Appendix — Quinn v. Muscare
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Supreme Court, U. & :
FILED
DEC 8 1975
APPENDIX MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK
Ixy Tus
Supreme Court of the Anited States
Ocroser Term, 1975
No. 75-130
ROBERT J. QUINN, individually and as Commissioner
of the Chicago Fire Department,
Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCIS MUSCARE,
Respondent.
On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit
Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60601, Financial 6-3988
Petition For Certiorari Filed July 24, 1975
Certiorari Granted October 14, 1975
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries ............ 1
EES ce ae aie a , 4
I a cchieeienneanisiiantias 15
Affidavit Evidencing Compliance with General Rule 39.. 16
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order .................. 17
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a |
Temporary Restraining Order ......2............--.--:--0-s00-0+- 23
Order Denying Motion for a Temporary Restraining
SII: seshasastaiesecethimameiaatandesinatesnacpanieeniticiahascibiisiiianinennntesenneenes 37
pS ee er a eT 37
Motion in Opposition to the Granting of a Preliminary
i ca inti aca ecrataaltitls 37
I eT Can oe ET 47
Transcript of Proceedings, March 19, 1974 .................... 48
Witnesses for the Defendant:
Leonard Johnson—
I lees 51
EE eee 59
Redirect Examination ~.............................0....-. 78
Recross Examination -......................-0-.-cossceses 80
Al Lundin—
PL RN 82
a 91
a 98
William F. Foley—
Direct Examination 99
Cross Examination —
Redirect Examination 105
Recross Examination ..... 107
Witness for the Plaintiff:
Francis Muscare—
Direct Examination 121
Cross Examination ....... - 129
Witness for the Defendant in Rebuttal:
William F. Foley—
| eI 131
Cross Examination .................... : ade 133
Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction ...... 137
Motion for Reconsideration and for Amendment of
Judgment Taken Under Advisement ...................-..--+ 138
Motion for Amendment of Judgment ......... ; 138
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsidera-
CBE axccosiscsccucssssesiiinsisssenntialinsennnnniniinnnn 139
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered oral-
Ae! 2 .. 146
Transcript of Proceedings, March 29, 1974 ‘a 150
Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
and for Amendment of Judgment ........... - 153
Bates CE ABO occcccecscsccssicnnninnalael 154
Designation of Record on Appeal - 154
iii
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 (Order No. 749) ..0......00cccccceecceeeeeeee 156
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Order No. 685) ..20.0.........cccescseceeeee 157
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Re-
versing and Remanding to the District Court ............ 167
Order of the United States Court of Appeals Denying
Defendant’s Petition for Rehearing ............0.0.0.0.0....... 167
Order of the United States Court of Appeals Staying
i esseteanonnneonnines 168
Order of the United States Court of Appeals Recalling
TINT dacicinetideescertereenencentestenteenenscncsennsonasnsenensenee 168
Order of the Supreme Court of the United States
Ee 169
ee
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enlies
APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT
DOCKET ENTRIES
In Tue Unrrep Srates District Court
For the Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division.
No. 74 C 656
3-11-74—Filed complaint andcopy (JS5) $15.00
3-11-74— Filed Designation
3-11-74—Filed Affidavit regarding rule 39.
3-11-74—Filed Motion for a temporary restraining order.
3-11-74—Filed Memorandum in support of plaintiff’s mo-
tion for a temporary restraining order.
3-11-74—Motion for a temporary restraining order is de-
nied. Cause continued to March 19, 1974 at 2pm
for hearing on preliminary injunction. McGarr,
J.
3-19-74—Filed defendant’s appearance and that of his at-
torney.
3-19-74—Filed Motion in opposition to the granting of pre-
liminary injunction.
3-19-74—Cause called for hearing on preliminary injunc-
tion. Plaintiff rests on the complaint. Evidence
heard for defendant. Defendant rests. Rebuttal evi-
dence heard and concluded. Surrebuttal evidence
heard and concluded. Court enters its findings of
fact and conclusions of law from the bench. Mo-
—2—
tion for preliminary injunction is denied. Cause
continued to March 26, 1974 at 10am for status
report. McGarr,J.
3-26-74—Motion of Plaintiff for reconsideration and for
amendment of judgment is taken under advise-
ment. Cause continued to March 29, 1974 at 10
A.M. for ruling on plaintiffs motion to reconsider
previous ruling and further status report.—Mc-
Garr,J
3-19-74—F iled summons returned served.
3-26-74—Filed Plaintiff’s Motion for Amendment of judg-
ment.
3-26-74—Filed Memorandum in support of plaintiff’s mo-
tion for reconsideration.
3-29-74 Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and motion
for amendment of judgment, are both denied.
Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction will
be considered as a motion for a permanent in-
junction without further hearing and is denied.
MeGarr,J.
4-4-74Clerk’s file copy of Excerpt of proceedings had on
March 19, 1974, before Judge McGarr, filed by
an official court reporter.” ds
4-26-74—Filed Plaintiff’s Notice of appeal. P
5-9-74—“Clerk’s file copy of transcript of proceedings had
on March 19, 1974 before Judge McGarr, filed by
an official court reporter.” ds
5-15-74Filed Plaintiff’s Designation for the Complete
Record. ds
5-29-74—Filed Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 and 2. (Identified on
attached list) Y
-o
In Tue Unitep States Court Or AppEALs
For The Seventh Circuit
No. 74-1460
6-7-74—Record on appeal filed.
8-1-74—Appellant’s brief and appendix filed.
10-15-74—A ppellee’s brief filed.
11-15-74—Appellant’s reply brief filed.
1-16-75—Oral Argument heard. Cause taken under advise-
ment.
5-21-75—Judgment order entered, reversing and remand-
ing to District Court with directions. Per curiam
opinion filed.
6-17-75—Petition for rehearing denied.
6-24-75—Order entered staying mandate until July 24,
1975.
7-31-75—Mandate issued.
8-11-75—Order entered recalling mandate.
In Tue Supreme Court Or Tue Unirep States
No. 75-130
7-24-75—Petition for certiorari filed by defendant.
10-14-75—Order entered granting certiorari.
ites
In Tue Unitep States Districr Court
Northern District Of Illinois
Eastern Division
FRANCIS MUSCARE, »
Plaintiff,
Vs.
| No. 74C 656
eel Civil Action
ROBERT J. QUINN, individually and as
Commissioner, Chicago Fire Department,
D-* ndant. J
COMPLAINT
(Filed March 11, 1974)
1. This is an action by Plaintiff seeking to enjoin the
Chicago Fire Department from continuing his suspension
from his duties for alleged violations of §§61.001, 61.006
and 51.133, of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago
Fire Department; for declaratory judgment that §§61.001
and 51.133 are unconstitutional on their face, that §61.006
is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff in this case, and
that procedures of the Chicago Fire Department under
which Plaintiff was suspended are unconstitutional ; and for
back pay for the period of wrongful suspension.
2. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. $1343, to
enforce rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. $1983, and under
28 U.S.C. §2201, et seq., and the Constitution of the United
States.
3. Defendant Robert J. Quinn is Commissioner of the
Chicago Fire Department and exercises sole and exclusive
control and management of the Fire Department and its
etfs
personnel. {Municipal Code of the City of Chicago, Ch. 12,
§4].
4. Plaintiff Francis Muscare has been a member of the
Chicago Fire Department since 1955. He currently holds
the rank of Lieutenant. Plaiutiff wears a small mustache
and short goatee. His hair is trimmed to medium length.
5. In December, 1973, Plaintiff’s superior officer, Chief
Morgan, warned him that he would not be permitted to
continue working as a fire fighter unless he shaved his
beard off. A few days thereafter Plaintiff was informed
that charges had been filed against him with the adminis-
tration authorities of the Fire Department.
6. Two and one-half months later, on Wednesday, Feb-
ruary 27, 1974, at 11:30 A.M., Second Deputy Lattice,
Third Division Fire Marshall Callahan and Third Battalion
Chief Swoboda entered the fire station where Lt. Muscare
was performing his duties as a fire fighter and ordered
him to turn in his equipment because he was being sus-
pended effective immediately. Plaintiff was informed that
he would receive a letter detailing the charges against him.
7. The appearance of Plaintiff’s face and the trim of
his hair has remained essentially the same from October,
1973, to the present. Photographs of Plaintiff taken March
1, 1974 and reflecting his appearance since October, 1973
and as of the date of Plaintiff’s suspension, are attached
hereto as Exhibits “A” and “B” and made a part hereof.
8. On March 4, 1974, Plaintiff received a letter bearing
the signature of Walter R. Braun, Chief of Personnel, in-
forming him that he was accused of violating §§61.001,
61.006 and 51.133 of the Chicago Fire Department Rules
and Regulations and that his suspension was to last twenty-
nine days, beginning February 27, 1974. A copy of the
letter from Walter R. Braun is attached hereto as Exhibit
“C” and made a part hereof.
_
9. Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Chicago Fire Department provides as follows:
Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance. All
members of the Chicago Fire Department shall present
a clean and proper appearance in personal care and
attire at all times. The face shall be clean-shaven, ex-
cept that a non-eccentric mustache is permissible. Mus-
taches shall not extend beyond a line perpendicular to
the corner of the mouth and the full upper lip must
be readily visible.
Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower
than a line from the middle of the ear.
Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the
hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and
slope to the back of the neck. It will be gradually tap-
ered overall, in order to present a neat appearance.
A copy of §51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department is attached hereto as Exhibit “D”
and made a part hereof.
10. Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Chicago Fire Department provides as follows:
Part VI
OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES
IN RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND
PROCEDURES OF THE CHICAGO FIRE
DEPARTMENT
. * .
OFFENSES
Section 61.001. Conduct Unbecoming a Member or
Employee of the Chicago Fire Department.
A copy of §61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department is attached hereto as Exhibit “EK”
and made a part hereof.
11. Section 61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Chicago Fire Department provides as follows:
= =
Part VI
OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES
IN RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND
PROCEDURES OF THE CHICAGO FIRE
DEPARTMENT
OFFENSES
Section 61.006. Disobedience of Orders.
A copy of §61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department is attached hereto as Exhibit “F”
and made a part hereof.
12. The twenty-nine day suspension of Plaintiff, a fire
fighter of twenty years’ service, without any prior notice
or opportunity for a hearing, is a violation of Plaintiff’s
right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
13. Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Chicago Fire Department on its face prohibits Plaintiff
Muscare from determining the details of his personal ap-
pearance and violates Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights to
personal freedom guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
14. Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the
Chicago Fire Department, creating the offense of “Conduct
unbecoming a member or employee of the Chicago Fire
Department,” is so vague as not to give notice of the con-
duct it prohibits, depriving Plaintiff of his right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and is so overbroad as to infringe
upon Plaintiff’s Constitutionally protected right to personal
freedom.
oiiiies
15. Insofar as $61.006, creating the offense of “Dis-
obedience of Orders,” is applied by the Fire Department to
punish Plaintiff for the alleged violation of orders issued
under §§51.133 and 61.001, such orders were unconstitu-
tional and void, and as applied in this case, $61.006 is un-
constitutional.
16. The suspension of Plaintiff has deprived him of his
employment and the earnings used to sustain himself and
his family, has stigmatized him in his career as a fire fighter
and jeopardized his future ability to earn a living in his
chosen work. Unless Plaintiff foregoes his Constitutional]
rights, he will be subject to continued disciplinary actions
which will perpetuate the injury. This action of suspending
Plaintiff has thus caused and is continuing to cause him to
suffer immediate, irreparable injury.
17. If Defendant is enjoined from continuing the sus-
pension or taking any other disciplinary action against
Plaintiff for the alleged violations of $51.133, $61.001 and,
in this case, for alleged violation of §61.006, Defendant
would not be harmed thereby.
Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court:
1. For a declaratory judgment that: (a) §51.133 and
§61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire
Department are unconstitutional on their face and void;
and (b) §61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
eago Fire Department is unconstitutional as applied to
Plaintiff in this case; and (c) the suspension of Plaintiff
without a hearing or an opportunity to defend himself is
unconstitutional ; and :
2. To enjoin Defendant and any of his agents, employ-
ees, officers, lawyers, representatives and servants, prelimi-
narily and permanently from enforcing §§61.001 and 51.133,
and, insofar as related to orders issued under the aforemen-
ote .
:
4
H
5
;
4
|
aliens
tioned, §61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago
Fire Department against Plaintiff by means of suspension
from duty or any other means; and
3. For back pay to which Plaintiff would have been en-
titled if he had not been wrongfully suspended in violation
of his rights under the United States Constitution.
/s/ Francis Muscare
Plaintiff
/s/ Robert S. Sugarman
/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Counsel for Plaintiff
(Affidavit of Francis Muscare).
—10— _—
EXHIBIT “A” EXHIBIT "B”
= =
EXHIBIT “C”
(Letterhead Of)
Chicago Fire Department
FIRE ACADEMY
February 28, 1974
Lieutenant Frank Muscare
4059 West Barry
Chicago, Illinois 60641
Subject: Suspension
Sir:
You are hereby notified that you have been, or will be,
removed from the payroll of the Chicago Fire Department
for violations of the Rules and Regulations, Practices and
Procedures of the Chicago Fire Department.
Recommended Duration of Suspension: twenty-nine (29)
days.
Dates of suspension:
From: 0800 February 27, 1974
To: 0800 March 28, 1974
You are accused of violations of the following sections
of the rules:
Sections: 61.001-61.006 and 51.133
1. You will report to the Personnel Department on March
27, 1974 to pick up your badge and other City property as-
signed to you, and to receive further orders. _
2. This suspension does not preclude the filing of these
charges against you by the Civil Service Commission. Un-
less previously notified you will contact the Chief of Per-
sonnel on to find out the disposition
of your case.
By order of
/s/ Walter R. Braun
Chief of Personnel
ec: 3rd Division Marshal
a ata
afin
EXHIBIT “D”
Section 51.131. Use of Vending Machines in Fire Sta-
tions. The vending machines, dispensing soft drinks and
candy, located in fire stations are for the use of Fire De-
partment personnel only. Under no circumstances will other
persons be allowed to use the facilities or products dis-
pensed by these vending machines. Cigarette vending ma-
chiues are not permitted in fire stations.
Section 51.132. Time Off Due to a Death in the Family.
Time off duty (one work day off) may be granted to all
members of the Chicago Fire Department when a death
occurs in the immediate family of the member. Immediate
family is defined as consisting of mother, father, husband,
wife, brother, or sister (including step or half) son or
daughter (including step or half) father-in-law, mother-in-
law, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, grand parents and grand-
children.
When someone in the “immediate family” dies, the mem-
ber will notify his immediate superior officer by telephone
and give all the pertinent information. The superior officer
will then relay the information through the chain of com-
mand so that sufficient manpower can be maintained.
Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance. All mem-
bers of the Chicago Fire Department shall present a clean
and proper appearance in personal care and attire at all
times. The face shall be clean-shaven, except that a non-
eccentric mustache is permissible. Mustaches shall not ex-
tend beyond a line perpendicular to the corner of the mouth
and the full upper lip must be readily visible.
Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower
than a line from the middle of the ear.
Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the
hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and slope to
the back of the neck. It will be gradually tapered overall, in
order to present a neat appearance.
Le
eniitinin
EXHIBITS “E” AND “F”
Part VI.
OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES IN
RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
OF THE CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT
Members or other employees who shall be found guilty
of infractions of any of the Rules and Regulations, Prac-
tices and Procedures of the Fire Department, shall be sub-
ject to the penalties hereinafter enumerated.
OFFENSES
Section 61.000
Section 61.001. Conduct unbecoming a member or em-
ployee of the Chicago Fire Department.
Section 61.002. Intoxication. ,
Section 61.003. Keeping or drinking intoxicating liquors
in or about premises of the Fire Department.
Section 61.004. Entering any tavern or bar while on
duty, or in uniform, except in the performance of assigned
duty.
Section 61.005. Neglect of duty.
Section 61006. Disobedience of orders.
Section 61.007. Inattention to duty.
Section 61.008. Immoral conduct.
Section 61.009. Making a false official report.
Section 61.010. Reporting for duty while incapable of
performing duties without a proper medical reason.
Section 61.011. Absence from duty without permission.
Section 61.012. Leaving a post of duty without being
properly relieved or without proper authorization.
Section 61.013. Violation of any law or ordinance.
Section 61.014. Insubordination or disrespect toward a
superior officer.
Section 61.015. Using coarse, profane or insolent lan-
guage or showing disrespect to, or willful maltreatment to-
ward any member of the department or any other person.
ee
niin
In Tue Unitrep States Districr Covurr
* * (Uaption No.74C 656) * *
DESIGNATION FORM—CIVIL
(Filed March 11, 1974)
A. Pending Related Cause, If Any:
Number ; Judge
Reason case deemed related (indicate by (X)):
1. ( ) Involves property included in earlier num-
bered pending cause.
