Petition — Parlane Sportswear Co. v. Mathews

Supreme Court brief1975

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Supreme Court of the United States.

Ocroser TERM, 1974.

No. 75-99

PARLANE SPORTSWEAR CO., INC.,

PETITIONER,

SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION

AND WELFARE, er AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit.

Evan T. Lawson,

Lawson & Wayne,

79 Milk Street,

Boston, Massachusetts 02109.

(617) 542-4010

ADDISON c. GETCHELL & SON, Mc. THE LAWYERS’ PRINTER · BOSTON

Table of Contents.

Opinions below

Jurisdiction

Questions presented

Statute involved

Statement of the case

A. Prior proceedings

B. Facts

Reasons for allowance of the writ

A. The Court of Appeals below has decided an

important question of Federal law which has

not been, but should be, decided by this Court

B. Parlane is entitled to relocation assistance

under the Act

C. Parlans is entitled to relocation assistance

under HEW regulations

Conclusion

Appendix A, United States District Court, District

of Massachusetts, Decision

Appendix B, United States Court of Appeals for

the First Circuit, Decision

Appendix C, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601 et seq.

Table of Authorities Cited.

CasEs.

Barnhart v. Brinegar, 362 F. Supp. 464

(W.D. Mo. 1973)

Fr owwnte hw bw

$8 8 88

ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co.,

281 U.S. 599 (1930)

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 517 (1819)

Kbert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548 (1925)

Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949)

Logan v. Davis, 233 U.S. 613 (1914)

Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v.

Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U.S. 361

(1906)

Railroad Retirement Board v. Duquesne Warehouse

Co., 149 F. 2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1945), aff’d 326 U.S.

446 (1946)

United States v. Braddy, 320 F. Supp. 1239

(D. Ore. 1971)

United States v. Colorado Anthracite Co.,

225 U.S. 219 (1912)

United States v. County School Board of Prince

George County, 221 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Va. 1963)

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)

United States v. Sumter County School District,

No. 2, 232 F. Supp. 945 (B.D. S. C. 1964)

United States v. United Verde Cooper Co.,

196 U.S. 207 (1905)

Wahba v. New York University, 492 F. 2d 96

(2d Cir. 1974)

Young v. Harder, 361 F. Supp. 64 (D. Kan. 1973)

20 E Ss

19-20

16, 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

SraruTes.

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

§ 2201

§ 2202

42 U.S.C. §§ 281 et seq.

$§ 291 et seg.

§ 292

§§ 292 et seq.

§ 292(c)

N § 293

§§ 4601 et seq.

§ 4601(5)

§ 4601(6)

§ 4621

§ 4625

§ 4630

§ 4633(b)

50 U.S.C. $9(a)

50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1 et seg.

$§ 451 et seq.

MISCELLANEOUS.

73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 153

§ 279

45 C. F. R. §§ 15.2 et seq.

§ 15.5

§ 15.6

The Committee on Public Works, House of Repre-

sentatives, 93rd Congress, Ist Session,

Report No. 93-747

iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Congressional Record, 91st Congress, 2d Session,

Vol. 116, Part 31, p. 41255

Conway, The Federal Grant: An Administrative

View, 30 Fed. B. J. 119 (1971)

Department of Health, Education and Welfare,

Regulation 15.6

Grossbaum, Federal Support of Research Projects

through Contract and Grants: A Rationale,

19 Am. U. L. Rev. 423 (1970)

S. 261

US. Code, Cong. & Admin. News, 91st Congress,

2d Session, Vol. 3,

p. 5850

pp. 5850-5875

Wilcox, The Function and Nature of Grants,

27 Admin. L. Rev. 125 (1970)

Corrigenda.

Page 1, last two lines. Appendix A, infra, pp. 23-28

should read Appendix B, infra, pp. 29-32

Page 2, line 2. Appendix B, infra, pp. 29-32 should read

Appendix A, infra, pp. 23.28.

Page 2, line 5. Appendix A, p. 23 should read Appen-

dix B, p. 29.

Page 4, last line. App. A., p. 26 should read App. B,

pp. 30-31.

No.

Ooronn Tau, 1974.

PARLANE SPORTSWEAR CO., INC.,

PRTITIONER,

SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION

AND WELFARE, er A.,

ResporDEeNTs.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit.

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice, and the Associate

Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

The petitioner, Parlane Sportswear Co., Inc., prays that

a writ of certiorari issue to review the opinion and judg-

ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First

Cireuit rendered in these proceedings on April 17, 1975.

Opinions Below.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-

cuit, as yet. unreported, appears as Appendix A, infra,

pp. 23-28. The opinion of the United States District

Court for the District of Massachusetts is reported at 381

F. Supp. 411, and appears as Appendix B, infra, pp. 29-32.

Jurisdiction.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit was entered on April 17, 1975. See

Appendix A, p. 23 infra. This petition for certiorari

was filed less than 90 days thereafter. The jurisdiction

of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Questions Presented.

1. Whether the Uniform Relocation Assistance and

Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4601 et seg., requires relocation assistance payments

by the United States Government to persons displaced

by federally funded projects undertaken by a private en-

tity.

2. Whether the recipient of a Federal grant from the

Department of Health, Education and Welfare is 2 con-

tractor within the meaning of Regulation 15.6 promulgated

by said Department to implement the Uniform Relocation

Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of

1970, thereby obligating the United States Government to

provide relocation assistance payments to persons displaced

by such grant recipient for purposes of the grant.

Statute Involved.

This case arises under the Uniform Relocation Assist-

ance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,

42 U.S.C. §§ 4601 et seq. (hereinafter the Act) which is

set forth as Appendix C at pp. 33-58.

Statement of the Case.

A. Prion Procezpmcs.

This is an action in the United States District Court

for the District of Massachusetts (District Court) by Par-

lane Sportswear Company, Inc. (Parlane), against Casper

Weinberger, Secretary of the Department of Health, Edu-

cation and Welfare (HEW), and the trustees of Tufts

College, a/k/a Tufts University (Tufts), wherein Par-

lane seeks a declaration under 28 U.S.C. 56 2201 and 2202

that it is entitled to Federal relocation assistance under

the provisions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and

Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.

5 4601 et seg. The District Court by judgment entered

on August 29, 1974, denied Parlane’s motion for sum-

mary judgment and allowed HEW’s and Tufts’ motion

to dismiss. Parlane appealed. Thereafter, the United

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed

on April 17, 1975.

B. Faors.

Parlane had engaged in the business of manufacturing

women’s sportwear at 57 Kneeland Street in Boston since

1959. In 1969, Tufts purchased the building in which the

business is located, but continued to lease the premises

to Parlane.

By 1970 and 1971 a variety of programs had hen estab-

lished by acts ( Congress to improve health care, treat-

ment of diseases, training of health professionals and

medical and research facilities. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 291

et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 5 281 et seq. In 1971 and 1972, Tufts

was awarded certain grants from the National Institutes

of Health, a subsidiary division of HEW (NIH), by which

it would participate in such programs. A special project

training grant in the amount of $364,785 was awarded

under the Health Professions Educational Improvement

Program; a similar grant in the amount of $990,365 was

awarded in 1972. In 1972, Tufts received a grant in the

amount of $1,174,169 under the Health Professions Capi-

tation Grant Program. And, again in 1972, Tufts was

awarded a Cancer Research Grant under its Cancer Re-

search Grant Program. Under the terms of the grants

Tufts is to provide additional teaching space, library space,

a learning resources center, faculty research offices and

laboratories as well as engage in research.

Upon receipt of the grants, Tufts undertook to evict

Parlane from 57 Kneeland Street in order to use the space

occupied by Parlane to fulfill the purpose of the grants.

By agreement with Tufts, Parlane vacated one of the

three floors which it occupied. Thereafter, in May, 1973,

Tufts brought an action of summary process against Par-

lane and obtained a judgment for possession of the re-

maining two floors. Execution has issued, Parlane has

vacated the premises and Tufts is currently occupying

for the purposes of the grants.

Beginning in August, 1971, Parlane sought relocation

assistance from HEW under the Act, but was refused any

aid. Having exhausted all of its administrative remedies,

Parlane brought this action seeking a declaration that it

is entitled to relocation assistance under the Act.

Reasons for Allowance of the Writ.

A. Tue Court or Appgats BLOW Has Doms an Im-

PORTANT QuEsTION oF FepenaL Law Wuion Has Nor

Been, Bur SHovutp Bz, Doms sy Tus Cover.

The Court of Appeals below has ruled in summary

fashion that the benefits of the Act are not to be accorded

persons displaced by programs or projects of a Federal

agency which are implemented by federally assisted proj-

ects of private entities. (App. A., p. 26.) As is demon-

strated in part B, infra, that court’s conclusion is directly

contrary to Congress’ stated purpose in passing the Act.

Moreover, the anachronistic result: viz., that displace-

ment of a business solely caused by a multi-million dollar

Federal project will go uncompensated only because of an

artificial distinction based upon whom the Federal agency

chooses to implement its project has far reaching impli-

cations which may affect many thousands of similarly sit-

uated businesses throughout the country.

This appears to be the first case of its kind to be de-

cided under the Act. The decision below, on an important

question of Federal law, can therefor be expected to guide

the decisions of other Federal courts in this area. The

use of literally millions of dollars of Federal funds and

the continued existence of thousands of businesses is at

stake. Accordingly, the court below has decided an im-

portant question of Federal law which has not been, but

should be, decided by this Court.

B. Pamlan is Entrrizp ro ReiocaTion AssisTaANCE

UNDER THE AcT.

