Petition — Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner
Supreme Court brief1976
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the CGnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
ADOLPH Coors COMPANY,
Petitioners,
VS.
COMMISSIONER OL INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CiRCUIT
Respectfully submitted,
Gene W. Reardon
Reardon, Reardon and Reardon
A Professional Corporation
2!50 First National Bank Building
Denver. Colorado 80202
Telephone: (303) 534-1631
Attorneys for Petitioners
BRAD! D PRINTING
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CO re ere ere er rT ee ere 1
DE cise ache wade deekeb beets cacenent 2
I os sclule ple bk6ebseuub ane ae 2
STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED .............+20% 2
oe cae ha wek eh eeas eee eke een 2
EE 4G aoe eeeawne hr eueide hehe 8 2
see ee er ere are 7
REASONING FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .............-. 8
I. The Tenth Circuit Opinion that there was no
judicial determination of the overhead issue
conflicts with the taxing statute ............. 9
II. The Tenth Circuit Opinion that res judicata
and collateral estoppel doesn’t apply conflicts
with other Circuit Court decisions .......... 15
III. The Tenth Circuit Opinion that res judicata
and collateral estoppel doesn’t apply conflicts
with other U. S. Supreme Court cases ........ 18
SE bn 5 deka cenedeseesbeenckennsi cece 21
APPENDIX A — Tax Court Opinion in First Case... la
APPENDIX B — Commissioner’s Computation
Statement in First Tax Court Case ............ 28a
APPENDIX C— Decision in First Tax Court Case .... 42a
APPENDIX D — Tax Court Opinion in Second Case .. 44a
APPENDIX E — Tenth Circuit Opinion in
Ps cee w iu beseaseu tenes aceen eae 115a
APPENDIX F — Denial of Petition for
PGT oo cc cccwcccsscccccccens 122a
APPENDIX G — Section 6214(a) Internal
OEE Ee Por rT EE 123a
APPENDIX H — Rule 123(d) of Rules of Practice
and Procedure, United States Tax Court ...... 123a
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
Bettcher v. State of Colorado (En Banc, Colo. Sup. Ct.
ey Ge oe aaah eee en 14
Blander-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Il-
linois Foundation et al. (1971) 402 U.S. 313 . 17,20
Ross Bowman (1951) 17 T.C. 681 ............. 11,13
Evergreens Vv. Nunan (CA-2, 1944) 141 F.2d 927-928,
SP PP oo 6 ecb bececcsccesee’ 17
Fairmont Aluminum Company v. CIR (CA-4, 1955)
222 F.2d 622, cert. den’d. 350 U.S. 838 ......... 20
Hyman Vv. Regenstein (CA-5, 1958) 258 F.2d 502, cert.
ns I i a ekaew es 17
The LTV Corporation (7/21/75) 64 T.C.
DMs Cc cue ae Goes on eae nea cee 10,11, 13
Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co. (1895) 157
ery ae aah es eerie ae 13, 14, 20
Morris Vv. Jones (1947) 329 U.S. 545 ............6. 14
Olsen v. Muskegan Piston Ring Co. (CA-6, 1941) 117
fl rene earner 14, 16, 17, 20
Thomas A. Shaheen, Jr. (1974) 62 T.C. 359 ......... 14
CIR v. Sunnen (1948) 333 U.S. 591,597 ........... 14
James Talcott v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd. (CA-5, 1971)
444 F.2d 451, cert. den’d. 404 U.S.940 ........ 20
U.S. v. Zimmerman (CA-7, 1973) 478
RN a ER dere an ROR 14, 15, 17, 20
STATUTES AND RULES:
Internal Revenue Code (1954)
I Sk ere Chega 13
Rules of Practice and Procedure, United States Tax
Court
8 FO OS eT eee eT 13
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
ADOLPH Coors COMPANY,’
Petitioners,
VS.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,’
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
OPINIONS BELOW
First Case. The Opinion of the Tax Court in the first
case is unreported, T. C. Memo. 1968-256, filed November
7, 1968 (Appendix A, pp. la-27a, infra); Commissioner’s
computation statement was filed with the Tax Court in the
first case, after its above Opinion (Appendix B, pp. 28a-
41a, infra); the Decision of the Tax Court in the first case
was entered January 23, 1969 (Appendix C, pp. 42a-43a,
infra).
1Adolph Coors Company is referred to as Coors and Commissioner of Internal
Revenue as Commissioner.
—
Second Instant Case. The Opinion of the United States
Tax Court in a consolidated case, was filed June 12, 1973
and is reported at 60 T. C. 368 (1973) (Appendix D, pp.
44a-114a, infra); and the Opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals Tenth Circuit, in the instant Coors case, was filed
July 22, 1975 (Appendix E, pp. 115a-121a, infra).
JURISDICTION
_ The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1254(1). Coors’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc was
denied by the Division of the United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit August 25, 1975 (Appendix F, p. 122a, in-
fra). The petition for certiorari is due November 24, 1975.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Where in the first case the Commissioner, after trial,
abandoned his overhead issue determination and the Tax
Court entered judgment against the Commissioner and for
Coors, does the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion hold-
ing that res judicata and collateral estoppel doesn’t apply in
the present second case on its premise “there was no judicial
determination” of the overhead issue and it “was not judicial-
ly determined” in the first case conflict with (I) the federal
taxing statute, (II) several Circuit Courts decisions, and
(III) decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
STATUTES AN RULES INVOLVED
Internal Revenue Code (1954) Section 6214(a) (Ap-
pendix G, p. 123a, infra).
Rules of Practice and Procedure, United States Tax Court,
Rule 123(d) appears in Appendix H, p. 123a, infra.
STATEMENT
The parties and the overhead issue were the same in the
first case for the prior years 1962, 1963 and 1964 and in the
—
instant second case for the following years 1965 and 1966.
In both cases the Commissioner had determined and capi-
talized as overhead (1) part of the reported depreciation on
idle construction and repair equipment, and (2) estimated
indirect costs for self-constructed capital assets. These an-
nual capitalized amounts were substantial and were current-
ly added to taxable income for each of the five years in the
Commissioner’s two separate notices of deficiency, the first
one for years 1962-1964 and the second notice of deficiency
for 1965 and 1966. The two trials involved the Commission-
er’s changing of Coors’ long and continuous use of a full ab-
sorption method of cost accounting, extending over a fifty-
year period with the Commissioner’s tacit approval, and in
each case substantially the same set of events, accounting
documents and expert witnesses were used.
FIRST CASE
In the first case Coors filed its petition with the Tax Court,
in which it assailed the Commissioner’s determined construc-
tion overhead and capitalized depreciation issue for each of
the years 1962, 1963 and 1964. There was a full and com-
plete trial on the merits before Tax Court Judge Murdock.
After trial, Coors timely filed its brief with the Tax Court, in
which it set forth requested findings of fact, law and argu-
ment to support its request that the Tax Court redetermine
the overhead and capitalized depreciation issue for Coors and
against the Commissioner.
The Commissioner, in his brief filed with the Tax Court,
declined to further pursue the defense of his capitalized con-
struction overhead and equipment depreciation determina-
tion for each of the three years. Thereupon Judge Murdock’s
Tax Court Opinion found as facts the ultimate amounts of
self-construction overhead and idle construction equipment
depreciation determined and disallowed by the Commis-
sioner and now abandoned by him as follows (Appendix A,
p. 2a, infra):
— oe
“The Commissioner in his brief abandons the dis-
allowances of deductions made in the deficiency
notice of $405,567.07 for 1962, $560,942.25 for
1963 and $310,866.81 for 1964 representing cor-
poration costs of construction overhead and main-
tenance and costs of engineering department over-
head. He also abandons disallowances of $59,-
009.60 for 1962, $95,931.71 for 1963 and
$122,076.56 for 1964 representing depreciation
on construction equipment of the corporation.”
The Commissioner’s Computation Statement, which was
thereupon filed with the Tax Court, finds overpayments in
income taxes of $16,434.02 for 1962, $121,571.00 for 1963
and $156,322.58 for 1964. (Appendix B, pp. 28a, 29a and
30a, infra).
The Commissioner’s said Computation Statement also
finds as facts the amounts reported by Coors as Other ex-
penses and Depreciation expense for the years 1962, 1963
and 1964, which the Commissioner had capitalized and
added to income in his notice of deficiency and which he now
was decreasing income by such amounts as follows (Appen-
dix B, p. 31a, infra):
Taxable Years Ended
December 31, December 31, December 31,
Name 1962 1963 1964
Adolph Coors
Company
(Decreases) In
Income
(a) Other
expenses —
overhead $(405,567.07) $(560,942.25) $(310,866.81)
(b) Depreciation
expense $( 62,912.18), $( 58,160.75) $( 27,635.66)
The Commissioner’s “Explanation of Adjustments” ( Ap-
pendix B, p. 32a, infra) were as follows:
="
“1962
(a) The Commissioner in his brief aban-
doned the disallowance as operating expenses
of costs of construction overhead and main-
tenance in the amount of $373,218.74 and
costs of engineering department overhead in
the amount of $32,348.33. Accordingly, your
taxable income is decreased in the amount of
$405,567.07.
1963
(a) The Commissioner in his brief aban-
doned the disallowance as operating expenses’
of costs of construction overhead and main-
tenance in the amount of $506,562.04 and
costs of engineering department overhead in
the amount of $54,380.21. Accordingly, your
taxable income is decreased in the amount of
$560,942.25.
1964
(a) The Commissioner in his brief aban-
doned the disallowance as operating expenses
of costs of construction overhead and main-
tenance in the amount of $241,115.48 and
costs of engineering department overhead in
the amount of $69,751.33. Accordingly, your
taxable income is decreased in the amount of
$310,866.81.”
The Commissioner’s said computation statement finds as
facts the amounts of depreciation reported as expenses by
Coors on idle repair and construction equipment, which were
disallowed and added to income and determined in the notice
of deficiency by the Commissioner to be non-deductible
overhead costs, and the Commissioner’s Explanation of Ad-
justments for the amounts now conceded by him for the years
—
1962, 1963 and 1964 as follows (Appendix B, pp. 33a and
34a, infra):
1962. The Commissioner in his brief abandoned
his notice of deficiency determined disallowance
of depreciation on idle construction equipment and
addition to income of the amount of $59,009.60,
which sum he now concedes should be deducted
from the Commissioner’s previous determined
taxable income.
1963. The Commissioner in his brief abandoned
his notice of deficiency determined disallowance
of depreciation on idle construction equipment and
addition to income of $95,931.74, which sum he
now concedes should be deducted from the Com-
missioner’s previous determined taxable income.
1964. The Commissioner in his brief abandoned
his notice of deficiency determined disallowance
of depreciation on idle construction equipment and
addition to income of $122,076.56, which sum he
now concedes should be deducted from the Com-
missioner’s previous determined taxable income.
The Tax Court Decision following the filing of the Com-
missioner’s Computation Statement and Judge Murdock’s
Decision entered January 23, 1969, stated as follows (Ap-
pendix C, p. 42a, infra):
“Pursuant to the opinion of the Court filed Novem-
ber 7, 1968, and incorporating herein the facts
recited in the respondent’s computation as the
findings* of the Court, it is
ORDERED and DECIDED: That there is an
overpayment in income tax for the taxable year
2In conflict with the Opinion of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (Appendix
E, p. 118a, infra), actually there were “either mediate or ultimate” findings made
by the Tax Court in its first case.
— a
1962 in the amount of $16,434.02 . . . That there
iS an Overpayment in income tax for the taxable
year 1963 in the amount of $121,571.00 .. .
That there is an overpayment in income tax for the
taxable year 1964 in the amount of $156,322.58
The Commissioner appealed the first case to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals but later withdrew his appeal.
SECOND CASE
In the instant second case the Commissioner made the
same overhead deficiency determination for the following
years 1965 and 1966, with the amounts necessarily varying.
The Commissioner also made a companion adjustment un-
der Section 481 of the Internal Revenue Code, which com-
putation therefor caused him to again make his same original
deficiency capitalized overhead determination for the first
case years 1962, 1963 and 1964, in direct contradiction of
the Tax Court first case Opinion, decision and judgment re-
determining the overhead issue against the Commissioner
and for Coors. The Commissioner could have made and de-
termined the same comparable Section 481 IRC issue deter-
mination in the first case.
Coors again filed a petition in the instant second case with
the Tax Court, in which it assailed the Commissioner’s same
overhead second determination for the two following years
1965-1966, requesting the application of the doctrine of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. The Tax Court in an opinion
by a single substitute judge, who did not participate in the
trial, concluded “the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel do not apply” because of the Commissioner’s aban-
donment of the overhead issue in the first case. (Appendix
D, p. 82a, infra). Coors’ Motion requesting review by the full
Tax Court was denied.
—_
A three judge division of the United States Court of Ap-
peals, Tenth Circuit, in an Opinion authored by the one judge
who was absent from the oral arguments hearing, stated as
follows (Appendix E, pp. 118a-119a, infra):
“The overhead capitalization issue was, as taxpay-
er correctly contends, raised in the first case. How-
ever, no findings, either mediate or ultimate, were
made with respect thereto, and there was no Jju-
dicial determination of the issue. To obtain the
protection afforded by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel an issue must have been raised, litigated
and actually adjudged on the merits in the first
proceeding. Here, the overhead issue was raised,
but because it was abandoned by the IRS, was not
judicially determined. Under these circumstances
collateral estoppel cannnot apply.”
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Where in ‘he first case the Commissioner, after trial, aban-
doned his overhead issue determination and the Tax Court
entered judgment against the Commissioner and for Coors,
the Tenth Circuit Court’s Opinion‘ that res judicata and
collateral estoppel doesn’t apply in the present second case
on its premise there was “no judicial determination” of the
overhead issue and it “was not judicially determined” by the
Tax Court in the first case conflicts with (1) the federal tax-
ing statute, (II) several United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decisions, and (III) decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court.
“The cited precedents by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals of Trapp v. United
States. 177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. den’d.; Jones v. United States, 466 F.2d
131, 133 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. den'd.; and CIR v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948)
are not authority for its Opinion. In conflict these three cited cases all held that
collateral estoppel applies and, we submit, are authority for Coors’ claim that in
the instant second case collateral estoppel applies.
‘In the instant second case neither the Tax Court nor the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals directly held that the opinion and Decision of Tax Court Judge Murdock
in the first case was not a final judgment on the merits.
=
I
IN CONFLICT WITH THE OPINION OF THE TENTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, THE OPINION AND
DECISION OF THE TAX COURT IN THE FIRST CASE
WAS A JUDICIAL REDETERMINATION AND A
JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS OF THE OVERHEAD
ISSUE AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER AND FOR
COORS, FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION
OF RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
IN THE INSTANT SECOND CASE.
In the first case the Commissioner in his deficiency deter-
mination capitalized as overhead (i) part of the reported
depreciation on idle construction and repair equipment, and
(2) capitalized as overhead estimated indirect costs for se!f-
constructed capital assets. Coors assailed the Commissioner’s
overhead determinations and requested a redetermination
against the Commissioner and for Coors in its petition filed
in the United States Tax Court.
There was a full and complete trial between the parties on
the merits of the overhead issue before Judge Murdock of
the Tax Court. The Commissioner, after trial, on brief de-
faulted on his right and obligation to brief the overhead issue
and declined to continue to pursue the defense of his over-
head determination. The Commissioner in his brief stated
that he now abandons the overhead issue.
Judge Murdock in his Opinion® stated:
*The Opinion of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals makes the following er-
roneous findings: “By abandoning these adjustments, the respondent does not
concede one way or the other that Adolph Coors Company’s accounting treatment
for these items is correct. The respondent is merely abandoning any attempt to
change Adolph Coors Company's treatment of these items for the taxable years
1962, 1963 and 1964.” These “findings” of the Tenth Circuit Court are merely
self-serving statements taken from Commissioner's first case Tax Court brief,
they are non-evidentiary findings and are not findings of Judge Murdock in the
first case.
— on
“The Commissioner in his brief abandons the dis-
allowances of deductions made in the deficiency
notice of $405,567.07 for 1962, $560,942.25 for
1963 and $310,866.81 for 1964 representing cor-
poration costs of sonstruction overhead and main-
tenance and costs of engineering department over-
head. He also abandons disallowances of $59,009.-
60 for 1962, $95,931.71 for 1963 and $122,076.-
56 for 1964 representing depreciation on construc-
tion equipment of the corporation.”
Thereupon the Commissioner filed his Computation State-
ment with the Tax Court finding overpayments in income
taxes of $16,434.02 for 1962, $121,571.00 for 1963 and
$156,322.58 for 1964. The Commissioner’s Computation
Statement also finds as facts the amounts of expenses ;re-
ported by Coors, which were disallowed and determined by
the Commissioner to be non-deductible overhead costs and
now abandoned by the Commissioner for the years 1962,
1963 and 1964 as follows:
Construction Engineering
Year amounts amounts Depreciation
1962 $373,218.74 $32,348.33 $ 59,009.60
1963 506,562.04 54,380.21 95,931.74
1964 241,115.48 69,751.33 122,076.56
Judge Murdock’s Tax Court Decision, which followed, in-
corporated the facts recited in the Commissioner’s Computa-
tion Statement as the findings of the Court, it redetermined
and decided overpayments in income tax of $16,434.02 for
the year 1962, $121,571.00 for the year 1963 and $156,-
322.58 for the year 1964.