2. ( ) Involves same issue of fact or grows out of
same transaction as earlier numbered pending
suit.
3. ( ) Involves validity or infringement of a patent
already in suit in earlier numbered pending
suit.
4. ( ) Involves both the same issue of law and the
same class as a pending suit and is brought
as a class action.
B. Indicate Basis Of Jurisdiction By (X):
1. ( ) United States is plaintiff or defendant.
2. (X) Federal question.
3. ( ) Diversity of citizenship.
C. Category Of Case (see reverse side of this form for
list of categories) :
Civil Rights—Federal Question
D. Is This Suit Brought As A Class Action?
( ) Yes (X) No
/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Attorney at Law
—_ =
In Tue Unrrep Strares Districr Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) °* *°
AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCING COMPLIANCE
WITH GENERAL RULE 39
(Filed March 11, 1974)
Affiant is the attorney of record for Francis Muscare and
has knowledge of the matters covered by this affidavit and
has read General Rule 39.
Affiant has not directly or indirectly solicited employment
by the above-named party or parties, and knows of no
solicitation of said party or parties by any person that has
resulted in the employment of the affiant, except (here state
all exceptions, or if none state “no exception”): No Ex-
ceptions
Affiant has not paid, or promised to pay, and knows of no
payment or promise of payment to the above-named party,
or parties, of the costs of this case, or of the medical, liv-
ing of other expenses of any party, or of any part of an
attorney’s fee, or of any portion of the recovery by suit or
settlement herein to any person whatever other than the
above-named party or parties and the attorneys of record
herein, except (here state all exceptions, or if none state
“no exception”) : No exceptions
Affiant has filed contemporaneously herewith a signed
copy of any written contingent fee agreement applicable
to his compensation for representing the above-named party
or parties in this action and represents that a signed copy
thereof has been furnished to each party whom he repre-
sents; if no copy of a contingent fee agreement is filed here-
with, affiant represents that his compensation for services
in this case is not on a contingent basis.
/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Affiant
— | a
In Tue Unirep Srares Districr Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *
MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
(Filed March 11, 1974)
Plaintiff Francis Muscare, by his counsel Robert S.
Sugarman and Linda R. Hirshman of J acobs, Gore, Burns
& Sugarman, moves this Court pursuant to Rule 65(b),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a temporary restrain-
ing order restraining Defendant in the above captioned
case from continuing susper ding him under the provisions
of §$61.001, 61.006 and 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations
of the Chicago Fire Department, for the following reasons:
1. That Plaintiff has filed in this Court a Complaint
against the Defendant praying for a declaratory judgment
that §§61.001, 61.006 and 51.133 of the Rules and Regula-
tions of the Chicago Fire Department and his suspension
under those sections without a hearing and opportunity to
defend is unconstitutional and void; a preliminary and per-
manent injunction against the enforcement of §§61.001,
51.133 and, as applied in this matter, 461.006, of the Rules
and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department, and for
back pay for the period of Plaintiff’s suspension. The al-
legations of that Complaint are incorporated herein by
reference and made a part hereof.
2. That Defendant has not yet filed his Answer to said
Complaint but that, nevertheless, the material allegations
of that Complaint are true, and Plaintiff will be able to
substantiate the same by sufficient and competent evidence.
3. That the suspension of Plaintiff is causing him im-
mediate and irreparable injury by depriving him of his em-
ployment and the earnings used to sustain himself and his
—18—
family, stigmatizing him in his career, and jeopardizing
his future ability to earn a living as a fire fighter, and if an
injunction would be entered as prayed for in the Com-
plaint only after notice upon Defendant and a hearing,
Plaintiff will suffer continuing immediate and irreparable
injury.
4. That if a temporary restraining order would be en-
tered, Defendant would not be harmed thereby. .
Wherefore, Plaintiff requests that a temporary restrain-
ing order be entered, without bond, restraining Defendant
and any of his agents, employees, officers, lawyers, repre-
sentatives and services, from suspension of Plaintiff under
the provisions of §61.001 and §51.133, and, insofar as re-
lated to orders issued under the aforementioned, §61.006 of
the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department
and from taking any disciplinary action against him, pend-
ing further order by this Court; and for such other and
further relief as this Court may deem just.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robert 8. Sugarman
/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Counsel for Plaintiff
State Of Illinois
County Of Cook—ss.
AFFIDAVIT
Affiant Francis Museare, being first duly sworn on oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1. He has been a member of the Chicago Fire Depart-
ment since 1955, currently holding the rank of Lieutenant.
9. He has worn a small mustache, a short goatee, and
hair trimmed to medium length, as he presently appears,
since October, 1973.
—_——
ee
nine Aa LO AAR 1 ONE PEE cD ot ET RMN oe
Pet? Ae apitee bt ee at
4 —_ ee ae —
—19—
3. In December, 1973, his superior officer, Chief Mor-
gan, instructed him to shave his goatee off and, when he
declined to do so, was shortly thereafter informed that
charges had been filed against him with the administration
of the Chicago Fire Department.
4. On February 27, 1974, while he was performing his
duties as a fire fighter, Second Deputy Lattice, Third Divi-
sion Fire Marshall Callahan and Third Battalion Chief
Swoboda of the Chicago Fire Department ordered him to
turn in his fire equipment and leave the fire station where
he was on duty, »ecause he was being suspended from duty
as a fire fighter, effective immediately.
5. On March 4, 1974, he received a letter signed by
Walter R. Braun, Chief of Personnel, informing him that
he was being suspended from duty until March 28, 1974
for alleged violation of §§61.001, 61.006 and 51.133 of the
Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department. A
copy of said letter is hereto attached as Exhibit “A” and
made a part hereof. Copies of §61.001, §61.006 and §51.133
of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Depart-
ment are hereto attached as Exhibits “B”, “C,” and “D,”
respectively and made a part hereof. |
6. Affiant was afforded no hearing or opportunity to
defend himself before his suspension.
7. Affiant is currently being deprived of the earnings
use to sustain himself and his family, the opportunity to
perform ‘his duties as a fire fighter with the Chicago Fire
Department, and present and future ability to pursue his
chosen career.
8. This action by the Defendant suspending Affiant from
his position as a fire fighter with the Chicago Fire Depart-
ment is causing Affiant to suffer, and will continue to cause
immediate, irreparable injury to the Affiant.
Further Affiant Sayeth Not.
/s/_ Francis Muscare
— =
EXHIBIT “A”
(Letterhead Of)
Chicago Fire Department
FIRE ACADEMY
February 28, 1974
Lieutenant Frank Muscare
4059 West Barry
Chicago, Illinois 60641
Subject: Suspension
Sir:
You are hereby notified that you have been, or will be,
removed from the payroll of the Chicago Fire Department
for violations of the Rules and Regulations, Practices and
Procedures of the Chicago Fire Department.
Recommended Duration of Suspension: twenty-nine (29)
days.
Dates of suspension:
From: 0800 February 27, 1974
To: 0800 March 28, 1974
You are accused of violations of the following sections
of the rules:
Sections: 61.001-61.006 and 51.133
1. You will report to the Personnel Department on March
27, 1974 to pick up your badge and other City property as-
signed to you, and to receive further orders.
2. This suspension does not preclude the filing of these
charges against you by the Civil Service Commission. Un-
less previously notified you will contact the Chief of Per-
IEE GU cnnccsnstieciincnsinasiceinntniniiinibiiie to find out the disposition
of your case.
By order of
/s/ Walter R. Braun
Chief of Personnel
ec: 3rd Division Marshal
a
EXHIBITS “B” AND “C”
Part VI.
OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES IN
RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
OF THE CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT
Members or other employees who shall be found guilty
of infractions of any of the Rules and Regulations, Prac-
tices and Procedures of the Fire Department, shall be sub-
ject to the penalties hereinafter enumerated.
OFFENSES
Section 61.000
Section 61.001. Conduct unbecoming a member or em-
ployee of the Chicago Fire Department.
Section 61.002. Intoxication.
Section 61.003. Keeping or drinking intoxicating liquors
in or about premises of the Fire Department.
Section 61.004. Entering any tavern or bar while on
duty, or in uniform, except in the performance of assigned
duty.
Section 61.005. Neglect of duty.
Section 61.006. Disobedience of orders.
Section 61.007. Inattention to duty.
Section 61.008. Immoral conduct.
Section 61.009. Making a false official report.
Section 61.010. Reporting for duty while incapable of
performing duties without a proper medical reason.
Section 61.011. Absence from duty without permission.
Section 61.012. Leaving a post of duty without being
properly relieved or without proper authorization.
Section 61.013. Violation of any law or ordinance.
Section 61.014. Insubordination or disrespect toward a
superior officer.
Section 61.015. Using coarse, profane or insolent lan-
guage or showing disrespect to, or willful maltreatment to-
ward any member of the department or any other person.
=
EXHIBIT “D”
Section 51.131. Use of Vending Machines in Fire Sta-
tions. The vending machines, dispensing soft drinks and
candy, located in fire stations are for the use of Fire De-
partment personnel only. Under no circumstances will other
persons be allowed to use the facilities or products dis-
pensed by these vending machines. Cigarette vending ma-
chines are not permitted in fire stations.
Section 51.132. Time Off Due to a Death in the Family.
Time off duty (one work day off) may be granted to all
members of the Chicago Fire Department when a death
occurs in the immediate family of the member. Immediate
family is defined as consisting of mother, father, husband,
wife, brother, or sister (including step or half) son or
davghter (including step or half) father-in-law, mother-in-
law, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, grand parents and grand-
children.
When someone in the “immediate family” dies, the mem-
ber will notify his immediate superior officer by telephone
and give all the pertinent information. The superior officer
will then relay the information through the chain of com-
mand so that sufficient manpower can be maintained.
Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance. All mem-
bers of the Chicago Fire Department shall present a clean
and proper appearance in personal care and attire at all
times. The face shall be clean-shaven, except that a non-
eccentric mustache is permissible. Mustaches shall not ex-
tend beyond a line perpendicular to the corner of the mouth
and the full upper lip must be readily visible.
Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower
than a line from the middle of the ear.
Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the
hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and slope to
the back of the neck. It will be gradually tapered overall, in
order to present a neat appearance.
rf
—23—
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I, Linda R. Hirshman, one of the attorneys for Plaintiff
Francis Muscare, Do Hereby Certify that on March 11,
1974, I attempted to give notice of this motion for a tem-
porary restraining order to the named Defendant by tele-
phoning him and the Corporation Counsel of the City of
Chicago personally at their official places of business and
' - @dvising them of the filing of this motion.
/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Counsel for Plaintiff
In Tue Unitep States Districr Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
(Filed March 11, 1974)
1.
FACTS
Plaintiff in this action, Francis Muscare, has been a fire
fighter with the Chicago Fire Department since 1955. On
February 27, 1974, while Plaintiff was performing his
duties as a fire fighter at his fire station, three of his su-
perior officers, Second Deputy Lattice, Third Division Fire
Marshall Callahan, and Third Battalion Chief Swoboda,
presented themselves at Plaintiff’s station and informed
him that he was being suspended as of that moment, to
turn in his equipment and identification. On Monday, March
4, 1974, Lieutenant Muscare received a letter signed by
Walter R. Braun, Chief of Personnel, informing him that
—_— =
he was being suspended for a period of twenty-nine days
from February 27, 1974, for alleged violations of §$61.001,
61.006 and 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department.
Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cage Fire Department provides:
Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance.
All members of the Chicago Fire Department shall pre-
sent a clean and proper appearance in personal care
and attire at all times. The face shall be clean-shaven,
except that a non-eccentric mustache is permissible.
Mustaches shall not extend beyond a line perpendicular
to the corner of the mouth and the full upper lip must
be readily visible.
Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower
than a line from the middle of the ear.
Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the
hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and
slope to the back of the neck. It will be gradually
tapered overall in order to present a neat appearance.
Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department creates the offense of “conduct un-
becoming a member or employee of the Chicago Fire De-
partment” and Section 61.006 of the Rules and Regulations
of the Chicago Fire Department « eates the offense of
“disobedience of orders.”
Since October, 1973, Lt. Muscare has worn a small mus-
tache and a short, neatly-trimmed goatee. His hair is med-
ium in length. Plaintiff’s facial appearance and the length of
his hair has remained essentially the same from October,
1973 to the present. In December, 1973, one of Lt. Muscare’s
superior officers, Chief Morgan, informed him that he could
not work with a goatee and shortly thereafter, Morgan ad-
vised Plaintiff that charges had been filed against him.
However, it was not until February 27, 1974 that any fur-
ther action was taken against him.
- =
Lt. Museare was then suspended from duty without pay,
with the prospect of further disciplinary action if he did
not conform his personal appearance to the dictates of the
Chicago Fire Department.
Plaintiff has been and is continuing to be deprived of
his income, his chosen work, and his reputation as a fire
fighter by a summary procedure of the Chicago Fire De-
partment enforcing regulations which infringe upon his
Constitutional right to determine his personal appearance
as he chooses, and the suspension of Lt. Muscare can only
be conceived as an initial step in long-range disciplinary
measures aimed at forcing him to conform his appearance
to the dictates of the administration of the Chicago Fire
Department.
Il.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to redress the deprivation of
Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights protected by 42 U.S.C.
$1983, under 28 U.S.C. $1343 and 28 U.S.C. $2201, et seq.
The Court also has jurisdiction over actions arising di-
rectly under the United States Constitution itself. Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773 (1946).
ITI.
ARGUMENT
A. Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department is an Unconstitutional Depriva-
tion of Plaintiff’s Right to Determine His Personal
Appearance.
Plaintiff’s right to determine the details of his personal
appearance free from arbitrary governmental interference
is protected by the United States Constitution. The Fire
Department may not condition Plaintiff’s employment upon
—26—
the requirement that he yield up this right. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit specifically
set out the Constitutional pretections for the right to de-
termine one’s appearance, particularly with regard to length
of hair, in Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7 Cir. 1969) :
The right to wear one’s hair at any length or in any
desired manner is an ingredient of personal freedom
protected by the United States Constitution . . . wheth-
er this right is designated as within the ‘penumbras’
of the First Amendment freedom of speech, see Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14
L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), or as encompassed within the
Ninth Amendment as an ‘additional fundamental right
. . . which exists alongside those fundamental rights
specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional
Amendments” [cite Griswold], it clearly exists and is
applicable to the states through the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[419 F.2d at 1037].
In light of the Constitutional protections for this self-de-
termination, the Court of Appeals struck down as uncon-
stitutional a high school regulation prescribing the length
and appearance of hair for male students. Since the deci-
sion in Breen v. Kahl, both the Court of Appeals and the
District Court have consistently reiterated their commit-
ment to protect the right of the individual to decide what
the length and style of his hair will be. Arnold v. Car-
penter, 459 F.2d 939 (7 Cir. 1972), Crews v. Clones, 432
F.2d 1259 (7 Cir. 1970), Copeland v. Hawkins, 352 F.Supp.
1022 (E.D.IIL., 1973).
The Constitutional protection of freedom to determine
one’s personal appearance protects public employees from
the enforcement of officially imposed standards. Absent the
showing of a compelling governmental interest of the most
serious nature, public employers may not dictate to their
employees the way in which they must groom themselves:
Oe
~~ =
It is now clearly established that the State does not
possess an absolute right arbitrarily to refuse oppor-
tunities such as . . . employment in public service .. .
[Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d at 1263, supra].
This protection was specifically applied to a fireman in 1971,
in Hunt v. Board of Fire Commissioners of Massapequa
Fire District, 327 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup.Ct. 1971), where the
New York Court struck down a fireman’s suspension for
violation of a grooming regulation, holding:
“there is as a matter of substantive due process a con-
stitutional right to determine one’s own hair style and
... the burden is upon the Board to show substantial
justification for the regulation it seeks to impose.
[327 N.Y.S. at 45].
Similarly, in the case of Lindquist v. City of Coral
Gables, 323 F.Supp. 1161 (S.D.Fla. 1971), the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida ordered
the Coral Gables Fire Department to reinstate with back
pay a fireman who had been suspended for violation of
hair regulations substantially similar to the ones involved
in the case at hand. Recently, in Black v. Rizzo, 360 F.Supp.
648 (E.D. Pa. 1973) the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania reiterated a fireman’s right to de-
termine his personal appearance despite regulations al-
most identical to those of the Chicago Fire Department and
reinstated the fireman with back pay. The Pennsylvania
District Court, after a survey of_the substantial body of
law that has evolved around this subject, concluded that:
Among other things, the plaintiff has argued that his
interest in wearing his hair in a style, manner, and
length of his choosing constitutes a Constitutional right
implicitly protected by the “liberty” assurance of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
[cites] ... The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has
demonstrated the existence of such a constitutionally
protected interest.
