Appendix — Quinn v. Muscare

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Supreme Court, U. & :

FILED

DEC 8 1975

APPENDIX MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

Ixy Tus

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Ocroser Term, 1975

No. 75-130

ROBERT J. QUINN, individually and as Commissioner

of the Chicago Fire Department,

Petitioner,

vs.

FRANCIS MUSCARE,

Respondent.

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States

Court Of Appeals For The Seventh Circuit

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60601, Financial 6-3988

Petition For Certiorari Filed July 24, 1975

Certiorari Granted October 14, 1975

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Chronological List of Relevant Docket Entries ............ 1

EES ce ae aie a , 4

I a cchieeienneanisiiantias 15

Affidavit Evidencing Compliance with General Rule 39.. 16

Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order .................. 17

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a |

Temporary Restraining Order ......2............--.--:--0-s00-0+- 23

Order Denying Motion for a Temporary Restraining

SII: seshasastaiesecethimameiaatandesinatesnacpanieeniticiahascibiisiiianinennntesenneenes 37

pS ee er a eT 37

Motion in Opposition to the Granting of a Preliminary

i ca inti aca ecrataaltitls 37

I eT Can oe ET 47

Transcript of Proceedings, March 19, 1974 .................... 48

Witnesses for the Defendant:

Leonard Johnson—

I lees 51

EE eee 59

Redirect Examination ~.............................0....-. 78

Recross Examination -......................-0-.-cossceses 80

Al Lundin—

PL RN 82

a 91

a 98

William F. Foley—

Direct Examination 99

Cross Examination —

Redirect Examination 105

Recross Examination ..... 107

Witness for the Plaintiff:

Francis Muscare—

Direct Examination 121

Cross Examination ....... - 129

Witness for the Defendant in Rebuttal:

William F. Foley—

| eI 131

Cross Examination .................... : ade 133

Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction ...... 137

Motion for Reconsideration and for Amendment of

Judgment Taken Under Advisement ...................-..--+ 138

Motion for Amendment of Judgment ......... ; 138

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsidera-

CBE axccosiscsccucssssesiiinsisssenntialinsennnnniniinnnn 139

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered oral-

Ae! 2 .. 146

Transcript of Proceedings, March 29, 1974 ‘a 150

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

and for Amendment of Judgment ........... - 153

Bates CE ABO occcccecscsccssicnnninnalael 154

Designation of Record on Appeal - 154

iii

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 (Order No. 749) ..0......00cccccceecceeeeeeee 156

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Order No. 685) ..20.0.........cccescseceeeee 157

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Re-

versing and Remanding to the District Court ............ 167

Order of the United States Court of Appeals Denying

Defendant’s Petition for Rehearing ............0.0.0.0.0....... 167

Order of the United States Court of Appeals Staying

i esseteanonnneonnines 168

Order of the United States Court of Appeals Recalling

TINT dacicinetideescertereenencentestenteenenscncsennsonasnsenensenee 168

Order of the Supreme Court of the United States

Ee 169

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APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT

DOCKET ENTRIES

In Tue Unrrep Srates District Court

For the Northern District of Illinois

Eastern Division.

No. 74 C 656

3-11-74—Filed complaint andcopy (JS5) $15.00

3-11-74— Filed Designation

3-11-74—Filed Affidavit regarding rule 39.

3-11-74—Filed Motion for a temporary restraining order.

3-11-74—Filed Memorandum in support of plaintiff’s mo-

tion for a temporary restraining order.

3-11-74—Motion for a temporary restraining order is de-

nied. Cause continued to March 19, 1974 at 2pm

for hearing on preliminary injunction. McGarr,

J.

3-19-74—Filed defendant’s appearance and that of his at-

torney.

3-19-74—Filed Motion in opposition to the granting of pre-

liminary injunction.

3-19-74—Cause called for hearing on preliminary injunc-

tion. Plaintiff rests on the complaint. Evidence

heard for defendant. Defendant rests. Rebuttal evi-

dence heard and concluded. Surrebuttal evidence

heard and concluded. Court enters its findings of

fact and conclusions of law from the bench. Mo-

—2—

tion for preliminary injunction is denied. Cause

continued to March 26, 1974 at 10am for status

report. McGarr,J.

3-26-74—Motion of Plaintiff for reconsideration and for

amendment of judgment is taken under advise-

ment. Cause continued to March 29, 1974 at 10

A.M. for ruling on plaintiffs motion to reconsider

previous ruling and further status report.—Mc-

Garr,J

3-19-74—F iled summons returned served.

3-26-74—Filed Plaintiff’s Motion for Amendment of judg-

ment.

3-26-74—Filed Memorandum in support of plaintiff’s mo-

tion for reconsideration.

3-29-74 Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and motion

for amendment of judgment, are both denied.

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction will

be considered as a motion for a permanent in-

junction without further hearing and is denied.

MeGarr,J.

4-4-74Clerk’s file copy of Excerpt of proceedings had on

March 19, 1974, before Judge McGarr, filed by

an official court reporter.” ds

4-26-74—Filed Plaintiff’s Notice of appeal. P

5-9-74—“Clerk’s file copy of transcript of proceedings had

on March 19, 1974 before Judge McGarr, filed by

an official court reporter.” ds

5-15-74Filed Plaintiff’s Designation for the Complete

Record. ds

5-29-74—Filed Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 and 2. (Identified on

attached list) Y

-o

In Tue Unitep States Court Or AppEALs

For The Seventh Circuit

No. 74-1460

6-7-74—Record on appeal filed.

8-1-74—Appellant’s brief and appendix filed.

10-15-74—A ppellee’s brief filed.

11-15-74—Appellant’s reply brief filed.

1-16-75—Oral Argument heard. Cause taken under advise-

ment.

5-21-75—Judgment order entered, reversing and remand-

ing to District Court with directions. Per curiam

opinion filed.

6-17-75—Petition for rehearing denied.

6-24-75—Order entered staying mandate until July 24,

1975.

7-31-75—Mandate issued.

8-11-75—Order entered recalling mandate.

In Tue Supreme Court Or Tue Unirep States

No. 75-130

7-24-75—Petition for certiorari filed by defendant.

10-14-75—Order entered granting certiorari.

ites

In Tue Unitep States Districr Court

Northern District Of Illinois

Eastern Division

FRANCIS MUSCARE, »

Plaintiff,

Vs.

| No. 74C 656

eel Civil Action

ROBERT J. QUINN, individually and as

Commissioner, Chicago Fire Department,

D-* ndant. J

COMPLAINT

(Filed March 11, 1974)

1. This is an action by Plaintiff seeking to enjoin the

Chicago Fire Department from continuing his suspension

from his duties for alleged violations of §§61.001, 61.006

and 51.133, of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago

Fire Department; for declaratory judgment that §§61.001

and 51.133 are unconstitutional on their face, that §61.006

is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff in this case, and

that procedures of the Chicago Fire Department under

which Plaintiff was suspended are unconstitutional ; and for

back pay for the period of wrongful suspension.

2. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. $1343, to

enforce rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. $1983, and under

28 U.S.C. §2201, et seq., and the Constitution of the United

States.

3. Defendant Robert J. Quinn is Commissioner of the

Chicago Fire Department and exercises sole and exclusive

control and management of the Fire Department and its

etfs

personnel. {Municipal Code of the City of Chicago, Ch. 12,

§4].

4. Plaintiff Francis Muscare has been a member of the

Chicago Fire Department since 1955. He currently holds

the rank of Lieutenant. Plaiutiff wears a small mustache

and short goatee. His hair is trimmed to medium length.

5. In December, 1973, Plaintiff’s superior officer, Chief

Morgan, warned him that he would not be permitted to

continue working as a fire fighter unless he shaved his

beard off. A few days thereafter Plaintiff was informed

that charges had been filed against him with the adminis-

tration authorities of the Fire Department.

6. Two and one-half months later, on Wednesday, Feb-

ruary 27, 1974, at 11:30 A.M., Second Deputy Lattice,

Third Division Fire Marshall Callahan and Third Battalion

Chief Swoboda entered the fire station where Lt. Muscare

was performing his duties as a fire fighter and ordered

him to turn in his equipment because he was being sus-

pended effective immediately. Plaintiff was informed that

he would receive a letter detailing the charges against him.

7. The appearance of Plaintiff’s face and the trim of

his hair has remained essentially the same from October,

1973, to the present. Photographs of Plaintiff taken March

1, 1974 and reflecting his appearance since October, 1973

and as of the date of Plaintiff’s suspension, are attached

hereto as Exhibits “A” and “B” and made a part hereof.

8. On March 4, 1974, Plaintiff received a letter bearing

the signature of Walter R. Braun, Chief of Personnel, in-

forming him that he was accused of violating §§61.001,

61.006 and 51.133 of the Chicago Fire Department Rules

and Regulations and that his suspension was to last twenty-

nine days, beginning February 27, 1974. A copy of the

letter from Walter R. Braun is attached hereto as Exhibit

“C” and made a part hereof.

_

9. Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the

Chicago Fire Department provides as follows:

Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance. All

members of the Chicago Fire Department shall present

a clean and proper appearance in personal care and

attire at all times. The face shall be clean-shaven, ex-

cept that a non-eccentric mustache is permissible. Mus-

taches shall not extend beyond a line perpendicular to

the corner of the mouth and the full upper lip must

be readily visible.

Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower

than a line from the middle of the ear.

Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the

hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and

slope to the back of the neck. It will be gradually tap-

ered overall, in order to present a neat appearance.

A copy of §51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

cago Fire Department is attached hereto as Exhibit “D”

and made a part hereof.

10. Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the

Chicago Fire Department provides as follows:

Part VI

OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES

IN RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES

AND REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND

PROCEDURES OF THE CHICAGO FIRE

DEPARTMENT

. * .

OFFENSES

Section 61.001. Conduct Unbecoming a Member or

Employee of the Chicago Fire Department.

A copy of §61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

cago Fire Department is attached hereto as Exhibit “EK”

and made a part hereof.

11. Section 61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the

Chicago Fire Department provides as follows:

= =

Part VI

OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES

IN RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES

AND REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND

PROCEDURES OF THE CHICAGO FIRE

DEPARTMENT

OFFENSES

Section 61.006. Disobedience of Orders.

A copy of §61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

cago Fire Department is attached hereto as Exhibit “F”

and made a part hereof.

12. The twenty-nine day suspension of Plaintiff, a fire

fighter of twenty years’ service, without any prior notice

or opportunity for a hearing, is a violation of Plaintiff’s

right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

13. Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the

Chicago Fire Department on its face prohibits Plaintiff

Muscare from determining the details of his personal ap-

pearance and violates Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights to

personal freedom guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth,

Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

14. Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the

Chicago Fire Department, creating the offense of “Conduct

unbecoming a member or employee of the Chicago Fire

Department,” is so vague as not to give notice of the con-

duct it prohibits, depriving Plaintiff of his right to due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, and is so overbroad as to infringe

upon Plaintiff’s Constitutionally protected right to personal

freedom.

oiiiies

15. Insofar as $61.006, creating the offense of “Dis-

obedience of Orders,” is applied by the Fire Department to

punish Plaintiff for the alleged violation of orders issued

under §§51.133 and 61.001, such orders were unconstitu-

tional and void, and as applied in this case, $61.006 is un-

constitutional.

16. The suspension of Plaintiff has deprived him of his

employment and the earnings used to sustain himself and

his family, has stigmatized him in his career as a fire fighter

and jeopardized his future ability to earn a living in his

chosen work. Unless Plaintiff foregoes his Constitutional]

rights, he will be subject to continued disciplinary actions

which will perpetuate the injury. This action of suspending

Plaintiff has thus caused and is continuing to cause him to

suffer immediate, irreparable injury.

17. If Defendant is enjoined from continuing the sus-

pension or taking any other disciplinary action against

Plaintiff for the alleged violations of $51.133, $61.001 and,

in this case, for alleged violation of §61.006, Defendant

would not be harmed thereby.

Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court:

1. For a declaratory judgment that: (a) §51.133 and

§61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire

Department are unconstitutional on their face and void;

and (b) §61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

eago Fire Department is unconstitutional as applied to

Plaintiff in this case; and (c) the suspension of Plaintiff

without a hearing or an opportunity to defend himself is

unconstitutional ; and :

2. To enjoin Defendant and any of his agents, employ-

ees, officers, lawyers, representatives and servants, prelimi-

narily and permanently from enforcing §§61.001 and 51.133,

and, insofar as related to orders issued under the aforemen-

ote .

:

4

H

5

;

4

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aliens

tioned, §61.006 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago

Fire Department against Plaintiff by means of suspension

from duty or any other means; and

3. For back pay to which Plaintiff would have been en-

titled if he had not been wrongfully suspended in violation

of his rights under the United States Constitution.

/s/ Francis Muscare

Plaintiff

/s/ Robert S. Sugarman

/s/ Linda R. Hirshman

Counsel for Plaintiff

(Affidavit of Francis Muscare).

—10— _—

EXHIBIT “A” EXHIBIT "B”

= =

EXHIBIT “C”

(Letterhead Of)

Chicago Fire Department

FIRE ACADEMY

February 28, 1974

Lieutenant Frank Muscare

4059 West Barry

Chicago, Illinois 60641

Subject: Suspension

Sir:

You are hereby notified that you have been, or will be,

removed from the payroll of the Chicago Fire Department

for violations of the Rules and Regulations, Practices and

Procedures of the Chicago Fire Department.

Recommended Duration of Suspension: twenty-nine (29)

days.

Dates of suspension:

From: 0800 February 27, 1974

To: 0800 March 28, 1974

You are accused of violations of the following sections

of the rules:

Sections: 61.001-61.006 and 51.133

1. You will report to the Personnel Department on March

27, 1974 to pick up your badge and other City property as-

signed to you, and to receive further orders. _

2. This suspension does not preclude the filing of these

charges against you by the Civil Service Commission. Un-

less previously notified you will contact the Chief of Per-

sonnel on to find out the disposition

of your case.

By order of

/s/ Walter R. Braun

Chief of Personnel

ec: 3rd Division Marshal

a ata

afin

EXHIBIT “D”

Section 51.131. Use of Vending Machines in Fire Sta-

tions. The vending machines, dispensing soft drinks and

candy, located in fire stations are for the use of Fire De-

partment personnel only. Under no circumstances will other

persons be allowed to use the facilities or products dis-

pensed by these vending machines. Cigarette vending ma-

chiues are not permitted in fire stations.

Section 51.132. Time Off Due to a Death in the Family.

Time off duty (one work day off) may be granted to all

members of the Chicago Fire Department when a death

occurs in the immediate family of the member. Immediate

family is defined as consisting of mother, father, husband,

wife, brother, or sister (including step or half) son or

daughter (including step or half) father-in-law, mother-in-

law, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, grand parents and grand-

children.

When someone in the “immediate family” dies, the mem-

ber will notify his immediate superior officer by telephone

and give all the pertinent information. The superior officer

will then relay the information through the chain of com-

mand so that sufficient manpower can be maintained.

Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance. All mem-

bers of the Chicago Fire Department shall present a clean

and proper appearance in personal care and attire at all

times. The face shall be clean-shaven, except that a non-

eccentric mustache is permissible. Mustaches shall not ex-

tend beyond a line perpendicular to the corner of the mouth

and the full upper lip must be readily visible.

Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower

than a line from the middle of the ear.

Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the

hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and slope to

the back of the neck. It will be gradually tapered overall, in

order to present a neat appearance.

Le

eniitinin

EXHIBITS “E” AND “F”

Part VI.

OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES IN

RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES AND

REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

OF THE CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT

Members or other employees who shall be found guilty

of infractions of any of the Rules and Regulations, Prac-

tices and Procedures of the Fire Department, shall be sub-

ject to the penalties hereinafter enumerated.

OFFENSES

Section 61.000

Section 61.001. Conduct unbecoming a member or em-

ployee of the Chicago Fire Department.

Section 61.002. Intoxication. ,

Section 61.003. Keeping or drinking intoxicating liquors

in or about premises of the Fire Department.

Section 61.004. Entering any tavern or bar while on

duty, or in uniform, except in the performance of assigned

duty.

Section 61.005. Neglect of duty.

Section 61006. Disobedience of orders.

Section 61.007. Inattention to duty.

Section 61.008. Immoral conduct.

Section 61.009. Making a false official report.

Section 61.010. Reporting for duty while incapable of

performing duties without a proper medical reason.

Section 61.011. Absence from duty without permission.

Section 61.012. Leaving a post of duty without being

properly relieved or without proper authorization.

Section 61.013. Violation of any law or ordinance.

Section 61.014. Insubordination or disrespect toward a

superior officer.

Section 61.015. Using coarse, profane or insolent lan-

guage or showing disrespect to, or willful maltreatment to-

ward any member of the department or any other person.

ee

niin

In Tue Unitrep States Districr Covurr

* * (Uaption No.74C 656) * *

DESIGNATION FORM—CIVIL

(Filed March 11, 1974)

A. Pending Related Cause, If Any:

Number ; Judge

Reason case deemed related (indicate by (X)):

1. ( ) Involves property included in earlier num-

bered pending cause.

