Petition — Weeks v. Clark
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No. 75-653 4
Se the ) li Bore ie
Supreme Court of the Bmited States ,
Octoser Term, 1975 ih
i MICHAEL +
GERALD R. WEEKS, individually and as Chairman of
the DuPage County Board of Commissioners, ROBERT
A. MORRIS, individually and as Chairman of the Special
Investigative Committee, and FRANK H. BELLINGER,
individually and as Vice-Chairman of the Special Investi-
gative Committee,
Petitioners,
vs.
JAMES CLARK, Treasurer of DuPage County, and
MICHAEL DUTTON,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Terry M. Grimm
Rosert G. Foster
Exiten C. NEwcoMer
One First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Attorneys for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
Winston & Strawn
One First National Plaza
Suite 5000
Chicago, Illinois 60603
The Scheffer Press, Inc.—(312) 263-6850
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT. .............. 6
EER TEITIITTIITE -- sictiincisseticccaipnitssiegninsintenaeaiindseiiastainipedienatbcsiienitinieten 9
APPENDIX A
Minute Order of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ilinois .........0..0... la
APPENDIX B
Opinion of the Court of Appeals .........ccceeeeeees 3a
Taste Or Autuorities CIrep
CASES:
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Team-
sters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415°U.S. 423 (1974) .... 6,7
Jacobs v. Tawes, 250 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1957) ............ &
Majuri v. U.S., 431 F.2d 469 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert.
denied 400 U.S. 943 (1970) ............ scsdalaaaiiaidsmminiieaaaiiiiiidta 8
Pan American World Airways v. Flight Engineers
Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1962) .............ccccsssscssseees 6,8
Preston County Light & Power Co. v. Public Service
Commission of West Virginia, 297 F.Supp. 759 (S.D.
We THEI ccscovensnccescstsivssdcbistdipiidnendcniianemiieniesndnainemmneniines 8
Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (3rd Cir. 1947) «0.0.0.0... 6,8
West Virginia Motor Trust Ass’n v. Public Service
Commission of West Virgima, 123 F.Supp. 206 (S.D.
W.Va. 1954), aff'd 348 U.S. 881 (1954) oo... cece 8
In THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OQcroBer Term, 1975
No.
GERALD R. WEEKS, individually and as Chairman of
the DuPage County Board of Commissioners, ROBERT
A. MORRIS, individually and as Chairman of the Special
Investigative Committee, and FRANK H. BELLINGER,
individually and as Vice-Chairman of the Special Investi-
gative Committee, ;
Petitioners,
vs.
JAMES CLARK, Treasurer of DuPage County, and
MICHAEL DUTTON,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
To the Honorable Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, and
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court:
Petitioners, Weeks, Morris and Bellinger, respectfully
petition for a writ of certiorari to review an order of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cireuit
dismissing Petitioners’ appeal below.
=
OPINIONS BELOW
The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois rendered no opinion below. The District
Court’s Minute Order which was appealed from is re-
printed as Appendix A to this Petition. The opinion of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing Peti-
tioners’ appeal is not officially reported but its Slip
Opinion is reprinted as Appendix B to this Petition.
JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals which constitutes
its judgment was entered on August 5, 1975. Jurisdiction
of this Court to review the judgment by writ of certiorart
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. $1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(1) Whether a Temporary Restraining Order in a
case required to he ° ecard by a three-judge court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §2281 may be extended over opposition
beyond twenty days without a hearing on a motion for a
preliminary injunction and whether such a procedure is
sanctioned by Rule 65(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(2) Whether an indefinitely extended Temporary Re-
straining Order becomes an appealable interlocutory in-
junction within the terms of 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1) even
though a three-judg* court has been convened pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §2284(1).
(3) Whether 28 U.S.C. §§2281 or 2284 confers general
appellate jurisdiction on three-judge district courts.
(4) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the Petitioners’ appeal,
a va
STATUTES INVOLVED
Title 28 U.S.C. §2284(3) provides in relevant part:
“In any such case in which an application for an
interlocutory injunction is made, the district judge
to whom the application is made may, at any time,
grant a temporary restraining order to prevent irrep-
arable damage. The order, unless previously revoked
by the district judge, shall remain in force only until
the hearing and determination by the full court.”
Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, Effective July 1, 1966, provides in relevant
part:
“A temporary restraining order ... shall expire
by its terms within such time after entry, not to
exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless within the
time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is
extended for a like period or unless the party against
whom the order is directed consents that it may be
. extended for a longer period.”
Rule 65(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides in relevant part:
“These rules do not modify any statute of the
United States relating to temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions in actions affect-
ing employer and employee; ... or Title 28, U.S.C.
$2284, relating to actions required by Act of Con-
gress to be heard and determined by a district court
of three judges.”
Title 28 U.S.C. $1450 provides in relevant part:
“Whenever any action is removed from a State
court to a district court of the United States...
* * *
ad
—_—
All injunctions, orders; and other proceedings had
in such action prior to its removal shall remain in
full foree and effect until dissolved or modified by
the district court.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents (plaintiffs below) filed a lawsuit on June
19, 1975, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Llinois, pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C.
§1983, to redress alleged deprivations of their rights
under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the Constitution of the United States.
Respondents sought and obtained a Temporary Re-
straining Order of June 23, 1975, preventing your Peti-
tioners from proceeding with an investigation of James
Hi. Clark relating to the propriety of his conduct as
Treasurer of DuPage County by a special committee
comprised of 13 members of the County Board of DuPage
County, Illinois. Petitioners are elected members of the
DuPage County Board.
On July 1, 1975, over opposition of Petitioners, who
filed a motion to dissolve the Temporary Restraining
Order, the single district court judge extended the Tem-
porary Restraining Order indefinitely. (Appendix A) To
date, Petitioners have had no hearing on the Respondents’
motion for a prelimmary injunction. On July 14, 1975,
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal in the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. On August 5, 1975, acting on the
motion of Respondents, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The court below held it was without jurisdiction to hear
Petitioners’ appeal in view of the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
en
§$2284(3) and §2284(5), citing Hicks v. Pleasure House,
Inc., 404 U.S. 1 (1971):
“
.
. a temporary restraining order issued pur-
suant to $2284(3) is reviewable in a court of appeals
to the extent that any such order is reviewable under
28 U.S.C. §§1291 and 1292(a). However, if no such
appeal ig taken before the three-judge court is con-
vened, application must be made to that court for
vacation or modification of the temporary restraining
order pending a final determination of the merits.”
404 U.S. at 3
ees
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Petition raises a fundamental question concerning
the limited and fixed duration of Temporary Restraining
Orders. Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is explicit. Petitioners have had uo evidentiary
hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction and have
been indefinitely enjoined. In normal circumstances, the
law is clear that the Temporary Restraining Order pres-
ently entered is of no effect. Granny Goose Foods, Inc.
v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 451 (1974); Pan American
World Atrways v. Flight Engineers Ass'n., 306 F.2d 840
(2d Cir. 1962); Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (3rd Cir.
1947).
Thus, the court must determine whether a ‘Temporary
Restraining Order granted in a three-judge court case
has a special indefinite life which Temporary Restraining
Orders in other cases do not.
In Granny Goose Foods, Inc. vy. Teamsters, supra, this
court granted certiorari to the Ninth Cireuit Court of
Appeals in a case involving an interpretation of 28 U.S.C.
§1450. The case in the Ninth Cireuit turned on the narrow
issue of whether a Temporary Restraining Order could
he extended indefinitely without a hearing held on a
motion for a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit
held that it could not and this Court, noting a conflict in
the circuits, granted certiorari and affirmed the Ninth
Circuit.