[360 F.Supp. at 651).
—28
The Court in Black v. Rizzo definitively rejected the argu-
ment that interference with that right could be justi‘ed on
grounds of a fire department’s disciplinary interest in regu-
lating the activities of its members. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently ruled that
even the unique public function of a Department of Po-
lice does not justify the interference with a policeman’s
right to determine his personal appearance, specifically
with regard to the style of his hair. Dwen v. Barry, 483
F.2d 1126 (2 Cir. 1973).
Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department reveals its constitutional infirmity
on its face. Without setting forth any reason for the rule,
the Fire Department has simply created a requirement
that its members present a “proper appearance in per-
sonal care and attire.” The standards of §51.133, including,
for example, “non-eccentric mustaches” can only be based
on some administrative officer’s subjective aesthetic pref-
erence. This patent attempt to impose the personal pref-
erences of administration of the Chicago Fire Department
upon the members of the Department is a violation of the
members’ Constitutional rights and cannot be sustained.
Such official attempts to dictate the details of personal ap-
pearance have been prohibited again and again by the
United States District Courts and Courts of Appeals, in-
cluding the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. This
attempt once again to impose an official standard of ap-
pearance is directly counter to what is now a well-settled
body of case law. There can be no doubt that Plaintiff will
ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and the in-
jury he is now suffering for his exercise of his clear Con-
stitutional rights is illegal, irreparable and unjustifiable.
B. Continued Suspension of Plaintiff and the Likelihood
of Additional Action Against Him is Causing and Will
—29_—
Cause Additional Immediate, Irreparable Injury to
Plaintiff, and Restraint of Plaintiff's Suspension will
not Harm Defendant.
By action of the Chicago Fire Department on February
27, 1974, Lt. Francis Muscare was summarily ordered off
the premises of his employment and suspended from ac-
tive service with the Chicago Fire Department. Under the
terms of his suspension, as described in the Fire Depart-
ment’s letter of February 28, 1974, Lt. Muscare can only
anticipate further disciplinary action being taken against
him if he continues to exercise his Constitutional rights in
violation of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire
Department dictating the details of his personal appear-
ance. By its action suspending Lt. Muscare, the Chicago
Fire Department has deprived and is continuing to de-
prive him of the earnings current!y used to support him-
self and his family, the opportunity to pursue his career
as a fire fighter, his reputation in the community, and his
prospects for future successful pursuit of his chosen
career. Plaintiff is thus suffering extensive, immediate,
ongoing, irreparable injury every day that he remains
excluded from the fulfillment of his chosen work, and he
has no reasonable anticipation that the penalties currently
being imposed upon him will be mitigated in the future un-
less he yields his Constitutional rights to the Fire Depart-
ment. Unless this Court acts to remedy Plaintiff’s position
immediately, he will be irreparably injured.
Lt. Muscare has been performing as a fire fighter with
his personal appearance essentially the same as it is at this
moment since at least October, 1973. Nothing in the Rules
and Regulations of the Chicago Fire 1’epartment indicates
that any harm would come tc the Department if he were
to continue to do so. By contrast to the injury which Lt.
Muscare has suffered and is continuing to suffer, his rein-
— =
statement as a fire fighter will not harm Defendant in any
substantial manner. Indeed, unless the Chicago Fire De-
partment is employing superfluous fire fighters, one must
assume that Lt. Muscare’s suspension for twenty-nine days,
if anything, actually harms the Fire Department by depriv-
ing them of a qualified and experienced fire fighter, for no
substantial reason. Since the Chicago Fire Department
had been aware of Lt. Muscare’s appearance since at least
last December, it is inconceivable that his appearance cre-
ated a crisis of such urgent nature to warrant action against
him without any of the Constitutionally required procedures
for action against him.
C. Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
cago Fire Department is Unconstitutionally Vague and
Overbroad. :
Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-
eago Fire Department creates an offense denominated
“Conduct unbecoming a member or employee of the Chi-
cago Fire Department.” This prohibition is so general as
to be incapable of a reasoned interpretation in advance of
its application. Further, the wide scope of activities which
may be interpreted as “conduct unbecoming” a fire fighter
encompasses both Constitutionally protected activities and
those which may be beyond such protections, and thus the
regulation contains the potential for infringement upon
Constitutional rights. Such sweeping regulations are a vio-
lation of Constitutional standards and must be replaced
by more narrowly drawn rules. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960).
Absent any definition of conduct unbecoming a member
of the Chicago Fire Department, §61.001 is simply what
the administrators of the Fire Department say it will be in
any given ease. The person unfortunate enough to come
31S
within the purview of this section cannot predict what his
offenses may be. Such a rule violates the very fundamentals
of due process of law and chills the exercise of Constitu-
tionally protected rights.
In Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7 Cir. 1969), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
ruled that a university could not undertake disciplinary
proceedings for violation of a rule proscribing “miscon-
duct” on the grounds that such proceedings were not based
on “standards of conduct expressed in reasonably clear and
narrow rules.” [418 F.2d at 167] The Court stated:
The use of ‘misconduct’ as a standard in imposing the
penalties threatened here must therefore fall for vague-
ness. The inadequacy of the rule is apparent on its face.
It contains no clues which could assist a student, an
administrator or a reviewing judge in determining
whether conduct not transgressing statutes is sus-
ceptible to punishment by the University as ‘miscon-
duct’.
Here, also the inadequacy of §61.001 is apparent on its
face. The impossibility of predicting what administrators
will determine to be “conduct unbecoming” is obvious. The
members and employees of the Chicago Fire Department
may not be forced to guess at what behavior will bring the
penalty of suspension or other discipline upon them any
more than any other citizen must be forced to guess at what
behavior will provoke the wrath of an unpredictable govern-
ment. The Constitutional infirmity of $61.001 is particu-
larly offensive because as in the instant case it can be
interpreted to prohibit conduct protected by the Constitu-
tion.
Even the military are restrained from ordering their in-
ternal affairs through means such as sweeping and vague
regulations. In Avrech v. Secretary of Navy, 477 F.2d 1237
(D.C. Cir. 1973), the United States Court of Appeals for
—32—
the District of Columbia Circuit struck down as unconstitu-
tional a conviction under Article 134 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice which provided:
All disorders and neglect to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the Armed Forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces, and
crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons sub-
ject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cog-
nizance of by a general, special, or summary court
martial, according to the nature and degree of the of-
fense and shall be punished at the discretion of that
court.
[477 F.2d 1237 at 1239].
See also: Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3 Cir. 1973). The
Court ruled that such a broad-brush prohibition fell far
short of the Constitutional requirements of fair warning
to the accused and an ascertainable standard for the judge.
Certainly, the Chicago Fire Department does not have a
freer hand in constructing its disciplinary system than the
United States Armed Forces. Section 61.001 of the Rules
and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department does not
approach the Constitutional requirements of due process
of law.
D. The Summary Suspension of Plaintiff Violates His
Constitutional Right to Due Process of Law.
The suspension of Lt. Muscare was carried out by means
of a verbal pronouncement from three of his superior of-
ficers in the Fire Department and a one-page letter from
the Chief of Personnel inferming him that he was “accused
of” violating certain sections of the Rules and Regulations
of the Chicago Fire Department. Plaintiff’s suspension be-
came effective immediately after the three superior of-
ficers entered his fire station on February 27, 1974. Plain-
tiff was afforded no opportunity to make a case on his own
—33—
behalf before the penalty of suspension was imposed upon
him.
It is well settled that the public employees have rights
in their employment which cannot be taken away without
procedural due process. Slochower v. Board of Higher Edu-
cation of the City of New York, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637
(1956). Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694
(1972).2 The protections of procedural due process apply
whether the penalty being imposed amounts to a perma-
nent discharge or a suspension from whatever public prop-
erty right is involved. Snead v. Department of Social Serv-
ices, City of New York, 355 F.Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
Soglin v. Kauffman, supra.
In Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515,
Counties of Cook and Will, and State of Illinois, 471 F. 2d
488 (7 Cir. 1973), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit set forth the procedure which must be
followed in order to afford a public employee elementary
due process:
We find that the resolution of these interests requires
that Plaintiff be given a notice of the charges against
him, notice of the evidence upon which the charges will
1 It is plain that this initial suspension is merely a prelude to
additional disciplinary action against Plaintiff unless he con-
forms to the administratior’. views of ‘‘proper personal appear-
ance.’’
2 The protections against be 1g deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of la. are so fundamental to the Amer-
ican system of ordered liberty that the requirements of elemen-
tary procedural due process has been imposed in cases involving
a wide range of interests including, for example, the right to a
hearing before consumer goods may be summarily repossessed,
Fuentes v. Schevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 8S. Ct. 1983 (1972) or welfare
benefits cut off, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011
(1970).
-
be based, a hearing before a tribunal possessing ap-
parent impartiality, and a chance to present witnesses
and confront adverse evidence at the hearing.
[471 F.2d 488 at 495].
Further, these procedures must be made available to the
government employee prior to the action against him. As
the United States Court of Claims pointed out in Ricucci
v. United States, 425 F.2d 1252, (Ct. Cl. 1970):
Few of them [government employees] earn more than
enough to pay their living expenses from month to
month, and when their salaries are cut off, they may be
in the same destitute circumstances as a welfare re-
cipient whose aid has been discontinued.
[425 F. 2d 1252 at 1256].
Just as a welfare recipient may not be cut off from the
basic necessities of life without a hearing prior to the ac-
tion, Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, or a citizen deprived of his
everyday consumer goods without judicial process, Fuentes
v. Schevin, supra, and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corpo-
ration, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969), this Court should
not permit a fire fighter with civil service status and twen-
ty years’ service with the Department to be summarily sus-
pended without prior opportunity to meet the charges
against him and present any kind of defense. Only the
most serious type of emergency would justify the procedure
used to suspend Lt. Muscare. The present case is hardly
such an instance, where the Fire Department utilized the
services of Lt. Muscare for a period of over two months
from the time he was initially reprimanded for wearing a
goatee. The manner in which Lt. Muscare was involuntarily
suspended from his employment only illustrates the abuses
which the right to due process is designed to avoid.
E. As Applied to Plaintiff in this Case, §61.006 of the
Rules and Reguletions of the Chicago Fire Department
is Unconstitutional.
=
Under §61.006, Plaintiff is being punished for failure to
obey orders which infringe upon his Constitutional rights
to personal freedom and due process of law. Just as the
Fire Department was exceeding its powers by ordering
Plaintiff to shave his goatee and thus forego his Consti-
tutional rights under $51.133 and §61.001, Rules and Regu-
lations, Chicago Fire Department, they cannot now punish
Plaintiff for failing to obey an unconstitutional order, ac-
complishing by indirection what they could not do directly.
The Court in Hunt v. Board of Fire Commissioners, supra,
drew this obvious conclusion from its ruling that the Fire
Department had no right to dictate its members’ appear-
ance:
It follows that John Hunt’s promise to obey the de-
partment rules must be read as requiring only that he
comply with rules not in violation of his constitutional
rights and not as a waiver of such rights.
[327 N.Y.S. 2nd 36 at 41}.
Or, as the Seventh Cirenit recently affirmed in C.O.P. v.
Conlisk, ...... F.2d ...... (7 Cir. 1973):
The district court held that Rules 2, 5, and 6 were un-
constitutional as applied in this case. We agree with
this determination. Rules 2, 5, and 6 were used only
in conjunction with Rule 51 in discharging the six po-
licemen. The underlying ‘violation’ in each case was the
exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination be-
fore the grand jury, which was prohibited by Rule 51.
Since we have found Rule 51 to be constitutionally in-
valid insofar as it denies the Fifth Amendment right
to a public employee where there is a possibility of
criminal prosecution, the use of Rules 2, 5, and 6 in
conjunction with Rule 51 in such a circumstance was
also invalid.
—36—
IV.
CONCLUSION
Since February 27, 1974, Lt. Francis Muscare, a fire
fighter who has devoted twenty years to the service of the
City of Chicago Fire Department, has been separated from
his employment, with accompanying loss of income, job op-
portunities, and reputation in the community. He has been
thus penalized for attempting to exercise his Constitutional
right to determine his personal appearance. The penalty of
suspension, with accompanying further penalties if Plain-
tiff does not forego his Constitutional rights, was imposed
upon him without even a semblance of the procedures re-
quired by due process of law. By virtue of his suspension
from the Chicago Fire Department, Plaintiff has been and
is continuing to be, subjected to irreparable injury. Plain-
tiff is thus being deprived of his Constitutional rights in
the most immediate, irreparable manner and for no justi-
fiable governmental reason. Only immediate action by this
Court can terminate the imposition of this injury on Plain-
tiff.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robert S. Sugarman
/s/ Linda R. Hirshman
Counsel for Plaintiff
In Tue Unitrep States Districr Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) ° *
Name of Presiding Judge, Honorable Frank J. McGarr
Cause No. 74C 656 Date Mar. 11, 1974
Title of Cause—Francis Muscare v. Robert J. Quinn, in-
dividually and as Commissioner, Chicago Fire Depart-
ment
- =
Brief Statement of Motion—Shall move the Court for a
temporary restraining order
Names and Addresses of moving counsel—Linda R. Hirsh-
man of Jacobs, Gore, Burns & Sugarman, 201 North
Wells, Suite 2122, Chicago, Illinois 60606
Representing—Plaintiff
Motion for a temporary restraining order is denied.
Cause continued to Mar. 19, 1974 at 2:00 P.M. for hear-
ing on preliminary injunction. McGarr, J.
In Tue Unitep States District Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *
APPEARANCE
(Filed March 19, 1974)
I enter my Appearance as Attorney for said Robert J.
Quinn.
Dated: 2-19, 1974
/s/ Richard L. Curry
Corporation Counsel
City Of Chicago
/s/ R.L. Curry by
/s/ Philip M. Sheridan
Asst. Corp. Counsel
In Tue Unitep States District Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *
MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO THE
GRANTING OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
(Filed March 19, 1974)
Now comes the Detendant, Robert J. Quinn, Commis-
sioner, Chicago Fire Department, by his attorney, Richard
—38—
L. Curry, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, and
moves this Honorable Court to deny plaintiff’s prayer for
a Preliminary Injunction and in support thereof states as
follows:
1. The plaintiff has failed to show that without such
relief he would be irreparably damaged. The so-called ir-
reparable injury that is alleged by plaintiff amounts to no
more than the suspension on his record and loss of salary
incurred as the result of the 29 day suspension. Even if
this Court were to find that he had been illegally “in-
jured”, nevertheless, such injury is not irreparable. Eco-
nomic injury, loss of income or employment does not en-
title an individual to injunctive relief. The plaintiff is not
injured in any manner that could not be readily rectified
if he is successful on the merits. For reasons that the de-
fendant will show at this hearing, the defendant submits
that it would not be in the public interest to issue a Pre-
iiminary Injunction.
The burden is clearly upon the parties requesting tem-
porary or preliminary injunctive relief to demonstrate that
they are entitled to such relief. Crowther v. Seaborg, (CA
10th, 1969) 415 F.2d 437; Weber v. Continental Motors
Corp., (S.D.N.Y. 1969) 365 F.Supp. 404. It is also settled
that the granting of a temporary or preliminary injunc-
tion is a matter of Judicial discretion. The propriety of its
issuance depends on the circumstances of a particular case.
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 316 U.S. 4 (1942). Courts consider the effect
their actions might have on the public interest prior to is-
suing injunctive relief, see Yakus v. U. S., 321 U.S. 414;
Snively Groves v. Florida Citrus Commission, D. C. Fla.
1938, 23 F.Supp. 600.
—59—
2. There has been no prima facie showing by the plain-
tiff of reasonable probability that he will prevail on the
merits of the case.
It would appear the Federal Courts in the various cir-
cuits are divided about equally with respect to the consti-
tutional right of a student to choose the length of his hair.
See footnote 5 in Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th
Cir. 1972) cited by plaintiff and New Rider v. Board of
Education of Indiana School District No. 1, Okl., 480 F.2d
693 (10th Cir. 1973). These student-hair cases are not, how-
ever, controlling in the case before this Court.
The salient issue before this Honorable Court is wheth-
er or not the Chicago Fire Department was justified in
suspending plaintiff, a Lieutenant in the Chicago Fire De-
partment, because of his refusal to shave off his beard.
The factual situation in the case at bar is very similar to
that presented in the case of Yarbrough v. City of Jack-
son, 363 F.Supp. 1176 (M.D. Fla. 1973). The Fire Depart-
ment in that city had a grooming regulation with respect
to the prohibition of beards and limitations with respect
to the type of mustaches and length of hair that could be
worn by firemen similar to Section 51.133 of the Rules and
Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department. The plain-
tiff therein was discharged from his employment for re-
fusing to obey an order by a Fire Chief to trim his hair.