2. ( ) Involves same issue of fact or grows out of

same transaction as earlier numbered pending

suit.

3. ( ) Involves validity or infringement of a patent

already in suit in earlier numbered pending

suit.

4. ( ) Involves both the same issue of law and the

same class as a pending suit and is brought

as a class action.

B. Indicate Basis Of Jurisdiction By (X):

1. ( ) United States is plaintiff or defendant.

2. (X) Federal question.

3. ( ) Diversity of citizenship.

C. Category Of Case (see reverse side of this form for

list of categories) :

Civil Rights—Federal Question

D. Is This Suit Brought As A Class Action?

( ) Yes (X) No

/s/ Linda R. Hirshman

Attorney at Law

—_ =

In Tue Unrrep Strares Districr Court

* * (Caption No.74C 656) °* *°

AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCING COMPLIANCE

WITH GENERAL RULE 39

(Filed March 11, 1974)

Affiant is the attorney of record for Francis Muscare and

has knowledge of the matters covered by this affidavit and

has read General Rule 39.

Affiant has not directly or indirectly solicited employment

by the above-named party or parties, and knows of no

solicitation of said party or parties by any person that has

resulted in the employment of the affiant, except (here state

all exceptions, or if none state “no exception”): No Ex-

ceptions

Affiant has not paid, or promised to pay, and knows of no

payment or promise of payment to the above-named party,

or parties, of the costs of this case, or of the medical, liv-

ing of other expenses of any party, or of any part of an

attorney’s fee, or of any portion of the recovery by suit or

settlement herein to any person whatever other than the

above-named party or parties and the attorneys of record

herein, except (here state all exceptions, or if none state

“no exception”) : No exceptions

Affiant has filed contemporaneously herewith a signed

copy of any written contingent fee agreement applicable

to his compensation for representing the above-named party

or parties in this action and represents that a signed copy

thereof has been furnished to each party whom he repre-

sents; if no copy of a contingent fee agreement is filed here-

with, affiant represents that his compensation for services

in this case is not on a contingent basis.

/s/ Linda R. Hirshman

Affiant

— | a

In Tue Unirep Srares Districr Court

* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *

MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

(Filed March 11, 1974)

Plaintiff Francis Muscare, by his counsel Robert S.

Sugarman and Linda R. Hirshman of J acobs, Gore, Burns

& Sugarman, moves this Court pursuant to Rule 65(b),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a temporary restrain-

ing order restraining Defendant in the above captioned

case from continuing susper ding him under the provisions

of §$61.001, 61.006 and 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations

of the Chicago Fire Department, for the following reasons:

1. That Plaintiff has filed in this Court a Complaint

against the Defendant praying for a declaratory judgment

that §§61.001, 61.006 and 51.133 of the Rules and Regula-

tions of the Chicago Fire Department and his suspension

under those sections without a hearing and opportunity to

defend is unconstitutional and void; a preliminary and per-

manent injunction against the enforcement of §§61.001,

51.133 and, as applied in this matter, 461.006, of the Rules

and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department, and for

back pay for the period of Plaintiff’s suspension. The al-

legations of that Complaint are incorporated herein by

reference and made a part hereof.

2. That Defendant has not yet filed his Answer to said

Complaint but that, nevertheless, the material allegations

of that Complaint are true, and Plaintiff will be able to

substantiate the same by sufficient and competent evidence.

3. That the suspension of Plaintiff is causing him im-

mediate and irreparable injury by depriving him of his em-

ployment and the earnings used to sustain himself and his

—18—

family, stigmatizing him in his career, and jeopardizing

his future ability to earn a living as a fire fighter, and if an

injunction would be entered as prayed for in the Com-

plaint only after notice upon Defendant and a hearing,

Plaintiff will suffer continuing immediate and irreparable

injury.

4. That if a temporary restraining order would be en-

tered, Defendant would not be harmed thereby. .

Wherefore, Plaintiff requests that a temporary restrain-

ing order be entered, without bond, restraining Defendant

and any of his agents, employees, officers, lawyers, repre-

sentatives and services, from suspension of Plaintiff under

the provisions of §61.001 and §51.133, and, insofar as re-

lated to orders issued under the aforementioned, §61.006 of

the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department

and from taking any disciplinary action against him, pend-

ing further order by this Court; and for such other and

further relief as this Court may deem just.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Robert 8. Sugarman

/s/ Linda R. Hirshman

Counsel for Plaintiff

State Of Illinois

County Of Cook—ss.

AFFIDAVIT

Affiant Francis Museare, being first duly sworn on oath,

deposes and states as follows:

1. He has been a member of the Chicago Fire Depart-

ment since 1955, currently holding the rank of Lieutenant.

9. He has worn a small mustache, a short goatee, and

hair trimmed to medium length, as he presently appears,

since October, 1973.

—_——

ee

nine Aa LO AAR 1 ONE PEE cD ot ET RMN oe

Pet? Ae apitee bt ee at

4 —_ ee ae —

—19—

3. In December, 1973, his superior officer, Chief Mor-

gan, instructed him to shave his goatee off and, when he

declined to do so, was shortly thereafter informed that

charges had been filed against him with the administration

of the Chicago Fire Department.

4. On February 27, 1974, while he was performing his

duties as a fire fighter, Second Deputy Lattice, Third Divi-

sion Fire Marshall Callahan and Third Battalion Chief

Swoboda of the Chicago Fire Department ordered him to

turn in his fire equipment and leave the fire station where

he was on duty, »ecause he was being suspended from duty

as a fire fighter, effective immediately.

5. On March 4, 1974, he received a letter signed by

Walter R. Braun, Chief of Personnel, informing him that

he was being suspended from duty until March 28, 1974

for alleged violation of §§61.001, 61.006 and 51.133 of the

Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department. A

copy of said letter is hereto attached as Exhibit “A” and

made a part hereof. Copies of §61.001, §61.006 and §51.133

of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Depart-

ment are hereto attached as Exhibits “B”, “C,” and “D,”

respectively and made a part hereof. |

6. Affiant was afforded no hearing or opportunity to

defend himself before his suspension.

7. Affiant is currently being deprived of the earnings

use to sustain himself and his family, the opportunity to

perform ‘his duties as a fire fighter with the Chicago Fire

Department, and present and future ability to pursue his

chosen career.

8. This action by the Defendant suspending Affiant from

his position as a fire fighter with the Chicago Fire Depart-

ment is causing Affiant to suffer, and will continue to cause

immediate, irreparable injury to the Affiant.

Further Affiant Sayeth Not.

/s/_ Francis Muscare

— =

EXHIBIT “A”

(Letterhead Of)

Chicago Fire Department

FIRE ACADEMY

February 28, 1974

Lieutenant Frank Muscare

4059 West Barry

Chicago, Illinois 60641

Subject: Suspension

Sir:

You are hereby notified that you have been, or will be,

removed from the payroll of the Chicago Fire Department

for violations of the Rules and Regulations, Practices and

Procedures of the Chicago Fire Department.

Recommended Duration of Suspension: twenty-nine (29)

days.

Dates of suspension:

From: 0800 February 27, 1974

To: 0800 March 28, 1974

You are accused of violations of the following sections

of the rules:

Sections: 61.001-61.006 and 51.133

1. You will report to the Personnel Department on March

27, 1974 to pick up your badge and other City property as-

signed to you, and to receive further orders.

2. This suspension does not preclude the filing of these

charges against you by the Civil Service Commission. Un-

less previously notified you will contact the Chief of Per-

IEE GU cnnccsnstieciincnsinasiceinntniniiinibiiie to find out the disposition

of your case.

By order of

/s/ Walter R. Braun

Chief of Personnel

ec: 3rd Division Marshal

a

EXHIBITS “B” AND “C”

Part VI.

OFFENSES, PROCEDURES, AND PENALTIES IN

RESPECT TO VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES AND

REGULATIONS, PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

OF THE CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT

Members or other employees who shall be found guilty

of infractions of any of the Rules and Regulations, Prac-

tices and Procedures of the Fire Department, shall be sub-

ject to the penalties hereinafter enumerated.

OFFENSES

Section 61.000

Section 61.001. Conduct unbecoming a member or em-

ployee of the Chicago Fire Department.

Section 61.002. Intoxication.

Section 61.003. Keeping or drinking intoxicating liquors

in or about premises of the Fire Department.

Section 61.004. Entering any tavern or bar while on

duty, or in uniform, except in the performance of assigned

duty.

Section 61.005. Neglect of duty.

Section 61.006. Disobedience of orders.

Section 61.007. Inattention to duty.

Section 61.008. Immoral conduct.

Section 61.009. Making a false official report.

Section 61.010. Reporting for duty while incapable of

performing duties without a proper medical reason.

Section 61.011. Absence from duty without permission.

Section 61.012. Leaving a post of duty without being

properly relieved or without proper authorization.

Section 61.013. Violation of any law or ordinance.

Section 61.014. Insubordination or disrespect toward a

superior officer.

Section 61.015. Using coarse, profane or insolent lan-

guage or showing disrespect to, or willful maltreatment to-

ward any member of the department or any other person.

=

EXHIBIT “D”

Section 51.131. Use of Vending Machines in Fire Sta-

tions. The vending machines, dispensing soft drinks and

candy, located in fire stations are for the use of Fire De-

partment personnel only. Under no circumstances will other

persons be allowed to use the facilities or products dis-

pensed by these vending machines. Cigarette vending ma-

chines are not permitted in fire stations.

Section 51.132. Time Off Due to a Death in the Family.

Time off duty (one work day off) may be granted to all

members of the Chicago Fire Department when a death

occurs in the immediate family of the member. Immediate

family is defined as consisting of mother, father, husband,

wife, brother, or sister (including step or half) son or

davghter (including step or half) father-in-law, mother-in-

law, daughter-in-law, son-in-law, grand parents and grand-

children.

When someone in the “immediate family” dies, the mem-

ber will notify his immediate superior officer by telephone

and give all the pertinent information. The superior officer

will then relay the information through the chain of com-

mand so that sufficient manpower can be maintained.

Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance. All mem-

bers of the Chicago Fire Department shall present a clean

and proper appearance in personal care and attire at all

times. The face shall be clean-shaven, except that a non-

eccentric mustache is permissible. Mustaches shall not ex-

tend beyond a line perpendicular to the corner of the mouth

and the full upper lip must be readily visible.

Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower

than a line from the middle of the ear.

Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the

hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and slope to

the back of the neck. It will be gradually tapered overall, in

order to present a neat appearance.

rf

—23—

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

I, Linda R. Hirshman, one of the attorneys for Plaintiff

Francis Muscare, Do Hereby Certify that on March 11,

1974, I attempted to give notice of this motion for a tem-

porary restraining order to the named Defendant by tele-

phoning him and the Corporation Counsel of the City of

Chicago personally at their official places of business and

' - @dvising them of the filing of this motion.

/s/ Linda R. Hirshman

Counsel for Plaintiff

In Tue Unitep States Districr Court

* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

(Filed March 11, 1974)

1.

FACTS

Plaintiff in this action, Francis Muscare, has been a fire

fighter with the Chicago Fire Department since 1955. On

February 27, 1974, while Plaintiff was performing his

duties as a fire fighter at his fire station, three of his su-

perior officers, Second Deputy Lattice, Third Division Fire

Marshall Callahan, and Third Battalion Chief Swoboda,

presented themselves at Plaintiff’s station and informed

him that he was being suspended as of that moment, to

turn in his equipment and identification. On Monday, March

4, 1974, Lieutenant Muscare received a letter signed by

Walter R. Braun, Chief of Personnel, informing him that

—_— =

he was being suspended for a period of twenty-nine days

from February 27, 1974, for alleged violations of §$61.001,

61.006 and 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

cago Fire Department.

Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

cage Fire Department provides:

Section 51.133. Proper Personal Appearance.

All members of the Chicago Fire Department shall pre-

sent a clean and proper appearance in personal care

and attire at all times. The face shall be clean-shaven,

except that a non-eccentric mustache is permissible.

Mustaches shall not extend beyond a line perpendicular

to the corner of the mouth and the full upper lip must

be readily visible.

Sideburns shall be trimmed short and shall be no lower

than a line from the middle of the ear.

Hair shall be worn neatly and closely trimmed, and the

hair outline shall follow the contour of the ear and

slope to the back of the neck. It will be gradually

tapered overall in order to present a neat appearance.

Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

cago Fire Department creates the offense of “conduct un-

becoming a member or employee of the Chicago Fire De-

partment” and Section 61.006 of the Rules and Regulations

of the Chicago Fire Department « eates the offense of

“disobedience of orders.”

Since October, 1973, Lt. Muscare has worn a small mus-

tache and a short, neatly-trimmed goatee. His hair is med-

ium in length. Plaintiff’s facial appearance and the length of

his hair has remained essentially the same from October,

1973 to the present. In December, 1973, one of Lt. Muscare’s

superior officers, Chief Morgan, informed him that he could

not work with a goatee and shortly thereafter, Morgan ad-

vised Plaintiff that charges had been filed against him.

However, it was not until February 27, 1974 that any fur-

ther action was taken against him.

- =

Lt. Museare was then suspended from duty without pay,

with the prospect of further disciplinary action if he did

not conform his personal appearance to the dictates of the

Chicago Fire Department.

Plaintiff has been and is continuing to be deprived of

his income, his chosen work, and his reputation as a fire

fighter by a summary procedure of the Chicago Fire De-

partment enforcing regulations which infringe upon his

Constitutional right to determine his personal appearance

as he chooses, and the suspension of Lt. Muscare can only

be conceived as an initial step in long-range disciplinary

measures aimed at forcing him to conform his appearance

to the dictates of the administration of the Chicago Fire

Department.

Il.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to redress the deprivation of

Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights protected by 42 U.S.C.

$1983, under 28 U.S.C. $1343 and 28 U.S.C. $2201, et seq.

The Court also has jurisdiction over actions arising di-

rectly under the United States Constitution itself. Bell v.

Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773 (1946).

ITI.

ARGUMENT

A. Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

cago Fire Department is an Unconstitutional Depriva-

tion of Plaintiff’s Right to Determine His Personal

Appearance.

Plaintiff’s right to determine the details of his personal

appearance free from arbitrary governmental interference

is protected by the United States Constitution. The Fire

Department may not condition Plaintiff’s employment upon

—26—

the requirement that he yield up this right. The United

States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit specifically

set out the Constitutional pretections for the right to de-

termine one’s appearance, particularly with regard to length

of hair, in Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7 Cir. 1969) :

The right to wear one’s hair at any length or in any

desired manner is an ingredient of personal freedom

protected by the United States Constitution . . . wheth-

er this right is designated as within the ‘penumbras’

of the First Amendment freedom of speech, see Gris-

wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14

L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), or as encompassed within the

Ninth Amendment as an ‘additional fundamental right

. . . which exists alongside those fundamental rights

specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional

Amendments” [cite Griswold], it clearly exists and is

applicable to the states through the due process clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment.

[419 F.2d at 1037].

In light of the Constitutional protections for this self-de-

termination, the Court of Appeals struck down as uncon-

stitutional a high school regulation prescribing the length

and appearance of hair for male students. Since the deci-

sion in Breen v. Kahl, both the Court of Appeals and the

District Court have consistently reiterated their commit-

ment to protect the right of the individual to decide what

the length and style of his hair will be. Arnold v. Car-

penter, 459 F.2d 939 (7 Cir. 1972), Crews v. Clones, 432

F.2d 1259 (7 Cir. 1970), Copeland v. Hawkins, 352 F.Supp.

1022 (E.D.IIL., 1973).

The Constitutional protection of freedom to determine

one’s personal appearance protects public employees from

the enforcement of officially imposed standards. Absent the

showing of a compelling governmental interest of the most

serious nature, public employers may not dictate to their

employees the way in which they must groom themselves:

Oe

~~ =

It is now clearly established that the State does not

possess an absolute right arbitrarily to refuse oppor-

tunities such as . . . employment in public service .. .

[Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d at 1263, supra].

This protection was specifically applied to a fireman in 1971,

in Hunt v. Board of Fire Commissioners of Massapequa

Fire District, 327 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup.Ct. 1971), where the

New York Court struck down a fireman’s suspension for

violation of a grooming regulation, holding:

“there is as a matter of substantive due process a con-

stitutional right to determine one’s own hair style and

... the burden is upon the Board to show substantial

justification for the regulation it seeks to impose.

[327 N.Y.S. at 45].

Similarly, in the case of Lindquist v. City of Coral

Gables, 323 F.Supp. 1161 (S.D.Fla. 1971), the Federal Dis-

trict Court for the Southern District of Florida ordered

the Coral Gables Fire Department to reinstate with back

pay a fireman who had been suspended for violation of

hair regulations substantially similar to the ones involved

in the case at hand. Recently, in Black v. Rizzo, 360 F.Supp.

