Petition — Nonnewaug Regional School District No. 14 v. Scott

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No 75-528 |

NonNEWAUG ReaionaL Scuoou District No, 14,

Town or BETHLEHEM,

Petitioners,

VS,

Josern M. Scort,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

Tuomas N, SULLIVAN

Attorney for Nonnewaug School

District No. 14

632 Prospect Avenue

Hartford, Conn. 06105

Donatp J. DenEEN

Attorney for Town of Bethlehem

20 Maple Avenue

Windsor, Conn. 06095

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IV. CownstirvTionaL Provisions Statutes AND Reov-

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The One-Ferson-One-Vote Principle Of Constitu-

tional Law Is Not Applicable To The Election Of

Members Of The Board Of Education Of A

Regional School District Created Pursuant To

Provisions Of The Connecticut General Statutes ..

APPENDIX

A. United States Court of Appeals for the See-

Ond Circuit—Opinion ...........ccc.ccecscsccserssrecsseereoees

B. United States District Court for the District

of Connecticut—Opinion ..................ccceceeeeeeeeeees

Table of Cases

Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec, 410 U.S. 748

RRR NR pe: SEC RAPE ENE tos er

Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) ............

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ..............cccsccesseeeesies

Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967) ...0.....0.....ccccccsseseees

Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan

Kansas City, Mo., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) .. 7

Keegan v. Town of ke 103 Conn. 418, 130 A

SE” EIT: heredeensnithindisenaaeheneneealadabiaemiaaniainianabatininininemainies

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S, 533 (1964) saiieeniiniiiiia

Sailors v. Board of Education of the County of Kent,

es Se CITED sisiichertsteiecsiastumseeninieiaictanitisiennntinestinien

Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, 410 U.S.

Re PTUUED sncseesciesiciniienttentitansiasneiaiaintbiitnistenalictanatiatitiapiaicipsertas

Second School District of Glastonbury, 8 86 Conn. 590

86 A 577 (1913)

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Statutes

(Connecticut General Statutes Sections)

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References:

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Supreme Court Rules, Rule 19 20.......0.....cccccccceeeeeeee

Title 28, U.S. Code, Sections 1254(1) & 1343(3) ....

Title 42, U.S. Code, Section

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No.

eee

NonnewavuG Reoionat Scuoon District No. 14,

Town or BETHLEHEM,

4 Petitioners,

vs.

Josern M, Scort,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

To the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the

Supreme Court of the United States:

The Petitioners Nonnewaug Regional School District

No. 14, and Town of Bethlehem, Connecticut, pray that a

Writ of Certiorari be issued to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

rendered on July 23, 1975 affirming the judgment of the

Honorable Jon O. Newman, U. S. District Court for

Connecticut.

I.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, entered on July 23, 1975 is at this time

unreported. It is set forth in Appendix A, pp. la et seq.

2

The opinion of the United States District Court for

the District of Connecticut, entered on November 22, 1974,

is also unreported and is set forth in Appendix B. pp. lb

et seq.

Il.

JURISDICTION

This suit was originally commenced in the United District

Court with jurisdiction sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. see-

tions 1343 (3) and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C,

sections 1983, The District Court granted plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment on November 22, 1974 and

entered judgment for plaintiff on January 8, 1975 (Appen-

dix B). Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit affirmed the judgment on July 23, 1975

(Appendix A). The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is

invoked, under Rule 19 of the Supreme Court Rules and

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1254 (1) on the ground

that review by the Supreme Court by a Writ of Certiorari

is sought of a judgment of the affirmance on appeal by the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Il.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Does the one-person-one-vote rule apply to the election

of members of the board of education of a regional school

district created pursuant to the provisions of the Connecti-

cut General Statutes?

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Constitutional Provisions: Fourteenth Amendment.

Statutes: Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1254(1)

and Sections 1343(3); Title 42, United States Code, Section

1983; Connecticut General Statutes, Sections 10-46, 10-47,

3

10-51, 10-56, 10-60, 10-220, 10-221, 10-240, 10-241, 10-241a,

10-242, 10-262.

- Rules: Rule 19, Supreme Court Rules.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was brought in the United States District

Court for the District of Connecticut, by the Plaintiff, a

citizen, elector and taxpayer ef the Town of Woodbury,

Connecticut to obtain a permanent injunction requiring the

reorganization of Nonnewaug Regional School District No.

14. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. Sections 1343(3)

and injunctive relief sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections

1983. Plaintiff complained that the allocation of member-

ship on the regional district’s board of education deprived

the electors of the Town of Woodbury of equal protection

of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-

ments to the United States Constitution.

Nonnewaug Regional School District No. 14 was estab-

lished by the Towns of Woodbury and Bethlehem, Con-

necticut on May 20, 1968, by a vote of the majority of the

electors in each of the towns. It was organized pursuant

to and now operates under the provisions of the Connecti-

cut General Statutes pertaining to regional school districts.

Under Section 10-47 of the Connecticut General Statutes,

such a regional board is not possessed of general govern-

mental powers, but is. vested with very specific and

restricted powers. General governmental powers with

regard to the publie school system are vested in the towns

themselves.

The Regional Board of Education serving the Nonne-

waug Regional School District consists of eight members,

four elected from each of the two towns. According to the

1970 United States Census of Population, the respective

4

populations are 5,869 for Woodbury and 1,923 for Bethle-

hem; the respective electorates are 3,653 for Woodbury

and 1,298 for Bethlehem. .

The basis for determining the size and composition of

a regional school board is determined by statutory proced-

ure which requires approval by referendum held in each

participating town. (Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 10-46.)

VI.

ARGUMENT

The One-Person-One-Vote Principal of Constitutional

Law is not Applicable to the Election of Members of

the Board of Education of a Regional School District

Created Pursuant to Provisions of the Connecticut

General Statutes.

A.

The constitutional principle of one-person-one-vote, first

enunciated in Baker vy. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and

extended in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), was held

applicable in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968)

to “units of local government having general governmental

powers over the entire geographic area served by the

body.” Id., at 485. The Court in Avery, however, recog-

nized that the Midland County Commissioner’s Court “is

representative of most of the general governing bodies of

American cities, counties, towns, and villages”, id. at 483

and warned against a too liberal application of the rule:

This Court is aware of the immense pressures facing

units of local government, and of the greatly varying

problems with which they must deal. The Constitu-

tion does not require that a uniform straitjacket bind

citizens in devising mechanisms of local government

suitable for local needs and efficient in solving local

problems. Id at 485.

