Amicus Brief — Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train
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MOTION FILED
SEP 22 1975
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No. 75-415
PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
Vv.
RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND BRIEF OF
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN
SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
By RICHARD D. GoDOWN
General Counsel
STEPHANIE RICHMOND
Assistant General Counsel
1776 F Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
INDEX
I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BriEF Amicus Curiae ..........
II, Brier Amicus Curiae
Pee eee eee eee ee
Be, CI GP IID GED ccccccccccccsccvccnccccccsesssccssecesescssccsce
IV. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................----c0e00eeeeeeees
THE Court BELOW ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED SECTION
111(a)(1) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 000000000...0.0ccceeneeceeneeeneeees
(a) The Congressional Intent of the Clean Air Act
(b)
and the National Environmental Policy Act Re-
quires that Economic Factors Be Given Significant
Weight by the Administrator .................-...-.0-++-
EPA Has Ignored the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) Policy on Cost-Benefit Analyses,
and the Views of Its Own Task Force, When Fail-
ing to Require a Balancing of Costs and Benefits
of the New Source Emission Standards Under
Cem RUMI, oancccenceccocecoccscecsssecsneqqeeencnosscensescnsnsees
(c) The Lower Court Erred in Upholding the Ad-
(d)
(e)
ministrator’s Actions Which Failed to Comply
with the Statutory Mandate ..................-..0s--00-9
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Has Referred to the Necessity for Weighing and
Balancing Costs versus Benefits in Environmen-
a
The Cost Burden to Industry Is Not Being Given
Meaningful Consideration by EPA ................------
WF, COUPIUIIIIIIY iesiccceoctesticncenccenstnstnsscccsincnrscbescesnentssncssssnscesssses
CASES:
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ............--+-+-
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C.
| |
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 412 US.
| | / ) ne,
Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375
(D.C, Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 wee TC °
10
12
13
14
6,
ee
ii Index Continued
Page
Portland Cement Association V. Train, 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.
TET) ccncesnccsessinenisctessiananatiailladhceniaisaitiiasttaieiaiasmainaisastadeamiiaaibitadils 9
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (1973) .............. “a
STATUTES:
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. $1857, et seq. .... 2, 3, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14
2. |. | ) ae 7
|.) CESS > a> io See oe
BE IIE | cinccncenceccitticcepnenammenncenisiaenitadaiane 2
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
42 U.S.C. §4321, ef Seq. ......2.......e000+-+- 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
MISCELLANEOUS:
116 Cong. Rec. 19242-19243, December 2, 1970 .................. 8
116 Cong. Rec. 42392, December 18, 1970 ..........-......-s-eseeeees 7
Air/Water Pollution Report (Business Publications, Inc., May,
TPC) cxitesnerenicimainnintenemenEEnnntnnn 13
Boothe, Joan N., “Cleaning Up: The Cost of Refinery Pollution
Control,” (Council on Economic Priorities, 1975) ............ 13
Chemical and Engineering News, December 2, 1974 ..........-----»+- 13
EPA Task Force Report: “Application of NEPA to EPA’s En-
vironmental Regulatory Activities,” (February, 1973) ...... 10
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental om,
second annual report, 1971 __.......... 10
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality,
fourth annual report, 1973 ............--.-----esereseesenssesennesneees 14
U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality,
fifth annual report, 1974 ............-.--c-eseessensenesensennsneesenennenees 14
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No. 75-415
PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION,
| Petitioner,
Vv.
RuSsELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., |
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND BRIEF OF
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN
SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The National Association of Manufacturers hereby re-
spectfully moves for leave to file the accompanying brief
as amicus curiae in this case. The consent of the Attorney
for the Petitioner has been obtained. The consent of the
Attorneys for the Respondents was requested but no reply
was received.
2
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) is
a nonprofit voluntary business organization, organized as a
membership corporation under the laws of the State of New
York. It is composed of approximately 13,000 manufactur-
ing and related concerns of all sizes located throughout the
United States. Because of the broad scope and application
of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §1857 et seq.) a substan-
tial number of NAM member concerns are subject to the
provisions of the Act and will be directly affected by the
decision in this case.
In the interest of its membership, the NAM has appeared
as amicus curiae in suits of significant national concern. For
example, the Supreme Court granted the NAM’s motion for
leave to file a brief amicus curiae in Gateway Coal Co. V.
United Mine Workers of America, 412 U.S, 903 (1973), a
suit brought under the Labor-Management Relations Act
and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
A substantial number of the member concerns of the NAM
have a real and direct interest in the instant litigation and
believe that, as before, the views of the NAM, its experi-
ence with the critical issues involved herein, and its general
manufacturing and technical expertise may be of assistance
to this Court.