648 (E.D. Pa. 1973) the District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania reiterated a fireman’s right to de-

termine his personal appearance despite regulations al-

most identical to those of the Chicago Fire Department and

reinstated the fireman with back pay. The Pennsylvania

District Court, after a survey of_the substantial body of

law that has evolved around this subject, concluded that:

Among other things, the plaintiff has argued that his

interest in wearing his hair in a style, manner, and

length of his choosing constitutes a Constitutional right

implicitly protected by the “liberty” assurance of the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

[cites] ... The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has

demonstrated the existence of such a constitutionally

protected interest.

[360 F.Supp. at 651).

—28

The Court in Black v. Rizzo definitively rejected the argu-

ment that interference with that right could be justi‘ed on

grounds of a fire department’s disciplinary interest in regu-

lating the activities of its members. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently ruled that

even the unique public function of a Department of Po-

lice does not justify the interference with a policeman’s

right to determine his personal appearance, specifically

with regard to the style of his hair. Dwen v. Barry, 483

F.2d 1126 (2 Cir. 1973).

Section 51.133 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

cago Fire Department reveals its constitutional infirmity

on its face. Without setting forth any reason for the rule,

the Fire Department has simply created a requirement

that its members present a “proper appearance in per-

sonal care and attire.” The standards of §51.133, including,

for example, “non-eccentric mustaches” can only be based

on some administrative officer’s subjective aesthetic pref-

erence. This patent attempt to impose the personal pref-

erences of administration of the Chicago Fire Department

upon the members of the Department is a violation of the

members’ Constitutional rights and cannot be sustained.

Such official attempts to dictate the details of personal ap-

pearance have been prohibited again and again by the

United States District Courts and Courts of Appeals, in-

cluding the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. This

attempt once again to impose an official standard of ap-

pearance is directly counter to what is now a well-settled

body of case law. There can be no doubt that Plaintiff will

ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and the in-

jury he is now suffering for his exercise of his clear Con-

stitutional rights is illegal, irreparable and unjustifiable.

B. Continued Suspension of Plaintiff and the Likelihood

of Additional Action Against Him is Causing and Will

—29_—

Cause Additional Immediate, Irreparable Injury to

Plaintiff, and Restraint of Plaintiff's Suspension will

not Harm Defendant.

By action of the Chicago Fire Department on February

27, 1974, Lt. Francis Muscare was summarily ordered off

the premises of his employment and suspended from ac-

tive service with the Chicago Fire Department. Under the

terms of his suspension, as described in the Fire Depart-

ment’s letter of February 28, 1974, Lt. Muscare can only

anticipate further disciplinary action being taken against

him if he continues to exercise his Constitutional rights in

violation of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Fire

Department dictating the details of his personal appear-

ance. By its action suspending Lt. Muscare, the Chicago

Fire Department has deprived and is continuing to de-

prive him of the earnings current!y used to support him-

self and his family, the opportunity to pursue his career

as a fire fighter, his reputation in the community, and his

prospects for future successful pursuit of his chosen

career. Plaintiff is thus suffering extensive, immediate,

ongoing, irreparable injury every day that he remains

excluded from the fulfillment of his chosen work, and he

has no reasonable anticipation that the penalties currently

being imposed upon him will be mitigated in the future un-

less he yields his Constitutional rights to the Fire Depart-

ment. Unless this Court acts to remedy Plaintiff’s position

immediately, he will be irreparably injured.

Lt. Muscare has been performing as a fire fighter with

his personal appearance essentially the same as it is at this

moment since at least October, 1973. Nothing in the Rules

and Regulations of the Chicago Fire 1’epartment indicates

that any harm would come tc the Department if he were

to continue to do so. By contrast to the injury which Lt.

Muscare has suffered and is continuing to suffer, his rein-

— =

statement as a fire fighter will not harm Defendant in any

substantial manner. Indeed, unless the Chicago Fire De-

partment is employing superfluous fire fighters, one must

assume that Lt. Muscare’s suspension for twenty-nine days,

if anything, actually harms the Fire Department by depriv-

ing them of a qualified and experienced fire fighter, for no

substantial reason. Since the Chicago Fire Department

had been aware of Lt. Muscare’s appearance since at least

last December, it is inconceivable that his appearance cre-

ated a crisis of such urgent nature to warrant action against

him without any of the Constitutionally required procedures

for action against him.

C. Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

cago Fire Department is Unconstitutionally Vague and

Overbroad. :

Section 61.001 of the Rules and Regulations of the Chi-

eago Fire Department creates an offense denominated

“Conduct unbecoming a member or employee of the Chi-

cago Fire Department.” This prohibition is so general as

to be incapable of a reasoned interpretation in advance of

its application. Further, the wide scope of activities which

may be interpreted as “conduct unbecoming” a fire fighter

encompasses both Constitutionally protected activities and

those which may be beyond such protections, and thus the

regulation contains the potential for infringement upon

Constitutional rights. Such sweeping regulations are a vio-

lation of Constitutional standards and must be replaced

by more narrowly drawn rules. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.

479 (1960).

Absent any definition of conduct unbecoming a member

of the Chicago Fire Department, §61.001 is simply what

the administrators of the Fire Department say it will be in

any given ease. The person unfortunate enough to come

31S

within the purview of this section cannot predict what his

offenses may be. Such a rule violates the very fundamentals

of due process of law and chills the exercise of Constitu-

tionally protected rights.

In Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7 Cir. 1969), the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

ruled that a university could not undertake disciplinary

proceedings for violation of a rule proscribing “miscon-

duct” on the grounds that such proceedings were not based

on “standards of conduct expressed in reasonably clear and

narrow rules.” [418 F.2d at 167] The Court stated:

The use of ‘misconduct’ as a standard in imposing the

penalties threatened here must therefore fall for vague-

ness. The inadequacy of the rule is apparent on its face.

It contains no clues which could assist a student, an

administrator or a reviewing judge in determining

whether conduct not transgressing statutes is sus-

ceptible to punishment by the University as ‘miscon-

duct’.

Here, also the inadequacy of §61.001 is apparent on its

face. The impossibility of predicting what administrators

will determine to be “conduct unbecoming” is obvious. The

members and employees of the Chicago Fire Department

may not be forced to guess at what behavior will bring the

penalty of suspension or other discipline upon them any

more than any other citizen must be forced to guess at what

behavior will provoke the wrath of an unpredictable govern-

ment. The Constitutional infirmity of $61.001 is particu-

larly offensive because as in the instant case it can be

interpreted to prohibit conduct protected by the Constitu-

tion.

Even the military are restrained from ordering their in-

ternal affairs through means such as sweeping and vague

regulations. In Avrech v. Secretary of Navy, 477 F.2d 1237

(D.C. Cir. 1973), the United States Court of Appeals for

—32—

the District of Columbia Circuit struck down as unconstitu-

tional a conviction under Article 134 of the Uniform Code

of Military Justice which provided:

All disorders and neglect to the prejudice of good order

and discipline in the Armed Forces, all conduct of a

nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces, and

crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons sub-

ject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cog-

nizance of by a general, special, or summary court

martial, according to the nature and degree of the of-

fense and shall be punished at the discretion of that

court.

[477 F.2d 1237 at 1239].

See also: Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3 Cir. 1973). The

Court ruled that such a broad-brush prohibition fell far

short of the Constitutional requirements of fair warning

to the accused and an ascertainable standard for the judge.

Certainly, the Chicago Fire Department does not have a

freer hand in constructing its disciplinary system than the

United States Armed Forces. Section 61.001 of the Rules

and Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department does not

approach the Constitutional requirements of due process

of law.

D. The Summary Suspension of Plaintiff Violates His

Constitutional Right to Due Process of Law.

The suspension of Lt. Muscare was carried out by means

of a verbal pronouncement from three of his superior of-

ficers in the Fire Department and a one-page letter from

the Chief of Personnel inferming him that he was “accused

of” violating certain sections of the Rules and Regulations

of the Chicago Fire Department. Plaintiff’s suspension be-

came effective immediately after the three superior of-

ficers entered his fire station on February 27, 1974. Plain-

tiff was afforded no opportunity to make a case on his own

—33—

behalf before the penalty of suspension was imposed upon

him.

It is well settled that the public employees have rights

in their employment which cannot be taken away without

procedural due process. Slochower v. Board of Higher Edu-

cation of the City of New York, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637

(1956). Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694

(1972).2 The protections of procedural due process apply

whether the penalty being imposed amounts to a perma-

nent discharge or a suspension from whatever public prop-

erty right is involved. Snead v. Department of Social Serv-

ices, City of New York, 355 F.Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),

Soglin v. Kauffman, supra.

In Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515,

Counties of Cook and Will, and State of Illinois, 471 F. 2d

488 (7 Cir. 1973), the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit set forth the procedure which must be

followed in order to afford a public employee elementary

due process:

We find that the resolution of these interests requires

that Plaintiff be given a notice of the charges against

him, notice of the evidence upon which the charges will

1 It is plain that this initial suspension is merely a prelude to

additional disciplinary action against Plaintiff unless he con-

forms to the administratior’. views of ‘‘proper personal appear-

ance.’’

2 The protections against be 1g deprived of life, liberty or prop-

erty without due process of la. are so fundamental to the Amer-

ican system of ordered liberty that the requirements of elemen-

tary procedural due process has been imposed in cases involving

a wide range of interests including, for example, the right to a

hearing before consumer goods may be summarily repossessed,

Fuentes v. Schevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 8S. Ct. 1983 (1972) or welfare

benefits cut off, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011

(1970).

-

be based, a hearing before a tribunal possessing ap-

parent impartiality, and a chance to present witnesses

and confront adverse evidence at the hearing.

[471 F.2d 488 at 495].

Further, these procedures must be made available to the

government employee prior to the action against him. As

the United States Court of Claims pointed out in Ricucci

v. United States, 425 F.2d 1252, (Ct. Cl. 1970):

Few of them [government employees] earn more than

enough to pay their living expenses from month to

month, and when their salaries are cut off, they may be

in the same destitute circumstances as a welfare re-

cipient whose aid has been discontinued.

[425 F. 2d 1252 at 1256].

Just as a welfare recipient may not be cut off from the

basic necessities of life without a hearing prior to the ac-

tion, Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, or a citizen deprived of his

everyday consumer goods without judicial process, Fuentes

v. Schevin, supra, and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corpo-

ration, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820 (1969), this Court should

not permit a fire fighter with civil service status and twen-

ty years’ service with the Department to be summarily sus-

pended without prior opportunity to meet the charges

against him and present any kind of defense. Only the

most serious type of emergency would justify the procedure

used to suspend Lt. Muscare. The present case is hardly

such an instance, where the Fire Department utilized the

services of Lt. Muscare for a period of over two months

from the time he was initially reprimanded for wearing a

goatee. The manner in which Lt. Muscare was involuntarily

suspended from his employment only illustrates the abuses

which the right to due process is designed to avoid.

E. As Applied to Plaintiff in this Case, §61.006 of the

Rules and Reguletions of the Chicago Fire Department

is Unconstitutional.

=

Under §61.006, Plaintiff is being punished for failure to

obey orders which infringe upon his Constitutional rights

to personal freedom and due process of law. Just as the

Fire Department was exceeding its powers by ordering

Plaintiff to shave his goatee and thus forego his Consti-

tutional rights under $51.133 and §61.001, Rules and Regu-

lations, Chicago Fire Department, they cannot now punish

Plaintiff for failing to obey an unconstitutional order, ac-

complishing by indirection what they could not do directly.

The Court in Hunt v. Board of Fire Commissioners, supra,

drew this obvious conclusion from its ruling that the Fire

Department had no right to dictate its members’ appear-

ance:

It follows that John Hunt’s promise to obey the de-

partment rules must be read as requiring only that he

comply with rules not in violation of his constitutional

rights and not as a waiver of such rights.

[327 N.Y.S. 2nd 36 at 41}.

Or, as the Seventh Cirenit recently affirmed in C.O.P. v.

Conlisk, ...... F.2d ...... (7 Cir. 1973):

The district court held that Rules 2, 5, and 6 were un-

constitutional as applied in this case. We agree with

this determination. Rules 2, 5, and 6 were used only

in conjunction with Rule 51 in discharging the six po-

licemen. The underlying ‘violation’ in each case was the

exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination be-

fore the grand jury, which was prohibited by Rule 51.

Since we have found Rule 51 to be constitutionally in-

valid insofar as it denies the Fifth Amendment right

to a public employee where there is a possibility of

criminal prosecution, the use of Rules 2, 5, and 6 in

conjunction with Rule 51 in such a circumstance was

also invalid.

—36—

IV.

CONCLUSION

Since February 27, 1974, Lt. Francis Muscare, a fire

fighter who has devoted twenty years to the service of the

City of Chicago Fire Department, has been separated from

his employment, with accompanying loss of income, job op-

portunities, and reputation in the community. He has been

thus penalized for attempting to exercise his Constitutional

right to determine his personal appearance. The penalty of

suspension, with accompanying further penalties if Plain-

tiff does not forego his Constitutional rights, was imposed

upon him without even a semblance of the procedures re-

quired by due process of law. By virtue of his suspension

from the Chicago Fire Department, Plaintiff has been and

is continuing to be, subjected to irreparable injury. Plain-

tiff is thus being deprived of his Constitutional rights in

the most immediate, irreparable manner and for no justi-

fiable governmental reason. Only immediate action by this

Court can terminate the imposition of this injury on Plain-

tiff.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Robert S. Sugarman

/s/ Linda R. Hirshman

Counsel for Plaintiff

In Tue Unitrep States Districr Court

* * (Caption No.74C 656) ° *

Name of Presiding Judge, Honorable Frank J. McGarr

Cause No. 74C 656 Date Mar. 11, 1974

Title of Cause—Francis Muscare v. Robert J. Quinn, in-

dividually and as Commissioner, Chicago Fire Depart-

ment

- =

Brief Statement of Motion—Shall move the Court for a

temporary restraining order

Names and Addresses of moving counsel—Linda R. Hirsh-

man of Jacobs, Gore, Burns & Sugarman, 201 North

Wells, Suite 2122, Chicago, Illinois 60606

Representing—Plaintiff

Motion for a temporary restraining order is denied.

Cause continued to Mar. 19, 1974 at 2:00 P.M. for hear-

ing on preliminary injunction. McGarr, J.

In Tue Unitep States District Court

* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *

APPEARANCE

(Filed March 19, 1974)

I enter my Appearance as Attorney for said Robert J.

Quinn.

Dated: 2-19, 1974

/s/ Richard L. Curry

Corporation Counsel

City Of Chicago

/s/ R.L. Curry by

/s/ Philip M. Sheridan

Asst. Corp. Counsel

In Tue Unitep States District Court

* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *

MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO THE

GRANTING OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

(Filed March 19, 1974)

Now comes the Detendant, Robert J. Quinn, Commis-

sioner, Chicago Fire Department, by his attorney, Richard

—38—

L. Curry, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, and

moves this Honorable Court to deny plaintiff’s prayer for

a Preliminary Injunction and in support thereof states as

follows:

1. The plaintiff has failed to show that without such

relief he would be irreparably damaged. The so-called ir-

reparable injury that is alleged by plaintiff amounts to no

more than the suspension on his record and loss of salary

incurred as the result of the 29 day suspension. Even if

this Court were to find that he had been illegally “in-

jured”, nevertheless, such injury is not irreparable. Eco-

nomic injury, loss of income or employment does not en-

title an individual to injunctive relief. The plaintiff is not

injured in any manner that could not be readily rectified

if he is successful on the merits. For reasons that the de-

fendant will show at this hearing, the defendant submits

that it would not be in the public interest to issue a Pre-

iiminary Injunction.

The burden is clearly upon the parties requesting tem-

porary or preliminary injunctive relief to demonstrate that

they are entitled to such relief. Crowther v. Seaborg, (CA

10th, 1969) 415 F.2d 437; Weber v. Continental Motors

Corp., (S.D.N.Y. 1969) 365 F.Supp. 404. It is also settled

that the granting of a temporary or preliminary injunc-

tion is a matter of Judicial discretion. The propriety of its

issuance depends on the circumstances of a particular case.

Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications

Commission, 316 U.S. 4 (1942). Courts consider the effect

their actions might have on the public interest prior to is-

suing injunctive relief, see Yakus v. U. S., 321 U.S. 414;

Snively Groves v. Florida Citrus Commission, D. C. Fla.

1938, 23 F.Supp. 600.

—59—

2. There has been no prima facie showing by the plain-

tiff of reasonable probability that he will prevail on the

merits of the case.

It would appear the Federal Courts in the various cir-

cuits are divided about equally with respect to the consti-

tutional right of a student to choose the length of his hair.

See footnote 5 in Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th

Cir. 1972) cited by plaintiff and New Rider v. Board of

Education of Indiana School District No. 1, Okl., 480 F.2d

693 (10th Cir. 1973). These student-hair cases are not, how-

ever, controlling in the case before this Court.