5

In Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967)

and Hadley v. Junior College District (1970), this Court

considered the applicability of the one-person-one-vote rule

to the method of selecting members of two school boards.

In Sailors, the governing board of education was found to

be appointive, not elective, and to be performing essentially

adminstrative functions. Consequently, the one-person-

one-vote principle was held inapplicable. Commenting on

Sailors and its companion case, Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S.

112 (1967), this Court later observed in Avery, supra, that:

The Sailors and Dusch cases demonstrate that the

Constitution and this Court are not roadblocks in

the path of innovation, experiment, and development

among units of local government. We will not bar

what Professor Wood has called “the emergence of

a new idealogy and structure of public bodies,

equipped with new capacities and motivations . . .”

R. Wood 1400 Governments, at 175 (1961). Id. at

485.

In Hadley, this Court reviewed a statutory scheme for

the election of a board of trustees for a regional junior

college district which diluted the votes of the electors in the

more populous districts comprising the junior college dis-

trict. After a discussion of the powers exercised by the

board of trustees, the Court found application of the one-

person-one-vote principal to election of its members con.

stitutionally required:

Appellants in this case argue that the junior college

trustees exercised general governmental powers over

the entire district and that under Avery the State

was thus required to apportion the trustees according

to population on an equal basis, as far as practicable.

Appellants argue that since the trustees can levy and

collect taxes, issue bonds with certain restrictions,

hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees,

supervise and discipline students, pass on petitions

6

to annex school districts, acquire property by con-

demnation, and in general manage the operations of

the junior college their powers are equivalent, for

apportionment purposes, to those exercised by the

County Commissioners in Avery. We feel that these

powers, while not fully as broad as those of the Mid-

land County Commissioners, certainly show that the

trustees perform important governmental functions

within the district, and we think these powers are

general enough to have sufficient impact throughout

the district to justify the conclusion that the princi-

ple which we applied in Avery should also be applied

here. Id. at 53.

Nevertheless, the Hadley Court, quoting from Sailors,

supra, echoed the cautionary note found in Avery, supra:

As we said before, “(v)iable local governments may

need many innovations, numerous combinations of

old and new devices, great flexibility in muncipal

arrangements to meet changing urban conditions. We

see nothing in the Constitution to prevent experimen-

tation. Id. at 59.

This reference to Sailors by the Hadley Court is of pecu-

liar interest in light of its enunciation of the general rule

that:

(W)hen a state or local government decides to select

persons by popular election to perform governmental

functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-

teenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter

must be given an equal opportunity to participate in

that election, and when members of an elected body

are chosen from separate districts, each district must

be established on a basis that will insure, as far as

it is practicable, that equal numbers of voters can

vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials.

Id. at 56.

With Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, 410 U.S.

719 (1973) and Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec, 410

7

U.S. 743 (1973), this Court limited application of the one-

person-one-vote rule as it had developed through earlier

decisions. In Salyer, the Court held the rule inapplicable

to election of members of the governing board of a

California Water District which has the statutory power

to eontract for the construction of district projects; the

power to condemn private property for use in such projects;

the authority to issue general obligation bonds; the power

of eminent domain; the power to employ and to dismiss

persons on a regular staff; the authority to provide for

the generation and distribution of hydro-electric power ; and

the power to fix tolls and charge for the use of water, and

to collect them from persons receiving services in propor-

tion to the services rendered. Salyer, at 723-724 and 728 n.7.

Despite the possession of such governmental powers the

majority of this Court held that the one-person-one-vote

principle does not apply to such a governmental arrange-

ment:

The appellee district in this case, although vested

with some typical governmental powers, has rela-

tively limited authority. Its primary purpose, indeed

the reason for its existence, is to provide for the

acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for

farming in the Tulare Lake Basin. It provides no

cther general public services, such as_ schools,

housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything

else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal

body. App. 86. There are no towns, shops, hospitals,

or other facilities designed to improve the quality of

life within the district boundares, and it does not

have a fire department, police, buses, or trains. [bid

Id. at 728-729.

B.

The decision of this Court in Salyer, supra, resulting from

a careful analysis of the governmental powers possessed

by the Tulare Water District demonstrates the utility of

8

such an analysis in cases which involve the application of

the one-person-one-vote rule to cooperative governmental

efforts. An assessment of the powers possessed by the

boards of education of Connecticut regional school districts

must lead to the conclusion that the one-person-one-vote

rule is not applicable to the election of members of such

boards.

In Connecticut the respective powers of the school dis-

trict, and its governing body, the school board, are care-

fully delineated and distinguished by the following state

statutes: 10-46, 10-47, 10-51, 10-53, 10-56, 10-60, 10-220,

10-221, 10-240, 10-241, 10-241a, 10-242, and 10-262. General

Statutes Section 10-240 provides that:

Each town shall maintain the control of all ihe public

schools within its limits and for this purpose shall

be a school district and shall have all the powers and

duties of school districts, except so far as such

powers and duties are inconsistent with the provi-

sions of this chapter.

The intent of Section 10-240 was to transfer control of

all the public schools within the town to the town itself,

with each town constituting a separate school district. See

Keegan v. Town of Thompson, 103 Conn. 418, 130A. 707

(1925). Second School District of Glastonbury, 86 Conn.

590, 86A. 577 (1913). General Statutes Section 10-241 pro-

vides that “(e)ach school district shall be a body corporate”

with certain powers, including the power to lay taxes. Sec-

tion 10-242 establishes the annual town meeting as the

annual school district meeting.

The duties of the school board as distinct and separate

from the power vested solely in the school district, are

found in Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 10-220 which provides

that boards of education shall maintain in their several

towns good public elementary and secondary schools and

shall promote the educational interests of the State. The

9

terms “school district” and “school board” are not used

interchangeably in the statutes and while, for example,

school districts in Connecticut do have the power to levy

and collect taxes, it is clear that Connecticut school boards

do not possess such power.

