s

company records for the year ended September 30,

1975 indicate that the carrier’s rate of return has

slipped significantly below the ‘‘reasonable”’ level to

8.9%.

Company records also indicate that traffic in the San

Diego-Denver market for the year ended September

30, 1975 has remained static as compared with the pre-

ceeding year, and that load factors in the market have

declined slightly.

These, of course, are all facts which are relevant to

the present need for competitive service between Den-

ver and San Diego and the issue of selection of ear-

rier; but which are not now in the record.

There was also much controversy in the Board pro-

ceeding about the quality of service in the San Diego-

Denver market as measured by Western’s load factors;

Continental and the ALJ claiming that they were much

too high (J.A. 17-21), and the Board explaining why

26

they were reasonable (J.A. 87-89). All of this discus-

sion is now superfluous because the Board has recently

instituted a rulemaking proceeding for the express

purpose of evaluating a new policy with regard to load

factors in the light of today’s economic climate (Ad-

vance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking PSDR-43, 40

F.R. 37048, August 25, 1975). Although the proceeding

is directed primarily to establishing load factor stand-

ards for ratemaking purposes, there is no doubt that

the result will have a carry-over impact on route pro-

ceedings.

Finally, there have been significant changes in the

Board itself since the last order was issued in this case.

The ALJ has retired. Only two of the Board meni-

bers who participated in the decisions under review re-

main on the Board—one from the majority and one

from the minority. This means that, in order to get a

quorum necessary to carry out; the court ’s mandate to

decide the case on the basis of the existing record, one

er more Board members would be required to qualify

himself by reading an extensive record which is now

over five vears old. Even after reviewing the record,

the new members would apparently not have the pre-

rogatives normally available to them in a case of first

impression. They would be constrained to vote in ac-

cordance with the directions of the court’s mandate.

3. The Court Below Has So Far Departed from the Accepted and

Usual Course of Judicial Proceedings as To Require Super-

vision and Guidance by the Supreme Court.

The lower court’s decision in this case is the most

recent product of several years of ‘judicial activism

by the D.C. Cireuit toward actions of administrative

agencies. This ‘‘activism”’ is well known, and has drawn

27

the attention of several legal scholars.” Some of the

comment is favorable,* and other is adverse; ** but it

cannot be denied that the court’s position has been rec-

ognized as an important phenomenon.

The activist stance is relatively recent and represents

a radical change in the D.C. Circuit’s prior view as to

its relationship with the administrative agencies.

The court’s former view was in line with the Su-

preme Court’s decisions in Pottsville and Chenery to

the effect that the courts must not assume what is essen-

tially a function of the administrative agency. This

view is exemplified by the following quote from J udge

Prettyman’s opinion in Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v.

F.C.C., 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1956) :

‘The controversy is in an area into which the

courts are seldom justified in intruding. The selee-

tion of an awardee from among several qualified

applicants is basically a matter of judgment, often

difficult and delicate, entrusted by the Congress to

the administrative agency. The decisive factors in

comparable selections may well vary; sometimes

one applicant is superior to another in one respect,

whereas in another case one applicant may be su-

perior to its rivals in another feature. And it is

also true that the Commission’s view of what is

best in the public interest may change from time

to time. Commissions themselves change, under-

lying philosophies differ, and experience often dic-

** See e.g., Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Ac-

tion—Remarks Before the D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference, 34

Fed.Bar 54 (1974).

*8 Paper, Judicial Scrutiny of the F.C.C.: The Illusion of Usurpa-

tion, 52 Bos.U.L.Rev. 659 1972).

*° Gardner and Greenberger, Judicial Revicw of Administrative

Action and Responsible Government, 63 Geo.L.J. 7 (1974).

28

tates changes. Two diametrically opposite schools

of thought in respect to the public welfare may

both be rational; e.g., both free trade and protec-

tive tariff are rational positions. All such matters

are for the Congress and the executive and their

agencies. They are political, in the high sense of

that abused term. They are not for the judiciary.”

This should be compared with the court’s more recent

position as expressed by Judge Leventhal in /nterna-

tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648

(D.C.Cir. 1973) :

‘Tt is with even more diffidence that a court con-

cludes that the law, as judicially construed, re-

quires a different approach from that taken by an

official or ageney with technical expertise. Yet this

is an inescapable aspect of the judicial condition,

though we stay mindful of the overreaching con-

sideration that a court’s role on judicial review

embraces that of a constructive cooperation with

the ageney involved in furtherance of the public

interest.’’

The Prettyman court would not have tried to direct

the course of CAB proceedings on remand in a case of

this nature, or to interfere with the Board’s powers to

select a carrier in a route proceeding.” The Leventhal

court in the instant case has found that the substantial

evidence requires competitive service in a specifie mar-

ket: has indieated a strong preference for a particular

airline to provide the competitive service; and has di-

rected the Board to review the existing record and

render a supplemental order either adopting the ALJ’s

4

3° See: State Airlines v. C.A.B., 17

4

1949), rev’d on other grounds, 338 U.S. 57

(1950).

F.2d 510, 518 (D.C.Cir.

9

wee ee a ee

AO CR AE tay Nel

?

29

decision that the preferred carrier be selected, or set-

ting forth reasons why not.

The new “activism” is founded on the concept

adopted by Judge Leventhal for the first time in Niag-

ara Mohawk Power Corp. v. F.P.C." Judge Leventhal

expanded on the principle in Greater Boston Television

v. F.C.C.," which has since become the basis for the

development of a substantial body of case law, all in

the District of Columbia Circuit. Although some res-

ervations have been expressed by Judges of the Court

about the propriety and feasibility of the expanded

scope of review,” it is firmly embedded in the ease law

of the Cireuit, and will remain so until review by the

Supreme Court.

Under the D.C. Cireuit’s “‘partnership’’ theory the

court on review is entitled to substitute its judgment

for that of the agency, and that is exactly what has

been done here.

So far as we know, the Supreme Court has not con-

sidered the new activism or the ‘‘partnership”’ theory.

Moreover, we have been unable to uncover any deci-

sions in other circuits which have adopted the “ part-

** 379 F.2d 153, 160 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert.den. 393 U.S. 1085.

444 F.2d 841 (D.C.Cir. 1970), cert.den. 403 U.S. 923 (1971).

* E.g., Alabama Power Co. v. F.P.C., 450 F.2d 716 (D.C. Cir

1971); City of Lafayette, La. v. SE.C. 454 F2d 941 (DC Cir.

1971) ; Natural Resources Defense Co ucil v. Morton. 458 F.2d

827 (D.C.Cir, 1972). See also the dissent of Judze Leventhal in

Sindicato Puertoriqneno de Trabajadores v. Hodgson. 448 F.2d

1161 (D.C.Cir. 1971), cert.den. 404 U.S. 1025, where he arcues for

a more flexible scope of review than adopted by the majority.

** See: Judge Robb’s dissent in Environmental Defense Fund v.

Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C.Cir. 1971). and statement of

Judge MeGowan in Union of Concerned Scientists v. A.E.C.. 499

F.2d 1069, 1094 (D.C.Cir. 1974). 5

30

nership” theory. In fact, the prevailing law in other

circuits is consistently the view that a court shall not

substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”

Since the D.C. Cireuit reviews many more adminis-

trative cases than other circuits, its partnership theory

is bound to be picked up elsewhere as substantive law.

Therefore, the ideal time for review and guidance by

the Supreme Court is now, while the concept resides

wholly in the District of Columbia.

The question is undoubtedly an important one. It is

important from the standpoint of the parties Whose

rights are determined by administrative action. It is

important in terms of the quality of the work per-

formed by the administrative agencies.” But it is also

extremely important in the context of today’s over-

crowded eourt dockets. As Judge MeGowan stated in

Union of Concerned Scientists v. A-E.C., 499 F.2d 1069,

1094 (D.C.Cir. 1974) :

‘it is patent from the foregoing that despite the

procedural nature of the issues raised, we have had

to deal with subject matter ranging far beyond the

* E.g., Colonial Stores, Inc. v. F.T.C., 450 F.2d 733 (5th Cir.

471) ; Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir.

1972); Why? Ass’n v. Burns, 372 F.Supp. 223 (Conn. 1974).

% See Pottsville, 309 U.S. at 146, where the Court said: ‘‘Inter-

ference by the courts is not conducive to the development of habits

of responsibility in administrative agencies.”

oo a

Ve Od We NOL Redes) x Lata prt aid tant

cs

-

.

