Appendix — R. L. Sweet Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board
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Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
/ AG 29 1975
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
75-3214
No.
R. L. SWEET LUMBER COMPANY,
Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES E. HOFFHAUS
HILirx, Brewer, HOFFHAUS, GRIER
& WHITTAKER
2715 Commerce Tower
Kansas City, Missouri 64105
Attorneys for Petitioner
August 25, 1975
E. L. Menpewnatt, Ivc., 926 Cherry Street, Kansas City, Mo. 64106, 421-3080
roy
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERA
4 ee 2p ©
¢ » “os me
+ w—*
INDEX
Appendix A (Decision and Proposed Order of Admin-
istrative Law Judge) .. siabemeneniah ,
Appendix B (Decision and Order of National Labor Re-
lations Board)
Appendix C (Opinion of Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit) ~
Appendix D (Judgment of Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit)
53
55
ere 8 ae
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
R. L. SWEET LUMBER COMPANY
and
CARPENTERS’ DISTRICT COUNCIL OF KANSAS
CITY AND VICINITY, AFL-CIO
and
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 541
Party to the Contract
7) anand [093
Case No. 17-CA-5292 f +e K [ N\ 7
(Decision Issued May 18, 1973)
DECISION
Statement of the Case
JOHN F. CORBLEY, Administrative Law Judge: A
hearing was held in this case on March 6, 7 and 8, 1973, at
Kansas City, Kansas, pursuant to a charge filed on August
18, 1972, a complaint and notice of hearing dated October
20, 1972, and an amended complaint and notice of hearing
dated December 26, 1972, both issued by the Regional Di-
rector for the Seventeenth Region of the National Labor
2
Relations Board and which were likewise duly served. The
charge was filed by Carpenters’ District Council of Kansas
City and Vicinity, AFL-CIO, sometimes hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Carpenters. The complaint alleges pri-
marily that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by unilaterally discontinuing certain unit work
at its Roe Boulevard Kansas City, Kansas, plant and trans-
ferring that work and certain employees from the latter
location to Standard Homes Company, alleged to be Re-
spondent’s alter ego, without prior consultation with the
Carpenters which was and is the representative of the unit
from which the work and employees were allegedly trans-
ferred.
The complaint further alleges that Respondent and its
claimed alter ego, Standard Homes Company, have further
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to abide by
the terms of Respondent’s collective bargaining agreement
with the Carpenters covering the Roe Boulevard unit and
by other acts described in the complaint.
The complaint also alleges that Respondent acting by
and through Standard Homes Company has violated Sec-
tion 8(a) (1),(2) and (3) of the Act by recognizing Team-
sters Local 541 (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
Teamsters) as the exclusive representative of a unit of
production and maintenance employees at the Standard
Homes plant in Olathe, Kansas, pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement with the Teamsters at a time when
the Teamsters did not represent an uncoerced majority of
the employees at the instant Standard Homes Company
plant. Finally the complaint alleges that Respondent by
other acts described in the complaint has violated Section
1. Both Standard Homes Company and Teamsters partici-
pated in the hearing.
TT me LE IE sR RG
8(a)(1),(2) and (3) of the Act. In its answer, amended
at the hearing, Respondent denied the commission of any
unfair labor practices. Teamsters also filed an answer to
the complaint, amended at the hearing, in which it denied
certain allegations of the complaint.
For reasons which will appear hereinafter, I find and
conclude that Respondent and Standard Homes Company
are a single employer within the meaning of the Act and
that the homes prefabrication and assembly employees
were removed from the Carpenters unit at Roe Boulevard
and, although assigned to the Olathe plant of Standard
Homes Company, continued to be a part of Carpenters Roe
Boulevard unit. I further find and conclude that by
unilaterally applying and enforcing the Teamsters contract
at Olathe to the employees who were moved out of the
Carpenters Roe Boulevard unit to work at Standard
Homes Company at Olathe and by enforcing the union
security provisions of that Teamsters contract to these
employees, Respondent by and through Standard Homes
Company has violated, and is violating, Section 8(a) (1),
(2), (3) and (5) of the Act.
At the hearing all parties including the Teamsters (the
Party to the Contract) and Standard Homes Company (the
Intervenor) were represented by counsel. All parties were
given full opportunity to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, to introduce evidence and to file briefs. The Gen-
eral Counsel, Respondent and Standard Homes Company
presented oral argument through their respective counsel
at the close of the hearing; the other parties waived this
right. Briefs have subsequently been filed by Respondent,
Teamsters Local 541, Standard Homes Company, and, on
April 26, 1973, by the General Counsel and have been duly
considered.
4
Upon the entire record? in the case including the briefs,
and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the fol-.
lowing:
Findings of Fact
I. The Business of Respondent
The Respondent is a Missouri corporation engaged in
the wholesale and retail sale of lumber and related prod-
ucts with its principal office and lumberyard located at
4400 Roe Boulevard, Kansas City, Kansas, one of the two
locations primarily involved in this proceeding. Respon-
dent annually sells lumber and related products valued in
excess of $50,000 to customers located outside of the State
of Kansas and annually has a gross volume of business in
excess of $500,000. Upon the foregoing facts, which are
alleged in the complaint and are admitted in Respondent’s
2. The record is hereby corrected in the following partic-
At page 34, line 22, insert the word “may” between the words
“you” and “have.”
At page 42, line 7, insert the word “or outside of” between
the words “within” and “the.”
At page 475, line 2, delete the word “swear” and substitute
“present” therefor.
At page 493, line 15, insert the word “not” between the words
“are” and “going.”
At page 513, line 6, the word “law” should be deleted and
“clause” substituted therefor.
At page 542, line 13, substitute the word “discontinue” for
the word “continue.”
At page 546, line 8, insert the word “not” between the words
“would” and “be.”
At page 554, line 16, delete the word “and” and substitute
therefor the punctuation mark “-’’; and in the next line insert
a “~” after the word “parties.”
To make the record absolutely clear at p. 417, line 23, insert the
ruling “Without objection Respondent’s Exhibit No. 7 is received
in evidence,” a ruling reflected in my trial notes.
5 cael i Mais
answer and Teamsters’ answer, I find, as also admitted in
these answers, that Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
II. The Labor Organization Involved
The complaint alleges, Respondent admitted at the
hearing, and Teamsters also admitted in its answer, that
Carpenters’ District Council of Kansas City and Vicinity,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act and that Teamsters Local 541 is also a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of the Act.
Ill. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. Background and sequence of events
Respondent was founded in 1936, and, although a Mis-
souri corporation, it is also qualified to do business in Kan-
sas. One of its locations, primarily involved in this pro-
ceeding, was established on a tract of land over 13 acres
in size at 4400 Roe Boulevard in Kansas City, Kansas,
and was opened for business in 1952. i
The founder of the firm, Mr. R. L. Sweet, passed away
in 1958 and since that time his widow, Mrs. Louise V.
Sweet, has been president of the corporation. Some 95%
of the stock in Respondent is held in trust for Mrs. Sweet
and her two daughters. The trustees are the First National
Bank and the husbands of these two daughters.
At the Roe Boulevard location, the Respondent be-
came engaged in several aspects of the lumber business
including the manufacture and sale of windows, doors and
room dividers and single package prefabricated homes.
For a number of years a unit of Respondent’s warehouse
and yard employees (e.g., lumber handlers, truckdrivers,
loaders, forklift operators, stockmen, etc.) at Roe Boule-
vard have been represented by Teamsters Local 541, the
so-called Party to the Contract, which participated in these
proceedings. Certain of Respondent’s inside employees at
Roe Boulevard, who were engaged in the manufacturing
process (e.g., millmen and prefabricated homes assem-
blers) had been represented for some time by the Charg-
ing Party, Carpenters’ District Council of Kansas City and
Vicinity, AFL-CIO, in a separate unit. The prefabricated
homes manufacturing activity was known as the Standard
Homes Division of Respondent.
There came a time in 1971 when Respondent’s volume
of business at Roe Boulevard had developed to the point
where Respondent had outgrown its facilities at that loca-
tion.
The crowding at that facility was particularly notice-
able in the Standard Homes production activity which was
required to operate without an assembly line but utilizing
several separated work locations at the Roe Boulevard site.
Thus, window units were manufactured in one area and
wall panels in another. Rafter cutting took place in yet
a different area. Rafters and joints were stored in another
space which had a dirt floor. The assembly of the com-
pleted wall panels for delivery was in a different location
from that at which the panels were manufactured.
In view of this manifestly inefficient method of pro-
duction and the generally cramped quarters at Roe Boule-
vard it was decided at a meeting of Respondent’s directors
in June 1971 that the Standard Homes production opera-
tion would be moved to another site. Accordingly, land
was purchased and a new building was erected some 19
miles away at Olathe, Kansas, in the latter part of 1971.
POT a a ewer ve
ee ee
7
The new building is clear span (no intervening walls)
and provides for a continuous flow through production line
whereby lumber is brought in at one end, the walls are
manufactured and assembled and are carried out of the
other end of the building essentially as a package ready to
be sold and delivered. There is also a storage yard and a
railroad spur at the Olathe facility.
The land and building at Olathe are owned by R. L.
Sweet Investment Company and all the stock in that Com-
pany is held in trust for Mrs. Louise V. Sweet by the First
National Bank of Kansas City, Missouri and Mrs. Sweet’s
same two sons-in-law, mentioned previously.
Sometime in the late summer of 1971 a “Staff Bulle-
tin” from Mrs. Sweet dated August 5, 1971, was placed in
the timecard slots of all employees at Roe Boulevard an-
nouncing the purchase and the construction of the new
building at Olathe. This bulletin recited, inter alia, that
the new plant would be occupied by “Standard Homes
Company, a division of Sweet Lumber.’
For some time prior to 1971 there had been another
separate corporation, of which Mrs. Sweet was also presi-
dent, which was known as Construction Loan Company.
About October 31, 1971, legal action was taken to change
the name vi the latter corporation to Standard Homes
Company (thereby, in effect, separately incorporating the
Standard Homes Division of R. L. Sweet Company).
3. While some employees, who testified at the hearing did
not recall seeing this bulletin, others testified that they did see
the bulletin and it is undisputed that it was prominently rumored
among the employees at Roe Boulevard in the latter part of 1971
and early 1972 that a move of the Standard Homes operation was
imminent. Carpenters’ Business Representative, Harding, was
told in January 1972 about this impending move by Boyce, the
Carpenters’ steward at the Roe Boulevard plant.
Notwithstanding this incorporation of Standard Homes
Company, the prefabricated homes operation continued
at the Roe Boulevard plant the same as before. Thus, the
prefabricated homes continued to be manufactured and
shipped from that location and all production employees
continyed to be employed by R. L. Sweet Company and
were paid with its checks. All these arrangements came
to an end, however, in February 1972‘ when prefabricated
homes production was halted at Roe Boulevard.®
Meanwhile, the plant at Olathe was so near to comple-
tion that in early January 1972, Frank H. Woodbury, an
employee of Respondent, and Charles Roberts, now the
assistant plant manager of Standard Homes Company,
went to the Olathe site to check on the completion of the
plant with the general contractor, R. E. Dunn Construction
Company. Also by January 1972 lumber began to arrive
4. After the separate incorporation of Standard Homes Com-
pany but before the prefabricated homes production was discon-
tinued at the Roe Boulevard plant, an arrangement was arrived
at whereby Respondent sold its prefabricated homes to Standard
Homes Company for a price which included the value of the ma-
terials and a fixed labor cost for each unit. Much of the equip-
ment (such as saws, tables, desks, etc.) which had been used by
the Standard Homes Division were sold at their “book value” by
Respondent to Standard Homes Company on November 1, 1971.
A separate office was temporarily established for Standard
Homes Company office employees at Roe Boulevard and some
office employees were paid on Standard Homes Company checks
in January and February 1972. None of the latter were, how-
ever, shown to be unit employees.
5. Carpenters, which was the recognized representative of
the employees performing the homes prefabrication work at Roe
Boulevard as well as the mill employees at that location, was
not notified by Respondent that the prefabrication work was going
to be discontinued at Roe Boulevard in February 1972. The first
discussion of this matter between Respondent and Carpenters,
occurred ,as will appear, on February 20, 1972, when James Hard-
ing, the Carpenters’ business representative spoke about it with
Hatcher, Respondent’s vice president in charge of production,
after Harding had been informed by his steward that one of the
homes prefabrication employees, Coffelt, was about to leave the
Roe Boulevard plant to begin working at the Olathe location.
OO
at the Olathe plant and four individuals (Streeter, Nicely,
Brown and Kline) were hired at the site to put the lum-
ber in place. In addition to moving lumber, these four in-
dividuals built some racks and other facilities to be used
in the plant’s operation.
On January 24, Aubrey Williamson, then a business
agent of Teamsters Local 541, went to the Olathe site,
spoke to the aforementioned four employees and obtained
from them signed authorizatinn cards for that union. There-
after Teamsters Local 541 sought recognition as the col-
lective bargaining representative of these employees.
On February 4, 1972, Williamson met with Eugene D.
Smith, vice president of Standard Homes Company (who
had previously been the vice president of Respondent and
manager of the old Standard Homes Division), and with
Respondent’s counsel, Hoffhaus, and presented the four
union authorization cards. After the signatures on these
authorization cards were verified, Smith and Hoffhaus
agreed to discuss a contract.