When the Connecticut legislature adopted its statutory

scheme for the creation of regional school districts, the

distinction between the powers possessed by the school

district and those possessed by the sehool board was main-

tained and made a part of the regional school laws. Thus

Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 10-56 provides in part:

A regional school district shall be a body politie and

corporate with power to sue and be sued; to pur-

chase, receive, hold and convey real and personal

property for school purposes; and to build, equip,

purchase, rent, maintain or expand schools. Such

district may issue bonds in the name and upon the

full faith and credit of such district and the member

towns to acquire land, prepare sites, purchase or

erect buildings and equip the same for school pur-

poses, if so authorized by referendum.

The powers enumerated in Section 10-56, powers which

may be described as important governmental powers, are

vested in the regional school districts, i.e., in the voters of

such districts qualified to vote at the regional school dis-

trict meeting. They are not possessed by regional school

boards. The primary function of the regional school board

is to administer the affairs of the regional school district.

In addition, while Section 10-60 of the Connecticut General

Statutes refers to a power to issue bonds as provided in

Section 10-56, a reading of that statute makes clear that

the power to authorize the issuance of bonds lies exclusively

with the voters of the school district at the regional school

district meeting. Indeed, to borrow money at all, the

regional board of education must have the authorization of

10

a majority of the region’s voters present at a regional

district meeting called specifically for the purpose of obtain-

ing such authorization. And, while a regional board of

education has the duty to prepare an estimated budget for

the region, the power to adopt a budget lies exclusively

with the voters at a regional school district meeting as pro-

vided in Section 10-51.

In Connecticut, it is the regional school district, operat-

ing through the school district meeting, which possesses

general governmental powers, which powers are exercised

in accordance with the one-person-one-vote principal. The

lack of such powers in regional boards of education in

Connecticut clearly exempts them from this constitutional

mandate.!

The distinction between the essentially administrative

powers possessed by regional school boards in Connecticut

and the broad governmental powers vested in the voters

of regional school districts and exercised at the district

meeting is readily discernible upon a reading of the

relevant statutes. These statutes evidence a legislative

intent that Connecticut’s traditionally autonomous towns

retain some control of the administration of their local

schools, even upon regionalization. The vehicle for reten-

tion of such control is a statutory scheme which permits

towns equal representation on the regional school board

while, at the same time, vesting the region’s voters with

the district’s important governmental powers, which powers

they exercise at the regional district meeting, on a one-

person-one-vote basis. The result is a mechanism of local

government meeting legitimate local needs without diluting

the vote of the regional school district voters when it comes

to the exercise of important governmental functions.

1, Judge Oakes’ opinion in the Court of Appeals decision recognizes

the Regional Board's limited power to propose and initiate in the

area of school financing with the ultimate and final authority in the

voters to approve or disapprove such proposals (See Appendix

Page 6a).

ll

Residents of large and small towns alike benefit economic-

ally from the cooperative educational effort which region-

alization brings: a combining of resources among towns to

provide for more efficient school operation with a resultant

improvement in educational programs. In addition, region-

alization is encouraged by the state through the legislative

provision for a greater portion of state aid (through the

“average daily membership grant”) to regional school

districts as opposed to local school districts, thus easing

the tax burden of local towns. (Conn, Gen. Stat., Section

10-262). The legislative intent to encourage regionaliza-

tion is further evidenced by the requirement found in

Conn. Gen, Stat. Section 10-39 which requires the State

Board of Edueation to promulgate regulations setting

standards governing the formation of regional school

districts with respect to those factors which bear on “the

achievement of more efficient administration of a school

district and efficacious education of the pupils therein.”

And although each member town is required to have at least

one representative on the regional board of education, there

ean be no doubt that the otherwise unfettered discretion

towns have in apportioning membership on the board upon

formation of the district greatly encourages regionalization.

(General Statutes, Section 10-46).

It is, of course, true that after Avery, a mechanism of

local government which has general governmental authority

cannot be comprised of officers who are elected on other

than a one-person-one-vote basis even if it meets legitimate

local needs. But, even this Court’s decision in Hadley does

not require the application of the one-person-one-vote rule

to all regional schoo) administration schemes without regard

to their differences and unique characteristics. Such a

non-discriminatory application would unduly discourage

the development of cooperative governmental efforts in the

area of public education and necessitate the imposition of

12

constitutional requirements beyond those laid down in

Avery.

Since the legislative scheme for the creation of regional

school districts in Connecticut does not result in regional

school boards with general governmental powers, the one-

person-one-vote principle should not be found applicable

to election to membership on such boards.

Respectfully Submitted,

Tuomas N. SULLIVAN

Suuziivay, Lerrick & Scnoen

632 Prospect Avenue

Hart! »rd, Connecticut 06105

Counsel for the Appellant

Nonnewaug Regional School

District No, 14

Donato J, Deneen and Anprew G.

Messina, JR.

O’Matiey, Deneen, Messtna &

Osweckt

20 Maple Avenue

Windsor, Connecticut 06095

Attorneys for Appellant

Town of Bethlehem

la

APPENDIX |

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tae Seconp Circuit

Nos. 845, 898-99, 921-22—September Term, 1974.

(Argued June 6, 1975 Decided July 23, 1975.)

Docket Nos. 75-7001, 75-7009, 75-7015, 75-7039-40

Ee

Joun E. Baker and Greravpine S. Georae,

~ Appellees,

Reciona Hicu Scnoont District No. 5, Reaionan Boarp

or Epvucation or Reaionat Hien Scioon District No. 5,

Henry W. Benepict, James Berry, Smney Svirsky and

Jean Hanna, Appellants.

Josern M. Scort, Sr. Appellee,

v.

Nonnewavue Reaionat Scuoon District No. 14, et al.,

Appellants.

B e f o r e—Smirn, Anperson and Oakes, Circuit Judges.

EE ae

Appeal from a decision of the United States District

Court for the District of Connecticut, Jon O. Newman,

Judge, which held on motion for summary judgment that

certain Connecticut regional school boards performed a

range of activities sufficiently extensive to require the appli-

cation of one person-one vote principles. Held that not-

2a

withstanding the fact that the boards in question could

neither levy taxes nor issue bonds, their powers were gov-

ernmental in nature, thus requiring that election to the

boards be in accordance with one person-one vote principles.