This case presents issues of national importance which
are of direct concern to the NAM and its members because
the Clean Air Act applies to all industrial stationary sources
(“any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits
or may emit any air pollutant”). Clean Air Act §111(a)(3),
42 U.S.C. §1857c-6 (Supp. 1975). Section 111(a)(1) of
the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §1857c-6) requires the Ad-
ministrator to “take into account the cost of achieving the
emission reduction” he prescribes when promulgating emis-
sion standards for new stationary sources. Just how this cost
factor is to be taken into account is the fundamental issue
involved in the present case. It is an issue of great concern
3
to a substantial number of NAM members who expend in-
creasingly large sums for pollution control and need mean-
ingful, careful consideration to be given to the cost of, and
public benefit expected from, EPA regulation as the Clean
Air Act and National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.
§4321, et seq.) would require.
Although this case deals with specific emission standards
promulgated for the cement industry, if the construction and
interpretation of the Clean Air Act by the Court below are
correct, the Administrator, in effect, can disregard the stat-
utory mandate contained in Section 111(a)(1) of the Act
and predicate such standards essentially upon environmen-
tal considerations, unless an industry can prove such regula-
tions will endanger its economic survival. Thus the ramifica-
tions of the decision below are not limited to the cement
industry, but can have application to many other industries
which are subject to the Act. It is, therefore, of vital impor-
tance to have Section 111(a)(1) interpreted by this Court.
Accordingly, the NAM has an interest in the proper res-
olution of the issues before the Court in this case and urges
that leave be granted to file the accompanying brief as
amicus curiae and respect ully so moves this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
By RicHarD D. GopOWN
General Counsel
STEPHANIE RICHMOND
Assistant General Counsel
1776 F Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No. 75-415
PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION,
; Petitioner,
Vv.
RusseLL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ETAL., |
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the -
District of Columbia Citcuit
a
_ BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS. OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT
OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
INTEREST OF AMICUS ~URIAE
The interest of the National Association of Manufactur-
ers (NAM), in this case is set forth in the foregoing Motion
for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae
6
IL REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Court Below Erroneously Interpreted Section
11l(aX1) of the Clean Air Act.
The Appellate Court decision, in effect, holds that the
EPA Administrator, when promulgating emission “stand-
ards of performance” for new stationary sources, may elect
to ignore or reject all evidence relating to cost versus benefit
and may predicate emission standards essentially on envi-
ronmental considerations, as long as the involved industries
are able to “bear the costs and survive.” * This conclusion is
contrary to the express provisions of the Clean Air Act, and
the congressional intent as manifested by the legislative his-
tories of both the Clean Air Act and the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA). It is, therefore, necessary for
this Court to construe Section 111(a)(1) of the Clean Air
Act, thereby clarifying the role of the Administrator in pro-
mulgating standards, and providing the essential criteria on
which courts of appeal will review and rule upon the valid-
ity of emission standards.
(a) The Congressional Intent of the Clean Air Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act Requires that Economic
Factors Be Given Significant Weight by the Administrator.
Section 111(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.
§1857c-6) requires that when setting emission standards for
new stationary sources, the EPA Administrator must “take
into account the cost of achieving the emission reduction”
he prescribes. It is clear on its face that there are two factors
to be considered simultaneously. These are the specific cost
of achieving that particular emission reduction prescribed.
In other words, the Administrator must consider that to
achieve X% pollution reduction (i.e., benefit) it costs Y
amount of dollars (cost). Since the pollution reduction is a
1 EPA Response to Remand in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckels-
haus, 486 F.2d 375 (1973); Joint Appendix to the Brief Following Re-
mand, p. 201.
7
benefit to the public, it follows that Section 111(a)(1) re-
quires a cost-benefit analysis. EPA ignored this section of
the law when it rashly stated that cost-benefit analyses can-
not be established or justified in promulgating emission
standards, and that as long as the costs are not so great that
an industry could not bear them and survive, such stand-
ards will be promulgated.” Since EPA’s statement effectively
eradicates Section 111(a)(1) of the Act, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was incorrect
in upholding the EPA view.
tion 111(a)(1) mentioned above, there are further
Mr. Randolph . . . I know at times on the sub-
committee and on the committee we ha talked about
e
|
E
B
aé
:
5
have recognized that this legislation
nomic measure and an air pollution measure . .
Mr. Muskie . . . The Senator is correct. (116 Cong.
Rec. 42392, December 18, 1970). (Emphasis added. )
nomic impact. This amendment was proposed by Congress-
man Ryan of New York, who stated:
I believe that the threat to our environment is so
2 Ibid.
great that, as a matter of public policy, industry should
be required to use the most advanced technology re-
gardless of whether or not a particular industry finds
it economically feasible.