The overriding purpose of Congress in passing the Act

was to protect all persons displaced by projects funded by

the Federal government for the public welfare from dis-

proportionate injury. See Young v. Harder, 361 F. Supp.

64 (D. Kan. 1973).

„The purpose of this subchapter is to establish a

uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment

of persons displaced as a result of Federal and fed-

e assisted programs im order that such persons

shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result

of programs designed for the benefit of the public ag

a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 4621. (Emphasis added.)

Not only has Congress set forth a generous policy, but

it has also defined a displaced person (including corpora-

tions; see 42 U.S.C. § 4601(5)) in sweeping terms as one

Who:

%. . . on or after January 2, 1971, moves from real

property ... as a result of the acquisition of such

real property, in whole or in part .. for a program

or project undertaken by a Federal agency or with

Federal financial assistance. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (6).

HEW contends and the courts below ruled that under

the operative sections of the Act only persons displaced

directly by Federal agencies or by state agencies which

receive Federal financial assistance are entitled to receive

relocation assistance. HEW asserts and the District Court

found that the operative sections exclude from coverage

persons ‘‘displaced by a private entity that has a grant

of Federal financial assistance.’’ (App. A., p. 26).

The Court of Appeals stated: ‘‘HEW’s regulations re-

fer to ‘direct projects of the Department,’ 45 C. F. R.

§ 15.5(a), and deny aid to persons displaced by federally

assisted projects of private entities, 45 C.F.R. § 15.6. We

find no compelling indications that HEW’s coutemporane-

ous construction of the statute is wrong [Footnote omit-

ted]. (App. B, p. 30.) ö

In arriving at its decision the Distriet Court below re-

ferred to a number of so-called operative sections of the

Act. It stated that ‘‘Sections 4622, 4627 and 4628 direct

that displacement payments be made when the real prop-

erty is acquired ‘. . for a program or project undertaken

by a Federal agency’ ’’ (App. A, p. 25).

It referred to § 4630 as the basis for relief when a state

agency conducts a program or project with Federal monies.

The court then concluded that there is no ‘‘operational pro-

vision calling for payments to a person, such as the plain-

tiff, who is displaced by a private entity that has a grant

of Federal financial assistance for its project.“ (App. A,

p. 26). |

However, analysis of these sections does not lead to

the conclusion which the District Court reached and the

Court of Appeals affirmed. To the contrary, proper stat-

utory construction establishes that the work undertaken

by Tufts with grants from HEW constitutes a Federal

program under § 4621, or ‘‘a program or project under-

taken by a Federal agency in any State’’ under § 4622(a).

On the face of the statute there is no language which

limits the definition of ‘‘a program or project of a Fed-

eral agency’’ to one which is conducted exclusively by

the employees of the agency. There is no language re-

quiring direct, immediate and continuous daily supervision

of a program or project to make it qualify as ‘‘a program

or project of a Federal agency.’’ There is no language

excluding from the definition of ‘‘a program or project

of a Federal agency’’ an undertaking by a university with

millions of dollars of Federal money. Since the statute

does not so narrowly define a Federal program or project,

the court below erred in excluding Parlane from the pro-

tection of the Act.

Given the sweeping declarations of Congressional pur-

pose to compensate persons displaced as a result of Fed-

eral and federally assisted programs, and given the broad

deflinition of displaced person contained in the Act, the

District Court should have interpreted the term ‘‘ Federal

program or project’’ so as to effectuate the stated pur-

pose.

Indeed the proper course in all cases is to adopt that

sense of the words which promotes in the fullest man-

ner the policy of the legislature in the enactment of

the law, and to avoid a construction which would alter

or defeat that policy.“ 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes,

§ 153.

In the case of Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945),

for example, this Court ignored a statutory provision

which would have restricted an otherwise broad and gener-

ous purpose. Markham was an action brought under the

Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1 et seg.

Section 9(a) of that statute provided that any person

not an enemy or ally of enemy claiming any interest,

right, or title in any money or other property which may

have been conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or

paid to the Alien Property Custodian ... may file with

the said custodian a notice of his claim... Section 9(a),

however, limited the debts subject to collection to those

owed prior to October 6, 1917.

In Markham the plaintiff sought to collect a debt which

arose during World War II. The Alien Property Custo-

dian refused to allow it because it was not owed prior

to October 6, 1917. In rejecting the Custodian’s claim

that the plaintiff was excluded from the protections of

the statute, the Court looked to the Congressional declara-

tion of policy.

„The policy as well as the letter of the law is a

guide to decision. Resort to the policy of a law may

be had to ameliorate its seeming harshness or to qual-

ify its apparent absolutes as Holy Trinity Church v.

United States, 143 U.S. 457 illustrates. The process

of interpretation also misses its high function if a

strict reading of a law results in the emasculation or

deletion of a provision which a less literal reading

would preserve.’’ 326 U.S. at 409.

Further, when a statute is remedial, humanitarian or

beneficial, a strict or narrow interpretation is inappro-

priate. Rather, it ‘‘. . . is to be construed liberally, and

so as to effectuate the purpose of Congress and secure

the relief which was designed. Logan v. Davis, 233

U.S. 613, 628 (1914); see also United States v. Colorado

Anthracite Co., 225 U.S. 219, 223 (1912); New York, New

Haven d Hartford Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce

Commission, 200 U.S. 361, 391 (1906).

A remedial statute should be construed so as to

afford all the relief within the power of the court

which the language of the act indicates that the legis-

lature intended to grant. In this respect, it has been

declared that the remedy should be extended as far

as the words of the statute permit, and it is not un-

usual to extend the enacting words of a remedial stat-

ute beyond their literal import and effect in order to

include cases within the same mischief, or within the

reason of the statute. Indeed, in the construction of

statutes, the intention of a remedial statute will pre-

vail over the literal sense of its terms, and therefore

when the expression is special or particular, but the

reason is general, the expression should be deemed

general. Words may be omitted, or may be supplied

by implication, and sentences transformed, to render

the statute a consistent whole and effectuate the legis-

lative will.“ 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 279.

Surely, a liberal but reasonable interpretation of the

term ‘‘program or project of a Federal agency’’ necessarily

includes the massive grants by HEW to Tufts which ooca-

sioned the displacement of Parlane. It would be truly

anomalous for Parlane to suffer such disproportionate in-

jury on account of HEW’s humanitarian programs given

the stated policy of the Act. The inequity is even more

evident when one considers that Parlane unquestionably

would be entitled to relocation assistance were Tufts a

state university.

The court below considered the legislative history of

the Act in determining who is entitled to its benefits. How-

ever, it is well settled that when a statute is unambiguous

a court cannot look to the legislative history to ascertain

its meaning. Eæ parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949).

Here, the declaration of Congressional policy is unambig-

uous; it would extend benefits to all persons displaced by

any federally-financed programs. Moreover, the Act in

defining a displaced person includes those persons dis-

located by any federally-assisted program. Therefore, re-

sort to legislative history is inappropriate.

Nonetheless, it is submitted that the legislative history

does nothing to exclude Parlane from the protection of

the Act. The history of the Act was complex and tor-

tured; the Act was liberally amended prior to passage

and emerged a synthesis of many divergent points of view.

Barnhart v. Brinegar, 362 F. Supp. 464 (W. D. Mo. 1973).

Thus it is difficult to divine any clear statement of legis-

lative intent.

Yet, certain indicia of support for Parlane’s claim for

relief can be discerned. There is a declaration of intent

in the Report of the House which is as broad as that

found in the Act itself. This bill, as reported, is re-

ported unanimously. It is a comprehensive effort to pro-

vide equitably for all persons affected by Federal or

federally assisted programs.“ Report, 5850. (Emphasis

added.)

Furthermore, Congress, in passing the Act, broadened

the definition of displaced person set forth in the Report

from one dislodged as a result of a project ‘‘undertaken

by a Federal agency, or by a State agency with Federal

financial assistance, Report, p. 5853, to one dislodged

as a result of a program or project undertaken by a

Federal agency, or with Federal financial assistance.’’ 42

U.S.C. § 4601(6). In so doing, Congress manifested an

intent to expand rather than restrict the protection of the

Act.

The Report of the House is set forth at United States Code,

Cong. and Admin. News, 91st Congress, 2d Session, vol. 3, pp. 5850-

5875, herein cited as Report.

A section-by-section examination of the Report might

imply limits on the definitions of Federal projects and

federally-assisted programs. See opinion of the District

Court, App. A, p. 23. This type of analysis is inappro-

priate to interpret a statute where there is an explicit

declaration of Congressional intent.

In the case of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163

(1965), the meaning of the term ‘‘religious training and

belief within the Universal Military Training and Serv-

ice Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 451 et seg., was in question. In ar-

guing against the granting of conscientious objector status

the Government referred to the Senate report which cited

a case containing a restrictive definition of religious be-

lief. In replying to the Government’s argument, the Court

said:

„Hirst, we think it clear that an explicit statement

of congressional intent deserves more weight than the

parenthetical citation of a case which might stand for

a number of things.’’ 380 U.S. at 177.

Thus, resort to the legislative history of the Act does not

support the restrictive interpretation given it by HEW

and endorsed by the District Court.

It was argued below that the Act fails to specifically

set forth the case in which a Federal agency funds a pri-

vate entity to conduct a program or project to accomplish

an objective of the Federal government, and in so doing

precludes a court from judicially including such a case.