Oakes, Circuit Judge:

At issue in this appeal is the applicability of one person-

one vote principles (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),

and Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)) to the elee-

tion of school board members in two Connecticut regional

school districts.' The districts in question are each com-

prised of towns with substantial population differences,

but, as presently organized, each participating town has

an equal number of elected representatives serving on the

regional school board and voting with equal weight. The

United States District Court for the District of Connecti-

eut, Jon O. Newman, Judge, relying on Hadley vy. Junior

College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (trustees of a junior

college school district performing governmental functions

must be elected in accordance with one person-one vote

standards) ; Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968)

(applying one person-one vote standards to the election

of county officials); Rosenthal vy. Board of Education of

Central High School District #3, 497 F.2d 726 (2d Cir.

1974) (finding a substantial federal question presented by

a requested application of one person-one vote principles

to an elected school board which had the power to issue

bonds and propose taxes); Leopold v. Young, 340 F. Supp.

1014 (D. Vt. 1972) (applying one person-one vote stan-

dards to a school board with substantial public functions),

1. A number of other districts throughout Connecticut will pre-

sumably be affected by this decision since most, although not all,

of Connecticut's regional boards are not apportioned on the basis of

one person-one vote. The statutes under which regional school dis-

tricts were created did not require malapportionment, but permitted

towns to agree among themselves on the terms of their consolidation.

3a

held, on motion for summary judgment, that the school

boards in question performed a range of governmental

activities sufficiently extensive to require the application

of one person-one vote principles.? We affirm.’

The facts presented by these two consolidated appeals

are the same in all significant aspects. The school district

in Scott, Connecticut Regional District No. 14 (Nonne-

waug), is comprised of two towns, Woodbury (population

5,869) and Bethlehem (population 1,923). As of May, 1973,

1,887 pupils were attending the school district with 1,385

from Woodbury and 492 from Bethlehem. For each of the

three years ending with 1973-74, Woodbury contributed

to the regional district budget in an amount equal to two

and one-half times the amount contributed by Bethlehem.

Each of the towns, however, is equally represented on the

regional school board by four members.

The school district in Baker is comprised of three

towns, Bethany (population 3,857), Woodbridge (popula-

tion 7,673), and Orange (population 13,524). The average‘

number of pupils in the district is 3,377, with 543 pupils

from Bethany, 998 from Woodbridge and 1,835 from

Orange. Orange contributed in 1972-73 55.04 per cent of

2. In fashioning a remedy for these constitutional violations,

Judge Newman, whose opinion is unpublished, granted declaratory

relief only. His denial of injunctive relief was premised on his

unwillingness “to disrupt on-going educational activities pending

legislative action.” In response to Judge Newman's decision, we are

advised, the Connecticut General AssembMy has enacted contingency

legislation which would apply one person-one vote principles to school

districts, while providing that towns so inclined may withdraw from

regional school districts. (H.R. Bill No. 6596.)

3. Jurisdiction is grounded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and

injunctive and declaratory relief was sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

28 U.S.C. § 2201. A three-judge court is not required as there is no

facial attack on the Connecticut statutes which create regional boards,

and any special acts involved relate only to the particular district

involved and hence are not of statewide applicability.

4. An average student census was — from the actual daily

membership as of June, 1973; October, 1973; and February, 1974.

da

the total school budget, with Bethany's share amounting

to 15.62 per cent and Woodbridge’s 29.34 per cent. How-

ever, each of the three towns is equally represented on

the regional board by three members. In both districts,

the members of the boards are selected through an elective

process.’

Plaintiffs-appellees in both Scott and Baker are resi-

dents, taxpayers and electors of Woodbury and Orange

respectively,® who claim that the present apportionment

on their regional boards of education dilutes their voting

power and deprives them of the equal protection of the

law. ‘The critical question on this appeal therefore is

whether these school boards are elective bodies perform-

ing regulatory functions of a kind that can be characterized

as governmental. Jladley vy. Junior College District, 397

U.S. at 53-54. An affirmative answer to this question re-

quires the additional finding that the boards are con-

structed unconstitutionally, since all parties concede that

their members are not elected according to strict one

person-one vote principles, nor do they vote in accordance

with any kind of weighted formula which would reflect the

population differences in the towns they represent.

The towns in Scott elect members directly to the school

board; the towns in Baker, however, maintain that their

regional hoard is not elective in the sense the Supreme

Court intended for application of the one person-one vote

principle. The essence of this claim is that the board

5. See text at note 7 infra.

6. The Baker appellants maintain that this court's jurisdiction has

heen improperly invoked through “collusive joinder.” Their theory

seems to be that voters of the town are not the real parties in interest

here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). It is, however, the electors whos

vote is being diluted and as such their interests are quite properly

before the court. This is clearly not a case where collusion has been

used to manufacture diversity jurisdiction.

5a

members are “appointed” through a “legislative” town

meeting’ rather than elected through a “popular election.”

We find no merit to this line of argument. While the

forum for selecting board members was a town meeting,

any person who was an elector of the town had the right

to cast a vote at the meeting, and the majority prevailed.

The suggested distinction is one of form, not substance.

On the question whether the board is governmental in

character, appellants make much of the powers which the

school boards lack. By reading Hadley v. Junior College

District as narrowly as possible, they maintain that, since

the Connecticut regional boards lack the powers to levy

and collect taxes and to issue bonds, then their powers are

not sufficiently broad or general to be governmental. But

as Judge Newman recognized in his opinion below, “[t]he

proper question is rather whether the power the Boards

do have, in fulfilling what ‘has traditionally been a vital

governmental function,’ Hadley v. Junior College District,

397 U.S. at 56, make it reasonable to describe the board

members as ‘governmental officials in every relevant sense

of the term.’ Ibid.”

The powers of Connecticut’s regional school districts

are detailed in what is now Chapter 164 of the Connecti-

cut General Statutes,® with Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-47 pro-

viding as follows:

7. In the traditional town meeting, a moderator is chosen by the

assembled electors of the town, and thereafter the meeting is con-

ducted as if it were a parliamentary body.