>

*

A

”

31

normal ken of judges. This case is only one among

many such these days, and thus, suggests the ex-

traordinary tasks that the seemingly endless stat-

utory proliferation of judicial review of agency

action is imposing on the federal courts. How

meaningful judicial review on this scale can be

over any sustained period of time, at least if not

invariably invoked with an acute sense of respon-

sibility and a willingness to recognize that many

of these more esoteric battles must largely be won

or lost at the agency level, is problematic. (empha-

sis supplied )

One commentator points out that, in 1973, the D.C.

Circuit remanded for further proceedings 61 percent

of the administrative cases it reviewed.” It is obvious

that court burden and delay will increase as the court

injects itself more and more into its ‘“‘partnership”’

with the agencies.

The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to exercise

its power of supervision. All of the meaningful deei-

sions on scope of review were issued in the late 1940°s

and early 1950’s shortly after adoption of the Admin-

istrative Procedure Act. None of them anticipated the

‘broad judicial activism’’ now being practiced in the

D.C. Circuit. The lower court, as well as the courts of

other circuits, needs fresh guidance.

** Gardner and Greenberger, supra note 16, at 37.

32

CONCLUSION

For the reasons aforesaid, petitioner respectfully

requests that this honorable court grant this Petition ,

for Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

“.

Emory N. ELLIs, Jr.

FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI

1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

- {7ERALD P. O’GrRapdy

P.O. Box 92005

World Way Postal Center

Los Angeles, Calif. 90009

APPENDIX

Counsel for Petitioner

Western Air Lines

Pe ae as wag Sam AE Ci BR Lack! |

la

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit

No. 74-1651

ConTINENTAL Arr Lives, Inc.

v.

Crvm AERONAUTICS BoarpD

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No 74-1651

ConTINENTAL Arr Lives, Inc., Petitioner,

Vv

Civm ArEronattics Boarp, Respondent,

Western Air Lines, Inc., Hughes Air Corporation, db a

Hughes Airwest United Air Lines, Inc., Trans World

Air Lines, Ine., of Kansas City, Missouri and Chamber

of Commerce of Greater Kansas City, City and County

of Denver, Colorado, Public Utilities Commission of the

State of Colorado, San Diego Unified Port District,

the City of San Diego, San Diego Chamber of Com-

merece, Intervenors.

Argued April 11, 1975

Decided Sept. 22, 1975

2a

Before Wricut and Leventuat, Circuit Judges, and vie

cEL,* United States District Judge for the Northern Dis-

trict of California.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Leventhal

Leventuat, Cireuit Judge:

Continental Air Lines, Ine. petitions for review of two

orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) —— =

the Board’s Additional Service to San Diego pee :

Challenged orders—Order 72-12-29, December 8, 1972, “

Order 745-17, May 3, 1974—rejected the recommenda-

tions of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that —

petitive nonstop authority be certificated between —e

Diego and Denver.’ The ALJ had selected Continental to

provide the competitive service.

Petitioner contends that the Board ’s order should be set

aside on the ground that the CAB ‘failed to give adequate

weight to the statutory mandate favoring remaprng’

and ‘failed to engage in reasoned decision-making. -

Board responds that its orders were adequately supporte

by the need for caution at a time when the yess J W

“plagued by retrenchment and lagging traffic growth’’ an

i iminis »] supplies.’’ *

by the ‘‘erucial problem of diminished fuel sup}

We find that, as a general matter, § 102 of the Federal

Aviation Act requires the Board to foster competition as

a means of enhancing the development and oe

of air transportation service on routes generating suffi-

cient traffic to support competing carriers.‘ We are cogni-

* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(d). ,

1 The challenged orders are set forth at JA 83-98 and JA 100-24,

respectively.

2 Brief for Petitioner at 18, 31. ,

* Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at 2, 13, JA 101, 112.

* Sec text accompanying notes 44-61 infra. .

Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970),

3a

zant that in some circumstances the other considerations

set forth in § 102 may conflict with and predominate over

the public interest in competition.’ The Board urges in

effect that here the need to foster sound economic condi-

tions in view of the industry’s financial posture and the

fuel situation overrides the benefits of competition. After

a careful examination of the record, we conclude that the

Board’s position is not supported by substantial evidence

states:

§ 1302. Consideration of matters in public interest by Board.

In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under

this chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other

things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the

publie convenience and necessity :

(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transporta-

tion system properly adapted to the present and future needs of

the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the

Postal Service, and of the national defense ;

(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to

recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the

highest degree of safety and foster sound economic conditions

in, such transportation, and to improve the relations between,

and coordinate transportation by, air carriers:

(e) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service

by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust diserimina-

tions, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive

competitive practices;

(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound

development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to

the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United

States. of the Postal Service, and of the national defense ;

(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce: and

(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil

aeronautics, (Pub.L. 85-726, Title I, § 102. Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat.”

740.)

° See United States v. CAB, —~ U.S.App.D.C. ; , 511

F.2d 1315, 1322 (1975) (‘‘the statute would appear to contemplate

that the factor of competition could be outweighed by one or more

of the other factors’’).

4a

and that its rejection of competitive nonstop service in a

San Diego Denver market is not in aceord with the age

interest considerations set forth in § 102 of the Act. Ac-

cordingly, we remand the ease for further proceedings con-

sistent with Part IV of this opinion.

I. Background

We begin with a summary of the seven years of rn

ministrative proceedings culminating in the orders under

review.

The challenge orders are the last of a series of ns

ings entered in the Additional Service to San a _*

That proceeding arose out of an application ec bY

United Air Lines on January 12, 1967, requesting permis-

sion to provide nonstop service in several San vitae

markets.” On May 26, 1967, the CAB issued a show cause

order which rejected United’s San Diego-Denver nonstop

request, but proposed to give United nonstop -pnagroon

for the San Diego-New York and San Diego-C icago

routes.’ In response to the City of Denver s petition for

reconsideration, the Board sua sponte issued a second val

der to show eause why Western Air Lines, the primary

San Diego-Denver carrier, should not be permitted to pro-

vide nonstop service in that market." The Board he

posals prompted numerous objections and competitive -

ings from other airlines. By order of April 3, 1968, the

CAB instituted the Additional Service to San Diego Case,

setting a consolidated hearing on applications for nonstop

© See Initial Decision of Hyman Goldberg, Hearing Examiner,

September 4, 1969, at 2, JA 373.

‘Order to Show Cause, Order No. E-25202, May 26, 1967, at 4,

JA 24.

“Order to Show Cause, Order No, E-25727, September 22, 1967,

atl &n.1,.JA27&n.1.

5a

authority between San Diego and New York/Newark,

Washington/Baltimore, Chicago and Denver.’

Following the submission of briefs by numerous ear-

riers and local groups and three days of hearings, the ALJ

issued his initial decision on September 4, 1969. The ALJ

recommended that competitive nonstop authority be au-

thorized in all four markets under consideration. With

regard to the San Diego-Denver market, he adopted the

Bureau of Operating Rights’ forecast that there would

be ‘‘not less than 100,335 passengers in 1970.’ Based on

this ‘‘conservative’’ estimate he found ‘‘ample traffie to

support two carriers on an economic basis without recard

to the support of through traffie flowin z over the route.’’*

The ALJ selected Western and Continental to provide the

competing nonstop service. Western was a ‘*logie choice”’

because it carried the great bulk of the San Diego-Denver

passengers on its one stop flights routed via Phoenix.”

Continental was chosen ahead of United, TWA and Air

West as the second carrier because of United’s past ‘‘ree-

ord of neglect and indifference’? toward the market and

because of Continental’s superior proposed pattern of

service; attractive fare schedules: substantial beyond mar-

ket benefits; and history as ‘‘an extremely vigorous, ag-

gressive, and efficient carrier.’’ ”

* Order No. E-26608, April 3, 1968, at 4. JA 33.

*° Sce Initial Decision, supra note 6, at 64 & n. 115, JA 435 & n.

115. The ALJ deemed the Bureau’s forecast conservative because

its base year traffie figures did not include ‘on-line connecting

passengers’’ and its stimulation factor—growth attributed to new,

improved service—did not take account of Continental's attractive

fare proposals.

** See id. at 65, JA 436.

*? See id. at 66-76, JA 437-47.

