Amicus Brief — Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train

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MOTION FILED

SEP 22 1975

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-415

PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION,

Petitioner,

Vv.

RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND BRIEF OF

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

MANUFACTURERS, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN

SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By RICHARD D. GoDOWN

General Counsel

STEPHANIE RICHMOND

Assistant General Counsel

1776 F Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

INDEX

I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BriEF Amicus Curiae ..........

II, Brier Amicus Curiae

Pee eee eee eee ee

Be, CI GP IID GED ccccccccccccsccvccnccccccsesssccssecesescssccsce

IV. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................----c0e00eeeeeeees

THE Court BELOW ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED SECTION

111(a)(1) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 000000000...0.0ccceeneeceeneeeneeees

(a) The Congressional Intent of the Clean Air Act

(b)

and the National Environmental Policy Act Re-

quires that Economic Factors Be Given Significant

Weight by the Administrator .................-...-.0-++-

EPA Has Ignored the Council on Environmental

Quality (CEQ) Policy on Cost-Benefit Analyses,

and the Views of Its Own Task Force, When Fail-

ing to Require a Balancing of Costs and Benefits

of the New Source Emission Standards Under

Cem RUMI, oancccenceccocecoccscecsssecsneqqeeencnosscensescnsnsees

(c) The Lower Court Erred in Upholding the Ad-

(d)

(e)

ministrator’s Actions Which Failed to Comply

with the Statutory Mandate ..................-..0s--00-9

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Has Referred to the Necessity for Weighing and

Balancing Costs versus Benefits in Environmen-

a

The Cost Burden to Industry Is Not Being Given

Meaningful Consideration by EPA ................------

WF, COUPIUIIIIIIY iesiccceoctesticncenccenstnstnsscccsincnrscbescesnentssncssssnscesssses

CASES:

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy

Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ............--+-+-

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C.

| |

Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 412 US.

| | / ) ne,

Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375

(D.C, Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 wee TC °

10

12

13

14

6,

ee

ii Index Continued

Page

Portland Cement Association V. Train, 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.

TET) ccncesnccsessinenisctessiananatiailladhceniaisaitiiasttaieiaiasmainaisastadeamiiaaibitadils 9

Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (1973) .............. “a

STATUTES:

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. $1857, et seq. .... 2, 3, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14

2. |. | ) ae 7

|.) CESS > a> io See oe

BE IIE | cinccncenceccitticcepnenammenncenisiaenitadaiane 2

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),

42 U.S.C. §4321, ef Seq. ......2.......e000+-+- 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13

MISCELLANEOUS:

116 Cong. Rec. 19242-19243, December 2, 1970 .................. 8

116 Cong. Rec. 42392, December 18, 1970 ..........-......-s-eseeeees 7

Air/Water Pollution Report (Business Publications, Inc., May,

TPC) cxitesnerenicimainnintenemenEEnnntnnn 13

Boothe, Joan N., “Cleaning Up: The Cost of Refinery Pollution

Control,” (Council on Economic Priorities, 1975) ............ 13

Chemical and Engineering News, December 2, 1974 ..........-----»+- 13

EPA Task Force Report: “Application of NEPA to EPA’s En-

vironmental Regulatory Activities,” (February, 1973) ...... 10

U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental om,

second annual report, 1971 __.......... 10

U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality,

fourth annual report, 1973 ............--.-----esereseesenssesennesneees 14

U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality,

fifth annual report, 1974 ............-.--c-eseessensenesensennsneesenennenees 14

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-415

PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION,

| Petitioner,

Vv.

RuSsELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., |

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND BRIEF OF

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

MANUFACTURERS, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN

SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The National Association of Manufacturers hereby re-

spectfully moves for leave to file the accompanying brief

as amicus curiae in this case. The consent of the Attorney

for the Petitioner has been obtained. The consent of the

Attorneys for the Respondents was requested but no reply

was received.

2

The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) is

a nonprofit voluntary business organization, organized as a

membership corporation under the laws of the State of New

York. It is composed of approximately 13,000 manufactur-

ing and related concerns of all sizes located throughout the

United States. Because of the broad scope and application

of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §1857 et seq.) a substan-

tial number of NAM member concerns are subject to the

provisions of the Act and will be directly affected by the

decision in this case.

In the interest of its membership, the NAM has appeared

as amicus curiae in suits of significant national concern. For

example, the Supreme Court granted the NAM’s motion for

leave to file a brief amicus curiae in Gateway Coal Co. V.

United Mine Workers of America, 412 U.S, 903 (1973), a

suit brought under the Labor-Management Relations Act

and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.

A substantial number of the member concerns of the NAM

have a real and direct interest in the instant litigation and

believe that, as before, the views of the NAM, its experi-

ence with the critical issues involved herein, and its general

manufacturing and technical expertise may be of assistance

to this Court.