The salient issue before this Honorable Court is wheth-

er or not the Chicago Fire Department was justified in

suspending plaintiff, a Lieutenant in the Chicago Fire De-

partment, because of his refusal to shave off his beard.

The factual situation in the case at bar is very similar to

that presented in the case of Yarbrough v. City of Jack-

son, 363 F.Supp. 1176 (M.D. Fla. 1973). The Fire Depart-

ment in that city had a grooming regulation with respect

to the prohibition of beards and limitations with respect

to the type of mustaches and length of hair that could be

worn by firemen similar to Section 51.133 of the Rules and

Regulations of the Chicago Fire Department. The plain-

tiff therein was discharged from his employment for re-

fusing to obey an order by a Fire Chief to trim his hair.

The plaintiff therein filed suit alleging an illegal infringe-

ment upon the constitutionally protected rights of free-

dom of expression of firemen.

The Court granted judgment to the City of Jackson for

two reasons. The first reason was that the Court was

unwilling to interfere with the reasonable conclusions of

the responsible officers in the Fire Department that there

was a rational relationship between longer hair and per-

—_— =

sonal safety of its firemen (longer hair more prone to

catch on fire, interference with seal of gus mask). The sec-

ond basis fcr the decision of the Court was its “firm con-

viction that it is not the function of the judiciary to inter-

fere with a fire chief’s reasonable notion as to what is

necessary to maintain discipline within a ‘quasi military’

organization for which he is responsible and which is dedi-

cated to the protection of the public and its property” (p.

1179). With respect to the second basis of its decision the

Court noted it was following the case of Stradley v. Ander-

son, 478 F. 2d 188 (8th Cir. 1973), rather than the case

of Owen v. Barry, 483 F. 2d 1126 (2nd Cir. 1973), because

it felt “there is a rational relationship between discipline

among firefighters and public safety and that it is not the

province of this Court to dictate its own philosophy as to

the best method to promote discipline” (p. 1181).

The recent Illinois ease of Hordorwich v. Board of Po-

lice and Fire Commissioners of Melrose Park, ...... Ill. App.

Re sein (No. 58652—Copy of Opinion attached), sustained

the discharge of a fireman who refused to follow a hair

regulation and refused a direct order to obtain a haircut.

After noting that the evidence substantiated that sideburns

interfered with the use of a smoke mask the Court stated

—‘Personal rights must be reasonably limited when the

safety of firemen and others is involved.”

On January 4, 1974, the Supreme Court of New Jersey

sustained in an Abstract Opinion (64 N.J. 142) the deci-

sion of the Superior Court of New Jersey in the case of

Manco v. Town of Irvington, 126 N.J. Super. 148 (1973).

The fireman therein had been suspended for violating a

directive of his department requiring him to have short

hair and a clean face so that a good face seal could be

obtained on face masks used in fighting fires.

= =

The defendant respectfully submits that the defendant

acted properly and was justified in suspending the plain-

tiff for his having the beard and his refusal to obey a di-

rect order to shave off his beard.

3. Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the State Adminis-

trative and Judicial remedies available to him. Slayton v.

Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971), Seetion 10-1-18 of Chapter 24

of the Illinois Revised Statutes, 1971, provides no civil

service employee shall be suspended for over 30 days ex-

cept for cause upon written charges and after an oppor-

tunity to be heard in his own defense by the Civil Service

Commission. This Section also grants those in charge with

the administration of a department the power to suspend

an employee for 30 days or less and grants to said em-

ployee the right to have a hearing before the Civil Service

Commission concerning the propriety of that suspension if

said suspension was for more than 5 days or incurred

within 6 months of a previous suspension regardless of

the length of said suspension.

In Elko v. McCarey, 315 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1970),

the Court refused to proceed on a case where a fireman was

suspended for violating a hair regulation and allegedly

threatened with additional disciplinary sanctions because

the Court felt that there was no immediate irreparable in-

jury that could not be redressed by the utilization of avail-

able administrative remedies and judicial review provided

for by city civil service regulations. The factual situations

before the Court would appear to be substantially the same.

Wherefore, the Defendant, Robert J. Quinn, Individually

and as Commissioner, Chicago Fire Department, prays that

this Honorable Court deny the request for a Preliminary

—42—

Injunction and for such other relief as this Honorable Court

may deem meet and just.

Richard L. Curry, Corporation Counsel

of the City of Chicago,

Attorney for Defendant,

Robert J. Quinn, Individually and as

. Commissioner, Chicago Fire Depart-

ment,

By: /s/ Philip M. Sheridan

Assistant Corporation Counsel

State Of Illinois

County Of Cook—ss

AFFIDAVIT

Philip M. Sheridan, being first duly sworn on oath, de-

poses and says that he is an Assistant Corporation Counsel

and in said capacity has been assigned to this cause; that

he has read the foregoing Motion by him subscribed and

that the same is believed to be well founded and that any

facts contained therein are correct and true to the best of

his knowledge and belief.

/s/ Philip M. Sheridan

Assistant Corporation Counsel

Subscribed And Sworn To

Before Me This 19th Day

Of March, A.D., 1974.

/s/ Barbara E. Hanses

Notary Public

(Seal)

— =

58652

Peter Hordorwich, 7

Appeal From

Plaintiff-Appellant,

— Circuit Court,

= . Cook County.

Board Of Police And Fire Commis- Hon.

sioners Of Melrose Park, et al., Edward F. Healy,

Presiding.

Defendants-Appellees. )

Mr. Justice Dieringer delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Circuit

Court of Cook County sustaining the plaintiff’s discharge

by the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the Vil-

lage of Melrose Park.

The issues presented on appeal are (1) whether the find-

ings and decision of the Board of Police and Fire Commis-

sioners of Melrose Park were based upon cause and sup-

ported by substantial evidence; (2) whether the Board’s

denial of plaintiff’s motion for continuance constituted

prejudicial error and deprived the plaintiff of a fair hear-

ing; and (3) whether the findings of the Board were ade-

quate to support the decision of the Board.

The plaintiff, Peter Hordorwich, became a fireman for

the Village of Melrose Park in 1967. On March 15, 1971,

Fire Chief Anthony Zito posted a General Order which

directed all Melrose Park firemen to be clean shaven and

to have their hair cut in conformity with an attached draw-

ing of a human head. In December, 1971, Chief Zito sus-

pended the plaintiff from duty for his failure to comply

with the General Order and insubordination in disobeying

a direct order to obtain a haircut. Chief Zito also filed

charges with the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners

of the Village of Melrose Park asking for plaintiff’s dis-

_

charge. A hearing on the charges was held on January 21,

1972. At the hearing counsel for plaintiff requested a

continuance for the reason that he was not yet adequately

prepared for trial. The motion was denied by the Board.

On February 28, 1972, the Board found that cause existed

for the discharge of the plaintiff from his position as fire-

man in that he “was not clean shaven nor did he have a

length of hair so as to be able to perform all of his duties

required as a fireman... [and in that he was] ... guilty

of insubordination in that on December 21, 1971, he did

violate a direct order of the Chief of the Fire Department

of the Village of Melrose Park to get a hair cut that would

place him within the purview of the General Order of March

15, 1971,” and he was thereupon discharged. He filed suit

in the Cireuit Court of Cook County and on November 17,

1972, a hearing was held on the plaintiff’s amended com-

plaint in administrative review. At the close of the hearing

the court sustained and affirmed the Board’s decision to

discharge the plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s first contention is the findings and deci-

sion of the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of

Melrose Park were neither based upon cause nor supported

by substantial evidence. The plaintiff argues the Board’s

finding plaintiff was “unfit for duty by reason of his long

hair” was insufficient. He relies on the decision in Gigger

v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, (1960) 23 Ill.

App. 2d 433, wherein the Appellate Court held it is im-

perative the record of an administrative hearing show that

an impartial inquiry into the facts was conducted.

We believe the findings and decision of the Board of

Police and Fire Commissioners were based upon cause and

supported by substantial evidence. The scope of review of

the final decision of an administrator agency is well set-

tled and succinctly stated in Davern v. Civil Service Com-

mission of the City of Chicago, (1970) 47 Ill. 2d 469, where-

in the Supreme Court stated:

—45—

“The Administrative Review Act provides that agency

findings on questions of fact are ‘prima facie true and

correct’ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, Ch. 110, par. 274.) We

have construed this provision to limit the function of

the reviewing court to ascertaining whether the find-

ings and decisions of the administrative agency are

against the manifest weight of the evidence .... The

courts will not reweigh the evidence, but are limited to

a determination whether the final decision of the ad-

ministrative agency is just and reasonable in light of

the evidence presented.”

In the case at bar the Chief of the Melrose Park Fire De-

partment promulgated a General Order which directed all

firemen to be clean shaven and to have their hair cut in

accordance with an attached drawing of a human head.

Failure to comply with the order would result in disci-

plinary action. Evidence submitted at the hearing before

the Board established that inordinate growth of hair and

sideburns could cause an inability to wear a smoke mask

required at certain types of fires and would be detrimental

to a fireman’s safety and the safety of others. It was fur-

ther established the plaintiff did not comply with the Gen-

eral Order and disobeyed the direct orders of his superior

to comply with said General Order. We conclude there-

fore, that the findings and decision of the Board were

based upon valid cause for removal of the plaintiff from

his duties and fully supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff's second contention is the denial of his

motion for continuance by the Board constituted preju-

dicial error and deprived plaintiff of a fair hearing. The

plaintiff bases his contention on the decision in Lindeen v.

Illinois State Police Merit Board, (1962) 25 Ill. 2d 349,

wherein the Supreme Court held the Board’s denial of a

motion for continuance deprived plaintiff Lindeen of a fair

trial.

—4G6—

We do not agree with the plaintiff’s contention. It is

well settled that the granting of a continuance is a matter

which rests in the sound discretion of an administrative

tribunal. (People ex rel. Egan v. Dunham, (1942) 314 II.

App. 110.) In the instant case, the plaintiff and his attor-

ney did not file a written motion for continuance prior to

the hearing but, rather, orally requested a continuance at

the hearing. Plaintiff’s counsel stated he was requesting a

continuance because he was not adequately prepared for

trial. At the hearing, however, counsel demonstrated he

was well versed in all facets of the circumstances giving

rise to plaintiff’s suspension and presented an admitted

expert in fire fighting devices. Under these circumstances

we couclude the Board did not breach its discretion in de-

nying plaintiff’s motion for continuance.

Plaintiff’s final contention is the findings of the Board

were inadequate to support its decision to discharge the

plaintiff. The plaintiff argues he was not insubordinate

and the order issued by Chief Zito to get a haircut could

not reasonably be construed as an order which the plaintiff

had to obey. In support of his contention the plaintiff re.

lies primarily on the decision in Lindquist v. City of Coral

Gables, (1971) 323 F. Supp. 1161, wherein the District

Court of Florida held a hair regulation was invalid as the

City had shown no relationship between sideburns and in-

terference with the proper functioning of the fire depart-

ment.

We believe the findings of the Board were adequate to

support its decision. A review of the record indicates the

plaintiff violated a General Order promulgated as a safety

measure to firemen as well as victims of fires. Furthermore,

the plaintiff violated a direct order of the Fire Chief to

obtain a haircut. Such insubordination cannot be condoned.

Rules designed for purposes of safety and efficiency must

— =

be followed. What if a fireman refused to wear his uni-

form, or boots, or fire hat, or ride the firetruck to the scene

of a fire, insisting upon doing as he pleased? Such results

could be chaotic and disastrous. Personal rights must be

reasonably limited when the safety of firemen and others

is involved.

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Cir-

cuit Court of Cook County is affirmed.

; Affirmed.

Adesko, P.J., and Burman, J., concur.

In Tue Unritep States District Court

* * (Caption No.74C 656) * °

SUMMONS

(Filed March 19, 1974)

To the above named Defendant:

You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon

Linda R. Hirshman of Jacobs, Gore, Burns & Sugarman,

plaintiff’s attorney, whose address is 201 North Welis

Street, Suite 2122, Chicago, Illinois 60606 an answer to

the complaint which is herewith served upon you, within

20 days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive

of the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by

default will be taken against you for the relief demanded

in the complaint.

/s/ H. Stuart Cunningham

Clerk of Court.

/s/ Dan H. Stevenson

Deputy Clerk.

[Seal of Court]

Date: March 11, 1974

Note :—-This summons is issued pursuant to Rule 4 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(U. S. Marshal’s Service showing date of service as 3-13-75)

1

4G...

In Tue Unitep Srares District Court

* * (Caption No.74C 656) * *

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

had in the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable

Frank J. McGarr, one of the Judges of said Court, in

his courtroom in the United States Courthouse, Chi-

cago, Lllinois, on Tuesday, March 19, 1974, at the hour

of 2:00 o’clock p.m.

Present:

Messrs. Jacobs, Gore, Burns & Sugarman

(201 North Wells Street, Suite 2122,

Chicago, Illinois, 60606), by

Mr. Charles Orlove and

Mrs. Linda Hirshman,

appeared on behalf of the plaintiff;

Mr. Richard L. Curry,

Corporation Counsel,

City of Chicago

(City Hall, 5th Floor,

Chicago, Illinois, 60602), by

Mr. Philip M. Sheridan,

Assistant Corporation Counsel,

appeared on behalf of the defendant.

The Clerk: 74 C 656, Francis Muscare versus Rob-

ert J. Quinn, et cetera, hearing on preliminary injunc-

tion.

Mr. Orlove: Good afternoon, your Honor. Charles

Orlove and Linda Hirshman appearing for the plain-

tiff.

I see some—whom I think to be, perhaps, officials

from the Fire Department.

The Court: Who is the attorney for the defendant

in this case?

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, is this Muscare?

The Court: Yes.

=

Mr. Sheridan: Iam, your Honor. My name is Philip

M. Sheridan. I am an Assistant Corporation Counsel,

your Honor.

The Court: All right, Mr. Sheridan, I will give you

a minute to put your coat down.

Mr. Sheridan: Thank you, sir.

The Court: There has been no appearance filed for

the defendant. I assume you intend to do that, Counsel?

Mr. Sheridan: Yes, I would like to file an appear-

ance, your Honor.

I would also ask leave, your Honor, to file a motion

in opposition to the granting of a preliminary injunc-

tion.

The Court: Well, the case is set this afternoon, as

I recall, for hearing on a preliminary injunction. And

I intend to go forward with that.

Mr. Sheridan: Yes, I understand, your Honor.

The Court: You may file your motion, however,

and I will look at it.

Mr. Sheridan: I understand, your Honor.

The Court: And, perhaps, if it becomes appro-

priate, you can argue whatever basis you have for it.

But in the meantime, and I assume, Counsel, you will

file an appearance some time soon.

Mr. Sheridan: Before I leave the court, your Honor.

The Court: I will count on that.

In the meantime, I have set the matter today for

a hearing on such evidence as the plaintiff cares to

produce for a preliminary injunction. And I am ready

to co forward on that, if you are, Counsel?

Mr. Orlove: Fine, we are ready, your Honor, ex-

cept that, of course, the Court knows we have just

received a copy of this motion, we haven’t seen it be-

fore this minute.

—50—

Also, I would point out to the Court that we have

on file our complaint and the motion for a temporary

restraining order. The complaint is verified by the

plaintiff. And the motion for a restraining order is

also supported by an affidavit.

The Court: Those things are deemed—let’s assume

that the motion for temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction is consolidated for all purposes.

Any evidence or argument made in support of one will

automatically be considered in support of the other.

Your affidavit, therefore, stands in support of the

motion for preliminary injunction and anything else

you have filed.

So that, I think, the spirit of the rules is that when-

ever possible we consolidate .the two. If you are en

titled to a T.R.O., you are probably entitled to a prelim-

inary injunction. Let’s assume we are going forward

for a hearing on the preliminary injunction issue. Any-

thing of record and anything mentioned earlier in the

case is relevant and will be considered.

Do you want to rely on your affidavit or do you have

additional evidence?

Mr. Orlove: We can rely upon that affidavit, your

Honor, as evidence in support of our case in chief.

The Court: And the affidavit contains pictures of

the plaintiff. So to the extent that we have to see the

dimensions of his beard, we have that in the record.

Are you prepared to argue the matter, assuming

this closes the evidence, Counsel?

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I would like an op-

portunity to present evidence.—

The Court: Fine.

Mr. Sheridan: —if I may?

aliens

The Court: All right. I assume that the plaintiff

rests on the pleadings and the affidavit, is that correct?

Mr. Orlove: Yes, that is correct, your Honor. And,

of course, we have an opportunity for rebuttal.

The Court: The defense may put in evidence. And

you, certainly, have rebuttal opportunity, if it becomes

appropriate.

Go ahead, Counsel.

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I have various wit-

nesses that will testify. Can I ask that they all be sworn

at the same time?

(Witnesses sworn.)

LEONARD JOHNSON, called as a witness on behalf of

the defendant, having been first duly sworn, was

examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination by Mr. Sheridan.