8. The Baker appellants maintain that there are material facts in

issue concerning the powers of the boards so as to preclude a sum-

mary judgment. Because the regional boards’ powers are statutory

and are for our purposes unambiguous summary judgment was

roperly rendered in the present case. See Leopold v. Young, 340

F. Supp. at 1015.

6a

Regional boards of education shall have all the

powers and duties conferred upon boards of educa-

tion by the general statutes not inconsistent with

the provisions of this part. Such boards may pur-

chase, lease or rent property for school purposes

and, as part of the purchase price may assume and

agree to pay any bonds or other capital indebted-

ness issued by a town for any land and buildings so

purchased; shall perform all acts required to imple-

ment the plan of the committee for the transfer of

property from the participating towns to the re-

gional school district and may build, add to or equip

schools for the benefit of the towns comprising the

district. Such boards may receive gifts of real and

and personal property for the purposes of the

regional school districts. .. .

In the area of school financing, a regional board may auth-

orize bond anticipation notes for periods of up to four

years, and may treat the proceeds of the notes as other

school districts or municipalities. Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-

56(¢)-(d). In addition, the board may also borrow money

for periods up to five years. Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-60.

While such actions by the board must be approved by the

voters of the regional district in a referendum, it is or

should be clear that this does not substantially undercut

the significance of the boards’ function. As stated in the

amicus brief of the town of New Hartford, “whether to

propose a bond ordinance, for what purpose, when, for

how much, and in what form are all within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the regional board.” While the voters have

the final word, what they ratify or disapprove can be only

what the board decides to present to them. See also Leo-

pold v. Young, supra.

Similarly, with respect to the budget-making process,

the board has the exclusive power to initiate and propose.

The voters may choose not to ratify, but it is within the

sole power of the board to draw up the budget, and if it

7a

is disapproved, the board then decides whether to amend

and how to amend. Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-51.

In addition, the regional school boards hire and fire

teachers, supervise and discipline students, and in gen-

eral manage all of the schools within their district.2 As

such, there can be no question but that the board members

perform important governmental functions within

the districts and . . . these powers are general enough

and have sufficient impact throughout the district to

justify the conclusion that [one person-one vote]

should be applied here,

Hadley vy. Junior College District, 397 U.S. at 53-54.

With respect to collective bargaining agreements, again

the contract is negotiated by the board; a district meet-

ing must ratify the board’s action only if the chief execu-

tive officer of a constitutent town requests that a meeting

be called. Conn. Gen. Stats. § 10-153d.

The power to tax is not a sine qua non to a determina-

tion that a local board serves a governmental function.

The regulatory and supervisory powers possessed by the

regional boards here at issue are sufficiently broad to be

classified as governmental activity. See generally Powers

v. Maine School Administrative District No. 1, 359 F. Supp.

30 (D. Me. 1973); Leopold v. Young, supra."

Appellants’ last line of argument focuses upon the

Supreme Court’s decisions in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare

Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973),

9. Nor is this a complete list of the boards’ powers and duties.

The boards also have duties in connection with school curriculum,

transportation and a wide range of support services. In short, this

is not a case like Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967),

where an appointed school board, whose duties were largely admin-

istrative, was exempted from application of one person-one vote

principles.

10. Nor does havi So geee ie ates ee Sy ee

mental in nature. ‘ulyer Co. v. Tulare ¢ Basin Water

Storage District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973).

8a

and Associated Enterprises, Inc. vy. Toltec Watershed

Improvement District, 410 U.S. 743 (1973), to diminish the

force of Hadley. In Salyer and Toltec the Court held that

one person-one vote principles did not apply to the elec-

tion of members of the governing board of a California

water and a Wyoming watershed district. Since the dis-

tricts in issue in Salyer and Toltec had a “special limited

purpose” and since the districts’ action had a substan-

tially “disproportionate effect . . . on landowners as a

group,” 410 U.S. at 728, 410 U.S. at 744, it was aeceptable

for the officers of the district to be elected by weighted

vote of the district's landowners. The regional school

hoards’ impact is general and related to all voters of the

towns as such. In Salyer, the Court was careful to note

that it was the land which was being benefited and the

landowners only paying the costs; the Court also empha-

sized that the water district “provides no other general

publie services such as a school.” Id. at 728-29 (emphasis

added). Here we have school districts in which those

towns which are paying the most for the districts’ sup-

port have to accept a diluted vote" in the running of the

schools. Salyer and Toltec are simply not relevant. The

boards here are elective bodies serving governmental

functions. They must be organized to reflect one person-

one vote principles.

Judgment affirmed.

11. It is of no aid to appellants that the manner in which the

regional boards were to be organized was voted upon and accepted

by a majority of the voters of each of the towns in the district. As

the Supreme Court held in Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly

of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964):

An individual’s constitutionally protected right to cast an

equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a

majority of a State’s electorate, if the apportionment scheme

adopted by the voters fails to measure up to the requirements

of the Equal Protection Clause. Manifestly, the fact that an

apportionment plan is adopted in a popular referendum is

insufficient to sustain its constitutionality or to induce a court

of equity to refuse to act.

Nor is the fact that the districts were formed pursuant to agreement

of the towns. See Leopold v. Young, supra.

9a

APPENDIX Il

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE

Seconp Crrcvit

$<

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Court-

house in the City of New York, on the twenty-third day of

July one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five

Present—Hon. J. Josep Sarrn,

Hon. Rosert P. ANDERSON,

Hon. James L. Oakes, Circuit Judges.

75,7001, 75-7009, 75-7015, 75-7039, 75-7040.

Joun E. Baker, and Geratprne 8. Georeer,

Appellees,

v.

RecionaL Hicu Scuoor District No. 5, Recionat Boarp or

Epvucation or Recionat Hig Scuoor District No. 5, Mrs.

Marion P. Crocco, Mr. Grorce P. Davis, Jr., Mrs. Jean

Virsuvup, Mr. Lovis Kurzner, Mrs. Jean S. Mippieton, Dr.