The taxing statute, Section 6214(a) Internal Revenue
Code, vested the Tax Court with jurisdiction, authority and
responsibility to redetermine the Commissioner’s deficiency
determination in the first case. The LTV Corporation
(7/21/75) 64 T.C. No. 59; (judgment from Commissioner’s
6s ios barat ows
—_—
concession); Ross Bowman (1951) 17 T.C. 681 (judgment
from Commissioner’s waiver® and disclaimer ).
In The LTV Corporation, supra, the Tax Court stated:
“We agree with petitioner that respondent’s con-
cession of no deficiency does not deprive us of ju-
risdiction over the subject matter. It would be
anomalous in the extreme if respondent’s conces-
sion on the merits deprived the Court of jurisdic-
tion to enter a decision in favor of petitioner. As
we said in Daniel E. Hannan, 52 T.C. 787 791
(1969):
[I]t is not the existence of a deficiency but the
Commissioner’s determination of a deficiency
that provides a predicate for Tax Court ju-
risdiction .. . Indeed, were this not true, then
the absurd result would be that in every case
in which this Court determined that no de-
ficiency existed, our jurisdiction would be
lost.
Having acquired jurisdiction, this Court has the
authority and responsibility to enter a decision on
the merits. Ross Bowman, 17 T.C. 681 (1951)
. . . But section 6214(b) simply makes unmis-
takably clear what is contemplated by the jurisdic-
tion conferred in section 6214(a) and the two
preceding sections: that this Court’s jurisdiction
is limited to a redetermination of the correct
amount of the deficiency, if any, for the years for
which the deficiency notice specified in section
6212 has determined a deficiency as defined in
section 6211.”
In the referred to case of Ross Bowman, supra, at pages
685-686, the Tax Court stated:
‘waiver is a synonym of abandon
— i
“Having unquestionably obtained jurisdiction for
1943, this Court may not be ousted from that status
by action of the respondent nor deprived of its
right to enter a final decision with respect to the
petitioner’s tax liability for that year. The reason
for this rule is clear. A litigant in a matter before
a court of competent jurisdiction who brings the
other party into court is entitled to an ultimate
judgment, and the opposing party cannot defeat
the jurisdiction of the court by a waiver or dis
claimer on his part. The rule is aptly stated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Last Chance Min.
Co. v. Tyler Min. Co., 157 U.S. 683, in which it
is said:
... When an action has been instituted in the
court to determine such a controversy, it is
not within the competency of the defendant
to take himself out of court. A defendant may
withdraw his answer and thus let judgment
go by default, but he does not thereby deprive
the court of a jurisdiction which has been
once established. The rule applicable here
is no different from that which applies in any
other case. When a defendant has by personal
service Or appearance once been brought into
a court, having jurisdiction of the subject
matter, he cannot at his election oust the court
of jurisdiction, or prevent the case from pass-
ing to judgment. Whether he confesses plain-
tiff’s right or defaults in answer, or files a
denial or a disclaimer, is alike immaterial. In
each and all of these cases the jurisdiction
remains and the court may enter the appro-
priate judgment. Where the defendant simply
withdraws his answer, as was this case, the
ten lynn
—=_—_—
court is under no obligations to inquire
whether he has lost all interest, but may pro-
ceed to judgment, and its judgment is an ad-
judication of the rights of the plaintiff, as
shown by the complaint and testimony...
Here, after trial in the first case, the Commissioner’s de-
cline to brief the facts of record and the law in defense of his
overhead deficiency determination and his abandonment of
the overhead issue in the first case, has the sameness of a de-
cline to continue to proceed in defense of his deficiency de-
termination, to a disclaimer, to a waiver, to a default and toa
concession of the overhead issue. Last Chance Min. Co. v.
Tyler Min. Co. (1895) 157 U.S. 683.
Rule 123(d) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure
United States Tax Court (Appendix H, p. 123a, infra) reads:
“Effect of Decision on Default . . . A decision ren-
dered upon a default . . . shall operate as an adjudi-
cation on the merits.”
Here, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion that
there was neither a judicial determination nor a judgment
on the merits of the overhead issue in the first Tax Court
case because of the Commissioner’s abandonment of the is-
sue after trial, conflicts with the aforesaid Rule 123(d) of
the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States
Tax Court.
Conclusion. It follows that Tax Court Judge Murdock’s
Opinion and Decision in the first case, contrary to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals holding, was a judicial redeter-
mination and a final judgment on the merits of the overhead
issue against the Commissioner and for Coors. Section
6214(a) Internal Revenue Code; The LTV Corporation,
supra, (judgment from Commissioner’s concession); Ross
Bowman, supra, (judgment from Commissioner’s waiver
a \ oe
and disclaimer); Thomas A. Shaheen, Jr. (1974) 62 T.C.
359 (Judgment by default); Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler
Min. Co., supra, (judgment for plaintiff from defendant’s
default, disclaimer and abandonment); U.S. v. Zimmerman
(CA-7, 1973) 478 F.2d 59 (judgment from agreement of
Commissioner and taxpayers); Olsen v. Muskegan Piston
Ring Co. (CA-6, 1941) 117 F.2d 163 (judgment from de-
fault); and Bettcher v. State of Colorado (En Banc, Colo.
Sup. Ct., 1959) 344 P.2d 969 (judgment from default and
defendant’s decline to pursue its defense).
The Tenth Circuit’s inference that Judge Murdock’s
Opinion and Decision in the first case was not a judgment
on the merits conflicts with the above taxing statute, Tax
Court cases, Circuit Court of Appeals cases, and cases of
the Colorado Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court.
The Opinion and Decision of Tax Court Judge Murdock
was a final valid judgment as to all matters of fact and law
of the overhead issue that were or should have been adjudi-
cated in the first case. Morris v. Jones (1947) 328 U.S. 545.
The guidelines underlying the doctrine of res judicata
and collateral estoppel were finalized by the Supreme Court
in CIR v. Sunnen (1948) 333 U.S. 591, 597 as follows:
“The general rule of res judicata applies to repe-
titious suits involving the same cause of action. It
rests upon considerations of economy of judicial
time and public policy favoring the establishment
of certainty in legal relations. The rule provides
that when a court of competent jurisdiction has
entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause
of action, the parties to the suit and their privies
are thereafter bound ‘not only as to every matter
which was offered and received to sustain or de-
feat the claim or demand, but as to any other ad-
ee ee Sree
w Neier ask eo rl. BNR. BAAD Wr
_ =
missible matter which might have been offered for
that purpose.’ Cromwell v. County of Sac, 97 U.S.
351, 352. The judgment puts an end to the cause
of action, which cannot again be brought into
litigation between the parties upon any ground
whatever, absent fraud or some other factor in-
validating the judgment.”
Accordingly, it is submitted for purposes of the applica-
tion of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the question of
whether Judge Murdock’s Tax Court Opinion and Decision
of the overhead issue in the first case was a judicial redeter-
mination and a judgment on the merits involves a federal
taxing statute (Section 6214(a) IRC) of national impor-
tance, which federal question is so substantial that it should
be absolutely resolved and settled by this Court.
II
THE OPINION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS IN HOLDING THAT RES JUDICATA
AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOESN’T APPLY,
BASED UPON ITS ERRONEOUS PREMISE “THERE
WAS NO JUDICIAL DETERMINATION” OF THE
OVERHEAD ISSUE AND IT “WAS NOT JUDICIALLY
DETERMINED” AND ITS ERRONEOUS INFERENCE
THERE WASN’T A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS IN
THE FIRST CASE, CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF
THE SEVENTH AND SIXTH UNITED STATES CIR-
CUIT COURT OF APPEALS: U. S. V. ZIMMERMAN,
SUPRA (JUDGMENT FROM AGREEMENT) AND
OLSEN V. MUSKEGAN PISTON RING CO., SUPRA,
(JUDGMENT FROM DEFAULT).
In U. S. v. Zimmerman, supra, where the Tax Court en-
tered decisions for joint income taxes and penalties against
a husband and wife based upon agreement of the parties, the
a
Seventh Circuit held the doctrine of res judicata to the ap-
plicable.
Olsen v. Muskegan Piston Ring Co., supra, was a case to
compel the issuance of stock and for an accounting. At the
trial Olsen declined to proceed and the company presented
testimony. The Trial Court entered an order of dismissal
with prejudice. There the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
holding that the judgment of the Trial Court was rendered
on the merits, said:
“Appellants’ contention that no judgment was
rendered on the merits also is not tenable. A judg-
ment on the merits does not require a determina-
tion of the controversy after a trial or hearing on
controverted facts. It is sufficient if the record
shows that the parties might have had their con-
troversies determined according to their respective
rights if they had presented all their evidence and
the court had applied the law. Freeman on Judg-
ments, 5th Ed., Vol. II, s823-725. Such an op-
portunity was afforded the appellant, who did not
avail himself of the right. Under such circum-
stances the dismissal with prejudice is justified.”
In the instant first case, after a full adversary trial on the
merits between Coors and the Commissioner, Coors filed its
brief with the Tax Court. The Commissioner declined and
defaulted upon his obligation and right to brief the defense
of his, overhead determination. The Commissioner in his
brief stated that he now abandons the several adjustments
of his overhead issue determination. The Tax Court in its
Opinion and Decision made findings of fact and ultimate
conclusions of the several overhead adjustments issue. The
Tenth Circuit’s Opinion here that Judge Murdock’s Opinion
and Decision was not a judicial redetermination of the over-
head issue because of the Commissioner’s abandonment is
nee a
ee ae
ee
a
untenable and in conflict with the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals judgment in Olsen v. Muskegan Piston Ring Co.,
supra.
Res Judicata. In the first case the Commissioner’s deter-
mined overhead issues for the years 1962, 1963 and 1964
were redetermined by the Tax Court for Coors. Contrarily,
in the instant second case the Commissioner again deter-
mined the same overhead issues for the years 1962, 1963
and 1964 for purposes of making his computations and de-
termination under Section 481 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denial of
the application of the doctrine of res judicata incident to the
Commissioner’s Section 481 overhead adjustment in the in-
stant second case conflicts with the cases of Hyman v. Re-
genstein (CA-5, 1958) 258 F.2d 502, cert. den’d. 359 U.S.
913 and Evergreens v. Nunan (CA-2, 1944) 141 F.2d 927-
928, cert. den’d. 323 U.S. 720.
Accordingly, it follows that the Tenth Circuit’s holding
that res judicata and collateral estoppel doesn’t apply, based
upon its erroneous premise the overhead issue “was not
judicially determined” and its erroneous inference there
wasn’t a judgment on the merits in the first case, also con-
flicts with the aforesaid cases of the Seventh and Sixth United
States Courts of Appeal, U. S. v. Zimmerman, supra, and
Olsen v. Muskegan Piston Ring Co., supra.
The Tenth Circuit’s holding that the doctrine of res judi-
cata is inapplicable equally conflicts with the decisions of
Hyman v. Regenstein, supra; and Evergreens v. Nunan,
supra.
[n view of the aforesaid conflicts between the several
Circuit Courts of Appeals, it is submitted that certiorari
should be granted and the issue finally resolved and decided
by the United States Supreme Court.
—_—
iit
WHERE THE PARTIES AND THE OVERHEAD IS-
SUE WERE THE SAME IN THE PRIOR FIRST CASE
AND THE INSTANT SECOND CASE AND WHERE
THE OPINION AND DECISION OF THE TAX COURT
IN THE PRIOR FIRST CASE CONSTITUTED A FINAL
JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS, THE TENTH CIRCUIT
OPINION THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IS NOT APPLICA-
BLE AND DISPOSITIVE OF THE OVERHEAD ISSUE
IN THE INSTANT SECOND CASE CONFLICTS WITH
THE DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT.
In Blander-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Il-
linois Foundation, et al (1971) 402 U.S. 313, a patent in-
fringement case, the Supreme Court listed with approval the
following criteria for application of the doctrine of res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel or estoppel by judgment:
“In determining the validity of a plea of res judi-
cata three questions are pertinent: Was the issue
decided in the prior adjudication identical with the
one presented in the action in question? Was there
a final judgment on the merits? Was the party
against whom the plea is asserted a party. . . to the
prior adjudication? 19 Cal. 2d, at 813, 122 P.2d,
at 895.”
1. SAME PARTIES. Here the parties in the first and
second Tax Court cases were the same.
2. SAME ISSUE. The overhead issue decided by the
Tax Court against the Commissioner and for Coors in the
first case is identical with the overhead issue decided for the
Commissioner in the instant second case by the Tax Court
and affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
3. A FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS. The
third and crucial question is whether there was “a final judg-
_
ment on the merits” by the Tax Court of the overhead issue
in the first case.
In the first case there was a full and complete trial on the
merits by the litigating parties of the overhead issue. After
trial, Coors filed its Tax Court brief setting forth the facts,
law and argument to support its request that the Tax Court
redetermine the overhead issue for Coors. The Commissioner
in his brief declined, defaulted and waived his right and ob-
ligation to continue to defend his overhead deficiency deter-
mination and therein he stated that he now abandons’ the
issue.
Judge Murdock entered his Tax Court Opinion finding
and holding that:
“The Commissioner in his brief abandons the dis-
allowances of deductions made in the deficiency
notice of $405,567.07 for 1962, $560,942.25 for
1963 and $310,866.81 for 1964 representing cor-
poration costs of construction overhead and main-
tenance and costs of engineering department over-
head. He also abandons disallowances of $59,-
009.60 for 1962, $95,931.71 for 1963 and $122,-
076.56 for 1964 representing depreciation of con-
struction equipment of the corporation.”
The Commissioner then filed his computation with the Tax
Court showing findings of overpayments in income taxes for
each of the years 1962, 1963 and 1964. The Commissioner's
computation also found as facts the amounts of expenses re-
ported by Coors, which were disallowed and determined by
the Commissioner to te non-deductible overhead costs and
now abandoned by the Commissioner for the years 1962,
1963 and 1964.
*Abandon is a synonym of “waiver” and “waive”. See definitions of “waiver” and
“waive” in Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Third Fdition, 1925 and 1959 Fdi-
tions. Tne same dictionaries define abandon “to give up with the intent to never
again claiming one’s rights or interest in, to give over or surrender completely.”
= oe
Thereupon Judge Murdock entered his Tax Court De-
cision, incorporating the findings stated in the Commis-
sioner’s computation as the findings of the Tax Court, and
redetermining overpayments in income tax of $16,343.02 for
1962, $121,571.00 for 1963 and $156,322.58 for 1964.
Accordingly, it is submitted, Judge Murdock’s Opinion
and decision redetermining income tax overpayments for the
years 1962, 1963 and 1964 was a judgment on the merits
and that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in not in-
voking the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
In conclusion, we submit that the Opinion and judgment
of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in holding that res
judicata and collateral estoppel is inapplicable, conflicts with
case law, the long established doctrine of res judicata and
collateral estoppel and is in direct conflict with U.S. Supreme
Court cases and other Circuit Court of Appeals cases.
Blander-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation, et. al., supra; Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler
Min. Co., supra (judgment from defendant’s abandonment,
default and disclaimer); '/. S. v. Zimmerman, supra, CA-7,
(judgment from agreement ); Olsen v. Muskegan Piston Ring
Co., supra CA-6 (judgment from default); Fairmont Alumi-
num Company v. CIR (CA-4, 1955) 222 F.2d 622, cert.
den’d. 350 U.S. 838 (judgment upon failure of proof) ; James
Talcott v. Allanhabad Bank Ltd. (CA-5, 1971) 444 F.2d
451, cert. den’d. 404 U.S. 940.
—_—
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Gene W. Reardon
Reardon, Reardon and Reardon
A Professional Corporation
2150 First National Bank Building
Denver, Colorado 80202
Telephone: (303) 534-1631
Attorneys for Petitioners
APPENDIX
— ja—
APPENDIX A
T. C. Memo. 1968-256
TAX COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ADOLPH Coors Co., ADOLPH Coors, JR., AND MAY KISTLER
Coors, JOSEPH Coors AND HOLLY H. Coors,
Petitioners
Vv.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos. 3179-66, 3180-66, 3181-66.
Filed November 7, 1968.
Gene W. Reardon, for the petitioners.
Richard J. Shipley, for the respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
The Commissioner determined deficiencies in income tax
of the petitioners as follows:
Adolph Coors, Jr. & Joseph and
Year Adolph Coors Co. May Kistler Coors Holly H. Coors
1962 $1,515,137.09 $7,650.00 $4,919.99
1963 873,545.20 7,650.00 5,933.27
1964 4,213,516.29 6,705.00 6,334.63
The issues requiring decision in the corporation case are:
1. Were the earnings of the company accumulated in
each year beyond its reasonable needs to avoid tax on its
shareholders,
2. Did two beer cellars and four barley receiving sta-
tions qualify as ‘Section 38 property” for investment credit
purposes, and
3. Are costs of repairs and utilities on house No. | and
depreciation on houses Nos. 1 and 2 deductible.
——
The issues for decision in the cases of the individuals are:
1. Did the Commissioner err by including in income
rental values of houses belonging to the company and oc-
cupied by the petitioners, and
2. Wasa fee paid by Joseph to an attorney to apply for
and receive a patent deductible as a business expense.
Paragraphs 29 and 40 of the stipulation are agreements to
two adjustments favoring the corporation.
The Commissioner in his brief abandons the disallowances
of deductions made in the deficiency notice of $405,567.07
for 1962, $560,942.25 for 1963 and $310,866.81 for 1964
representing corporation costs of construction overhead and
maintenance and costs of engineering department overhead.