Continental proposed three “‘eonveniently timed’’ round trips a

day and offered ‘‘not only first-class and coach service. at substan-

tial reductions in fares, but also .. . the economy service for which

the carrier is well-known, at considerably reduced fare levels.’ In

6a

The CAB execised its right of discretionary review of

the ALJ initial decision, issuing its opinion on April 9,

1970. The Board adopted the ALJ’s findings regarding

the need for competitive nonstop service in the Chicago,

New York/Newark, and Washington/Baltimore markets

but decided, by a vote of 3-2, to certificate only one non-

stop carrier, Western, in the San Diego-Denver market.

This departure from the ALJ’s determination rested pri-

marily on the majority’s view that ‘‘the examiner s fore-

cast may be too optimistic’? given ‘‘the recent lag in na-

tionwide traffic growth.’’™* Although the CAB noted that

a competitive authorization would provide a spur to bet-

ter service and significant benefits to beyond segment

markets, it concluded that Western’s possible ‘sizable

operating loss if competitive service is instituted’’ in con-

junction with the adequacy of Western’s proposed service

to meet the needs of the market rendered a denial of a

competing nonstop carrier certification ‘more consistent

with the goal of fostering sound economic conditions in

air transportation. .. .’?** The dissenting Board members

contrast to TWA, it offered 3-2 seating in coach | and economy

sections instead of less comfortable 3-3 seating. Continental s selee-

tion would also provide a substantial number of passengers in four

bevond markets either first single-plane or first single-carrier service

—a factor of prime importance. The ALJ considered Continental s

efficiency and agressiveness important in view of W estern s long-

entrenched” position in the market. Finally, in addition to service,

scheduling, and beyond market advantages over TWA, Continental

was given a plus as a far smaller carrier to which the award would

‘‘be more important’’ than to TWA. Air West was passed over

because its shaky financial position made it doubtful that it could

offer Western ‘‘effective, dynamie competition.”’

13 See 14 CFR §§ 385.50-.54 (1975) (delineating the discretionary

review procedure).

4 Opinion 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, at 2, JA 39, 41.

15 Jd. at 4 & n. 6, JA 41 & n. 6. The Board also noted that the

examiner had relied in part on Western receiving new revenue from

7a

emphasized that the projection of 100,335 passengers (275

per day) in 1970 was ‘‘a very conservative estimate”’

which did not include either ‘‘true San Diego passengers

(because they traveled from Los Angeles to San Diego by

surface transportation or intrastate airlines) or ‘‘the sub-

stantial number of passengers carried between these

points who will move beyond Denver to points on the

routes of both Western and Continental.’’ * In addition,

the dissent noted that within the past year the Board had

made grants of competitive nonstop service in a number

of substantially smaller markets.”

A number of parties, including Continental sought re-

consideration of the Board’s determination. Petitioner

claimed that the majority lacked substantial evidence to

support its determination that the traffic forecast of the

ALJ and the Bureau of Operating Rights was too optimis-

tic. It noted that the lag in national traffic had not affected

San Diego-New York/Newark and San Diego- Washington /Balti-

more awards which the Board decided to grant to United. Id. at

Bt

** Coneurring and Dissenting Opinion of Members Murphy and

Minetti in Opinion 70-4-46, at 1, JA 49.

“Td. at 1-2 & n. 1, JA 49-50 & n. 1. A partial list of such

awards showing O & D plus interline connecting traffic projected

for the forecast year included:

Houston-Seattle /Portland 150

Denver-San Antonio 194

Denver-Portland 220

Salt Lake City-Seattle 222

Salt Lake City-Portland 138

Houston-St. Louis 272

San Antonio-Washington 176-224

New Orleans-Tampa (3 carriers) 206

Houston-Miami 280

Dallas-Tampa 158

Albuquerque-Las Vegas 206

Albuquerque-San Francisco 190-330

Memphis-New Orleans 246

8a

the market at issue—the San Diego-Denver market had

grown 34% between 1967 and 1968 and both San Diego

and Denver experienced an increase in total traffic well

in excess of the national average. Continental reinforced

its argument by pointing out that the traffie estimates of

three other carriers paralleled or exceeded the ALJ’s fore-

east and the ALJ’s figure was significantly understated

because of the factors noted by the dissenting members.”

The CAB, by order of June 5, 1970, deferred action on

the petitions to reconsider certification of a second non-

stop carrier between San Diego and Denver. In its Sup-

plemental Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of Mareh

93, 1971, the Board, by an identical 3-2 vote, reaffirmed

its previous denial of competitive service. The majority

conceded that the San Diego-Denver market ‘‘maintained

a healthy growth rate in calendar year 1968,’’ but argued

that 1969 traffic data demonstrated that ‘‘the market is by

no means an exception to the nationwide slowdown.”’ * Us-

ing more recent traffic figures and a 1971 forecast year,

the majority ecaleulated that ‘‘Continental certification

would produce an operating loss of about $84,000 for

Western in 1971... .’’ The Board concluded that harm to

Western ‘‘at a difficult period for the industry as a whole

and Western in particular’’ outweighed the ‘‘significant

1* Petition of Continental Air Lines, Ine., for Reeonsideration of

Order 70-4-46, May 4, 1970, at 2, 5-6, JA 211, 214-15.

Party Annual Daily

Air West 98,870 271

Continental 101,222 277

TWA 117,240 320

Western 94.216 258

Bureau 100,335 275

Since Western's forecast assumed monopoly service, it would have

to be increased to obtain an estimate for the size of a competitive

market.

*° Order 71-3-135, March 23, 1971, at 2, JA 68.

9a

factors’’ favoring certification such as substantial beyond

segment benefits and profitable operation for Continental.”

The dissenters claimed that ‘‘[t]here can be no serious

question . . . that this market is large enough to support

competition,’’ emphasizing that the majority projection

for 1971 yielded a larger traffic volume than the ALJ had

found sufficient to support competition using a 1970 target

year.** They found that the possibility of a temporary

loss by Western in 1971 was overshadowed by public bene-

fits from improved service which Continental's competi-

tive flights would provide in the San Diego-Denver mar-

ket and in other related markets.”

Shortly after issuance of its supplemental opinion, the

Board discovered that its financial caleulations had errone-

ously rested on fiscal rather than calendar 1971 traffie esti-

mates and consequently had underforecast 1971 traffie vol-

ume. Corrected estimates revealed that, in competition

with Continental, Western’s 1971 profits would range from

slightly below to somewhat above the break-even level. The

CAB stated: ‘‘These revised figures render extremely

close the balance of decisional criteria—harm to Western

under existing economic conditions weighed against public

benefit factors favoring competition and improved be-

yond service—in determining whether such competition

should be authorized.’’ Under these circumstances, the

Board, by order of April 16, 1971, remanded the competi-

20 Td. at 4-5, JA 70-71,

*t Dissenting Opinion of Members Murphy and Minetti in Order

71-3-135, at 1, JA 72. The majority forecasted 103,124 passengers

in 1971 as compared with the ALJ's 1970 forecast of 100.335. See

Order 71-3-135, March 23, 1971, Appendix A, at 2, JA 78.

*? Dissenting Opinion, supra note 21, at 4, JA 75. The dissenters

also challenged the majority’s loss projection on the basis of its

underestimation of passengers by ignoring surface and intrastate

Los Angeles-San Diego traffic and using atypical 1969 growth rate

figures and its overestimation of costs.

10a

tion question to the ALJ for an analysis of ‘‘the most

recent traffic and cost data and Western’s actual experi-

ence with nonstop service in the market.’’ *

The remand proceeding culminated in a 92-page Sup-

plemental Initial Decision issued on March 20, 1972. The

decision found a second nonstop earrier warranted by the

size of the market in the 1972 and 1973 forecast years, the

serious deficiencies and omissions in Western’s service,

and Western’s ability ‘‘to achieve a substantial operating

profit’? in each of the forecast years in competition with

another nonstop earrier.** The ALJ accepted as reason-

able the Bureau of Operating Right’s traffic estimate of

118,520 passengers in 1972 and 127,409 in 1973 and its

related projection of an operating profit for Western of

$417,000 in 1972 and $325,000 in 1973.*° The supplemental

decision faulted Western’s San Diego-Denver service for

scheduling inadequacies and high load factors.” The ALJ

selected Continental to compete with Western for sub-

stantially the same reasons contained in his initial deci-

sion.”

The Board, 3-2, again reversed the ALJ and declined

to authorize competitive nonstop service. The majority

2° Order of Remand, Order 71-4-112, April 16, 1971, at 1. JA 79.

2* Supplemental Initial Decision of Hyman Goldberg, Hearing

Examiner, March 20, 1972, at 55, JA 585.