This case presents issues of national importance which

are of direct concern to the NAM and its members because

the Clean Air Act applies to all industrial stationary sources

(“any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits

or may emit any air pollutant”). Clean Air Act §111(a)(3),

42 U.S.C. §1857c-6 (Supp. 1975). Section 111(a)(1) of

the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §1857c-6) requires the Ad-

ministrator to “take into account the cost of achieving the

emission reduction” he prescribes when promulgating emis-

sion standards for new stationary sources. Just how this cost

factor is to be taken into account is the fundamental issue

involved in the present case. It is an issue of great concern

3

to a substantial number of NAM members who expend in-

creasingly large sums for pollution control and need mean-

ingful, careful consideration to be given to the cost of, and

public benefit expected from, EPA regulation as the Clean

Air Act and National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.

§4321, et seq.) would require.

Although this case deals with specific emission standards

promulgated for the cement industry, if the construction and

interpretation of the Clean Air Act by the Court below are

correct, the Administrator, in effect, can disregard the stat-

utory mandate contained in Section 111(a)(1) of the Act

and predicate such standards essentially upon environmen-

tal considerations, unless an industry can prove such regula-

tions will endanger its economic survival. Thus the ramifica-

tions of the decision below are not limited to the cement

industry, but can have application to many other industries

which are subject to the Act. It is, therefore, of vital impor-

tance to have Section 111(a)(1) interpreted by this Court.

Accordingly, the NAM has an interest in the proper res-

olution of the issues before the Court in this case and urges

that leave be granted to file the accompanying brief as

amicus curiae and respect ully so moves this Court.

Respectfully submitted,

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By RicHarD D. GopOWN

General Counsel

STEPHANIE RICHMOND

Assistant General Counsel

1776 F Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-415

PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION,

; Petitioner,

Vv.

RusseLL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ETAL., |

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the -

District of Columbia Citcuit

a

_ BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

MANUFACTURERS. OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT

OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

INTEREST OF AMICUS ~URIAE

The interest of the National Association of Manufactur-

ers (NAM), in this case is set forth in the foregoing Motion

for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae

6

IL REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Court Below Erroneously Interpreted Section

11l(aX1) of the Clean Air Act.

The Appellate Court decision, in effect, holds that the

EPA Administrator, when promulgating emission “stand-

ards of performance” for new stationary sources, may elect

to ignore or reject all evidence relating to cost versus benefit

and may predicate emission standards essentially on envi-

ronmental considerations, as long as the involved industries

are able to “bear the costs and survive.” * This conclusion is

contrary to the express provisions of the Clean Air Act, and

the congressional intent as manifested by the legislative his-

tories of both the Clean Air Act and the National Environ-

mental Policy Act (NEPA). It is, therefore, necessary for

this Court to construe Section 111(a)(1) of the Clean Air

Act, thereby clarifying the role of the Administrator in pro-

mulgating standards, and providing the essential criteria on

which courts of appeal will review and rule upon the valid-

ity of emission standards.

(a) The Congressional Intent of the Clean Air Act and the

National Environmental Policy Act Requires that Economic

Factors Be Given Significant Weight by the Administrator.

Section 111(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.

§1857c-6) requires that when setting emission standards for

new stationary sources, the EPA Administrator must “take

into account the cost of achieving the emission reduction”

he prescribes. It is clear on its face that there are two factors

to be considered simultaneously. These are the specific cost

of achieving that particular emission reduction prescribed.

In other words, the Administrator must consider that to

achieve X% pollution reduction (i.e., benefit) it costs Y

amount of dollars (cost). Since the pollution reduction is a

1 EPA Response to Remand in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckels-

haus, 486 F.2d 375 (1973); Joint Appendix to the Brief Following Re-

mand, p. 201.

7

benefit to the public, it follows that Section 111(a)(1) re-

quires a cost-benefit analysis. EPA ignored this section of

the law when it rashly stated that cost-benefit analyses can-

not be established or justified in promulgating emission

standards, and that as long as the costs are not so great that

an industry could not bear them and survive, such stand-

ards will be promulgated.” Since EPA’s statement effectively

eradicates Section 111(a)(1) of the Act, the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was incorrect

in upholding the EPA view.

tion 111(a)(1) mentioned above, there are further

Mr. Randolph . . . I know at times on the sub-

committee and on the committee we ha talked about

e

|

E

B

aé

:

5

have recognized that this legislation

nomic measure and an air pollution measure . .

Mr. Muskie . . . The Senator is correct. (116 Cong.

Rec. 42392, December 18, 1970). (Emphasis added. )

nomic impact. This amendment was proposed by Congress-

man Ryan of New York, who stated:

I believe that the threat to our environment is so

2 Ibid.

great that, as a matter of public policy, industry should

be required to use the most advanced technology re-

gardless of whether or not a particular industry finds

it economically feasible.