On February 8, 1972, Smith and Hoffhaus came to
Local 541’s office and began negotiating a collective bar-
gaining agreement.
Further meetings were held on February 9 and 11,
1972, and a contract was executed on the latter date effec-
tive February 7, 1972, until February 2, 1975, with a pro-
vision for subsequent automatic renewal. Pursuant to this
agreement Teamsters |ocal 541 was recognized in a pro-
duction and maintenance unit at the Olathe facility of
Standard Homes Company.
10
_ This agreement was a separate agreement from the
same Union’s previously mentioned contract covering the
yard employees at Respondent’s Roe Boulevard location.
The latter unit was covered at the time by a contract with
Teamsters Local 541, effective from April 1, 1969 to April
1, 1972, and said Roe Boulevard unit is currently covered
by a contract with the same labor organization, effective
from April 1, 1972 to March 31, 1975.
The date when the Olathe plant contract was executed
—February 11, 1972—is prior to the 6 month statute of
limitations provision set forth in Section 10(b) of the Act.
On February 11, 1972, only the four individuals previ-
ously named (outside of Woodbury and Roberts) were
working at Olathe. The work they still were performing
consisted of unloading lumber, moving it with forklifts, and
putting up racks.’ No production work had as yet begun
at the Olathe plant.
In about the middle of February 1972 Smith began
interviewing employees of Respondent at its Roe Boulevard
plant and elsewhere to inquire whether they would accept
employment at the Olathe plant. As will appear, several of
these employees had been engaged for a number of years
in the building and assembly of wall sections and other
operations in the manufacture of the prefabricated housing
units for Standard Homes at Roe Boulevard. A number of
those interviewed including Coffelt, who was then consider-
ing retirement, and Schaffer, Phillip Fisher and John
Papineau accepted the offer of employment and began
working at the Olathe plant before the end of February
1972. These four employees were members of Carpenters
Local 1635 while working at Respondent’s Roe Boulevard
location.
7. Williamson and Smith credibly so testified.
11
The first prefabricated home package was produced
at the Standard Homes Company Olathe plant on February
29, 1972.
In the meantime James Harding, business represen-
tative of Carpenters’ District Council of Kansas City and
Vicinity, AFL-CIO, which, as previously noted, was the
recognized representative of the mill and prefabricated
homes unit at Respondent’s Roe Boulevard location, was
told by his steward, Louis Boyce,* on February 20, 1972,
that Coffelt, who had been employed in that unit, was about
to begin work at the new Olathe plant. Accordingly, Hard-
ing went to the office of Hatcher, Respondent’s vice presi-
dent in charge of production,’ to inquire about (what
Harding considered to be) the transfer of Coffelt from Roe
Boulevard to the Olathe facility. Hatcher informed Hard-
ing that the Olathe facility was not a part of the Respon-
dent, but was a separate Delaware corporation. Hence, said
Hatcher, he and Harding had nothing to discuss. Harding,
however, insisted that he would process the matter through
the grievance procedures of the Carpenters contract cover-
ing the Roe Boulevard plant.’®
Sometime in February or March of 1972 the office and
plant equipment—previously used at the Roe Boulevard
plant by the Standard Homes Division of Respondent and
which had been sold to Standard Homes Company by Re-
spondent on November 1, 1971,—were moved to the Olathe
plant, where such assets were put to use for the same pur-
8. Boyce was the steward of the Carpenters unit at Roe
Boulevard and was also employed by Respondent at that locaticn.
9. While Hatcher is not in charge of production at the Olathe
plant, he was in charge of all production of prefabricated homes
when that operation was still going on at the Roe Boulevard plant.
10. These findings are based on the credible testim of
Harding which was not denied by Hatcher. bad
12
poses and essentially in the same manner as their utilization
at Roe Boulevard.
Also in February and March 1972 other employees”
of Respondent left its Roe Boulevard plant and began work-
ing for Standard Homes Company in Olathe. These in-
cluded Dial and Quick who had been members of Carpen-
ters Local 1635 while working in the Carpenters unit at
Roe plant. Others were Berry, Donica, Dale Long and
Terry Long, Savage, Simpson, Vest and Webb who had
been members of Teamsters Local 541 while employed by
Respondent at its Roe Boulevard plant.
On March 17, 1972, Carpenters filed a grievance with
Respondent complaining, inter alia, that Respondent had
transferred bargaining unit work from Roe Boulevard to
Olathe without consultation with Carpenters; unilaterally
imposed a different collective bargaining agreement with
less favorable wages and working conditions upon Car-
penters unit employees; bypassed Carpenters in dealing
directly with Carpenters unit employees about their work-
ing conditions and threatened said employees with termi-
nation if they did not transfer to the Olathe plant—all in
violation of the Carpenters collective bargaining agree-
ment then in effect at the Roe Boulevard plant. By letter
dated March 22, 1972, Respondent denied the grievance on
the ground that the work to which the grievance referred
was then being performed by a different corporation (i.e.,
Standard Homes Company) and by employees of that cor-
poration under the aegis of a collective bargaining agree-
ment with a different union (i.e., Teamsters Local 541).
In a letter dated April 19, 1972, Respondent further took
the position that the grievance was not arbitrable, essen-
11. Besides Coffelt, Schaffer, Fisher and Papineau, who have
already been mentioned.
al werent.
eT ee ee
13
tially for the same reasons Respondent had denied the
grievance in its letter of March 22.
At about this same time the Carpenters contract cover-
ing the Roe Boulevard plant was nearing its termination
date and Carpenters gave timely notice at the end of
February 1972 that it sought to negotiate a new agreement
with Respondent for the Carpenters unit at Roe Boulevard.
In early April and May of 1972, Respondent and Car-
penters negotiated a new agreement covering the Carpen-
ters Roe Boulevard unit. The new agreement was ratified
by the unit employees about June 1, 1972, and was made
retroactive to May 1, 1972 (the day after the termination of
the prior contract). The new agreement is effective from
the latter date until April 30, 1974.
During the negotiations for this 1972-1974 contract, Re-
spondent’s claimed transfer of Roe Boulevard Carpenters
unit work to the Olathe plant was not discussed by the par-
ties. Nor did the parties advert, in these negotiations, to
the terms and conditions of employment of the former Roe
Boulevard Carpenters unit employees who were by then
working at the Olathe plant.
Since the spring of 1972 the prefabricated homes manu-
facturing operation continues to be carried on at the Olathe
plant.” And all production and maintenance employees at
the plant continue to be represented by Teamsters Local
541 under the terms of its contract for that plant.
Respondent’s cessation of the prefabricated homes op-
eration at Roe Boulevard utilizing Carpenters unit em-
12. According to the credible testimony of Harding, which
was not denied by Hatcher.
13. Although utilizing door and windows which are manu-
tactured by Respondent at the Roe Boulevard plant and sold by
Respondent to Standard Homes Company.
14
ployees at that location and the subsequent reconstitution
of that activity at the Olathe plant of Standard Homes
Company without notification to, and bargaining with, the
Carpenters are the principal bases of the Section 8(a) (5)
allegations of the complaint. The application of the Team-
sters Olathe plant contract to the former Roe Boulevard
Carpenters unit employees now working at Olathe, as well
as the application of that contract and its union security
provisions to all production and maintenance employees at
the Olathe plant, constitute the substance of the Section
8(a)(1), (2) and (3) allegations of the complaint as well
as other Section 8(a) (5) allegations of the complaint.
B. The supervisory status of
Smith and Kline
The complaint alleges that Eugene D. Smith and Wal-
ter Kline, both of Standard Homes Company, are super-
visors within the meaning of the Act. The answers deny
these allegations. I find and conclude, however, that both
are supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
Act.
Smith is the vice president of Standar? Homes Com-
pany. He is in charge of the draftsmen who draw the
plans for Standard Homes Company, has the ultimate au-
thority over production at the Olathe facility and is in
charge of sales and marketing. Charles Roberts, assistant
plant manager, recommends hiring and firing to Wood-
bury who reports on such matters to Smith. Smith hired
Coffelt, Schaffer, Papineau and Fisher to work at the Ola-
the plant or, in any event, arranged for their employment
at that location. I find, therefore, that Smith responsibly
directs the activities of all employees at Olathe and has
authority to hire, fire and transfer employees, all in a man-
ner requiring the exercise of independent judgment. I con-
Pee FD a PP? OE rr ere
15
clude therefore that he is, and was at least since the hiring
or transfer of Coffelt, Schaffer, Papineau and Fisher in
February 1972, a supervisor within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the Act."
Walter Kline, as previously noted, was one of the in-
dividuals originally hired in January 1972 to work at tne
Olathe plant.” When Coffelt, Schaffer, Fisher and Papi-
neau took up their duties at the Olathe plant in February
1972, Kline had become a foreman."* As a foreman, ac-
cording to the undisputed testimony of Smith, Kline has
the authority to recommend hiring and firing, and, ac-
cording to the admission of Smith, management has the
obligation to “back up” Kline. Further, Smith admitted,
Kline has enjoyed the status of non-working foreman since
he, Kline, “first came down to Olathe.”
I find, therefore, that Kline has been a foreman since
at least February 21, 1972 (when Coffelt began working at
Olathe) and has had the authority effectively to recom-
mend hiring and firing in a manner requiring the exer-
cise of independent judgment. I conclude, accordingly,
that he has been, at least since February 21, 1972, a super-
visor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
C. The alleged status of Standard Homes Company
as an alter ego of Respondent
The complaint alleges that Standard Homes Com-
pany is an alter ego of Respondent. Respondent and Team-
14.- I make these findings on the basis of the credible and
— testimony of Smith, Coffelt, Schaffer, Fisher, and
‘a u.
15. Kiine also formerly worked at Respondent’s Roe Boule-
vard plant.
16. I make this finding on the basis of the undisputed tes-
timony of Coffelt. Kline did not testify.
16
sters 541 deny that Standard Homes Company occupies
such status. I find, in agreement with the General Counsel,
that Standard Homes Company is an alter ego of Respon-
dent and that the two companies are a single employer
within the meaning of the Act.
1. Both Respondent and Standard Homes Company
have essentially common ownership.
Standard Homes Company is almost entirely owned
by Respondent, by Mrs. KR. L. Sweet (the president of Re-
spondent and also of Standard Homes Company) and by
relatives or in-laws of Mrs. Sweet.’*
As previously noted, about 95% of the outstanding
stock in Respondent is held in trust for Mrs. Sweet, and her
two daughters, Marilyn S. Kiene and Athelia S. Clingan.
The trustees are Mrs. Sweet’s sons-in-law, Melvin H.
Clingan, Ralph Kiene and the First National Bank of
Kansas City.
2. Respondent and Standard Homes Company have a
number of common officers. Thus, Mrs. Sweet is the presi-
dent of both companies as well as the treasurer of Re-
spondent. Melvin H. Clingan (her son-in-law) is the secre-
tary of Respondent and is also the secretary and assistant
treasurer of Standard Homes Company, George E. Fischer
is a vice president (controller) of Respondent and assistant
secretary of Standard Homes Company.
3. The directors of Respondent and Standard Homes
Company were not shown. However, it is undisputed that
17. Thus, there are 10,000 outstanding shares of stock in
Standard Homes Rng any. Of these shares Respondent owns
8,950 (89.5%). weet owns 150 shares; her two daughters
Marilyn S. Kiene rans Athelia S. Clingan, 150 each; one son-in-
law, Melvin H. Clingan, 150; her four minor Kiene grandchildren,
150 ‘altogether; —for a total of 9%. Therefore, 98.5% of the stock
in Standard Homes Company is owned or controlled by Respondent
and members of Mrs. Sweet’s family.
we LR mene
www tee ee. =~ aan ™
17
the directors of Respondent are elected by the trustees of
95% of Respondent’s corporate stock. And, as noted, two
trustees are sons-in-law of Mrs. Sweet. Since Respondent
and members of the Sweet family own 98.5% of the Stan-
dard Homes Company, I conclude that Respondent and the
Sweet family also elect the directors of Standard Homes
Company.
4. Mrs. Sweet is actively engaged in overseeing both
corporations. She has an office on Roe Boulevard and an-
other at Olathe. She keeps office hours at Roe Boulevard
6 days per week and assists in sales promotion at Olathe
every Sunday. During the week, Mrs. Sweet is in contact
with Eugene D. Smith, the vice president of Standard
Homes Company and its manager, everyday—in person or
by telephone—and Mrs. Sweet must approve decisions of
Smith particularly major purchases recommended by him.
Mrs. Sweet signs all the paychecks'® for Standard Homes
Company employees.’®
5. Respondent and Standard Homes have a com-
monly controlled labor relations policy.
As noted, Mrs. Sweet is president of both companies.
A “Staff Bulletin” from Mrs. Sweet, dated August 24,
1972, was issued to all employees of Respondent and Stand-
ard Homes Company announcing that all offices and yards
of Respondent and Standard Homes Company including the
exhibition houses of Standard Homes Company would be
closed for all 3 days of the Labor Day weekend September
2, 3 and 4, 1972.
P > aoe Sen: Oo Seem Rp Saye. ie.
19. In her testimony Mrs. Sweet also referred to the product
of Standard Homes Company as “our home.”