The Court: State your name, sir?

The Witness: My name is Leonard Johnson.

The Court: Your address, Mr. Johnson?

The Witness: 5747 West 64th Street.

The Court: Your business or occupation?

The Witness: I’m a drill instructor at the Chicago

Fire Academy.

The Court: All right. Go ahead, Counsel.

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. Mr. Johnson, can you tell us what subjects you

teach at the Fire Academy, please?

A. I teach the self-contained breathing apparatus,

manufactured by M.S.A. Company.

Q. During the course of the middle part of Feb-

ruary, did Lt. Muscare happen to be a student in one

of your classes?

<_<

A. Yes, sir, he was.

Q. Now, when students appear for the purpose of

taking the instruction with respect to this self-con-

tained breathing apparatus, how long is instruction

given; how many days?

A. Two days.

Q. Calling your attention to the first day that Lt.

Muscare was present there—

The Court: Let me interrupt for a moment. Let’s

get the plaintiff’s name straight. That is Muscare,

M-u-s-c-a-r-e, Muscare..

Mr. Sheridan: Thank you; your Honor.

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. On the first day that Lt. Muscare appeared for

the lessons, who did he appear with?

A. He appeared with Hook and Ladder Company

10.

Q. Is he in charge of Hook and Ladder Company

10, or the senior officer there?

A. Yes, sir, that particular shift.

Q. Now, during the course of your instruction, did

you have occasion to lecture the students or inform

the students, in any manner, with respect to the policy

of the Fire Department regarding facial hair?

A. Yes, sir, we do.

Mr. Orlove: I would object, vour Honor, to the

leading nature of the question, unless this is prelim-

inary—

The Court: I assume we are getting through pre-

liminaries here. The objection is overruled. Go ahead.

Ry Mr. Sheridan:

Q. Will you tell the Court, what, if anything, you

stated on the first day the students were present with

respect to that subject matter?

-_—

A. When I got to the wearing of the face-piece,

I explained the importance of a tight face seal and

about the objection of facial hair, whether it be beards,

sideburns or moustaches.

Q. At the time you did that, what, if anything,

happened?

A. A remark was made.

Q. And who made the remark?

A. Lt. Muscare.

Q. Will you tell the Court what, if anything, Lt.

Muscare stated?

A. Lt. Muscare said, “Boston and New York have

men with long hair, beards, moustaches, and they are

not concerned about it.”

Q. Now, in the conducting of these classes, is it

customary for students to speak out in such a man-

ner?

Mr. Orlove: Objection.

The Witness: No, sir, it is not.

The Court: The objection is sustained. I will dis-

regard it. Go ahead.

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. Did you have occasion to have the students, on

that day, put on the self-contained breathing appara-

tus?

A. Yes, sir, every member of the company puts the

apparatus on.

Q. Now, are you able to tell, when the apparatus

is charged, whether or not that person is getting a

good facial fit? =

A. Only when they test the seal of the face mask.

Q. Do you have to have the machine charged?

A. Yes, sir, you do.

—j4—

Q. Now, do all the students, on the Jirst day, charge

their machines?

A. All but one, sir.

Q. Who was that one?

A. Lt. Muscare.

Q. Now, recalling—

The Court: Would you stop for a moment and ex-

9 plain that a little bit to me? Would you tell me, Mr.

Johnson, what do you mean by “charging”?

~The Witness: Your Honor, by charging the appara-

tus, you open up the cylinder valve and your regulator

valve on the apparatus, which allows the air, the high

pressure air, into the regulator, through the regulator

up into the face piece, so you get your air.

The Court: Are you able. to tell, by watching a

student do this, whether there is a facial seal, whether

there is a tight seal?

The Witness: Yes, sir, I can.

The Court: When you said that Lt. Museare did

not charge his, what do you mean; it didn’t charge

or he didn’t do it?

The Witness: He didn’t do it, no, sir.

The Court: All right. Go ahead.

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. Now, on the second day of class, did you have

occasion to show them any slides?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And on the slides—during the course of watch-

ing the slides, is there any voice mechanism operating

at the same time?

A. Yes, sir, there is a tape recording.

10 Q. Now, at any place during the operation of that

type, is any reference made to the subject matter of

facial hair and the wearing of the mask?

11

—55—

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And basically can you tell us what the state-

ment states? ;

Mr. Orlove: Objection, your Honor. That would not

be the best evidence of that.

The Court: Well, I assume that Mr. Johnson is

reporting something that is part of the instructional

material in the class.

Is that right?

The Witness: Yes, sir.

The Court: This instructional slides and tape that

you are talking about?

The Witness: Yes, sir.

The Court: All right. The objection is overruled.

What does the tape recording say about facial hair?

The Witness: The tape recording says that side-

burns, moustaches and beards will not permit a good

fit.

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. Now, at the time the voice on the tape was

making the statement, did Lt. Musecare make any state-

ments?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Can you tell us, if anything, he stated?

A. He said, “New York and Boston have long hair

and they are not concerned with the problem of tight

face seals.” |

Q. Now, following the—at any time that day, did

any of the students again don these machines?

A. You mean the second day, sir?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, sir, on the second day every man put the

apparatus on.

12

—$6—

Q. And what did they ao?

A. They walked to the 5th floor with the apparatus

on, to get an actual effect of wearing the apparatus

while they are exerting themselves.

Q. Now, approximately how many men were in Lt.

Muscare’s company at this time, taking these instruc-

tions?

A. I believe there were five, sir.

Q. And did Lt. Muscare—did he also participate

by putting the machine on—turning it on and use

it while it was operating, walk these five flights of

stairs?

A. No, sir, he did not.

Q. Did he put the machine on at all that day?

A. No, sir. .

Q. Did you subsequently have a conversation with

any one regarding the attendance of Lt. Muscare in

your class?

A. T talked to Chief Prohaska.

Mr. Sheridan: Will you please mark this as De-

fendant’s Exhibit No. 1 for identification.

(The document was thereupon marked Defend-

ant’s Exhibit No. 1 for identification, 3/19/74.)

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. I would like to show you what has been hereto-

fore marked as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1 for iden-

tification; and ask you if you recognize that document?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

Q. And what do you use that document for, if any-

thing?

Mr. Orlove: Objection, your Honor.

The Court: Let me—before I rule on that objection,

tell me briefly what it is, sir?

By Mr. Sheridan:

13

14

—o7—

Q. Can you tell us briefly what that exhibit is?

A. This is a fire officer’s guide for—prepared by

the National Fire Prevention Association, on breathing

apparatus for the fire service.

The Court: All right. Now the next question is,

what use do you put that to—or does the Fire De-

partment put that to, if you know.

I will assume there is an objection to that.

Mr. Orlove: Your Honor, if the Court please, there

is. I would object to the use of that document without

any proper foundation being laid for its credibility,

validity.

The Court: Until we get an answer to this question,

as to whether it is used, I don’t think we can get into

that. The objection is overruled.

You may answer. What use is that put to in the

Chicago Fire Department?

The Witness: It covers—

The Court: Well, how do you use it, if you use it

at all?

The Witness: I use the information in here as far

as maintenance of the breathing equipment and how

a breathing apparatus is tested and also respiratory

hazards in general.

The Court: Do you use it as part of your teach-

ing? Do you use it instructing your students?

The Witness: Yes, sir, I do.

The Court: All right. You may cross examine on

its authenticity and its source, Counsel, but over ob-

jection, I will allow those answers to stand.

Go ahead.

Mr. Orlove: Do you wish me to examine now?

The Court: No, I don’t mean now. I mean whenever

cross examination is appropriate.

15

salliien

Mr. Sheridan: I have no further questions, your

Honor.

The Court: To enlighten me on the contents of that

manual, may I glance at that, please?

Mr. Sheridan: Perhaps, I should ask him another

question, your Honor.

The Court: Ask him what section is relevant to this

problem.

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. With resnect to the subject matter under con-

sideration by the Court, do you use that book in any

fashion?

A. Yes, siz, I do.

Q. Can you point out the page you are referring

to?

A. On Page 2.

Mr. Sheridan: Would you like me to—

The Court: May I see Page 2, then we will show

it to opposing counsel.

You are referring to the portion marked out in

yellow?

The Witness: On the left-hand page, Judge, your

Honor, and on the—

The Court: All right. At the bottom of Page 2,

Counsel, there is a section here called, “Beards, mous-

taches and sideburns”, and it continues over to the top

of Page 3. I have read it and you may wish to use it

for cross examination.

Mr. Orlove: Yes. May I see it, your Honor?

The Court: Yes.

Any further questions, Counsel?

Mr. Sheridan: No, I do not, your Honor.

16

= =

Cross Examination by Mr. Orlove.

Q. Is it Officer Johnson?

A. Fireman.

Q. What rank do you hold with the Fire Depart-

ment?

A. I’m a Firefighter, First Class.

Q. How long have you held that rank?

A. Nineteen and a half years.

Q. And your present position with the Fire Depart-

ment is an instructor, is that correct?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. How long have you held that position?

A. Approximately five months.

Q. What subjects do you give instruction on?

A. On the self-contained breathing apparatus.

Q. That is the only subject that you are involved

with?

A. Yes, sir, that’s the only one.

Q. And the text book that you looked at, and that

you have identified, is this your only source materia]

with respect to self-contained breathing apparatus?

A. No, sir, I have other material.

Q. Do you recall the day or days that Lt. Muscare

was at the Academy for instruction?

A. Not the exact days, it was some time in Feb-

ruary.

Q. Was it one or more than one day?

A. More than one day.

Q. To your knowledge, Mr. Johnson—strike that.

When—I believe you started giving instruction on

self-contained breathing apparatus—can I call those

masks?

A. Yes, you can.

17

—_§p—

Q. You started giving instructions on mask five

months ago, is that correct?

A. That’s right, sir.

Q. Is that the first time the Fire Department had

any instruction on self-contained breathing apparatus?

4. No, sir, it isn’t.

Q. What material were you given when you were

assigned that job of giving the instruction on the

masks ?

A. I was given a mask program outline, a bulletin

put out by the American Standard—National Stand-

ards Institute, other reprints of bulletins of findings

of masks, And I also have the training book from the

International Fire Chiefs Training School. I believe it

is called “Ifsta”, I’m not sure if I got the right desig-

nation of it or not.

Q. Were instructions being given on masks before

you started five months ago?

A. Yes, sir, they were.

Q. Masks aren’t generally used by all levels of the

Department, are they?

A. What do you mean by all levels of the Depart-

ment, sir?

Q. Well, all units in the Fire Department, do they

all use masks?

A. Yes, sir, they do.

Q. Are you saying everyone is assigned to masks?

A. No, sir, I did not say that.

Q. All right. Which units are assigned to —

Or which units have masks assigned to them?

A. The flying manpower squads, trucks, hook and

ladder companies, engines.

Q. Are you saying that ali hook and ladder com-

panies are assigned masks?

18

19

— oe

No, sir.

Which hook and ladder companies are?

Offhand, I can’t tell you that.

But you know that all of them are not?

That is correct.

Now, you said that when you gave your talk

to the—to that particular company, you were talking

about an objection to facial hair?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

Q. With respect to the mask?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you included in that long siceburns, mous-

taches and beards?

A. And beards, yes, sir.

Q. Aren’t you aware that the Fire Department per-

mits the wearing of moustaches to a certain extent?

A. Yes, sir, to a certain extent.

Q. But you are telling the men, during this instruc-

tion, that moustaches should not be worn when wear-

ing face masks, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. How many men have you given instruction to,

approximately, within the last six weeks?

A. Approximately over 100.

Q. And isn’t it correct that some of those men, aside

from Lt. Muscare, have appeared with moustaches?

A. Yes, they have.

Q. And this is the speech though that you regularly

give to all your groups, that moustaches are not to be

worn in connection with wearing self-contained breath-

ing apparatus, is that correct?

A. Yes, it is.

OPoOoror

20

—$2—

Q. You gave some testimony about the machine

being charged, and I must confess, I don’t quite under-

stand it. What do you mean by “machine”?

A. The apparatus.

Q. What does the apparatus consist of?

A. It consists of your air cylinder, your face piece

and breathing tube, your harness, which the tank is

mounted to, which in turn is put on your back to carry

the apparatus.

Q. You also said something about machines being

charged, what do you mean by “charged”?

A. Activated so that you can use it.

Q. Have you heard of a product called M.S.A.

masks?

A. Yes, I have. ;

Q. Do you know what those are?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

Q. Would you tell the Court, please?

A. M.S.A. mask is a thirty-minute compressed air

mask, used for the protection of firemen or industrial

respiratory systems.

Q. And that is a self-contained breathing appara-

tus, is that correct?

A. That is right, sir.

Q. Tn other words, the air from tanks that are worn

by the individual is used for that individual to breathe,

is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that is the kind of mask that some of the

units on the Fire Department—in the Fire Department

use?

A. Yes.

Q. How long have those masks been used, if you

know, by the Chicago Fire Department?

—63—

I do not know how long, no.

Do you really know if they are used at all?

Yes, sir, they are used.

Some units use them, is that correct?

Some units use them, yes, sir.

And you don’t know which units do and which

units do not?

A. There are some hook and ladder companies,

there are engine companies and the flying squad com-

panies have them.

Q. And some hook and ladder companies do not

use M.S.A. masks, is that correct?

A. The reason they don’t use them, they are not

issued to them as yet.

Q. I see. Well, the fact is that some units do not

use—some hook and ladder trucks do not have any

masks issued to them as of this time, is that correct?

A. I won’t say any masks, they have masks, but it’s

not the M.S.A. mask.

Q. Can you testify—and do you know of your own

knowledge that every hook and ladder truck has some

kind of inask equipment assigned to it? We want your

knowledge.

A. As far as to my knowledge, the hook and ladder

companies do have some type of breathing apparatus.

Q. Now, when you use the word “charging”, do you

mean that somebody actually puts on the equipment

and sees if the air goes—the self-contained air goes

into the mask?

A. That is right, sir.

Q. Isn’t there another way of testing the mask or

an additional way of testing a mask?

OrOorop

22

=

A. Not to my knowledge, it has to be put on to—

it has to be put on the person that is going to wear it,

in order to test it.

Q. Isn’t it correct that a mask can be put on with-

out the tanks and tested by hold the tube—by holding

your hand over the tube?

A. Yes, you can do that.

Q. In fact, isn’t that what is recommended for the

proper use of the mask?

A. That is correct.

Q. Do you tell your men that when you given them

these instructions?

A. No, what I do is go through the procedure of

putting the apparatus to work, I do not mention the

fact that you can put the face piece on and kink the

hose to test it for a seal, because we are going through

the process of putting the apparatus on to work with

it when we are going through the instructions.

Q. Isee. If I understand your testimony then cor-

rectly, you are concerned only with giving the men in-

struction in the total use of the mask, how to put the

tanks on, how to connect the tubes and how to wear

the mask on their faces, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And your instruction does not include any tests

that should be made by the man each individual time

they wear the mask?

A. Yes, sir, there is individual tests that they have

to make. They have to test the regulator of it.

Q. What is the regulator?

A. That is the heart of the apparatus, which reduces

the high pressure air coming from the cylinder into

the regulator, reduces it to a breathable pressure and

also supplies the air to the wearer as he demands it.

— =

Q. I see. You say that is the most important part

23 of the whole apparatus?

A. That is right, without that you can’t operate.

Q. So if those tanks are working properly, and the

pressure is breathing properly, then it can be oper-

ated, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During your instruction to the men, do you also

have them actually put the mask on, on their faces and

test to see whether it is air-tight?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

Q. And will you describe for the Court, how one

would properly test to see if the seal is air-tight?

A. When the face piece is put on the face, there are

five straps, head straps that you must adjust for

tightness, starting at the bottom and then the temple

straps and the top one, if necessary. After that, you

either kink your breathing tube or put your hand over

the bottom and inhale to see if you have a proper seal

on the face piece. If you have a proper seal, the face

piece will collapse; if not, you will detect leaks around

the edge of the face piece.

Q. Or there can be a leak in the tube, isn’t that cor-

rect?

A. That is correct.

Q. In fact, if you kink the tube or squeeze the tube

with your hand, you wouldn’t really be testing it prop-

erly, would you?

A. Well, if you have a kink up close to the face

piece and your leak was down here, you wouldn’t detect

that.

Q. But what if a leak occurred in the tube at the

point where it was being kinked, then that wouldn’t

indicate—that wouldn’t be a proper test, would it?

25

- =

A. I don’t follow you, sir.

Q. Well, if one were to kink the tube—that is grasp

it in a fist—

A. Yes.

Q. —even at the bottom of the tube, and use that

to test the mask, that test would not indicate any leak

that might occur where the fist is holding the tube,

isn’t that correct?

A. It could be, yes.»

Q. Right?

A. Yes.

Q. So the only way to test it is by holding the bot-

tom of the tube with your hand?

A. Not necessarily. Like I say, you can’t kink the

tube. :

Q. You just told us if you did kink the tube that

might not indicate a leak that occurred where you were

kinking the tube.