This argument, the so-called casus omissus theory, see

Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 553-554 (1925), begs the

question here. It assumes that one in the position of Par-

lane has been omitted and cannot now be granted cover-

age by decision of the Court. However, it denies the Court

its right and obligation to interpret the statute in the

light of its declaration of policy, and thereby find Par-

lane entitled to relocation assistance.

To buttress its argument HEW offered remarks by Con-

gressman William F. Ryan of New York to the effect that

„. .. the problem of displacement by private institutions

through federally-assisted programs requires a legislative

solution.“ Congressional Record, 91st Congress, 2d Ses-

sion, vol. 116, Part 31, p. 41255. However, the individual

opinions of legislators are of little value in ascertaining

legislative intent. Railroad Retirement Board v. Duquesne

Warehouse Co., 149 F. 2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1945), aff’d 326

U.S. 446 (1946).

Evidence that there was no legislative oversight is found

in the history of amendatory legislation. The Committee

on Public Works, House of Representatives, 93rd Con-

gress, Ist Session, Report No. 93-747, states:

„Two projects have come to the attention of the

Committee in which the original intent of the Uniform

Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition

Policies Act of 1970 is being violated. .. .

„The second case involves the National Cancer In-

stitute Research Center Grant . . awarded to Tufts

University . . . where long time tenants of the Uni-

versity are being displaced to mae room for a Feder-

ally assisted program.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Further, S. 261, entitled ‘‘An Act to Amend the Uni-

form Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition

Policies Act of 1970 to Provide for minimum Federal pay-

ments for four additional years, and for other purposes,“

which passed the Senate on February 2, 1973, states:

‘‘Szc. 3. Notwithstanding any other provision of

law, any person who moves or relocates his place of

business currently located at 57 Kneeland Street,

Boston, Massachusetts, as a result of a National Cancer

Institute Research Center Grant 1-P02-CA12924-01,

awarded: to Tufts University, shall be deemed to be

a displaced person and eligible for assistance under

the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property

Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.’’

These statements by Congress are strong evidence that

projects such as those in which Tufts is participating with

Federal financial assistance are included under the Act

as programs or projects of a Federal agency in a state

or as federally-assisted programs. No attempt is made to

broaden the coverage of the Act; instead it is asserted

that the Act, in its present form, protects Parlane.

It is manifest that the activities undertaken by Tufts

with the NIH grants constitute a Federal program or

project in the state of Massachusetts. Each grant is in

furtherance of a specific governmental program estab-

lished by acts of Congress. In 1971 and 1972 Tufts was

awarded a Special Project Grant from the Health Profes-

sions Educational Improvement Program of the National

Institutes of Health in the amounts of $364,785 and $990,365

respectively. In 1972 Tufts received an additional grant

under the Health Professions Capitation Grant Program

in the amount of $1,174,169. Both of these programs were

created by HEW to implement the legislative directives

of the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act,

42 U.S.C. §§ 292 et seq.

That statute sets forth a national policy to improve and

increase medical research and training.

„(a) The Congress finds and declares that (1) the

Nation’s economy, welfare, and security are adversely

affected by many crippiing and killing diseases the

prevention and control of which require a substantial

increase, in all areas of the Nation, of research ac-

tivities in the sciences related to health, and (2) funds

for the construction of new and improved non-Federal

facilities to house such activities are inadequate.

„b) It is therefore the purpose of this part to as-

sist in the construction of facilities for the conduct of

research in the sciences related to health by providing

grants-in-aid on a matching basis to public and non-

profit institutions for such purpose.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 292.

It further appropriates and makes available by grants-

in-aid more than $500,000 of Federal money to fulfill its

purpose. 42 U.S.C. §§ 292(c), 293.

Additionally, in 1972 Tufts was awarded a Cancer Re-

search Grant on a renewing basis in the aggregate amount

of $8,667,707. By the terms of the grant, the money is

to be used for six itemized objectives:

„Tufts University proposes to establish a Cancer

Research Center which will be a major regional re-

source for the attack on cancer. Ultimately it will

include: 1) the establishment of a specific geographic

location for clinical and laboratory research into the

human cancer problem, especially as relates to pa-

tients with advancing malignancies; 2) to utilize the

center as a focal point for the integration of various

therapeutic measures in an effort to create an effective

interdisciplinary approach to the patient with cancer ;

3) to bring together research-oriented individuals of

different backgrounds and interests to work in a com-

mon geography, sharing experiences and ideas for

promoting cancer investigation, and to provide a fa-

cility for the rapid translation of research data into

clinical use; 4) to utilize the center for teaching pur-

poses for rurrs medical students and for house offi-

cers associated with the teaching hospitals; 5) to create

a central location for efforts in cancer research, both

clinical and laboratory, to which the various teaching

hospitals can turn for information, for participation,

and for teaching purposes, and 6) to provide a plat-

form for growth of community-oriented programs.

(Emphasis in original.)

It is self-evident that these various programs were not

created by Tufts. Rather, Tufts responded to the oppor-

tunity to participate in Federal programs created by acts

of Congress and implemented by HEW. Thus, Tufts’ ac-

tivities in connection with the grants must be held to be

a part of ‘‘a program or project undertaken by a Federal

agency.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 4625. To accept the ruling to the

contrary disregards the legislative directives that medical

training, research, treatment and facilities be provided

through the Department of Health, Education and Wel-

fare. Further, and more fundamentally, the ruling er-

roneously requires a delineation between the activities of

a Federal agency in designing and administering a pro-

gram or project and those activities by which the program

or project is conducted.

Consider the construction of an interstate highway. Con-

gress has determined that a network of Federal highways

is a national priority. It appropriates funds and author-

izes a Federal agency, the Department of Transportation,

to use those funds to carry out that national purpose. Ul-

timately, private businesses engaged in the construction of

the highways. Persons displaced by the construction are

unquestionably entitled to relocation assistance under the

Act.

There is no conceptual distinction between the highway

situation and the instant case. Congress has determined

that the improvement of health care and cancer research

is a national priority. It has appropriated funds and

authorized a Federal agency, the Department of Health,

Education and Welfare, to use those funds to carry out

that national purpose. Ultimately, Tufts will engage in

the improvement of health care and in cancer research.

But for the grants to Tufts, Parlane would not have been

displaced. Why, then, is Parlane not entitled to reloca-

tion assistance under the Act?

We are mindful of the case of Wahba v. New York Uni-

versity, 492 F. 2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974), in which the court

found insufficient governmental action to invoke the appli-

cation of First Amendment due process rights in the dis-

missal of a university employee working on a federally-

funded research project. It may be argued on the basis

of Wahba that Tufts’ activities under the grants do not

constitute programs or projects of the Federal govern-

ment within the Act. Wahba, however, is inapplicable to

the case at bar.

Wahba involved the application of constitutional strict-

ure to the employment practices of a private university.

Dr. Wahba contended that because he was working on a

project which was partially funded by a Federal agency,

he was entitled to a hearing and other due process rights

prior to dismissal despite the fact that his salary did not

come from Federal funds. In rejecting Dr. Wahba’s claims

the court limited its decision to the facts before it.

„. . . we do not find decisions dealing with one form

of state involvement and a particular provision of

the Bill of Rights at all determinative in passing upon

claims concerning different form of government in-

volvement and other constitutional guarantees.

Wahba, 492 F. 2d at 100.

Further, the court set out a weighing test for the de-

termination of government action, but it limited discussion

to cases involving the application of constitutional require-

ments to the private sector. Wahba, 492 F. 2d at 102.

Comparison of this case to Wahba demonstrates the

great disparities between the two in all aspects.. Wahba

was a private action for damages agaim the university

for his dismissal from the research project, or for the

University’s failure to renew his one-year contract with-

out according him a due process hearing, or for both.’’

492 F. 2d at 98. This case is an action to determine eligi-

_ bility for relocation assistance authorized by act of Con-

gress. Wahba involved the internal workings of a uni-

versity-run research project and the injury to one who

elected to participate in that project. This case involves

the administrative act of a Federal agency and the injury

to an innocent by-stander’’ occasioned by a Federal

project. In Wahba the court saw a possibility of harm

%. . . in loading a basic research program with the full

panoply of First Amendment and Fifth Amendment due

process rights. 492 F. 2d at 103. Here, the payment of

relocation assistance to Parlane by HEW poses no threat

of harm or curtailment to Tufts’ activities.’ Finally, Wahba

involved provisions of the Bill of Rights; the instant case

involves remedial legislation and a Congressional direc-

tive to compensate all persons displaced by Federal and

federally-assisted projects.

It is therefore apparent that Parlane is entitled to relo-

cation assistance under the Act. The sweeping statement

of Congressional purpose in passing the Act includes Par-

lane within its boundaries. Federal programs established

under health, medical and cancer training and research

legislation do not delineate between public and private

We are cognizant of the argument advanced by Tufts that the

payment of relocation assistance would reduce the size of the grant

to Tufts by a comparable amount. However, had Tufts applied

to HEW for assistance to Parlane as part of its grant application,

it would not stand to suffer any loss of grant funds.

: 18

participation in their implementation. Thus, Tufts’ ac-

tivities under the grants are parts of projects undertaken

by HEW and Parlane’s relocation costs must be reim-

bursed.

C. Paruane is Ex TrrIuD To ReLocatTion AssIsTaANCE UNDER

HEW Recvutations.

Pursuant to th Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4633(b), HEW has

promulgated regulations governing eligibility for reloca-

tion assistance. 45 C.F.R. §§ 15.2 et seg. Although the

regulations approximate the Act in many respects, e. g.,

definitional sections, they draw certain distinctions which

are inimical to the Act itself.