18
Hoffhaus, who ably represented Respondent at the
hearing, also represented it in denying Carpenters demand
for arbitration in April 1972. Hoffhaus also participated
in the discussions and negotiations in early February 1972
between Teamsters 541 and Standard Homes Company
which resulted in the recognition of Teamsters by Standard
Homes Company and the execution of a contract between
Teamsters and Standard Homes Company which, by its
terms, covers a unit of the production and maintenance
employees at the Olathe plant.”
Officials of Respondent sent employees to see Smith at
Respondent’s Roe Boulevard plant to discuss the possibility
of their working at the Olathe plant. Thus, Hatcher, Re-
spondent’s vice president in charge of production at Roe
Boulevard, who also negotiated and signed the 1972 Car-
penters contract for that location (and admitted handling
Respondent’s labor relations for a number of years previ-
ously) summoned or accompanied employees Schaffer and
Fisher to their interviews with Smith. When Schaffer
originally turned down the Olathe opportunity due to the
low wage offer by Smith, Hatcher told Schaffer he might
get another call. Schaffer did get another call from Smith
and Schaffer was offered and accepted a higher hourly rate
at Olathe than he was first offered. Roe Boulevard fore-
man, Don Walker, sent employee Fisher to his interview
with Smith. Coffelt, Schaffer, Fisher and Papineau all
credibly testified, and I find, that Smith told them, when
he spoke to them at the Roe Boulevard plant in February
1972, that they would retain their seniority from their em-
20. Lowe, who capably represented Standard Homes Com-
pany at the hearing, was not present at these negotiations. I am
constrained to observe, in passing, that I was favorably im-
pressed by the high degree of professional competence and courtesy
demonstrated by all counsel who appeared at the hearing.
19
ployment with Respondent at least insofar as vacations at
Standard Homes were concerned.”
6. The initial complement at Olathe at the time pro-
duction began on February 29, 1972, consisted of employees
who had just been released from Respondent. Thus, of
some 18 production and maintenance employees working
at Olathe by the end of February 1972, some 14 had
formerly been employed at Roe Boulevard where they had
been represented in the Carpenters unit by Carpenters or
had been represented by Teamsters Local 541, apparently
in the latter’s unit at the Roe Boulevard plant.”
7. Smith admitted that all supervisors at Olathe had
formerly worked at Respondent’s Roe Boulevard plant, al-
though he further stated that some of the Olathe leadmen
had not been part of supervision at Roe Boulevard.
8. As will appear, Standard Homes Company is pro-
ducing essentially the same product as was produced when
the prefabrication operation was located at Roe Boulevard.
9. There continues to be a certain measure of product
integration between the Olathe and Roe Boulevard plants
in that the window and door units installed by Standard
Homes Company at Olathe are manufactured at Roe Boule-
vard and sold to Standard Homes Company by Respondent.
The window and door units utilized by the old Standard
Homes Division were also manufactured at Roe Boulevard.
21. Kline, whom I have found to be a supervisor, told Papi-
neau about March 1972 that Papineau could be transferred from
Olathe to another plant of Respondent at Lee’s Summit in Missouri.
22. 6 eae eae oe ee seer Net heen pegeenntet by
Teamsters Local 541 at Roe Boulevard. This accords
information given to Teamsters Local 541 representative, William-
son, by Dale Long, Teamsters’ steward at Roe Boulevard, then
about seven of Teamsters members at Roe Boulevard would be
laid off as the result of Standard Homes leaving that location
to go to Olathe.
20
10. All purchasing for Standard Homes Company and
Respondent is performed by Respondent although Standard
Homes Company pays Respondent for this and other ac-
counting services. As previously mentioned, George E.
Fischer is Respondent’s controller as well as the assistant
secretary of Standard Homes Company.
11. A-considerable amount of office and factory equip-
ment was sold by Respondent to Standard Homes Company
on or about November 1, 1971, at the equipment’s “book
value” which I conclude in numerous instances was sub-
stantially less than its actual value. For example, some 7
saws of various descriptions were sold for $1 each, 12 desks
were sold at the same unit price as were 7 file cabinets,
6 Friden calculators and 2 Marchant calculators. Eleven
typewriters, mostly Royal, were also sold to Standard
Homes Company by Respondent for $1 each. This equip-
ment, particularly the shop items (such as saws, tables,
etc.) continued to be used by Respondent’s employees at
Roe Boulevard until February 1972 and is now in use at
Olathe.
12. Finally, Standard Homes Company is still held out
to the public as a division of Respondent in the local tele-
phone “Yellow Pages” for 1972* and 1973.% In newspaper
advertising as recently as May 7, 1972, Standard Homes
Company was also held out to the public as a subsidiary of
Respondent. The Standard Homes advertising brochure for
1972 also recites that Standard Homes is a subsidiary of
Respondent.
23. The cut-off date for placement of advertising in the
Yellow Pages for 1972 was October 13, 1971.
24. The cut-off date for placement of advertising in the
Yellow Pages for 1973 was October 13, 1972.
Pee ee ee ee
21
In view of all the foregoing, I find and conclude that
Respondent and Standard Homes Company are, and were
at all times material hereto, a single employer within the
meaning of the Act.*
D. The appropriate unit; are the Standard Homes
Company prefabrication employees at Olathe a
part of the Carpenters unit at Roe Boulevard or
have they been merged into a plant-wide produc-
tion and maintenance unit at the Oiathe plant?
Having concluded that Respondent and Standard
Homes Company are a single employer within the meaning
of the Act, it follows that all employees of the Olathe plant
are employed by the same employing entity as the em-
ployes who continue to work at the Roe Boulevard plant.
The pertinent question, however, insofar as these pro-
ceedings are concerned, now becomes whether the homes
prefabrication and assembly employees—who were repre-
sented in the Carpenters unit at Roe Boulevard—remain a
part of that unit (or have become an accretion to it) not-
withstanding the fact that such employees are now located
at the Olathe plant. I conclude that the instant employees
continue to be—or are an accretion to—the Carpenters unit
at Roe Boulevard.”
Coffelt, Schaffer, Fisher and Papineau all credibly tes-
tified, and I find, that, since they have begun their employ-
ment at Olathe, they have performed the same work, using
25. E.g., Macke Laundry Service Company of D.C. et al.
a a No. 1; Manitowoc Shipbuilding Inc., et al., 191 NLRB
0. 137.
26. I do not reach or decide the question of whether the yard
employees, forklift loaders, etc., at Olathe are an accretion to
the Teamsters unit at Roe Boulevard. That question was not
presented in the complaint nor was it litigated at the hearing.
22
the same tables, jigs and tools, as they did when employed”
at the Roe Boulevard plant. This work is also performed
for many of the same customers (particularly builders)
who used to purchase the prefabricated homes when the
prefabrication and assembly operation was located at Roe
Boulevard.
This work also continues to be performed under the
supervision of Smith who was in charge of the old Stan-
dard Homes Division of Respondent at Roe Boulevard,
albeit Smith did not then directly supervise the production
operation. Also, as noted, Mrs. Sweet is president of Stan-
dard Homes Company as well as Respondent.
Further, as already found, the former Roe Boulevard
employees, now employed at Standard Homes, were as-
sured that their seniority with Respondent would be con-
tinued at Olathe at least insofar as vacations at Standard
Homes are concerned.
While there is some evidence that employees are inter-
changed in what Smith described as a “fairly standard”
manner in the production operation at Olathe (i.e., utilizing
yard employees to do some production work and vice
versa), Smith gave only one specific example” of this and
27. Coffelt retired at the end of August 1972. I also conclude
that Dial and Quick, two other former members of Local 1635
who terminated their employment with Respondent in February
1972 and began work for Standard Homes Company in the same
month, also performed the same work at both locations. I reach
this conclusion based on the fact that each has the same job
classification with Standard Homes Company as he did with
Respondent (i.e., assembler and rafter cutter, respectively).
28. Smith conceded at the hearing that the work is essen-
tially the same, requiring the same skills. The only difference
cited by Smith is that the product must now conform precisely to
the drawing, a policy which did not obtain at Roe Boulevard.
29. Williamson, the then Teamsters representative, also saw
one or two of the four employees, whom he originally signed up,
doing production work after production began.
LL _______
23
conceded that a majority of the employees are assigned to
one particular job at which they are most efficient. In this
connection it is also important to note that, in addition to
hir‘ng six Carpenters unit prefabrication employees from
Roe Boulevard to work in Olathe in February 1972 (Cof-
feit, Fisher, Schaffer, Papineau, Quick and Dial), Standard
Homes Company also hired Duxbury and Fitzpatrick to
work at Olathe in March 1972. These last two employees
were former members of Carpenters Local 1635 at Roe
Boulevard, but had left Respondent’s employ there in 1971
and 1970 respectively.*° They were hired for assembly
work at Olathe. Further Coffelt credibly testified, and I
find, that he never saw Brown, Streeter and Nicely (i.e.,
three of the four individuals originally hired at Olathe in
January 1972) performing production work.™
I conclude, based on the foregoing, that the prefabrica-
tion and assembly employees now working at Olathe con-
tinue to be—or are an accretion to—the Carpenters unit
at Roe Boulevard. This conclusion also rests on my sub-
sidiary findings, supra, in support of my conclusion that
Respondent and Standard Company are a single employer
within the meaning of the Act including, inter alia, the
integration of operations whereby Respondent’s mill em-
ployees continue to manufacture the window and door
units for the prefabricated homes assembled at Olathe just
as such mill employees manufactured the same components
when the prefabrication and assembly operation was
carried out at Re. Boulevard.
. Duxbury had been an apprentice assembler and
Pispatrick an aul ler operator toe Boulvard
is not necessarily inconsistent with that
of ~~ My only saw “one or two” of these f -
slepene weuliinn an the soeteldion tine sana a
24
I am not persuaded in all the foregoing circumstances
that there has been sufficient interchange of the produc-
tion, maintenance and yard employees at Olathe to dis-
establish the integrity of the Standard Homes Company
prefabrication and assembly employees with the Carpen-
ters unit at Roe Boulevard. For under Board law, the
perimeters of an otherwise appropriate unit—here one
founded on bargaining history®? and a Board certification
(according to the language of the 1970-1972 contract be-
tween Carpenters and Respondent)—will not be washed
away merely by general testimony that interchange has
occurred into and out of such a unit. What is required to
defeat the appropriateness of such a unit on this basis is
a demonstration that the amount of such interchange has
been significant and such a showing would normally re-
quire evidence of the regularity and identity of individual
employees who have participated in such interchange.™
I do not find such a demonstration present in this
record.**
I further find, based upon the prior and current col-
lective bargaining agreement between Carpenters and Re-
spondent, and the apparent Board certification, both cover-
ing the Boulevard unit, that Carpenters was, at all times
relevant hereto, and remains, the majority representative
32. Where the same employees did essentially the same work
using the same equipment when members of the Roe Boulevard
Carpenters unit.
33. In fact a stipulation entered into by the parties, styled
General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 8, sets forth separate job assign-
ments for the Olathe plant employees which clearly place such
employees in homes assembly (Carpenters unit) work (e.g., “Ray
L. Dial—assembler of panels”) or non-Carpenters unit warehouse
work (e.g., “David N. Nicely—lift truck operator”).
34. See Big Y Supermarkets, 161 NLRB 1263, 1267-1268; cf.
American Cyanamid Company, 131 NLRB 909, 910.
——y
of that unit including the homes prefabrication and assem-
bly employees now working at the Standard Homes Com-
pany plant in Olathe.*
E. The alleged Section 8(a) (2) violations
The complaint alleges, as amended at the hearing, that
Respondent by and through Standard Homes Company un-
lawfully recognized Teamsters Local 541 as the exclusive
representative of the production and maintenance em-
ployees at the Olathe plant of Standard Homes Company
on February 4, 1972, at a time when Teamsters did not
represent an uncoerced majority of the Olathe plant em-
ployees and when a substantial and representative comple-
ment was not yet employed at the plant. Also alleged as
violative of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act was the
subsequent execution of the collective bargaining agree-
ment between Teamsters and Standard Homes Company
on February 11, 1972, effective from February 7, 1972. And
bers of Carpenters oy 1635 and had immediately prior thereto
su tly hired at Olathe to do homes pretabrication and
— i (as of September 1972, the hiring record
shown a
until March 21, 1972.
Pursuant to the union security provisions of
Roe Boulevard contract (Article (c)) employees desig-
E
;
;
3
ej
"
if
to remedy these alleged unfair labor practices the General
Counsel asks to have me recommend an order setting aside
the instant contract.
For its part, Respondent contends, that the recogni-
tion of, and execution of a contract with, the Teamsters at
the Olathe plant cannot be found to be unfair labor prac-
tices, if only for the reason that said events occurred prior
to the 6 month statute of limitations period set forth in
Section 10(b) of the Act. I have already found that these
events did, in fact, occur prior to the Section 10(b) period.**
I agree with Respondent’s contention. Since the rec-
ognition and contract execution occurred more than 6
months prior to the filing and service of the charge in the
instant case, the circumstances surrounding these matters
cannot be utilized to set aside the contract. Section 10(b)
so prescribes.** Nor does the possibility that such a con-
tract would not serve as a contract bar to a representation
petition under principles enunciated by the Board in its
General Extrusion Company, Inc.,* decision serve to in-
validate such an agreement in an unfair labor practice case,
where the agreement was entered into prior to the Section
10(b) period.*®
36. I conclude that the 6-month period of limitation began
on or about February 19, 1972, a date 6 months preceding the
filing and service of the charge. Even if said period were to
begin on February 18, 1972 (to account for the shortness of the
month of February) this would not alter my conclusion because
the events in question occurred on February 11 or earlier.