The plaintiff therein filed suit alleging an illegal infringe-
ment upon the constitutionally protected rights of free-
dom of expression of firemen.
The Court granted judgment to the City of Jackson for
two reasons. The first reason was that the Court was
unwilling to interfere with the reasonable conclusions of
the responsible officers in the Fire Department that there
was a rational relationship between longer hair and per-
—_— =
sonal safety of its firemen (longer hair more prone to
catch on fire, interference with seal of gus mask). The sec-
ond basis fcr the decision of the Court was its “firm con-
viction that it is not the function of the judiciary to inter-
fere with a fire chief’s reasonable notion as to what is
necessary to maintain discipline within a ‘quasi military’
organization for which he is responsible and which is dedi-
cated to the protection of the public and its property” (p.
1179). With respect to the second basis of its decision the
Court noted it was following the case of Stradley v. Ander-
son, 478 F. 2d 188 (8th Cir. 1973), rather than the case
of Owen v. Barry, 483 F. 2d 1126 (2nd Cir. 1973), because
it felt “there is a rational relationship between discipline
among firefighters and public safety and that it is not the
province of this Court to dictate its own philosophy as to
the best method to promote discipline” (p. 1181).
The recent Illinois ease of Hordorwich v. Board of Po-
lice and Fire Commissioners of Melrose Park, ...... Ill. App.
Re sein (No. 58652—Copy of Opinion attached), sustained
the discharge of a fireman who refused to follow a hair
regulation and refused a direct order to obtain a haircut.
After noting that the evidence substantiated that sideburns
interfered with the use of a smoke mask the Court stated
—‘Personal rights must be reasonably limited when the
safety of firemen and others is involved.”
On January 4, 1974, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
sustained in an Abstract Opinion (64 N.J. 142) the deci-
sion of the Superior Court of New Jersey in the case of
Manco v. Town of Irvington, 126 N.J. Super. 148 (1973).
The fireman therein had been suspended for violating a
directive of his department requiring him to have short
hair and a clean face so that a good face seal could be
obtained on face masks used in fighting fires.
= =
The defendant respectfully submits that the defendant
acted properly and was justified in suspending the plain-
tiff for his having the beard and his refusal to obey a di-
rect order to shave off his beard.
3. Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the State Adminis-
trative and Judicial remedies available to him. Slayton v.
Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971), Seetion 10-1-18 of Chapter 24
of the Illinois Revised Statutes, 1971, provides no civil
service employee shall be suspended for over 30 days ex-
cept for cause upon written charges and after an oppor-
tunity to be heard in his own defense by the Civil Service
Commission. This Section also grants those in charge with
the administration of a department the power to suspend
an employee for 30 days or less and grants to said em-
ployee the right to have a hearing before the Civil Service
Commission concerning the propriety of that suspension if
said suspension was for more than 5 days or incurred
within 6 months of a previous suspension regardless of
the length of said suspension.
In Elko v. McCarey, 315 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
the Court refused to proceed on a case where a fireman was
suspended for violating a hair regulation and allegedly
threatened with additional disciplinary sanctions because
the Court felt that there was no immediate irreparable in-
jury that could not be redressed by the utilization of avail-
able administrative remedies and judicial review provided
for by city civil service regulations. The factual situations
before the Court would appear to be substantially the same.
Wherefore, the Defendant, Robert J. Quinn, Individually
and as Commissioner, Chicago Fire Department, prays that
this Honorable Court deny the request for a Preliminary
—42—
Injunction and for such other relief as this Honorable Court
may deem meet and just.
Richard L. Curry, Corporation Counsel
of the City of Chicago,
Attorney for Defendant,
Robert J. Quinn, Individually and as
. Commissioner, Chicago Fire Depart-
ment,
By: /s/ Philip M. Sheridan
Assistant Corporation Counsel
State Of Illinois
County Of Cook—ss
AFFIDAVIT
Philip M. Sheridan, being first duly sworn on oath, de-
poses and says that he is an Assistant Corporation Counsel
and in said capacity has been assigned to this cause; that
he has read the foregoing Motion by him subscribed and
that the same is believed to be well founded and that any
facts contained therein are correct and true to the best of
his knowledge and belief.
/s/ Philip M. Sheridan
Assistant Corporation Counsel
Subscribed And Sworn To
Before Me This 19th Day
Of March, A.D., 1974.
/s/ Barbara E. Hanses
Notary Public
(Seal)
— =
58652
Peter Hordorwich, 7
Appeal From
Plaintiff-Appellant,
— Circuit Court,
= . Cook County.
Board Of Police And Fire Commis- Hon.
sioners Of Melrose Park, et al., Edward F. Healy,
Presiding.
Defendants-Appellees. )
Mr. Justice Dieringer delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Circuit
Court of Cook County sustaining the plaintiff’s discharge
by the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the Vil-
lage of Melrose Park.
The issues presented on appeal are (1) whether the find-
ings and decision of the Board of Police and Fire Commis-
sioners of Melrose Park were based upon cause and sup-
ported by substantial evidence; (2) whether the Board’s
denial of plaintiff’s motion for continuance constituted
prejudicial error and deprived the plaintiff of a fair hear-
ing; and (3) whether the findings of the Board were ade-
quate to support the decision of the Board.
The plaintiff, Peter Hordorwich, became a fireman for
the Village of Melrose Park in 1967. On March 15, 1971,
Fire Chief Anthony Zito posted a General Order which
directed all Melrose Park firemen to be clean shaven and
to have their hair cut in conformity with an attached draw-
ing of a human head. In December, 1971, Chief Zito sus-
pended the plaintiff from duty for his failure to comply
with the General Order and insubordination in disobeying
a direct order to obtain a haircut. Chief Zito also filed
charges with the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners
of the Village of Melrose Park asking for plaintiff’s dis-
_
charge. A hearing on the charges was held on January 21,
1972. At the hearing counsel for plaintiff requested a
continuance for the reason that he was not yet adequately
prepared for trial. The motion was denied by the Board.
On February 28, 1972, the Board found that cause existed
for the discharge of the plaintiff from his position as fire-
man in that he “was not clean shaven nor did he have a
length of hair so as to be able to perform all of his duties
required as a fireman... [and in that he was] ... guilty
of insubordination in that on December 21, 1971, he did
violate a direct order of the Chief of the Fire Department
of the Village of Melrose Park to get a hair cut that would
place him within the purview of the General Order of March
15, 1971,” and he was thereupon discharged. He filed suit
in the Cireuit Court of Cook County and on November 17,
1972, a hearing was held on the plaintiff’s amended com-
plaint in administrative review. At the close of the hearing
the court sustained and affirmed the Board’s decision to
discharge the plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s first contention is the findings and deci-
sion of the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of
Melrose Park were neither based upon cause nor supported
by substantial evidence. The plaintiff argues the Board’s
finding plaintiff was “unfit for duty by reason of his long
hair” was insufficient. He relies on the decision in Gigger
v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, (1960) 23 Ill.
App. 2d 433, wherein the Appellate Court held it is im-
perative the record of an administrative hearing show that
an impartial inquiry into the facts was conducted.
We believe the findings and decision of the Board of
Police and Fire Commissioners were based upon cause and
supported by substantial evidence. The scope of review of
the final decision of an administrator agency is well set-
tled and succinctly stated in Davern v. Civil Service Com-
mission of the City of Chicago, (1970) 47 Ill. 2d 469, where-
in the Supreme Court stated:
—45—
“The Administrative Review Act provides that agency
findings on questions of fact are ‘prima facie true and
correct’ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, Ch. 110, par. 274.) We
have construed this provision to limit the function of
the reviewing court to ascertaining whether the find-
ings and decisions of the administrative agency are
against the manifest weight of the evidence .... The
courts will not reweigh the evidence, but are limited to
a determination whether the final decision of the ad-
ministrative agency is just and reasonable in light of
the evidence presented.”
In the case at bar the Chief of the Melrose Park Fire De-
partment promulgated a General Order which directed all
firemen to be clean shaven and to have their hair cut in
accordance with an attached drawing of a human head.
Failure to comply with the order would result in disci-
plinary action. Evidence submitted at the hearing before
the Board established that inordinate growth of hair and
sideburns could cause an inability to wear a smoke mask
required at certain types of fires and would be detrimental
to a fireman’s safety and the safety of others. It was fur-
ther established the plaintiff did not comply with the Gen-
eral Order and disobeyed the direct orders of his superior
to comply with said General Order. We conclude there-
fore, that the findings and decision of the Board were
based upon valid cause for removal of the plaintiff from
his duties and fully supported by the evidence.
The plaintiff's second contention is the denial of his
motion for continuance by the Board constituted preju-
dicial error and deprived plaintiff of a fair hearing. The
plaintiff bases his contention on the decision in Lindeen v.
Illinois State Police Merit Board, (1962) 25 Ill. 2d 349,
wherein the Supreme Court held the Board’s denial of a
motion for continuance deprived plaintiff Lindeen of a fair
trial.
—4G6—
We do not agree with the plaintiff’s contention. It is
well settled that the granting of a continuance is a matter
which rests in the sound discretion of an administrative
tribunal. (People ex rel. Egan v. Dunham, (1942) 314 II.
App. 110.) In the instant case, the plaintiff and his attor-
ney did not file a written motion for continuance prior to
the hearing but, rather, orally requested a continuance at
the hearing. Plaintiff’s counsel stated he was requesting a
continuance because he was not adequately prepared for
trial. At the hearing, however, counsel demonstrated he
was well versed in all facets of the circumstances giving
rise to plaintiff’s suspension and presented an admitted
expert in fire fighting devices. Under these circumstances
we couclude the Board did not breach its discretion in de-
nying plaintiff’s motion for continuance.
Plaintiff’s final contention is the findings of the Board
were inadequate to support its decision to discharge the
plaintiff. The plaintiff argues he was not insubordinate
and the order issued by Chief Zito to get a haircut could
not reasonably be construed as an order which the plaintiff
had to obey. In support of his contention the plaintiff re.
lies primarily on the decision in Lindquist v. City of Coral
Gables, (1971) 323 F. Supp. 1161, wherein the District
Court of Florida held a hair regulation was invalid as the
City had shown no relationship between sideburns and in-
terference with the proper functioning of the fire depart-
ment.
We believe the findings of the Board were adequate to
support its decision. A review of the record indicates the
plaintiff violated a General Order promulgated as a safety
measure to firemen as well as victims of fires. Furthermore,
the plaintiff violated a direct order of the Fire Chief to
obtain a haircut. Such insubordination cannot be condoned.
Rules designed for purposes of safety and efficiency must
— =
be followed. What if a fireman refused to wear his uni-
form, or boots, or fire hat, or ride the firetruck to the scene
of a fire, insisting upon doing as he pleased? Such results
could be chaotic and disastrous. Personal rights must be
reasonably limited when the safety of firemen and others
is involved.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County is affirmed.
; Affirmed.
Adesko, P.J., and Burman, J., concur.
In Tue Unritep States District Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * °
SUMMONS
(Filed March 19, 1974)
To the above named Defendant:
You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon
Linda R. Hirshman of Jacobs, Gore, Burns & Sugarman,
plaintiff’s attorney, whose address is 201 North Welis
Street, Suite 2122, Chicago, Illinois 60606 an answer to
the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within
20 days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive
of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by
default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in the complaint.
/s/ H. Stuart Cunningham
Clerk of Court.
/s/ Dan H. Stevenson
Deputy Clerk.
[Seal of Court]
Date: March 11, 1974
Note :—-This summons is issued pursuant to Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(U. S. Marshal’s Service showing date of service as 3-13-75)
1
4G...
In Tue Unitep Srares District Court
* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
had in the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable
Frank J. McGarr, one of the Judges of said Court, in
his courtroom in the United States Courthouse, Chi-
cago, Lllinois, on Tuesday, March 19, 1974, at the hour
of 2:00 o’clock p.m.
Present:
Messrs. Jacobs, Gore, Burns & Sugarman
(201 North Wells Street, Suite 2122,
Chicago, Illinois, 60606), by
Mr. Charles Orlove and
Mrs. Linda Hirshman,
appeared on behalf of the plaintiff;
Mr. Richard L. Curry,
Corporation Counsel,
City of Chicago
(City Hall, 5th Floor,
Chicago, Illinois, 60602), by
Mr. Philip M. Sheridan,
Assistant Corporation Counsel,
appeared on behalf of the defendant.
The Clerk: 74 C 656, Francis Muscare versus Rob-
ert J. Quinn, et cetera, hearing on preliminary injunc-
tion.
Mr. Orlove: Good afternoon, your Honor. Charles
Orlove and Linda Hirshman appearing for the plain-
tiff.
I see some—whom I think to be, perhaps, officials
from the Fire Department.
The Court: Who is the attorney for the defendant
in this case?
Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, is this Muscare?
The Court: Yes.
=
Mr. Sheridan: Iam, your Honor. My name is Philip
M. Sheridan. I am an Assistant Corporation Counsel,
your Honor.
The Court: All right, Mr. Sheridan, I will give you
a minute to put your coat down.
Mr. Sheridan: Thank you, sir.
The Court: There has been no appearance filed for
the defendant. I assume you intend to do that, Counsel?
Mr. Sheridan: Yes, I would like to file an appear-
ance, your Honor.
I would also ask leave, your Honor, to file a motion
in opposition to the granting of a preliminary injunc-
tion.
The Court: Well, the case is set this afternoon, as
I recall, for hearing on a preliminary injunction. And
I intend to go forward with that.
Mr. Sheridan: Yes, I understand, your Honor.
The Court: You may file your motion, however,
and I will look at it.
Mr. Sheridan: I understand, your Honor.
The Court: And, perhaps, if it becomes appro-
priate, you can argue whatever basis you have for it.
But in the meantime, and I assume, Counsel, you will
file an appearance some time soon.
Mr. Sheridan: Before I leave the court, your Honor.
The Court: I will count on that.
In the meantime, I have set the matter today for
a hearing on such evidence as the plaintiff cares to
produce for a preliminary injunction. And I am ready
to co forward on that, if you are, Counsel?
Mr. Orlove: Fine, we are ready, your Honor, ex-
cept that, of course, the Court knows we have just
received a copy of this motion, we haven’t seen it be-
fore this minute.
—50—
Also, I would point out to the Court that we have
on file our complaint and the motion for a temporary
restraining order. The complaint is verified by the
plaintiff. And the motion for a restraining order is
also supported by an affidavit.
The Court: Those things are deemed—let’s assume
that the motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction is consolidated for all purposes.
Any evidence or argument made in support of one will
automatically be considered in support of the other.
Your affidavit, therefore, stands in support of the
motion for preliminary injunction and anything else
you have filed.
So that, I think, the spirit of the rules is that when-
ever possible we consolidate .the two. If you are en
titled to a T.R.O., you are probably entitled to a prelim-
inary injunction. Let’s assume we are going forward
for a hearing on the preliminary injunction issue. Any-
thing of record and anything mentioned earlier in the
case is relevant and will be considered.
Do you want to rely on your affidavit or do you have
additional evidence?
Mr. Orlove: We can rely upon that affidavit, your
Honor, as evidence in support of our case in chief.
The Court: And the affidavit contains pictures of
the plaintiff. So to the extent that we have to see the
dimensions of his beard, we have that in the record.
Are you prepared to argue the matter, assuming
this closes the evidence, Counsel?
Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I would like an op-
portunity to present evidence.—
The Court: Fine.
Mr. Sheridan: —if I may?
aliens
The Court: All right. I assume that the plaintiff
rests on the pleadings and the affidavit, is that correct?
Mr. Orlove: Yes, that is correct, your Honor. And,
of course, we have an opportunity for rebuttal.
The Court: The defense may put in evidence. And
you, certainly, have rebuttal opportunity, if it becomes
appropriate.
Go ahead, Counsel.
Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I have various wit-
nesses that will testify. Can I ask that they all be sworn
at the same time?
(Witnesses sworn.)
LEONARD JOHNSON, called as a witness on behalf of
the defendant, having been first duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
Direct Examination by Mr. Sheridan.
The Court: State your name, sir?
The Witness: My name is Leonard Johnson.
The Court: Your address, Mr. Johnson?
The Witness: 5747 West 64th Street.
The Court: Your business or occupation?
The Witness: I’m a drill instructor at the Chicago
Fire Academy.
The Court: All right. Go ahead, Counsel.
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. Mr. Johnson, can you tell us what subjects you
teach at the Fire Academy, please?
A. I teach the self-contained breathing apparatus,
manufactured by M.S.A. Company.
Q. During the course of the middle part of Feb-
ruary, did Lt. Muscare happen to be a student in one
of your classes?