He also abandons disallowances of $59,009.60 for 1962,
$95,931.71 for 1963 and $122,076.56 for 1964 representing
depreciation on construction equipment of the corporation.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Adolph Coors Co. (hereinafter referred to as the corpora-
tion) is a Colorado corporation. Its principal place of busi-
ness at all times material hereto was at Golden, Colorado.
Its federal income tax returns for the years 1962, 1963 and
1964 were filed with the district director of internal revenue
at Denver, Colorado.
Adolph Coors, Jr. and May Kistler Coors are husband and
wife and their legal residence at all times material hereto was
Golden, Colorado. They filed joint federal income tax re-
turns for the years 1962, 1963 and 1964 with the district
director of internal revenue at Denver, Colorado.
Joseph Coors and Holly H. Coors are husband and wife
and their legal residence at all times material hereto was
Golden, Colorado. They filed joint federal income tax re-
—
turns for the years 1962, 1963 and 1964 with the district
director of internal revenue at Denver, Colorado.
The deficiency notice to Adolph Coors Co. first states the
deficiencies determined as listed above. Then the following
is the first paragraph of the text of that document:
In accordance with the provisions of existing in-
ternal revenue laws, notice is given that the deter-
mination of your income tax liability for the
above-noted taxable year(s) discloses a deficiency
(or deficiencies) in the amount(s) shown above.
The attached statement shows the computation of
the deficiency or deficiencies.
The computations in “The attached statement” show for
each year how those deficiencies were computed and also
show how an accumulated earnings tax for each year was
computed. “The attached statement” also contains a para-
graph as follows:
It is determined that for each of the years ending
December 31, 1962, 1963 and 1964, you were
formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding
the income tax with respect to your shareholders
by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate
instead of being divided or distributed. According-
ly, the accumulated earnings tax as provided by
section 531 of the Internal Revenue Code is as-
serted for each of those years.
The amounts “asserted for each of those years” were $1,245,-
567.97 for 1962, $560,073.37 for 1963 and $4,076,129.43
for 1964.
The Commissioner, in computing the income tax deficien-
cies and the “asserted” accumulated earnings tax against the
corporation for each year, used the following amounts as the
—
corporation’s taxable income and accumulated earnings tax
net income:
Year Taxable Income | -
1962 $20,210,906.60 $ 3,263,812.91
1963 21,657,879.44 1,483,307.46
1964 27,723,068.14 10,615,920.59
All of the above amounts are erroneous and their use by the
Commissioner in determining the deficiencies and “asserting”
the accumulated earnings taxes resulted in the determination
of erroneous deficiencies and in the assertion of erroneous
accumulated earnings taxes.
William K. Coors and Joseph Coors are sons of Adolph
Coors, Jr.
The principal officers of the corporation during the tax
years were: William K. Cooss, president and chairman of the
board; Joseph Coors, executive vice president; Adolph Coors,
Jr., treasurer; and Ray V. Frost, financial vice president and
secretary. These officers and Herman F. Coors, now de-
ceased, comprised the Board of Directors. Herman F. Coors
resided in Arizona.
The capital stock of the corporation as of December 31,
1964 was as follows:
Authorized Treasury Outstanding
Class A voting common
stock ($100 par value) 12,000 687 11,313
Class B, no par, non-
voting common stock 440,000 30,054 409,946
This capital stock structure remained unchanged throughout
the years 1962, 1963 and 1964 with the exception of a re-
demption by the corporation for $507,500 of 7,000 shares
of Class B stock from the Bertha Coors Monroe Estate in
—.
October 1963. A preferred stock dividend of $10,000,000
was issued in 1951 by the corporation to holders of the com-
mon stock. A preferred stock dividend of $1,000,000 was
issued to holders of preferred stock in 1957. The capita! stock
was thereafter issued under a 1959 plan of recapitalization
in which the corporation’s common stock was reclassified as
Class A common stock and its preferred stock was changed
into Class B common stock.
The corporation had the right under its Articles of Incor-
poration and By-laws of first refusal to purchase at market
value any of its outstanding shares of capital stock which
were being offered for sale.
All of the outstanding shares of Class A common stock
were held in trust during the tax years under a trust agree-
ment executed on January 7, 1922. That agreement as
amended provides that the trustees shall have and exercise
the voting powers with respect to the Class A stock. The
amendment to the said trust agreement dated July 10, 1959
contains the following statement as to purpose of the trust:
WHEREAS the intention and purposes of said
trust agrecment as amended were and this amend-
ment is to unify, protect, preserve, and develop to
the greatest possible advantage and benefit the in-
terests of the members of the Adolph Coors family
as the beneficiaries under said Trust Agreement as
Amended, and to that end to preserve the con-
tinuity of management and of the managing per-
sonnel of Adolph Coors Co. * * *
The shareholders were given trust receipts in place of their
capital stock, and the corporation had the right of first re-
fusal to purchase any trust receipts being offered for sale.
—~- 64 —
Trust receipts representing beneficial interests in the shares
of Class A stock were held as follows during 1962:
William K. Coors 1,625 shares
Joseph Coors 1,625 shares
Adolph Coors, Jr., as Trustee of
1923 Trust of Adolph Coors 4,500 shares
Trustees of Trust of
Adolph Coors, Jr. 1,750 shares
Trustees of Trust of
Grover C. Coors 1,063 shares
Trustees of Trust of
Bertha Coors Monroe 750 shares
Total 11,313 shares
The trustees under said trust during the tax years were:
Adolph Coors, Jr., Herman Coors, William K. Coors and
Joseph Coors. Those holdings continued throughout the tax
years except that in about March 1963 the 750 shares of the
trust of Bertha Coors Monroe were purchased equally by
William K. Coors and Joseph Coors.
The following Class B shares of the corporation were held
as of December 31, 1964 in the following amounts by trusts
(created in the years indicated) of Adolph Coors and the
Trusts of the latter’s three sons and three daughters:
Adolph Coors (1923) 165,004 shares
Adolph Coors, Jr. (1946) 64,168 shares
Grover C. Coors (1952) 37,860 shares
Herman F. Coors (1946) 65,914 shares
Augusta Coors Collbran (1946) 28,250 shares
Bertha Coors Monroe (1946) 16,500 shares
Louise Coors Porter (1946) 28,250 shares
Total 405,946 shares
=_— 7g —
All of those trusts, except the irrevocable trust created by
Adolph Coors of which Adolph Coors, Jr. is sole trustee,
were created as revocable trusts but they have or will become
irrevocable upon the death of the respective settlors. The
trustees of the six trusts are the same individuals as the
trustees of the 1922 Voting Trust, except that Adolph Coors,
Jr. is not a trustee of his own trust and Herman F. Coors was
not a trustee of his trust. The beneficiaries of each of the
Class B trusts are either the respective settlors or their rela-
tives. William K. Coors and Joseph Coors each owned
2,000 Class B shares on December 31, 1964 which they ob-
tained from the Estate of Bertha Coors Monroe in 1963.
Apart from this transfer and the redemption in 1963, the
Class B shareholdings continued unchanged throughout the
years involved.
The brewery business was started in 1873 by Adolph Coors
and in 1913 it was incorporated under the laws of Colorado.
The principal business of the corporation is the production
and sale of beer and malt. The ingredients of its beer are
Rocky Mountain Spring Water, hops, barley and rice. The
Rocky Mountain Spring Water is obtained from wells drilled
by the corporation on land in the vicinity of Golden, Colo-
rado. The corporation purchases most of its hops which are
grown in the Bavarian s >tion of Western Germany. It buys
from farmers and conditions its barley within the State of
Colorado. It purchases its rice, which is grown principally in
California. The finished beer is placed in bottles, cans and
kegs at the Golden plant, from where it is promptly shipped,
either by railroad car or truck, and sold to its 180 distributors
throughout eleven Western States of the United States.
— §a—
The corporation employs numerous engineers, and it con-
ducts its own planning, designing, development and archi-
tectural work at its brewery plant. Many of the planned
projects of the engineers are scrapped and abandoned. The
corporation’s expansion projects are planned months to years
in advance of the actual starting. The corporation erects
buildings and other physical structures, as additions to its
brewery plant, from the plans drafted and approved by its
engineers and management. The corporation uses its own
equipment and work force to build these structures, and it
does its own r2pair and maintenance work. The corporation
also designs, builds and installs machinery and equipment
which are used in the operation of its brewery plant. The
corporation owns and operates a very modern, complete and
independent brewery plant.
The corporation has limited storage facilities for its pack-
aged beer, and consequently its beer is mostly shipped to its
distributors as soon as it is packaged in kegs, bottles or cans.
There were 750 breweries in the United States in the late
1940’s and only 93 in 1968. The corporation ranked tenth in
volume of sales among the nation’s brewing companies in
1966 and in 1967 it moved into seventh position. Most of the
breweries which rank ahead of the corporation sell their
products nationwide and have branch production plants.
Adolph Coors Co. has only one production plant.
+
The corporation has not increased the sales price of its
beer to its distributors in the last 20 years.
The corporation’s comparative balance sheets for the ends
—
of the taxable years 1962, 1963 and 1964 disclose the fol-
lowing:
ASSETS 1962 1963 1964
Cash $10,256,797 $ 8,740,398 $13,806,244
Tax Ant. Cert.* 2,477,756 2,505,000 8,000,000
seme Accts. Rec. 3,188,548 3,135,605 3,505,904
nventories 11,131,945 14,293,912
Prepaid and deferred masses
Charges 278,183 248,047 154,476
Total Current Assets $27,333,229 $28,922,962 $42,984,559
Investment in Corporate
Securities 793,100 735,866 733,196
Prepayment on Stock
Redemption 758,475 94,411 555,939
Fixed Assets 38,276,110 47,081,160 48,841,371
TOTAL ASSETS $67,160,914 $76,834,399 $93,115,065
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Current Liabilities 9,589,231 9,766,367 12,391,315
Non-current Liabilities 965,000 804,433 643,922
Stockholders’ Equity 56,606,683 66,263,599 80,079,828
TOTAL $67,160,914 $76,834,399 $93,115,065
WORKING CAPITAL
(Current Assets less
Current Liabilities) $17,743,998 $19,156,595 $30,593,244
NET LIQUID ASSETS
(All Cash less
Current Liabilities) $ 3,145,322 $ 1,479,031 $ 9,414,929
The demand for Coors beer has constantly exceeded pro-
duction. Each year there has been an expansion of facilities,
an increase in beer production and an increase in sales of 10
to 13 percent over the previous year.
The beer production and sales of the corporation have in-
creased from 811,995 barrels in 1953 to 2,772,309 barrels
in 1962, 3,053,241 barrels in 1963 and 3,421,132 barrels in
*U.S. Government Securities or Cerificates of Deposit.
— 10a—
1964. Gross profits increased during this period from $7,-
811,739 in 1953 to $26,223,855 in 1962, $28,345,824 in
1963 and $32,790,993 in 1964.
The corporation continuously carries on a current and a
future building and plant expansion program to meet the an-
nual increased demand for its products. This expansion pro-
gram is carried out without any interruption of the brewery’s
current output of beer. The expansion program is financed
solely from accumulated earnings. The corporation does not
borrow any money. The extent of the expansion each year is
limited to the corporation’s accumulated earnings and its
available cash on hand. Its cash position is always low in the
early months of each year, particularly in March. Early in
1964 the Board of Directors became alarmed over the cor-
poration’s low cash position and caused a temporary curtail-
ment in expansion expenditures but later in 1964 there was a
sufficient accumulation of cash to accelerate its construction
expansion. The corporation does not and cannot rely solely
on future earnings to finance its planned expansion projects
because of the uncertainty of the level of such earnings.
The following schedule shows the corporation’s cash posi-
tion including bank balances and U.S. Certificates of In-
debtedness as of quarterly dates during the tax years:
US. Cert. of
Date Bank Balances Indebtedness Total
Jan. 1, 1962 $ 9.095,560.60 $1,966,560.00 $11,062,120.60
Mar. 31, 1962 4,488,256.31 1,977,517.22 6,465,773.53
June 30, 1962 6,825,153.56 1,490,270.00 8,315,423.56
Sept. 30, 1962 8,323,399.25 1,986,250.00 10,309,649.25
Dec. 31, 1962 10,256,797.04 2,477,755.56 12,734,552.60
Mar. 31, 1963 7,197,159.67 2,.476,973.61 9,674,133.28
June 30, 1963 8,122,661.03 2,482,896.53 10,605,557.56
Sept. 30, 1963 7.621.834.05 2,500,000.00 10,121,834.05
Dec. 31, 1963 8.738,381.79 2,505,000.00 11,243,381.79
Mar. 31, 1964 5,502.880.42 2,700,000.00 8,202,880.42
June 30, 1964 9.477,028.61 3,000,000.00 12,477,028.61
Sept. 30, 1964 15,566,516.36 3,000,000.00 18,566,516.36
Dec. 31, 1964 13,806,244.02 %,000,000.00 21,806,244.02
—lla—
The expansion of the brewery facilities and the increase in
beer production requires additional cash for increases in in-
ventories and accounts receivable and proportionately in-
creased operating expenditures.
The corporation neither carries insurance nor does it main-
tain cash reserves to cover losses from fire, casualty, crop
losses, spoilage losses, business interruption losses, or other
risks and hazards.
A $14,000,000 civil suit for breach of contract was filed
against the corporation in the Denver District Court on
March 5, 1964. The corporation is not insured against any
judgment and does not have any cash reserve set aside there-
for.
The corporation would like to acquire additional water
rights and additional land should either become available.
The corporation needs substantial amounts of cash on
hand to pay its federal excise taxes for which liability is in-
curred as the beer is shipped.
The corporation has never made any loans to its stock-
holders and none of its accumulated earnings for the taxable
years were invested in nonbusiness assets.
The corporation, during the tax years, commenced or had
committed itself to 33 building projects. It worked on 22 of
them in 1962 and the remaining cost, at the end of 1962 on
those to which it was then committed, was $35,343,000.
It completed 6 in 1963 and worked on 22 others. The re-
maining cost, at the end of 1963 on those to which it was then
committed, was $28,391,000.
It completed 5 in 1964 and worked on 20 others. The re-
maining cost, at the end of 1964 on those to which it was then
committed, including the aluminum can plant, was $48,055,-
000. At that time it knew that the cost of land for the can
— 12a—
plant would be $1,500,000 and that the plant would need
$2,400,000 for aluminum cooperage.
The corporation paid federal and state taxes of over
$119,000.000 during the tax years. It paid $5,909,682.20 in
1963 with the filing of its federal income tax return for 1962,
$5,540,343.28 in 1964 for 1963 and $7,075,674.44 in 1965
for 1964. It also filed and paid substantial taxes on its declara-
tion of estimated tax for each year, including the year 1965.
The corporation had no accumulated earnings beyond the
reasonable needs of its business at the end of any of the years
1962, 1963 or 1964.
The total dividends paid by Adolph Coors Co. were as
follows:
Year Dividends Paid
1962 $513,910.80
1963 511,810.80
1964 505,510.80
Since its incorporatior in 1913 the company policy has
been to keep the corporation’s stock within the Ade'»h Coors
family. This policy has applied to both the Class A and Class
B stock. The purpose of this policy is to avoid letting “out-
siders” interfere with the management or learn about com-
pany affairs.
The principal shareholders of the corporation or holders
of beneficial interests under the various trusts in recent years
have been the six sons and daughters of Adolph Coors who
died in 1929. The sons were Grover Coors who died in 1954,
Herman F. Coors who died in January 1967, and Adolph
Coors, Jr. who in 1964 was about 80 years old. The daughters
were Bertha Coors Monroe who died in about February 1961,
Augusta Coors Collbran who died in about January 1963,
and Louise Coors Porter who died in November 1964.
— l3a—
The corporation had owned stock of six companies for
many years. None had any relation to its business.
The corporation received income from dividends as fol-
lows:
Year Dividends Paid
1962 $332,741.48
1963 411,768.85
1964 416,364.89
The following table shows the dividends reczived from the
corporation during the tax years and the minimum tax rates
at which any additional dividends would have been taxed:
Maximum
Dividends Tax
Stockholder Year Received Bracket
Adolph Coors, Jr. 1962 $144,646.24 89%
1963 144,646.24 89%
1964 142,009.52 76.5%
William K. Coors 1962 1,950.00 84%
1963 2,887.50 712%
1964 11,656.88 63.5%
Joseph Coors 1962 1,950.00 72%
1963 2,887.50 712%
1964 4,640.00 63.5%
Herman F. Coors 1962 105,312.80 715%
1963 105,312.80 75%
1964 102,171.24 66%
Louise Coors Porter 1962 60,116.00 715%
1963 60,116.00 75%
1964 44,239.00 58.5%
Cellars 11 and 12 are units. Each is an integral part of the
brewery through which the beer flows for the fermentation,
— l4a—
aging, cooling, filtration and clarification stages of produc-
tion and storage before being packaged for sale. Every detail
of each cellar was specially designed and constructed to ac-
complish the above steps in the production of the finished
product. They have no other use.
The corporation constructed a shell and steel supports to
enclose and support very large beer tanks and related equip-
ment, all of which was known as Cellar No. 11. Construction
on this facility was started in 1961 and completed and put in
use in 1963. The corporation expended $612,763.61 in 1962
and $9,734.76 in 1963 on Cellar 11. It is subject to deprecia-
tion and it has a useful life of over eight years.
The corporation constructed a similar shell and steel sup-
ports to enclose and support beer tanks and related equipment
known as Cellar No. 12. Construction on this facility was
started in 1962 and was completed and put in use in 1964.