A. If you had that particular leak right on that

kink where you had it grabbed.

Q. Well, are you suggesting to the men that you

are training that they should kink the tube like that?

A. Yes, sir, I am.

Q. Even though there may be a leak at the point

where they are grasping it with their fist?

A. If there is a leak, it will be discovered, because

when the apparatus is used and they return back to

quarters that apparatus is given a test.

Q. When is the apparatus used?

A. It’s used to perform a rescue, to shut off elec-

trical appliances, gas supply lines, locating the seat of

the fire and also for ventilation.

Q. Well, let me ask you this, Mr. Johnson, if one

were to kink the tube as you suggest and there were,

26

= =

in fact, a leak there, but it could not be detected by

its fist kinking the tube that is—wouldn’t that be dan-

gerous to send that man into a smoke-filled room?

The Court: Counsel, it might be, but I don’t see

how it is relevant to the issues here. It seems that

tightness around the face is the only thing we care

about. And if the tube has holes in it that is a problem

for the Fire Department. I just don’t see where you

are heading with that.

Mr. Orlove: Your Honor, it goes, I think, to the

ability of this witness to speak authoritatively with

respect to the mask.

The Court: All right. We have established that the

way he tests and recommends the test by kinking the

tube, if that has deficiencies, you have established that.

So let’s go on to something else.

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. When you are at your instruction do the men

test the masks themselves?

A. Yes, they do.

Q. So one checks the other to determine if the face

seal is correct?

A. No, the man puts the apparatus on himself in-

dividually.

Q. I see.

A. And he goes through the test himself.

Q. I see. And then the man—each man determines

for himself whether he has attained a good facial seal,

is that correct?

A. Right, yes.

Q. Now, you testified that Lt. Muscare made some

remarks about men in Boston and men in New York

having beards; what was your response to that?

~~

A. Well, I said, “I don’t care what they do in New

York or Boston, I am concerned with the men here.”

And I also went and got an article for him to look

at, but he showed very little interest in it, in regard

to facial seal.

Q. Directing your attention particularly to the

event when Mr.—or Lt. Muscare was at the Fire Aca-

demy, did you testify that he did not put the mask on?

A. I did.

Q. How many men were present at that time, when

the mask was being tested?

Mr. Sheridan: Could I make an objection, your

Honor? I think that the students were requested to put

the mask on on both days. And I think the question

might be—

The Court: I assume the same class both times.

And he did testify that there were about five men

in the class. |

If you want to pin it down further on either day,

go ahead.’

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. How many masks were available to the men at

the time they were putting them on?

A. On the first day of the class I have one mask

that I use for demonstration purposes.

Q. Did the men put masks on on that day?

A. Yes, they did.

. They put on that one mask?

A. That is right, they did. And the second day we

had two masks, and the reason I use the two masks is

because I want both companies to use the one mask

to lower the pressure in the cylinder, so that the audi-

alarm will ring so that they know what it sounds like.

—_$o

And it won’t be a strange feeling to them. But there

were two masks available. You see, the cylinder is

charged to 2,216 pound pressure per square inch and

with the two companies using one mask, you can lower

the pressure in the tanks quicker than you can if you

use two masks, so we use the one mask until the alarm

rings then we use the other mask.

Q. If I understand your testimony correctly, you

are using one mask to check the pressure situation

and you are using the other mask to try it on for

a face seal, is that what you are saying?

A. No, no, we use the one mask—put it in opera-

tion, so the men walk to the 5th floor of the drill

academy, walk up and walk back down. Then the com-

panies—each man on the company—on both companies

—I have two companies a day—each mar. puts it on

and walks up and down the stairs.

Q. You mean you have five men in each company,

is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And if you had two companies, then you had

ten men?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had either one or two masks and ten

men?

A. The second day I have two masks, right.

Q. Are you saying that the class—everyone in the

class waits while one man puts on the mask and walks

up to the—

A. No, we are discussing things.

Q. Iam asking you now about putting on the mask,

at what point in your instruction—

A. One man at a time walks to the 5th floor, and

we are in a group there discussing things, and maybe

—_70—

questions will come up that one of the men wants to

know something.

Q. You mean while one man is walking up to the

5th floor, the others remain with you in the discus-

sion?

A. That is correct.

Q. Now, these classes then, you have Firefighters

or Firemen First Class, and their lieutenant, is that

correct?

A. Yes, or it could be a captain.

Q. Or a captain?

A. Yes.

Q. And Muscare is a lieutenant, is that correct?

A. That is correct, yes.

Q. And you look to him as an officer to assist you,

do you not—

A. Yes.

Q. —in drilling with the men—

A. Yes.

Q. —is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And in fact, Lt. Muscare did cooperate with you

and assist you in drilling the men, assigning them

whatever roles had to be assigned in the drill?

A. That is correct.

Q. He cooperated fully with you on that?

A. Yes, he cooperated fully.

Q. Sure.

I believe you testified, near the end of your exam-

ination on direct, that you said after Muscare’s com-

pany left, you reported something to someone.

A. I didn’t say I reported, I said I had a discus-

sion.

31

—_—,

With whom did you have a discussion?

Chief Prohaska.

And what is his position?

Chief Prohaska is the Drillmaster.

Well, you have discussions with him often, don’t

you, about the work going on in the academy?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

Q. Was Lt. Muscare the subject of that discussion?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What did you say to Chief Prohaska?

A. I just mentioned about the beard that he had

on his face.

Q. Do you call what Lt. Muscare has on his face

a beard?

A. I call that a beard, yes, sir.

Q. Haven’t you heard the word “goatee”?

A. I am not a qualified barber or hairdresser, I

don’t know a goatee from a beard, sir.

Q. You termed what he has as a beard?

A. Yes, sir, I would term that as a beard.

Q. And you also term what he has on his upper

lip as a moustache?

A. From what I can see, I would say it is a mous-

tache.

Q. Did you tell Chief Prohaska that he has a mous-

tache?

A. No, I did not say he has a moustache.

(). What is it then that vou told Chief Prohaska

concerning Lt. Muscare?

A. The discussion was about his beard. Due to the

fact that he wears a beard, he wouldn’t get a good seal

on the face piece.

Q. You testified that he didn’t put on the face piece,

didn’t you?

OProreo

32

—72—

A. That is correct.

Q. So you don’t know whether he could get a good

seal or not, do you?

A. No, because I have no way of checking.

Q. So you don’t know if he could get a good seal

on that or not, isn’t that correct?

A. According to articles that I have read and tests

that have been performed, men with facial hair will

not get a good seal on their apparatus.

Q. Iam not asking you now about articles you have

read, I am asking you, is it not correct you have no

immediate knowledge of whether Lt. Muscare could

get a good seal or not? You did not see him put on

the mask, isn’t that correct?

A. That is right. ;

Mr. Sheridan: I will object to that question. I think

the witness has been asked and answered the question.

He basically stated that he never saw Lt. Muscare

with the mask on. Based on the articles he has read,

facial hair will interfere—

The Court: It has been asked and answered now.

The answer may stand. The objection is overruled.

I assume you are through v. th that particular ques-

tion, Counsel.

Mr. Orlove: That particular one, yes, your Honor.

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. Isn't it a fact, Officer Johnson, that there are

a number of factors that can affect a good facial seal?

A. That is correct.

Q. What are those factors?

A. Eyeglasses—

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I will object to it as

being immaterial. The issue here is whether or not

~ =

facial hair—well, I just feel whatever else might affect

the seal seems to me to be not relevant, your Honor.

The Court: The objection is overruled. You may

answer.

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. What other factors affect the seal on a face

mask?

A. Eyeglasses, dentures, oddly shaped faces, or if

a man had sores or boils along the face piece, he

couldn’t get a good seal there either.

Q. In fact, haven’t you learned from your reading

that turning the head affects the face seal?

A. Not if the face piece is secured, just by turning

your head, no.

Q. Haven’t you read that coughing or smiling af-

fects the face seal?

A. No, I have not.

Q. When you mentioned dentures, aren’t you really

saying that some people have their face structured

differently than others?

A. That is correct.

Q. There is a bone structure involved or a fatty

skin tissue involved, and those factors may affect the

seal?

A. Yes.

Q. And isn’t it true, you have seen men come be-

fore you who could not get a perfect seal, by reason

of a jutting jaw or some other characteristic other than

hair that prevented a good seal? Haven’t you seen

that?

A. The men I have seen have all got a good seal.

And I can tell it is a good seal, because when they

kink the tube or use the bottom of the tube, the face

35

= =

piece will collapse on their face and it will stay col-

lapsed as long as they hold it.

Q. And that includes men that have come before

you with moustaches, isn’t that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. They get a good seal?

A. That is correct.

Q. So then the articles you have read about face

hair affecting the seal aren’t wholly correct, as far

as the moustache is concerned; you know that from

your own observation, don’t you? Isn’t that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. So you know that from your own immediate ob-

servation at your academy, some of the books you have

read are inaccurate when they say that somebody with

a moustache can’t get a good seal?

Mr. Sheridan: Well, I will object, your Honor, the

question has been asked and answered.

The Court: The objection is sustained.

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. Mr. Johnson—-or Officer Johnson, isn’t it cor-

rect you have also had firemen come to you for in-

struction with, what one might term as sideburns, long

sideburns, down to the middle or the bottom of the

ears?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. And isn’t it correct that you have seen these

men put on the mask and obtain a good seal, even

though they have sideburns, as what you consider long,

to the bottom of their ear?

A. The Fire Department regulations say the side-

burns will be to the middle of the ear.

Q. All right. I didn’t ask you what the Fire De-

partment regulations said.

36

= =

A. Would you let me finish my answer? Do you

want an answer?

The Court: Just a moment, the answer was not

responsive. Restate the ,uestion.

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. Isn’t it correct that firemen have come to your

academy for instruction, having sideburns at the mid-

point in the ear or to the lower lobe of the ear?

A. Yes.

Q. Firemen have come to your academy in that

way?

A. Yes.

Q. And isn’t it correct that they have put on the

face mask, pursuant to your instructions, and have at-

tained a good seal?

A. As far as I know, I mean I can’t—I can’t say

definitely that it’s a good seal.

Q. You are there to determine whether they are

using the apparatus correctly, are you not?

A. That is correct.

Q. And wouldn’t that be vital to the use of the

apparatus to make sure that it is air-tight?

A. That is correct.

Q. So, I assume that you are checking the men that

you instruct?

A. I certainly am.

Q. To determine whether they are obtaining an air-

tight seal?

A. That I am.

Q. So that these men with moustaches and long side-

burns are achieving a good seal?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have seen that yourself?

37

- =

A. Ihave seen it, yes.

Q. In your reading, with respect to the face masks

or self-contained breathing apparatus, have you also

read that there is no such thing as a perfect, one-

hundred per cent seal?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. That in every case, even one who is clean-shaven,

there is an element of leakage, isn’t that correct?

A. From what I have read, yes.

Q. You know, as a firefighter of many years, that

a fireman cannot be clean-shaven immediately before

a run or a ¢all, don’t you?

A. That is correct. We start work at 8:00 o’clock

in the morning and we may get a run at 3:00 or 4:00

o’clock in the afternoon.

Q. And one may have a face stubble or some hair

stubble of a beard, right?

A. It could be.

Q. And I am sure the Fire Department doesn’t re-

quire their men to shave before they make the run,

right?

A. That is correct.

Q. Do you recall ever coming across an article or

reading an article from the Los Alamos Scientific Lab-

oratory, from the University of California, concern-

ing facial hair with the use of masks?

A. No, sir, I haven’t.

Q. Have you ever come across any articles, or this

one in particular, where you have read that small

moustaches and small Vandyke beards will probably

present no difficulty to a face mask?

A. No, sir, I haven’t.

Q. Mr. Witness, if I may show you the booklet or

the book that you identified in your examination.

39

= =

Mr. Orlove: And with the Court’s permission, if I

may read the first sentence?

The Court: Go ahead.

Mr. Orlove: I would like to read it in view of the

witness.

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. It says here, does it not, Mr. Johnson, that, “In

recent years, a number of court cases developed when

fire department personnel challenged orders requiring

them to be clean-shaven in order that they could wear

breathing apparatus face pieces safely.”

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I will object to that

question. I think it is this Court’s function to deter-

mine what the law is.

The Court: Well, it is. I have already read that

section. I am aware that there is a division of author-

ity, but I don’t know that the witness’ conclusion on

the point would be helpful, Counsel.

Mr. Orlove: I will withdraw the question, your

Honor.

The Court: All right.

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. I assume, Officer Johnson, that you have had ac-

tual firefighting experience?

A. Yes, sir, I have.

Q. And have you ever operated under firefighting

—actual firefighting conditions with face masks and

breathing apparatus?

A. Yes, sir, I have.

Q. Then you know, do you not that before each in-

stance when a man would put on the equipment, it

should be tested each time, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

-_ =

Q. And that no man would go in and use that equip-

ment if there was any leakage, is that right?

A. Either leakage or a malfunction in the appara-

tus.

Q. Then one certainly would not use that equip-

ment, the Fire Department wouldn’t request them to

use that equipment?

A. That is right.

Mr. Orlove: Nothing further, at this time, your

Honor.

The Court: Any redirect, Counsel?

Mr. Sheridan: Just a few questions.

Redirect Examination by Mr. Sheridan.

Q. Mr. Johnson, look at Exhibit 2 for identifica-

tion; and I ask you if you recognize that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Tell us, briefly, what it is?

A. That is a tape recording that is played along

with the slide program.

Q. And in your testimony, you also mentioned some-

thing about some of the other information that you

read, was the American National Standards Institute

publications, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir. |

Q. I would like to show you what has been marked

as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 2; and ask you if you recog-

nize that document?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

Q. Is that the document you are referring to?

A. Yes, sir, this is the one I am referring to.

Mr. Orlove: I object to those, your Honor, being

offered at this time on redirect examination.

41

= =

The Court: I don’t know whether they have been

offered or not.

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I would offer them.

The Court: Well, the recording, we have already

heard testimony as to what is on the tape, I don’t think

it adds anything to the evidence we have already heard.

What is the booklet or whatever the document was?

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, the other document, I

will hand to the Court, your Honor.

The Court: Yes. All right. Over objection you may

introduce that document ai this time. Give it to coun-

sel, he may wish to cross examine further on it. And

I will allow him to do so.

Mr. Sheridan: I have no further questions.

The Court: The offer of this tape is refused. There

is a reference—

Mr. Orlove: I beg the Court’s pardon, I didn’t hear

the Court’s ruling.

The Court: I said, over objection that document

may be admitted. The tape is refused. And I call your

attention to Page 9, which has a crucial section here.

And I said you may cross examine additionally on

that, if you wish.

(Whereupon, the document previously marked

Defendant’s Exhibit No. 2, for identification, was

received in evidence.)

Mr. Orlove: I might say, your Honor, perhaps, on

or off the record, we had no—of course, this is an

expedited proceeding, we had no indication what tack

the Government was going to take in its defense. So

if I could indulge the Court and ask for some time—

The Court: You may, Counsel, but I just saw it for

the first time—I think there is only two sentences in

onlin

there that are relevant to the issues here. And I am

sure you can glance at them and then cross examine

further, if you to, on them.

Mr. Orlove: Thank you, your Honor.

Just, perhaps, a few questions, your Honor.

If I understand the Court, this pamphlet is going

into evidence?

The Court: Yes, it is.

Recross Examination by Mr. Orlove.

Q. Officer Johnson, when did you first see the docu-

ment which is in evidence, as Defendant’s Exhibit

No. 2?

A. I saw that when I first started giving my in-

structions.

Q. When was that, sir?

A. Approximately five months ago.

Q. So that would be some time in November, is it,

or October?

A. Right, some time in November.

Q. Are you sure of that?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. I direct your attention to the inside page, which

indicates the date here of “Approved, January 8th”—

I’m sorry, I withdraw the question.

Having looked this over and I haven’t had time to

read the whole thing, can you tell us if, anywhere in

Defendant’s Exuibit 2, there is a definition of beard?

A. ‘There is no definition, no.

Q. And the document says, sideburns, unusual fa-

cial contours; is there any definition or description or

pictures in here of what is considered a beard?

A. No, sir, there isn’t.

—81—

Mr. Orlove: No further questions, your Honor.

The Court: Anything further from this witness?

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, if I may make this

statement with respect to the City’s—Defendant’s Xx-

hibit 2. I have heard that—and my purpose in offer-

ing it was that when they speak of the—on that tape,

when they speak of —

Mr. Orlove: I object to the remarks as to what the

tape says. The tape is not in evidence.

The Court: Well, I don’t think it is important to

put it into evidence, Counsel. It has been refused and

44 I won’t reverse that ruliug.

Mr. Sheridan: Fine, your Honor.

The Court: 1 and 2 have been admitted.

Is there anything further.

Mr. Sheridan: Nothing further.

Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

The Court: You are excused, sir. Thank you.

(Witness excused.)