<_<
A. Yes, sir, he was.
Q. Now, when students appear for the purpose of
taking the instruction with respect to this self-con-
tained breathing apparatus, how long is instruction
given; how many days?
A. Two days.
Q. Calling your attention to the first day that Lt.
Muscare was present there—
The Court: Let me interrupt for a moment. Let’s
get the plaintiff’s name straight. That is Muscare,
M-u-s-c-a-r-e, Muscare..
Mr. Sheridan: Thank you; your Honor.
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. On the first day that Lt. Muscare appeared for
the lessons, who did he appear with?
A. He appeared with Hook and Ladder Company
10.
Q. Is he in charge of Hook and Ladder Company
10, or the senior officer there?
A. Yes, sir, that particular shift.
Q. Now, during the course of your instruction, did
you have occasion to lecture the students or inform
the students, in any manner, with respect to the policy
of the Fire Department regarding facial hair?
A. Yes, sir, we do.
Mr. Orlove: I would object, vour Honor, to the
leading nature of the question, unless this is prelim-
inary—
The Court: I assume we are getting through pre-
liminaries here. The objection is overruled. Go ahead.
Ry Mr. Sheridan:
Q. Will you tell the Court, what, if anything, you
stated on the first day the students were present with
respect to that subject matter?
-_—
A. When I got to the wearing of the face-piece,
I explained the importance of a tight face seal and
about the objection of facial hair, whether it be beards,
sideburns or moustaches.
Q. At the time you did that, what, if anything,
happened?
A. A remark was made.
Q. And who made the remark?
A. Lt. Muscare.
Q. Will you tell the Court what, if anything, Lt.
Muscare stated?
A. Lt. Muscare said, “Boston and New York have
men with long hair, beards, moustaches, and they are
not concerned about it.”
Q. Now, in the conducting of these classes, is it
customary for students to speak out in such a man-
ner?
Mr. Orlove: Objection.
The Witness: No, sir, it is not.
The Court: The objection is sustained. I will dis-
regard it. Go ahead.
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. Did you have occasion to have the students, on
that day, put on the self-contained breathing appara-
tus?
A. Yes, sir, every member of the company puts the
apparatus on.
Q. Now, are you able to tell, when the apparatus
is charged, whether or not that person is getting a
good facial fit? =
A. Only when they test the seal of the face mask.
Q. Do you have to have the machine charged?
A. Yes, sir, you do.
—j4—
Q. Now, do all the students, on the Jirst day, charge
their machines?
A. All but one, sir.
Q. Who was that one?
A. Lt. Muscare.
Q. Now, recalling—
The Court: Would you stop for a moment and ex-
9 plain that a little bit to me? Would you tell me, Mr.
Johnson, what do you mean by “charging”?
~The Witness: Your Honor, by charging the appara-
tus, you open up the cylinder valve and your regulator
valve on the apparatus, which allows the air, the high
pressure air, into the regulator, through the regulator
up into the face piece, so you get your air.
The Court: Are you able. to tell, by watching a
student do this, whether there is a facial seal, whether
there is a tight seal?
The Witness: Yes, sir, I can.
The Court: When you said that Lt. Museare did
not charge his, what do you mean; it didn’t charge
or he didn’t do it?
The Witness: He didn’t do it, no, sir.
The Court: All right. Go ahead.
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. Now, on the second day of class, did you have
occasion to show them any slides?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And on the slides—during the course of watch-
ing the slides, is there any voice mechanism operating
at the same time?
A. Yes, sir, there is a tape recording.
10 Q. Now, at any place during the operation of that
type, is any reference made to the subject matter of
facial hair and the wearing of the mask?
11
—55—
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And basically can you tell us what the state-
ment states? ;
Mr. Orlove: Objection, your Honor. That would not
be the best evidence of that.
The Court: Well, I assume that Mr. Johnson is
reporting something that is part of the instructional
material in the class.
Is that right?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: This instructional slides and tape that
you are talking about?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. The objection is overruled.
What does the tape recording say about facial hair?
The Witness: The tape recording says that side-
burns, moustaches and beards will not permit a good
fit.
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. Now, at the time the voice on the tape was
making the statement, did Lt. Musecare make any state-
ments?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Can you tell us, if anything, he stated?
A. He said, “New York and Boston have long hair
and they are not concerned with the problem of tight
face seals.” |
Q. Now, following the—at any time that day, did
any of the students again don these machines?
A. You mean the second day, sir?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir, on the second day every man put the
apparatus on.
12
—$6—
Q. And what did they ao?
A. They walked to the 5th floor with the apparatus
on, to get an actual effect of wearing the apparatus
while they are exerting themselves.
Q. Now, approximately how many men were in Lt.
Muscare’s company at this time, taking these instruc-
tions?
A. I believe there were five, sir.
Q. And did Lt. Muscare—did he also participate
by putting the machine on—turning it on and use
it while it was operating, walk these five flights of
stairs?
A. No, sir, he did not.
Q. Did he put the machine on at all that day?
A. No, sir. .
Q. Did you subsequently have a conversation with
any one regarding the attendance of Lt. Muscare in
your class?
A. T talked to Chief Prohaska.
Mr. Sheridan: Will you please mark this as De-
fendant’s Exhibit No. 1 for identification.
(The document was thereupon marked Defend-
ant’s Exhibit No. 1 for identification, 3/19/74.)
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. I would like to show you what has been hereto-
fore marked as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1 for iden-
tification; and ask you if you recognize that document?
A. Yes, sir, I do.
Q. And what do you use that document for, if any-
thing?
Mr. Orlove: Objection, your Honor.
The Court: Let me—before I rule on that objection,
tell me briefly what it is, sir?
By Mr. Sheridan:
13
14
—o7—
Q. Can you tell us briefly what that exhibit is?
A. This is a fire officer’s guide for—prepared by
the National Fire Prevention Association, on breathing
apparatus for the fire service.
The Court: All right. Now the next question is,
what use do you put that to—or does the Fire De-
partment put that to, if you know.
I will assume there is an objection to that.
Mr. Orlove: Your Honor, if the Court please, there
is. I would object to the use of that document without
any proper foundation being laid for its credibility,
validity.
The Court: Until we get an answer to this question,
as to whether it is used, I don’t think we can get into
that. The objection is overruled.
You may answer. What use is that put to in the
Chicago Fire Department?
The Witness: It covers—
The Court: Well, how do you use it, if you use it
at all?
The Witness: I use the information in here as far
as maintenance of the breathing equipment and how
a breathing apparatus is tested and also respiratory
hazards in general.
The Court: Do you use it as part of your teach-
ing? Do you use it instructing your students?
The Witness: Yes, sir, I do.
The Court: All right. You may cross examine on
its authenticity and its source, Counsel, but over ob-
jection, I will allow those answers to stand.
Go ahead.
Mr. Orlove: Do you wish me to examine now?
The Court: No, I don’t mean now. I mean whenever
cross examination is appropriate.
15
salliien
Mr. Sheridan: I have no further questions, your
Honor.
The Court: To enlighten me on the contents of that
manual, may I glance at that, please?
Mr. Sheridan: Perhaps, I should ask him another
question, your Honor.
The Court: Ask him what section is relevant to this
problem.
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. With resnect to the subject matter under con-
sideration by the Court, do you use that book in any
fashion?
A. Yes, siz, I do.
Q. Can you point out the page you are referring
to?
A. On Page 2.
Mr. Sheridan: Would you like me to—
The Court: May I see Page 2, then we will show
it to opposing counsel.
You are referring to the portion marked out in
yellow?
The Witness: On the left-hand page, Judge, your
Honor, and on the—
The Court: All right. At the bottom of Page 2,
Counsel, there is a section here called, “Beards, mous-
taches and sideburns”, and it continues over to the top
of Page 3. I have read it and you may wish to use it
for cross examination.
Mr. Orlove: Yes. May I see it, your Honor?
The Court: Yes.
Any further questions, Counsel?
Mr. Sheridan: No, I do not, your Honor.
16
= =
Cross Examination by Mr. Orlove.
Q. Is it Officer Johnson?
A. Fireman.
Q. What rank do you hold with the Fire Depart-
ment?
A. I’m a Firefighter, First Class.
Q. How long have you held that rank?
A. Nineteen and a half years.
Q. And your present position with the Fire Depart-
ment is an instructor, is that correct?
A. That is correct, sir.
Q. How long have you held that position?
A. Approximately five months.
Q. What subjects do you give instruction on?
A. On the self-contained breathing apparatus.
Q. That is the only subject that you are involved
with?
A. Yes, sir, that’s the only one.
Q. And the text book that you looked at, and that
you have identified, is this your only source materia]
with respect to self-contained breathing apparatus?
A. No, sir, I have other material.
Q. Do you recall the day or days that Lt. Muscare
was at the Academy for instruction?
A. Not the exact days, it was some time in Feb-
ruary.
Q. Was it one or more than one day?
A. More than one day.
Q. To your knowledge, Mr. Johnson—strike that.
When—I believe you started giving instruction on
self-contained breathing apparatus—can I call those
masks?
A. Yes, you can.
17
—_§p—
Q. You started giving instructions on mask five
months ago, is that correct?
A. That’s right, sir.
Q. Is that the first time the Fire Department had
any instruction on self-contained breathing apparatus?
4. No, sir, it isn’t.
Q. What material were you given when you were
assigned that job of giving the instruction on the
masks ?
A. I was given a mask program outline, a bulletin
put out by the American Standard—National Stand-
ards Institute, other reprints of bulletins of findings
of masks, And I also have the training book from the
International Fire Chiefs Training School. I believe it
is called “Ifsta”, I’m not sure if I got the right desig-
nation of it or not.
Q. Were instructions being given on masks before
you started five months ago?
A. Yes, sir, they were.
Q. Masks aren’t generally used by all levels of the
Department, are they?
A. What do you mean by all levels of the Depart-
ment, sir?
Q. Well, all units in the Fire Department, do they
all use masks?
A. Yes, sir, they do.
Q. Are you saying everyone is assigned to masks?
A. No, sir, I did not say that.
Q. All right. Which units are assigned to —
Or which units have masks assigned to them?
A. The flying manpower squads, trucks, hook and
ladder companies, engines.
Q. Are you saying that ali hook and ladder com-
panies are assigned masks?
18
19
— oe
No, sir.
Which hook and ladder companies are?
Offhand, I can’t tell you that.
But you know that all of them are not?
That is correct.
Now, you said that when you gave your talk
to the—to that particular company, you were talking
about an objection to facial hair?
A. Yes, sir, I was.
Q. With respect to the mask?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you included in that long siceburns, mous-
taches and beards?
A. And beards, yes, sir.
Q. Aren’t you aware that the Fire Department per-
mits the wearing of moustaches to a certain extent?
A. Yes, sir, to a certain extent.
Q. But you are telling the men, during this instruc-
tion, that moustaches should not be worn when wear-
ing face masks, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. How many men have you given instruction to,
approximately, within the last six weeks?
A. Approximately over 100.
Q. And isn’t it correct that some of those men, aside
from Lt. Muscare, have appeared with moustaches?
A. Yes, they have.
Q. And this is the speech though that you regularly
give to all your groups, that moustaches are not to be
worn in connection with wearing self-contained breath-
ing apparatus, is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
OPoOoror
20
—$2—
Q. You gave some testimony about the machine
being charged, and I must confess, I don’t quite under-
stand it. What do you mean by “machine”?
A. The apparatus.
Q. What does the apparatus consist of?
A. It consists of your air cylinder, your face piece
and breathing tube, your harness, which the tank is
mounted to, which in turn is put on your back to carry
the apparatus.
Q. You also said something about machines being
charged, what do you mean by “charged”?
A. Activated so that you can use it.
Q. Have you heard of a product called M.S.A.
masks?
A. Yes, I have. ;
Q. Do you know what those are?
A. Yes, sir, I do.
Q. Would you tell the Court, please?
A. M.S.A. mask is a thirty-minute compressed air
mask, used for the protection of firemen or industrial
respiratory systems.
Q. And that is a self-contained breathing appara-
tus, is that correct?
A. That is right, sir.
Q. Tn other words, the air from tanks that are worn
by the individual is used for that individual to breathe,
is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that is the kind of mask that some of the
units on the Fire Department—in the Fire Department
use?
A. Yes.
Q. How long have those masks been used, if you
know, by the Chicago Fire Department?
—63—
I do not know how long, no.
Do you really know if they are used at all?
Yes, sir, they are used.
Some units use them, is that correct?
Some units use them, yes, sir.
And you don’t know which units do and which
units do not?
A. There are some hook and ladder companies,
there are engine companies and the flying squad com-
panies have them.
Q. And some hook and ladder companies do not
use M.S.A. masks, is that correct?
A. The reason they don’t use them, they are not
issued to them as yet.
Q. I see. Well, the fact is that some units do not
use—some hook and ladder trucks do not have any
masks issued to them as of this time, is that correct?
A. I won’t say any masks, they have masks, but it’s
not the M.S.A. mask.
Q. Can you testify—and do you know of your own
knowledge that every hook and ladder truck has some
kind of inask equipment assigned to it? We want your
knowledge.
A. As far as to my knowledge, the hook and ladder
companies do have some type of breathing apparatus.
Q. Now, when you use the word “charging”, do you
mean that somebody actually puts on the equipment
and sees if the air goes—the self-contained air goes
into the mask?
A. That is right, sir.
Q. Isn’t there another way of testing the mask or
an additional way of testing a mask?
OrOorop
22
=
A. Not to my knowledge, it has to be put on to—
it has to be put on the person that is going to wear it,
in order to test it.
Q. Isn’t it correct that a mask can be put on with-
out the tanks and tested by hold the tube—by holding
your hand over the tube?
A. Yes, you can do that.
Q. In fact, isn’t that what is recommended for the
proper use of the mask?
A. That is correct.
Q. Do you tell your men that when you given them
these instructions?
A. No, what I do is go through the procedure of
putting the apparatus to work, I do not mention the
fact that you can put the face piece on and kink the
hose to test it for a seal, because we are going through
the process of putting the apparatus on to work with
it when we are going through the instructions.
Q. Isee. If I understand your testimony then cor-
rectly, you are concerned only with giving the men in-
struction in the total use of the mask, how to put the
tanks on, how to connect the tubes and how to wear
the mask on their faces, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And your instruction does not include any tests
that should be made by the man each individual time
they wear the mask?
A. Yes, sir, there is individual tests that they have
to make. They have to test the regulator of it.
Q. What is the regulator?
A. That is the heart of the apparatus, which reduces
the high pressure air coming from the cylinder into
the regulator, reduces it to a breathable pressure and
also supplies the air to the wearer as he demands it.
— =
Q. I see. You say that is the most important part
23 of the whole apparatus?
A. That is right, without that you can’t operate.
Q. So if those tanks are working properly, and the
pressure is breathing properly, then it can be oper-
ated, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. During your instruction to the men, do you also
have them actually put the mask on, on their faces and
test to see whether it is air-tight?
A. Yes, sir, I do.
Q. And will you describe for the Court, how one
would properly test to see if the seal is air-tight?
A. When the face piece is put on the face, there are
five straps, head straps that you must adjust for
tightness, starting at the bottom and then the temple
straps and the top one, if necessary. After that, you
either kink your breathing tube or put your hand over
the bottom and inhale to see if you have a proper seal
on the face piece. If you have a proper seal, the face
piece will collapse; if not, you will detect leaks around
the edge of the face piece.
Q. Or there can be a leak in the tube, isn’t that cor-
rect?
A. That is correct.
Q. In fact, if you kink the tube or squeeze the tube
with your hand, you wouldn’t really be testing it prop-
erly, would you?
A. Well, if you have a kink up close to the face
piece and your leak was down here, you wouldn’t detect
that.
Q. But what if a leak occurred in the tube at the
point where it was being kinked, then that wouldn’t
indicate—that wouldn’t be a proper test, would it?
25
- =
A. I don’t follow you, sir.
Q. Well, if one were to kink the tube—that is grasp
it in a fist—
A. Yes.
Q. —even at the bottom of the tube, and use that
to test the mask, that test would not indicate any leak
that might occur where the fist is holding the tube,
isn’t that correct?
A. It could be, yes.»
Q. Right?
A. Yes.
Q. So the only way to test it is by holding the bot-
tom of the tube with your hand?
A. Not necessarily. Like I say, you can’t kink the
tube. :
Q. You just told us if you did kink the tube that
might not indicate a leak that occurred where you were
kinking the tube.
A. If you had that particular leak right on that
kink where you had it grabbed.
Q. Well, are you suggesting to the men that you
are training that they should kink the tube like that?
A. Yes, sir, I am.
Q. Even though there may be a leak at the point
where they are grasping it with their fist?