37. Local No, 1424, 1AM v. N.L.R.B., 362 U.S. 411.
38. 121 NLRB 1165.
39. The Kroger Company, 165 NLRB 872. I am not impressed
with the General Counsel’s argument in his brief that the Sec-
tion 10(b) period should begin with the hiring of Coffelt on
February 21, because, says the General Counsel, Coffelt was the
first employee whose rights were unlawfully affected by the con-
tract.
(Continued on following page)
27
Altogether different questions are, however, posed by
the further allegations of the complaint that said agreement
was enforced in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (2) and (3)
of the Act with respect to employees at the Standard
Homes Company Olathe plant and that Teamsters was un-
lawfully assisted by officials of Standard Homes Company
at a time when Teamsters did not represent an uncoerced
majority of employees at said plant. For, as will be dis-
cussed, said agreement, including its union security pro-
visions, was applied and enforced to the homes prefabrica-
tion and assembly employees at Olathe and said assistance
occurred at times clearly occurring within the Section
10(b) period. And, as already found, Teamsters Local 541
did not represent these employees (even though said em-
ployees had become a part of the complement at the Olathe
plant) since, despite their assignment to Olathe, such em-
ployees continued to be included in the Carpenters unit at
Roe Boulevard, as also already found.
I find, for reasons explained hereafter, that Teamsters
never represented an uncoerced majority of this group of
employees at Olathe nor the unit of which they were, and
are, a part. Rather Carpenters, was, and is, the exclusive
bargaining representative of these homes prefabrication
and assembly employees of Standard Homes Company.
Footnote Continued—
_ The General Counsel’s argument rests on Southern California
District Council of Laborers v. Ordman, 318 F. Supp. 633, which is
distinguishable on its facts. There, no employees were hired
when the complained of contract was executed and the court
held that the Section 10(b) period began with the hiring of the
first employees whose rights were affected by the contract. Here
three, or more probably four, employees (if Kline was not then
a supervisor) were hired before the execution of the contract.
The rights of all three or four would have to be “affected” by
the contract, which covered their terms and conditions of employ-
ment if, as the General Counsel says, that contract was executed
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act and none could
lawfully be deprived of an opportunity to file a charge with the
Board so alleging.
As previously found, the only individuals working at
the time the contract was executed on February 11, 1972,
were four who were engaged primarily in unloading lum-
ber, in moving it on forklift trucks and in making racks.
Production did not begin until February 29, i.e., a date by
which some six Carpenters unit employees from Roe
Boulevard—who had performed homes prefabrication and
assembly work at Roe Boulevard—resumed these same
duties at the Olathe plant; the first, Coffelt, having begun
work there on or about February 21.
It is undisputed that the Teamsters contract, with its
lower wage rates and different benefits, was applied to
the prefabrication and assembly employees upon their em-
ployment at Olathe.*
I further conclude that this contract’s provisions rec-
ognizing the Teamsters as the bargaining representative
of the instant prefabrication and assembly employees and
requiring membership in Teamsters as a condition of em-
ployment were enforced as to these employees. Thus,
Smith advised Coffelt on about February 17, 1972, and
Papineau and Fisher a few days later, that the employees
at Olathe would be represented by one union, the Team-
sters.“ The contract which had already been entered into
contains a union security provision requiring membership
in the Teamsters as a condition of employment and Coffelt,
Fisher and Papineau did, in fact, subsequently join that
labor organization.
40. Except for Fisher during the first 2 days of his employ-
ment there. He credibly testified that he worked “unofficially”
at Olathe for 2 days, at the Roe Boulevard Carpenters hourly rate,
setting up tables and lining up machinery. Thereafter he was
paid the Teamsters Olathe leadman rate which was less.
41. Coffelt, Fisher and Papineau credibly so testified and
Smith did not deny it.
“Oa -
I am not persuaded that the fact that Kansas is a so-
called “Right to Work” state exculpates Respondent from
the charge that it enforced the union security provisions of
the Teamsters agreement. That is, the argument goes,
since Kansas has a “Right to Work” law union membership
must be considered voluntary. I reject this argument on
the simple basis of the fact of Smith’s foregoing admonition
to these three employees that there would be one union at
Olathe—the Teamsters.** If Respondent had intended to
rely on the voluntary character of union membership un-
der such a law there would have been no reason for Smith
to have advised the employees that the Teamsters was to
be the only union at Olathe.
However, by making the statement that Teamsters was
the only union, in the context of an employment or transfer
interview, the implication was clearly left in the minds of
the employees that this was the union which they had best
join.
After these employees had begun work at Olathe, fur-
ther efforts were expended by Respondent to have them
join the Teamsters. Thus, as has already been mentioned
in part, Supervisor Kline spoke to Papineau in March 1972
about the matter of Papineau’s joining that union. To
Papineau’s statement that he, Papineau, thought that Kan-
sas had a “Right to Work” law, Kline retorted that Re-
spondent also had a plant in Missouri (which does not have
a “Right to Work” law) and there would be nothing to
stop Respondent from transferring Papineau to that loca-
tion. Papineau subsequently joined the Teamsters.“
42. In view of Smith’s failure to deny these admonitions, I
—! no weight to his general testimony that he did not enforce
at clause.
43. Papineau credibly testified to this conversation. Kline
did not testify.
30
Smith also offered to pay Fisher’s initiation fee of
$100 to the Teamsters several weeks after Fisher began
work at Olathe. Fisher declined the offer and paid the
fee himself when he later joined.“
The application and enforcement of this contract to
these prefabrication and assembly employees would not be
unlawful if the work in which they were to be engaged
would have been an accretion to the unit work already
being performed at Olathe.“ But the work being per-
formed at Olathe at the time the contract was executed
did not include production and assembly of prefabricated
homes. Nor was such production and assembly begun at
Olathe until the homes prefabrication and assembly em-
ployees from the Carpenters unit at Roe Boulevard were
assigned to work at Olathe on and after February 21, 1972.
But, as I have found, these prefabrication and assembly
employees continue to be—or are on accretion to—the Car-
penters unit at Roe Boulevard despite their assignment to
the Olathe plant subsequent to the execution of the Olathe
Teamsters contract. Hence, that contract when applied
and enforced with respect to these employees has been
applied to employees in a different unit, not represented
by the Teamsters.
The application of a collective bargaining agreement
with one labor organization (here Teamsters) and enforce-
44. Fisher credibly so testified. Smith stated in relation
to this offer to pay the fee that he, Smith, “sort of left him
[Fisher] with the impression that I [Smith] would check on it
and see,” but he later told Fisher that “the ce” had told Smith
that it could not pay the initiation fee.
In offering this somewhat different version in his testimony
Smith looked at me with a resigned expression on his face. To
the extent that the versions differ, I credit Fisher.
45. E.g., The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (Fam-
ily Savings Center), 140 NLRB 1011.
|
—
31
ment of that contract’s union security provisions to em-
ployees in a different unit represented by a different labor
organization (here Carpenters) is violative of Section
8(a) (1), (2) and (3) of the Act,** even though the contract
thus applied and enforced was entered into prior to the
Section 10(b) period.
I therefore find that Respondent through Standard
Homes on and after February 21, 1972, violated Sections
8(a)(1),(2) and (3) of the Act by applying and enforcing
the Teamsters Olathe contract to the homes prefabrication
and assembly employees who were then, and still are, a
part of the Carpenters unit at Roe Boulevard.”
And in reaching the conclusion that Respondent
through Standard Homes Company unlawfully assisted
Teamsters in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the
Act, I rely not only on the undisputed application of Team-
sters contract to the instant production employees but also
upon Smith’s aforedescribed statements to Fisher and
Papineau in February 1972 and Smith’s and Kline’s afore-
mentioned remarks to Fisher and Papineau in March 1972,
whereby I have concluded that Respondent enforced the
union security provisions of this contract.
46. Wolfer Printing Co., Inc, 145 NLRB 695; White Front
Stores, Inc., 166 NLRB 175.
47. See Sewanee Coal Association et al., 167 NLRB
172, 181-182, enf. denied, sub nom. Tennessee Products, Chemical
Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 423 F. 2d 169, C.A. 6. The Board decision
is binding upon me. Prudential Insurance Agents, 119 NLRB 768,
reversed on other grounds, 361 U.S. 477. Moreover, I am con-
strained to observe that the Sixth Circuit’s disagreement with the
Board in the Sewanee case stemmed mainly from its disagreement
with the Board’s determination in the underlying representation
case as to the identity of the majority representative of the unit in
which, - Board found, the contract therein had been unlawfully
entered into.
48. See Sheraton Kauai Corporation, 177 NLRB 25, enf.
429 F. 2d 1352, C.A. 9.
32
F. The Section 8(a)(5) allegations of the complaint
On February 20, 1972, the day before the first of these
employees (Coffelt) reported for work at Olathe, Car-
penters Representative Harding sought to discuss the
matter of “the transfer” of the instant employees \. ith
Hatcher, Respondent’s vice president in charge of produc-
tion (Hatcher was also Respondent’s principal bargainer in
the Carpenters unit contract negotiations in 1972 and ad-
mitted that he had handled Respondent’s labor relations
prior to that time). Hatcher told Harding there was
nothing to discuss because the Olathe plant was a “wholly
owned Delaware corporation and was not part of Sweet
Company.”
To the extent that Hatcher’s response may have in-
tended the meaning that Respondent was contending that
Standard Homes Company was a separate employer, I
have already rejected this contention in my conclusion that
Respondent and Standard Homes Company are a single
employer within the meaning of the Act. I have also al-
ready found that the homes prefabrication and ~ssembly
employees continue to be a part of—or are an accretion
to—the Carpenters unit at Roe Boulevard notwithstanding
the present assignment of these employees to the Olathe
plant. I have further found that the Teamsters contract
at Olathe was unlawfully applied and enforced as to these
employees after they began work at the Olathe plant.
In these circumstances, it follows that Respondent by
Hatcher, on February 20, 1972, refused to bargain with re-
spect to the wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment with Carpenters, the recognized represen-
tative of the unit in which these employees were employed.
It likewise follows that the application of the Teamsters
Olathe contract, with its lower wage rates and different
benefits, was a unilaterial change by Respondent, through
33
Standard Homes Company, in the terms and conditions of
employment of these employees. Respondent continued its
refusal to bargain with Carpenters about these matters by
denying Carpenters grievance in March 1972 and also by
denying Carpenters request for arbitration in April 1972,
both of which dealt, inter alia, with the same unilateral
changes in the terms and conditions of employment of
these employees. And the prefabrication and assembly
employees at Olathe continue to work under the unilater-
ally changed terms and conditions of employment imposed
upon them by the unlawful application to them of the
Teamsters Olathe contract.
In so refusing to bargain with Carpenters and unilater-
ally changing the terms and conditions of employment of
these employees, I find that Respondent itself, and Re-
spondent by and through Standard Homes Company, on
and after February 20, 1972, has violated and continues to
violate Sections 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.”
In reaching this conclusion I have carefully considered
each of the defenses offered by Respondent and Teamsters
at the hearing and in their briefs but reject them.
1. The defense of constructive notice. It is argued
that by placing a notice to each employee in the timecard
rack at Roe Boulevard in August 1971 informing the em-
ployees of the expected move by Standard Homes to
Olathe, as well as through the rumors about the move
which were rife at the Roe plant thereafter, Carpenters was
constructively notified of the move and should have taken
prompt action to bargain about it. I disagree.
It is clear the Carpenters was never formally notified
of the move nor offered a reasonable opportunity to bar-
gain about that move or any consequence from it upon the
49. See N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736.
34
terms and conditions of employment of the Carpenters
unit employees.
But even if it could be held that notice to the em-
ployees of the move and the aforementioned rumors some-
how stand on the same footing as a formal notice to the
Union of an opportunity to bargain, I would still disagree
that Carpenters was thereby given an adequate notice of
the opportunity to bargain on this matter. For there is
no indication in the notice itself that the move would re-
sult in any change in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of Carpenters unit employees. The notice merely
recited in this regard that the “new plant [at Olathe] will
be occupied by Standard Homes Company, a division of
Sweet Lumber,” and no mention was made of a separate
corporation at the Olathe location. Since the production
employees of “Standard Homes Company, a division of
Sweet Lumber” were already a part of the Carpenters
unit at Roe Boulevard, the notice provided no basis for
any expectation that such employees would not continue
to be a part of that unit after the move of the “division”
to Olathe.
Nor does it appear that the separate incorporation of
Standard Homes Company on November 1, 1971, was made
known to the Carpenters or the Carpenters unit employees.
In fact, despite the existence of this separate corporation,
as of November 1, 1971, the Standard Homes production
operations continued at Roe Boulevard from November 1,
1971, into February 1972 and the production employees
continued to be paid on Respondent’s checks, as already
found.