The Court: Call your next witness.

You recall, sir, that you were administered an oath

earlier?

The Witness: Yes, sir.

The Court: And your name, please?

The Witness: Al Lundin, A-l, L-u-n-d-i-n.

The Court: Your address, sir?

The Witness: 1345 Michelle.

The Court: Is that Chicago?

The Witness: Palatine.

The Court: And your business or occupation?

The Witness: I am District Sales Manager for Mine

Safety Appliances Company.

The Court: Go ahead, Counsel.

45

46

—82—

AL LUNDIN, called as a witness on behalf of the de-

fendant, having been previously duly sworn, was

examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination by Mr. Sheridan.

Q. Can you tell the Court what Mine Safety Ap-

pliances Company is, please?

A. They are a manufacturer, located in Pittsburgh,

of devices for personal protective devices of various

kinds, such as hard hats, goggles, dust respirators, in-

struments for detecting toxicant materials.

Q. Now, does your company sell various self-con-

tained breathing apparatuses to any fire department?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And in this area, can you-tell us what depart-

ments or city agencies you sell these apparatuses to?

A. Yes, most of this is done through fire depart-

ment distributors, in some cases we do sell direct, but

generally through fire department distributors located

throughout the country.

Q. Does your company furnish the City of Chicago

Fire Department with any self-contained breathing ap-

paratus?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, in addition to being District Sales Man-

ager for Mine Safety Appliances, do you teach any

course with respect to the safety aspects of these safety

devices?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Can you tell us where you teach this course?

A. At the National Safety Council here in Chicago.

Q. Briefly, can you tell us what the National Safety

Council is?

47

—83—

A. This is probably the safety organization in the

country that coordinates record-keeping, dispenses in-

formation to—it has various sections, industrial sec-

tions, mining sections, chemical sections, home and

farm sections, agricultural sections.

Q. Can you tell us what subject you are associated

with with that institution?

A. All right. I teach basics of respiratory protec-

tion to the basics of industrial hygiene group to the

Council.

Q. And does your teaching in all encompass the

field of self-contained breathing apparatuses?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. Can you tell us who attends these classes?

A. Generally safety directors, really from through-

out the world, but primarily from various companies

throughout the United States, major companies, as well

as small companies.

Q. Generally can you just tell us what fields are

encompassed when you conduct these classes?

A. A large part of the class is taken up with eur-

rent laws governing the selection and use of respiratory

devices. And then actual samples are on hand and we

discuss the three main basic types of respiratory de-

vices from the mechanical filter, sma!! mechanical filter

apparatus into a self contained breathing apparatus.

Q. Now, with respect to the law, is the Occupational

Safety and Health Act in any way involved?

A. Yes.

Mr. Orlove: Objection, your Honor.

The Court: What is the basis for the objection,

Counsel?

Mr. Orlove: Well, counsel seems to be eliciting tes-

timony now with respect to the witness’ legal conclu-

—34—

sions or conclusions as to the state of the law, which

is not appropriate.

The Court: Well, it isn’t, but maybe he knows more

about the Occupational Safety Act than we do. Let’s

hear him and we will decide, in any event.

Go ahead.

The Witness: What was the question?

Mr. Sheridan: You do, is that correct?

The Court: Is the Occupational Safety Act in any

way involved; and I think the answer was yes. Go on

from there.

The Witness: Yes, very much so. It is now the out-

growth of the William Steiger Act, which was intended

to add additional protection to the industrial—and I

believe—municipal worker in the United States. So it

became law on, I think, April of ’71, I believe, the

Occupational Safety and Health Act.

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. What standards are used? Do they refer to any

standards in that act?

A. Yes. As a matter of fact, the standards were set

up—the standards references within the act were set

up prior to the law coming into effect. So that the law,

for the most part, either references standards already

in existence—

Q. What standards would they be, can you tell us?

Mr. Orlove: Your Honor, again I would like to

object, for two reasons. Number one, when we are talk-

ing about standards set forth in an act, the act is

available for all of us to read, as lawyers and judges.

Number two, as I am listening to the testimony there

does not seem to be any connection made with respect

to the facts in this case.

49

=~ =

The Court: I don’t see it yet, either.

But I assume, Counsel, that you interd ultimately

to—well, there is no jury here—let’s discuss this?

Where are you heading with this, is there an incor-

poration of the National Safety Council standards into

the act; is that what you are leading to?

Mr. Sheridan: Well, it’s my understanding, your

Honor, that within the Occupational Safety and Health

Act, they encompass the standards of the American

National Standards Institute.

The Court: All right. Is this witness going to be

able to testify to your expectation that there is some

such standard that will apply precisely to this face

mask question? Is that what you expect now, I assume

that is where you are heading?

Mr. Sheridan: Well, it was my impression, your

Honor, that this in some regards was the American

National Standards Institute.

The Court: I see. All right, then over objection,

you may go ahead. This is leading up to some connec-

tion with your Exhibit 2, I assume?

Mr. Sheridan: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: All right. Go ahead.

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. Mr. Lundin, we’d appreciate it if you’d look at

Exhibit 2; and are those the standards you refer to,

with respect to the standards that were adopted or

referred to by OSHA?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, during the conducting of your classes, do

you have any occasion to discuss with them the ob-

taining of a facial seal on self-contained breathing

apparatuses?

51

—_96—

Mr. Orlove: Your Honor, again I object, because if

where it is taking us, we have no foundation of a con-

nection in this case that Chicago Fire Department of-

ficials or personnel are subject to or bound by Mr.

Lundin’s interpretation of OSHA or his lectures.

The Court: Let me ask, Mr. Lundin, whether you

are familiar with the self-contained breathing appara-

tus that is used by the Chicago Fire Department?

The Witness: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: Is it your company or your sales effort

that has had something to do with their buying this

equipment?

The Witness: No, these were sold through our dis-

tributor.

The Court: But you are familiar with the equip-

ment that they use and which has been the subject of

earlier testimony? I note that you were in the court-

room during the earlier testimony?

The Witness: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: Then with regard not to the general

face masks or anything of that sort, and limiting your

answers to this particular equipment used by the

Chicago Fire Department, with which you are familiar,

you can go ahead on that line.

Mr. Sheridan: Okay.

The Court: Let the record indicate that it is over

objection, so that counsel may make his record.

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. With respect to the self-contained breathing ap-

paratuses used by the Chicago Fire Department, can

you tell the Court what, if any, in your opinion, would

be the effect of facial hair on obtaining a facial seal?

Mr. Orlove: I object to an opinion by this individ-

ual, as not being qualified as an expert.

52

=

The Court: Over objection, you may answer. Go

ahead.

By the Witness:

A. Yes, I rather firmly take the stand that facial

hair, by law, by the ANSC standards, and from my

vwn observations would affect a facial seal.

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. Can you tell us in what manner it would affect

a facial seal?

A. It’s looked upon as a facial seal being the main

point that has to be obtained in any type of respiratory

device, whatever type it might be—and this is brought

out in, I guess, various studies that have been made—

without affecting this seal, you cannot only conceivably

affect the operation of the apparatus, but certainly

your breathing toxic materials or the possibility of

breathing of toxic materials through the face piece and

into the wearer.

Q. Now, if someone places an order with your com-

pany and obtains a certain type of self-contained

breathing apparatus, they come in standard sizes, is

that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And do these sizes fit all people?

A. We certainly intend that they should. There may

be—I think we say something on the order of ninety-

seven, ninety-eight per cent of all the people we expect

to fit them with, yes.

Q. Now, if one person were to be able to obtain

a seal with some facial hair, would that necessarily

mean that ail others would also?

A. No, this has to do with the facial—different facial

sizes and shapes and so forth. So that you can say

=~ =

that an individual who could form a seal, with the

variously shaped moustache or whatever, doesn’t mean

that that same size moustache or beard on another type

of face would affect a seal. And I have noticed a tre-

mendous variance, where you have a big, heavy-set

face versus the narrow smaller face, on the position-

ing of the face piece on the face. It makes a tremen-

dous difference.

Q. Would the presence of facial hair even if a per-

son—assume a person were to obtain a seal, would

the presence of facial hair in any way affect his ability

to maintain that seal?

A. Yes, I would say so.

Q. Why would you say so, sir?

A. Well, it’s bound to. As I mentioned before, it

is very difficult to form a seal to the face under the

best conditions, and facial hair of any type is going

to endanger that. And to the extent that, perhaps, you

can affect a seal, but the seal is not as strong. So that

as he would do various things during his operation,

this seal could be broken conceivable—or more easily

broken.

Q. Mr. Lundin, is it correct or incorrect that some-

times the only person who can tell if there is an effec-

tive seal would be the person wearing the mask?

A. That is correct.

Q. That is correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And approximately on the—or where does the

seal end, in relation to the neck, can you tell us that?

A. It is going to vary considerably with the facial

type of the individual.

—39—

54 QQ. Do you have any publication or sales brochure

59

which would indicate the type of mask worn by the

Chicago Fire Department?

A. Yes. There are three main types, all of them

within the Chicago Department; that is, different styles

of manufacture. This is the more recent one. And then

you have what you eall a clear-view.

Mr. Sheridan: Would you please mark this as De-

fendant’s Exhibit 4?

(The document was thereupon marked Defend-

ant’s Exhibit No. 4 for identification, 3/19/74.)

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. I would like to show you Exhibit 4, and that is

the publication of MSA that you were looking at, is

that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you identify for the Court, please, the pages

on which the mask that the Chicago Fire Department

has?

A. All right. That is on Page 24, is the Chicago

Fire Department mask. And you can get—did you want

these other face masks too?

Q. If you will just name a page and point out the

one that the Chicago Fire Department has?

A. Page 24, the Chicago Fire Department has.

Q. Now, you indicated—is that the exact—are there

any variations in the self-contained breathing ap-

paratus that the Chicago Fire Department has, opposed

to the photograph shown on Page 24 of this publica-

tion?

A. No.

Q. Are there any other pages where the Chicago

Fire Department has some of this equipment?

56

— =

A. Yes, I believe there are. Page 23, the Chemox

mask represents another type. However, the ones that

the Chicago Fire Department has do have different

face pieces than the one pictured.

Q. So you have indicated Pages 23 and 24; are

there any other masks that you know that the Chicago

Fire Department has?

A. I don’t believe so, you may have some of the

older styles of that shown on Page 24.

Q. Now, are the stylings of these masks changed

at various times through research and development

or one thing or another?

A. Yes, they are. More through changes in the laws,

or one thing or another.

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, at this time, I would

like to offer this as an exhibit.

Mr. Orlove: I object, your Honor, because just a

picture of the mask, I don’t think it tells the Court

anything. There is really a serious question as to

whether this witness has any direct knowledge of what

the Chicago Fire Department has.

The Court: He has testified that he has.

So what it’s worth, it may be admitted, over objec-

tion.

Mr. Orlove: Did the Court say it will be received?

The Court: Yes, it may be admitted for whatever

it may be worth.

(The document previously marked Defendant’s

Exhibit No. 4 for identification was received in

evidence. )

The Court: It isn’t as good as a mask, but it is

better than nothing.

Go ahead, Counsel.

57

—

By Mr. Sheridan:

Q. Mr. Lundin, based upon the mask that the Chi-

cago Fire Department has in operation, do you have

an opinion whether or not the presence of a goatee—

such as worn by the plaintiff in this case—would ad-

versely affect—whether or not it would adversely affect

the obtaining and maintaining of a good facial seal on

a self-contained breathing apparatus?

Mr. Orlove: I object, your Honor.

The Court: Over objection, you may testify. Do

you have such an opinion?

The Witness: Yes.

The Court: And what is it?

The Witness: I would be very skeptical of it, yes,

of being able to maintain a good seal.

Mr. Sheridan: I have no further questions of the

witness?

The Court: Do you wish to cross examine, Coun-

sel?

Mr. Orlove: Yes, your Honor.

Cross Examination by Mr. Orlove.

Q. Is it correct, you do work for MSA Company?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And if I understand your testimony correct, you

do not sell masks directly to the Chicago Fire Depart-

ment?

A. No, we deal—we go through a distributor here.

@. And as far as you know, perhaps the Chicago

Fire Department buys from a distributor in Chicago

or elsewhere?

A. Right.

Q. And you don’t have that information?

08

59

=

A. No—well, at the time it occurs, it generally goes

out on a bid-type of thing, we are aware of this through

the distributor, we are aware of it.

Q. You are not certain what equipme: * they may

have from other sources?

What did he tell you about this case?

Very little, other than—in fact, I didn’t learn

of it until last evening, late yesterday afternoon. And

he asked if I would come in and stand by if asked to

submit testimony.

Q. Of course, you have never met Mr. Muscare or

Lt. Museare before?

A. No, sir.

Q. He is the man sitting at the counsel table.

A. Not to my knowledge, no.

Q. And, of course, you have never seen him put on

either your mask or other manufacturer’s equipment?

A. No, sir.

Q. Is that correct? ©

A. No, sir. That is right.

Q. Now, did I understand you correctly that you

said any hair of any type will affect the seal?

A. Ihave to be very suspicious of it. I would sus-

pect that it would affect the seal.

Q. Any facial hair?

A. Well, you are splitting hairs there. Pardon the

pun? —

Q. Pardon the pun?

A. Oh, no.

Q. Who asked you to testify today?

A. Chief Foley.

Q. Chief who?

A. Foley.

Q.

A.

—93—

A. Yes. Well, I have to be suspicious of it. Certain-

ly anything that is going to interrupt that seal is not

desirable. And now it becomes, I suppose, a matter of

degrees. So if I have to make a statement, and I do

have to make a statement, in schooling and so on, I try

to get rid of the idea that hair is not a good thing,

it interrupts and interferes with a good seal.

Q. You were in the courtroom, were you not, when

Officer Johnson testified as to instances he has per-

sonally seen where men with moustaches have tested

the equipment?

A. Yes.

Q. And they have attained a good seal?

A. Yes.

Q. Does that surprise you or shock you?

A. Oh, no, not at all.

Q. So then it is possible for facial—for one with

facial hair to attain a good seal?

A. Correct.

Q. In fact, isn’t it also possible that one with hair

on his chin, as opposed to a moustache, could also at-

tain a good seal?

Yes, it’s possible.

Doesn’t it depend on the face?

A great deal on the face.

The structure of the face, is that correct?

Well, that is one of the things, yes.

Or the size of the jaw, if one were to be wear-

ing hair on his jaw, isn’t that correct?

A. That is right, yes. That is one of the reasons

I have to be suspicious, because of the various sizes

of the face.

Orroroo,

61

—94—

Q. Well, being suspicious—and I suppose you mean

you are personally suspicious, your own idea that you

are suspicious?

A. Well, may I respond to that?

Q. Well, let me ask you a question first?

A. All right. Fine.

Q. While being suspicious, you recognize that there

is a possibility that one with a small goatee may still

attain a good seal?

A. Certainly.

Q. One with a moustache may attain a good seal?

A. Certainly may, yes, they may.

Q. Then, by looking at Lt. Muscare, as he is sitting

here, you can’t tell whether he could get a good seal

or not, can you? ,

A. No, this was my indication, I suspect: there would

be problems.

Q. But you don’t know?

A. No.

Q. Isn’t it a fact that every man who becomes fa-

miliar with the equipment of self-contained breathing

apparatus should determine for himself whether he

has a good seal?

A. Because of the nature of the test, he is really

the only one that can tell whether he has a good seal.

Q. Really, there is another reason too; isn’t it that

he is the man that is going to go into an adverse or

dangerous situation and risk his life with toxicity and

smoke inhalation?

A. Well, what he is doing—

Q. He is the one that has to secure in his own mind

that he can live with that mask on?

A. Well, he is checking out the apparatus and to be

sure that it is operating functionally and it is oper-

62

—95—

ating properly with the apparatus, or it is operating

properly on him, and this is the purpose of the test

that he is conducting.

Q. So if a man were to say to you, I have put on

the mask and I know how it works and I have a good

seal, you would be confident in that remark, wouldn’t

you?

A. Yes.

Q. You wouldn’t question the man, would you?

Mr. Sheridan: Well, I will object, your Honor,

whether he would question a hypothetical man under

a hypothetical situation.

The Court: Objection sustained. You made your

point.

Mr. Orlove: Your Honor, all of the direct exam-

ination has been hypothetical.

The Court: It’s true, but I don’t think it is rel-

evant whether an individual can get a good seal, no

matter how much facial hair he has. It is relevant

whether the Fire Department can reasonably prohibit

facial hair in the interest of getting a good seal. The

individual case is illustrative, but I think you have

gone as far with it as you can.

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. You are aware, are you not, that there are other

factors that can affect the seal, besides facial hair?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what are those?

A. I think Mr. Johnson spelled them out very well.

Eyeglass frames or temples, lack of dentures, possibly.