Section 15.5, entitled Applicability, uses the term ‘‘direct

project’’ of the Department.

„(a) This part applies, in relation to title II of

the Act, to all direct projects of the Department which

have resulted in or will result in the displacement of

persons or, in relation to title III of the Act, which

have resulted in or will result in the acquisition of

real property.

„(b) This part applies, in relation to title II of

the Act, to all projects of State agencies receiving fi-

nancial assistance in whole or in part from the De-

partment which projects have resulted in or will result

in the displacement of persons or, in relation to title

III of the Act, which have resulted in or will result

in the acquisition of real property. For this purpose,

it is immaterial whether Federal funds are used by

the State agency for the acquisition of such real prop-

erty as is required for, or as a direct result of, the

project.

It is here that HEW draws a distinction between public

and private participation in Federal programs and proj-

ects. It designs a distinction not made by the Act and

then writes regulations to reinforce the distinction. The

very next regulation, 4 15.6, carries out the division by

segregating work done by a private entity from a Federal

program or project.

**§ 15.6 Categorical exceptions.

„This part does not apply to federally-assisted proj-

ects of those entities, such as private entities, that do

not meet the definition of a State agency in § 15.4(s),

except when such an entity is acting as an agent or

contractor of a State agency, or of the Department,

in the discharge of its responsibilities.

In light of the arguments advanced in section B supra,

it is maintained that the distinction is an invalid one in

relation to this action. Just as a regulation may not en-

large the scope of a statute, United States v. United Verde

Copper Co., 196 U.S. 207 (1905), Campbell v. Galeno Chem-

ical Co., 281 U.S. 599 (1930), it may also not restrict the

scope of coverage afforded by a statute. United States

v. Braddy, 320 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Ore. 1971).

Thus, Tufts’ participation in Federal projects can not

be excluded from the meaning of ‘‘program or project

undertaken by a Federal agency by resort to a regula-

tion.

Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that Tufts

is a private entity receiving Federal assistance and, there-

fore, subject to potential exclusion by the regulation, it

is nonetheless certain that Tufts, as a grant recipient,

would be a contractor of HEW and as such would be in-

cluded within the scope of the regulation and the Act. It

has long been held that, for purposes of legal analysis,

a grant is a contract. Dartmouth College v. Woodward,

4 Wheat. 517 (1819) ; United States v. County School Board

of Prince George County, 221 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Va. 1963);

United States v. Sumter County School District No 2,

232 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. S. C. 1964).

Mo. over, legal commentators have uniformly concluded

that it is essential that grants, even for research projects,

be considered contracts. See Wilcox, The Fumction and

Nature of Grants, 27 Admin. L. Rev. 125, 128-131 (1970).

Conway, The Federal Grant: An Administrative View, 30

Fed. B. J. 119 (1971).

Viewing the contract as an exchange of promises

which is in some manner enforceable, the conclusion

is inescapable that ‘grants’, as that term is used to

describe instruments appropriate for supporting un-

directed research projects, are contracts. The Gov-

ernment promises to pay money in return for the

recipient’s promise to perform research in furtherance

of an agency’s mission. The recipient undertakes to

use the funds paid him for the purpose of pursuing

such research and the Government undertakes not to

interfere with such pursuit. Upon breach of that un-

dertaking by the recipient, the Government may revoke

its promise, withhold payment or demand restitution.

Likewise, the grantee who keeps his end of the bargain

would appear to have a corresponding right to compel

the Government to make the promised payment; how-

ever, this point seems never to have been adjudicated.

‘* Acknowledging that research project grants are

contracts should not in itself make the word ‘grant’

disappear. If use of the word ‘grant’ may have gen-

erated more heat than light during the past decade,

the fault lies not with the word itself. The term

‘grant’ is itself not especially meaningful. Its rele-

vance is dependent on the manner in which it is ap-

plied and the use to which it is put. Regretfully, in

the hands of many of those charged with applying

the term, the word ‘grant’ has assumed so many con-

flicting attributes, and has become so distorted, that

the purposes for which it may have been designed have

been lost. Grossbaum, Federal Support of Research

Projects Through Contracts and Grants: A Rationale,

19 Am. U. L. Rev. 423 (1970).

Therefore, even under an interpretation of the regula-

tions which removes Tufts from the scope of participants

in a Federal project, Tufts is inelu in the scope of

the Act as a contractor of HEW and Parlane is entitled

to relocation assistance.

Conclusion.

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to

review the judgment and opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

EVAN T. LAWSON,

LAWSON & WAYNE,

79 Milk Street,

Boston, Massachusetts 02109.

(617) 542-4010

Counsel for Petitioner.

Appendix A.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

PARLANE SPORTSWEAR COMPANY, INC.,

PLAINTIFF,

CASPER WEIN BERGER, as ne is SECRETARY

OF HEALTH, EDUCATION aynp WELFARE

AND

TRUSTEES OF TUFTS COLLEGE, a/x/a

TUFTS UNIVERSITY,

DegreNDANTS.

CIVIL ACTION No. 74- 375-0

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The plaintiff, in order to operate its clothing manufac-

turing business, had been leasing several floors of a build-

ing belonging to Tufts University (Tufts), which is a

privately owned and operated educational institution in

Massachusetts. Tufts applied for and was awarded grants

of more than one million dollars by appropriate repre-

sentatives of the Secretary of the Department of Health,

Education and Welfare (HEW) in order that Tufts might

establish and conduct a Cancer Research Center.

Upon receipt of such grant, Tufts decided that the fa-

cilities then occupied by the plaintiff would be needed in

order to provide adequate housing for the cancer research

project, and Tufts thereupon ordered the plaintiff to va-

cate such premises, the term of the lease previously having

expired. Eviction proceedings are currently in progress,

and the mandatory move to new quarters will understand-

ably result in expense to the plaintiff.

The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property

Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq.

(the Act), provides for payments by the United States

Government to compensate persons required to vacate

premises needed for certain federally financed projects.

The plaintiff contends that it is entitled to such compen-

sation, and it applied accordingly to HEW. Upon be-

ing refused by that agency, the plaintiff seeks in this action

a declaratory judgment that it is entitled to relocation as-

sistance as provided in the Act. Defendants Tufts and

HEW have countered with motion to dismiss on the ground

that the Act does not benefit the plaintiff under the cir-

cumstances here concerned. For reasons hereinafter set

forth, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment will

be denied and the defendants’ motions to dismiss granted.

It is clear from a reading of the Act that the plain-

tiff would have been entitled to certain payments to help

cover the costs of relocation if its eviction had stemmed

from the need of a Federal agency to use the property

for one of its own projects. It is equally evident that

similar compensation would be payable if the plaintiff had

been displaced by an agency of the Commonwealth of Mas-

sachusetts in order to accommodate one of its projects for

which it was receiving Federal financial assistance. Here,

the evicting agency is a non-governmental entity that

wants the premises in order to carry out a program of

its own that is financed by a Federal grant. The issue is

whether the Act provides relocation assistance to a busi-

ness that is evicted under these circumstances.

The policy of Congress in enacting the legislation here

concerned is set out in 42 U.S.C. § 4621:

„The purpose of this subchapter is to establish a

uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment

of persons displaced as a result of Federal and feder-

ally assisted programs in order that such persons shall

not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of 14

grams designed for the benefit of the public as a

whole.’’

Such a declaration expresses a clear intention to assist

all persons displaced because of the need to accommodate

federally financed programs, whether such programs are

conducted by the Federal Government, an agency of a

State, or a private institution. This intent is again mani-

fested in § 4601(6) which defines ‘‘displaced persons,

which are the target beneficiaries of the legislation, as

being. . . any person who . . . moves from real prop-

erty . . . as the result of the written order of the acquiring

agency to vacate real property [,] for a program or

project undertaken by a Federal agency, or with Federal

financial assistance; ... . According to § 4601 (4) ‘Fed-

eral financial assistance’ means a grant, loan, or con-

tribution provided by the United States.

Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the broad expression of

congressional intention to compensate all persons displaced

by federally funded projects is much more narrowly im-

plemented in the operational sections of the Act.

Sections 4622, 4627 and 4628 direct that displacement

payments be made when the real property is acquired

% .. for a program or project undertaken by a Federal

agency’ 1

1 Section 4622 (e) reads as follows:

„(a) Whenever the acquisition of real property for a program

or project undertaken by a Federal agency in any State will re-

sult in the displacement of any person on or after January 2,

1971, the head of such agency shall make a payment to any dis-

placed person, upon proper application as approved by such

agency head, for—

(1) actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family,

business, farm operation, or other personal property;

(2) actual direct losses of tangivle personal property as a re-

sult of moving or discontinuing a business or farm operation,

Relief for persons displaced by action of a State agency

that is seeking a grant or contract ‘‘under which Federal

financial assistance will be available,’’ is contained in

§ 4630. It requires the head of a Federal agency to re-

frain from approving a grant to a State unless he re-

ceives satisfactory assurance that the relocation payments

provided for by the Act will be accorded.

Nowhere in the statute is there any operational pro-

vision calling for payments to a person, such as the plain-

tiff, who is displaced by a private entity that has a grant

of Federal financial assistance for its project. On the

but not to exceed an amount equal to the reasonable expenses

that would have been required to relocate such property, as de-

termined by the head of the agency; and

(3) actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement

business or farm.

Subsections (b) and (e) prescribe the amounts of the payments

to be made.

