Jurisdictional Statement — Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Atkins

Supreme Court brief1975

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1975

No. 15°14 "

LOUISVILLE AND BARE ELE RAILROAD

COMPANY Appellant,

versus

Zz. D. ATKINS, ROBERT CLEMENT, and CAYCE

PENTECOST, Commissioners composing the

Tennessee Public Service Commission;

HONORABLE RAY BLANTON, Governor of the

State of Tennessee;

HONORABLE JOE OC. CARR, Secretary of State

of the State of Tennessee;

HONORABLE RANDOLPH A. ASHLEY, JR.,

Attorney General of the State of Tennessee;

ALICE T. STEELE, Trustee of Dickson County,

Tennessee; and

DICKSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE - - = Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee

Nashville Division

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

(See inside cover for list of attorneys)

WESTERFIELO-GONTE CO,, 610 W. KENTUCKY<P.0, BOX 3251, LOUISVILLE, KY

Suprame Court, |

oe. el )

MICHAEL RODAN, JS.)

-

INDEX

PAGE

SL TE o's ocdccdactacccevnccsessccesseses 2

PUNE 5 oe crcccccccccsccccecscsecccscessseee 2- 3

BORAMAES TRVOEVOE 0 cece ccscceveccccecccccccens 3

GmemtEOMS PUCROMAOE 2 oc cee eccccccccccnccccccscens 3- 4

RSIS GE GD GMD. ow ccc cecccvcccesescccesecce 4-9

The Questions Are Substantial... ......... 6c cee ees Y-19

IED 6. 0's Wo cvccvncccccwnccescccnceédcscdvas 19

Appendix A—Opinion Below. ....... ccc ceeeeeees 21-26

Appendix B—Constitution of Tennessee, Art. II,

SD Us 6 6:6 6406000006 6000-003 RedEbeneeeneueenssun 27-29

Appendix C—Tennessee Code Annotated, §§ 67-601;

PS GED 0 6 00 KécvccesecessccsecccccscssssQuee

Appendix D—Order Below... .......cccscceeeeeees 34-35

Appendix E—Notice of Appeal.......cccccceeeeees 36-37

f § . WPPPPTTTTTTITITITITiTi irri Te 38

CITATION OF AUTHORITIES iii

Other: PAGE

Cases: PAGE Notes of Advisory Committee, Fed, R, Civ. P. .....12, 16

B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Rubber Latex Products, Inc., S. Rep. No, 92-1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972),

400 F. 2d 401 (6th Cir., 1968)...... 0.00 cee eens 15 Discriminatory State Taxation of Interstate

Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. 8S. 15 (1953).... 15 Carriers... cece ces eee eeeeeeeeeeeneeesenees 10

Featherstone v. Barash, 345 Fed. 2d 246 (10th Cir., H. R. 5385, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).......0065 11

1965)... cecccceeeceseeenseeeeeeessveesenas 14, 16 H. R. 12891, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1974). ....6.0065 11

Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, State S, 1876, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975)... cee eee eens 11

Revenue Commissioner, 342 U. 8. 299 (1952)... 3 H. R. Doe. No, 94-155, 94th Cong., Ist Sess, (1975). 11

Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. 8, 150

CRED 0 oh b Uedeccecnsncvccececccevesesosesee 11

Herkness v. [rion, Commissioner of Conservation,

STG UT. BH. GB CIBGB) ow cccccccccccccccsvcccnecs 3

Interstate Cireuit, Inc. v. U. S., 304 U. 8S. 55, 56-57

COREE 0.06 cecececcseccecceccsacnacesnensens: 17

Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 U. 5.

Ge CED 4 6.6 6 00:00 ctccrecnnsceseccrescoente 15

Kweskin v. Finkelstein, 223 F, 2d 677 (7th Cir,

DE bab KdGCKCKERR ODED ODEONEDSEOCEESSRCRRNS 14

Nashville, C, & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U. 8, 405

FT PrTTTrrirrrrr tT tty 12,17, 18

New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303

oS 8, RRP TTTTT TTT Tree 9

O’Neill v. United States, 411 F. 2d 139 (8rd Cir,

PCCP TrTrreT err Tr Te Tree 14

Query v. United States, 316 U. S, 486 (1942)...... 8

Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S, 412 (1920). 11

United States v. Forness, 125 F. 2d 928 (2nd Cir.,

PPT rr rrrTrr TT irr TT ee 14-15

Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1953)... 11

Woods Construction Co. v. Pool Construction Co.,

314 F. 2d 405 (10th Cir., 1963)... ..... cee eeee 14, 15

Constitutions:

Constitution of Tennessee, Art. IT, § 28........... 3

Statutes:

Tennessee Code Annotated, §§ 67-601, 67-611, 67-616, 3

Text:

Moore’s Federal Practice.......cccccsccsseeseees 16

SUPREME COURT OF THE UMTED STATES

October Term, 1975

No.

LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAmLRoaD ComM-

PANY - - - - - = = Appellant,

v.