A. If there is a leak, it will be discovered, because
when the apparatus is used and they return back to
quarters that apparatus is given a test.
Q. When is the apparatus used?
A. It’s used to perform a rescue, to shut off elec-
trical appliances, gas supply lines, locating the seat of
the fire and also for ventilation.
Q. Well, let me ask you this, Mr. Johnson, if one
were to kink the tube as you suggest and there were,
26
= =
in fact, a leak there, but it could not be detected by
its fist kinking the tube that is—wouldn’t that be dan-
gerous to send that man into a smoke-filled room?
The Court: Counsel, it might be, but I don’t see
how it is relevant to the issues here. It seems that
tightness around the face is the only thing we care
about. And if the tube has holes in it that is a problem
for the Fire Department. I just don’t see where you
are heading with that.
Mr. Orlove: Your Honor, it goes, I think, to the
ability of this witness to speak authoritatively with
respect to the mask.
The Court: All right. We have established that the
way he tests and recommends the test by kinking the
tube, if that has deficiencies, you have established that.
So let’s go on to something else.
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. When you are at your instruction do the men
test the masks themselves?
A. Yes, they do.
Q. So one checks the other to determine if the face
seal is correct?
A. No, the man puts the apparatus on himself in-
dividually.
Q. I see.
A. And he goes through the test himself.
Q. I see. And then the man—each man determines
for himself whether he has attained a good facial seal,
is that correct?
A. Right, yes.
Q. Now, you testified that Lt. Muscare made some
remarks about men in Boston and men in New York
having beards; what was your response to that?
~~
A. Well, I said, “I don’t care what they do in New
York or Boston, I am concerned with the men here.”
And I also went and got an article for him to look
at, but he showed very little interest in it, in regard
to facial seal.
Q. Directing your attention particularly to the
event when Mr.—or Lt. Muscare was at the Fire Aca-
demy, did you testify that he did not put the mask on?
A. I did.
Q. How many men were present at that time, when
the mask was being tested?
Mr. Sheridan: Could I make an objection, your
Honor? I think that the students were requested to put
the mask on on both days. And I think the question
might be—
The Court: I assume the same class both times.
And he did testify that there were about five men
in the class. |
If you want to pin it down further on either day,
go ahead.’
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. How many masks were available to the men at
the time they were putting them on?
A. On the first day of the class I have one mask
that I use for demonstration purposes.
Q. Did the men put masks on on that day?
A. Yes, they did.
. They put on that one mask?
A. That is right, they did. And the second day we
had two masks, and the reason I use the two masks is
because I want both companies to use the one mask
to lower the pressure in the cylinder, so that the audi-
alarm will ring so that they know what it sounds like.
—_$o
And it won’t be a strange feeling to them. But there
were two masks available. You see, the cylinder is
charged to 2,216 pound pressure per square inch and
with the two companies using one mask, you can lower
the pressure in the tanks quicker than you can if you
use two masks, so we use the one mask until the alarm
rings then we use the other mask.
Q. If I understand your testimony correctly, you
are using one mask to check the pressure situation
and you are using the other mask to try it on for
a face seal, is that what you are saying?
A. No, no, we use the one mask—put it in opera-
tion, so the men walk to the 5th floor of the drill
academy, walk up and walk back down. Then the com-
panies—each man on the company—on both companies
—I have two companies a day—each mar. puts it on
and walks up and down the stairs.
Q. You mean you have five men in each company,
is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you had two companies, then you had
ten men?
A. Yes.
Q. And you had either one or two masks and ten
men?
A. The second day I have two masks, right.
Q. Are you saying that the class—everyone in the
class waits while one man puts on the mask and walks
up to the—
A. No, we are discussing things.
Q. Iam asking you now about putting on the mask,
at what point in your instruction—
A. One man at a time walks to the 5th floor, and
we are in a group there discussing things, and maybe
—_70—
questions will come up that one of the men wants to
know something.
Q. You mean while one man is walking up to the
5th floor, the others remain with you in the discus-
sion?
A. That is correct.
Q. Now, these classes then, you have Firefighters
or Firemen First Class, and their lieutenant, is that
correct?
A. Yes, or it could be a captain.
Q. Or a captain?
A. Yes.
Q. And Muscare is a lieutenant, is that correct?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. And you look to him as an officer to assist you,
do you not—
A. Yes.
Q. —in drilling with the men—
A. Yes.
Q. —is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And in fact, Lt. Muscare did cooperate with you
and assist you in drilling the men, assigning them
whatever roles had to be assigned in the drill?
A. That is correct.
Q. He cooperated fully with you on that?
A. Yes, he cooperated fully.
Q. Sure.
I believe you testified, near the end of your exam-
ination on direct, that you said after Muscare’s com-
pany left, you reported something to someone.
A. I didn’t say I reported, I said I had a discus-
sion.
31
—_—,
With whom did you have a discussion?
Chief Prohaska.
And what is his position?
Chief Prohaska is the Drillmaster.
Well, you have discussions with him often, don’t
you, about the work going on in the academy?
A. Yes, sir, I do.
Q. Was Lt. Muscare the subject of that discussion?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. What did you say to Chief Prohaska?
A. I just mentioned about the beard that he had
on his face.
Q. Do you call what Lt. Muscare has on his face
a beard?
A. I call that a beard, yes, sir.
Q. Haven’t you heard the word “goatee”?
A. I am not a qualified barber or hairdresser, I
don’t know a goatee from a beard, sir.
Q. You termed what he has as a beard?
A. Yes, sir, I would term that as a beard.
Q. And you also term what he has on his upper
lip as a moustache?
A. From what I can see, I would say it is a mous-
tache.
Q. Did you tell Chief Prohaska that he has a mous-
tache?
A. No, I did not say he has a moustache.
(). What is it then that vou told Chief Prohaska
concerning Lt. Muscare?
A. The discussion was about his beard. Due to the
fact that he wears a beard, he wouldn’t get a good seal
on the face piece.
Q. You testified that he didn’t put on the face piece,
didn’t you?
OProreo
32
—72—
A. That is correct.
Q. So you don’t know whether he could get a good
seal or not, do you?
A. No, because I have no way of checking.
Q. So you don’t know if he could get a good seal
on that or not, isn’t that correct?
A. According to articles that I have read and tests
that have been performed, men with facial hair will
not get a good seal on their apparatus.
Q. Iam not asking you now about articles you have
read, I am asking you, is it not correct you have no
immediate knowledge of whether Lt. Muscare could
get a good seal or not? You did not see him put on
the mask, isn’t that correct?
A. That is right. ;
Mr. Sheridan: I will object to that question. I think
the witness has been asked and answered the question.
He basically stated that he never saw Lt. Muscare
with the mask on. Based on the articles he has read,
facial hair will interfere—
The Court: It has been asked and answered now.
The answer may stand. The objection is overruled.
I assume you are through v. th that particular ques-
tion, Counsel.
Mr. Orlove: That particular one, yes, your Honor.
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. Isn't it a fact, Officer Johnson, that there are
a number of factors that can affect a good facial seal?
A. That is correct.
Q. What are those factors?
A. Eyeglasses—
Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I will object to it as
being immaterial. The issue here is whether or not
~ =
facial hair—well, I just feel whatever else might affect
the seal seems to me to be not relevant, your Honor.
The Court: The objection is overruled. You may
answer.
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. What other factors affect the seal on a face
mask?
A. Eyeglasses, dentures, oddly shaped faces, or if
a man had sores or boils along the face piece, he
couldn’t get a good seal there either.
Q. In fact, haven’t you learned from your reading
that turning the head affects the face seal?
A. Not if the face piece is secured, just by turning
your head, no.
Q. Haven’t you read that coughing or smiling af-
fects the face seal?
A. No, I have not.
Q. When you mentioned dentures, aren’t you really
saying that some people have their face structured
differently than others?
A. That is correct.
Q. There is a bone structure involved or a fatty
skin tissue involved, and those factors may affect the
seal?
A. Yes.
Q. And isn’t it true, you have seen men come be-
fore you who could not get a perfect seal, by reason
of a jutting jaw or some other characteristic other than
hair that prevented a good seal? Haven’t you seen
that?
A. The men I have seen have all got a good seal.
And I can tell it is a good seal, because when they
kink the tube or use the bottom of the tube, the face
35
= =
piece will collapse on their face and it will stay col-
lapsed as long as they hold it.
Q. And that includes men that have come before
you with moustaches, isn’t that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. They get a good seal?
A. That is correct.
Q. So then the articles you have read about face
hair affecting the seal aren’t wholly correct, as far
as the moustache is concerned; you know that from
your own observation, don’t you? Isn’t that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. So you know that from your own immediate ob-
servation at your academy, some of the books you have
read are inaccurate when they say that somebody with
a moustache can’t get a good seal?
Mr. Sheridan: Well, I will object, your Honor, the
question has been asked and answered.
The Court: The objection is sustained.
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. Mr. Johnson—-or Officer Johnson, isn’t it cor-
rect you have also had firemen come to you for in-
struction with, what one might term as sideburns, long
sideburns, down to the middle or the bottom of the
ears?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And isn’t it correct that you have seen these
men put on the mask and obtain a good seal, even
though they have sideburns, as what you consider long,
to the bottom of their ear?
A. The Fire Department regulations say the side-
burns will be to the middle of the ear.
Q. All right. I didn’t ask you what the Fire De-
partment regulations said.
36
= =
A. Would you let me finish my answer? Do you
want an answer?
The Court: Just a moment, the answer was not
responsive. Restate the ,uestion.
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. Isn’t it correct that firemen have come to your
academy for instruction, having sideburns at the mid-
point in the ear or to the lower lobe of the ear?
A. Yes.
Q. Firemen have come to your academy in that
way?
A. Yes.
Q. And isn’t it correct that they have put on the
face mask, pursuant to your instructions, and have at-
tained a good seal?
A. As far as I know, I mean I can’t—I can’t say
definitely that it’s a good seal.
Q. You are there to determine whether they are
using the apparatus correctly, are you not?
A. That is correct.
Q. And wouldn’t that be vital to the use of the
apparatus to make sure that it is air-tight?
A. That is correct.
Q. So, I assume that you are checking the men that
you instruct?
A. I certainly am.
Q. To determine whether they are obtaining an air-
tight seal?
A. That I am.
Q. So that these men with moustaches and long side-
burns are achieving a good seal?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have seen that yourself?
37
- =
A. Ihave seen it, yes.
Q. In your reading, with respect to the face masks
or self-contained breathing apparatus, have you also
read that there is no such thing as a perfect, one-
hundred per cent seal?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. That in every case, even one who is clean-shaven,
there is an element of leakage, isn’t that correct?
A. From what I have read, yes.
Q. You know, as a firefighter of many years, that
a fireman cannot be clean-shaven immediately before
a run or a ¢all, don’t you?
A. That is correct. We start work at 8:00 o’clock
in the morning and we may get a run at 3:00 or 4:00
o’clock in the afternoon.
Q. And one may have a face stubble or some hair
stubble of a beard, right?
A. It could be.
Q. And I am sure the Fire Department doesn’t re-
quire their men to shave before they make the run,
right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Do you recall ever coming across an article or
reading an article from the Los Alamos Scientific Lab-
oratory, from the University of California, concern-
ing facial hair with the use of masks?
A. No, sir, I haven’t.
Q. Have you ever come across any articles, or this
one in particular, where you have read that small
moustaches and small Vandyke beards will probably
present no difficulty to a face mask?
A. No, sir, I haven’t.
Q. Mr. Witness, if I may show you the booklet or
the book that you identified in your examination.
39
= =
Mr. Orlove: And with the Court’s permission, if I
may read the first sentence?
The Court: Go ahead.
Mr. Orlove: I would like to read it in view of the
witness.
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. It says here, does it not, Mr. Johnson, that, “In
recent years, a number of court cases developed when
fire department personnel challenged orders requiring
them to be clean-shaven in order that they could wear
breathing apparatus face pieces safely.”
Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I will object to that
question. I think it is this Court’s function to deter-
mine what the law is.
The Court: Well, it is. I have already read that
section. I am aware that there is a division of author-
ity, but I don’t know that the witness’ conclusion on
the point would be helpful, Counsel.
Mr. Orlove: I will withdraw the question, your
Honor.
The Court: All right.
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. I assume, Officer Johnson, that you have had ac-
tual firefighting experience?
A. Yes, sir, I have.
Q. And have you ever operated under firefighting
—actual firefighting conditions with face masks and
breathing apparatus?
A. Yes, sir, I have.
Q. Then you know, do you not that before each in-
stance when a man would put on the equipment, it
should be tested each time, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
-_ =
Q. And that no man would go in and use that equip-
ment if there was any leakage, is that right?
A. Either leakage or a malfunction in the appara-
tus.
Q. Then one certainly would not use that equip-
ment, the Fire Department wouldn’t request them to
use that equipment?
A. That is right.
Mr. Orlove: Nothing further, at this time, your
Honor.
The Court: Any redirect, Counsel?
Mr. Sheridan: Just a few questions.
Redirect Examination by Mr. Sheridan.
Q. Mr. Johnson, look at Exhibit 2 for identifica-
tion; and I ask you if you recognize that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Tell us, briefly, what it is?
A. That is a tape recording that is played along
with the slide program.
Q. And in your testimony, you also mentioned some-
thing about some of the other information that you
read, was the American National Standards Institute
publications, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir. |
Q. I would like to show you what has been marked
as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 2; and ask you if you recog-
nize that document?
A. Yes, sir, I do.
Q. Is that the document you are referring to?
A. Yes, sir, this is the one I am referring to.
Mr. Orlove: I object to those, your Honor, being
offered at this time on redirect examination.
41
= =
The Court: I don’t know whether they have been
offered or not.
Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I would offer them.
The Court: Well, the recording, we have already
heard testimony as to what is on the tape, I don’t think
it adds anything to the evidence we have already heard.
What is the booklet or whatever the document was?
Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, the other document, I
will hand to the Court, your Honor.
The Court: Yes. All right. Over objection you may
introduce that document ai this time. Give it to coun-
sel, he may wish to cross examine further on it. And
I will allow him to do so.
Mr. Sheridan: I have no further questions.
The Court: The offer of this tape is refused. There
is a reference—
Mr. Orlove: I beg the Court’s pardon, I didn’t hear
the Court’s ruling.
The Court: I said, over objection that document
may be admitted. The tape is refused. And I call your
attention to Page 9, which has a crucial section here.
And I said you may cross examine additionally on
that, if you wish.
(Whereupon, the document previously marked
Defendant’s Exhibit No. 2, for identification, was
received in evidence.)
Mr. Orlove: I might say, your Honor, perhaps, on
or off the record, we had no—of course, this is an
expedited proceeding, we had no indication what tack
the Government was going to take in its defense. So
if I could indulge the Court and ask for some time—
The Court: You may, Counsel, but I just saw it for
the first time—I think there is only two sentences in
onlin
there that are relevant to the issues here. And I am
sure you can glance at them and then cross examine
further, if you to, on them.
Mr. Orlove: Thank you, your Honor.
Just, perhaps, a few questions, your Honor.
If I understand the Court, this pamphlet is going
into evidence?
The Court: Yes, it is.
Recross Examination by Mr. Orlove.
Q. Officer Johnson, when did you first see the docu-
ment which is in evidence, as Defendant’s Exhibit
No. 2?
A. I saw that when I first started giving my in-
structions.
Q. When was that, sir?
A. Approximately five months ago.
Q. So that would be some time in November, is it,
or October?
A. Right, some time in November.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. I direct your attention to the inside page, which
indicates the date here of “Approved, January 8th”—
I’m sorry, I withdraw the question.
Having looked this over and I haven’t had time to
read the whole thing, can you tell us if, anywhere in
Defendant’s Exuibit 2, there is a definition of beard?
A. ‘There is no definition, no.
Q. And the document says, sideburns, unusual fa-
cial contours; is there any definition or description or
pictures in here of what is considered a beard?
A. No, sir, there isn’t.
—81—
Mr. Orlove: No further questions, your Honor.
The Court: Anything further from this witness?
Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, if I may make this
statement with respect to the City’s—Defendant’s Xx-
hibit 2. I have heard that—and my purpose in offer-
ing it was that when they speak of the—on that tape,
when they speak of —
Mr. Orlove: I object to the remarks as to what the
tape says. The tape is not in evidence.
The Court: Well, I don’t think it is important to
put it into evidence, Counsel. It has been refused and
44 I won’t reverse that ruliug.
Mr. Sheridan: Fine, your Honor.
The Court: 1 and 2 have been admitted.
Is there anything further.
Mr. Sheridan: Nothing further.
Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
The Court: You are excused, sir. Thank you.
(Witness excused.)
The Court: Call your next witness.