„ 4627. State required to furnish real property incident to

Federal assistance (local cooperation)

Whenever real property is acquired by a State agency and

furnished as a required contribution incident to a Federal pro-

gram or project, the Federal agency having authority over the

program or project may not accept such property unless such

State agency has made all payments and provided all assistance

and assurances, as are required of a State agency by sections 4630

and 4655 of this title. Such State agency shall pay the cost of

such requirements in the same manner and to the same extent

as the real property acquired for such project, except that in

the case of any real property acquisition or displacement occur-

ring prior to July 1, 1972, such Federal agency shall pay 100

per centum of the first $25,000 of the cost of providing such

payments and assistance.

„4628. State acting as agent for Federal program.

Whenever real property is acquired by a State agency at the

request of a Federal agency for a Federal program or project,

such acquisition shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be deemed

an acquisition by the Federal agency having authority over such

program or project.’’

contrary, the wording of the statute appears to assume

that all ‘‘displaced persons’’ covered by the Act are

evicted either because of projects of Federal agencies or

because of projects by State agencies receiving Federal

financial assistance. For example:

(a) Section 4633(a) provides that the heads of Federal

agencies concerned with Federal projects or... projects

by State agencies receiving Federal financial assistance,“

shall consult together toward the implementation of regu-

lations and procedures for relocation assistance.

(b) Section 4633(b)(43) provides that any complaints

with respect to eligibility determinations or payments of

relocation assistance shall be reviewed. . . by the head

of the Federal agency having authority over the applica-

ble program or project, or in the case of a program or

project receiving Federal financial assistance, by the head

of the State agency.’’

(e) Section 4625 (b) requires that Federal agencies ad-

ministering programs which may be of assistance to dis-

placed persons covered by this chapter shall cooperate to

the maximum extent feasible with the Federal or State

agency causing the displacement to insure that such dis-

placed persons receive the maximum assistance available

to them.

This same concept that would limit the coverage of the

Act to persons evicted because of projects operated by

Federal or State governmental entities is expressed in the

legislative history. House Report No. 91-1656, 91 Cong.,

2d Sess. (1970), U.S. Cong. & Admin. News, 5850, 5853,

refers to the term ‘‘displaced person’’ to mean any per-

son required to vacate property ‘‘for a program or proj-

ect undertaken by a Federal agency, or by a State agency

with Federal financial assistance.“

The plaintiff is no less injured by the fact that the en-

tity that brings about its eviction is a private institu-

tion, rather than a State or Federal agency. However,

in the absence of an operational provision in the Act

authorizing payment to a person in the position of the

plaintiff, I do not see how the Secretary of HEW would

be justified in allowing the plaintiff’s claim. This case

points up the need for corrective legislation if the gener-

ous intention expressed by Congress in the Act is to be

given full implementation.

By separate judgment filed contemporaneously herewith,

the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment will be de-

nied and the motions of the defendants that the action be

dismissed will be granted.

DATED: August 29, 1974.

WILLIAM P. GRAY,

United States District Judge,

Central District of California,

sitting in the District of

Massachusetts by designation.

—

Appendix B.

United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit.

No. 74-1411

PARLANE SPORTSWEAR COMPANY, INC.,

PLAINTIFF, APPELLANT,

CASPAR WEINBERGER, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS, APPELLEES.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[381 F. Supp. 411]

Before Albanien, McEnree and CampseELw,

Circuit Judges.

Evan T. Lawson, with whom Judith E. Turtz and Lawson &

Wayne were on brief, for appellant.

Patrick F. B dy, with whom Nutter, McClennen & Fish was

on brief, for Trustees of Tuft’s College, appellee.

Marshall D. Stein, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom

James N. Gabriel, United States Attorney, was on brief, for Casper

Weinberger, appellee.

April 17, 1975

McEntesz, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Parlane had manu-

factured women’s sportwear at 57 Kneeland Street in

Boston since 1359. In 1969 Tufts University purchased

the building but continued to lease the premises to Par-

lane. In 1971 and 1972 the National Institutes of Health,

a subsidiary division of HEW, awarded substantia) grants

to Tufts under 42 U.S.C. $4 281 et seg. and $4 291 et seg.

for personnel, equipment, alterations and renovations to

expand Tufts’ medical teaching facilities and to establish

a Cancer Research Center. Upon receipt of the grants Tufts

undertook to evict Parlane from 57 Kneeland Street in

order to use the space occupied by Parlane, whose lease

had expired, to fulfill the purpose of the grants. By agree-

ment Parlane vacated one of the three floors it occupied,

and in May 1973 Tufts obtained a judgment for posses-

sion of the two remaining floors and is currently occupying

them for purposes of the grants.

In August 1971 Parlane first sought relocation assist-

ance from HEW under the Uniform Relocation Assistance

and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42

U.S.C. §§ 4601 et seg., but was refused such aid. It then

sought a judicial declaration that it was entitled to bene-

fits under the Act but the court dismissed its complaint

and Parlane appeals.

The statute extends assistance to persons displaced by

the acquisition of real property ‘‘for a program or project

undertaken by a Federal agency, 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a).

HEW’s regulations refer to direct projects of the De-

partment,’’ 45 C.F.R. § 15.5(a), and deny aid to persons

displaced by federally assisted projects of private entities,

— —u—

45 C. F. R. § 15.6.“ We find no compelling indications that

HEW's contemporaneous construction of the statute is

wrong. New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino,

413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973). The committee report states

that the statute is aimed at alleviating the hardships of

displacement for public works projects’’ and ‘‘public im-

provement programs, H.R. Rep. No. 1656, 91st Cong.,

2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.

News 5850, 5851-52; and none of the examples furnished

therein (highways, reservoirs, public buildings, facilities

or services, urban renewal projects, hospitals), approxi-

mate the arrangement here, which Tufts initiated and ad-

ministers. Cf. Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d

96, 100 & n. 3 (2d Cir. 1974). Parlane contends that the

phrase ‘‘federal financial assistance’’ appearing in the

statutory definition of displaced persons, 5 4601(b), and

statement of policy, § 4621, demonstrates an intent to

include all such projects. But we are satisfied, especially

1 More than a year after rejecting Parlane’s application HEW

amended its regulations to except from this denial private en-

tities acting as agents or contractors of the Department. 45 C. F. R.

§ 15.6 (1974). The regulation unfortunately leaves these terms

undefined. The term ‘‘contractor’’ may sometimes signify any

party to a contract (although there is some indication that HEW

may regard the grant as a conditional gift, see Wahba v. New

York University, 492 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1974)), but here it

was seemingly used in a sense similar to that in the Miller Act,

40 U.S.C. § 270a(a) (1970), to signify a person awarded a con-

struction or repair contract for a public building or public work.

The committee report indicates, H.R. Rep. No. 1656, 91st Cong.,

2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News

5850, 5853-54, that it is inmmaterial that a private person ac-

tually acquires, builds or holds title to the site if the facility

„serves the public and is regarded by the public as a public

building. We think the regulation’s exception is addressed to

such à situation and is inapplicable here. Compare the definition

of agent in 42 U.S.C. 5 4628.

in light of the committee report, that this phrase was

intended to cover only such assistance to State agencies.

See H.R. Rep. No. 1656, supra at 5853, 5865. Finally,

Representative Ryan criticized the Act shortly before it was

enacted because it ‘‘does not cover displacement arising

from construction by private institutions — such as schools

and hospitals — even though they, too, may be receiving

federal financial assistance, 116 Cong. Rec. 41254-55

(1970); his own bill, H.R. 609, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),

which would have covered such displacement, was allowed

to die in committee. Although statements of opponents

of a bill may not be authoritative, they are nevertheless

relevant and useful, especially where the proponents make

no response to the opponents’ criticisms. Arizona v.

California, 373 U.S. 546, 583 n. 85 (1963).

We might add that the interpretations sought for by

appellant could lead to many difficult situations, if, for

example, the federal assistance was mercly supplementary

to the grantee’s own funds and contributions.

Affirmed.

2 Parlane cites language in a committee report made three years

after enactment to the effect that HEW’s failure to provide re-

location assistance to it violated the original intent of the Act,

H.R. Rep. No. 747, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1973) but the views

of one Congress as to the meaning of statutes enacted by an

earlier Congress are entitled to little if any weight. United States

v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968).

— ee ee ee

Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property

Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. 42 U.S.C. 5% 4601 et seq.

SUBCHAPTER I.--GENERAL PROVISIONS.

§ 4601. [Definitions.]

As used in this chapter—

(1) The term “Federal agency” means any department, agency, or

instrumentality in the executive branch of the Government (except

the National Capital Housing Authority), any wholly owned Govern-

ment corporation (except the District of Columbia Redevelopment

Land Agency), and the Architect of the Capitol, the 2 Reserve

banks and branches thereof.

(2) The term State“ means any of the several States of the Unit-

ed States, the Distriet of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto

Rico, any territory or possession of the United States, the Trust Ter-

ritory of the Paeifie Islands, and any political subdivision thereof.

(3) The term State agency“ means the National Capital Housing

Authority, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency,

and any department, agency, or instrumentality of a State or of a

political subdivision of a State, or any department, agency, or in-

strumentality of two or more States or of two or more political sub-

divisions of a State or States.

(4) The term “Federal financial assistance” means a grant, loan,

or contribution provided by the United States, except any Federal

guarantee or insurance and any annual payment or capital loan to

the District of Columbia.

(5) The term “person” means any individual, partnership, corpo-

ration, or association.