Q. Coughing?

A. No, as a matter of fact that doesn’t necessarily

interrupt the—affect the seal. During the tests required

—96—

63 by the Bureau of Mines, and now apparently NIAC,

this is one of the tests required to be passed on before

an apparatus can be certified or receive an approval

is to wear it into—you actually put individuals—there

is bench test, then they put individuals into an odor-

ant—a room full of odorants and they are required to

go through a number of actions, including chewing and

talking and various things. And should they detect any

odorant coming through, then that is an indication of,

perhaps, they better leave. So really this is one of the

things they want to watch for is that they can main-

tain a seal while an individual does normal things, such

as coughing and talking and so on.

Q. Haven’t you observed or read among various

studies some writers have given an opinion that a small

moustache and a small goatee probably will not affect

the seal?

A. I can’t say that I have read that, no. I have

read a number of—I try to read as much of the stuff

as I can, and do read a lot of it. I can’t specifically

recall having seen that. But certainly I have no reason

to doubt it.

Q. Pardon?

A. I have no reason to doubt it.

Q. I believe you said that there have been some

studies that indicate that perhaps the standard-sized

mask will not fit three per cent of the population; did

I understand that correctly?

A. Yes. I would hate to be held to that figure, but

it is certainly in that area.

Q. In those studies do they indicate what types or

what varieties there are that make up that three per

cent figure?

~ =

A. Not to my recollection, I don’t recall that spe-

cifically,

Q. Isn’t it correct that there is no such thing as

a perfect seal at all times, an absolute 100 per cent

seal?

. A. I understand that, yes, from personal observa-

tion, putting them on and where you go through the

operation that Mr. Johnson mentioned—which is ree-

ommended procedure—and when you inhale and hold

that tube, you can feel no leakage at all and you feel

the tube—the face piece extending, I feel that I can

hold it twenty-four hours, if I can hold my breath

that long, it feels like there is absolutely no leakage

at all and it is sucked tightly to the face, to me that

is a perfect seal. I understand then can hook up with

the equipment and detect in the parts-per-million range

for various odorants that are being introduced around

the face piece, I guess, and determine that in a parts-

per million range, they can pick up leakage inside this

face piece. And I have no reason, again, to doubt these

studies, I assume they are true. I am sure they are.

Q. Do you have any knowledge or recollection as

to when the City of Chicago purchased these masks

from your distributors?

A. Well, they have had masks of ours that go way

back, long before my time, here in the City of Chicago.

The most recent purchase was, I believe, this past fall,

I would say fall through winter.

Q. Fall through winter of 1973-74?

A. Yes, I am thinking—I don’t recall just exactly

when the purchase was, delivery was continuing, I

think the purchase was made last summer, I wouldn’t

swear to that.

—98—

Q. Has delivery been completed, to your knowl-

edge?

A. To my knowledge, it has.

Q. Do you know the quantity of that order?

A. I believe it was 150 apparatuses.

Q. 150 face—

A. Complete apparatus.

Q. There is more than 150 firemen in the Chicago

Fire Department, aren’t there?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Do you know anything about this particular pur-

chase, was it designed to equip every firefighter with

his own mask?

A. Ihave no idea.

Q. The most recent purchase was the 150 items?

A. Yes.

Mr. Orlove: No further cross examination.

The Court: Any redirect?

Redirect Examination by Mr. Sheridan.

Q. You indicated you were contacted yesterday

afternoon by the Fire Department, is that correct?

A. Right.

Q. Have you ever been contacted at any other time

recently with respect to a similar issue?

A. By the Fire Department?

Q. No, by anybody else other than the Fire Depart-

ment.

A. On similar mask problems?

Q. Similar circumstances, yes.

A. Just generally mask problems?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Just within the last three weeks, have you re-

ceived any phone calls from anyone?

—99—

A. Oh, yes, I did.

Q. Approximately how long ago was that?

A. A week ago, I would say.

Mr. Sheridan: I have no further questions, your

Honor.

67 Mr. Orlove: Nothing further.

The Court: You are excused. Thank you.

The Witness: Thank you, your Honor.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. Sheridan: I just have one last witness, your

Honor.

The Court: All right. Call him.

You have already taken an oath?

The Witness: Yes, sir.

The Court: All right. And your name, please, sir?

The Witness: William F. Foley.

The Court: And your rank in the Fire Department?

The Witness: I am the Acting Chief Fire Mashal.

The Court: I assume that answers your business

or occupation.

Gio ahead, Counsel.

WILLIAM F. FOLEY, called as a witness on behalf

of the defendant, having been previously duly sworn,

was examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination by Mr. Sheridan.

Q. Chief Foley, did the Chicago Fire Department

recently obtain some additional self-contained breath-

ing apparatuses?

A. Yes, sir, they did. During the calendar year 1973

68 we purchased 150 complete units.

Q. And for the year 1974, do you have any idea

how much money has been budgeted to the Chicago

69

Fire Department for the purchase of additional self-

contained breathing apparatus?

A. For this year? No, sir, I couldn’t tell you the

dollar amount. We do have funds available for breath-

ing gear, yes, sir.

Q. Do you know what the amount was for 1973?

A. No, offhand, I couldn’t give you an exact dollar

amount, but the average price-per-unit is a little short

of $400. So you could multiply 400 by 150 and you

arrive at the budgeted figure. We did spend all of the

budgeted figure for the appropriation of gear.

Q. Now, with respect to the duties of a lieutenant

in the Fire Department, would such a person have as

much cause to use this apparatus as any other fire-

fighter within the Department assigned to a working

unit?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, with respect to the—the Chicago Fire De-

partment does not have enough “=ssks, colf contained

breathing apparatus for each fireman, does it?

A. That is correct. There was no intention ever to

do this.

Q. Can you tell the Court how the Fire Department

has distributed the self-contained breathing appara-

tuses that they do have?

A. We originally adopted a self-contain breathing

apparatus program back in 1958. At that time the

distribution of gear was two masks per hook and lad-

der company, five masks per squad company. Now,

over the years, we have developed a new mask, new

equipment and we have augmented this when we retired

some of the older masks. At the present time Inven-

tory Control assigns to each hook and ladder two self-

70

—101—

contained breathing gears. Now, I am not saying spe-

cifically the type in question here, but there are two

breathing gears assigned. Some trucks temporarily

may be out of masks, due to the fact that they are in

for repair and so forth and there is not enough back-

up to maintain the two-per-unit level.

In addition to this, we have equipped, at the present

time, some twenty-four companies, engine companies

with two masks apiece of the later design. Our inten-

tion is—in addition to this we have six flying squads—

seven flying squads, who carry six masks apiece. We

also are introducing one self-contained breathing gear

to each chief officer’s car, at the Battalion level. At the

present time, we only have three or four of these in

service.

Our ultimate aim, though, is complete coverage of

the job, pending acquisition of the proper amounts of

material.

Q. Chief Foley, with respect to the wearing of the

self-contained breathing apparatuses, what does the

Chicago Fire Department do with respect to facial

hair?

A. Well, we would like the men clean-shaven.

Mr. Orlove: I will object to the question, your Hon-

or, because we have—

The Court: We have the regulation before us and

I have read it and I know what it is. So if the witness

is going to repeat the regulation, it is unnecessary.

Of course, what they like is not too relevant either.

So I will sustain the objection.

Mr. Sheridan: I understand, your Honor.

I have no further questions, your Honor.

The Court: Any cross examination of Chief Foley?

71

—102—

Cross Examination by Mr. Orlove.

Q. Iam always worried about using the wrong title.

How shall I term you “Chief”?

A. Yes.

Q. Chief, you say currently there are supposed to

be two masks on each hook and ladder?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that is every single hook and ladder?

A. All hook and ladders are assigned two masks.

Q. Do you know that there are some hook and lad-

ders that don’t have masks at all?

I mentioned that before?

Yes, I think you said some are in for repair.

Right.

And repair might take months, doesn’t it?

Availability of parts and labor to repair them.

In fact, hasn’t it come to your attention that

some hook and ladder trucks never really got masks?

A. That is not true.

Q. How many men are assigned to a hook and lad-

der truck?

A. There is two different levels of manpower as-

signment, depending upon the area the truck is pro-

tecting. We have five-man companies and four-man

companies under the present manning levels dictated

us by outside consultants. The particular company in-

volved, is a five-man company.

Q. And you say the “particular company involved”,

the company—

A. Lt. Muscare’s company.

Q. The company in which Lt. Muscare works?

A. Yes, sir.

QPoreopr

72

—103—

Q. Is lieutenant the highest officer in the company?

A. No, sir, a captain.

Q. I see. What is the scope of Lt. Muscare’s—or

a lieutenant, but a lieutenant like Lt. Muscare—his

operation? ”

A. The lieutenant commands the company unit or

platoon on his platoon in the absence of the command-

ing officer, the captain.

Q. Is the hook and ladder—does the hook and lad-

der truck consist of the company itself?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So his company is a five-man company?

A. Five-man per shift, sir.

Q. I see.

A. Five men per shift. It is staffed on the basis of

providing five men each day, each working day on

that company, yes.

Q. And he is the chief official for that company on

that shift?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when you use the number “five”, does that

include the lieutenant or exclude him?

A. No, that includes the lieutenant.

Q. So you have two masks designed for use by five

men in the company?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I take it by that, obviously, that not everybody

fighting a fire in the company is going to be required

to use a mask, they may be assigned other duties that

don’t require a mask, is that correct?

A. Yes, All members are required to be proficient

in the use of the mask.

Q. I understand, but—okay, I understand.

74

—104—

But a company might assign men to different areas

in fighting a fire?

A. Yes, sir. The company officer would give orders,

at his discretion, on the fire-ground problem.

Q. I didn’t hear the end of your answer, sir.

A. The commanding officer of the unit may give

various orders, depending upon the fire-ground prob-

lem.

Q. And is it correct, that usually the lieutenant is

in charge of that company and issuing orders to the

men to do one job or another?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Chief, when did the action that was taken with

respect to Lt. Muscare first come to your attention?

A. It came to my attention on the 21st of December.

The first time it was brought to my attention is when

I received messenger mail concerning this incident.

Q. Chief, do I understand your testimony correct-

ly, that since 1958 every hook and ladder truck has had

two masks assigned to it?

A. No, sir, I didn’t say that. I said starting in 58

we started the program for breathing gear and the

ultimate goal was two per truck. Eventually, this was

realized. Since that time, some of the gear has fallen

into disrepair and some trucks are short at this time.

But the overall administrative policy is two masks per

truck.

Q. And at what point in time did you realize the

goal of two gear—two masks per truck?

A. Well, I believe that back in the early ’60’s all

trucks had Chemox masks, which is another type of

breathing—it’s merely a trade name, but it is a self-

contained breathing apparatus.

Q. And are those now out of use, Chemox masks?

75

=x =

A. No, sir, they are not.

Q. They are also used?

A. Yes, sir.

Mr. Orlove: No further cross, your Honor.

The Court: Any redirect?

Mr. Sheridan: Briefly, your Honor.

Redirect Examination by Mr. Sheridan.

Q. Chief, did anything happen to you personally

after December 21st?

A. Yes, sir, Christmas night I was a victim of emer-

gency appendicitis operation.

Q. So you were incapacitated approximately when?

A. I came back to administrative duties on Feb-

ruary 10th or the 12th, I’m not sure without referring

to the records.

Q. And did you have any conversation with Chief

Prohaska on or about February 21st, 1974?

A. Yes, sir, I did. It was brought officially to my

attention by him.

Q. That is all. And Lt. Muscare, he is assigned to

a hook and ladder company, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, is it the policy of the Fire Department to

have—strike that.

Are the self-contained breathing apparatuses—are

they normally worn by the firemen at all fires or are

they just used in somewhat of an emergency or un-

usual circumstances?

A. No, generally they are at the direction of the

company officer.

Q. Under what circumstances would a company

officer order men or he himself put on the self-con-

tained breathing apparatus?

76

77

—106—

A. Well, rescue would be one condition under hos-

tile environment. Certainly I would use a mask in

irrascible type atmosphere, some of which would be

highly toxic, poisonous gas, for instance.

Q. And is there any policy of the Chicago Fire

Department to attempt to have some masks available

at any given type of fire?

A. No, there is not a set policy as to the number

of masks.

Q. But do certain number of vehicles respond to

certain types of fires?

A. Yes, sir. There is a predetermined response to

ordinary call for help, yes.

Q. Now, is there any policy in the Chicago Fire

Department with respect to taking into consideration

how many masks are on each vehicle—as to how many

masks they would hope to have at each type of fire,

depending on its size and nature?

A. Yes, sir. You mean our administrative goal to

try to reach the ultimate—

Q. Iam just saying at a certain type-size of a fire.—

A. Yes.

Q. —certain number of vehicies will respond to that

fire—

A. Right.

Q. —has the Chicago Fire Department given any

consideration with respect to the type of vehicles re-

sponding as to how many masks or self-contained

breathing apparatuses will be present at that fire?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are these masks generally located on the same

place of each vehicle?

A. It’s impossible to do, because the vehicles them-

selves—

73

—107—

Q. I am referring to same types of vehicles, say

hook and ladders?

A. I am also referring to them. All hook and lad-

ders are not the same. All engines are not the same.

Q. With respect to the style of the vehicles, is the

style the same generally or generally not?

A. We have tried to standardize as much as human-

ly possible.

Mr. Sheridan: I have no further questions, your

Honor.

Recross Examination by Mr. Orlove.

Q. Chief Foley, in this case we are concerned with

the suspension of Lt. Muscare, what officer—what is

the lowest rank officer in the Fire Department that

may suspend an employee of the Fire Department?

Mr. Sheridan: Your Honor, I will object to that.

I think that is covered by Section 10-1-18 of Chapter

24% of the Illinois Revised Statutes.

The Court: It is outside of the scope of the prior

examination. What do you have in mind, Counsel? I

don’t want to foreclose you on anything relevant. I

have the suspension before me, it’s Exhibit C, which

I think you attached to your complaint.

Mr. Orlove: Just the question that counsel raised

on redirect as to his unavailability during certain pe-

riods of time.

The Court: I didn’t understand the reason for thet

myself.

Mr. Orlove: I took it to be going to the allegations

in the complaint as to a conversation that occurred,

and, an allegation sworn to by affidavit, a conversation

occurred in December and the suspension taking place

later in February.

79

—108—

The Court: I see. All right, then go ahead into the

matter, if you wish.

Could someone else have signed the suspension order

or directed the suspension during your illness, some-

one else in the Department?

The Witness: Well, I am confused here, your Hon-

or. You are saying it was a conversation in Decem-

ber. There was not, not involving me.

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. I wasn’t directing that to you, Chief, but to the

Court.

I just wanted to ask you—you are Acting Chief Fire

Marshal, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, isn’t it true that subordinates of yours,

namely, a captain or battalion chief or division marshal

have authority within the Fire Department rules to

suspend an individual?

A. No, sir, they could file charges, the suspension

would rest in the Commissioner’s Office.

The Court: I assume that while you were home ill

that somebody else had authority to file—

The Witness: Yes, sir.

The Court: —to order a suspension?

The Witness: There was another man that took my

place.

The Court: All right. Is there anything else, Coun-

sel?

The Witness: I follow the counsel’s line there. The

man that took my place, I don’t believe was aware of

this, because the mail went into my desk and this man

didn’t use my office. And I don’t feel he was really

aware of this paper that was in the process.

—109—

By Mr. Orlove:

Q. When you say “aware”, you mean aware of the

appearance of Lt. Muscare?

A. I don’t believe the man who took my place, Chief

Williams, even knew that there was charges preferred

or that there was anything at all in the mill on this.—

Q. Were there charges?

A. —due to the fact it came to me on a holiday

weekend, I put it in my office, I left it there. And the

24th was a holiday, I did not come back to work. And

Christmas night I was taken sick. And it went on until

I came back to work. In the meantime it held in abey-

ance. This was my own opinion, the man who took my

place wasn’t aware that there was a set of charges,

active set of charges on my desk.

Q. Were there a set of charges on your desk?

A. Yes, sir, they were.

Q. Were you in communication with your office,

when you were at home recuperating?

A. Was I?

Q. Yes.

A. No, sir, I was not.

(. Do you have these charges with you in this

courtroom?

A. No, sir, I don’t.

Q. Pardon?

A. No, they are the charges that you see here, I be-

lieve.

You said there were a set of charges there, your

Honor.

The Court: I said this was a suspension notice.

The Witness: I’m sorry.

The Court: This is what I am referring to, if this

will assist you in your testimony.

82

—110—

The Witness: Yes. Well, this is a suspension notice

that goes out from the Personnel Department and not

from my office.

The Court: The question is, did anyone give you

written charges against Lt. Muscare?

The Witness: Yes, sir, they did.

The Court: All right. And that was a day or two

or a few days before you went home and took sick,

is that right?

The Witness: Yes, sir.

The Court: All right. Now, counsel is asking if you

know where those charges are, the written charges, the

document.

The Witness: Yes, sir, they are in the Bureau of

Personnel. [

The Court: How

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Appendix — Quinn v. Muscare · 425 U.S. 560 | Frix