You recall, sir, that you were administered an oath
earlier?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: And your name, please?
The Witness: Al Lundin, A-l, L-u-n-d-i-n.
The Court: Your address, sir?
The Witness: 1345 Michelle.
The Court: Is that Chicago?
The Witness: Palatine.
The Court: And your business or occupation?
The Witness: I am District Sales Manager for Mine
Safety Appliances Company.
The Court: Go ahead, Counsel.
45
46
—82—
AL LUNDIN, called as a witness on behalf of the de-
fendant, having been previously duly sworn, was
examined and testified as follows:
Direct Examination by Mr. Sheridan.
Q. Can you tell the Court what Mine Safety Ap-
pliances Company is, please?
A. They are a manufacturer, located in Pittsburgh,
of devices for personal protective devices of various
kinds, such as hard hats, goggles, dust respirators, in-
struments for detecting toxicant materials.
Q. Now, does your company sell various self-con-
tained breathing apparatuses to any fire department?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And in this area, can you-tell us what depart-
ments or city agencies you sell these apparatuses to?
A. Yes, most of this is done through fire depart-
ment distributors, in some cases we do sell direct, but
generally through fire department distributors located
throughout the country.
Q. Does your company furnish the City of Chicago
Fire Department with any self-contained breathing ap-
paratus?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, in addition to being District Sales Man-
ager for Mine Safety Appliances, do you teach any
course with respect to the safety aspects of these safety
devices?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Can you tell us where you teach this course?
A. At the National Safety Council here in Chicago.
Q. Briefly, can you tell us what the National Safety
Council is?
47
—83—
A. This is probably the safety organization in the
country that coordinates record-keeping, dispenses in-
formation to—it has various sections, industrial sec-
tions, mining sections, chemical sections, home and
farm sections, agricultural sections.
Q. Can you tell us what subject you are associated
with with that institution?
A. All right. I teach basics of respiratory protec-
tion to the basics of industrial hygiene group to the
Council.
Q. And does your teaching in all encompass the
field of self-contained breathing apparatuses?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Can you tell us who attends these classes?
A. Generally safety directors, really from through-
out the world, but primarily from various companies
throughout the United States, major companies, as well
as small companies.
Q. Generally can you just tell us what fields are
encompassed when you conduct these classes?
A. A large part of the class is taken up with eur-
rent laws governing the selection and use of respiratory
devices. And then actual samples are on hand and we
discuss the three main basic types of respiratory de-
vices from the mechanical filter, sma!! mechanical filter
apparatus into a self contained breathing apparatus.
Q. Now, with respect to the law, is the Occupational
Safety and Health Act in any way involved?
A. Yes.
Mr. Orlove: Objection, your Honor.
The Court: What is the basis for the objection,
Counsel?
Mr. Orlove: Well, counsel seems to be eliciting tes-
timony now with respect to the witness’ legal conclu-
—34—
sions or conclusions as to the state of the law, which
is not appropriate.
The Court: Well, it isn’t, but maybe he knows more
about the Occupational Safety Act than we do. Let’s
hear him and we will decide, in any event.
Go ahead.
The Witness: What was the question?
Mr. Sheridan: You do, is that correct?
The Court: Is the Occupational Safety Act in any
way involved; and I think the answer was yes. Go on
from there.
The Witness: Yes, very much so. It is now the out-
growth of the William Steiger Act, which was intended
to add additional protection to the industrial—and I
believe—municipal worker in the United States. So it
became law on, I think, April of ’71, I believe, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. What standards are used? Do they refer to any
standards in that act?
A. Yes. As a matter of fact, the standards were set
up—the standards references within the act were set
up prior to the law coming into effect. So that the law,
for the most part, either references standards already
in existence—
Q. What standards would they be, can you tell us?
Mr. Orlove: Your Honor, again I would like to
object, for two reasons. Number one, when we are talk-
ing about standards set forth in an act, the act is
available for all of us to read, as lawyers and judges.
Number two, as I am listening to the testimony there
does not seem to be any connection made with respect
to the facts in this case.
49
=~ =
The Court: I don’t see it yet, either.
But I assume, Counsel, that you interd ultimately
to—well, there is no jury here—let’s discuss this?
Where are you heading with this, is there an incor-
poration of the National Safety Council standards into
the act; is that what you are leading to?
Mr. Sheridan: Well, it’s my understanding, your
Honor, that within the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, they encompass the standards of the American
National Standards Institute.
The Court: All right. Is this witness going to be
able to testify to your expectation that there is some
such standard that will apply precisely to this face
mask question? Is that what you expect now, I assume
that is where you are heading?
Mr. Sheridan: Well, it was my impression, your
Honor, that this in some regards was the American
National Standards Institute.
The Court: I see. All right, then over objection,
you may go ahead. This is leading up to some connec-
tion with your Exhibit 2, I assume?
Mr. Sheridan: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: All right. Go ahead.
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. Mr. Lundin, we’d appreciate it if you’d look at
Exhibit 2; and are those the standards you refer to,
with respect to the standards that were adopted or
referred to by OSHA?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, during the conducting of your classes, do
you have any occasion to discuss with them the ob-
taining of a facial seal on self-contained breathing
apparatuses?
51
—_96—
Mr. Orlove: Your Honor, again I object, because if
where it is taking us, we have no foundation of a con-
nection in this case that Chicago Fire Department of-
ficials or personnel are subject to or bound by Mr.
Lundin’s interpretation of OSHA or his lectures.
The Court: Let me ask, Mr. Lundin, whether you
are familiar with the self-contained breathing appara-
tus that is used by the Chicago Fire Department?
The Witness: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: Is it your company or your sales effort
that has had something to do with their buying this
equipment?
The Witness: No, these were sold through our dis-
tributor.
The Court: But you are familiar with the equip-
ment that they use and which has been the subject of
earlier testimony? I note that you were in the court-
room during the earlier testimony?
The Witness: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: Then with regard not to the general
face masks or anything of that sort, and limiting your
answers to this particular equipment used by the
Chicago Fire Department, with which you are familiar,
you can go ahead on that line.
Mr. Sheridan: Okay.
The Court: Let the record indicate that it is over
objection, so that counsel may make his record.
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. With respect to the self-contained breathing ap-
paratuses used by the Chicago Fire Department, can
you tell the Court what, if any, in your opinion, would
be the effect of facial hair on obtaining a facial seal?
Mr. Orlove: I object to an opinion by this individ-
ual, as not being qualified as an expert.
52
=
The Court: Over objection, you may answer. Go
ahead.
By the Witness:
A. Yes, I rather firmly take the stand that facial
hair, by law, by the ANSC standards, and from my
vwn observations would affect a facial seal.
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. Can you tell us in what manner it would affect
a facial seal?
A. It’s looked upon as a facial seal being the main
point that has to be obtained in any type of respiratory
device, whatever type it might be—and this is brought
out in, I guess, various studies that have been made—
without affecting this seal, you cannot only conceivably
affect the operation of the apparatus, but certainly
your breathing toxic materials or the possibility of
breathing of toxic materials through the face piece and
into the wearer.
Q. Now, if someone places an order with your com-
pany and obtains a certain type of self-contained
breathing apparatus, they come in standard sizes, is
that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And do these sizes fit all people?
A. We certainly intend that they should. There may
be—I think we say something on the order of ninety-
seven, ninety-eight per cent of all the people we expect
to fit them with, yes.
Q. Now, if one person were to be able to obtain
a seal with some facial hair, would that necessarily
mean that ail others would also?
A. No, this has to do with the facial—different facial
sizes and shapes and so forth. So that you can say
=~ =
that an individual who could form a seal, with the
variously shaped moustache or whatever, doesn’t mean
that that same size moustache or beard on another type
of face would affect a seal. And I have noticed a tre-
mendous variance, where you have a big, heavy-set
face versus the narrow smaller face, on the position-
ing of the face piece on the face. It makes a tremen-
dous difference.
Q. Would the presence of facial hair even if a per-
son—assume a person were to obtain a seal, would
the presence of facial hair in any way affect his ability
to maintain that seal?
A. Yes, I would say so.
Q. Why would you say so, sir?
A. Well, it’s bound to. As I mentioned before, it
is very difficult to form a seal to the face under the
best conditions, and facial hair of any type is going
to endanger that. And to the extent that, perhaps, you
can affect a seal, but the seal is not as strong. So that
as he would do various things during his operation,
this seal could be broken conceivable—or more easily
broken.
Q. Mr. Lundin, is it correct or incorrect that some-
times the only person who can tell if there is an effec-
tive seal would be the person wearing the mask?
A. That is correct.
Q. That is correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And approximately on the—or where does the
seal end, in relation to the neck, can you tell us that?
A. It is going to vary considerably with the facial
type of the individual.
—39—
54 QQ. Do you have any publication or sales brochure
59
which would indicate the type of mask worn by the
Chicago Fire Department?
A. Yes. There are three main types, all of them
within the Chicago Department; that is, different styles
of manufacture. This is the more recent one. And then
you have what you eall a clear-view.
Mr. Sheridan: Would you please mark this as De-
fendant’s Exhibit 4?
(The document was thereupon marked Defend-
ant’s Exhibit No. 4 for identification, 3/19/74.)
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. I would like to show you Exhibit 4, and that is
the publication of MSA that you were looking at, is
that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you identify for the Court, please, the pages
on which the mask that the Chicago Fire Department
has?
A. All right. That is on Page 24, is the Chicago
Fire Department mask. And you can get—did you want
these other face masks too?
Q. If you will just name a page and point out the
one that the Chicago Fire Department has?
A. Page 24, the Chicago Fire Department has.
Q. Now, you indicated—is that the exact—are there
any variations in the self-contained breathing ap-
paratus that the Chicago Fire Department has, opposed
to the photograph shown on Page 24 of this publica-
tion?
A. No.
Q. Are there any other pages where the Chicago
Fire Department has some of this equipment?
56
— =
A. Yes, I believe there are. Page 23, the Chemox
mask represents another type. However, the ones that
the Chicago Fire Department has do have different
face pieces than the one pictured.
Q. So you have indicated Pages 23 and 24; are
there any other masks that you know that the Chicago
Fire Department has?
A. I don’t believe so, you may have some of the
older styles of that shown on Page 24.
Q. Now, are the stylings of these masks changed
at various times through research and development
or one thing or another?
A. Yes, they are. More through changes in the laws,
or one thing or another.
Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, at this time, I would
like to offer this as an exhibit.
Mr. Orlove: I object, your Honor, because just a
picture of the mask, I don’t think it tells the Court
anything. There is really a serious question as to
whether this witness has any direct knowledge of what
the Chicago Fire Department has.
The Court: He has testified that he has.
So what it’s worth, it may be admitted, over objec-
tion.
Mr. Orlove: Did the Court say it will be received?
The Court: Yes, it may be admitted for whatever
it may be worth.
(The document previously marked Defendant’s
Exhibit No. 4 for identification was received in
evidence. )
The Court: It isn’t as good as a mask, but it is
better than nothing.
Go ahead, Counsel.
57
—
By Mr. Sheridan:
Q. Mr. Lundin, based upon the mask that the Chi-
cago Fire Department has in operation, do you have
an opinion whether or not the presence of a goatee—
such as worn by the plaintiff in this case—would ad-
versely affect—whether or not it would adversely affect
the obtaining and maintaining of a good facial seal on
a self-contained breathing apparatus?
Mr. Orlove: I object, your Honor.
The Court: Over objection, you may testify. Do
you have such an opinion?
The Witness: Yes.
The Court: And what is it?
The Witness: I would be very skeptical of it, yes,
of being able to maintain a good seal.
Mr. Sheridan: I have no further questions of the
witness?
The Court: Do you wish to cross examine, Coun-
sel?
Mr. Orlove: Yes, your Honor.
Cross Examination by Mr. Orlove.
Q. Is it correct, you do work for MSA Company?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And if I understand your testimony correct, you
do not sell masks directly to the Chicago Fire Depart-
ment?
A. No, we deal—we go through a distributor here.
@. And as far as you know, perhaps the Chicago
Fire Department buys from a distributor in Chicago
or elsewhere?
A. Right.
Q. And you don’t have that information?
08
59
=
A. No—well, at the time it occurs, it generally goes
out on a bid-type of thing, we are aware of this through
the distributor, we are aware of it.
Q. You are not certain what equipme: * they may
have from other sources?
What did he tell you about this case?
Very little, other than—in fact, I didn’t learn
of it until last evening, late yesterday afternoon. And
he asked if I would come in and stand by if asked to
submit testimony.
Q. Of course, you have never met Mr. Muscare or
Lt. Museare before?
A. No, sir.
Q. He is the man sitting at the counsel table.
A. Not to my knowledge, no.
Q. And, of course, you have never seen him put on
either your mask or other manufacturer’s equipment?
A. No, sir.
Q. Is that correct? ©
A. No, sir. That is right.
Q. Now, did I understand you correctly that you
said any hair of any type will affect the seal?
A. Ihave to be very suspicious of it. I would sus-
pect that it would affect the seal.
Q. Any facial hair?
A. Well, you are splitting hairs there. Pardon the
pun? —
Q. Pardon the pun?
A. Oh, no.
Q. Who asked you to testify today?
A. Chief Foley.
Q. Chief who?
A. Foley.
Q.
A.
—93—
A. Yes. Well, I have to be suspicious of it. Certain-
ly anything that is going to interrupt that seal is not
desirable. And now it becomes, I suppose, a matter of
degrees. So if I have to make a statement, and I do
have to make a statement, in schooling and so on, I try
to get rid of the idea that hair is not a good thing,
it interrupts and interferes with a good seal.
Q. You were in the courtroom, were you not, when
Officer Johnson testified as to instances he has per-
sonally seen where men with moustaches have tested
the equipment?
A. Yes.
Q. And they have attained a good seal?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that surprise you or shock you?
A. Oh, no, not at all.
Q. So then it is possible for facial—for one with
facial hair to attain a good seal?
A. Correct.
Q. In fact, isn’t it also possible that one with hair
on his chin, as opposed to a moustache, could also at-
tain a good seal?
Yes, it’s possible.
Doesn’t it depend on the face?
A great deal on the face.
The structure of the face, is that correct?
Well, that is one of the things, yes.
Or the size of the jaw, if one were to be wear-
ing hair on his jaw, isn’t that correct?
A. That is right, yes. That is one of the reasons
I have to be suspicious, because of the various sizes
of the face.
Orroroo,
61
—94—
Q. Well, being suspicious—and I suppose you mean
you are personally suspicious, your own idea that you
are suspicious?
A. Well, may I respond to that?
Q. Well, let me ask you a question first?
A. All right. Fine.
Q. While being suspicious, you recognize that there
is a possibility that one with a small goatee may still
attain a good seal?
A. Certainly.
Q. One with a moustache may attain a good seal?
A. Certainly may, yes, they may.
Q. Then, by looking at Lt. Muscare, as he is sitting
here, you can’t tell whether he could get a good seal
or not, can you? ,
A. No, this was my indication, I suspect: there would
be problems.
Q. But you don’t know?
A. No.
Q. Isn’t it a fact that every man who becomes fa-
miliar with the equipment of self-contained breathing
apparatus should determine for himself whether he
has a good seal?
A. Because of the nature of the test, he is really
the only one that can tell whether he has a good seal.
Q. Really, there is another reason too; isn’t it that
he is the man that is going to go into an adverse or
dangerous situation and risk his life with toxicity and
smoke inhalation?
A. Well, what he is doing—
Q. He is the one that has to secure in his own mind
that he can live with that mask on?
A. Well, he is checking out the apparatus and to be
sure that it is operating functionally and it is oper-
62
—95—
ating properly with the apparatus, or it is operating
properly on him, and this is the purpose of the test
that he is conducting.
Q. So if a man were to say to you, I have put on
the mask and I know how it works and I have a good
seal, you would be confident in that remark, wouldn’t
you?
A. Yes.
Q. You wouldn’t question the man, would you?
Mr. Sheridan: Well, I will object, your Honor,
whether he would question a hypothetical man under
a hypothetical situation.
The Court: Objection sustained. You made your
point.
Mr. Orlove: Your Honor, all of the direct exam-
ination has been hypothetical.
The Court: It’s true, but I don’t think it is rel-
evant whether an individual can get a good seal, no
matter how much facial hair he has. It is relevant
whether the Fire Department can reasonably prohibit
facial hair in the interest of getting a good seal. The
individual case is illustrative, but I think you have
gone as far with it as you can.
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. You are aware, are you not, that there are other
factors that can affect the seal, besides facial hair?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what are those?
A. I think Mr. Johnson spelled them out very well.
Eyeglass frames or temples, lack of dentures, possibly.