2 Jd. at 56, 75, JA 586, 605.

.

2° See id. at 59-65, JA 589-95. Among the ‘‘many serious inade-

quacies’’ were findings that the carrier did not provide prime time

departures in both directions, that there were significant service

gans, that Western served the market only as part of long-haul

flights, and that load factors indicated ‘‘unresponsive scheduling

on Western's part.’’ Although Western had proposed to provide

three nonstop round trips, it had never flown more than two daily

nonstop round trips.

27 See id. at 77, JA 607-17; note 12 supra.

lla

members expressed concern that, ‘“‘during a period of

lagging traffic growth and retrenchment within the in-

dustry, and during the subsequent period of recovery be-

fore an adequate upward trend has been assured,’’ the

agency ‘‘must be more than usually careful to avoid im-

peding the industry’s opportunities for full recovery.’ *

It concluded that certification of competition would be

imprudent since Western’s service had been ‘‘reasonably

responsive to the needs of the market’’ and since compet-

itive service was ‘‘likely to produce, at best, only mar-

ginal financial results.’’ ** The Board found the ALJ’s and

the Bureau’s traffic forecast ‘‘too optimistic’’ and set forth

a number of adjustments in their growth and stimulation

percentages which reduced the 1973 traffic estimates by

29,000 passengers. Although the Board made no profit

or loss calculations of its own, it concluded that ‘‘the pros-

pect for profitable two-carrier operation is tenuous at this

time.’’ **

Continental’s detailed petition for reconsideration took

issue inter alia with the Board’s adjustments to the ALJ’s

traffic forecast. In particular, it questioned the majority

members’ reliance on experience during recession years

to support its forecast of a 3 percent growth rate for

1972 and 1973, in view of the Board’s earlier finding that

the recession was a ‘‘temporary phenomenon.”’’* As proof

of the Board’s error, Continental noted that, as a result

of substantial growth, Western’s traffic figures revealed

that the market was significantly larger at the end of

*8 Opinion 72-12-29, December 8, 1972, at 2, JA 85.

*° See id. at 3, JA 86.

°° See id. at 8-10, JA 91-93.

* Td. at 8, JA 91.

*? Petition of Continental Air Lines, Ine. for Reconsideration of

Order 72-12-29, January 29, 1973, at 20, JA 313, quoting Domestic

Passenger Fare Investigation, Order 71-4-54, at 28.

l2a

1972 than the Board had predicted it would be a year

later.”

On May 3, 1974, fifteen months after the opinion fol-

lowing the remand, the Board issued an Opinion and Or-

der on Reconsideration reaffirming, by a 2-1 vote, its

denial of a competitive nonstop certification. This final

opinion in these extended proceedings reiterates the

Board's **poliey of caution’? and expresses its ‘resolve

to avoid making unnecessary awards of competitive au-

thority on routes which are adequately served.** Noting

recent traffic growth data, the Board conceded ‘‘that the

prospects for profitable competitive operations are far

stronger than earlier believed’’ and that *‘competitive serv-

ice would be more profitable than originally anticipated—

although not as profitable as Continental ciaims.’’ ** How-

ever, without further explication, it stated that ‘‘the

Board's original decision did not turn on profitability

alone... .’’°* Despite the improved financial outlook for

competition and the benefits it offered, the Board deter-

mined that, given the general state of the industry and

the recent onset of the fuel shortage, ‘‘a competitive au-

thorization is unnecessary and undesirable at this time.’’ *

The dissenting member emphasized that traffie data in-

dicated that the ALJ's 1973 foreeasts ‘‘were on sound

ground, indeed if anything conservative’? and that there

would likely be ‘‘well over 150,000 annual passengers”’

for fiseal 1975, the earliest possible first year of compet-

itive operations."* He commented: ‘Overall, it is hard to

Petition, supra note 32. at 20, JA 313.

Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, Order 74-5-17, May 3,

1974, at 2, JA 101.

‘Td. at 3,13, JA 102, 112.

* Td. at 3, JA 102.

* Jd. at 8, JA 107.

%* Dissent of Member Minetti in Order 74-5-17, at 2, JA 121.

13a

avoid the impression that the majority is not really in-

terested in whether competitive service would be profit-

able, and has effectively eliminated this as a decisional

factor.’’** Nor did he find any warrant for a denial of

competitive service in the fuel situation. In view of West-

ern’s scheduled four and a half nonstop roundtrips, the

dissent noted that ‘‘competitive service in this market is

possible today without materially increasing overall jet

fuel consumption or reducing service in other, perhaps

more essential markets.’’ ”

On June 25, 1974, Continental filed a petition for re-

view of the Board’s 1972 order and its 1974 order on re-

consideration."

II. Competition and the Public Interest Standard of the

Federal Aviation Act

Continental urges that the challenged orders must be

set aside in part because the Board failed to give ade-

quate weight to the governing statute’s mandate favoring

competition.” Petitioner’s contention rests both on an as-

°% Jd. at 3n.4, JA 122 n. 4.

*° Td. at 4-5, JA 123-24.

* The following carriers and local representatives intervened in

the action: Western Air Lines, Ine., Hughes Air Corp. d/b/a

Hughes Air West, United Air Lines, Inc., Trans World Airlines.

Ine., City of Kansas City, Missouri and Chamber of Commerce of

Greater Kansas City, City and County of Denver, Colorado, Public

Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado, San Diego Unified

Port District, The City of San Diego, and the San Diego Chamber

of Commerce. Western filed a brief in support of the CAB and the

local interests filed briefs urging competitive service. The court

granted leave to the Department of Justice to file an amicus brief.

Amicus supported petitioner’s challenge to the CAB’s order.

*? Brief for Petitioner at 18-31. Petitioner also argued that the

Board’s orders must be set aside for failure to engage in reasoned

decisionmaking. 7d. at 3-48. We believe that this case is most

naturally treated as presenting a question of the existence of sub-

lta

sessment of the general importance of competition in the

statutory scheme and an analysis of the Board’s treatment

of the record in view of that scheme. As shall be seen,

these two aspects of petitioner’s argument implicate dis-

tinct questions of statutory interpretation and substan-

tial evidence. We turn first to an examination of the role

of competition, in order to develop a framework for eval-

uating the record to determine whether the Board’s deci-

sion is supported by substantial evidence and evinces a

‘*fidelity to the functions assigned to the regulatory agen-

ey by the Congress.’’ *

‘*‘Competition to the extent necessary’’ is one of the six

public interest factors set forth in § 102 of the Federal

Aviation Act to guide the CAB ‘‘[i]n the exercise and

performance of its powers and duties.’’** The parties

present divergent interpretations of {102 and its com-

petition subsection, § 102(d). Continental contends that the

Act creates ‘‘a ‘strong presumption’ in favor of compe-

tition.’ * The CAB’s brief argues that the statute ‘‘con-

templates that competition may or may not be ‘neces-

sary’ ’’ and that competition is not per se favored ‘‘where

it endangers other policy goals in the public interest, such

as the achievement of efficient, econon ical service or the

fostering of sound economy of operations.’’“” Intervenor

Western opines that in view of the origin of the Act ‘‘it

is apparent Congress contemplated that as to Section

stantial evidenee to support the CAB’s rejection of the statutory

interest in the promotion of competition.

*8 Nee Public Service Comm'n, State of N.Y. v. FPC (Teras Gulf

Coast Area Rate Cases), 159 U.S.App.D.C, 172, 208-09, 487 F.2d

1043, 1679-80 (1973), vacated and remanded sub nom, Shell Oil

Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 417 U.S. 964, 94 S.Ct. 3166, 41

L.Ed.2d 1136 (1974).

** Section 102 is set forth at note 4 supra.

* Reply Brief for Petitioner at —

* Brief for Respondent at 20, 22.

ee ee eee

loa

102(d) the emphasis would be, not on the word ‘compe-

tition,’ but on the remainder of the phrase: to the extent

necessary to assure the sound development of an air trans-

portation system properly adapted to the needs of the

foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of

the Postal Service, and of the national defense.’’* An

examination of the origins of the statute and of its ‘‘con-

temporaneous construction’’ by persons ‘‘charged with

the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion’’*

clarifies the intended meaning of §102(d) and the rela-

tionship between competition and the other public interest

factors.