The proposal was rejected on voice vote. (116 Cong. Rec.

19242-43, December 2, 1970).*

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has stated

that in order to give full effect to the Clean Air Act, it must

be read, at minimum, in pari materia with NEPA. See

Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, supra, at 380.

NEPA states that all agencies of the Federal Government

shall: “identify and develop methods and procedures, in

consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality,

which will insure that presently unqualified environmental

amenities and values may be given appropriate considera-

tion in decisionmaking along with economic and technical

considerations;” 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(B) [Emphasis sup-

plied]. NEPA also states that all agencies of the Federal

Government shall include in every recommendation or re-

port on major Federal actions significantly affecting the

quality of the environment, a detailed statement by the

responsible official on: _

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

(ii) any adyerse environmental effects which cannot

be avoided should the proposal be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, __

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses

of man’s environment and the maintenance and

enhancement of long-term productivity; [Em-

phasis supplied] and,

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments

of resources which would be involved in the pro-

action should it be implemented. 42 U.S.C.

4332(2)(C) (i)-(v).

3 Referred to in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d

375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).

9

While EPA is not required to file a formal NEPA impact

statement, it is required to prepare the “functional equiva-

lent of a NEPA impact statement.” Portland Cement

v. Ruckelshaus, supra, at 380. Such a “functional equiva-

lent” must give consideration to all five NEPA issues

quoted above. Environmental Defense F und (EDF) v.

E.P.A., 489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973). And the

legislative history of NEPA as gleaned by the courts leaves

no question that this Act requires that full, careful con-

sideration be given by EPA to economic factors:

The legislative history of NEPA clearly reveals that

Congress intended the ‘development of adequate me-

thodology for evaluating the full environmental impacts

and the full costs—social, economic, and environmen-

tal—of federal actions Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359

F. “upp. 1289, 1366 (1973) . . . NEPA is at the

very least ‘an environmental full disclosure law’ .. .,

Ibid., 359 F. Sau & noting nang oo see

that important legislative purposes are not or

misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureauc-

racy ... Ibid., 359 F. Supp. at 1332.

10

the environment. And such improvement should, of

course, continue as long as the perceived added gains

of attaining each higher level of environmental quality

exceed the expected costs.” (Environmental Quality,

1971, at 119 (U.S.G.P.O.) ). [Emphasis supplied. ]

The italicized words demonstrate the need for the weigh-

ing and balancing of costs versus benefits.

An EPA Task Force Report entitled “Application of

NEPA to EPA’s Environmental Regulatory Activities”

(February, 1973), at 57, states that full compliance with

NEPA might necessitate a balancing of costs and benefits

of the standards being considered:

4. Benefit: Full compliance with NEPA would re-

sult in providing more information to the public, in-

dustry, and other government agencies in regard to

the source categories selected, standards proposed, and

consequences and benefits of these actions. Full com-

pliance might necessitate a balancing of costs and

benefits to the standards being considered; the benefits

to the public health and welfare would be stressed.

The basis and rationale for setting standards would

be documented for mternal and public use. (Emphasis

supplied. )

EPA rejects both the policy of CEQ, and the views of its

own task force when failing to adequately consider peti-

tioner’s cost-benefit analysis, or prepare one of its own.

(c) The Lower Court Erred in Upholding the Administrator's

Actions Which Failed to Comply with the Statutory Mandate.

Despite a clear expression of legislative intent, the Ad-

ministrator when promulgating the cement standards failed

to follow the statutory mandate with respect to economic

considerations. Indeed, EPA hastily rejected Portland’s cost-

benefit analysis which showed the regulation would impose

a cost increase of nearly 20% in order to achieve an emis-

sion reduction of one tenth of 1%—a ratio of more than

ee

11

100 (cost) to 1 (benefit). EPA then made the following

statement against cost-benefit analyses:

We believe that Congress intended §111 to be used

to establish emission limitations which are the lowest

that can be achieved by that industry. Where the cost

of meeting such standards would be so great that the

industry could not bear the costs and survive, such

standards could not be implemented by the industry

regardless of technological feasibility. There are also

cases where a reduction in emissions that would be

achieved by a particular control technique would be

so grossly disproportionate to the cost of the control

technique that it would not be required. However,

these determinations are necessarily judgmental and

are left specifically to the Administrator in §111. EPA

does not believe that cost-benefit analyses can be estab-

lished or justified on the basis of such an analysis.*

By virtue of this statement, EPA can effectively promulgate

the lowest standards technically achievable by industry,

without regard to the degree of necessity for such standards

(which could be determined by a cost-benefit analysis).