' Appalachian Volunteers, Inc. vy. Clark, 432 F.2d 530
(Gth Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 939 (1971); Morning
Telegraph vy. Powers, 450 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
= =
The Granny Goose case involved employer-employee’
relationships and, read literally, Rule 65(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure might well proscribe any appli-
cation of Rule 65(b) with respect to the duration of a
Temporary Restraining Order in such a case. This Court,
while not considering the applicability of the provisions
of Rule 55(e), rejected the notion that a special breed of
Temporary Restraining Orders was created by the provi-
sions of 28 U.S.C. $1450 and accordingly should grant
certiorart here to determine the important question of
whether a special breed of Temporary Restraining Order
of indefinite duration is created by virtue of 28 U.S.C.
§2284(3).
In Granny Goose, this Court was faced with the pre-
cise circumstances which are present in the instant case.
In resolving the facial conflict between the provisions of
28 U.S.C. §1450 and Rule 65(b), the Court succinctly
stated the issue and held:
“To the extent this reading of $1450 is inconsistent
with the time limitations of Rule 65(b), petitioners
con‘end the statute must control.
In our view, however, §1450 can and should be
interpreted in a manner which fully serves its under-
lying purposes, yet at the same time places it in
harmony with the important congressional policies
reflected in the time limitations in Rule 65(b).” 415
U.S. at 435.
The Court should grant this petition for certiorari
to place Title 28 U.S.C. $2284(3) in harmony “with the
* Basically involved, as this court noted, was a dispute
over the enforceability against the defendant union of
certain changes in new contracts. 415 U.S. at 427. The
Temporary Restraining Order was obtained ez parte and
the union’s motion to dissolve the Temporary Restraining
Order was denied.
a
important congressional policies reflected in the time
limitations in Rule 65(b).”
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it
was without jurisdiction to hear Petitioners’ appeal since
if the Temporary Restraining Order were appealable at
all it must be heard by the three-judge court. A three-
judge court is a nist prius tribunal and does not have
general appellate jurisdiction. Preston County Light 4
Power Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of West Virginia,
297 F.Supp. 759, 864 (S.D.W.Va. 1969; Jacobs v. Tawes,
250 F.2d 611, 614 (4th Cir. 1957) ; see also Majuri v. United
States, 431 F.2d 469 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S.
943 (1970); West Virginia Motor Truck Ass’n vy. Public
Service Comm'n, 123 F.Supp. 206, 216 (S.D.W.Va. 1954),
aff'd 348 U.S. 881 (1954). Normally, of course, Temporary
Restraining Orders are not appealable. Pan American,
supra, at 841-842. It is only when a Temporary Restrain-
ing Order becomes an interlocutory injunction that it is
subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1). Pan
Amverican at 842; Sims v. Greene, swpra, at 517. Petition-
ers filed a timely notice of appeal on July 14, 1975, exactly
one day after a “normal” Temporary Restraining Order
would have expired. If in three-judge cases the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure for filing a notice of appeal
are amended so that a party against whom a Temporary
Restraining Order is obtained must file his notice of
appeal before the chief judge of the circuit court con-
venes the three-judge court, this Court should seize an
opportunity to make this anomaly clear to the practicing
bar. It is Petitioners’ view that the Temporary Restrain-
ing Order entered June 23, 1975 did not become an inter-
locutory injunction and thus appealable within 28 U.S.C.
§1292(a)(1) until the expiration of twenty days from
the date it was originally granted, June 23, 1975.
—9—
CONCLUSION
All questions now presented for review were answered
incorrectly by the lower courts in that the holdings below
conflict with applicable decisions of this court and the
mandate of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating
to the duration of Temporary Restraining Orders.
It is requested, therefore, that this petition for a Writ
of Certiorar: be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Terry M. Grimm
Rosert G. Foster
ELLen C. NEWCOMER
One First National Plaza
Suite 5000
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Attorneys for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
Winston & Strawn
One First National Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60603
—10—
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
County of Cook )}
State of Illinois ; *
I, Terry M. Grimm, state under oath that I have this
date served the attached Petition for Writ of Certiorari
on James Clark and on Michael Dutton by delivering three
copies of the same by hand to their counsel of record,
Thomas P. Sullivan, Alan L. Metz and Jeffrey D.