The corporation expended $37,693.27 in 1962, $1,443,-
182.22 in 1963, and $298,140.88 in 1964 on Cellar 12. It
is subject to depreciation and has a useful life of over eight
years.
Cellars 11 and 12 are substantially identical. The enclos-
ure for the tanks and equipment of each cellar rests on con-
crete caissons, which support heavy steel columns. The
columns, together with supporting heavy cross beams, sup-
port a closely packed honeycomb of 192 large glass-lined
metal storage tanks, each weighing 40,000 pounds empty and
holding 1,584 barrels of beer. There are a number of levels
of horizontal beer storage tanks and a top level (equal to two
lower levels) of 50 fermenting tanks within each enclosure.
Each fermenting tank has a capacity of 2,000 barrels. Above
each fermentor is a stainless steel foam chamber 7 feet high
and 12 feet in diameter. The outer wall of each enclosure
consist of a four-inch weather barrier insulated by a ten-inch
blown glass wool insulation. The top of the enclosure is a
— |Sa—
weather protecting cover with a six-inch rigid styro-foam
insulation that is supported by and bolted to the top of the
fermenting tanks.
The basement of each enclosure contains the ammonia
refrigeration system for the tanks. Fans propel the refriger-
ated air through air ducts at each end of the enclosure, and
the refrigerated air circulated through controlled air baffles
located at the base of each level of tanks keeps the beer at a
controlled temperature.
The highly insulated equipment enclosures of Cellars 11
and 12 were specially designed to accommodate the beer
tanks and constitute large refrigeration units, which are ab-
solutely essential to maintain the storage and processing of
beer at fixed and controlled temperatures.
The refrigerated and air-cooling systems and the tempera-
ture controls of each cellar are checked by an employee two
or three times daily while the tanks are filled with beer.
Periodically an employee checks the pressure on the tanks and
takes beer samples for quality control purposes. Three or four
employees are required to fill and empty the beer tanks, and
two crews of two employees each clean the empty tanks.
Around and below the tanks in each cellar there is suf-
ficient room for men to tend the equipment and some space
below the tanks is used occasionally to store items tem-
porarily.
Cellars 11 and 12 were and are units usable solely for the
purposes listed above. Neither is a “building” within the
meaning of section 48(a) (1) (B) defining “section 38 prop-
perty.”
One of the most important ingredients of the Coors beer is
barley. The corporation years ago obtained seeds of barley
from Moravia and has worked since then to improve the
grain. It sells the seed to farmers who raise the barley and, if
— l6a—
it meets the Coors test, sell it to the corporation. There is only
one crop of the barley grown each year, and it is essential that
the corporation have a one-year supply on hand to insure it
against a crop failure. The corporation employs 12 agrono-
mists who work closely with the barley farmers. They super-
vise and control the planting of the seed, the fertilization, ir-
rigation, and the growing of the barley, the harvesting of the
grain, and the storage of the barley in the growers’ bins. The
seed is distributed to the growers in January and March and
is planted by April 14. The growing season for the barley is
approximately 100 days. It is harvested in August and placed
in storage bins of the growers for a three-month rest period to
overcome dormancy and develop germination to its highest
potential. The barley is shipped by the growers in November
and December to the nearest field receiving station of the
corporation. There it remains in storage under temperature
controls for over one year.
The corporation constructed a receiving station and barley
storage facility at Delta, Colorado which was completed in
September 1962 and was placed in service in 1962. It is sub-
ject to depreciation and has a useful life of more than eight
years. The corporation made a capital expenditure of $237,-
000.26 in 1962 on the construction of this facility.
The corporation constructed a receiving station and barley
storage facility at Monte Vista, Colorado. It was started in
1962 and completed and put in use in 1963. The corporation
expended $211,207.76 in 1962, $613,828.16 in 1963 and
$3,245.46 in 1964 on the construction of this facility. It is
subject to depreciation and has a useful life of more than
eight years.
The corporation started, constructed, completed and put
in use a barley receiving station and storage facility at Mont-
rose, Colorado in 1963. The corporation expended $95,-
310.29 in 1963 in constructing this facility, which is subject
to depreciation and has a useful life of over eight years.
Bae tnieintnsisntnina neste dba eases
—17a—
The corporation started construction in 1963 and com-
pleted and put in use in 1964 a barley receiving station and
storage facility at La Jara, Colorado. The corporation ex-
pended $2,409.81 in 1963 and $59,506.56 in 1964 in con-
structing this facility, which is subject to depreciation and has
a useful life of over eight years.
The facilities at Delta and Monte Vista are essentially
similar, although the Monte Vista facility is larger. The Delta
storage facility is 100 feet wide and 221 feet long. The storage
capacity is 500,000 bushels. The structure has reinforced
tapered concrete walls and is covered with a sheet metal
roof. It has two conveyor systems, one located in a gallery or
monitor at the peak of the roof for loading grain into the bins
and another conveyor system located in a tunnel beneath the
floor which is used for emptying the bins. There are walkways
along each of the conveyor systems by which employees may
operate the equipment and service it. There is a mechanical
bay area located at the end of the station which is 21 feet by
100 feet in size. This contains cleaning and elevating equip-
ment. At the end of the station next to the mechanical bay
area is a structure in which is located the grain temperature
controls and thermo-couple temperature indicators, and also
the truck scale dials.
The grain storage facility located at Monte Vista, Colo-
rado is essentially the same as that at Delta. It is, however,
considerably larger; it is 110 feet wide and 860 feet long and
consists of two wings, 400 feet long, which are divided by a
mechanical bay area in the middle which measures 60 feet
by 165 feet. This facility has the same type of equipment as
the Delta facility.
The facilities at Delta and Monte Vista are designed to re-
ceive, weigh, clean, store, and later load for shipment to
Golden, barley grown in the respective areas of the state.
During the fall or winter when the facilities are receiving
grain, normally three employees will be there. Later, during
— 18a—
the storage period, one man will visit the facility periodically.
When the grain is shipped out, one man can ordinarily per-
form that function.
The Montrose and La Jara facilities are essentially the
same. They differ from the Delta and Monte Vista facilities
in that they are receiving stations where grain can be weighed,
received and stored temporarily in a hopper, which is located
above a railroad track. The barley then is sent on to either
Delta or Monte Vista. The primary difference is that the
Montrose and La Jara stations have only temporary storage
facilities. Montrose and La Jara have enclosed spacing for
reading the truck weighing scale dial and for operating the
truck lift. During the harvest season these stations are normal-
ly operated by two employees.
After one year, the aging and storage period at the field
receiving station, the barley is shipped to the corporation’s
brewery plant in Golden. There it is processed into malt in
one of the corporation’s malt houses. The malting process
consists of spreading out the barley in compartment beds,
mixing it with water for further germination, and later putting
the mixed barley through a roasting process. Then the malt is
placed in storage for an aging period. The one-day brewing
process follows and then the beer is transferred to the cellars.
House No. | on the brewery premises was owned by the
corporation and occupied during the tax years by the corpora-
tion’s treasurer, Adolph Coors, Jr. and his wife. Depreciation
on that house of $9,377.54 for 1962, $12,110.66 for 1963
and $12,161.85 for 1964 was sustained. The Commissioner
in the notice of deficiency disallowed that depreciation.
The corporation also has owned and maintained house
No. 2 on its brewery premises. That house has been occupied
since 1953 by its executive vice president, Joseph Coors, and
his family. Depreciation on that house of $3,127.91 for 1962,
— 19a —
$4,839.39 for 1963, and $5,027.17 for 1964 was sustained.
The Commissioner disallowed that depreciation in the notice
of deficiency.
The Commissioner estimated utility expenses (one-half for
each house) for the two aforesaid houses furnished by the
corporation to be $2,400 for each year and added $2,400 to
the taxable income of the corporation for each year. The
utilities for the house occupied by Joseph were paid for by
Joseph an¢ were furnished by the Public Service Co. of Colo-
rado. Those expenditures were not deducted by the corpora-
tion on its federal income tax returns. The utilities for the
house occupied by Adolph Coors, Jr. were supplied by the
corporation’s power plant.
The corporation had commenced the construction of cellar
No. 11 in 1961 and to provide space for it, the property desig-
nated as Residence No. i was moved a short distance. The
cost of salaries, wages and materials for repairs in 1962 in-
cident to the house move amounted to $60,421.50. The cor-
poration expended in 1963 and 1964 additional amounts of
$7,763.15 and $20,372.82 for salaries, wages and materials
for repairs in connection with Residence No. 1. Those
amounts for each of the three years were added to its taxable
income in the notice of deficiency.
The Commissioner in the notice of deficiency determined
that house No. | had a rental value of $9,000 per year and
added that amount as dividend income to the taxable income
of Adolph Coors, Jr. for each of the years 1962, 1963 and
1964.
The Commissioner in the notice of deficiency determined
that the corporation’s house No. 2 had a rental value of $7,-
235.29 for 1962, $8,725.39 for 1963 and $8,725.39 for 1964
and added those amounts as dividend income to the taxable
income of Joseph Coors for each year.
—20a—
House No. 1 was old, built in 1880, and was in a very un-
attractive location for a residence in the brewery complex.
It was occupied during the tax years by Adolph Coors, Jr.
and his wife and was regularly used on behalf of the corpora-
tion for daily luncheons and frequent business meetings.
Adolph Coors, Jr. spent most of his time inspecting and
checking all parts and activities at the brewery. It was neces-
sary to the performance of his duties for the corporation and
required by the corporation that he reside on the premises of
the brewery. No amount may be included in his income on
account of his occupancy of house No. 1.
The costs of repairs to, utilities for and depreciation on
house No. 1 are deductible by the corporation..
House No. 2 was occupied by Joseph Coors and his fami-
ly. It was newer and was in a much better location than house
No. 1. However, it was on the brewery property. Joseph was
executive vice president and resident manager of the corpora-
tion, was very active in the daily operation of the business of
the corporation at the brewery and it was necessary to the
performance of his duties for the corporation that he reside
at the brewery. The rental value of that residence was not
taxable to him as income 7nd the corporation is entitled to
deduct depreciation on house No. 2.
Petitioner Joseph Coors paid $1,253.83 which was claimed
on his 1964 return as “expenses relative to research and de-
velopment of a patent of visual and audio language inter-
preter.” The Commissioner disallowed the claimed deduction.
The $1,253.83 included $800 paid to a patent lawyer for
obtaining a patent which was granted to the inventor, Paul
E. Flury and $450’ paid to a law firm to form a corporation.
Flury worked for Joseph Coors in some way. The evidence
does not show that any part of the $1,253.83 was paid as an
1Petitioner concedes in his brief that the $450 is not deductible herein.
—22la—
incident to any business regularly carried on in 1964 by
Juseph.
All stipulated facts and exhibits are incorporated herein by
this reference.
OPINION
MURDOCK, Judge: The Commissioner has “asserted”
that the corporation accumulated earnings of each year be-
yond the reasonable needs of its business and this was done
to prevent the imposition of tax upon its shareholders which
would have resulted from the payment of larger dividends to
the shareholders. He does not claim that the corporation was
formed for that purpose but claims it was availed of for that
purpose in each tax year.
The Commissioner mailed to the petitioner a notification
required by section 534 but the deficiency notice was mailed
before the expiration of the 30 days allowed by the Code
within which the petitioner could file its statement re accumu-
lated earnings and consequently no statement was filed.
The Commissioner, in the statement attached to the notice
of deficiency, “asserted” that the corporation had accumu-
lated income beyond the reasonable needs of its business in
the amounts of $3,263,812.91 for 1962, $1,483,307.46 for
1963 and $10,615,920.59 for 1964 and that the accumulated
earnings tax thereon was $1,245,567.97 for 1962, $560,-
073.37 for 1963 and $4,076,129.43 for 1964. Those asser-
tions are now obviously incorrect because of concessions of
the Commissioner in the stipulation and in his brief, by evi-
dence in this case and by the holding of this opinion on sev-
eral issues which, taken together, reduce the corporate in-
come substantially below the amounts used in the notice of
deficiency. The first question relating to each year is — were
there actual earnings of each year accumulated beyond the
reasonable needs of the business.
—22a—
The Commissioner makes a computation in his brief in an
endeavor to show that the amounts “asserted” as unreason-
able accumulations in the statement attached to the deficiency
notice are still correct for each year.* We have already stated
why they are incorrect. Furthermore, nonsequiturs and fact-
ual weaknesses on which the Commissioner’s reasoning in his
brief is based render his conclusions unacceptable for the pur-
pose of this case.
The Commissioner concedes that the petitioner needed a
large amount of its current earnings in each year for operat-
ing expenses, “working capital.” He decides how much by
making a complicated computation with a “multiple cycle
concept” which computation is not convincing because, as
already mentioned, of nonsequiturs and factual weaknesses
involved in it. He concludes that the available amounts far
exceeded the needs in each year. He unjustifiably belittles
too many of the needs of the petitioner for operating expenses,
and exaggerates the availability of working capital in his
“cycle.”
How the need for and availability of funds would coincide
or fail to coincide in regard to time during each year was an
uncertainty with which the petitioner was annually con-
fronted and with respect to which it will have to be allowed
some leeway, particularly as to estimated anticipated needs,
in a proper decision here.
The Commissioner also concedes that in determining ex-
cessive profits, all amounts actually spent in each year for
construction, less allowed depreciation, must be subtracted
from current earnings and, he says,® they have been sub-
tracted in the deficiency notice in the approximate amounts
of $6,300,000 for 1962, $9,000,000 for 1963 and $2,200,-
000 for 1964. He subtracted nothing for any incomplete
“He mentions no lower figures.
‘It is not clear from the notice of deficiency how much he subtracted but the
actual expenditures in 1962 and 1964 were far in excess of the above amounts.
—23a—
construction or anticipated needs because, he says, all con-
struction “was paid for out of current earnings.” Actually
construction was paid for out of “accumulated earnings,” of
which current earnings could become a part only as currently
earned during the year.
But in any event section 537, I.R.C. 1954, provides that
“the term ‘reasonable needs of the business’ includes the rea-
sonably anticipated needs of the business.” The corporation’s
operations do not and cannot start and stop at the beginning
and end of each year, and it had some large reasonably antici-
pated needs of its business at the end of each tax year. Work
was progressing but was not completed on numerous con-
struction projects in each year. This was particularly true in
1964 when construction was delayed temporarily. It was rea-
sonable to retain a large amount of earnings at the end of
each year to assure completion of those projects. Substantial
funds would also be needed for anticipated increases in in-
ventories, packaging and other increased production and ad-
ministration costs. A damage suit for $14,000,000 was insti-
tuted against the corporation in 1964. It carried no insurance
except against damage to others.
Because of the substantial amount of construction in
progress at all times, the corporation’s plant has been general-
ly out of balance, as William Coors testified. That is, all parts
of a desired increase in production cannot be completed or
even started at the same time or even in the same year. But
when a project is started its complement must follow as soon
as funds and circumstances permit and retention of sufficient
current earnings should be allowed for such reasonably an-
ticipated needs at the end of each year, particularly for 1964.
The corporation had, from 1954 to about 1962, been ex-
perimenting with the manufacture and use of aluminum cans
and had operated a pilot manufacturing plant for four years.
Aluminum keeps the flavor of the beer better than cans made
— 24a —
of other metals. The cost of an adequate plant to manufacture
aluminum cans had been estimated during the tax years at
$20,000,000. It was decided in the summer of 1964 to design
and build such a plant but construction was not started until
after 1964. However, this plant was a reasonably anticipated
need of the business in 1964 and the cost was going to be
large. Work on the plant was started and completed after
1964.
Neither party has set forth a computation supported by
competent evidence to determine convincingly the reasonable
needs of the business or the excess, if any, of earnings over
reasonable needs for any year. The evidence shows that this
company was continuously expanding rapidly and substan-
tially in order to remain successful in a very competitive busi-
ness and it needed funds in large amounts to do that. It had to
plan well ahead. Its annual earnings had been increasing in
most years but its officers and directors were not unreason-
able in retaining substantial amounts of current earnings of
the tax years for later needs and use.
Beer is a more popular drink in warm weather than in cold.
This, no doubt, accounts for the fact that the Coors corpora-
tion was lowest in bank deposits in March of each year. The
corporation needed funds to carry its operations through the
early months of the year when its sales were not bringing in
new profits.
A part of the funds required in the early months of 1963,
1964 and 1965 to continue construction in progress but in-
complete at the end of each year; a part of the funds needed
for reasonably anticipated additional construction at the be-
ginning of each year; funds then needed for operating ex-
penses; funds needed for the payment of state and federal
taxes in the early months of 1963, 1964 and 1965; reductions
and adjustments resulting from the stipulation, substantially
reduciiig the income shown in the deficiency notice, conces-
sions and holding herein, when combined with deductions
i patti
—25a—
properly recognized in the deficiency notice, leave no ac-
cumulations of income beyond the reasonable needs of the
corporation’s business for any of the years 1962, 1963 and
1964. We hold, after considering all of the facts and circum-
stances, that for none of the years 1962, 1963 and 1964 were
the earnings of the petitioner accumulated beyond its reason-
able needs and no accumulated earnings tax is due for those
years.
The Commissioner in his brief concedes that the two cellars
and the four receiving stations of the corporation “were used
as an integral part of its beer manufacturing business” and
that the only question is “Do these facilities come within the
definition of a building?” Sections 48 and 38, I.R.C. 1954.