Freperick Streicert, Mrs. Frank Gruskay, Dr. Hersert

HersHenson, and Mr. Leonarp Loxwne, individually and in

their official capacities as members of the Recionat Boarp

or Epvucation oF Recionat High Scuoout District No. 5,

Dove.as J. Suir, individually and in his official capacity

as Acting Superintendent or Reciona Hicw Scuoor Dis-

rrict No. 5, Mr. Frepertck Ross, Mr. Henry W. Bewnepict,

Mr. Harry I. Wirson, as Treasurers respectively of the

Towns of Orange, Bethany, and Woodbridge, and Mrs.

Marsorre B. Wanxquist, Mr. Smney Svirsxky and Mrs.

Jean Hanna, as Town Clerks respectively of the Towns of

Orange, Bethany and Woodbridge,

Defendants,

10a

Recionat Hicw Scnoor District No. 5 and Recronat Boarp

or Epvucation or Recionat High Scuoot Disrrict No. 5,

James Berry, as Treasurer of the Town of Woodbridge

(succeeding Harry I. Witson, deceased)

Defendants-A ppellants,

JosepH M. Scort, Sr.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Vv.

NonnewavuG Recionat Scuoor District No. 14, THe Town

or Woopsury, Connecticut, THe Town or BretHLEHEM

Connecticut, Town or Woopsury, and Samvet J. Swenp-

SEN, First SetectTMAN, Town oF BETHLEHEM,

Defendants

NonnewauG RecionaL Scuoot District No. 14, Town or

BETHLEHEM,

Defendants-A ppellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT.

+ ———— nl Oe

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record

from the United States District Court for the District of

Connecticut, and was argued by counsel.

Own ConsiperaTion WHereor, it is now hereby ordered,

adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District

Court be and it hereby is affirmed with costs to be taxed

against the appellants.

lla

APPENDIX Ill

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

District or CONNECTICUT

Civil No. B-538

Civil No. N-74-75

rr

JosepnH M. Scort, Sr.

vw

Nonnewavue Recionat Scuoor District No. 14, et al.,

Joun E. Baker, et al.

v.

Recionat Hicu Scuoor District No. 5, et al.

rrr)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

These motions for summary judgment present identical

questions concerning the applicability of one person-one vote

principles to boards of education of Connecticut’s regional

school districts. See generally, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 10-39 to

10-63i. Plaintiff in Civil No. B-538 (Scott), a resident, tax-

payer, and elector of the Town of Woodbury, seeks the

reorganization of the Board of Education of Nonnewaug

Regional School District No. 14, which administers the joint

elementary and secondary school systems of the Towns of

Woodbury and Bethlehem.' In Civil No. N-74-75 (Baker),

1. Plaintiff Scott seeks to pursue the suit as a class action.

Since “any equitable relief to which [plaintiff] may be entitled would

benefit all persons similarly situated, there is no compelling reason

to designate a class.” Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of

Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 354 F. Supp. 778, 783 (D.

Conn. 1973), modified on other grounds, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.

1973). Class action designation is accordingly denied.

12a

plaintiffs are residents, taxpayers, and electors of the Town

of Orange, and they seek re-organization of the Board of

Education of Regional High School District No. 5, which

includes the Towns of Orange, Bethany and Woodbridge.

The defendants in Scott are Regional District No. 14, the

chairman of the Distriet’s Board of Education, the Towns

of Woodbury and Bethlehem, and the First Selectman of

each Town? In Baker the defendants are Regional Dis-

trict No. 5, its Board of Education and the members of the

Board, the District’s superintendent, and the treasurers and

clerks of the Towns of Orange, Woodbridge and Bethany.

Tn addition, the Towns of Bethany and Woodbridge have

moved to intervene as defendants in Baker. They argue

that they have sicnificant interests not adequately protected

by the present defendants, and that only they are properly

situated to protect the interests of their residents and elec-

_tors.’ However, the elected representatives of the voters

who are already parties to this action are equal to that task.

Cf. Powers v. Maine School Administrative District No. 1,

359 F.Supp. 30(D. Me. 1973) ; Leopold v. Young, 340 F.Supp.

1014 (D. Vt. 1972). The Towns as such do not have any

substantial interest in the controversy; they are merely

election districts from which board members are chosen.

Cf. Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F.Supp. 754, 798-99 (D.

Conn, 1964) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom. Town of

Franklin vy. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 562 (1964). See Rey-

nolds vy. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Moreover, an ap-

propriately fashioned remedy will adequately protect the

Towns. See 3A Moore's Federal Practice § 19.07-2[2]. The

motions to intervene are denied.

2. The Town of New Hartford has moved to appear in Scott as

amicus curiae. The motion is granted.

3. Other defendants have raised the same issue in the form of an

affirmative defense alleging that the Towns are necessary parties

without whose joinder the action cannot go forward, Fed. R. Civ,

P. 19,

13a

In both actions plaintiffs argue that the present appor-

tionment of membership on their respective regional boards

of education impermissibly dilutes their voting power and

deprives them of the equal protection of the laws, They

claim jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1343(3), and request a

variety of injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. In

Scott the parties have stipulated to the material facts,‘

and both actions are before the Court on motions for sum-

mary judgment.$

Preliminarily, the Baker defendants dispute this Court’s

jurisdiction and urge that a three-judge court must be con-

vened to hear the suit. They rely primarily on Judge Tim-

4. Defendants in Baker note that in their action the parties have

not entered into a stipulation and urge that summary judgment is

inappropriate because a triable issue of fact is presented by disagree-

ment about the powers of their Board. There is no dispute, however,

that the powers of the Boards are defined by the Connecticut Gen-

eral Statutes, compare Education/Instruccion, Inc. v. Moore,

F.2d (2d Cir. 1974), Slip op. at 5321 (August 21, 1974) (Oakes,

J. dissenting); the only disagreement is whether as a matter of law

the powers conferred 4 statute are sufficient to bring the Boards

within apportionment requirements.