Congress first established a comprehensive system for

regulation of air transportation through the Civil Aero-

nautics Act of 1958. The legislative history of that act

makes clear that the statute was designed to correct the

abuses of unrestrained competition among carriers. The

Senate Report on the proposed legislation warned that

‘*(ejompetition among air carriers is being carried to an

extreme, which tends to jeopardize and render unsafe”’

air transportation and urged the ‘‘immediate enactment”’

of the bill to ‘‘promote an orderly development of our

Nation’s civil aeronauties’’ and to ‘‘prevent the spread of

bad practices and of destructive and wasteful tacties re-

sulting from the intense competition now existing within

the air-carrier industry.’’ *° In floor debates, Congressman

Randolph cited ‘‘rate war, cutthroat devices, and destruce-

** Brief for Intervenor Western Air Lines at 30.

** Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of

Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408, 81 S.Ct. 1529, 1535. 6

L.Ed.2d 924 (1961), queting Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co.

v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796

(1933).

#9 52 Stat. 973 (1938).

°° S.Rep.No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938) ; see H.R.Rep.No.

911, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1937).

16a

tive and wasteful practices’’ as evidence that ‘‘[t]he in-

dustry has reached the point where unbridled and unregu-

lated competition is a publie menace.’’™

However, Congress made it clear that while it was mov-

ing to safeguard against the excesses of destructive and

unrestrained competition, it was in favor of the competi-

tive principle and opposed to a policy of monopoly. In the

debates, Senator McCarran stressed that the Act estab-

lished a ‘‘nonpolitical ageney’’ that would focus on the

public interest of avoiding destructive competition where

e. g. United Air Lines already serves Chicago to Salt

Lake City, and the ageney rejects another applicant who

wants to serve the’ route, ‘‘because if you do both lines

will fail... .’’ He added:

[This] is not to say that any line may be ‘‘frozen”’

nor that any line may be perpetuated, nor that any

monopoly over any terrain may be established to the

exclusion of the necessity which the publie may pre-

sent.”?

Other speakers likewise evinced a clear intent to protect

against the evils of monopoly. Senator Borah, for exam-

ple, stated: ‘‘I have no doubt of the intent of the framers

of this proposed legislation to inhibit or prohibit monop-

oly... .’’®* And Senator Copeland, Chairman of the per-

tinent committee, pointed to the ‘‘competition to the ex-

tent necessary’’ language in the declaration of policy sec-

tion—{2 of the 1988 Act which was reenacted in 1958

as {102 of the Federal Aviation Act-—as one of ‘‘five

places in the pending bill where the question of monopoly

is dealt with in one way or another with the view to its

control and prevention.’’ ™*

283 Cong.Ree. 6507 (1938).

83 Cong. Ree. 6852 (1938). Senator McCarran was the author

of the original Senate bill.

°° 83 Cong.Rec. 6730 (1938).

“* Jd. Senator Copeland was chairman of the Senate Commerce

Committee which conducted the hearings on the bill.

17a

The central point is that this was one of an emerging

group of statutes that did not regulate the so-called ‘‘nat-

ural monopolies’’ that identified conventional public util-

ity regulation, but instead called for ‘‘regulated competi-

tion,’’ achieving the benefits of competition without the

evils of unrestrained entry or under-cost rate wars.

It is significant that Congress, addressing itself to the

air transport industry, deliberately fashioned this 1938

law so as to identify competition in express language as

a key element of the public interest. During the Senate

debate it was emphasized that both of the 1938 bills—the

McCarran bill and the Administration substitute—altered

the general declaration of policy contained in earlier bills

to take ‘‘explicit recognition of the importance of compe-

tition to the extent necessary to assure the sound develop-

ment of air transport.’’ *

Numerous early CAB opinions provide insight into the

intended role of competition in the new regulatory scheme.

In one of its first decisions the Board stated: ‘‘Reference

to both the legislative history and to the text of the act

demonstrates the congressional intent to safeguard an in-

dustry of vital importance to the commercial and defense

interests of the Nation against the evils of unrestrained

competition on the one hand, and the consequences of mo-

nopolistie control on the other.’’** The CAB read the in-

clusion of an express reference to competition in §2 to

render inapplicable doctrine developed under other trans-

portation regulatory schemes that competition should not

be authorized where an existing carrier was furnishing

adequate service and stood ready to meet any additional

°° 83 Cong.Rec. 6726 (1938) (comparison of bills submitted by

Senator Truman).

* Acquisition of Western Air Erpress Corp., 1 CAA 739, 749-50

(1940) (a § 408 case), cifed with approval in Additional North-

South California Services Case, 4 CAB 373, 374 (1943) (interpret-

ing § 2 in a route award proceeding).

18a

service needs of the public.” The Board stated explicitly

that when ‘‘competition will be neither destructive not

uneconomical . . . the Board is directed to implement com-

petition’’ because it generally promotes the other publie

interest factors set forth in § 2.° Thus the CAB concluded

in the Additional North-South California Service Case:

While no convenient formula of general applicability

may be available as a substitute for the Board’s dis-

cretionary judgment it would seem to be a sound prin-

ciple that, since competition in itself presents = 4

centive to improved service and technological devel-

opment, there would be a strong, although not pon

clusive, presumption in favor of competition on any

route which offered sufficient traffic to support com-

“T Sec American Export Airlines, Inc., 2 CAB 16, 29-31 (1940).

Snbsequent CAB decisions have firmly established that, in —

sidering the extent to which competition Is necessary to the sounc

development of the air transportation syscem, the Board has not

heen guided by the negative concept of determining first whether

the existing services met minimum standards of legal adequacy.

Nouthwest Northeast Service Case, 22 CAB 52, 60 (1955). Although

inadequacy of existing service is a factor to be weighed heavily in

assessing the need for a competitive spur, the presence of adequate

service by a monopoly earrier does not supplant the statutory

recognition of the desirability of competition. Se €, €. Oe panes

Passenger-Fare Investigation, Order 71-4-54, April 9, 1971, at 27

(“We have stated that major markets require competition regard-

less of the quality or quantity of service provided by monopoly

carriers. ") ; Syracuse-New York City Case, 24 CAB 170, 190 | 1957)

(**as to the principal criteria for authorizing competing service : the

size, importance, and potential are the prevailing factors—not 4

quacy of service’’); ilawaiian Case, 7 CAB 83, 103 (1946) ; Ae di-

tional North-South California Services Case, 4 © AB 373, 375

(1943).

Nee. ¢. g.. Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Order 71-4-

54, April & 1971, at 27; Seaboard & Western Airlines, Ine., Mail

Authorization, 29 CAB 49, 85 (1999) ; Southern Service to the W est

Case, Reopened, 18 CAB 790, 799-800 (1954) ; Trans-Pacific Air-

lines, Ltd., 122 CAB 900, 901 (1951); TATA Ageney Resolutions

Proceeding, 12 CAB 493, 509 (1951) ; Colonial Airlines, Inc., et al.,

Atlantic Seaboard Operation, 4 CAB 552, 555 (1944).

19a

peting services without unreasonable increase of to-

tal operating cost.

And it further explained in the Hawaiian Case:

The greatest gain from competition ... is the stimu-

lus to devise and experiment with new operating tech-

niq) ©. and new equipment, to develop new means of

acquiring and promoting business, including the rend-

ering of better service to the customer and the Na-

tion. . . . Competition invites comparison as to equip-

ment, costs, personnel, methods of operation, solici-

tation of traffic, all of which tend to assure the devel-

opment of an air transportation system as contem-

plated by the Act.*°

The legislative history and the early CAB decisions in-

dicate that there is no presumption in favor of competi-

tion per se because competition may prove uneconomical

and destructive of the healthy development of the industry

if the relevant market is too small to support competing

carriers. But when sufficient traffic exists to support com-

petition, certification of competing carriers is mandated

by the Act as providing the best means of effectuating the

other public interest goals contained in § 102."

°° 4 CAB 373, 375 (1943).

° 7 CAB 83 103-04 (1946).

** The CAB has repeatedly noted the unique advantages to im-

proved service offered by competition. Sce, e. g.. North Atlantic

Route Case, 6 CAB 319, 326 (1945) (‘‘No effective substitute for

healthy competition as a stimulus to progress and efficiency can

be found in monopoly.’*); Colonial Airlines, Inc., et al., Atlantic

Scaboard Operations, 4 CAB 552, 555 (1944) (‘The improvements

which flow from competitive service cannot be obtained by admin-

istrative fiat. There is no regulation conceivable which could assure

courtesy by a earrier’s employees, for example, and it would be

extremely difficult to attempt to dictate many other matters affect-

ing the quality of service rendered.’’). In the present proceeding,

the Board noted that ‘‘competition ultimately holds the greatest

potential for vigorous development of air transportation.’’ Order

72-12-29 at 3, JA 86.