Certainly the so-called cellars, numbers 11 and 12 located
at the brewery, were important and essential parts of the
process used by the corporation in producing its marketable
product. beer. Every detail of each was specially designed
and constructed for the sole purpose of performing a step in
the process of producing the finished product. They had no
other use. Beer in a partially finished state flowed into these
cellars for the final steps performed by the cellars, fermenting,
cooling, aging, filtering, clarifying and storing until the pack-
aging department put the finished beer into kegs, bottles and
cans for shipment and sales. These cellars were in no true
sense a mere “building” within the meaning of the Code. They
were units, each part of which was essential to the whole.
Each is an enclosure which is closely combined with the equip-
ment which is a part of it. Even the walls and top of the
structure were of a very special design to make the whole an
efficient part of the brewery. The cellars were “section 38
property” during the tax years.
The members of the Coors family, who have been respon-
sible for the popularity of their beer and the success of their
business, have always regarded the barley grown from the
seeds they have developed as one of the most important in-
7
—_ —27a—
gredients in the preduction and popularity of the Coors beer. The record does not provide the Court with factual details
They develop the seeds for planting and sell them to the barley from which it could find that Joseph was regularly engaged
farmers. The receiving stations have been placed for the con- in any business in which the $800 paid to a patent lawyer was
venience of the farmers and have been constructed to receive, an ordinary and necessary expense.
store and handle the barley to the best advantage of the cor- Decision will be entered
poration. Storage is the main purpose of the receiving sta- under Rule 50.
tions. The corporation tries to keep available a two-year sup-
ply of barley to avoid shortage due to a possible crop failure.
The stations are of great importance to the corporation in
storing the barley until it is needed for malting at the brewery.
The stations have no purpose except those stated herein and
were designed and constructed to best accomplish those pur-
poses and no others. The stations were “section 38 property”
during the tax years. Cf. Schuyler Grain Co., Inc., 50 T.C.
265; Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306.
House No. | was old and large for a residence. Its location
was most unattractive for a residence. A real estate agent
testified that it could not be rented as a residence because of
its location. It was occupied by Adolph Coors, Jr. and his
wife and was used on behalf of the corporation and was very
active in the day to day operation of the brewery. It was im-
portant to the corporation and the operation of the business
that he reside on the premises. The costs of repairs, utilities
and depreciation relating to house No. 1 were deductible by
the corporation. No amount should be included in Adolph’s
income on account of his occupancy of house No. 1.
Joseph Coors occupied house No. 2 so that he could be
close to the daily operations at the brewery and readily on
call should any emergency arise. The corporation provided
the house so that he would be close and would thus benefit
the corporation. The agreement had been that he would live
there for those purpo. es. The rental value of the house was
not taxable as his income and the corporation is entitled to
deduct depreciation on house No. 2. -
Pentre ded sa
—28a—
APPENDIX B
COMPUTATION STATEMENT
CC:DEN-TC:RJS:RDD:ct
In re: Adolph Coors Co.
Golden, Colorado 80401
Docket No. 3179-66
Income Tax
1962
Tax assessed and paid $9,909,682.20
Payments:
September 18,1962 $2,000,000.00
December 14, 1962 2,000,000.00
March 15, 1963 2,954,841.10
June 14, 1963 2,954,841.10
Total payments $9,909,682.20
Tax liability 9,893,248.18
Overpayment ) $ 16,434.02
Sections 6512(b)(2)(B) and 6511(b)(2)(A)
Return filed March 15, 1963
No claim filed
Deficiency notice mailed March 14, 1966
—29a—
1963
Tax assessed and paid $10,440,343.28
Payments:
September 18, 1963 $ 2,500,000.00
December 18, 1963 2,500,000.00
March 16, 1964 2,720,171.64
June 12, 1964 2,720,171.64
Total payments $10,440,343.28
Tax liability 10,318,772.28
Overpayment $ 121,571.00
Sections 6512(b)(2)(B) and 6511(b) (2) (A)
Return filed March 16, 1964
No claim filed
Deficiency notice mailed March 14, 1966
1964
Tax assessed and paid $12,453,514.44
Payments:
April 15, 1964 $ 103,420.00
June 11, 1964 103,420.00
September 14, 1964 2,585,500.00
December 14, 1964 2,585,500.00
— 30a —
1964 Continued
March 16, 1965 $ 3,537,837.22
June 14, 1965 3,537,837.22
Total payments $12,453,514.44
Tax liability 12,297,191.86
Overpayment $ 156,322.58
Sections 6512(b)(2)(B) and 6511(b) (2) (A)
Return filed March 15, 1965
No claim filed
Deficiency notice mailed March 14, 1966
The details supporting the above computation are set forth
on attached pages 4 through 13, inclusive.
The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion T. C. Memo
1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held that for none of the
years 1962, 1963 and 1964 were the earnings of the peti-
tioner accumulated beyond its reasonable needs and no ac-
cumulated earnings tax as provided by section 531 of the
Internal Revenue Code is due for those years.
The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion T. C. Memo
1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held that Cellars No. 11
and 12 and four barley receiving stations and storage facili-
ties qualify as section 38 property for investment credit pur-
poses during the years 1962, 1963 and 1964.
re,
—3la—
U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT -
FORM 3613 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE Rule 50 Computation
mance 1885) {CORPORATION INCOME TAX] ‘“‘*'sment Pages
TAXABLE YEARS ENDED
Adolph Coors Co. December 31, | December 31, | December 31,
1962 1963 1964
TAXABLE INCOME PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED IN $ $ $
STATUTORY NOTICE DATED March 14, 1966 20,210,906.60 | 21,657,879.44] 25,723,068.14
INCREASES (DECREASES) IN INCOME
(a) Other expenses — overhead (405,567.07) ] (560,942.25)] (310,866.81)
Page 5 for explanation
2) Gapeteten expen ( 62,912.18 58,160.7
Pages 6, 7 & 8 for explanation : oy C SAseReeeE ¢ Shae
(c) Repairs and Maintenance expense ( 60,421.50)] ( 7,763.15)] (¢ 20,372.82)
Page 9 for explanation ; =
(d) Other deductions ( 2,400.00) ( 2,400.00) ( 2,400.00)
Page 10 for explanation
TAXABLE INCOME AS REVISED $19,679,605.85 | $21,028,613.29 | $25,361,792.85
LESS: EXCESSOFNETLONGTERMCAPITAD | 206rt<“‘<i‘i‘ictwéwé‘ !”w;*;*é*drS!OCO~™
GAIN OVER NET SHORT-TERM — _ 219.32
CAPITAL LOSS
INCOME SUBJECT TO TAX
Rate 1962 & 1963 52% less $5,300 $19,679,605.85 | $21,028,613.29 | $25,361,573.53
PARTIAL TAX:
Rate 1964 50% less $7,000 plus
Section 1562 $10,227,895.04 | $10,929,378.91 | $12,675,286.77
ADD. 25% OF EXCESS ABOVE Bib oral _ Sareea eee sealed netiinendaeen
(26% for years beginning before 4/1/54) _ _ $4.83
TAX COMPUTATION
SUBTOTAL
$10,227,895.04 | $10,929,378.91 | $12,675,341.60
LESS TAX CREDITS: ets insite
Investment Credit
See pages 11, 12 & 13 334,646.86] 610,606.63 378,149.74
INCOME TAX LIABILITY $ 9,893,248.18 | $10,318,772.28 | $12,297,191.86
INCOME TAX PREVIOUSLY ASSESSED | ## #[| |.
* argon 9,909,682.29| 10,440,343.28] 12,453,514.44
DEFICIENCY (OVERASSESSMENT) $ ( 16,434.02)] $ (121,571.00) |$ ( 156,322.58)
— 32a—
Rule 50 Computation
Statement Page 5
Adolph Coors Co.
Explanation of Adjustments
1962
(a) The Commissioner in his brief abandoned the dis-
allowance as operating expenses of costs of construction
overhead and maintenance in the amount of $373,-
218.74 and costs of engineering department overhead
in the amount of $32,348.33. Accordingly, your tax-
able income is decreased in the amount of $405,567.07.
1963
(a) The Commissioner in his brief abandoned the dis-
allowance as operating expenses of costs of construction
overhead and maintenance in the amount of $506,-
562.04 and costs of engineering department overhead
in the amount of $54,380.21. Accordingly, your tax-
able income is decreased in the amount of $560,942.25.
1964
(a) The Commissioner in his brief abandoned the dis-
allowance as operating expenses of costs of construction
overhead and maintenance in the amount of $241,-
115.48 and costs of engineering department overhead
- in the amount of $69,751.33. Accordingly, your tax-
able income is decreased in the amount of $310,866.81.
Rule 50 Computation
Statement Page 6
Explanation of Adjustments
Adolph Coors Co.
1962
(b) The deduction for depreciation is increased $62,-
a
— 33a—
912.18 and your taxable income is decreased in a like
amount computed as follows:
(1) The Commissioner in his brief abandoned the
disallowance of depreciation on construction equip-
ment in the amount of $59,009.60.
(2) The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion
T. C. Memo 1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held
that $12,505.45 depreciation on residences furnished
by the company to Adolph Coors, Jr. and Joseph
Coors is an allowable deduction to the corporation.
(3) Due to the adjustments in (a) and (b)(1)
above, the additional depreciation of $8,602.87 as
computed in the statutory notice is eliminated.
Summary of Adjustment
(1) Depreciation on construction
equipment $(59,009.60)
(2) Depreciation on residences (12,505.45)
(3) Additional depreciation
reversed 8,602.87
Increase depreciation —
decrease taxable income
$(62,912.18)
Adolph Coors Co. Rule 50 Computation
Statement Page 7
Explanation of Adjustments
1963
(b) The deduction for depreciation in increased $58,-
160.75 and your taxable income is decreased in a like
amount computed as follows:
(1) The Commissioner in his brief abandoned the
disallowance of depreciation on construction equip-
ment in the amount of $95,931.74.
Adolph Coors Co.
— 34a—
(2) The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion
T. C. Memo 1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held
that $16,950.05 depreciation on residences furnished
by the company to Adolph Coors, Jr. and Joseph
Coors is an allowable deduction to the corporation.
(3) Due to the adjustments in (a) and (b)(1)
above, the additional depreciation of $54,721.04 as
computed in the statutory notice is eliminated.
Summary of Adjustment
(1) Depreciation on construction
equipment $(95,931.74)
(2) Depreciation on residences (16,950.05 )
(3) Additional depreciation
reversed 54,721.04
Increase depreciation — ‘
decrease taxable income $(58,160.75)
Rule 50 Computation
Statement Page 8
Explanation of Adjustments
(b) The deduction for depreciation is increased $27,-
635.66 and your taxable income is decreased in a like
amount computed as follows:
(1) The Commissioner in his brief abandoned the
disallowance of depreciation on construction equip-
ment in the amount of $122,076.56.
(2) The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion
T. C. Memo 1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held
that $17,189.02 depreciation on residences furnished
by the company to Adolph Coors, Jr. and Joseph
Coors is an allowable deduction to the corporation.
Cen rt al A et eR ne le A a eT IS te
— 35a—
-
(3) Due to the adjustments in (a) and (b)(1)
above, the additional depreciation of $111,629.92 as
computed in the statutory notice is eliminated.
Summary of Adjustment
(1) Depreciation on construction
equipment $( 122,076.56)
(2) Depreciation on residences ( 17,189.02)
(3) Additional depreciation
reversed 111,629.92
Increase depreciation —
decrease taxable income
$( 27,635.66)
Adolph Coors Co. Rule 50 Computation
Statement Page 9
Explanation of Adjustments
1962
(c) The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion
T. C. Memo 1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held
that costs of repairs in the amount of $60,421.50 in-
curred in connection with residence No. | furnished by
the corporation to Adolph Coors, Jr. are deductible. Ac-
cordingly, taxable income is decreased in the amount of
$60,421.50.
1963
(c) The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion
T. C. Memo 1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held
that costs of repairs in the amount of $7,763.15 in-
curred in connection with residence No. | furnished by
the corporation to Adolph Coors, Jr. are deductible. Ac-
cordingly, taxable income is decreased in the amount of
$7,763.15.
1964
Adolph Coors Co.
— 36a—
(c) The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion
T. C. Memo 1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held
that costs of repairs in the amount of $20,372.82 in-
curred in connection with residence No. 1 furnished by
the corporation to Adolph Coors, Jr. are deductible. Ac-
cordingly, taxable income is decreased in the amount of
$20,372.82.
Rule 50 Computation
Statement Page 10
Explanation of Adjustments
1962
(d) The Commissioner in his brief conceded that the
utilities expense relating to residence No. 2 furnished by
the corporation to Joseph Coors was paid by him in-
dividually and was not deducted by the corporation on
its federal income tax return.
The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion T. C.
Memo 1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held that the
utilities expense relating to residence No. | furnished by
the corporation to Adolph Coors, Jr. is deductible by the
corporation.
Due to the above explanations, the statutory notice ad-
justment of $2,400 to utilities expenses (estimated) is
eliminated and taxable income is decreased in a like
amount.
1963
(d) The Commissioner in his brief conceded that the
utilities expense relating to residence No. 2 furnished by
—37a—
the corporation to Joseph Coors was paid by him ‘n-
dividually and was not deducted by the corporation on
its federal income tax return.
The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion T. C.
Memo 1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held that the
utilities expense relating to residence No. 1 furnished by
the corporation to Adolph Coors, Jr. is deductible by the
corporation.
Due to the above explanations, the statutory notice ad-
justment of $2,400 to utilities expenses (estimate) is
eliminated and taxable income is decreased in a like
amount.
1964
(d) The Commissioner in his brief conceded that the
utilities expense relating to residence No. 2 furnished by
the corporation to Joseph Coors was paid by him in-
dividually and was not deducted by the corporation on
its federal income tax return.
The Tax Court of the United States in its opinion T. C.
Memo 1968-256, filed November 7, 1968, held that the
utilities expense relating to residence No. 1 furnished by
the corporation to Adolph Coors, Jr. is deductible by the
corporation.
Due to the above explanations, the statutory notice ad-
justment of $2,400 to utilities expenses (estimate) is
eliminated and taxable income is decreased in a like
amount.
— 38a —
Adolph Coors Co. Rule 50 Computation
Statement Page 11
Computation of Investment Credit
1962
Total qualified investment as
reported on return
Add: Additional qualified investment
Delta, Colorado, receiving station
$4,543,669.10
& grain storage facility 237,000.26
Total qualified investment as revised $4,780,669.36
(1) Tentative investment credit 7% $ 334,646.86
(2) Limitation Based on Amount of Tax
Limitation
Tax from page 2 $10,227,895.40
Less: (25,000.00) $ 25,000.00
Excess: Times 25% $10,202,895.40 2,550,723.76
Limitation based on amount of tax $2,575,723.76
Allowable investment credit lesser
of (1) or (2) above $ 334,646.86
— 39a —
Adolph Coors Co. Rule 50 Computation
Statement Page 12
Computation of Investment Credit
1963
Total qualified investment as
reported on return $6,977 ,309.06
Add: Additional qualified investment
Cellar No. 11 622,498.37
Receiving station and grain
storage facility
Delta, Colorado 2,798.15
Monte Vista, Colorado 825,035.92
Montrose, Colorado 95,310.29
Total qualified investment as revised $8,522,951.79
(1) Tentativeinvestment credit 7% $ 596,606.63
Add: Mathematical error on return 14,000.00*
Total tentative credit $ 610,606.63
(2) Limitation Based on Amount of Tax
Limitation
Tax from page2 $10,929,378.91
Less: (25,000.00) $ 25,000.00
Excess: Times 25% $10,904,378.91 2,726,094.73
Limitation based on amount of tax $2,751,094.73
Allowable investment credit lesser
of (1) or (2) above $ 610,606.63
*In the stipulation of facts, it was agreed that Adolph Coors Co. made a mathe-
matica! error in computing the investment credit allowable with respect to certain
equipment for the Monte Vista elevator.
—40a— —4la—
Adolph Coors Co. Rule 50 Computation | Rule 50 Computation |
Statement Page 13 REFERENCE SYMBOLS
| STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT eee | Cc:DEN-TC:RIS:-
Computation of Investment Credit NAME AND ADDRESS DOCKET NUMBER KIND OF TAX
Adolph Coors Co. 3179-66 Income
1964 an Se TAXABLE YEAR ENDED
lie 12-31-62 12-31-63 12-31-64
Total = — as $3.555,218.49 REVISED LIABILITY $9,893,248.18 | $10,318,772.28 | $12,297,191.86
reporte on return . , : ASSESSED (Disclosed by return): ie a one # ae es 4
Add: Additional qualified investment 9,909,682.20 | 10,440,343.28| 12,453,514.44
Cellar No. 12 1,779,016.37 SOSEEY COSI #
Receiving station and grain ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENTS: |
storage facility DATE DOCUMENT LOCATOR NO!