The proposal was rejected on voice vote. (116 Cong. Rec.
19242-43, December 2, 1970).*
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has stated
that in order to give full effect to the Clean Air Act, it must
be read, at minimum, in pari materia with NEPA. See
Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, supra, at 380.
NEPA states that all agencies of the Federal Government
shall: “identify and develop methods and procedures, in
consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality,
which will insure that presently unqualified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate considera-
tion in decisionmaking along with economic and technical
considerations;” 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(B) [Emphasis sup-
plied]. NEPA also states that all agencies of the Federal
Government shall include in every recommendation or re-
port on major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the environment, a detailed statement by the
responsible official on: _
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adyerse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, __
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses
of man’s environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity; [Em-
phasis supplied] and,
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments
of resources which would be involved in the pro-
action should it be implemented. 42 U.S.C.
4332(2)(C) (i)-(v).
3 Referred to in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d
375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
9
While EPA is not required to file a formal NEPA impact
statement, it is required to prepare the “functional equiva-
lent of a NEPA impact statement.” Portland Cement
v. Ruckelshaus, supra, at 380. Such a “functional equiva-
lent” must give consideration to all five NEPA issues
quoted above. Environmental Defense F und (EDF) v.
E.P.A., 489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973). And the
legislative history of NEPA as gleaned by the courts leaves
no question that this Act requires that full, careful con-
sideration be given by EPA to economic factors:
The legislative history of NEPA clearly reveals that
Congress intended the ‘development of adequate me-
thodology for evaluating the full environmental impacts
and the full costs—social, economic, and environmen-
tal—of federal actions Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359
F. “upp. 1289, 1366 (1973) . . . NEPA is at the
very least ‘an environmental full disclosure law’ .. .,
Ibid., 359 F. Sau & noting nang oo see
that important legislative purposes are not or
misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureauc-
racy ... Ibid., 359 F. Supp. at 1332.
10
the environment. And such improvement should, of
course, continue as long as the perceived added gains
of attaining each higher level of environmental quality
exceed the expected costs.” (Environmental Quality,
1971, at 119 (U.S.G.P.O.) ). [Emphasis supplied. ]
The italicized words demonstrate the need for the weigh-
ing and balancing of costs versus benefits.
An EPA Task Force Report entitled “Application of
NEPA to EPA’s Environmental Regulatory Activities”
(February, 1973), at 57, states that full compliance with
NEPA might necessitate a balancing of costs and benefits
of the standards being considered:
4. Benefit: Full compliance with NEPA would re-
sult in providing more information to the public, in-
dustry, and other government agencies in regard to
the source categories selected, standards proposed, and
consequences and benefits of these actions. Full com-
pliance might necessitate a balancing of costs and
benefits to the standards being considered; the benefits
to the public health and welfare would be stressed.
The basis and rationale for setting standards would
be documented for mternal and public use. (Emphasis
supplied. )
EPA rejects both the policy of CEQ, and the views of its
own task force when failing to adequately consider peti-
tioner’s cost-benefit analysis, or prepare one of its own.
(c) The Lower Court Erred in Upholding the Administrator's
Actions Which Failed to Comply with the Statutory Mandate.
Despite a clear expression of legislative intent, the Ad-
ministrator when promulgating the cement standards failed
to follow the statutory mandate with respect to economic
considerations. Indeed, EPA hastily rejected Portland’s cost-
benefit analysis which showed the regulation would impose
a cost increase of nearly 20% in order to achieve an emis-
sion reduction of one tenth of 1%—a ratio of more than
ee
11
100 (cost) to 1 (benefit). EPA then made the following
statement against cost-benefit analyses:
We believe that Congress intended §111 to be used
to establish emission limitations which are the lowest
that can be achieved by that industry. Where the cost
of meeting such standards would be so great that the
industry could not bear the costs and survive, such
standards could not be implemented by the industry
regardless of technological feasibility. There are also
cases where a reduction in emissions that would be
achieved by a particular control technique would be
so grossly disproportionate to the cost of the control
technique that it would not be required. However,
these determinations are necessarily judgmental and
are left specifically to the Administrator in §111. EPA
does not believe that cost-benefit analyses can be estab-
lished or justified on the basis of such an analysis.*
By virtue of this statement, EPA can effectively promulgate
the lowest standards technically achievable by industry,
without regard to the degree of necessity for such standards
(which could be determined by a cost-benefit analysis).