20a

We place substantial reliance on this view of the role of

competition both because of the particular respect due a

‘‘contemporaneous construction of a statute by men

charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery

in motion’’ and because the Board ‘‘has from the outset

consistently taken’’ that position.®* Although Continental

and the Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, charge

that this ease is indicative of the Board’s recent unan-

nounced abandonment of this view and adoption of a route

freeze policy, we need not address that claim in view of

the Board’s failure to articulate its actions as a funda-

mental change in policy. ‘‘In our reviewing role, it is pe-

culiarly appropriate for us to take the Board at its own

word as to what it was doing, and to scrutinize the result

in terms of that process.’’* We thus proceed to an exam-

ination of the Board’s treatment of the record to deter-

mine whether there is substantial evidence indicating

either that the San Diego-Denver market lacks sufficient

traffic potential for healthy competition or that another

6 Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of

Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408, 81 S.Ct. 1529, 6 L.Ed.2d

924 (1961), quoting Norwegian Products Co. v. United States,

288 US, 294, 315, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933) ; see NRDC

v. Train, —— U.S.App.D.C. —, , 510 F.2d 692, 706 (1974).

°3 Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 12 CAB 900, 901 (1951); see

Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation, Order 69-7-135,

July 24, 1969, quoted in Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 143

US.App.D.C. 330, 338, 443 F.2d 745, 753 (1971) (‘The Board

has always taken the view that competition in markets which can

sustain it is the best guarantee of good service to the traveling

public.’’) ; Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Order 71-4-54,

April 9, 1971, at 27 (‘‘One of our principal policies has been that

the traveling publie is entitled to the benefit of competition when-

ever it is justified by existing and projected market traffc.).

** See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 13-16; Brief for United

States as Amicus Curiae at 31-34.

5 (ontinental Air Lines, Inc., supra note 63, at 341, 443 F.2d

at 756.

Ghost Abad

2la

public interest consideration outweighs the significant ben-

efits afforded by competition.”

III. Lack of Substantial Evidence to Support Rejection of

Competition

The post-remand orders under review in this case set

forth two justifications for rejecting the ALJ’s recom-

mendation that competitive nonstop service be certificated

for the San Diego-Denver market—maintenance of the

economic health of the industry and the fuel shortage.

Although a comprehensive analysis would pinpoint a num-

ber of shortcomings in the CAB’s opinions, we find that

a focused examination of the evidence supporting these

two core rationales is entirely sufficient to demonstrate

the lack of substantial evidence to underpin the Board’s

rejection of competition.

A. Promotion of Sound Economic Conditions

In its initial orders culminating in a remand for further

proceedings on the issue of competitive nonstop service,

the Board concentrated on the economic threat to Western

posed by authorization of a competing carrier. Although

the ALJ had found that the market would be large enough

to support competition in 1970, the initial forecast year,

the Board concluded that the projection was too optimistic

‘*{i]Jn view of the recent lag in nationwide traffic growth’’

** The CAB’s counsel at oral argument on appeal stated that

the Board recognized ‘‘the prime value of competition’’ and as-

serted that “‘the Board’s interpretation of the statute would be

that competition would be mandated’’ where two carriers could

achieve a profit and a reasonable return and absorb the new route

without adverse impact on their system-wide operations. Accord-

ingly, Board counsel stated that ‘‘the question would turn on the

evidence in the record as to the projections going to traffic growth

and the projections going to revenues that would be received if

competition were instituted.’’

22a

and credited Western’s ‘‘gloomy forecast’’ of ‘fa sizeable

operating loss if competitive nonstop service 1s institut-

ed.’’ * When Continental petitioned for reconsideration on

the basis that the record showed substantial growth in the

San Diego-Denver market contrary to the national trend,

the Board responded that ‘‘more recent O & D data dem-

onstrates [sic] that the market is by no means an excep-

tion to the nationwide slowdown.’’* The CAB went on to

project an $84,000 operating loss for Western in 1971

under competition with Continental and to conclude that

‘‘Continental’s advantages’’ were outweighed “by the

harm the earrier would cause to Western’s operations .. .

at a difficult period for the industry as a whole and for

Western in particular.’’® When discovery of an error

erased the $84,000 loss projection, the Board altered its

analysis of the competition issue. It remanded the ques-

tion ‘for further proceedings, stating that ‘ [t hese revised

figures render extremely close the balance of decisional

criteria—harm to Western under existing economic con-

ditions weighed against public benefit factors favoring

competition and improved beyond service. . . .’’®

Significantly, by the time of the last CAB order in May,

1974, the Board had abandoned its reliance on the threat

of competition to the profitability of Western’s San Diego-

Denver service. The ALJ and the CAB’s Bureau of Oper-

ating Rights again found that there would be substantial

growth in the market in both the 1972 and 1973 forecast

*t Opinion 70-4-46, April 9, 1970, at 4, JA 41.

°8 Order 71-3-135, March 23, 1971, at 2, JA 68.

6° Td. at 4-5, JA 70-71. The Board relied solely on 1969 growth

figures in projecting 1971 traffic. The CAB did not distinguish

earlier decisions refusing to base determinations on short-term,

recession traffie data. See New York-San Francisco Nonstop Service

Case, 29 CAB 811, 815 (1959).

7 Order 71-4-112, April 16, 1971, at 1, JA 79.

re we _—

I ee ee

So ae

23a

years and projected that both Western and Continental

would achieve sizeable profits in each of those years.”!

The Board again deemed the ALJ and Bureau of Operat-

ing Rights’ traffic forecast ‘‘too optimistic,”’ making nu-

merous downward revisions in the ALJ's forecasting as-

sumptions and concluding that the competitive service was

‘likely to produce, at best, only marginal financial re-

sults.’’** In contrast to its pre-remand orders, the Board

did not make the key bottom line profit and loss caleula-

tion in its 1972 order or include any reference to the

financial status of Western and Continental. Implicit in

the Board’s decision was its belief that any doubts as

to the profitability of competition should be resolved

against certification of a second carrier ‘‘to avoid imped-

ing the industry’s opportunities for full recovery.’’ ”

The CAB argues that its analysis of traffic projections

and balancing of public interest factors involve a ** spe-

cialized task’’ that is ‘‘within the Board’s special prov-

ince’? and that the court should defer to the agency’s

erent

™ See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.

* Opinion 72-12-29, December 8, 1972, at 3, 8-12, JA 86, 91-95,

The Bureau’s forecast had used a 7.5% annual growth rate, a 15%

stimulation figure, and estimated that 30° of the San Diezo-Twin

cities traffie would travel on Western via Denver. Using 1968-71

figures, and discounting for presumed stimulation from Western's

eommencement of nonstop flights, the Board selected a 3% growth

rate for 1972 and 1973. Yet, at the time the Board adopted its

3° figure based on recession experience, it had Western’s projec-

tion of a 10% growth rate and Western's traffic data through April,

1972, showing a 12% increase for the first four months of 1972

over the first four months of 1971. See Brief for Petitioner at 39-40.

The Board also failed to note or to explain adequately the result

that its 1973 forecast of 98409 (the ALJ's forecast of 127.409

minus the reduction of 29,000 passengers resulting from the Board's

adjustments; JA 93) was substantially lower than its corrected

projection of 106,851 passengers for 1971,

*§ Opinion 72-12-29, at 2, JA 85.

24a

expertise in these technical matters.”* In response, Conti-

nental identifies a number of danger signals that serve to

alert the court to the Board’s failure to engage in a rea-

soned application of its expertise—a predicate to re-

strained and deferential judicial review of an agency’s

actions.’® It points to the ever-shifting basis of the Board’s

decisions, the inexplicable delay in preparation of agency

orders, and the persistent conservative downgrading of the

ALJ’s and staff’s traffic forecasts in the teeth of data

revealing significant growth as danger signals indicating

that the Board’s adjustments and conclusions are a prod-

uct of ‘‘result-oriented’’ rationalization.”

We are not required to rule on this contention, to eval-

uate the strength of these danger signals or to consider

whether they undereut the deference normally accorded

to agency analyses of technical traffic matters. These mat-

ters have been obviated by the Board’s May, 1974 Opinion

and Order on Reconsideration, which concedes the need

for adjustment of its forecast and states that competition

would be profitable.’ Subsequent additions to the traffic

data that were before the Board prior to its 1972 order

convineingly demonstrated that the majority members se-

verely underestimated the size of the market. Faced with

these figures, the Board acknowledged what could not fair-

ly be denied—‘*the prospects for profitable competitive

™* Brief for Respondent at 22, 38-39.