Delta, Colorado 2,742.49
La Jara, Colorado 61,916.37
Monte Vista, Colorado 3,245.46 OVERASSESSMENTS: ce
Total qualified investment as revised $5,402,139.18 ase DOCUMENT LOCATOR NO.|E7iiag
(1) Tentative investment credit 7% $ 378,149.74
| TOTAL (NET) ASSESSMENTS 9,909,682.20 | 10,440,343.28| 12,453,514.44
(2) Limitation Based on Amount of Tax Deficiency in Assessment (Overassessment) $ (16,434.02) | $ (121,571.00) | $ (156,322.58)
Limitation REVISED LIABILITY 9,893,248.18 | 10,318,772.28| 12,297,191.86
PAYMENTS (Dates) : oe ee ae
Tax from page 2 $12,675,341.60 1962 1963 1964
Less: (25,000.00) $ 25,000.00 | 9-18-62 9-18-63 4-15-64 | 2,000,000.00 | 2,500,000.00 | 103,420.00
- »* =
Excess: Times 25% $12,650,341.00 3,162,585.40 — j —s = = — re oo
Limitation based on amount of tax $3,187,585.40 6-14-63 6-12-64 12-14-64 | 2,954,841.10 | 2,720,171.64 | 2,585,500.00
3-15-65 , 3,537,837.22
Allowable investment credit lesser aren pre
of (1) or (2) above $ 378,149.74 CESS REFUNDS : —
(Dates)
TOTAL (NET) PAYMENTS 9,909,682.20 | 10,440,343.28 | 12,453,514.44
Deficiency in Payment (Overpayment) $ ( 16,434.02) | $( 121,571.00) | $( 156,322.58)
DATE DATE
IR CODE REFERENCE| DATE | acree. | STATUTE | periciency| DATE
RETUR EXTENDE AMOUNT
YEAR ENDED] “secrion| YEAR| FILED. ae| . MAILED FILED | OF CLAIM
12-31-62 | 6311 | 1984 |3-15-63| None o~ 3-14-66 | None] —
_ 12-31-63 sii 1954 | 3-16-64| None | — 3-14-66 | None| — _
12-31-64 esi 1954 | 3-15-65! None —_ 3-14-66 | None| —
US. TREASURY DEPARTMENT - INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE “FORM 3623 (7-63)
— 42a—
APPENDIX C
TAX COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ADOLPH Coors Co.,
Petitioner,
Vv. > Docket No. 3179-66
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
J
DECISION
Pursuant to the opinion of the Court filed November 7,
1968, and incorporating herein the facts recited in the re-
spondent’s computation as the findings of the Court, it is
ORDERED and DECIDED: That there is an overpay-
ment in income tax for the taxable year 1962 in the amount
of $16,434.02, which amount was paid on June 14, 1963, and
for which amount a claim for refund could have been filed
under the provisions of section 6511(b)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, on March 14, 1966, the date of the
mailing of the notice of deficiency;
That there is an overpayment in income tax for the taxable
year 1963 in the amount of $121,571.00, which amount was
paid on June 12, 1964, and for which amount a claim for re-
fund could have been filed under the provisions of section
6511(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, on
March 14, 1966, the date of the mailing of the notice of de-
ficiency; and
That there is an overpayment in income tax for the taxable
year 1964 in the amount of $156,322.58, which amount was
paid on June 14, 1965, and for which amount a claim for re-
oe ee ee een, FO ee ee en ee eet foe a ee ee ee ee ee es
TT) ee
— 43a—
fund could have been filed under the provisions of section
6511(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, on
March 14, 1966, the date of the mailing of the notice of de-
ficiency.
(Signed) J. E. MurpDock
Judge.
Entered: January 23, 1969
It is hereby stipulated that the foregoing decision is in ac-
cordance with the opinion of the Court and the respondent’s
computation, and that the Court may enter this decision,
without prejudice to the right of either party to contest the
correctness of the decision entered herein.
/s/ GENE W. REARDON
Counsel for Petitioner
/s/ RicHarp M. HaHN —ELL
RICHARD M. HAHN
Acting Chief Counsel
Internal Revenue Service
au» 449 oo
APPENDIX D
368
60 T. C. NO. 44
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
WILLIAM K. COORS and PHYLLIS E. COORS, ET AL..,’
Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REV-
ENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos.: 2837-69, 2839-69, 2840-69.
Filed June 12, 1973.
Held:
1. Where the Commissioner did not concede the correct-
ness of the company’s accounting treatment of its self-con-
structed assets in abandoning capitalization adjustments in
litigation involving the company for prior years, the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to the
present litigation.
2. The company’s method of accounting for its self-con-
structed assets does not clearly reflect its income on an annual
basis and is erroneous for Federal income tax purposes. Costs
of its self-constructed assets represent capital expenditures
under section 263, I.R.C. 1954.
3. The Commissioner properly changed the company’s
method of accounting for self-constructed assets, a recurring
material item, and made the necessary adjustments under
section 481 in 1965, the year of change, to give the company
an increased basis in its self-constructed assets on hand as of
January 1, 1965.
‘Proceedings of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith: Joseph Coors
and Holly H. Coors, Docket No. 2839-69; and Adolph Coors Company, Docket
No. 2840-69.
4
:
c
4
q
i
:
:
— 45a—
4. Thecompany is not prejudiced by the Commissioner’s
inventory adjustments.
5. Land development costs incurred by the company are
nondeductible capital expenditures.
6. Paving and fencing costs are partly deductible busi-
ness expenses and partly nondeductible capital expenditures.
7. The company’s duct work, saw room and valve test-
ing room do not qualify as section 38 property for investment
credit purposes.
8. The company is not entitled to deduct social club
membership dues paid for the personal benefit of two of its
principal stockholders and officers because under section 274 ~
and the implementing regulations it has failed to establish
that the primary use of each facility was for business purposes.
Certain amounts constitute constructive dividend income to
the two shareholders.
9. Certain expenditures by the company made for the
purpose of influencing legislation are not deductible.
10. Petitioner William K. Coors is entitled to deduct a
net loss in 1966 from the rental of an Aspen condominium.
11. The payment of a guarantor obligation by petitioner
Joseph Coors in 1965 is deductible as a non-business bad
debt.
Gene W. Reardon, for the petitioners.
Marvin T. Scott, for the respondent.
DAWSON, Judge:* Respondent determined the following
deficiencies in the Federal income taxes of petitioners:
2Pursuant to a notice of reassignment sent to counsel for all parties, and to which
no objections were filed, these cases were reassigned by the Chief Judge on De-
cember 13, 1972, from Judge Austin Hoyt to Judge Howard A. Dawson, Jr., for
disposition.
— 46a —
Petitioners Docket No. Year Deficiency
William K. Coors and
Phyllis E. Coors 2837-69 1966 $ 3,926.00
Joseph Coors and
Holly H. Coors 2839-69 1965 7,952.00
1966 7,803.00
Adolph Coors Co. 2840-69 1966 3,838,154.33
1966 ~—=—:1,268,786.83
Various concessions have been made by the parties and
will be given effect in the Rule 50 computations. The issues
remaining for decision are:
1. Whether the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel apply to certain capitalization adjustments made by
the respondent.
2. Whether the cost basis of certain self-constructed as-
sets has been understated by the Adolph Coors Company.
3. Whether respondent’s adjustments brought about a
change in the accounting method for the costs of the com-
pany’s self-constructed assets.
4. Whether adjustments under section 48 1, Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954, are applicable.
5. Whether the inventory adjustments with respect to
the company are proper.
6. Whether certain land development costs incurred by
the company are deductible business expenses or capital ex-
penditures.
7. Whether certain paving and fencing costs are capital
expenditures or deductible business expenses.
“Pursuant to a notice of reassignment sent to counsel for all parties, and to which
no objections were filed, these cases were reassigned by the Chief Judge on De-
cember 13, 1972, from Judge Austin Hoyt to Judge Howard A. Dawson, Jr., for
disposition.
:
-
:
— 47a —
8. Whether certain property qualifies as section 38 prop-
erty and is eligible for the investment tax credit.
9. Whether membership dues in social clubs paid by the
company on behalf of two stockholders are business or per-
sonal expenses and whether such amounts constitute dividend
income to the shareholders.
10. Whether certain payments made to influence legis-
lation are deductible by the company as business expenses.
11. Whether William K. Coors is entitled to deduct a net
loss from the rental of a condominium in Aspen, Colorado,
in 1966.
12. Whether the payment by Joseph Coors of a guarantor
obligation in 1965 constituted a business or nonbusiness bad
debt.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated by the parties. The
stipulation of facts and exhibits attached thereto are incor-
porated herein by this reference.
General
William K. Coors and Phyllis E. Coors, petitioners in
Docket No. 2837-69, are husband and wife. Their legal resi-
dence at the time they filed their petition herein was in
Golden, Colorado. Their joint Federal income tax return
for the year 1966 was filed with the district director of in-
ternal revenue at Denver, Colorado.
Joseph Coors and Holly H. Coors, petitioners in Docket
No. 2839-69, are husband and wife. Their legal residence
was in Golden, Colorado, when they filed their petition here-
in. Their joint Federal income tax returns for the years 1965
and 1966 were filed with the district director of internal rev-
enue at Denver, Colorado.
— 48a —
Adolph Coors Company (sometimes referred to herein as
either the company or the corporation) petitioner in Docket
No. 2840-69, is a Colorado corporation. Its principal place
of business as of the date the petition was filed herein was at
Golden, Colorado. Its Federal Corporation income tax re-
turns for the years 1965 and 1966 were filed with the district
director of internal revenue at Denver, Colorado. The cor-
poration is an accrual basis taxpayer. Its taxable year is the
calendar year.
In 1873 a brewery business was started by Adolph Coors,
the father of Adolph Coors, Jr. William K. Coors and Joseph
Coors are sons of Adolph Coors, Jr. The brewery has been
located in its present location at Golden, Colorado, since that
date. In 1913 the business was incorporated under the laws of
Colorado and the stock of Adolph Coors Company has been
held by the Adolph Coors family since incorporation. A sub-
stantial amount of the corporation’s capital stock is owned
either directly or beneficially by William K. Coors and Joseph
Coors.
During the years 1965 and 1966 the principal officers of
the corporation were: William K. Coors, president and chair-
man of the board; Joseph Coors, executive vice president;
Adolph Coors, Jr., treasurer; and Ray V. Frost, financial
vice president and secretary. The executive committee was
comprised of these same officers. These officers and Herman
F. Coors, now deceased, comprised the board of directors of
Adolph Coors Company. Herman F. Coors resided in Ari-
zona.
The principal business of the corporation is the manufac-
ture and sale of beer. The manufactured beer is placed in
bottles, cans, and kegs at its Golden, Colorado, manufactur-
ing plant, from where it is shipped either by railroad car or
truck and sold to its 180 distributors throughout the 11 West-
ern States of the United States. Adolph Coors Company is a
sr es _ =
bale a et Oe Dai,
— 49a —
regional type brewery and limits its market to 11 Western
States. It has only one production plant.
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
In its petition herein the company has affirmatively pleaded
res judicata and collateral estoppel with respect to the capital-
ization adjustments for 1965 and 1966, and with respect to
the section 481 adjustment for 1965.
In a previous notice of deficiency involving the years 1962,
1963, and 1964 respondent determined that the company
should have capitalized certain construction department over-
head costs and maintenance and certain costs of engineering
department overhead.
In the section of his brief captioned “Questions Presented”
filed in Adolph Coors Company, Docket No. 3179-66, the
respondent made the following statements:
Respondent hereby abandons the adjustment
made in the statutory notice of deficiency in the
amount of $405,567.07 for 1962, $560,942.25 for
1963, and $310,866.81 for 1964 in Docket No.
3179-66. These amounts represented costs of con-
struction overhead and maintenance and costs of
engineering department overhead. Respondent
also is hereby abandoning adjustments in the
amount of $59,009.60 for 1962, $95,931.74 for
1963, and $122,076.56 for 1964. These amounts
represent depreciation on construction equipment
which respondent determined to be capital ex-
penditures rather than operating expenses. By
abandoning these adjustments, the respondent does
not concede one way or the other that Adolph
Coors Company’s accounting treatment for these
items is correct. The respondent is merely aban-
doning any attempt to change Adolph Coors Com-
— 50a—
pany’s treatment of these items for the taxable
years 1962, 1963, and 1964. These items were re-
ferred to at paragraphs 4D and 4G of the petition
in Docket No. 3179-66.
In this Court’s Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opin-
ion in Adolph Coors Company, T. C. Memo. 1968-256, it
was stated:
The Commissioner in his brief abandons the
disallowances of deductions made in the deficiency
notice of $405,567.07 for 1962, $560,942.25 for
1963, and $310,866.81 for 1964 representing
corporation costs of construction overhead and
maintenance and costs of engineering department
overhead. He also abandons disallowances of $59,-
009.60 for 1962, $95,931.71 for 1963 and $122,-
076.56 for 1964 representing depreciation on con-
struction equipment of the corporation. [Emphasis
added.
In the notice of deficiency for the years 1962, 1963 and
1964 the amounts capitalized by the respondent were deter-
mined by adding five percent to the company’s capitalized
construction costs for such overhead. No specific account-
by-account analysis was done. The five-percent figure was an
admitted estimate. No effort was made in the previous litiga-
tion to make either a section 481 adjustment or an inventory
adjustment. The respondent did not believe the earlier ad-
justment rose to the level of a change in accounting methods
but rather considered it merely a correction of an error. The
present litigation involves a change in accounting methods
and a section 481 adjustment.
Capitalization of Overhead
A. Growth in Demand
Since the repeal of prohibition in 1934 the company has
steadily increased its production and sales. During the period
—S5la—
from 1934 through 1966 sales and production have increased
at an average compounded annual rate of 13 percent. The
company projected a substantially similar pattern for the
subsequent six years including 1972.
Throughout this expansion period the company has in-
creased its productive capacity to meet consumer demand for
its product. This capital asset program has been largely, if
not entirely, self-constructed. The company has long thought
that economies of scale and production would be essential if
it were to survive in the highly competitive brewing industry.
During the past 20 years the price of Coors beer charged by
the company to its distributors has not increased. By 1966
the company ranked tenth in volume of sales among the Na-
tion’s brewing companies. It is the largest regional brewery
in the Nation.
The company employs numerous engineers who perform
the planning, designing, development and architectural work
required for its capital additions program.
The capital budgeting decisions involve long lead times.
The increase in sales with its concomitant increase in produc-
tion requirements means that the company is at times working
on some 700 different design phases of construction. Each
phase must be closely coordinated with production require-
ments, material procurement and construction scheduling.
The company erects buildings and other needed structures
from its internally developed plans. The company also de-
signs and builds much of the machinery and equipment
needed in its brewing operations. The company is able to use
its own work force and equipment to build these structures.
Most maintenance and repair work is done by its own em-
ployees. By doing its own building and maintenance the com-
pany obtains two advantages: (1) The production of beer is
not interrupted and (2) the cost of such construction is re-
duced. The industry capitalization cost is approximately $40
— 52a—
per barrel of output. Adolph Coors Company is able to ob-
tain its productive capacity at less than half the industry-wide
figure.
To finance its capital asset acquisitions the company relies
on internally generated funds. The company does not borrow
any capital funds. In 1965 the company had noncurrent
(those due in more than one year) liabilities of only
$643,922.
A 1965 management report noted that plant expansion was
proceeding at an ever accelerating pace. The company had
reduced its construction activity in 1964 due to cash flow
difficulties. The report then stated that “with 400 employees
engaged in actual construction, 70 in design engineering and
approximately 30 in supporting staff work, 37 percent of our
total staff and much of our top level executive effort is
directly involved in plant expansion.”
During 1965 the company employees were categorized for
record keeping purposes in three classes: (1) office, salaried
and management, (2) plant and (3) construction. There was
a monthly average of 354 person in office, 588 in plant and
300 in construction in Golden, Colorado. For five months
during the year about 31 employees were engaged in con-
struction activities in Monte Vista, Colorado. The number
of employees engaged in construction rose throughout the
year 1965 from 204 in January to 398 in December. The
steady increase in this area of activity continued into 1966.
For 1966 the company employed each month an average of
515 persons in construction work. In January 1966, there
were 416 so employed; and by December 1966 there were
580 persons employed in such work.
For 1966 the monthly average employment in office,
salaried and management, totaled 425; plant required an
average of 651 persons per month; and construction required
515. The company was growing rapidly, especially on the
— 53a—
production side of its business. The construction activity in-
creased to keep up with demand. During 1965 the company
management was of the opinion that this increased construc-
tion activity would enable it to work from a base of adequate
facilities “for the sales challenge ahead.”
There are three major organizational efforts made by the
company. The office and administrative staff work supports
the line employees — those who actually produce the fin-
ished product; and the other support group involves the con-
struction efforts of an average of over 400 persons. These in-
dividuals are employed by the company because of a long-
standing policy of self-sufficiency and increased output at a
constant sales price.
B. Accounting Practices and Procedures
The company has, for cost accounting purposes, 45 sepa-
rate departments. There is no separate department for the
construction activities.
Because of the nature of its product, the company’s ac-
counting system has been organized and adapted to a full cost
absorption process costing system.
In accounting for self-constructed assets the company
capitalizes only certain indirect costs. Indirect costs are not
allocated to fixed assets. The company engineers, when work-
ing on a capital asset, have their salaries capitalized into the
cost of the asset. Engineering department expenses which go
through the cost absorption system are not allocated to a
fixed asset account. They are treated as expenses by the com-
pany and are written off without being reflected either in in-
ventory or in cost of goods sold.
In its chart of accounts the company closes garage costs
into truck operating cost. This cost is then allocated to de-
partments on the basis of usage determined by time cards
kept for each vehicle. Certain of these costs are then allocated
tv
— 54a—
to fixed assets. Although some of the plant management, per-
sonnel and occupancy expenses are distributed to various
accounting departments, these costs are not allocated to fixed
assets.
Some costs incurred are charged to one of 45 departments.
From there they are further allocated to certain subaccounts
for cost accounting purposes. At yearend these costs are then
regrouped in order to comport with the reporting require-
ments of the company’s Federal income tax return.