Such standards will be promulgated as long as the industry
is able to “bear the costs and survive.” This concept rejects
a careful, meaningful consideration of cost as required by
NEPA and the Clean Air Act; it totally ignores $111(a) (1)
of the Clean Air Act which plainly requires a comparison
of cost and benefit, and it creates a rebuttable presumption
that a standard is warranted, shifting the burden to industry
to prove that promulgation of the standards would result
in that industry’s economic destruction. The lower court
was incorrect in upholding this concept, stating that indus-
try must show “an inability to adjust itself in a healthy
economic fashion . . .” See Portland Cement Association V.
Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508, (1975). Thus the fundamental
and necessary procedure of weighing and balancing costs
versus benefits is cavalierly rejected in favor of a negative
4 Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, supra, n. 1 and 2.
12
burden of proof for industry. It is respectfully submitted that
the inability of the regulated industry to carry an impossible
burden of proof cannot substitute for the clear statutory
duty of the regulatory agency.
(d) The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Has Re-
ferred to the Necessity for Weighing and Balancing Costs
versus Benefits in Environmental Actions.
The U.S, Court of. Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
stated:
‘Environmental amenities’ will often be in conflict
with ‘economic and technical considerations’. To ‘con-
sider’ the former ‘along with’ the latter must involve
a balancing process. In some instances environmental
costs may outweigh economic and technical benefits
and in other instances they may not. But NEPA man-
dates a rather finely-tuned and ‘systematic’, balancing
analysis in each instance. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating
Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (1971).
While the Calvert Cliffs case concerned an Atomic Energy
Commission rule to govern consideration of environmental
matters (and did not concern emission standards), it must
respectfully be submitted that new source emission stand-
ards are also major environmental actions subject to NEPA,
and they, too, should be deemed to require a cost-benefit
balancing analysis, particularly inasmuch as Section 111
(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act provides for it.
Indeed, while Tennessee Valley Authority, the Army
Corps of Engineers, and other agencies have all utilized
the “cost-benefit” principle, EPA has not been willing to
consider the costs versus benefits when promulgating new
source emission standards. It emphatically states such a
balancing is an impossibility, but it is clear that it has not
even set the wheels in motion for developing an adequate
methodology for evaluating costs and benefits as required
13
by NEPA, since it defiantly believes that cost-benefit analy-
ses for new source standards are not justified. Meanwhile,
pollution costs are doubling and tripling, unemployment is
high, use of energy is costly, and capital availability is in-
creasingly difficult. However, as long as an industry can
still “bear the costs and survive,” a proposed standard is
acceptable to EPA. This is contrary to the public interest
as well as the interests of individual companies in an in-
dustry. It is also contrary to the congressional intent of the
Clean Air Act and the National Environmental Policy Act,
as stated above.
(e) The Cost Burden to Industry is Not Being Given Mean-
ingful Consideration by EPA.
The chemical industry’s capital expenditures in air and
water pollution control have more than doubled in the past
three years, going from $282 million in 1971 to $631 mil-
lion in 1974.° The nation’s steel industry must spend under
present regulations $12 to $14 billion on pollution control
equipment over the next nine years in order to meet 1983
standards.* U.S. petroleum refineries will invest approxi-
mately $3.4 billion for pollution control equipment between
1974 and 1983, and it will cost an additional $5.9 to $7.5
billion more to produce petroleum products from 1974
through 1983 if refineries meet government pollution con-
trol standards." In 1975 electric utilities plan to spend $970
million on air pollution control and $565 million on water
pollution control.’ For industry in general, The U.S. Council
on Environmenta! Quality estimated in 1973 that the private
sector’s capital investment will come to $112 billion from
5 Chemical and Engineering News, December 2, 1974, p. 12.
® Business Publications, Inc., Air/Water Pollution Report, May 19,
1975, p. 197.
T Joan Norris Boothe, “Cleaning Up: The Cost of Refinery Pollution
Control,” Council on Economic Priorities, 1975, p. 2.
* Business Publications, Inc., Air/Water Pollution Report, May 26,
1975, p. 207.
14
1972-1981.’ In 1974, CEQ estimated that, for the period
from 1973-1982, the environmental pollution control ex-
penditures required under the Federal program would be
$194.8 billion.”® Instead of relating such costs to benefits
in the instant case, EPA’s position is that as long as indus-
tries are “able to bear the costs and survive,” the standards
will be promulgated. It is submitted that this is an un-
realistic approach, and one which undermines one of the
stated purposes of the Clean Air Act: “to promote national
productive capacity.”
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth
by the Petitioner, this Court is respectfully requested to
grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
By RICHARD D. GODOWN
General Counsel
STEPHANIE RICHMOND
Assistant General Counsel
1776 F Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
September, 1975
® U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, fourth
annual report, 1973, p. 93.
1° U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, fifth
annual report, 1974, p. xvii.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.