(6) The term “displaced person” means any person who, on or

after January 2, 1971, moves from real property, or moves his per-

sonal property from real property, as a result of the acquisition of

such real property, in whole or in part, or as the result of the writ-

ten order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property, for a pro-

gram or project undertaken by a Federal agency, or with Federal fi-

nancial assistance; and solely for the purposes of sections 4622(a)

and (b) and 4625 of this title, as a result of the acquisition of or as

the result of the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate

other real property, on which such person conducts a business or

farm operation, for such program or project.

(7) The term “business” means any lawful activity, excepting a

farm operation, conducted primarily—

(A) for the purchase, sale, lease and rental of personal and 3

real property, and for the manufacture, processing, or market-

ing of products, commodities, or any other personal property ;

(B) for the sale of services to the public;

(D) solely for the purposes of section 4622(a) of this title,

for assisting in the purchase, sale, resale, manufacture, process-

ing, or marketing of products, commodities, personal property,

or services by the erection and maintenance of an outdoor ad-

vertising display or displays, whether or not such display or

displays are located on the premises on which any of the above

activities are conducted. ,

(8) The term “farm operation” means any activity conducted sole-

ly or primarily for the production of one or more agricultural prod-

ucts or commodities, including timber, for sale or home use, and

customarily producing such products or commodities in sufficient

quantity to be capable of contributing materially to the operator's

support.

(9) The term “mortgage” means such classes of liens as are com-

monlv given to secure advances on, or the unpaid purchase price of,

real property, under the laws of the State in which the real property

is located, together with the credit instruments, if any, secured

thereby. '

§ 4602. [Effect upon property acquisition. ]

(a) The provisions of section 4651 of this title create no rights or

liabilities and shall not affect the validity of any property acquisi-

tions by purchase or condemnation.

(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as creating in any

condemnation proceedings brought under the power of eminent do-

main, any element of value or of damage not in existence immediate-

ly prior te .anuary 2, 1971.

SUBCHAPTER IL—UNIFORM RELOCATION

ASSISTANCE.

§ 4621. [Declaration of policy.]

The purpose of this subchapter is to establish a uniform policy for

the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced as a result of

Federal and federally assisted programs in order that such persons

shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs

designed for the benefit of the public as a whole.

§ 4622. [Moving and related expenses—General provi-

sion.)

(a) Whenever the acquisition of real property for a program or

project undertaken by a Federal agency in any State will result in

the displacement of any person on or after January 2, 1971, the

head of such agency shall make a payment to any displaced person,

upon proper application as approved by such agency head, for—

(1) actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family,

business, farm operation, or other personal property:

(2) actual direct losses of tangible personal property as a re-

sult of moving or discontinuing a business or farm operation,

but not to exceed an amount equal to the reasonable expenses

that would have been required to relocate such property, as

determined by the head of the agency; and

(3) actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement

business or farm.

Displacement from dwelling; election of payments: moving

expense and dislocation allowance

(b) Any displaced person eligible for payments under subsection

(a) of this section who is displaced from a dwelling and who elects

to accept the payments authorized by this subsection in lieu of the

payments authorized by subsection (a) of this section may receive a

moving expense allowance, determined according to a schedule es-

tablished by the head of the Federal agency, not to exceed $300;

and a dislocation allowance of $200.

Dixplacemeat from business or farm eperation; election of payments;

limitations; eligibility fer business payments; “average

annual net earnings” defined

(a) of this section who is displaced from his place of business or

from his farm operation and who elects to accept the payment au-

thorized by this subsection in lieu of the payment authorized by

subsection (a) of this section, may receive a fixed payment in an

amount equal to the average annual net earnings of the business or

farm operation, except that such payment shall be not less than

$2,500 nor more than $10,000. In the case of a business no payment

shall be made under this subsection unless the head of the Federal

agency is satisfied that the business (1) cannot be relocated without

a substantial loss of its existing patronage, and (2) is not a part of a

| commercial enterprise having at least one other establishment not

' being acquired by the United States, which is engaged in the same

or similar business. For purposes of this subsection, the term

“average annual net earnings” means one-half of any net earnings

of the business or farm operation, before Federal, State, and local

income taxes, during the two taxable years immediately preceding

the taxable year in which such business or farm operation moves

from the real property acquired for such project, or during such

other period as the head of such agency determines to be more equi-

table for establishing such earnings, and includes any compensation

paid by the business or farm operation to the owner, his spouse, or

his dependents during such period.

§ 4623. [Replacement housing for homeowner; mort-

gage insurance.]

(a)(1) In addition to payments otherwise authorized by this sub-

chapter, the head of the Federal agency shall make an additional

payment not in excess of $15,000 to any displaced person who is dis-

placed from a dwelling actually owned and occupied by such dis-

placed person for not less than one hundred and eighty days prior

to the initiation of negotiations for the acquisition of the property.

Such additional payment shall include the following elements:

(A) The amount, if any, which when added to the acquisition

cost of the dwelling acquired by the Federal agency, equals the

reasonable cost of a comparable replacement dwelling which is

a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling adequate to accommodate

such displaced person, reasonably accessible to public services

and places of employment and available on the private market.

All determinations required to carry out this subparagraph shall

be made in accordance with standards established by the head

of the Federal agency making the additional payment.

(B) The amount, if any, which will compensate such dis-

placed person for any increased interest costs which such per-

son is required to pay for financing the acquisition of any such

comparable replacement dwelling. Such amount shall be paid

only if the dwelling acquired by the Federal agency was encum-

bered by a bona fide mortgage which was a valid lien on such

dwelling for not less than one hundred and eighty days prior to

the initiation of negotiations for the acquisition of such dwell-

ing. Such amount shall be equal to the excess in the aggregate

interest and other debt service costs of that amount of the prin-

cipal of the mortgage on the replacement dwelling which is equal

to the unpaid balance of the mortgage on the acquired dwelling,

over the remainder term of the mortgage on the acquired dwell-

ing, reduced to discounted present value. The discount rate shall

be the prevailing interest rate paid on savings deposits by com-

mercial banks in the general area in which the replacement

dwelling is located.

for evidence of title, recording fees, and other closing costs in-

cident to the purchase of the replacement dwelling, but not in-

cluding prepaid expenses.

(2) The additional payment authorized by this subsection shall be

made only to such a displaced person who purchases and occupies a

replacement dwelling which is decent, safe, and sanitary not later

than the end of the one year period beginning on the date on which

he receives from the Federal agency final payment of all costs of

the acquired dwelling, or on the date on which he moves from the

acquired dwelling, whichever is the later date.

(b) The head of any Federal agency may, upon application by a

mortgagee, insure any mortgage (including advances during con-

struction) on a comparable replacement dwelling executed by a dis-

placed person assisted under this section, which mortgage is eligible

for insurance under any Federal law administered by such agency

notwithstanding any requirements under such law relating to age,

physical condition, or other personal characteristics of eligible

mortgagors, and may make commitments for the insurance of such

mortgage prior to the date of execution of the mortgage.

ee ee

§ 4624. [Replacement housing for tenants and certain

others.]

In addition to amounts otherwise authorized by this subchapter,

the head of the Federal agency shall make a payment to or for any

displaced person displaced from any dwelling not eligible to receive

a payment under section 4623 of this title which dwelling was ac-

tually and lawfully occupied by such displaced person for not less

than ninety days prior to the initiation of negotiations for acquisi-

tion of such dwelling. Such payment shall be either—

(1) the amount necessary to enable such displaced person to

lease or rent for a period not to exceed four years, a decent,

safe, and sanitary dwelling of standards adequate to accommo-

date such person in areas not generally less desirable in regard

to public utilities and public and commercial facilities, and rea-

sonably accessible to his place of employment, but not to exceed

$4,000, or

(2) the amount necessary to enable such person to make a down-

payment (including incidental expenses described in section 4623

(a)(1)(C) of this title) on the purchase of a decent, safe, and

sanitary dwelling of standards adequate to accommodate such

person in areas not generally less desirable in regard to public

utilities and public and commercial facilities, but not to exceed

$4,000, except that if such amount exceeds $2,000, such person

must equally match any such amount in excess of $2,000, in

making the downpayment.

§ 4625. [Relocation assistance advisory services—Pro-

gram for displaced persons and economically injured oc-

cupants of adjacent property.]

(a) Whenever the acquisition of real property for a program or

project undertaken by a Federal agency in any State will result in

the displacement of any person on or after January 2. 1971, the

head of such agency shall provide a relocation assistance advisory

program for displaced persons which shall offer the services de-

scribed in subsection (e) of this section. If such agency nend deter-

‘mines that any person occupying property immediately adjacent to

the real property acquired is caused substantial economic injury be-

cause of the acquisition, he may offer such person relocation advi-

sory services under such program.

Cooperation between assisting and displacing agencies to

assure maximum assistance

(b) Federal agencies administering programs which may be of as-

sistance to displaced persons covered by this chapter shall cooperate

to the maximum extent feasible with the Federal or State agency

causing the displacement to assure that such displaced persons re-

ceive the maximum assistance available to them.