According to Ray Frost, the financial vice president, the
company-wide effort is concerned with the production of
beer. All efforts are directed to such end. The “construction
group” of Coors numbered 12 when Frost began working for
the company in 1926. In those days the crew was called “El-
mer Johnson’s Gang.” It was their job to build and maintain
the company’s property. The company now has a mainte-
nance crew doing the day-to-day work of keeping the plant
operating efficiently. Major repair jobs as well as construction
work are performed by the construction personnel. During
the years 1965 and 1966 the construction crew engaged in
repair and maintenance work 17.8 percent of their time. In
computing his allocations to capital assets, the respondent
adjusted the charges incurred by the construction group to
reflect this factor.
The construction personnel, when engaged in repair work,
would have their time and materials charged to various sub-
ledger repair accounts in the department involved.
As one of its 45 accounts the company has an Occupancy
account, number 0502. To this account was charged the de-
partmental expenses of the construction effort. From the Oc-
cupancy account these charges are then distributed among
14 different departments. A part of the charges to this account
are thus reflected in cost of goods sold. The balance of t..ese
— 55a—
expenses are treated as general selling and administrative ex-
penses. No part thereof is allocated to fixed asset accounts.
The total amounts charged by the company to the Oc-
cupancy subledger during 1965 and 1966 were $1,901,353
and $2,399,936, respectively. Respondent broke these ac-
counts down and, as a result, capitalized and added to in-
come $886,729.29 for 1965 and $1,346,851.34 for 1966.
For 1965 the respondent capitalized 46.6 percent of the
amounts charged to Occupancy. For 1966 he determined
56.1 percent of these charges to be capital in nature.
The following table shows the adjustments made by re-
spondent:
Account
(a) Occupancy-Direct Labor
(b) Occupancy-Supervision
$ 99,055.90 $ 8,617.86 $ 90,438.04
$ 15,993.53 $ 73,958.84
89,952.37
63,406.55
234,095.27
$
121,517.37
194,260.13
11,579.42
133,096.79
212,771.23
52,132.87
192,473.13
11,273.68
18,511.10
41,622.14
(c) Occupancy-S/W for Repair
(d) Occupancy-Matl for Repair
164,132.42*
15,640.22
187,372.64
95,836.82*
20,724.62
124,523.28
— 56a—
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15,083.32
196,515.85
1,437.29
18,726.05
16,520.61
215,241.90
12,666.83
99,047.42
2,739.19
21,418.91
15,406.02
120,466.33
(k) Occupancy-Plant Mgt. and Research
(I)
Occupancy-Truck Costs
8,473.45 88,922.47**
97,395.92
20,943.81
65,997.62**
14,271.92
80,269.54**
(m) Occupancy-Retirement Plan Costs
(n) Occupancy-Depreciation, Bldgs.
(0) Occupancy-Depreciation, M&E
19,121.70
80,346.37
1,822.11
7,656.23
15,095.16
3,264.31
13,583.50
18,359.47
76,397.65
$1,086,445.50
88,002.60
62,814.15
$191,754.37 $886,729.29
$1,482,793.16 $128,341.82 $1,346,851.34
Totals
* Adjusted to reflect concessions made by the parties.
**Conceded by respondent in toto.
—57a—
The charges to “Occupancy-Direct Labor” that reflected
the cost of those support personnel not of the skilled crafts-
man class engaged in construction activities were withdrawn
and capitalized. These individuals work on any given job as
directed. They are supportive of the skilled labor employed
by the company.
A further charge to this account involved storeroom labor
who spent one-half of their working hours in support of the
construction department.
During 1965 this account was charged with $191,597.09.
Of this, $89,952.37 was construction related. Reduced by the
“repair percentage” amount of $15,993.53, the balance
($73,958.84) was capitalized. For 1966 this same procedure
resulted in the capitalization of $90,438.04.
The “Occupancy-Supervision” amount was adjusted for
salaries paid construction supervisors. The bulk of the salaries
paid construction supervisors is capitalized with respect to
the capital asset then being constructed. Any salary paid to
these supervisors for time not actually spent on site is charged
to the Occupancy account. Such non-onsite payments include
sick leave, vacation pay, jury duty and the like.
There are certain construction supervisors whose func-
tion does not include onsite supervision. The supervisors in
central scheduling or in the sheet metal shop do not work on
a particular job. The salaries paid to these persons is charged
to the Occupancy account and deducted. Respondent reduced
this by the standard repair percentage of 17.78 and capital-
ized the balance.
The account “Occupancy-Salaries and Wages for Repair”
was charged with vacation and holiday pay for foremen, re-
pair work on construction department machinery and indirect
support activities for the construction effort. To reflect the
indirect support activities respondent reduced the gross ad-
justment by 10 percent in addition to the standard repair per-
—58a—
centage. For 1965 the amount capitalized was $192,473.13
of the $458,073.53 charged to the account. For 1966 the ad-
justment totaled $194,260.13 of $470,686.25 so charged.
The charge to “Occupancy-Repair Materials” was adjusted
to reflect materials purchased to maintain tools and equip-
ment used in the construction work. This adjustment totaled
$95,836.82 for 1965 and $164,132.42 for 1966. The Sup-
plies Expense subledger in Occupancy was reduced by $187,- .
422.89 for 1965 and $338,327.13 for 1966. The respondent
arrived at these adjustments not by an item-by-item examina-
tion of all supply material purchased for these two years. A
random sample was used. All vendor invoices for February
1966 were analyzed. Each vendor supplying more than $500
charged to this account in 1965 and $1,000 in 1966 was
listed. Of the $276,516.67 charged to this account in 1965,
$243,762.67 worth of supplies were procured from vendors
doing $500 or more in business with the company. The
$1,000 or above class of vendors supplied $361,229.97 of
the $422,396.69 charged to this account in 1966.
In 1965 the respondent charged 80 percent of the supplies
to construction and 20 percent to occupancy. The 1965 re-
pair allocation of 17.78 percent was then applied to arrive at
the 1965 capitalization figure.
For 1966 the construction effort consumed 84 percent of
the supplies charged to this account, while occupancy utilized
the remaining 16 percent.
To arrive at the capitalization ratio the respondent deter-
mined that, if over one-half of the dollar amount of the in-
voice was delivered to “construction receiving,” then the
entire dollar amount was allocated to construction. If over
one-half of the dollar amount of the invoice was delivered to
general stores, then one-half was allocated to construction
and one-half to occupancy.
— 59a —
In arriving at the net adjustment for 1966 the respondent
used as a repair allocation 8.70 percent, reducing the gross
adjustment of $370,566.41 to $338,327.13.
The account “Occupancy-Material for Repair” was ana-
lyzed in the same manner as supplies expense. The cost of
those materials procured primarily for the purpose of main-
taining construction equipment was capitalized after a repair
allocation was made. In 1965 the adjustment was $95,836.-
82; for 1966 it was $164,132.42. Both of these amounts were
adj usted to reflect concessions made with respect to residence
repairs.
The minor adjustment to “Occupancy-General Expenses”
resulted from the capitalization of janitorial services con-
tracted outside the company. These services were rendered
exclusively to the construction group.
The minor adjustment of “Occupancy-Rent” represented
rental payments for various tools and equipment used in con-
struction. After being reduced by the repair allocation, the
balance was capitalized. |
Respondent adjusted four nonoccupancy accounts during
these two years. These were:
Adjustment Amount Capitalized
1965 1966
Group Insurance $57,753.34 $ 76,014.21
Plant Mgmt. & Research 71,135.15 116,001.57
Personnel Department 46,597.27 81,290.99
Compensation Insurance — 17,471.77
These costs are allocated quarterly to various departments on
the basis of a ratio of the salaries and wages of the particular -
department receiving the allocation to the total wages of all
departments receiving the allocation.
A portion of the payroll costs of employees working on
capital asset projects is capitalized by the company. The per-
— 60a —
centage is developed by dividing the salaries and wages of the
particular department by the total wages of all departments
receiving the allocation. This figure is then applied to the
cost group being allocated. These costs are then distributed
to various accounting departments in the brewery, to occu-
pancy and finally to “Payroll Taxes, Capital Accounts.”
The same percentage figure showing capitalized salaries
is also allocated every quarter to Group Insurance Costs,
Compensation Insurance Costs, Personnel Department Costs
and Plant Management and Research Costs. These are then
charged to a profit and loss account, “Payroll Taxes, Capital
Accounts.” The amount in this account was taken as a deduc-
tion by the company.
Respondent capitalized these claimed deductions dollar
for dollar. No repair allocation adjustment was made.
In the Occupancy accounts the company maintains the fol-
lowing subaccounts:
a) Occupancy-Group Insurance Costs
b) Occupancy-Compensation Insurance Costs
c) Occupancy-Personnel Department Costs
d) Occupancy-Plant Management and Research
Costs
A portion of the costs of these four groupings is allocated
quarterly to the four occupancy accounts bearing the same
title. To arrive at the gross capitalization adjustment of the
accounts the respondent used the same wage and salary fig-
ures used by the company. After being reduced by the repair
percentage allocation, the balance in these accounts was
capitalized.
The company maintains a Garage Cost subledger as well
as a Truck Operating Cost subledger. Garage costs are all
closed into truck operating costs quarterly.
—6la—
During 1965 and 1966 a portion of these costs were allo-
cated to capital assets. In 1965 truck operating costs totaled
$539,565.77 of which $153,717.44 was charged to occu-
pancy. In 1966 of $823,865.46 truck operating costs the sum
of $268,614.96 was charged to occupancy.
Here again the respondent arrived at his allocation on the
basis of a statistical sampling procedure. The analysis of
activity showed 82.59 percent of the expense to be attributa-
ble to construction, 6.10 percent to occupancy and 11.31
percent was unidentified. The 11.31 percent was not capital-
ized. Only the 82.59 percent was capitalized. After a repair
allocation was applied, the balance was capitalized and dis-
allowed as a current expense.
For 1965 the respondent adjusted the account — “Occu-
pancy-Depreciation, Buildings” with respect to construction
property, such as the shops and other out buildings. The de-
preciation claimed, reduced by the repair allocation, was
disallowed as a deduction and capitalized. This was $15,-
095.16 in 1965 and $19,121.70 in 1966.
The company charges, either directly or by means of an
allocation, depreciation to the separate accounting depart-
ments. Depreciation is allocated on a time card basis during
which machinery and equipment are actually utilized on a
particular capital project. When equipment is idle deprecia-
tion On equipment acquired prior to 1965 is charged to an
idle equipment account. Depreciation on idle equipment ac-
quired after 1965 is charged to “Occupancy-Machinery and
Equipment.”
The gross charges to these accounts were reduced by the
repair allocation. The balances were disallowed as current
expenses and capitalized. With respect to the nonoccupancy
account, “Depreciation-Idle Equipment,” the amounts dis-
allowed are $25,966.81 for 1965 and $9,853.96 for 1966.
— 62a—
With respect to the account “Occupancy-Depreciation,
Machinery and Equipment.” the respondent determined that
the standard repair allocation $62,814.15 in 1965 was im-
properly deducted as an expense. For 1966 the improper de-
duction was found to be $80,346.37. These amounts were —
capitalized by respondent.
The company maintains a Purchasing Department charged
with the responsibility for all purchases for the company.
During 1965 the monthly average employment level in the
department was 12. In 1966 it rose to 24. The purchasing de-
partment maintains several employees on a full-time basis in
the construction group in order to expedite their material
requisitions. No part of the purchasing department costs is
capitalized. They are expensed in full.
The purchasing department was split into two divisions.
The efforts of about one-half of the purchasing department
employees not physically located in construction related to
securing materials needed for the construction of capital as-
sets. Sixty percent of the department's total effort was found
to be related to the procurement of construction material. Re-
duced by the repair allocation, this resulted in the disallow-
ance in 1965 of $82,205.07 as an expense and $160,396.91
in 1966. These amounts were capitalized.
During 1965 and 1966 the monthly average number of
employees working in the engineering department was 52 and
70 respectively.
Each engineer and draftsman keeps a time slip to record
time spent on each project during the day. These charges are
periodically allocated to capital assets under construction.
Engineering costs and construction costs are treated sub-
stantially the same. The difference lies in the treatment of
overhead costs. Those attributable to the engineering depart-
ment are so charged. The various occupancy accounts are
charged with construction overhead.
—63a—
All engineering supplies and materials are currently de-
ducted. No part thereof is allocated to fixed assets.
The costs incurred in research and development by the
company are currently deducted.
In his analysis of the time cards, respondent found engi-
neering time devoted to repairs as well as to research and
development. For 1965, 29.06 percent was found; for 1966
it was 31.19 percent. These percentages were applied to the
adjusted engineering department costs to reduce the adjust-
ment to “repairs and other” costs. For 1965 and 1966 the
respective amounts of engineering department costs capital-
ized were $122,779.99 and $157,389.02.
Certain construction workers’ labor costs were charged to
repairs in the accounting department in which new construc-
tion was in progress. These costs included the cost of scaf-
folding, tool room runners, project rework and site clean up.
No repair allocation was made with respect to the follow-
ing labor costs:
Department Capitalized
1965 1966
Steam Building $ 26,416.54 $ 49,667.05
Barley Malting 25,867.58 42,075.71
Beer Bottling 97,155.63 145,308.35
Brewing and Cellars 55,032.70 36,074.58
Totals $204,472.45 $273,125.69
The amounts allocated to capital construction were further
allocated by respondent to individual assets, thus increasing
the basis in such assets.
For 1965 and 1966 additional investment credits of $26,-
150.79 and $40,140.22, respectively, were allowed by virtue
of such capitalization.
| The adjustments in capitalization charges resulted in an
increase of $531,217.67 in allowable depreciation for the
— 64a —
year 1965. This resulted in a corresponding decrease in 1965
taxable income.
For 1966 the increase in allowable depreciation was $51 1,-
977.38 with a similar decrease in taxable income.
Change in Method of Accounting or Treatment of
a Material Item and Section 481 Adjustment
The company’s practice of deducting in part as current
expense and including in part in cost of goods sold a portion
of the direct costs of new capital construction, and all of the
indirect or overhead costs of new capital construction, does
not clearly reflect income.
The disallowance by respondent of a major portion of the
construction department and the engineering department in-
direct or overhead costs, and the capitalization thereof, con-
stitutes a change in method of accounting or a change in the
treatment of a material item within the meaning of sections
446 and 481(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Respondent’s method of computation should be applied in
determining the company’s additional basis in self-con-
structed assets on hand January 1, 1965.
Respondent's method of computing the section 481 adjust-
ment is reasonable and substantially accurate.
Inventory Adjustments
Respondent adjusted the company’s inventory accounts as
follows:
Inventory Grouping Net Adjustments
1965 1966
Inventory of Malt $ 66,615.51 $ 5,707.64
Inventory in Cellars 127,989.43 84,879.57
Denver inventories 242.07 26.86
Packages in Bottle House 3,067.49 (807.05)
Totals $197,914.50 $89,807.02
——
—65a—
The adjustments reduced the valuation of the inventory
and to that extent reduced taxable income in an amount
equal to the adjustment.
. The 1966 opening and closing inventories were both ad-
justed.
Land Development Costs
Respondent determined that certain amounts claimed as
expenses by the company and consequently deducted in full
in the year incurred were actually a portion of site develop-
ment costs. Respondent determined that these expenditures
were properly includable in the basis of the land. The amounts
at issue are:
Cost Grouping Amount
1965 1966
Relocation of 32nd Ave. $ 26,681.63 $129,810.33
East Springs Earth Fill 40,621.06
Straightening Clear Creek 12,255.54
Adolph Coors Company is as self-contained as it is possi-
ble to be. The company attempts to be vertically integrated
throughout its manufacturing process. It obtains Rocky
Mountain spring water from wells drilled by it. It purchases
hops from Bavaria, rice from California and barley from
Colorado. The seed to grow the barley, a most important in-
gredient to its product, is supplied to certain Colorado farm-
ers by the company. Barley thus grown, which meets its
specifications, is purchased. The company has enjoyed con-
siderable success and is one of the ten largest breweries in the
country. It has achieved this status in spite of its regional
markets and limited number of suppliers.
As a part of its drive for vertical integration, the company
determined that it needed a plant to make its own aluminum
beer cans te which it affixed its own labels.
— 66a—
The company’s Report of Management to its shareholders
for the year 1965 states:
The decision in late 1964 to erect a plant to
make 11 oz. aluminum cans required much engi-
neering study. The scope of the plant was increased
to include facilities for 15 oz. and 12 oz. cans in
addition to the 11 oz. package. In resolving the
question of plant location, we ended up with a
grand-scale industrial land development project
involving some 100 acres of Clear Creek Valley
land known to us as the East Springs area. In-
volved is the relocation of over a mile of state high-
way and several irrigation ditches and the straight-
ening and re-channeling of Clear Creek. Involved
also are 1,500,000 yards of land fill. With addi-
tional land parcels either presently acquired or in
the mill, the initial 100 acre industrial site can be
ultimately expanded to 800 acres which should be
ample for the all time needs of our company.
The same management report noted that the “iand involved,
being almost entirely Clear Creek alluvium, is highly valuable
land containing about $25,000 per acre of sand and gravel at
today’s prices.” Predicting a critical shortage of the material
in the near future, the company was confident that its value
would further increase.
The company was being forced by market demand to
operate at full capacity. The company was engaged in sub-
stantial capital improvement efforts. A 1966 Management
Report noted that the engineering and construction depart-
ments were faced with a need to upgrade facilities and to
simultaneously add “somewhere in the neighborhood of
500,000 barrels per year of additional brewing capacity.