73 See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 143 U.S.App.D.C.

$83, 393, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923, 91

S.Ct. 2229, 29 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971).

76 See Brief for Petitioner at 16-18, 47-49.

7? See Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at 3, 10, 13, JA 102, 109, 112.

78 Continental's petition for reconsideration pointed to Western’s

traffic data showing a 23.9% growth in the market during the first

eleven months of 1972 over the same period in 1971. See Petition of

Continental Air Lines, Inc. for Reconsideration of Order 72-12-29,

January 29, 1973, Appendix 10, at 1, JA 329.

25a

operations are far stronger than earlier believed’’ and

‘‘competitive service would be more profitable than orig-

inally anticipated.’’

But then the Board brushed these developments aside,

stating that its ‘‘original decision did not turn on profit-

ability alone. ...’’ * Since the profitability of Western was

the crucial reason for the original remand, we do not see

how this fairly could be discarded without explication of

why the change in this factor did not alter the conclu-

sion.’ The only factor identified in the Board’s April,

1971 order authorizing the remand of the competition ques-

tion was profitability—‘‘harm to Western under existing

economic conditions. .. .’’** The March, 1971 Supplemental

Opinion and Order on Reconsideration had pointed to the

related factor of ‘‘a difficult period . . . for Western in

particular,’’ but by May, 1974, Western’s financial situa-

tion had brightened with earnings in excess of the 12%

level found ‘‘reasonable’’ by the Board in its Domestic

Passenger-Fare Investigation. |

The only remaining factor mentioned in the CAB’s prior

decision in this matter was the financial condition of the

industry as a whole. But that consideration had been re-

lied upon solely in terms of justifying a ‘‘more than usual-

ly careful’’ approach to evaluating the competition ques-

tion in the San Diego-Denver market. That approach may

have validity, if not carried to extremes, for it still leads

*® Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at 3, 13, JA 102, 112.

*° Td. at 3, JA 102.

*t See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, su te 5

at 394, 44 F.2d at 852. ——

*? Order 71-4-112, April 16, 1971, at 1, JA 79.

a See Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Order 71-4-58,

April 9, 1971, at 2. Western’s 1973 rate of return was 12.3% and

its profit for the fiseal year ending March 31, 1974 was 14.1%.

See Brief for Petitioner at 15. _

26a

up to an ultimate decision focused on the subject market.

But we are unable to discern on what basis the Board can

glean any support from this factor of general conditions

onee it has recognized, as it now apparently has, that the

particular market will sustain competition and _ still be

profitable. If an air transport market is substantial and

thriving, we do not see how the fact that other markets

are over-served, can justify leaving this market under-

served, or depriving it of the public-interest benefits of

competition.

Is the Board obliquely saying that monopoly profits are

needed in this market to sustain overall industry earnings

when shaky?

This would not only raise serious questions of Con-

gressional intent, and adequacy of articulation of reason-

ing, but present the question whether there is evidence to

show that competition in this market will not maintain

overall profits,* by enhancing efficiency, quality of service,

and the size of this and connecting-beyond markets. In

the end we are left with the conviction that the Board’s

reference to general industry conditions is ‘‘local color’’

“Inder previous Board opinions, the important issue is not

maintenance of existing profit levels but the more fundamental

concern that carriers derive some profit from the market. See

Southern Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation, Order 73-2-89,

February 23, 1973, at 7-8 (The Board noted that, onee applicants

‘can be expected with reasonable assuranee to operate their pro-

posals at a profit,’’ ‘*{t}he relative profitability of their various

operations is therefore not nearly as important a decisional factor

as the public benefits they can provide.’’). In the present case, the

ALJ noted that the Board ‘‘traditionally does not look beyond

the estimated onerating profit or loss en a proposed operation’’ to

consider rate of return. Supplemental Initial Decision, supra note

24. at 80 n. 140, JA 610 n. 140.

* The Board in 1971 had viewed the prospect of new profitable

operation by Continental in the instant and connecting beyond

segments as a “‘significant’’ positive factor. See Order 71-3-135, .

March 23, 1971, at 4, JA 70.

27a

to gain an atmosphere of acceptability for the result, rath-

er than a novel, independent ground of decision resting on

substantial evidence.

We have not ignored the passage, in the Board’s opin-

ion denying reconsideration, which says that the indus-

try’s faltering in its effort to achieve recovery ‘‘fortifies

our resolve to avoid making unnecessary awards of com-

petitive authority on routes that are adequately served.’’ ~

The structure of this sentence suggests that the general

faltering of industry factor (which we have already dis-

cussed and found wanting) was taken in conjunction with,

and as fortifying, a separate regulatory notion that compe-

tition is ‘‘unnecessary’’ when existing (monopoly) service

is ‘‘adequate.’’ Such a concept would not only constitute

a fundamental change in doctrine that requires a more

direct address and reasoned analysis than this elliptical

reference * but more important would cencict with the in-

tent of Congress as we discern it.*

B. The Fuel Shortage

We come, finally, to the fuel shortage issue to which the

Board referred in ultimately denying reconsideration. The

onset of the oil embargo in late 1973 diminished the fuel

supplies available for air transportation. The Board’s

May, 1974 opinion grasped the fuel problem as an inde-

pendent reason for rejecting competitive service.” As the

86 Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at 2, JA 101.

®* See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, supra note 75,

at 394, 44 F.2d at 852; Northeast Airlines, Inc. y. CAB, 331 F.2d

579, 589 (1st Cir. 1964) (Aldrich, J., concurring).

88 We approve the initial construction of the Act adopted by the

Board concerning the relevance of the monopolist’s service to the

need for competition. Sce text accompanying note 57 and note 57

supra.

°° See Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at 1-2, 13, JA 100-01, 112;

Brief for Respondent in No. 74-1664, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.

CAB, at 24.

28a

Justice Department brief remarks, since fuel shortages

are a permanent fixture of American life, this is tanta-

mount to writing § )2(d) out of the Act.” Moreover, the

Justice Department aptly comments that there is no sup-

port for the Board s alleged fear that certificating com-

petitive service would increase fuel consumption at the

expense of more ‘‘essential service elsewhere’’ to the

‘‘overall’’ detriment of the public interest.’’** The crisis

of late 1973 may have justified temporary orders to pre-

serve the status quo pending analysis, but not an indefinite

abdication by CAB.” We have recently noted in another

context that the existence of an energy crisis does not

excuse a regulatory agency’s ‘‘failure to seek answers’’

pertinent to the exercise of its duties or its “abdication of’

its duty to ‘indicate fully and carefully the methods by

which, and the purposes for which, it has chosen to

act.’ 99 93

'

The CAB contends that its reference to the Remanded

Atlanta/Detroit/Cleveland/Cincinnati Investigation was

sufficient since ‘‘there was no reason for the Board to

repeat in this case what it had already said in a compan-

ion case issued on the same day.’’ * However, in the com-

panion ease the Board found that the proposed competi-

tive flights ‘‘would consume well over 10 million gallons

of fuel annually.’’ In addition, it noted that the markets

under consideration there were experiencing load factors

‘‘only moderately if at all above the Board’s rate-making

” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 31 n. 16.

"' Id. at 30; Dissent of Member Minetti on Order 74-5-17, May 3,

1974, at 4-5, JA 123-24.

* See United States v. CAB, —— U.S.App.D.C. ——, —— , 511

F.2d 1315, 1325-27.

°° See Public Service Comm’n v. FPC, —— US. App.D. C.—,

, 511 F.2d 338, 346 (1975).

* Brief for Respondent at 36.

29a

standard of 55 percent.’’** Here, by contrast, additional

fuel was not required to institute competition. At the time

of the final order, Western was planning to run four and

a half nonstop trips in the San Diego-Denver market. This

exceeded the two round trip flights each which the carriers

had proposed to institute in the remand proceedings.”

Moreover, the monthly on board coach load factors on

Western’s San Diego-Denver flights were repeatedly well

in excess of the 55% level during the 14 months ending

with July, 1973." In this context, the Board’s bare refer-

ence to the fuel shortage rationale set forth in the Atlanta-

Detroit case is not sufficient to constitute reasoned decision-

making for the disparate conditions of the San Diego-

Denver market.