Colman, Jenner & Block, One IBM Plaza, Chicago, Illi-
nois, and by mailing one copy of the same by certified
mail to their additional counsel of record, Paul T. Kalinich,
646 Roosevelt, Glen Ellyn, Illinois. All parties required
to be served have thus been served.
SEER EERE EEE EERE EEE EERE EEE EEE EEE EEE HEE HEHEHE EH EH EEE HH EEE
Terry M. Grimm
Subseribed and sworn to
before me this third day
of November, 1975.
Pee eee RCO RECEP ETUC PEEP EEC
Notary Public
APPENDIX
== 1g —
APPENDIX A
Unitep Srates Districr Court
Northern District of [linois
Eastern Division
Name of Presiding Judge, Honorable William J. Lynch
Cause No. 75 C 2009 Date 7-1-75
Title of Cause
James Clark
V
Gerald R. Weeks
Brief Statement of Motion
Ptff’s Motion for extension of T.R.O. & Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.
The rules of this court require counsel to furnish the
names of all parties entitled to notice of the entry of
an order and the names and addresses of their attorneys.
Please do this immediately below (separate lists may be
appended).
Names and
Addresses of
moving counsel
Representing
Names and
Addresses of
other counsel
entitled to
notice and names
of parties they
represent,
’
=
Notes: Ordered that the temporary restraining order
entered by this Court in the above-entitled action on
June 23, 1975, be extended in full force until such time
as the Three-Judge Court hears and decides the pltff’s.
Motion for a preliminary injunction. (Draft)
/s/ W. J. L.
(Docketed Jul 3 1975)
Hand this memorandum to the Clerk.
Counsel will not rise to address the Court until motion
has been called.
—_ so
APPENDIX B
Untrep States Court or APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
August 5, 1975
Before
Hon. THomas FE. Farrcui.p, Chief Judge
Hon. Jonn Pauw Srevens, Circuit Judge
Hon. Wriu1am J. Baver, Circuit Judge
No. 75-1667
James Cuark, Treasurer of DuPage County, and
MicHaEL Dutton,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees,
Vs.
GeraLp R. Weeks, etce.. et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 75 C 2009
Wiuiam J. Lyncn, Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the “Motion
of Defendants-Appellants for Suspension of Rule 2 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure” and plain-
tiffs-appellees’ “Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of
Jurisdiction and in the Alternative Answer in Opposition
to Suspension of F.R.A.P. 2.”
Defendants seek to appeal from an order entered by
a Single Judge District Court on July 1, 1975, extending
a temporary restraining order until such time as a
—
Three-Judge Court hears and decides plaintiffs’ motion
for a preliminary injunction. Defendants filed their notice
of appeal from the district court’s order on July 14,
1975. We note that plaintiffs’ application for the con-
vening of a Three-Judge Court was granted by the
Single Judge District Court on June 26, 1975 and that
on July 2, 1975 a Three-Judge Court was convened.
Plaintiffs argue that this Court is without jurisdiction
to hear this appeal in light of £° U.S.C. §§2284 (3) and
(5) and that defendants must seek relief from the Three-
Judge Court concerning dissolution or modification of
the temporary restraining order. In Hicks v. Pleasure
House, Inc, 404 U.S. 1 (1971) (Per Curiam), the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the proper
court for review of a temporary restraining order en-
tered by a Single Judge District Court when a Three-
Judge Court has convened. Though a court of appeals
may review a temporary restraining order entered pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. §2284 (3), in the same manner and
to the same extent that any such order is reviewable
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292(a), appellate review
is improper if the notice of appeal is filed subsequent
to the convening of a Three-Judge Court. The Supreme
Court stated:
“Thus, if a single judge oversteps his limited au-
thority under $2284(3), a court of appeals may cor-
rect his error. In addition, a temporary restraining
order issued pursuant to §2284(3) is reviewable in a
court of appeals to the extent that any such order
is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. §$§ 1291 and 1292(a).
However, if no such appeal is taken before the three-
judge court is convened, application must be made
to that court for vacation or modification of the
temporary restraining order pending a final deter-
mination of the merits.” Hicks, supra at 3.
In light of the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to
dismiss be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.