Q. Coughing?
A. No, as a matter of fact that doesn’t necessarily
interrupt the—affect the seal. During the tests required
—96—
63 by the Bureau of Mines, and now apparently NIAC,
this is one of the tests required to be passed on before
an apparatus can be certified or receive an approval
is to wear it into—you actually put individuals—there
is bench test, then they put individuals into an odor-
ant—a room full of odorants and they are required to
go through a number of actions, including chewing and
talking and various things. And should they detect any
odorant coming through, then that is an indication of,
perhaps, they better leave. So really this is one of the
things they want to watch for is that they can main-
tain a seal while an individual does normal things, such
as coughing and talking and so on.
Q. Haven’t you observed or read among various
studies some writers have given an opinion that a small
moustache and a small goatee probably will not affect
the seal?
A. I can’t say that I have read that, no. I have
read a number of—I try to read as much of the stuff
as I can, and do read a lot of it. I can’t specifically
recall having seen that. But certainly I have no reason
to doubt it.
Q. Pardon?
A. I have no reason to doubt it.
Q. I believe you said that there have been some
studies that indicate that perhaps the standard-sized
mask will not fit three per cent of the population; did
I understand that correctly?
A. Yes. I would hate to be held to that figure, but
it is certainly in that area.
Q. In those studies do they indicate what types or
what varieties there are that make up that three per
cent figure?
~ =
A. Not to my recollection, I don’t recall that spe-
cifically,
Q. Isn’t it correct that there is no such thing as
a perfect seal at all times, an absolute 100 per cent
seal?
. A. I understand that, yes, from personal observa-
tion, putting them on and where you go through the
operation that Mr. Johnson mentioned—which is ree-
ommended procedure—and when you inhale and hold
that tube, you can feel no leakage at all and you feel
the tube—the face piece extending, I feel that I can
hold it twenty-four hours, if I can hold my breath
that long, it feels like there is absolutely no leakage
at all and it is sucked tightly to the face, to me that
is a perfect seal. I understand then can hook up with
the equipment and detect in the parts-per-million range
for various odorants that are being introduced around
the face piece, I guess, and determine that in a parts-
per million range, they can pick up leakage inside this
face piece. And I have no reason, again, to doubt these
studies, I assume they are true. I am sure they are.
Q. Do you have any knowledge or recollection as
to when the City of Chicago purchased these masks
from your distributors?
A. Well, they have had masks of ours that go way
back, long before my time, here in the City of Chicago.
The most recent purchase was, I believe, this past fall,
I would say fall through winter.
Q. Fall through winter of 1973-74?
A. Yes, I am thinking—I don’t recall just exactly
when the purchase was, delivery was continuing, I
think the purchase was made last summer, I wouldn’t
swear to that.
—98—
Q. Has delivery been completed, to your knowl-
edge?
A. To my knowledge, it has.
Q. Do you know the quantity of that order?
A. I believe it was 150 apparatuses.
Q. 150 face—
A. Complete apparatus.
Q. There is more than 150 firemen in the Chicago
Fire Department, aren’t there?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Do you know anything about this particular pur-
chase, was it designed to equip every firefighter with
his own mask?
A. Ihave no idea.
Q. The most recent purchase was the 150 items?
A. Yes.
Mr. Orlove: No further cross examination.
The Court: Any redirect?
Redirect Examination by Mr. Sheridan.
Q. You indicated you were contacted yesterday
afternoon by the Fire Department, is that correct?
A. Right.
Q. Have you ever been contacted at any other time
recently with respect to a similar issue?
A. By the Fire Department?
Q. No, by anybody else other than the Fire Depart-
ment.
A. On similar mask problems?
Q. Similar circumstances, yes.
A. Just generally mask problems?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Just within the last three weeks, have you re-
ceived any phone calls from anyone?
—99—
A. Oh, yes, I did.
Q. Approximately how long ago was that?
A. A week ago, I would say.
Mr. Sheridan: I have no further questions, your
Honor.
67 Mr. Orlove: Nothing further.
The Court: You are excused. Thank you.
The Witness: Thank you, your Honor.
(Witness excused.)
Mr. Sheridan: I just have one last witness, your
Honor.
The Court: All right. Call him.
You have already taken an oath?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. And your name, please, sir?
The Witness: William F. Foley.
The Court: And your rank in the Fire Department?
The Witness: I am the Acting Chief Fire Mashal.
The Court: I assume that answers your business
or occupation.
Gio ahead, Counsel.
WILLIAM F. FOLEY, called as a witness on behalf
of the defendant, having been previously duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
Direct Examination by Mr. Sheridan.
Q. Chief Foley, did the Chicago Fire Department
recently obtain some additional self-contained breath-
ing apparatuses?
A. Yes, sir, they did. During the calendar year 1973
68 we purchased 150 complete units.
Q. And for the year 1974, do you have any idea
how much money has been budgeted to the Chicago
69
Fire Department for the purchase of additional self-
contained breathing apparatus?
A. For this year? No, sir, I couldn’t tell you the
dollar amount. We do have funds available for breath-
ing gear, yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what the amount was for 1973?
A. No, offhand, I couldn’t give you an exact dollar
amount, but the average price-per-unit is a little short
of $400. So you could multiply 400 by 150 and you
arrive at the budgeted figure. We did spend all of the
budgeted figure for the appropriation of gear.
Q. Now, with respect to the duties of a lieutenant
in the Fire Department, would such a person have as
much cause to use this apparatus as any other fire-
fighter within the Department assigned to a working
unit?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, with respect to the—the Chicago Fire De-
partment does not have enough “=ssks, colf contained
breathing apparatus for each fireman, does it?
A. That is correct. There was no intention ever to
do this.
Q. Can you tell the Court how the Fire Department
has distributed the self-contained breathing appara-
tuses that they do have?
A. We originally adopted a self-contain breathing
apparatus program back in 1958. At that time the
distribution of gear was two masks per hook and lad-
der company, five masks per squad company. Now,
over the years, we have developed a new mask, new
equipment and we have augmented this when we retired
some of the older masks. At the present time Inven-
tory Control assigns to each hook and ladder two self-
70
—101—
contained breathing gears. Now, I am not saying spe-
cifically the type in question here, but there are two
breathing gears assigned. Some trucks temporarily
may be out of masks, due to the fact that they are in
for repair and so forth and there is not enough back-
up to maintain the two-per-unit level.
In addition to this, we have equipped, at the present
time, some twenty-four companies, engine companies
with two masks apiece of the later design. Our inten-
tion is—in addition to this we have six flying squads—
seven flying squads, who carry six masks apiece. We
also are introducing one self-contained breathing gear
to each chief officer’s car, at the Battalion level. At the
present time, we only have three or four of these in
service.
Our ultimate aim, though, is complete coverage of
the job, pending acquisition of the proper amounts of
material.
Q. Chief Foley, with respect to the wearing of the
self-contained breathing apparatuses, what does the
Chicago Fire Department do with respect to facial
hair?
A. Well, we would like the men clean-shaven.
Mr. Orlove: I will object to the question, your Hon-
or, because we have—
The Court: We have the regulation before us and
I have read it and I know what it is. So if the witness
is going to repeat the regulation, it is unnecessary.
Of course, what they like is not too relevant either.
So I will sustain the objection.
Mr. Sheridan: I understand, your Honor.
I have no further questions, your Honor.
The Court: Any cross examination of Chief Foley?
71
—102—
Cross Examination by Mr. Orlove.
Q. Iam always worried about using the wrong title.
How shall I term you “Chief”?
A. Yes.
Q. Chief, you say currently there are supposed to
be two masks on each hook and ladder?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that is every single hook and ladder?
A. All hook and ladders are assigned two masks.
Q. Do you know that there are some hook and lad-
ders that don’t have masks at all?
I mentioned that before?
Yes, I think you said some are in for repair.
Right.
And repair might take months, doesn’t it?
Availability of parts and labor to repair them.
In fact, hasn’t it come to your attention that
some hook and ladder trucks never really got masks?
A. That is not true.
Q. How many men are assigned to a hook and lad-
der truck?
A. There is two different levels of manpower as-
signment, depending upon the area the truck is pro-
tecting. We have five-man companies and four-man
companies under the present manning levels dictated
us by outside consultants. The particular company in-
volved, is a five-man company.
Q. And you say the “particular company involved”,
the company—
A. Lt. Muscare’s company.
Q. The company in which Lt. Muscare works?
A. Yes, sir.
QPoreopr
72
—103—
Q. Is lieutenant the highest officer in the company?
A. No, sir, a captain.
Q. I see. What is the scope of Lt. Muscare’s—or
a lieutenant, but a lieutenant like Lt. Muscare—his
operation? ”
A. The lieutenant commands the company unit or
platoon on his platoon in the absence of the command-
ing officer, the captain.
Q. Is the hook and ladder—does the hook and lad-
der truck consist of the company itself?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So his company is a five-man company?
A. Five-man per shift, sir.
Q. I see.
A. Five men per shift. It is staffed on the basis of
providing five men each day, each working day on
that company, yes.
Q. And he is the chief official for that company on
that shift?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you use the number “five”, does that
include the lieutenant or exclude him?
A. No, that includes the lieutenant.
Q. So you have two masks designed for use by five
men in the company?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I take it by that, obviously, that not everybody
fighting a fire in the company is going to be required
to use a mask, they may be assigned other duties that
don’t require a mask, is that correct?
A. Yes, All members are required to be proficient
in the use of the mask.
Q. I understand, but—okay, I understand.
74
—104—
But a company might assign men to different areas
in fighting a fire?
A. Yes, sir. The company officer would give orders,
at his discretion, on the fire-ground problem.
Q. I didn’t hear the end of your answer, sir.
A. The commanding officer of the unit may give
various orders, depending upon the fire-ground prob-
lem.
Q. And is it correct, that usually the lieutenant is
in charge of that company and issuing orders to the
men to do one job or another?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Chief, when did the action that was taken with
respect to Lt. Muscare first come to your attention?
A. It came to my attention on the 21st of December.
The first time it was brought to my attention is when
I received messenger mail concerning this incident.
Q. Chief, do I understand your testimony correct-
ly, that since 1958 every hook and ladder truck has had
two masks assigned to it?
A. No, sir, I didn’t say that. I said starting in 58
we started the program for breathing gear and the
ultimate goal was two per truck. Eventually, this was
realized. Since that time, some of the gear has fallen
into disrepair and some trucks are short at this time.
But the overall administrative policy is two masks per
truck.
Q. And at what point in time did you realize the
goal of two gear—two masks per truck?
A. Well, I believe that back in the early ’60’s all
trucks had Chemox masks, which is another type of
breathing—it’s merely a trade name, but it is a self-
contained breathing apparatus.
Q. And are those now out of use, Chemox masks?
75
=x =
A. No, sir, they are not.
Q. They are also used?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Orlove: No further cross, your Honor.
The Court: Any redirect?
Mr. Sheridan: Briefly, your Honor.
Redirect Examination by Mr. Sheridan.
Q. Chief, did anything happen to you personally
after December 21st?
A. Yes, sir, Christmas night I was a victim of emer-
gency appendicitis operation.
Q. So you were incapacitated approximately when?
A. I came back to administrative duties on Feb-
ruary 10th or the 12th, I’m not sure without referring
to the records.
Q. And did you have any conversation with Chief
Prohaska on or about February 21st, 1974?
A. Yes, sir, I did. It was brought officially to my
attention by him.
Q. That is all. And Lt. Muscare, he is assigned to
a hook and ladder company, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, is it the policy of the Fire Department to
have—strike that.
Are the self-contained breathing apparatuses—are
they normally worn by the firemen at all fires or are
they just used in somewhat of an emergency or un-
usual circumstances?
A. No, generally they are at the direction of the
company officer.
Q. Under what circumstances would a company
officer order men or he himself put on the self-con-
tained breathing apparatus?
76
77
—106—
A. Well, rescue would be one condition under hos-
tile environment. Certainly I would use a mask in
irrascible type atmosphere, some of which would be
highly toxic, poisonous gas, for instance.
Q. And is there any policy of the Chicago Fire
Department to attempt to have some masks available
at any given type of fire?
A. No, there is not a set policy as to the number
of masks.
Q. But do certain number of vehicles respond to
certain types of fires?
A. Yes, sir. There is a predetermined response to
ordinary call for help, yes.
Q. Now, is there any policy in the Chicago Fire
Department with respect to taking into consideration
how many masks are on each vehicle—as to how many
masks they would hope to have at each type of fire,
depending on its size and nature?
A. Yes, sir. You mean our administrative goal to
try to reach the ultimate—
Q. Iam just saying at a certain type-size of a fire.—
A. Yes.
Q. —certain number of vehicies will respond to that
fire—
A. Right.
Q. —has the Chicago Fire Department given any
consideration with respect to the type of vehicles re-
sponding as to how many masks or self-contained
breathing apparatuses will be present at that fire?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are these masks generally located on the same
place of each vehicle?
A. It’s impossible to do, because the vehicles them-
selves—
73
—107—
Q. I am referring to same types of vehicles, say
hook and ladders?
A. I am also referring to them. All hook and lad-
ders are not the same. All engines are not the same.
Q. With respect to the style of the vehicles, is the
style the same generally or generally not?
A. We have tried to standardize as much as human-
ly possible.
Mr. Sheridan: I have no further questions, your
Honor.
Recross Examination by Mr. Orlove.
Q. Chief Foley, in this case we are concerned with
the suspension of Lt. Muscare, what officer—what is
the lowest rank officer in the Fire Department that
may suspend an employee of the Fire Department?
Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I will object to that.
I think that is covered by Section 10-1-18 of Chapter
24% of the Illinois Revised Statutes.
The Court: It is outside of the scope of the prior
examination. What do you have in mind, Counsel? I
don’t want to foreclose you on anything relevant. I
have the suspension before me, it’s Exhibit C, which
I think you attached to your complaint.
Mr. Orlove: Just the question that counsel raised
on redirect as to his unavailability during certain pe-
riods of time.
The Court: I didn’t understand the reason for thet
myself.
Mr. Orlove: I took it to be going to the allegations
in the complaint as to a conversation that occurred,
and, an allegation sworn to by affidavit, a conversation
occurred in December and the suspension taking place
later in February.
79
—108—
The Court: I see. All right, then go ahead into the
matter, if you wish.
Could someone else have signed the suspension order
or directed the suspension during your illness, some-
one else in the Department?
The Witness: Well, I am confused here, your Hon-
or. You are saying it was a conversation in Decem-
ber. There was not, not involving me.
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. I wasn’t directing that to you, Chief, but to the
Court.
I just wanted to ask you—you are Acting Chief Fire
Marshal, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, isn’t it true that subordinates of yours,
namely, a captain or battalion chief or division marshal
have authority within the Fire Department rules to
suspend an individual?
A. No, sir, they could file charges, the suspension
would rest in the Commissioner’s Office.
The Court: I assume that while you were home ill
that somebody else had authority to file—
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: —to order a suspension?
The Witness: There was another man that took my
place.
The Court: All right. Is there anything else, Coun-
sel?
The Witness: I follow the counsel’s line there. The
man that took my place, I don’t believe was aware of
this, because the mail went into my desk and this man
didn’t use my office. And I don’t feel he was really
aware of this paper that was in the process.
—109—
By Mr. Orlove:
Q. When you say “aware”, you mean aware of the
appearance of Lt. Muscare?
A. I don’t believe the man who took my place, Chief
Williams, even knew that there was charges preferred
or that there was anything at all in the mill on this.—
Q. Were there charges?
A. —due to the fact it came to me on a holiday
weekend, I put it in my office, I left it there. And the
24th was a holiday, I did not come back to work. And
Christmas night I was taken sick. And it went on until
I came back to work. In the meantime it held in abey-
ance. This was my own opinion, the man who took my
place wasn’t aware that there was a set of charges,
active set of charges on my desk.
Q. Were there a set of charges on your desk?
A. Yes, sir, they were.
Q. Were you in communication with your office,
when you were at home recuperating?
A. Was I?
Q. Yes.
A. No, sir, I was not.
(. Do you have these charges with you in this
courtroom?
A. No, sir, I don’t.
Q. Pardon?
A. No, they are the charges that you see here, I be-
lieve.
You said there were a set of charges there, your
Honor.
The Court: I said this was a suspension notice.
The Witness: I’m sorry.
The Court: This is what I am referring to, if this
will assist you in your testimony.
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The Witness: Yes. Well, this is a suspension notice
that goes out from the Personnel Department and not
from my office.
The Court: The question is, did anyone give you
written charges against Lt. Muscare?
The Witness: Yes, sir, they did.
The Court: All right. And that was a day or two
or a few days before you went home and took sick,
is that right?
The Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. Now, counsel is asking if you
know where those charges are, the written charges, the
document.
The Witness: Yes, sir, they are in the Bureau of
Personnel. [
The Court: How
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