Section 102 sets forth six public interest factors to guide

the CAB in the exercise of its statutory duties. We are

cognizant that in reviewing agency orders ‘‘[t]he court’s

responsibility is not to supplant the [Board’s] balance of

of these interests with one more nearly to its liking,’’*

but the state of the record establishes that the Board re-

cited the public benefits to be derived from competition,

and did not itself accord them any real weight in the

balance, dismissing them, in effect, as overborne by con-

siderations, of the health of the industry and the fuel sit-

* Opinion 74-5-18, May 3, 1974, at 4 & n. 6, JA 129 E& n. 6.

°° See Supplemental Initial Decision, supra note 24, at 28, 43 n.

9, JA 558, 573 n. 91.

** See Order 74-5-17, May 3, 1974, at Appendix A, JA 115 (6

months with load factors in excess of 60° and 3 additional months

with load factors in excess of 70).

We express no opinion on the merits of the petition to review

the companion case relied on by the CAB in the instant proceeding.

That case pending in this court, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB,

No. 74-1664 (D.C.Cir., filed June 28, 1974).

% See Permian Basin Arca Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792, 88

S.Ct. 1344, 20 L.Ed.2d 312 (1968).

30a

uation, which lacked any support in substantial evidence.

Accordingly, the challenged orders are set aside and the

record is remanded for further proceedings.

IV. Remand Proceedings

The agency proceedings eventuating in Continental’s

petition for review were commenced over 812 years ago.

Two complete evidentiary hearings have been conducted

and the ALJ has issued two thorough initial decisions

detailing the characteristics of the market, analyzing traf-

fic forecasts, and compairing the strengths of carriers seek-

ing certification. The record before us contains ample evi-

dence of the need for competing nonstop service. We agree

with Intervenor Western Air Lines that ‘‘[p]ublic policy

dictates that the case be brought to an end.’’*” We thus

contemplate that the CAB will proceed expeditiously on

remand with selection of a competing nonstop carrier.

To avoid any unnecessary delay, we note that if the Board

should invoke the procedure of petitioning this court to

modify its mandate to permit taking of additional evidence

on the pendency of this appeal, it should set forth with

particularity the matters involved and their relationship

to the desirability and feasibility of implementing compe-

tition.

Turning finally to the question of carrier selection, we

note that this issue has also been fully fleshed out in the

previous hearings. The ALJ has twice selected Continental

over the other carriers seeking nonstop authorization to

compete with Western. The Board has repeatedly noted

the substantial beyond market benefits offered by Conti-

nental and has spoken in terms of the advantages pro-

vided by Continental in addressing the related competition

question. Nonetheless, as Intervenor United Air Lines,

points out, the Board has not squarely examined the ALJ’s

findings on the carrier selection issue. On remand the CAB

*” Brief for Intervenor Western Air Lines at 25.

3la

should review the record and render a supplemental order

either adopting the ALJ’s determination or setting forth

its separate reasons for accepting or rejecting the ALJ's

selection. In view of the comprehensive record before the

agency and the public interest in a prompt determination,

we trust that the Board will proceed with expedition in

completing carrier seiection.

The case is remanded for further proceedings in ac-

cordance with this opinion.

So ordered. -

32a

APPENDIX B

Federal Aviation Act of 1958

[49 U.S.C. § 1302, § 1371. § 1486, and 5 U.S.C. § 706]

DecLARATION OF Poticy: THE Boarp

See. 102 [49 U.S.C. Code 1302]. In the exercise and per-

formance of its powers and duties uuder this Act, the

Board shall consider the following, among other things,

as being in the public interest, and in accordance with

the public convenience and necessity:

(a) The encouragement and development of an air-trans-

portation system properly adapted to the present and

future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of

the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the nation-

al defense;

(b) The regulation of air trausportation in such mar-

ner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages

of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster

sound economie conditions in, such transportation, and to

improve the relations between, and coordinate transporta-

tion, by air carriers;

(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and effi-

cient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, with-

out unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advan-

tages or unfair or destructive competitive practices;

(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the

sound development of an air-transportation system prop-

erly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic

commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and

of the national defense;

(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and

(f) The promotion, encocragement, and development of

civil aeronautics.

33a

CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND

NECESSITY

CERTIFICATE REQUIRED

Sec. 401 [49 U.S. Code 1371]. (a) No air carrier shall

engage in any transportation unless there is in force a

certificate issued by the Board authorizing such air carrier

to engage in such transportation.

IsSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE

(d) (1) The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing

the whole or any part of the transportation covered by the

application, if it finds that the application is fit, willing,

and able to perform such transportation properly, and to

conform to the provisions of this Act and the rules, regu-

lations, and requirements of the Board hereunder, and

that such transportation is required by the public conve-

nience and necessity; otherwise such application shall be

denied.

Avtnority To Mopiry, Suspenp, or RevoKe

(g) The Board upon petition or complaint or upon its

own initiative, after notice and hearings, may alter, amend,

modify, or suspend any such certificate, in whole or in

part, if the public convenience and necessity so require,

or may revoke any such certificate, in whole or in part,

for intentional failure to comply with any provision of

this title or any order, rule, or regulation issued here-

under or any term, condition, or limitation of such certifi-

cate: Provided, That no such certificate shall be revoked

unless the holder thereof fails to comply, within a reason-

able time to be fixed by the Board, with an order of the

Board commanding obedience to the provision, or to the

order (other than an order issued in accordance with this

proviso), rule, regulation, term, condition or limitation

found by the Board to have been violated. Any interested

34a

person may file with the Board a protest or memorandum

in support of or in opposition to the alteration, amend-

ment, modification, suspension, or revocation of the certifi-

eate.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ORDERS

Orpers or Boarp aNp ADMINISTRATOR SUBJECT TO Review

See. 1006 [49 U.S. Code 1486]. (a) Any order, affirma-

tive or negative, issued by the Board or Administrator

under this Act, except any order in respect of any foreign

air carrier subject to the approval of the President as

provided in section 801 of this Act, shall be subject to

review by the courts of appeals of the United States of the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

hia upon petition, filed within sixty days after the entry

of such order, by any person disclosing a substantial in-

terest in such order. After the expiration of said sixty

days a petition may be filed only by leave of the court upon

a showing of reasonable grounds for failure to file the

petition theretofore.

VENUE

(b) A petition under this section shall be filed in the

court for the cireuit wherein the petitioner resides or has

his principal place of business or in the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Notice To Boarp ok ADMINISTRATOR; FILING oF TRANSCRIPT

(c) A copy of the petition shall, upon filing, be forth-

with transmitted to the Board or Administrator by the

clerk of the court, and the Board or Administrator shall

thereupon file in the court the record, if any, upon which

the order complained of was entered, as provided in see-

tion 2112 of title 28, United States Code. [Subsection (c)

as amended by Public Law 86-546, 86th Congress, 2d Ses-

sion, approved June 29, 1960, 74 Stat. 255. |

35a

Power or Court

(d) Upon transmittal of the petition to the Board or

Administrator, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction

to affirm, modify, or set aside the order complained of, in

whole or in part, and if need be, to order further proceed-

ings by the Board or Administrator. Upon good cause

shown and after reasonable notice to the Board or Admin-

istrator, interlocutory relief may be granted by stay of

the order by such mandatoy or other relief as may be

appropiate. [subsection (d) as amended by Public Law 87-

225, 87th Congress, 1st Session, approved September 13,

1961, 75 Stat. 497.]

Fixpincs or Fact Concivsive

(e) The findings of facts by the Board or Administrator,

if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.

No objection to an order of the Board or Administrator

shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall

have been urged before the Board or Administrator or,

if it was not so urged, unless there were reasonable

grounds for failure to do so. /

CERTIFICATION OR CERTIORARI /

(f) The judgment and decree of the court affirming,

modifying, or setting aside any such order of the Beard or

Administrator shall be subject only to review by the Su-

preme Court of the United States upon certification or

certiorari as provided in section 1254 of title 28, United

States Code.

Score or Review

[5 U.S. Code 706]. To the extent necessary to decision

and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all

relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and

statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or appli-

36a

eability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing

court shall—

(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or un-

reasonably delayed; and

(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-

ings, and conclusions found to be—

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, priv-

ilege, or immunity;

(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,

or limitations, or short of statutory right;

(P} without observance of procedure required by

law ;

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a

case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this

title or otherwise reviewed on the record of

an agency hearing provided by statute; or

(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that

the facts are subject to trial de novo by the

reviewing court.

In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall

review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a par-

ty, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial

error. Pub.L. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 393.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.