The company was constantly faced with the need to ac-
quir2 land upon which to expand its productive capacity to
—67a—
meet demand. It hoped to achieve parity by 1967. To the east
of the company’s main plants lay the East Springs area.
Through this area of rocks and boulders ran numerous irri-
gation ditches dependent for their water upon Clear Creek.
A public road also ran through this area further segmenting
it. Clear Creek itself was an irregular freshet giving rise toa
perennial flood threat. This possibility of flooding neces-
sitated the construction of various protective dikes and levees
designed to protect existing plant and equipment. As then
constituted this area was unsuitable for building.
The company recognized the potential usefulness of this
area, as reflected in the minutes of an Executive Committee
meeting held March 17, 1965, in which the following was
reported:
Chairman reviewed preliminary talk about lo-
cating the can plant east of our plant in the Clear
Creek Valley, generally in the area of the land pur-
chased from Val and Henry Blatter, just north of
32nd Avenue. The site could be filled up to about
7’ under the 32nd Avenue level, the Lee Stewart
and Eskins Ditch could be tubed and put alongside
the road and make a fine area. It would be quite a
job as the bottles and machinery now in the area
would have to be taken out, the eastern part of the
area which we had previously partly filled would
have to be picked up, large rocks and concrete
broken up, put back and compacted with more dirt
being brought in to bring the area level up. After
discussing the committee approved this area for
the can plant.
Through the East Springs area ran at least one mile of 32nd
Avenue. In order to optimize the usefulness of the “grand-
scale industrial land development project,” this road had to
be relocated to the south. The relocation was to serve two
— 68a—
purposes: (1) The bisection of the project would be reduced
and (2) the fill from the redeployment excavation could be
utilized to raise the level of the East Springs area. Work on
both tasks began in August 1965.
Since 32nd Avenue was a public road the company was re-
quired to make a request to the Board of County Commis-
sioners before moving ahead. At an Executive Meeting held
June 22, 1965, the company’s minutes show the following
discussion: |
Chairman presented a proposed change of 32nd
Avenue east of plant on contour map showing it
staying south of the Agricultural Ditch coming
back into present road just east of Twin Spruce
Subdivision. He stated that in taking dirt for the fill
from the new aluminum can plant they would be
working in this area and would be doing part of
the necessary work on the road relocation which
would leave the area as a good site. After discus-
sion it was approved by the committee. It was felt
that it should be presented to the County Commis-
sioners to see if they would approve.
The regular meeting of the County Commissioners held on
August 30, 1965, reflects in its minutes a request by the com-
pany, through its attorney, to be allowed to straighten West
32nd Avenue. The work proceeded apace. The preparatory
work, base work, culverts, irrigation ditch relocation was
done by the company. The county paved the road segment
itself. On October 31, 1966, old 32nd Avenue was vacated
by the county and title assumed by the company, and new
" 32nd Avenue was dedicated by the company to the county.
The total amount spent on this project by the company was
$156,491.96. This enabled the company to proceed with its
plans.
— 69a —
In order to make the area useful as an industrial site the
company incurred substantial costs during 1966 in hauling
dirt and fill to the area. This was done in order to raise the
level of the land surrounding Clear Creek. This fill was ob-
tained from the site of the work on new 32nd Avenue. The
_ breakdown of the expenses shows the relative importance of
the haulage. The complete cost was as follows:
Purchases S 64.61
Equipment Depreciation 11,571.00
Salaries and Wages 2,809.55
Truck Operating Costs 26,175.90
Total $40,621.06
In the general area of the site of the new aluminum can
plant nearly 660,000 cubic yards of fill were utilized. This
raised the ground elevation at this point by 30 feet.
While the East Springs land fill operation and the reloca-
tion of 32nd Avenue were proceeding, the company was also
engaged in straightening Clear Creek. During 1966 they
spent $12,255.54 to do this. The channel of the creek was
relocated and widened. In some areas the creek was moved
approximately 1,000 feet in order to straighten its course and
define its flow. Portions of the banks of the creek were raised
and diked.
The entire effort of moving 32nd Avenue, filling in the
East Springs area and straightening Clear Creek was a part
of a long-range development project. This project revitalized
the area and made it possible to build additional productive
capacity. The bettering of the land has had a beneficial effect
On its value.
Paving and Fencing Costs
In his notice of deficiency the respondent determined:
The amount of $7,961.84 claimed as expense for
material for repairs is not allowed because it per-
—70a—
tains to asphait paving which is a capital expendi-
ture. Of this amount, $7,617.84 is allowed as a
depreciation asset and $344.00 pertains to resi-
dence furnished to Adolph Coors, Jr., which is
disallowed as an expense deduction or as a depreci-
able asset. Therefore, your taxable income is in-
creased $7,961.84.
On brief the respondent conceded the amount of $344
spent to repair certain asphalt driveways appurtenant to the
residence of Adolph Coors, Jr. This left the $7,617.84 at
issue. The expenditures were:
Vendor Amount
Table Mountain, Inc. $ 872.24
Asphalt Paving Co. 3,745.60
Lifetime Fence Co. 3,000.00
Total $7,617.84
Of the $7,961.84 claimed as an expense for 1965, the peti-
tioner was able to produce invoices totaling $7,665.34.
The Table Mountain, Inc., invoices covered road base
gravel material purchased during 1965. The invoices from
Asphalt Paving Co., covered asphalt repair work between
the cellars and Clear Creek as well as the application of a
slurry seal on the employees’ parking lot. The invoices from
Lifetime Fence Co., covered repairs and replacement of var’
ous fences on the factory site.®
For 1966 the company claimed a deduction of $7,600 as
repair expenses with respect to paving and fences. At the
trial the petitioner orally conceded that paving costs in the
amount of $4,248.76 should properly be capitalized. The re-
maining $3,351.23 expense deduction is poorly documented.
In disallowing the claimed expenses for paving and fenc-
ing costs, respondent determined that the assets had a useful
3The testimony adduced at trial from Mr. Field indicated the possession of in-
voices from Lifetime Fence Co., of $2,379.36. The difference between this and
the respondent's capitalization of $3,000 was not explained.
—7la—
life of eight years and should have been depreciated on that
basis.
Investment Credits
A. Duct Work
During 1965 and 1966 the company placed into service
sheet metal duct work in the basement and the fourth floor
of its bottle packaging building. In 1965 the petitioner spent
$3,344.77 on such installation. In 1966 the petitioner further
expended $13,656.62. The item here involved is approxi-
mately three to five feet thick, six to ten feet wide and 100
feet in length. The duct work is part of an air handling system
involving a louvered system mounted on the roof of the bottle
packaging building. There is included in this system an air
plenum with a large filter installation. A water spray system
and blowers complete the system. The duct work involved
is attached to the package building by means of steel angle
braces.
The equipment filters the air prior to diffusion in the area
of distribution. The building is not completely serviced by this
unit. The function of this air handling equipment is to remove
foreign matter from the air before it is released into the pack-
aging plant.
Although the air is cooled by means of a water spray it is
not an air cooling system as such. The equipment is not uti-
lized to heat this building. The heating function is performed
by an independent and entirely separate system.
B. Saw Room
During 1965 and 1966 the company expended $6,900 and
$500, respectively, in constructing a saw room. The invest-
ment credit was affirmatively claimed in the petition. The
saw room is on a mezzanine floor in the bottle packaging
building. It is a solid constructed room of approximately 30
feet by 40 feet. It has a door and a window with a load bear-
—72a—
ing roof. The room contains saws used to remove the tops
from boxes containing returned beer bottles. The dust is re-
moved by means of ventilating ducts. The bottles are then
shunted off to a cleaning process before being refilled. The
room encloses a conveyer belt system. The cartons enter the
room via the conveyer through an opening in one wall and
following the process exit through the other end of a con-
tinuous feed process.
The investment credit was claimed for the expenditure in-
volved in the construction of the room but not for the equip-
ment contained therein.
C. Valve Testing Room
In 1966 the company spent $4,870 in order to construct
a valve repair and maintenance workshop. This room in the
bottle packing plant is capable of other uses.
The room itself is 30 by 20 feet in size. It is of 1 asonry
construction. The walls of this room are permanently affixed
to the building. It has windows and doors. The roof of this
room can be utilized as a storage area. A stairway on the out-
side of the room provides access to the rooftop storage area.
Social Club Dues
During 1965 and 1966 the company paid the annual dues
at various social clubs used by two of the principal officers
of the company, namely, William K. Coors and Joseph Coors.
These club dues are as follows:
Dues
Club 1965 1966 Officer
Lakewood Country Club $ 484.00 $ 372.00 Joseph Coors
Denver Country Club 600.00 600.00 Joseph Coors
Rolling Hills Club 420.00 420.00 Joseph Coors
Hiwan Golf Club 240.00 240.00 William K. Coors
University Club 333.60 343.20 William K. Coors
Denver Club 360.00 360.00 William K. Coors
Denver Country Club 600.00 600.00 William K. Coors
Garden of the Gods Club 105.00 100.00 William K. Coors
Totals $3,142.60 $3,035.20
ee eee et aes Rae Stendine
Eee
—73a—
During these years numerous other charges were incurred
by William K. Coors and Joseph Coors. Such charges over
the two years in question amounted to $4,558.10. Of these
the corporation paid $948.12 (20.8 percent) and the in-
dividuals paid $3,609.98 (79.2 percent). Respondent did not
disallow the entertainment expenses paid by the company.
He did, however, disallow the claimed deductions totaling
$6,177.80 for 1965 and 1966 dues paid.
In arriving at a breakdown of the charges as to those paid
by the company and those paid by the individuals the re-
spondent resorted to the handwritten notations made on the
statements by the individual users.
During 1965 and 1966 Joseph Coors’ business and per-
sonal use of the clubs, by days of use, as taken from the
monthly statements was:
Days of Use
1965 1966
Social Club Personal Business Personal Business
Rolling Hills Club 7 0 l 0
Lakewood Country Club 5 0 4 0
Denver Country Club 20 2 23 l
During 1965 and 1966 William K. Coors’ business and
personal use of the clubs, by days of use, as taken from the
monthly statements was:
Days in Use
1965 1966
Social Club Personal Business Personal Business
University Club l 0 2 0
Denver Club 23 0 19 0
Denver Country Club 38 l 54 0
Thus, out of a total 201 days-in-use, only four days may be
attributed to business use and the remaining 197 days are
attributed to personal use.
The Hiwan Golf Club monthly statements do not reflect usage by day. During
1965 and 1966 the company paid only the dues while William K. Coors paid
$786.74 and $953.39, respectively, for personal expenses incurred there.
—74a—
Respondent further determined that Joseph Coors realized
dividend income of $1,504 for 1965 and $1,592 for 1966;
and that William K. Coors realized dividend income in 1966
of $1,643.
These social club memberships have been maintained by
the company in the names of the key officers for many years.
Except for 1965 and 1966, the respondent has not ques-
tioned the deductibility of such payments. Several of the
clubs permit corporate memberships which allow several
named members from a single company to utilize the club.
Other clubs refuse to permit this, and for business functions
a named individual must be in attendance.
The company does business with all these clubs in that
there are business functions scheduled there. Business guests
are lodged there and make use of the facilities. Similarly all
of the clubs serve the company’s product — Coors beer.
Payments Made to Influence Legislation
For each of the years 1965 and 1966 the company claimed
a deduction for “dues and subscriptions.” Certain of these
payments were determined by respondent to have been made
to organizations whose purpose and function it was and is to
influence legislation. The organizations and amounts paid
were:
Amount
Organization 1965 1966
National Right to Work Committee $100.00
Colorado Tax Equality Committee 250.00
Committee for Constructive
Government 100.00 $ 100.00
Colorado Plan for Apportionment 1,000.00
Committee for Nonpolitical
Selection 250.00
Totals $450.00 $1,350.00
—75a—
Aspen Condominum
William K. Coors acquired a condominium apartment in
Aspen, Colorado, in late October 1965. During 1965 the
apartment was not rented. William Coors and his wife spent
some time at the apartment during the last quarter of 1965
readying the apartment for rental.
William Coors had a cost basis in the apartment and its
furnishing of $41,897.
The apartment was operated under a rental agreement with
a property management firm in Aspen which undertook to
rent the apartment for Mr. Coors. In addition to a manage-
ment fee, the agent was to receive 20 percent of any rental
income.
It was standard practice for William to receive, at some
point during the summer, a calendar on which he was to block
off the dates on which he proposed to use the apartment. The
remainder of the time was available for rental. During 1966
William blocked out one week at Christmas and one week in
the spring. For the balance of the year the agency attempted —
to rent the apartment. During 1966 the apartment was rented
for approximately 21 days. For this period of rental William
Coors received $788.
During 1966 William Coors reported a net loss from the
condominium of $2,492. This was determined by adding de-
preciation ($2,039) to other deductions ($1,241) and de-
ducting therefrom the rental income ($788). The respondent
disallowed the net loss deduction of $2,492 asserting only
that William Coors had not established that he was “entitled
to such a deduction.”
Bad Debt
Sometime prior to 1965 Joseph Coors was interested in
the perfection of an audio-visual device intended to permit
communication between persons of different languages. The
— 76a—
idea was related to him by a prep school companion. His in-
terest aroused, Joseph Coors sought out and obtained the
services of Paul Flury,° an engineer then working for Coors
Porcelain Company. To enable Mr. Flury to proceed in the
development work for this device, Joseph Coors guaranteed
a loan made by the Golden State Bank to Paul Flury.
In 1964 Joseph Coors paid $1,253.83 in legal expenses
incident to research and development of a patent of a visual
and audio language interpreter. This claimed deduction was
disallowed. In other litigation in this Court with the year 1964
at issue Joseph conceded that $450 paid in connection with
the patent to an attorney to establish a corporation was not
deductible. This patent was the first in which Joseph had any
financial interest. The balance of the deduction was disal-
lowed because there was insufficient proof to show that
Joseph was regularly engaged in any business in which the
amount paid to a patent lawyer would constitute an ordinary
and necessary business expense.
Because of personal problems Mr. Flury terminated his
employment with Coors Porcelain Company and severed his
relationship with Interpretor Corporation. Mr. Flury has dis-
appeared and no one has heard from him since 1965. During
1965 Joseph was called upon by the bank to repay the loan.
He paid $2,167 to the bank under his guarantor obligation.
On his 1965 Federal income tax return this sum was deducted
as a business bad debt.
OPINION
1. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The Adolph Coors Company has raised the defenses of res
judicata and collateral estoppel with respect to respondent’s
capitalization of overhead costs. The company argues that
‘The spelling of this individual's name varies in all briefs and ihe transcript.
—77a—
(1) the same issue was in controversy between the parties for
the years 1962, 1963, and 1964; and (2) that this Court
finally determined the capitalization of overhead issue ad-
verse to the respondent and therefore the issue is no longer
properly before us.
The company states that our “redetermination of respon-
dent’s capitalized overhead determination in the old case for
the immediate three prior years constitutes a sufficient judg-
ment for res judicata purposes for the instant two following
years.” United States v. Utah Idaho Sugar Company, 15
A.F.T.R. 1037 (D.C. Utah, 1934), is cited. That case ap-
pears to have been one in which a complaint by the Utah
Idaho Sugar Company, lodged in the United States Court of
Claims, was dismissed upon agreement of certain “law of-
ficers” of the United States and counsel for the company.
Later other United States “law officers” instituted an action
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah
seeking relief from the agreement. The District Court dis-
missed the action summarily. The same parties dismissed the
cause of action in the Court of Claims and then one party
sought relief from the effect of such dismissal in another fo-
rum. Labeling its reasons for dismissal “res judicata,” the Dis-
trict Court dismissed the action, noting that the proper way
for the Government to obtain relief was to directly attack the
settlement and compromise. Whether or not such an attack
would succeed in view of the Court’s previous finding of “res
judicata” need not concern us here. We simply do not find the
case controlling in these circumstances.
The capitalization of certain overhead for 1962, 1963, and
1964 was not settled and compromised by the parties. Re-
spondent is not seeking in the present case a redetermination
of those years with respect to the capitalization issue. The
years involved in the present case (1965 and 1966) are dif-
ferent and distinct from the previous case. In the prior case
—78a—
no findings, either mediate or ultimate, were made by the
Court with respect to such issue.
The doctrine of res judicata applies where issues that were
or could have been determined in an earlier suit are presented
anew to the Court. If such action is taken by one party to at-
tempt to relitigate such issues, the idea of repose and con-
sideration of judicial economy operate to bar further review.
The necessity of finality applies in the area of tax law as much
as in other areas of the law. But the prior case did not result
in any determination of the capitalization issue. The “signifi-
cance of what a court says it decides is controlled by the is-
sues that were open for decision.” Angel v. Bullington, 330
U.S. 183, 187 (1947). The capitalization issue was merely
abandoned by respondent for the three years then at issue.
The Court did not reach that question in Adolph Coors Com-
pany, T.C. Memo. 1968-256.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies where matters
are actually litigated and determined in the first cause of
action. This principal is stated in the Restatement on Judg-
ments, section 68, as follows:
A judgment on one cause of action is not con-
clusive in a subsequent action on a different cause
of action as to questions of fact not actually liti-
gated and determined in the first action.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said, in the
area of consent judgments, that the spirit of justice requires
the doctrine to be limited to cases where there was “an ad-
judication on the merits.” United States v. International
Building Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506 (1953). Lawlor v. National
Screen Service Corp., 349
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