Measures, facilities, or services; description

subsection (a) of this section shall include such measures, facilities,

or services as may be necessary or appropriate in order to—

(1) determine the need, if any, of displaced persons, for re-

location assistance;

(2) provide urrent and continuing information on the availa-

bility, prices, and rentals, of comparable decent, safe, and sani-

tary sales and rental housing, and of comparable commercial! prop-

erties and locations for displaced businesses ;

(3) assure that, within a reasonable period of time, prior to

displacement there will be available in areas not generally less

desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial

facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of the

families and individuals displaced, decent, safe, and sanitary

dwellings, as defined by such Federal a i

gency head, equal in num-

ber to the number of and available to such displaced persons who

require such dwellings and reasonably accessible to their places

of employment, except that the head of that Federal agency may

— ~~ by regulation situations when such assurances may be

(4) assist a displaced person displaced from his business or farm

operation in obtaining and becoming established in a suitable re-

placement location ;

(5) supply information concerning Federal and State housing

programs, disaster loan r ograms, and other Federal or State

programs offering assistance to displaced persons; and

(6) provide other advisory services to displaced persons: in

= to minimize hardships to such persons in adjusting to relo-

cation.

Coordination of relocation activities with preject work and governmental

actions in the community or nearby areas affecting

. carrying out relocation assistance programs

(d) The heads of Federal agencies shall coordinate relocation ac-

tivities with project work, and other planned or proposed govern-

mental actions in the community or nearby areas which may affect

the carrying out of relocation assistance programs.

§ 4626. [Housing replacement by Federal agency as last

resort. ]

(a) If a Federal project cannot proceed to actual construction be-

cause comparable replacement sale or rental housing is not availa-

ble, and the head of the Federal agency determines that such hous-

ing cannot otherwise be made available he may take such action as

is necessary or appropriate to provide such housing by use of funds

authorized for such project.

(b) No person shall be required to move from his dwelling on or

after January 2, 1971, on account of any Federal project, unless the

Federal agency head is satisfied that replacement housing, in ac-

cordance with section 4625(c)(3) of this title, is available to such

person.

§ 4627. [State required to furnish real property incident

to Federal assistance (local cooperation).]

Whenever real property is acquired by a State agency and fur-

nished as a required contribution incident to a Federal program or

project, the Federal agency having authority over the program or

project may not accept such property unless such State agency has

made all payments and provided all assistance and assura‘ices, as

are required of a State agency by sections 4630 and 4655 of this ti-

tle. Such State agency shall pay the cost of such requirements in

the same manner and to the same extent as the real property ac-

quired for such project, except that in the case of any real property

acquisition or displacement occurring prior to July 1, 1972, such

Federal agency shall pay 100 per centum of the first $26,000 of the

cost of providing such payments and assistance.

§ 4628. [State acting as agent for Federal program.]

Whenever real property is acquired by a State agency at the re-

quest of a Federal agency for a Federal program or project, such

acquisition shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be deemed an ac-

quisition by the Federal agency having authority over such program

or project.

§ 4629. [Public works programs and projects of Dis-

trict of Columbia government and Washington Metropol-

itan Area Transit Authority.)

Whenever real property is acquired by the government of the Dis-

trict of Columbia or the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Au-

thority for a program or project which is not subject to sections 4630

and 4631 of this title, and such acquisition will result in the dis-

placement of any person on or after January 2, 1971, the Commis-

sicner of the District of Columbia or the Washington Metropolitan

Area Transit Authority, as the case may be, shall make all reloca-

tion payments and provide all assistance required of a Federal

agency by this chapter. Whenever real property is acquired for

such a program or project on or after January 2, 1971, such Com-

missioner or Authority, as the case may be, shall make all payments

and meet al! requirements prescribed for a Federal agency by sub-

chapter III of this chapter.

§ 4630. [Requirements for relocation payments and as-

sistance of Federally assisted program; assurances of avail-

ability of housing.)

Notwithstanding any other law, the head of a Federal agency

shall not approve any grant to, or contract or agreement with, a

State agency, under which Federal financial assistance will be

available to pay all or part of the cost of any program or project

which will result in the displacement of any person on or after Jan-

uary 2, 1971, unless he receives satisfactory assurances from such

State agency that—

(1) fair and reasonable relocation payments and assistance

shall be provided to or for displaced persons, as are required

to be provided by a Federal agency under sections 4622, 4623,

and 4624 of this title;

(2) relocation assistance programs offering the services de-

scribed in section 4625 of this title shall be provided to such

displaced persons;

(3) within a reasonable period of time prior to displacement,

decent, safe, and sanitary replacement dwellings will be avail-

able to displaced persons in accordance with section 4625 (e) (3)

of this title.

me ere

§ 4631. [Federal share of costs.]

(a) The cost to a State agency of providing payments and assist-

ance pursuant to sections 4626, 4630, 4635, and 4655 of this title,

shall be included as part of the cost of a program or project for

which Federal financial assistance is available to such State agen-

cy, and such State agency shall be eligible for Federal financial as-

sistance with respect to such payments and assistance in the same

manner and to the same extent as other program or project costs, ex-

cept that, notwithstanding any other law in the case where the Fed-

eral financial assistance is by grant or contribution the Federal

agency shall pay the full amount of the first $25,000 of the cost to a

State agency of providing payments and assistance for a displaced

person under sections 4626, 4630, 4635, and 4655 of this title, on ac-

count of any acquisition or displacement occurring prior to July 1,

1972, and in any case where such Federal financial assistance is by

loan, the Federal agency shall loan such State agency the full

amount of the first $25,000 of such cost.

(b) No payment or assistance under section 4630 or 4655 of this

title shall be required or included as a program or project cost un-

der this section, if the displaced person receives a payment required

by the State law of eminent domain which is determined by such

Federal agency head to have substantially the same purpose and ef-

fect as such payment under this section, and to be part of the cost

of the program or project for which Federal financial assistance is

available.

executed before January 2, 1971, under which Federal financial as-

sistance is available to pay all or part of the cost of any program or

project which will result in the displacement of any person on or

after January 2, 1971, shall be amended to include the cost of pro-

viding payments and services under sections 4630 and 4655 of this

title. If the head of a Federal agency determines that it is neces-

sary for the expeditious completion of a program or project he may

advance to the State agency the Federal share of the cost of any

payments or assistance by such State agency pursuant to sections

4626, 4630, 4635, and 4655 of this title.

§ 4632. [Administration; relocation assistance in pro-

grams receiving Federal financial assistance. ]

In order to prevent unnecessary expenses and duplications of

functions, and to promote uniform and effective administration of

relocation assistance programs for displaced persons under sections

4626, 4630, and 4635 of this title, a State agency may enter into con-

tracts with any individual, firm, association, or corporation for

services in connection with such programs, or may carry out its

functions under this subchapter through any Federal or State gov-

ernmental agency or instrumentality having an established organi-

zation for conducting relocation assistance programs. Such State

agency shall, in carrying out the relocation assistance activities de-

scribed in section 4626 of this title, whenever practicable, utilize the

services of State or local housing agencies, or other agencies having

experience in the administration or conduct of similar housing as-

sistance activities.

§ 4633. [Regulations and procedures.]

(a) In order to promote uniform and effective administration of

relocation assistance and land acquisition of State or local housing

agencies, or other agencies having programs or projects by Federal

agencies or programs or projects by State agencies receiving Feder-

al financial assistance, the heads of Federal agencies shall consult

together on the establishment of regulations and procedures for the

implementation of such programs.

(b) The head of each Federal agency is authorized to establish

such regulations and procedures as he may determine to be neces-

sary to assure—

(1) that the payments and assistance authorized by this

chapter shall be administered in a manner which is fair and rea-

sonable, and as uniform as practicable;

(2) that a displaced person who makes proper application

for a payment authorized for such person by this subchapter

shall be paid promptly after a move or, in hardship cases, be

paid in advance; and

(3) that any person aggrieved by a determination as to eligi-

bility for a payment authorized by this chapter, or the amount

of a payment, may have his application reviewed by the head

of the Federal agency having authority over the applicable

program or project, or in the case of a program or project re-

ceiving Federal financial assistance, by the head of the State

agency.

regulations and procedures, consistent with the provisions of this

chapter, as he deems necessary or appropriate to carry out this

chapter.

§ 4634. [Annual report to President; sdenti

7 ident; Presidential re-

The head of each Federal agency shall prepare and submi

nual report to the President on the — of such —

respect to the programs and policies established or authorized by

this chapter, and the President shall submit such reports to the

Congress not later than January 15 of each year, beginning January

15, 1972, and ending January 15, 1975, together with his comments

or recommendations. Such reports shall give special attention to:

(1) the effectiveness of the provisions of this chapter assuring the

availability of comparable replacement housing, which is decent,

safe, and sanitary, for displaced homeowners and tenants; (2) ac-

tions taken by the agency to achieve the objectives of the policies of

Congress, declared in this chapter, to provide uniform and equal

treatment, to the greatest extent practicable, for all persons dis-

placed by, or having real property taken for, Federal or federally

assisted programs; (3) the views of the Federal agency head on the

progress made to achieve such objectives in the various programs

conducted or administered by such agency, and among the Federal

agencies; (4) any indicated effects of such programs and policies

on the public; and (5) any recommendations he may have for fur-

ther improvements in relocation assistance and land acquisition pro-

grams, policies, and implementing laws and regulations.

§ 4635. [Planning and other preliminary expenses for

additional housing.]