I conclude rather that the matter was timely raised
by Harding’s unsuccessful effort to consult with manage-
ment the day before Coffelt, the first Carpenters unit em-
ployee to go to Olathe, began work there.
2. Exercise of the prerogative of management rights
under the management rights clause of the Carpenters con-
tract. While management obviously has the right to make
management decisions under a “management rights” con-
tract provision this does not permit management to avoid
the obligation to bargain about any change in the terms
and conditions of employment which might result from
such management decisions. While it is true that a labor
organization may enter into an agreement in which it
waives the right to bargain about mandatory subjects of
bargaining (wages, hours, etc.) such a waiver must be
“in clear and unmistakable” language and will not readily
be implied.” I find no clear and unmistakabie language
in the management rights provision of the applicable con-
tract herein whereby Carpenters could be deemed to have
waived the right to bargain over reassignment of unit em-
ployees and unit work at lower wage rates and different
benefits than they were already receiving.
3. The employees themselves agreed to the assign-
ment at Olathe. Since by obtaining the employees’ agree-
ment to the assignment, Respondent thereby bypassed their
bargaining representative, this defense need not detain us
long. Bypassing of the bargaining representative in a situ-
ation wherein an employer refuses to bargain with the em-
ployees’ exclusive representative about these same matters
is the very practice inveighed against by the Supreme
Court in Katz, supra.
4. The Carpenters failed to raise the question of the
relocation of bargaining unit work and unit employees to
Olathe when Carpenters bargained with Respondent in the
spring of 1972 for a new contract covering the Carpenters
Roe Boulevard unit.
. E.g., Smith Cabinet Manufacturing Company, Inc., 147
NLRB 1506. The Timken Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 325 ¥. 24
746, C.A. 6, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971.
36
It is undisputed that no mention was made by Car-
penters or Respondent of the matter of the relocation of
the Standard Homes prefabrication and assembly em-
ployees and their work to the Olathe plant, when Car-
penters and Respondent bargained in the spring of 1972
for a new agreement covering the Carpenters unit at Roe
Boulevard.
However, I do not believe that Carpenters’ failure to
bring up the matter during these negotiations absolved
Respondent of any obligation to bargain about it. For
Carpenters is not required to engage in a futile act. The
door to bargain on this subject had already thrice been
closed in Carpenters’ face before the spring 1972 negoti-
ations had begun—when Hatcher refused Harding’s re-
quest to discuss the matter on February 20, 1972, after the
first Carpenters unit employee, Coffelt, was about to begin
work at Olathe; again when Carpenters grievance over
this matter was rejected by Respondent in March 1972 and
for the third time when Carpenters request to arbitrate
the issue was also rejected by Respondent in April 1972.
5. The fact that the Carpenters contract coverage was
explicitly limited to the Roe Boulevard “plant.” The agree-
ment, which was in effect at the time of the relocation of
the homes prefabrication and assembly work (and the
employees performing that work) from Roe Boulevard to
Olathe, was the Carpenters Roe Boulevard contract which
was effective from June 1, 1970, to April 30, 1972.
The aforementioned management rights clause (Arti-
cle XIX) speaks of the “management of [this] plant” in the
singular. But at the time this agreement was entered into
on June 30, 1970, all of the instant work and employees
were located at the Roe Boulevard plant.
In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that this
language precludes Carpenters from bargaining over work
37
or employees subsequently removed from the “plant” to
another location, again, as supra, in the absence of “clear
anu unmistakable” language to the contrary. For, to hold
otherwise would mean that an employer operating under
a collective bargaining agreement containing such language
could avoid that agreement and its bargaining obligation
entirely, merely by a unilateral shutdown of the “plant”
and removal of all plant work and employees to a location
only one city block away.
I accordingly, conclude that Respondent itself and Re-
spondent by and through Standard Homes Company have
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing
rest on my other findings and the Katz decision, supra, I am con-
I make this alternative in the event the Board or
the Courts disagree with my usions—that t and
Standard Homes Company are a single employer wi the mean-
erations at Olathe remain or are an accretion to
Carpenters unit at Roe and that the Teamsters Olathe
(Continued on following page)
38
IV. The Effect of the Unfair Labor
Practices Upon Commerce
The activities of Respondent and Standard Homes
Company, above, occurring in connection with the opera-
tions of Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate and substantial relation to trade, traffic
and commerce among the several states, and tend to lead
to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
Footnote Continued—
All the elements of proof of this violation have already been
found with the possible exception of “substantial impact” or “sub-
stantial detriment” to the employees who left the homes pre-
fabrication and assembly operation at Roe Boulevard to work at
Olathe. I conclude that this detriment is established by the fact
that—if it is assumed that Standard Homes Company is a -
rate employer—at least six employees in the Carpenters
Boulevard unit lost their jobs with Respondent. See Royal Alu-
minum, Inc., supra.
I am not persuaded that this loss of jobs can be said to be
mitigated by the voluntary acceptance of work at Olathe by these
For it is manifest that such voluntary acceptance was
obtained in circumstances involving the bypassing of their bar-
gaining representative. See Katz, supra; Royal Aluminum, Inc.,
supra,
Moreover, while there is testimony by Mrs. Sweet that the
Carpenters unit employment in mid-February 1972 (presumably
before the move) stood at 15 and continued to be 15 in July 1972
(after the move) this provides no assurance that the six who
went to Olathe would have remained in the unit. For there is
no showing that all were qualified to perform the more highly
skilled Carpenters unit mill work (e.g., manufacture of window
and door units) which is still being carried on at Roe Boulevard
nor was there any assurance that they would have even found
employment elsewhere in the plant (Williamson, the representa-
tive of Teamsters was told by Dale Long, as previously found,
that 7 employees from the Teamsters unit at Roe Boulevard were
to be laid off as the result of Standard Homes moving from that
location). Even if my finding that Standard Homes Company
and Respondent are a single employer is sustained—but my ac-
cretion and unlawful contract application i reversed—this
detriment is also established by the loss of hourly wages in the
amount of $.56% per hour (the difference between the journey-
(Continued on following page)
eee com’?
V. The Remedy
Having found that Respondent itself and by and
through Standard Homes Company has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that both com-
panies cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Since I have concluded that Respondent itself and by
ployees now working at Olathe as a part of the Carpenters
unit of Respondent at Roe Boulevard and that Respondent
and Standard Homes bargain collectively upon request
with Carpenters as the exclusive representative of the in-
Footnote Continued—
40
stant homes prefabrication and assembly employees as a
part of that unit.
Having found that Respondent by and through Stan-
dard Homes Company violated Section 8(a)(1),(2) and
(3) of the Act by rendering unlawful support and assis-
tance to Teamsters Local 541 at the Olathe plant and en-
forcing that labor organization’s union security agreement,
I shall recommend that Respondent and Standard Homes
Company withdraw recognition from Teamsters Local 541
as the representative of the homes prefabrication and as-
sembly employees now working at Olathe, both until they
have complied with the bargaining order described supra,
and unless and until Teamsters Local 541 has been certified
by the Board as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees in the unit found appropriate, infra.
I shall also recommend that Respondent and Standard
Homes Company cease applying the provisions of Team-
sters Olathe contract to said employees.
Having found that Respondent unlawfully applied and
enforced the union security provisions of said contract to
the said employees, in violation of Section 8(a) (1),(2) and
(3) of the Act, I shall further recommend that Respondent
and Standard Homes Company be required to reimburse
the present and former homes prefabrication and assembly
employees for all initiation fees, dues or other moneys ex-
acted from them in favor of Teamsters Local 541, including
interest thereon at 6 percent per annum computed in the
manner set forth in Seafarers International Union of North
America, etc., 138 NLRB 1142 with 6 percent interest
thereon. J. Howard Jenks d/b/a Glendora Plumbing, 165
NLRB 101, 103; 172 NLRB 1700. And it will be recom-
mended that Respondent and Standard Homes Company be
ordered to cease giving effect to any Teamsters checkoff
41
authorizations of said employees and to cease offering to
pay Teamsters initiation fees for such employees.”
It will be recommended that Respondent and Standard
Homes Company make whole each of the aforementioned
present and former employees for any loss of pay or other
benefits which they may have suffered (as the result of
Respondent’s unilateral application to them of the terms
and conditions of employment of the Teamsters Olathe
contract with Standard Homes Company in late February
1972) with interest at 6 percent per annum and to continue
such payments™ until such time as Respondent negotiates
in good faith with Carpenters to agreement or impasse."
Further it will be recommended that Respondent and
Standard Homes Company preserve and make available
52. I recommend that the Teamsters initiation fees, dues or
‘any other moneys exacted under the Teamsters Olathe contract
be reimbursed to these employees and that their check-off au-
thorizations no longer be implemented in order to remedy fully
the Section BC) (S) violation which I have separ Bo!
remedying the 8(a)(1),(2) and (3)
were also found. For the union security provisions of the Team-
sters contract at Olathe are part and parcel of the terms and con-
ditions of employment unilaterally and unla Ras my upon
these employees by Respondent by and through
Company.
,
t have been struck as to the homes prefabrication and
sembly employees of Standard Homes Company, had such em-
ployees been bargained for as part of Carpenters Roe Boulevard
unit in the negotiations for a new agreement in the spring of 1972.
Relations
54. See Howard Johnson Company, 198 NLRB No. 98 (p. 4).
to the Board, upon request, all payroll records, social se-
curity payment records, timecards, personnel records and
reports, and all other records necessary and useful to deter-
mine the amount df moneys due under the terms of the
foregoing recommendations.
Finally, it will be recommended that the Respondent
and Standard Homes Company be required to post an ap-
propriate notice at their respective involved locations.
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent and Standard Homes Company are a
single employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Carpenters and Teamsters are both labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of the Act.
3. By the conduct set forth in section III, above, Re-
spondent by and through Standard Homes Company has
rendered unlawful assistance and support to Teamsters and
thereby has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (2) and (1)
of the Act.
4. By enforcing the provisions of the union security
agreement of the Teamsters contract to the homes prefabri-
cation and assembly employees at Olathe thereby en-
couraging membership in Teamsters and discouraging
membership in Carpenters or its locals, Respondent by and
through Standard Homes Company, on and after February
21, 1972, has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the
Act.
<a eee a ee ~~ -
43
5. The following unit is appropriate for the purpose
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act.
All production and maintenance employees of Respon-
dent at its Roe Boulevard, Kansas City, Kansas plant and
all employees primarily engaged in the prefabrication and
assembly of homes at the Olathe, Kansas plant of Standard
Homes Company excluding delivery truckdrivers, hard-
wood finishers, all employees covered by Teamsters Local
541 contract at the said Roe Boulevard plant; also ex-
cluding all other employees of Standard Homes Company
at its said Olathe plant and excluding all office clerical
employees, guards and supervisors at both of said plants.
6. At all times material herein Carpenters has been
the majority and exclusive representative of the aforesaid
bargaining unit.
7. By refusing to bargain collectively with Carpenters
as the exclusive representative of the homes prefabrication
and assembly employees at the Standard Homes Company
Olathe plant as a part of the aforesaid bargaining unit and
by unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of said employees on and after February 20, 1972,
Respondent itself and Respondent by and through Standard
Homes Company have violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case,
44
it is recommended that R. L. Sweet Company, Kansas City,
Kansas and Standard Homes Company, Olathe, Kansas,”
their officers, agents, successors and assigns, shall:*
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Assisting Teamsters Local 541, or any other labor
organization and from otherwise interfering with the rep-
resentative of their employees through a labor organization
of their own choosing.
(b) Recognizing Teamsters Local 541, or any succes-
sor thereto, as the representative of any of the employees
in the appropriate collective bargaining unit described be-
low, for dealing with them with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment or any other terms and condi-
tions of employment, both until they have complied with
the provisions of this order requiring them to bargain with
Carpenters’ District Council of Kansas City and Vicinity,
AFL-CIO, and unless and until Teamsters Local 541 has
been certified by the Board as the exclusive representative
of the employees in said appropriate unit.
(c) Performing, enforcing or giving effect to the col-
lective bargaining agreement of February 11, 1972, be-
tween Teamsters Local 541 and Standard Homes Company
55. Although no charge was filed against Standard Homes
Company, it was named in the complaint and its interests were
fully and ably represented by its counsel at the hearing. For
these reasons and since I have found that Respondent and Stan-
dard Homes Company are a single employer within the meaning
of the Act, my recommended order shall run against both Re-
spondent and Standard Homes Company. J. Howard Jenks d/b/a
Glendora Plumbing, supra.
56. In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec-
tion 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor
Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Or-
der herein shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and
Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findi
conclusions and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deem
waived for all purposes.
by applying or enforcing said agreement with respect to
any employees in the said appropriate unit, or by entering
into or enforcing any extension, renewal or modification or
supplement thereof, or any superseding collective bargain-
ing agreement with said labor organization, by applying
and enforcing any of said extensions, renewals, modifica-
tions, supplements or superseding collective bargaining
agreements to any employees in said appropriate unit.
(d) Giving effect to any checkoff authorizations in
favor of Teamsters by Standard Homes Company prefabri-
cation and assembly employees or offering to pay Team-
sters initiation fees for such employees.