5. The Baker defendants oppose summary judgment on the

— that the plaintiffs are not real parties in interest, Fed. R.

iv. P. 17(a), and on the additional ground that jurisdiction of this

Court has been invoked by “improper or collusive joinder,” 28 U.S.C,

§ 1359. Rule 17(a) is designed to make certain that an action is

brought by one who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to

be enforced. Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional

Hospital, 35 F.R.D. 516 (E.D. S.C. 1964); 3A Moore’s Federal

Practice § 17.07, text at n. 1. But as this opinion explains, text fol-

lowing n. 2, supra, the right sought to be protected in this case is

that of the Orange electors in an undiluted vote. Section 1359 is

similarly designed to prevent collusive attempts to “manufacture”

diversity jurisdiction, O’Brien v. Avco Corporation, 425 F.2d 1030

(2d Cir, 1969). It thus has no application in the present context.

Moreover, even if, as defendants allege, officials of the Town of

Orange solicited plaintiffs’ participation, and even if the Town of

Orange is paying the expenses of the litigation, it does not follow

that there has been the kind of “collusion” at which the statute is

directed Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 204

F.Supp. 83 (D. Conn, 1962).

l4a

bers’ tentative opinion in Giordano v. Amity Regional High

School District #5, 313 F.Supp. 403 (D. Conn, 1970). The

simple answer to this claim is one not raised by the parties

in Giordano (although recognized as persuasive by Judge

Timbers, 313 F.Supp. at 408-09, n, 9), but pressed strenu-

ously by all plaintiffs in the present actions. Plaintiffs here

do not seek to enjoin enforcement of a statute of statewide

application. Compare Hadley y. Junior College District of

Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 57 (1970), with

Leopold vy. Young, 340 F.Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Vt. 1972).

The Connecticut statutory system at issue “does not require

malapportionment, but only permits towns to agree among

themselves on the terms under which they will consolidate,

including the apportionment of school board members.”

Ibid. See C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of the Federal

Courts 190, text at n. 21 (1970).

The situation is no different as to Special Act 74-69,

regardless of the interpretation placed on it. If, as plain-

tiffs urge, it merely sets the time at which board members

will take office, there is no question of enjoining its enforce-

ment. And even if, as defendants urge, it represents a

“fixing” of the present apportionment of board members,

it applies by its terms only to District No. 5 and is there-

fore not a statute of statewide application,

Moreover, as the remainder of this opinion makes clear,

the law has progressed considerably since Giordano, and

what Judge Timbers concluded was a question requiring

three judges for resolution is now so clearly settled that

the issue lacks the substantiality requiring a three-judge

court. In such circumstances a single judge possesses the

power to dispose of the case. Bailey vy. Patterson, 369 U.S.

31 (1962); Anderson v. Nemetz, 474 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.

1973); Consumer Party v. Tucker, 364 F.Supp. 594, 604

(E.D. Pa. 1973). See Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375

F.2d 129, 131 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1967).

15a

Regional District No. 14 began operating on July 1,

1968, having been approved several months earlier by

separate referenda conducted in Woodbury and Bethle-

hem. ‘The District's board consists of eight members, with

four chosen by the electors of each of the two member

towns. Plaintiff Scott bases his objection to the equal divi-

sion of the membership on a comparison of the populations

of the two communities. According to the 1970 census,

Woodbury'’s population was 5,869 and Bethlehem’s was

1,923, and of the 1,887 pupils attending school in the Dis-

trict as of May, 1973, 1,885 were frore Woodbury and 492

were from Bethlehem. Finally, for each of the three con-

secutive academic years ending with 1973-74, Woodbury’s

contribution to the Regional District’s budget was approxi-

mately two and one-half times as large as Bethlehem’s. In

short, plaintiff complains that Woodbury has roughly 75%

of the joint distriet’s population and pupils, and contrib-

utes a similar proportion of the joint district’s budget, but

has only 50% of the votes on the body that administers

the District.

The comparable statistics for District No. 5, which com-

menced operations in the 1952-53 academic year, reflect a

similar imbalance, Orange, the largest of the three towns,

has approximately 55% of the population, 55% of the

student body, and contributes 55% of the District’s budget.

Bethany accounts fur approximately 15% of each category,

and Woodbridge 30%. Each Town, however, elects three

members of the nine-member joint Board of Education.

Defendants do not dispute the contention that the votes

of the Woodbury and Orange electors are in fact substan-

tially diluted. Cf. Powers v. Maine School Administrative

District No. 1, supra, 359 F.Supp. at 35. Nor do they

seriously contest the proposition that because the members

of the Regional Boards are chosen by election® the one per-

6. The Baker defendants do suggest that the town meetings from

which their Board members are elected are exercises of legislative

16a

son—one vote rules must apply. £.g., Hadley v. Junior

College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50,

D4 (1970); Rosenthal vy. Board of Education of Central

High School District No. 3 of Town of Hempstead, 497

F.2d 726, 729 (2d Cir. 1974).

On the merits of the motions for summary judgment

defendants press only two contentions. The first is that

the Regional Boards whose composition is at issue perform

an insufficiently broad range of governmental functions and

are therefore not the type of elective bodies to which appor-

tionment requirements apply. Compare Salyer Land Co. v.

Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719,

728-29 (1973). Both Regional Boards lack several signi-

ficant powers that were possessed by the junior college

board of trustees in Hadley, and defendants contend that

these were essential both in Hadley and in similar cases.

These include the power to levy and collect taxes, to issue

bonds, and to pass on petitions to annex school districts

and acquire property by condemnation.

Defendants’ approach, enumerating the powers that these

Regional Boards lack, is misconceived. Cf. Hadley v. Jun-

tor College District, supra, 397 U.S. at 53-54; Rosenthal

v. Board of Education, supra, 497 F.2d at 728. The proper

question is rather whether the powers the Boards do have

in fulfilling what “has traditionally been a vital govern-

mental function,” Hadley v. Junior College District, supra,

power and not “popular elections” within the meaning of Hadley,

and that one person-one vote requirements for that reason do not

apply. Defendants do not dispute, however, that in each member

town all registered voters are eligible to vote for board members,

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-46(b). Nothing in Hadley indicates that the

Court intended to limit its holding to elections of a particular type.

On the contrary, Justice Black took pains to observe that at the

center of each of the Supreme Court’s reapportionment cases was

“the decision of the government to have citizens participate individu-

ally by ballot in the selection of certain people who carry out govern-

mental functions.” 397 U.S. at 54. To accept the consequences of

defendants’ characterization would be to nak form over substance

at the expense of the right to vote.