In order to encourage and facilitate the construction or rehabili-

tation of housing to meet the needs of displaced persons who are

displaced from dwellings because of any Federal or Federal finan-

cially assisted project, the head of the Federal agency administering

such project is authorized to make loans as a part of the cost of any

such project, or to approve loans as a part of the cost of any such

project receiving Federal financial assistance, to nonprofit, limited

dividend, or cooperative organizations or td public bodies, for neces-

sary and reasonable expenses, prior to construction, for planning and

obtaining federally insured mortgage financing for the rehabilita-

tion or construction of housing for such displaced persons. Not-

withstanding the preceding sentence, or any other law, such loans

shall be available for not to exceed 80 per centum of the reasonable

costs expected to be incurred in planning, and in obtaining financing

for, such housing, prior to the availability of such financing, includ-

ing, but not limited to, preliminary surveys and analyses of market

needs, preliminary site engineering, preliminary architectural fees,

site acquisition, application and mortgage commitment fees, and

construction loan fees and discounts. Loans to an organization es-

tablished for profit shall bear interest at a market rate established

by the head of such Federal agency. All other loans shall be with-

out interest. Such Federal agency head shall require repayment of

loans made under this section, under such terms and conditions as

he may require, upon completion of the project or sooner, and ex-

cept in the case of a loan to an organization established for profit,

may cancel any part or all of a loan if he determines that a perma-

nent loan to finance the rehabilitation or the construction of such

housing cannot be obtained in an amount adequate for repayment of

such loan. Upon repayment of any such loan, the Federal share of

the sum repaid shall be credited to the account from which such

loan was made, unless the Secretary of the Treasury determines

that such account is no longer in existence, in which case such sum

shall be returned to the Treasury and credited to miscellaneous re-

ceipts.

§ 4636. [Payments not to be considered as income for

revenue purposes or for eligibility for assistance under

Social Security Act or other Federal law.]

No payment received under this subchapter shall be considered as

income for the purposes of Title 26; or for the purposes of deter-

mining the eligibility or the extent of eligibility of any person for

assistance under the Social Security Act or any other Federal law.

§ 4637. [Displacement by code enforcement, rehabilita-

tion, and demolition programs receiving Federal assist-

ance. }

A person who moves or discontinues his business, or moves other

personal property, or moves from his dwelling on or after January

2, 1971, as a direct result of any project or program which receives

Federal financial assistance under title I of the Housing Act of

1949, as amended, or as a result of carrying out a comprehensive

city demonstration program under title I of the Demonstration Cit-

ies and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 shall, for the pur-

poses of this subchapter, be deemed to have been displaced as the

result of the acquisition of real property.

§ 4638. [Transfers of surplus property.]

The Administrator of General Services is aut’ ‘rized to transfer

to a State agency for the purpose of providing replacement housing

required by this subchapter, any real property surplus to the needs

of the United States within the meaning of the Federal Property

and Administrative Services Act of 1949; as amended. Such trans-

fer shall be subject to such terms and conditions as the Administra-

tor determines necessary to protect the interests of the United

States and may be made without monetary consideration, except

that such State agency shall pay to the United States all amounts

received by such agency from any sale, lease, or other disposition of

such property for such housing.

SUBCHAPTER III.—UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY

ACQUISITION POLICY.

§ 4651. [Uniform policy on real property acquisition

practices.]

In order to encourage and expedite the acquisition of real proper-

ty by agreements with owners, to avoid litigation and relieve

congestion in the courts, to assure consistent treatment for owners

in the many Federal programs, and to promote public confidence in

Federal land acquisition practices, heads of Federal agencies shall,

to the greatest extent practicable, be guided by the following poli-

cies:

(1) The head of a Federal agency shall make every reasonable ef-

fort to acquire expeditiously real property by negotiation.

(2) Real property shall be appraised before the initiation of nego-

tiations, and the owner or his designated representative shall be

given an opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his inspec-

tion of the property.

(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, the

head of the Federal agency concerned shall establish an amount

which he believes to be just compensation therefor and shall make a

prompt offer to acquire the property for the full amount so estab-

lished. In no event shall such amount be less than the agency’s ap-

proved appraisal of the fair market value of such property. Any de-

crease or increase in the fair market value of real property prior to

the date of valuation caused by the public improvement for which

such property is acquired, or by the likelihood that the property

would be acquired for such improvement, other than that due to

physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the owner,

will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the proper-

ty. The head of the Federal agency concerned shall provide the

owner of real property to be acquired with a written statement of,

and summary of the basis for, the amount he established as just

compensation. Where appropriate the just compensation for the

real property acquired and for damages to remaining real property

shall be separately stated.

(4) No owner shall be required to surrender possession of real

property before the head of the Federal agency concerned pays the

agreed purchase price, or deposits with the court in accordance with

section 258a of Title 40, for the benefit of the owner, an amount not

less than the agency’s approved appraisal of the fair market value

of such property, or the amount of the award of compensation in the

condemnation proceeding for such property.

(5) The construction or development of a public improvement

shall be so scheduled that, to the greatest extent practicable, no per-

son lawfully occupying real property shall be required to move from

a dwelling (assuming a replacement dwelling as required by sub-

chapter II of this chapter will be available), or to move his business

or farm operation, without at least ninety days’ written notice from

the head of the Federal agency concerned, of the date by which

such move is required.

(6) If the head of a Federal agency permits an owner or tenant

to occupy the real property acquired on a rental basis for a short

term or for a period subject to termination by the Government on

short notice, the amount of rent required shall not exceed the fair

rental value of the property to a short-term occupier.

(7) In no event shall the head of a Federal agency either advance

the time of condemnation, or defer negotiations or condemnation

and the deposit of funds in-court for the use of the owner, or take

any other action coercive in nature, in order to compel an agreement

on the price to be paid for the property.

(8) If any interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise

of the power of eminent domain, the head of the Federal agency

concerned shall institute formal condemnation proceedings. No

Federal agency head shall intentionally make it necessary for an

owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking

of his real property.

(9) If the acquisition of only part of a property would leave its

owner with an uneconomic remnant, the head of the Federal agency

concerned shall offer to acquire the entire property.

§ 4652. (Buildings, structures, and improvements. ]

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the head of a

Federal agency acquires any interest in real property in any State,

he shall acquire at least an equal interest in all buildings, struc-

tures, or other improvements located upon the real property so ac-

quired and which he requires to be removed from such real property

or which he determines will be adversely affected by the use to

which such real property will be put.

(b)(1) For the purpose of determining the just compensation to

be paid for any building, structure, or other improvement required

to be acquired by subsection (a) of this section, such building,

structure, or other improvement shall be deemed to be a part of the

real property to be acquired notwithstanding the right or obligation

of a tenant, as against the owner of any other interest in the real

property, to remove such building, structure, or improvement at the

expiration of his term, and the fair market value which such build-

ing, structure, or improvement contributes to the fair market value

of the real property to be acquired, or the fair market value of such

building, structure, or improvement for removal from the real prop-

erty, whichever is the greater, shall be paid to the tenant therefor.

(2) Payment under this subsection shall not result in duplication

of any payments otherwise authorized by law. No such payment

shall be made unless the owner of the land involved disclaims all in-

terest in the improvements of the tenant. In consideration for any

such payment, the tenant shall assign, transfer, and release to the

United States all his right, title, and interest in and to such im-

provements. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to de-

prive the tenant of any rights to reject payment under this subsec-

tion and to obtain payment for such property interests in accord-

ance with applicable law, other than this subsection.

§ 4653. [Expenses incidental to transfer of title to

United States.]

The head of a Federal agency, as soon as practicable after the

date of payment of the purchase price or the date of deposit in

court of funds to satisfy the award of compensation in a condemna-

tion proceeding to acquire real property, whichever is the earlier,

shall reimburse the owner, to the extent the head of such agency

deems fair and reasonable, for expenses he necessarily incurred for—

(1) recording fees, transfer taxes, and similar expenses inci-

dental to conveying such real property to the United States;

(2) penalty costs for prepayment of any preexisting recorded

mortgage entered into in good faith encumbering such real

property; and

(3) the pro rata portion of real property taxes paid which are

allocable to a period subsequent to the date of vesting title in

the United States, or the effective date of possession of such

real property by the United States, whichever is the earlier.

§ 4654. [Litigation expenses.]

(a) The Federal court having jurisdiction of a proceeding insti-

tuted by a Federal agency to acquire real property by condemnation

shall award the owner of any right, or title to, or interest in, such

real property such sum as will in the opinion of the court reimburse

such owner for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses,

including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, ac-

tually incurred because of the condemnation proceedings, if—

(1) the final judgment is that the Federal agency cannot ac-

quire the real property by condemnation; or

(2) the proceeding is abandoned by the United States.

(b) Any award made pursuant to subsection (a) of this section

shall be paid by the head of the Federal agency for whose benefit

the condemnation proceedings was instituted.

ing brought under section 1346(a)(2) or 1491 of Title 28 awarding

compensation for the taking of property by a Federal agency, or the

Attorney General effecting a settlement of any such proceeding,

shall determine and award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of

such judgment or settlement, such sum as will in the opinion of the

court or the Attorney General reimburse such plaintiff for his rea-

sonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reas nable at-

torney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of

such proceeding.

§ 4655. [Requirements for uniform land acquisition pol-

icies; payments of expenses incidental to transfer of real

property to State; payment of litigation expenses in cer-

tain cases.]

Notwithstanding any other law, the head of a Federal agency

shall not approve any program or project or any grant to, or con-

tract or agreement with, a State agency under which Federal finan-

cial assistance will be available to pay all or part of the cost of any

program or project which will result in the acquisition of real prop-

erty on and after January 2, 1971, unless he receives satisfactory as-

surances from such State agency that—

(1) in acquiring real property it will be guided, to the great-

est extent practicable under State law, by the land acquisition

policies in section 4651 of this title and the provisions of sec-

tion 4652 of this title, and

(2) property owners will be paid or reimbursed for necessary

expenses as specified in sections 4653 and 4654 of this title.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.