(e) Refusing to bargain collectively with Carpenters’
District Council of Kansas City and Vicinity, AFL-CIO, as
the exclusive representative of all the employees in the fol-
lowing appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees of R. L.
Sweet Lumber Company at its Roe Boulevard, Kansas City,
Kansas, plant and all employees primarily engaged in the
prefabrication and assembly of homes at the Olathe, Kansas
plant of Standard Homes Company, excluding delivery
truckdrivers, hardwood finishers, all employees covered by
Teamsters Local 541’s collective bargaining agreement at
Roe Boulevard plant, all other employees of Standard
Homes Company at its said Olathe plant and excluding all
office clerical employees, guard: and supervisors at both
of said plants.
(f) Unilaterally changing the wages, hours and terms
and conditions of employment of any employees in the
aforesaid appropriate colle-tive bargaining unit.
(g) Encouraging membership in Teamsters Local 541
or any other labor organization, or discouraging member-
ship in Carpenters’ District Council of Kansas City and
Vicinity, AFL-CIO, or any of its locals or any other labor
organization, by applying or enforcing a collective bargain-
ing agreement containing union security provisions to em-
ployees outside of the bargaining unit covered by said col-
lective bargaining agreement or by discriminating in any
like or related manner in regard to employees’ hire or
tenure of employment or any other term and condition of
employment.
(h) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent
such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization, as authorized in Sec-
tion 8(a) (3) of the Act, as amended.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from
Teamsters Local 541 as the collective bargaining repre-
sentative of the homes prefabrication and assembly em-
ployees of Standard Homes Company both until there has
been compliance with the provisions of this Order re-
quiring bargaining with Carpenters’ District Council of
Kansas City and Vicinity, AFL-CIO, and thereafter and
unless and until Teamsters is certified by the Board as the
exclusive representative of the appropriate unit described,
supra.
(b) Reimburse each of the present and former homes
prefabrication and assembly employees of Standard Homes
Company for all initiation fees, dues and other moneys if
any, exacted pursuant to the terms of the union security
agreement between Standard Homes Company and Team-
sters Local 541 on and after February 21, 1972, as set forth
in “The Remedy” section of the Administrative Law Judge’s
47
(c) Upon request, bargain collectively with Carpen-
ters’ District Council of Kansas City and Vicinity, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
Standard Homes prefabrication and assembly employees
as a part of the appropriate unit described above, con-
cerning the wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment of said prefabrication and assembly em-
ployees.
(d) Make whole any present or former homes prefab-
rication and assembly employees of Standard Homes Com-
pany for any loss of pay or other benefits they may have
suffered as the result of the unilateral action of Respon-
dent by and through Standard Homes Company in apply-
ing the terms of Teamsters Local 541’s Olathe, Kansas,
collective bargaining agreement to said employees, with
interest at 6 percent per annum, and continue such pay-
ments until such time as Respondent and Standard Homes
negotiate in good faith with Carpenters’ District Council
of Kansas City and Vicinity, AFL-CIO, to agreement or
impasse with respect to said employees.
(e) Preserve and make available to the Board or
its agents all payroll and other records, as set forth in
“The Remedy” section of the Administrative Law Judge’s
Decision.
(f) Post at the Roe Boulevard plant of Respondent
and the Olathe plant of Standard Homes Company copies
of the the notice attached hereto and marked, “Appendix.”
Copies of this notice, on forms provided by the Regional
57. In the event the Board’s Order is enforced by a Judg-
ment oe Oe ees ab conan
“POSTED BY ORDER O
SUANT aan tale A JUDGMENT OF UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
48
Director for Region 17, after being duly signed by the ap-
propriate representative of Respondent and by the ap-
propriate ™presentative of Standard Homes Company, shall
be posted by each at its respective aforesaid plant imme-
diately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by each
at its plant to insure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 17 with-
in 20 days of the receipt of this Order, what steps Respon-
dent and Standard Homes Company have taken to comply
herewith.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the com-
plaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges
unfair labor practices not found herein.
Dated at Washington, D.C.
/s/ John F. Corbley
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD
AN AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give
evidence it has been decided that we, R.L. SWEET LUM-
BER COMPANY and STANDARD HOMES COMPANY,
have violated the National Labor Relations Act and we
have been ordered to post this notice.
The National Labor Relations Act gives you as em-
ployees, certain rights, including the right to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join or help unions and to bargain collectively
through a representative of your own choosing.
Accordingly we give you these assurances:
WE WILL NOT recognize Teamsters Local 541 (here-
in called Teamsters) as the collective bargaining rep-
resentative of the homes prefabrication and assembly
employees of Standard Homes Company for the pur-
pose of dealing with us concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or
other terms and conditions of employment of these
employees or give Teamsters any other assistance or
support with respect to the representation of these em-
ployees.
WE WILL NOT apply, enforce or give effect to the
Teamsters’ collective bargaining agreement with
Standard Homes Company, or any modification, ex-
tension or renewal of such agreement, insofar as the
homes prefabrication and assembly employees of
Standard Homes Company are concerned.
WE WILL NOT encourage membership in Teamsters,
or any other labor organization, or discourage member-
ship in Carpenters’ District Council of Kansas City and
Vicinity, AFL-CIO, or its locals, or any other labor or-
ganization by applying, maintaining or enforcing the
union security provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement between Teamsters and Standard Homes
Company upon the homes prefabrication and assembly
employees of Standard Homes Company or by discrim-
inating in any like or related manner proscribed by
the National Labor Relations Act in regard to the hire
or tenure of employment or any other term or condi-
tion of employment of these employees.
50
WE WILL NO LONGER give effect to Teamsters
checkoff authorizations by Standard Homes Company
prefabrication and assembly employees nor will we
offer to pay Teamsters initiation fees for any such em-
ployees.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
Carpenters’ District Council of Kansas City and Vicin-
ity, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the
homes prefabrication and assembly employees of
Standard Homes Company as a part of the following
appropriate collective bargaining unit:
All production and maintenance employees of R.L.
Sweet Lumber Company at its Roe Boulevard, Kansas
City, Kansas, plant and all employees primarily en-
gaged in the prefabrication and assembly of homes at
the Olathe, Kansas, plant of Standard Homes Com-
pany, excluding delivery truckdrivers, hardwood fin-
ishers, all employees covered by the Teamsters collec-
tive bargaining agreement at said Roe Boulevard plant,
all other employees of Standard Homes Company at its
said Olathe plant and excluding all office clerical em-
ployees, guards and supervisors at both of said plants.
WE WILL NOT in any lke or related manner inter-
fere with our employees in the exercise of any rights
guaranteed in the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL withdraw and withhold recognition from
Tearnsters as the collective bargaining representative
of any of the homes prefabrication and assembly em-
ployees of Standard Homes Company, both until we
have complied with the provisions of the Board’s
Order requiring us to bargain with Carpenters’ Dis-
trict Council of Kansas City and Vicinity, AFL-CIO,
and thereafter and unless and until Teamsters is cer-
Dated By
Dated By
51
tified by the National Labor Relations Board as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the above de-
scribed appropriate collective bargaining unit.
WE WILL reimburse each of the present and former
homes prefabrication and assembly ‘employees of
Standard Homes Company for all initiation fees, dues
and other moneys, if any, exacted from them pursuant
to the union security provisions of the Teamsters col-
lective bargaining agreement with Standard Homes
Company, with interest.
WE WILL make whole any present or former homes
prefabrication and assembly employees of Standard
Homes Company for any loss of pay or other benefits
they may have sufferec as the result of the application
to them of the wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment of the Teamsters contract with
Standard Homes Company, with interest.
WE WILL bargain with Carpenters’ District Council
of Kansas City and Vicinity, AFL-CIO, as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the homes prefabri-
cation and assembly employees of Standard Homes
Company as a part of the above described appropriate
collective bargaining unit.
R. L. Sweet Lumber Company
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
Standard Homes Company
(Employer) :
(Representative) (Title)
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE
DEFACED BY ANYONE
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concern-
ing this notice or compliance with its provisions may be
directed to the Board’s Office, 616-Two Gateway Center,
Fourth at State, Kansas City, Kansas 64101, Tel. No. (816)
374-4434.
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
R. L. SWEET LUMBER COMPANY
and
CARPENTERS’ DISTRICT COUNCIL OF KANSAS CITY
AND VICINITY, AFL-CIO
and
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 541
Party to the Contract
207 NLRB No. 89
Case 17-CA-5292
DECISION AND ORDER
(Decision Issued November 23, 1975)
On May 18, 1973, Administrative Law Judge John F.
Corbley issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a support-
ing brief, and the general Counsel filed cross-exceptions
ee ee ee
answering brief.’
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this
proceeding to a three-member panel.
1. As the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present
the issues and positions of the es, the Respondent’s request
for oral argument is hereby d
54
The Board has considered the record? and the attached
Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the rulings, findings and conclusions of the
Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended
Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the
Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that Re-
spondent, R. L. Sweet Lumber Company, Kansas City,
Kansas, and Standard Homes Company, Olathe, Kansas,
their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in said recommended Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C., Nov. 23, 1975.
Edward B. Miller, Chairman
John H. Fanning, Member
Howard Jenkins, Jr., Member
(Seal) National Labor Relations Board
2. The Respondent’s posthearing motion to complete the
record is hereby denied as lacking in merit.
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Petitioner,
v.
R. L. SWEET LUMBER COMPANY,
Respondent,
and
STANDARD HOMES COMPANY,
Intervenor.
OPINION
(Opinion Issued May 13, 1975)
NO. 74-1065
ON APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(NLRB Case No. 17-CA-5292)
Before HOLLOWAY and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges,
and CHRISTENSEN, District Judge’.
HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge
The petitioner, National Labor Relations Board, seeks
enforcement of its decision and order that Sweet Lumber
Company, the respondent, and Standard Homes Company,
*Of the District of Utah, sitting by designation.
the intervenor, cease recognition of Teamsters Local 541 as
bargaining agent of certain employees primarily engaged
in the prefabrication and assembly of homes at the Standard
Homes plant in Olathe, Kansas, and bargain collectively
with Carpenters’ District Council of Kansas City and
Vicinity, AFL-CIO, as the representative of the same
employees.
The Board adopted the findings, decision and proposed
order of the Administrative Law Judge, 207 NLRB No. 89.
It thereby determined that Sweet Lumber—acting by and
through its alter ego, Standard Homes—had violated § 8
(a)(1), (2), (3) and (5) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 USCA § 158(a)(1), (2), (3) and (5), in that
(R. 879-80):
1. Sweet Lumber, by and through Standard
Homes, rendered unlawful assistance and support to
the Teamsters in violation of § 8(a) (1) and (2).
2. Sweet Lumber, by and through Standard
Homes, enforced the provisions of the union security
agreement of the Teamster contract against certain
employees at Standard Homes’ Olathe plant, thereby
encouraging membership in the Teamsters and dis-
couraging membership in the Carpenters, in violation
of § 8(a) (1) and (3).
3. Sweet Lumber, by and through Standard
Homes, refused to bargain collectively with the Car-
penters as the exclusive representative of certain em-
ployees at Standard Homes’ Olathe plant and unilater-
ally changed the terms and conditions of employment
of said employees, in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5).
Respondent and intervenor challenge enforcement of
the Board’s decision and order, arguing principally that:
57
(1) the charge of unfair labor practices was time-barred
by § 10(b) of the Act, 29 USCA § 160(b); and (2) the
evidence is insufficient to support the Board’s findings of
unfair labor practices. We must disagree with the respon-
dent and intervenor, and grant enforcement.
Before treating the issues we will outline the factual
background. As we do so, it is convenient to focus on
dates in view of the time bar issue raised under § 10(b).
Since the unfair labor practices charge was filed on August
18, 1972, the crucial date is February 19, 1972. Charges of
unfair labor practices occurring before that date are
barred, while those occurring on or after that date are
timely.
The factual background
Sweet Lumber is engaged in the wholesale and retail
sale of lumber and related products. Its principal office
and lumberyard is, and has been since 1952, located at 4400
Roe Boulevard, Kansas City, Kansas. Mrs. R. L. Sweet
has been president of Sweet Lumber since the death of
Mr. Sweet in 1958. Along with the sale of lumber and
other building products, Sweet Lumber has manufactured
and sold millwork such as doors, windows and room di-
viders, and also single-package prefabricated homes.
Through October, 1971, the prefab home manufacturing
activity was carried on by the Standard Homes Division
of Sweet Lumber and through February, 1972, this oc-
curred at the Roe Boulevard location.
At all times pertinent to this case the employees at the
Roe Boulevard yard have been represented by two unions.
Warehouse and yard employees, including lumber handlers,
truckdrivers, loaders, forklift operators and stockmen, have
been represented by Teamsters Local 541. Other em-
ployees engaged in the manufacturing process, including
millmen and prefab home assemblers, have been repre-
sented by Carpenters Local 1635.
In 1971 the directors of Sweet Lumber determined that
the Roe Boulevard location was no longer adequate to carry
on all of the company’s activities, particularly the manu-
facture of prefab homes. At a directors meeting in June,
1971, it was decided to move the prefab homes operation
to another location. In late 1971 land was purchased and
construction of a new plant began at Olathe, Kansas, some
19 miles from the Roe Boulevard location.’