Such standards will be promulgated as long as the industry

is able to “bear the costs and survive.” This concept rejects

a careful, meaningful consideration of cost as required by

NEPA and the Clean Air Act; it totally ignores $111(a) (1)

of the Clean Air Act which plainly requires a comparison

of cost and benefit, and it creates a rebuttable presumption

that a standard is warranted, shifting the burden to industry

to prove that promulgation of the standards would result

in that industry’s economic destruction. The lower court

was incorrect in upholding this concept, stating that indus-

try must show “an inability to adjust itself in a healthy

economic fashion . . .” See Portland Cement Association V.

Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508, (1975). Thus the fundamental

and necessary procedure of weighing and balancing costs

versus benefits is cavalierly rejected in favor of a negative

4 Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, supra, n. 1 and 2.

12

burden of proof for industry. It is respectfully submitted that

the inability of the regulated industry to carry an impossible

burden of proof cannot substitute for the clear statutory

duty of the regulatory agency.

(d) The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Has Re-

ferred to the Necessity for Weighing and Balancing Costs

versus Benefits in Environmental Actions.

The U.S, Court of. Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has

stated:

‘Environmental amenities’ will often be in conflict

with ‘economic and technical considerations’. To ‘con-

sider’ the former ‘along with’ the latter must involve

a balancing process. In some instances environmental

costs may outweigh economic and technical benefits

and in other instances they may not. But NEPA man-

dates a rather finely-tuned and ‘systematic’, balancing

analysis in each instance. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating

Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commis-

sion, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (1971).

While the Calvert Cliffs case concerned an Atomic Energy

Commission rule to govern consideration of environmental

matters (and did not concern emission standards), it must

respectfully be submitted that new source emission stand-

ards are also major environmental actions subject to NEPA,

and they, too, should be deemed to require a cost-benefit

balancing analysis, particularly inasmuch as Section 111

(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act provides for it.

Indeed, while Tennessee Valley Authority, the Army

Corps of Engineers, and other agencies have all utilized

the “cost-benefit” principle, EPA has not been willing to

consider the costs versus benefits when promulgating new

source emission standards. It emphatically states such a

balancing is an impossibility, but it is clear that it has not

even set the wheels in motion for developing an adequate

methodology for evaluating costs and benefits as required

13

by NEPA, since it defiantly believes that cost-benefit analy-

ses for new source standards are not justified. Meanwhile,

pollution costs are doubling and tripling, unemployment is

high, use of energy is costly, and capital availability is in-

creasingly difficult. However, as long as an industry can

still “bear the costs and survive,” a proposed standard is

acceptable to EPA. This is contrary to the public interest

as well as the interests of individual companies in an in-

dustry. It is also contrary to the congressional intent of the

Clean Air Act and the National Environmental Policy Act,

as stated above.

(e) The Cost Burden to Industry is Not Being Given Mean-

ingful Consideration by EPA.

The chemical industry’s capital expenditures in air and

water pollution control have more than doubled in the past

three years, going from $282 million in 1971 to $631 mil-

lion in 1974.° The nation’s steel industry must spend under

present regulations $12 to $14 billion on pollution control

equipment over the next nine years in order to meet 1983

standards.* U.S. petroleum refineries will invest approxi-

mately $3.4 billion for pollution control equipment between

1974 and 1983, and it will cost an additional $5.9 to $7.5

billion more to produce petroleum products from 1974

through 1983 if refineries meet government pollution con-

trol standards." In 1975 electric utilities plan to spend $970

million on air pollution control and $565 million on water

pollution control.’ For industry in general, The U.S. Council

on Environmenta! Quality estimated in 1973 that the private

sector’s capital investment will come to $112 billion from

5 Chemical and Engineering News, December 2, 1974, p. 12.

® Business Publications, Inc., Air/Water Pollution Report, May 19,

1975, p. 197.

T Joan Norris Boothe, “Cleaning Up: The Cost of Refinery Pollution

Control,” Council on Economic Priorities, 1975, p. 2.

* Business Publications, Inc., Air/Water Pollution Report, May 26,

1975, p. 207.

14

1972-1981.’ In 1974, CEQ estimated that, for the period

from 1973-1982, the environmental pollution control ex-

penditures required under the Federal program would be

$194.8 billion.”® Instead of relating such costs to benefits

in the instant case, EPA’s position is that as long as indus-

tries are “able to bear the costs and survive,” the standards

will be promulgated. It is submitted that this is an un-

realistic approach, and one which undermines one of the

stated purposes of the Clean Air Act: “to promote national

productive capacity.”

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth

by the Petitioner, this Court is respectfully requested to

grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By RICHARD D. GODOWN

General Counsel

STEPHANIE RICHMOND

Assistant General Counsel

1776 F Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

September, 1975

® U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, fourth

annual report, 1973, p. 93.

1° U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, fifth

annual report, 1974, p. xvii.

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