17a

397 U.S. at 56, make it reasonable to describe the board

members as “government officials in every relevant sense

of that term.” Ibid.

With the question thus posed, the answer becomes clear.

The powers of the two Boards before this Court do not

differ significantly from those of the Board in Rosenthal,

supra, and the only question that troubled the Court of

Appeals in Rosenthal was whether the manner of selection

of board members was more nearly elective than it was

appointive; it was obvious to the Court that if the board

members were elected, their powers were sufficiently gov-

ernmental to invoke one person-one vote requirements. 497

F.2d at 729, text at n. 10. As the Court of Appeals has

more recently observed, “there was no question [in Rosen-

thal] that the body in question performed substantial gov-

ernmental functions.’”” Education/Instruccion, Inc, v.

Moore, —— F.2d . (2d Cir. 1974), Slip op. at 5320

(August 21, 1974). Compare, e.g., Dameron v. Tangipahoa

Parish Police Jury, 315 F.Supp. 137, 138 (E.D. La. 1970).

See also, Regional High School District ivo. 3 v. Town of

Newtown, 134 Conn. 613, 620-21 (1948).

Defendants’ second argument relies on dictum in Avery

v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). They suggest that

regional districts are a form of educational innovation and

are for that reason immune from judicial interference, even

interference in the name of equal protection. Defendants

contend that requiring equal apportionment will make it

unlikely that smaller towns will join regional districts, and

that a legitimate attempt by the State to provide for more

efficient operation of schools and improved educational

opportunity for students will thereby be frustrated.

In Avery, which held that elections for County Commis-

sioners Court in Texas must be conducted in accordance

7. The Rosenthal Board also lacked the power to set taxes. 497

F.2d at 728, n. 7 and accompanying text. .

18a

with principles of voting equality, the Supreme Court

acknowledged in passing that local governments are under

immense pressures to solve local problems, and denied that

such experimentation is foreclosed by the Constitution, The

two cases cited by the Court, however, indicate that these

observations were in no way intended to encourage retreat

from the Constitutional imperative. Sailors v. Board of

Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), exempted a board whose

members were appointed and whose duties were adminis-

trative, and in Dusch vy. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967), the

Court upheld residence requirements imposed on the

members of a multicounty legislative body, finding that the

voting power of the electors of the component counties

was not diluted. Defendants express a legitimate concern

in urging that there be no needless thwarting of experi-

mentation with regional arrangements in general or in the

field of education in particular. The desirability of such

arrangements, however, cannot suspend the Fourteenth

Amendment’s apportionment requirements. If regional

school districts are to be encouraged, it will have to be

done by ereative legislative authorization and cooperative

local arrangements that resolve the competing large and

small town interests within Constitutional standards.

Although the Constitution leaves a great deal of room for

legitimate experimentation and innovation, it also “imposes

one ground rule for the development of arrangements of

local government: a requirement that units with general

governmental powers over an entire geographic area not be

apportioned among... districts of substantially unequal

population.” Avery v. Midland County, supra, 390 U.S.

at 485-86,

The only question remaining is one of remedy. Plaintiffs

in hoth actions have requested a broad range of coercive

injunctive relief, hoth permanent and interlocutory. Plain-

tiffs have clearly established that they are entitled to a

19a

declaratory judgment, but it does not follow that the

requested permanent mandatory injunction is also appro-

priate at this time. While it is true that the violations

could be cured without legislative action, compare Hadley

v. Junior College District, supra, the relatively few options

presently available to defendants were designed by a legis-

lature that may well have thought that regional districts

would be free from one person-one vote requirements.

Respect for the pre-eminence of the states in matters of

educational policy requires, therefore, that the legislature

be given a reasonable opportunity to develop new alterna-

tives in light of this Court’s declaration before an injunc-

tion issues requiring defendants to act. Cf. Powers v.

Maine School Administrative District No. 1, supra. For

example, the legislature may want to consider the pro-

cedures for forming new districts and for dissolving, or

permitting withdrawal from, present districts now that one

person-one vote principles are applicable. The General

Assembly is to convene in January and should have at

least two months to consider whether it wishes to frame

legislation responsive to the concerns of these and other

aspects of regional districts. Permanent injunctive relief

will therefore be denied, without prejudice to a renewed

application after March 1, 1975. At any time prior to that

date, any parties may submit to the Court their proposals

for reapportionment plans and implementation procedures,

which the Court will review before formulating a final

deeree after March 1, 1975.

With respect to the requests for interim relief pending

entry of a final decree, the Court is not willing needlessly

to disrupt on-going educational activities pending legisla-

tive action. The requested decrees would work a substan-

tial departure from the status quo, and the request for

such relief is therefore denied. Plaintiffs are free to seek

supplemental interim relief if it should appear that the

20a

Regional Districts are about to undertake substantial

building programs or make other substantial capital

commitments.

Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment

are granted,* and judgment wili enter declaring that the

allocation of membership on the Boards of Education of

Nonnewaug Regional School District No. 14, and of

Regional High School District No. 5, deprives plaintiffs

of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 22 day of

November, 1974.

Jon O. Newman

United States District Judge

8. The motion of defendants in Scott is correspondingly denied.

2la

APPENDIX IV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

District oF CONNECTICUT

Civil No. B-538

Civil No. N-74-75

ee

JosepH M. Scort, Sr.

v.

NonnewavucG Recionat ScHoot District No. 14, e¢ al.,

Joun E. Baker, et al.,

v.

RecionaL Hiew ScHoor District No. 5, et al.

rrr i

JUDGMENT

The above cases having come on for consideration by the

Court on plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment and

the Court having rendered its Memorandum of Decision,

under date of November 22, 1974, granting said motions;

and the Court having rendered its Ruling on Request for

Rule 54(b) Certification, under date of January 3, 1975,

finding that there is no just reason for delay and specifically

directing the Clerk to enter judgment on the claims for

declaratory relief,

It is ORDERED and apsupGeED that judgment be and is hereby

entered declaring that the allocation of membership on the

Boards of Education of Nonnewaug Regional School Dis-

22a

trict No. 14, and of Regional High School District No. 5,

deprives plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 8th day of Janu-

ary, 1975.