The directors also decided to incorporate separately the
prefab home operation. They changed the name of Con-
struction Loan Company, an existing corporation of which
Mrs. Sweet was also president, to Standard Homes Com-
pany. Mrs. Sweet remained president of the newly named
company. Mrs. Sweet testified that the incorporation of
Standard Homes was not related to the decision to move
to Olathe (R. 382). Respondent and intervenor also stress
the fact that Standard Homes is a Delaware Corporation
while Sweet Lumber is a Missouri Corporation in challeng-
ing the finding that Standard Homes and Sweet Lumber
were a single employer (R. 863), and the finding that the
Olathe prefab operation was an accretion to the Roe Boule-
vard prefab unit, represented by the Carpenters union
(R. 865).
After the separate incorporation of Standard Homes,
on October 31, 1971, the production of prefab homes con-
tinued by the same manufacturing processes at the Roe
1. At Olathe the land and the building are owned by R. L.
Sweet Investment Company and all of the stock in that
is held in trust for Mrs. Sweet and her two sons-in-law (R. 352).
Standard Homes paid a rental to Sweet Investment Company for
use of the land and building (R. 405).
Boulevard plant. An arrangement was arrived at whereby
Sweet Lumber sold its prefab homes to Standard Homes
for a price that included the value of the materials and a
fixed labor cost for each unit. Fixed assets and various
items of property of Standard Homes Division were sold
at the book value by Sweet Lumber to Standard Homes
Company on November 1, 1971. Although a separate of-
fice was temporarily set up for Standard Homes Company
office employees at Roe Boulevard and some office em-
ployees were paid on Standard Homes Company checks at
least in January and February of 1972, the prefab produc-
tion employees continued to be employed and paid by
Sweet Lumber. -
In August, 1971, a “Staff Bulletin” was placed in the
timecard slots of the employees at Roe Boulevard relating
the news of the planned move to Olathe. The bulletin
stated that the new plant would be occupied by “Standard
Homes Company, a division of Sweet Lumber” and that
January, 1972, was the target date for completion (Ex. 4,
R. 795).
Preparations for occupying the Olathe plant began in
January, 1972. Early that month, Frank Woodbury and
Charles Roberts went out to the Olathe site to coordinate
completion of the plant with the general contractor. Lum-
ber also began arriving that month, and four employees
were hired to unload the initial lumber deliveries and to
build racks and other facilities. One of these men, Kline,
had been a member of the Teamsters unit at Roe Boule-
vard and became a foreman at Olathe. The other three—
Streeter, Nicely and Brown—were new employees.
On January 24, 1972, Aubrey Williamson, a business
agent of Teamsters Local 541, visited Olathe and obtained
signed authorization cards from Kline, Streeter, Nicely
60
and Brown (R. 257-258, 275, 855). On February 4,
Williamson met with Eugene Smith, then the vice-president
of Standard Homes, and Charles Hoffhaus, attorney for
Sweet Lumber, and presented the signed authorization
cards. After verifying the signatures, Smith and Hoffhaus
agreed to bargain, and on February 11, Standard Homes
and Teamsters Local 541 executed a contract running from
February 7, 1972, to February 2, 1975, with a provision for
automatic renewal (R. 260, 669, 855). The contract wage
scale provided for a minimum hourly wage of $3.50 per
hour. By its terms, the contract covered “all production
and maintenance employees at the Employer’s Olathe,
Kansas plant including truck drivers” and contained a
union security clause requiring all employees to join
Teamsters Local 541 within 31 days after beginning em-
ployment.
At the time that the contract was signed, only four
men (Kline, Streeter, Nicely and Brown) were performing
work that could be covered by its terms. As mentioned,
their work consisted of unloading lumber and building racks
and other facilities. No production was being done at
Olathe at this time,? and Smith testified that at the time
he signed the contract, he knew that he would have 12 to
13 more non-office employees working at Olathe shortly.
In mid-February, Smith began interviewing Sweet
Lumber employees at the Roe Boulevard plant to deter-
mine whether they would accept employment at Olathe.
Among these were four men who were working in the
prefab homes operation at Roe Boulevard and were mem-
bers of Carpenters Local 1635. These four—Coffelt, Schaf-
fer, Fisher and Papineau—all eventually accepted employ-
2. Vice-President Smith was still officing at Roe Boulevard
and the office employees of Standard Homes were also still at
Roe Boulevard.
61
ment at Olathe. Except for Coffelt, who was on vacation
and whom Smith went to see at home, they were inter-
3. While all four were initially offered a wage rate of $3.75
per hour under the Teamsters con Felgen gt yt Boom
paid at a “leadman” rate of $4.50 or . At that time,
four had been making $5.06 % per hour at Roe Boulevard under
the Carpenters’ contract. Fisher, in fact, was paid his Roe Boule-
BE
that production began
February 29, 1972. See note 8, infra. + Cup
5. Coffelt testified that who at this time
as a foreman at oe referred to a Tuiaaain eaeen onl
Schaffer similarly that either Kline or another foreman
On February 20, 1972, before the prefab workers began
production at Olathe, a Carpenters’ representative—Hard-
ing— questioned Mr. Hatcher, vice-president of Sweet Lum-
ber that handled union matters, about the transfer of em-
ployees to Olathe (R. 31-32). Hatcher informed Harding at
that time that the “facility out there was a wholly owned
Delaware corporation and was not part of Sweet Company,
there was nothing to discuss.” (R. 31). Harding indicated
at that time to Hatcher that they would “process the thing
through the provisions of our contract that refer to griev-
ance procedure.” (R. 31). This was found to be a refusal by
Sweet Lumber to bargain with the Carpenters union (R.
871), and it was found also that the refusal to bargain
continued by two other acts in March and April, 1972
(R. 872).
As stated, on August 18, 1972, the charge of unfair
labor practices—essentially refusing to bargain with the
Carpenters union concerning the Olathe operation and il-
legal support of the Teamsters union—was filed which
culminated in the challenged order. We turn now to re-
spondent’s grounds for opposing enforcement of the order.
I
Whether the charge of unfair labor practices was
time barred by § 10(b)
Respondent argues that the unfair labor practices al-
leged by the charge are time barred by § 10(b) of the
Act, 29 USCA § 160(b). It maintains that all acts involved
herein depend on the legitimacy of the Teamsters contract
executed on February 11, 1972, which is the significant
event for limitations purposes. It says that since the
charge in this case was not filed until August 18, 1972, acts
occurring prior to February 19, 1972, would be barred under
the six-month limitation provision of § 10(b), and that all
charges of violations are thus untimely.
The amended complaint (see R. 827) had challenged
the validity of the February 11 contract, but the Board
found that § 10(b) foreclosed consideration of whether the
recognition was lawful (R. 866-67) and on this basis
refused to set aside the bargaining agreement. This rul-
ing is not challenged. The Board went on to determine,
however, that the bar did not apply to the allegation that
the Teamsters contract was unlawfully applied after Febru-
ary 18 against Carpenters members from Roe Boulevard
who had begun working at Olathe.
Respondent argues that, as a matter of law, the § 10(b)
bar must be given effect against all the alleged unfair prac-
tices, relying principally on Local Lodge No. 1424, National
Ass’n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 362 US. 411 (the
Bryan case) and NLRB v. Serv-All Co.; 491 F.2d 1273 (10th
Cir.). We cannot, however, agree that either Bryan or
Serv-All dictate a denial of enforcement.
In Bryan, the employer had entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with a union that did not represent
a majority of the employees at the time that the original
agreement was executed. Charges were filed with the
Board 10 and 12 months after the execution of the agree-
ment. Conceding to the Court that the charges as to the
contract’s execution were barred by § 10(b), the Board
nevertheless argued that continued enforcement by the
employer and the union was a separate and continuing un-
fair labor practice not protected by § 10(b).
Disagreeing, the Court noted that the union security
clause and its enforcement, standing alone, were wholly
innocent and could not be charged as an unfair labor prac-
tice except through reliance on the illegality of the execu-
64
tion of the original agreement. Under such circumstances,
and since the execution of the agreement was over six
months prior to the filing of the charges, the Court held
that § 10(b) barred reference to the illegal nature of the
agreement’s execution and thus its illegality could not cast
a shadow across the agreement’s subsequent enforcement.
We should note, however, the limitations stated by the
Court to its holding in Bryan, 362 U.S. at 422, 423:
[W]e need not go beyond saying that a finding of
violation which is inescapably grounded on events
predating the limitations period is directly at odds
with the purposes of the § 10(b) proviso.
In any real sense, then, the complaints in this case
are ‘based upon’ the unlawful execution of the agree-
ment, for its enforcement, though continuing, is a con-
tinuing violation solely by reason of circumstances
existing only at the date of execution.
The Court pointed out that earlier events back of the
§ 10(b) period may be utilized to shed light on the true
character of matters occurring within the limitations pe-
riod, but concluded that the situation in Bryan was one
“where conduct occurring within the limitations period can
be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through re-
liance on an earlier unfair labor practice.” Id. at 416-17.
Respondent contends that here, as in Bryan, the date
of the contract’s execution is controlling for § 10(b) pur-
poses. The Teamsters contract, respondent points out, on
its face covers “‘all production and maintenance employees”
at Olathe (f 2, R. 669). Necessarily then, says the respon-
dent, if the Carpenters rights were violated, this occurred
at the time that the contract was signed. And if the con-
tract’s validity is beyond scrutiny, charges as to its subse-
quent application to the Carpenters are also barred.
We do not feel that Bryan established a black and .
white rule in all cases where a contract’s execution is re-
lated to the unfair labor practice charges that would bar
such charges where the contract’s execution was beyond
the six-month period.* Indeed, the Court referred to the
Board’s attitute lending support to its views, comparing
cases held timely by the Board “where evidence as to
events during the barred period was used to illuminate
current conduct claimed in itself to be an unfair labor prac-
tice . . .” with others held untimely “. . . where the grava-
men of the unfair labor practice complained of lay in a
fact or event occurring during the barred period.” Bryan,
supra at 419-20. And the Court cited Board cases holding
charges untimely where “. . . the evidence in fact mar-
shalled from within the six-inonth period is not substantial,
and the merit of the allegations in the complaint is shown
largely by reliance on the earlier events.” Id. at 421. The
Court stated, id. at 422:
However, we express no view on the problem raised
by such cases, for here we need not go beyond saying
that a finding of violation which is inescapably
grounded on events predating the limitations period is
directly at odds with the purposes of the § 10(b)
proviso.
We feel that we do not have a case where the contract
execution date in itself is controlling, and instead must con-
sider the circumstances surrounding several actions and
6. The Court made clear that Bryan was a case “w -
duct within ine Timitations period canbe Charged
oe et labor practi ie care ae Ti ne ay ee
Sper seater Laine t with Be cg, ee
majority at the time being agreement wi “indice *
events to determine when the gravamen of the unlawful
practices charged occurred. In determining this, we be-
lieve it is important to view the facts in light of the Board’s
findings, which we sustain." We musi focus on whether,
in substance, the unfair labor practices of refusal to bargain
with the Carpenters union and illegal support of the Team-
sters, and the like occurred before or after the critical date
—February 19, 1972.
As stated, the Sweet Lumber contract with the Team-
sters was executed on February 11. However, despite the
separate incorporation of Standard Homes and the subse-
quent move of prefabrication operations to Olathe, it was
found that Standard Homes and respondent remained a
single employer, Standard Homes being the alter ego of
Sweet Lumber. Hence all prefabrication employees
whether working at Roe Boulevard or Olathe, continued to
be represented by the Carpenters. The Board also found
that at the time of the execution of the Teamsters contract,
the only employees working at Olathe were four engaged
primarily in unloading lumber, etc. (R. 868), which was
not prefab work. In fact, the Board found that no prefab
production began at Olathe until on or after February 21
(R. 870). See note 8, infra.
The situation up to February 21, therefore, was that
prefabrication production workers were still working at
Roe Boulevard under the Carpenters contract and had not
yet begun work at Olathe, while four non-prefab produc-
tion workers—one of whom was a former Teamsters 541
member—had gained recognition of the Teamsters as their
bargaining agent.
7. The respondent and intervenor vigorously challenge the
Board’s findings. However for reasons stated later, we conclude
that there is substantial evidence to support the findings and sus-
67
It was found that the Teamsters contract was enforced
at Olathe in violation of § 8(a)(1)(2) and (3) (the inter-
ference; domination and support; and encouragement of
membership unfair labor practices), and that the Team-
sters union was unlawfully assisted, at times occurring
within the § 10(b) period (R. 868). In fact, not until on
or about February 21 were any of the Carpenters prefab
workers working at Olathe (R. 868, 870; e.g. R. 108).* It
was also found that the Teamsters contract, with its lower
wage rates and different benefits, was applied to the pre-
fab and assembly workers upon their employment at Olathe
(R. 868; see R. 221-38). Such acts in applying the Team-
sters contract thus come within the § 10(b) period.
We do note, in connection with the finding as to en-
forcement by intervenor of the Teamsters contract’s union
security clause, the finding that Standard Homes’ vice-
president Smith advised Coffelt on about February 17, and
Fisher and Papineau a few days later, that the employees
at Olathe would be represented by one union—the Team-
sters (R. 868). However, it was found that after the em-
ployees had begun work at Olathe, further efforts were
made by respondent to have the employees join the Team-
sters (R. 869). These acts included a remark by a Stan-
dard Homes foreman that Papineau could be transferred
to Missouri (where there was no right to work law’ when
Papineau raised a right to work law objection after the
foreman spoke to him about joining the Teamsters union
(R. 869; See note 5, supra). And there was also discussion
within the § 10(b) period of possible payment by Stan-
dard Homes of the Teamsters’ initiation fee for Fisher,
which offer was declined (R. 869; see note 5, supra).
And, as stated earlier, it was found that on February
20, 1972, respondent refused to bargain with the Carpen-
ters concerning the Olathe operation, and that the refusal
was repeated by two later acts in March and April, 1972
{R. 871-72).
In view of these findings, we cannot agree that NLRB
v. Serv-All Co., 491 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir.) dictates a de-
nial of enforcement. There the employer indicated by sev-
eral acts outside the § 10(b) period that it would not abide
by a new contract made by a multi-employer bargaining
group and the union. The Board held the charges timely
on the ground that the initial refusal to bargain recurred
within the six-month period. This Court held that the
record did not support a finding that the refusal to bargain
recurred within the period, and further rejected the views
of the Board as faulty in law in applying the recurring
violation theory. Here, we do not feel we have a recur-
ring violation question as in Serv-All, but rather a prob-
lem whether conduct which itself is the gravamen of the
unfair labor practices charged occurred within the § 10(b)
period. Bryan, supra, at 419-20.
While the case is not free from doubt, we are per-
suaded that in these circumstances the contract execution
date is not controlling. We conclude that the substantial
active conduct adversely affecting the Carpenters union
and those whom it was entitled to represent, and consti-
tuting the unfair labor practices found, fell within the six
month period. See Shumate v. NLRB, 452 F.2d 717, 719-20
(4th Cir.); Local Union No. 167, Progressive Mine Work-
ers of America v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir.);
NLRB v. Plumbers & Pipe Fitters Local Union 214, 298
F.2d 427 (7th Cir.); cf. NLRB v. New Mexico District
Council of Carpenters, 45 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (10th Cir.).
Accordingly we hold that the charges were not barred by
§ 10(b) as to the unfair labor practices found.
II
Whether there is substantial evidence supporting
the Board’s findings and order
As stated the Board adopted the Administrative Law
Judge’s findings of unfair labor practices, and respondent
and intervenor vigorously challenge the findings. In re-
viewing them we are enjoined by Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88, to review the record as a
whole, taking into consideration not only evidence sup-
porting the findings, but contradictory and conflicting evi-
dence as well. However, we may not ignore the Board’s
expertise or displace its findings between two fairly con-
flicting views, even though we would have made a differ-
ent choice had the matter been before us de novo. Id. at
488. If such review of the record as a whole reveals sub-
stantial evidence supporting the findings, they must not
be disturbed. Id. at 485.
a. The finding that Sweet Lumber and Standard
Homes were a single employer
The Board found that Sweet Lumber and Standard
Homes were a single employer under § 2(2) of the Act,
29 USCA § 152(2). Such a view of separate legal entities
may be made when necessary to safeguard statutory rights.
See NLRB v. Gibraltar Industries, Inc., 307 F.2d 428, 431
(4th Cir.). The controlling criteria are the interrelation
of relations, common management, centralized control of
labor operations, and common ownership. See Radio &
Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264, IBEW
v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255; NLRB v.
Jordan Bus Co., 380 F.2d 219, 221 (10th Cir.). The de-
termination is essentially a factual one and will not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. See NLRB v. M. P. Build-
70
ing Corp., 411 F.2d 567, 568 (5th Cir.); NLRB v. A. E.
Nettleton Co., 241 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.).
On consideration of the record as a whole and the
arguments by respondent and intervenor, we are satisfied
that the findings are supported by substantial evidence.
The challenges to the findings are essentially premised on
the stressing of conflicting evidence such as testimony by
Mrs. Sweet, president of both companies, that Mr. Smith
was in complete control of important mattere at Standard
Homes. There were, however, conflicting admissions as
to her degree of control. In any event there was substan-
tial proof of common management as to several officers,
including Mrs. Sweet who served both companies as presi-
dent.
In addition, as to its operations respondent vigorously
argues that Standard Homes was putting out a totally dif-
ferent product and using different purchasing and produc-
tion methods at Olathe. Again the contention is based on
portions of the proof admittedly favoring respondent, while
there was conflicting proof. For example, each of four
Carpenters who testified stated he did essentially the same
work with the same tools as he had done at Roe Boulevard.
We are satisfied that there was substantial proof as to
common management, common ownership, centralized con-
trol of labor policy, and interrelation of operations. We
feel the record amply supports the finding.
b. The finding that the Standard Homes pre-
fabrication employees are a part of or an accretion
to the Carpenters unit at Roe Boulevard
The Board’s finding of aecretion is similar to its func-
tion of determining the appropriateness of particular units
for bargaining purposes. See NLRB v. Sunset House,
71
415 F.2d 545, 547 (9th Cir.). The determination is one
involving the Board’s discretion and should not be set aside
unless a reviewing court is convinced that the Board has
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. NLRB v.
Baton Rouge Waterworks Co., 417 F.2d 1065, 1067 (5th
Cir.); International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 237,
243 (7th Cir.).
The factors weighed by the Board include functional
integration of the business, centralized management, simi-
larity of working conditions, collective bargaining history,
local power to hire and fire, lack of employee interchange,
and geographical distance. NLRB v. Sunset House, supra
at 548. The findings related to the single employer de-
termination are obviously relevant again.
In addition, here the Board found that employees at
Olathe were doing the same work with the same equip-
ment as at Roe Boulevard; that the product was essentially
the same; that employee seniority had been transferred
from Roe to Olathe, at least as to vacation rights; that
management of the companies was essentially the same; .
and that there was in fact little evidence of interchange
between production employees and others at Olathe. In
contesting the findings respondent again argues conflict-
ing interpretations, saying that Olathe was obviously go-
ing to be a plant for production of mass-produced homes
and that when employees were added to implement such
production, they were accreted to the Olathe plant, and
not to the Roe plant where such production had perma-
nently ceased. We are not persuaded by the different
emphasis. We must agree that the Board’s findings are
supported by substantial proof.
Respondent argues further that recognition of the Car-
penters as the bargaining representative of the prefab pro-
72
duction employees would have constituted an unfair labor
practice, relying on NLRB v. Hudson Berlind Corp., 494
F.2d 1200 (2d Cir.). There, however, a new facility was
established consolidating two older separate facilities, each
represented by a different union. The Board found no
accretion and the finding was sustained. In view of the
finding of no accretion and the presence of conflicting
unions, the employer’s bargaining with one union was
viewed as a violation of its duty of neutrality. See Mid-
west Piping Co., 63 NLRB 1060. We view the case as in-
apposite since it was based on a contrary determination of
no accretion.
We view the record as a whole as amply sustaining the
accretion finding here.
c. The Board’s findings of violations
of § 8(a) (5) and (1)
Respondent argues there is insufficient evidence to
support the findings of violation of § 8(a)(5) and (1), 29
USCA § 158(a) (5) and (1), refusal to bargain and inter-
ference with employees’ rights. More specifically respon-
dent says it notified the Carpenters concerning the move
to Olathe and that the union waived its right to bargain
by not promptly requesting negotiations concerning the
move; that the Carpenters contract with respondent was
limited to the Roe Boulevard plant; that the management
rights clause in the contract permitted respondent to dis-
continue the prefab operations without bargaining with the
Carpenters union; that the Olathe employees voluntarily
left the Carpenters unit at Roe Boulevard; and that there
was no substantial detriment to the Carpenters.
In support of respondent’s position the record does
show the distribution of the August, 1971, bulletin to the
73
Roe Boulevard employees about the new plant and the
Standard Homes move (R. 795)*, and testimony by em-
ployee. Shaffer that the move was common knowledge.
The Board found that the Carpenters union was not
formally notified of the move nor offered a reasonable op-
portunity to bargain about the move or its consequences.
And the findings stated that even if notice to employees
served as formal notice to the union, the Judge disagreed
that the Carpenters union was given an adequate notice
of the opportunity to bargain on the matter, there being
no indication in the notice that the move would result in
any change in the terms and conditions of employment of
Carpenters unit employees (R. 872).
We sustain the findings. The lack of formal notice to
the union is supported by testimony of the business rep-
resentative, Mr. Harding. Moreover the bulletin referred
to a change in location, but without mention of a change
in corporate status or conditions of employment (R. 795).
See NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191,
194-95 (3d Cir.). We are not persuaded by the notice argu-
ment, since the employer must provide the union with
notice of a vital change in working conditions. See NLRB
v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir.).’°
9. The respondent points out that such distribution to all
employees included Mr. Boyce, the union steward. He testified
he did not see any Sweet Lumber literature distributed at Roe
Boulevard about the Olathe plant (R. 175-176). This point is
not resolved by the Board’s findings, the Board concluding that
ied notice was not given by the bulletin in any event (R.
10. Reliance on NLRB v. Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d 379 (2d
Cir.) is misplaced. The information there conveyed was informal
but complete, while here the bulletin did not give information
sufficient to alert the union to bargain, and thus did not constitute
sufficient notice.
74 :
Since we sustain the finding of lack of adequate notice
to the Carpenters union concerning the relocation to
Olathe, we are not persuaded that there was waiver by
the union’s failure to demand bargaining concerning the
move before Harding’s discussion on February 20, 1972,
with Mr. Hatcher. As stated earlier, we sustain the find-
ing that Harding then sought to discuss the transfer and
that respondent refused to bargain (R, 871).
A further waiver argument is made on failure of the
Carpenters union to attempt bargaining concerning the
Olathe plant when the Roe Boulevard contract was re-
negotiated in April and May of 1972. There was no dis-
cussion by the Union concerning the Olathe employees in
those negotiations. However, the failure to make such a
demand in those negotiations was found not to have ab-
solved respondent of its duty to bargain, and we sustain
this determination. Any such waiver of the Union’s right
to bargain must be clear and unmistakable. See Murphy
Diesel Co. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 303, 306-07 (7th Cir.). We
accept the determination that no waiver of the right to
bargain occurred. In addition we are not persuaded by
the waiver argument since it would seem futile that the
Carpenters union again attempt to bargain about the
Olathe plant when efforts to do so had been rebuffed
three times previously (R. 874).
Respondent argues that the management rights clause
in Article XIX of the 1970-1972 contract with the Carpen-
ters gave it the right to determine what products should
not be manufactured and the right to introduce new fa-
cilities (R. 632). It says that Olathe was such a new fa-
cility that the company had a right to establish and that
it did not have to bargain for the right again. Here, how-
ever, application of the Teamsters contract effected sub-
75
stantial changes in terms and conditions of employment.
As the Board’s decision points out, any waiver of the right
to bargain about mandatory subjects of collective bargain-
ing must be clear and unequivocal. See Weltronic Co.,
173 NLRB 235; enforced, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir.). We
must agree the contract did not go so far. And despite
the right to introduce the new facility, there was still a
duty to bargain about the effects on employees repre-
sented by the Carpenters. See NLRB v. Thompson Trans-
port Co., 406 F.2d 698, 702-03 (10th Cir.).
Respondent argues that the employees voluntarily left
the Carpenters unit at Roe Boulevard and accepted em-
ployment at Olathe and that consequently they are not
proper subjects for bargaining. We must disagree. The
voluntary response by employees directly approached did
not extinguish the duty to bargain, or constitute a defense
to the charge of refusal to bargain with the bargaining
representative. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 678.
d. The Board’s findings of violations of § 8(a) (2)
(3) and (1)
There remain respondent’s and intervenor’s arguments
against the findings of unlawful assistance to the Teamsters
union in violation of § 8(a)(2)(3) and (1), the “domi-
nation” and “illegal support” findings. Essentially re-
spondent argues that these charges were time barred, and
were clearly erroneous since separate corporations and an
utterly new and different type of industrial labor unit
was involved, having no affiliation with the cabinet makers
at Roe Boulevard. For reasons already stated, we must re-
ject the time bar argument and the factual arguments
about the operations at the two plants.
76
We have considered these objections and others ad-
vanced against the findings. We are persuaded there is
substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support
the findings and must sustain them.
We are satisfied that the findings of the Board are
supported by substantial evidence as to the unfair labor
practices found and we must reject the defense that the
charges were barred by § 10(b). Accordingly the order
will be enforced.
77
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
NATION AL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner,
V.
R. L. SWEET LUMBER COMPANY,
Respondent,
and
STANDARD HOMES COMPANY,
Intervenor.
NO. 74-1065
(NLRB Case No. 17-CA-5292)
JUDGMENT
(Judgment Entered June 5, 1975)
Before: Holloway and McWilliams, Circuit Judges, and
Christensen, District Judge*
*Of the District of Utah, sitting by designation.
THIS CAUSE came on to be heard upon the application
of the National Labor Relations Board for the enforcement
of a certain order issued by it against Respondent, R. L.
Sweet Lumber Company, and Standard Homes Company,
their officers, agents, successors, and assigns on November
23, 1973. The Court heard argument of respective counsel
on September 13, 1974, and has considered the briefs and
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.