Z. D. Arxins. Ropert CLEMENT, and CAYCE

PENTECOsr, Commissioners composing the

Tennessee Public Service Commission ;

HonoraB_eE Ray Bianton, Governor of the

State of Tennessee ;

HonoraB_eE Jor C. Carr, Secretary of State

of the State of Tennessee ;

HoNORABLE RANDOLPH A. ASHLEY, JR., Attor-

ney General of the State of Tennessee ;

Auice T. STEELE, Trustee of Dickson County,

Tennessee; and

Dickson County, TENNESSEE - - Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellant appeals from the judgment of the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Ten-

2

nessee, Nashville Division (three judges sitting), en-

tered on March 12, 1975, as amended on April 21, 1975,

denying injunctive relief against enforcement of a

state statute relating to the assessment of properties

and dismissing the case, aud submits this Statement to

show that the Supreme Court of the United States has

jurisdiction of the appeal and that substantial ques-

tions are presented.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the District Court for the Middle

District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, has not been

officially reported. A copy of the opinion is attached

hereto as Appendix A.

JURISDICTION

This suit was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-

2202 and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 seeking an in-

junction restraining the action of state officials in the

enforcement of a state statute prescribing equalization

ratios to be applied in the assessment of railroad prop-

erties for ad valorem taxation in the State of Tennessee,

the ground of challenge being that the said statute de-

prives Appellant of the equal protection guaranteed by

the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States. The judgment of the District Court

was entered on March 12, 1975, and amended on April

21, 1975. Notice of appeal was filed in the said Dis-

trict Court on May 9, 1975. The jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court to review this decision by direct appeal

3

is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1253. The following deci-

sions sustain the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to

review the judgment on direct appeal in this case:

Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. V. Redwine, State

Revenue Commissioner, 342 U. S. 299 (1952); Query

v. United States, 316 U. S. 486 (1942); Herkness v.

Irion, Commissioner of Conservation, 278 U. 8. 92

(1928).

STATUTES INVOLVED

Constitution of Tennessee, Article II, Sec. 28. The

pertinent text is set forth in Appendix B hereto.

Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 67-601(4), (7) and

(8); § 67-611; § 67-616. The pertinent texts are set

forth in Appendix C hereto.

A copy of the judgment below, aud of the amend-

ment thereto, are appended hereto as Appendix D.

A copy of the Notice of Appeal in this case is ap-

pended hereto as Appendix E.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. On the facts of the case, do sufficient relevant

differences, having a fair and reasonable relation to

the division of the ad valorem tax burden, exist to

justify taxation of railroad property on the basis ot

a higher assessment ratio than is applied to industrial

and commercial properties, as defined by the Tennessee

statute, without depriving the railroad of the equal

protection of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?

4

2. Do the Order and Opinion entered in this case

sufficiently contain Findings of Fact to comply with

Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ?

3. Did the Court below err in concluding that the

complaint of Appellant is a matter solely for legisla-

tive concern and that for the Court to grant the relief

requested ‘‘would take the Court outside the confines

of judicial review,’’ causing it to substitute its judg-

ment for that of the Tennessee General Assembly ?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Subsequent to court decisions finding that dispro-

portionate taxation of the properties of railroads vio-

lated the Tennessee constitutional requirement of uni-

formity, the Tennessee Constitution was amended to

establish four classes of property for ad valorem tax-

ation purposes, i.e., publie utility (to be equalized at

59% of value of real and personal property), commer-

cial and industrial (to be equalized at 40% of value of

real property and at 30% of value of personal prop-

erty), residential (to be equalized at 25% of value of

real property and 5% of value of personal property)

and farm (to be equalized at the same ratios as resi-

dential property). (Appendix B). The Tennessee

General Assembly then enacted legislation in imple-

mentation of the constitutional amendment, placing

railroads in the classification of public utility prop-

erty (Appendix C). Appellant duly challenged classifi-

cation of its property as public utility property, the

challenge was rejected by the assessing body, and

5)

Appellant instituted this litigation, eontending that

the actions of the Tennessee General Assembly in

classifying railroads as public utilities for property

tax purposes and of the assessing bodies in assessing

Appellant’s properties within that category, rather

than their being included within the classification of

industrial and commercial property, were arbitrary

and unreasonable and a denial to Appellant of that

equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-

ment to the Constitution of the United States.

Evidence in the case demonstrates that conditions

which formerly were held to justify separate property

tax treatment of railroads no longer exist; that there

are no such special conditions today; and that it is,

therefore, arbitrary and unreasonable to classify rail-

roads for that purpose separately from other non-

public utility commercial and industrial property.

The record below! discloses many changes in the

situation of railroads in the past 45 to 50 years. It

shows, for example, that in 1929, 75% of all ton-miles

of freight transported in the United States were car-

ried by rail whereas by 1973, that percentage had

dropped to less than 40% (I Tr. 11). It shows that in

the days when discriminatory taxation of railroads was

being upheld by the courts, the railroads had a virtual

monopoly on intercity passenger traffic, but that rail

1There are three parts to the transcript: I, testimony taken in

open court; II, Appellant’s depositions; and III, Appellee’s depo-

sitions. References are identified by reference to parts and page,

e.g.,1 Tr. 1. The prepared statement of Witness Frye was stipu-

lated as his direct testimony. References thereto are in the follow-

ing manner: ‘‘Frye, 1’’, meaning Frye statement, page 1.

6

passenger traffic has diminished from 34,000,000 pas-

senger-miles in 1929 to 9,000,000 in 1973 (I Tr. 11).

Since 1945, the ton-miles generated by motor car-

riers in the United States have increased four times

and the tonnage carried by water carriers has also in-

creased four times but railroads’ tonnage has dropped

from 67.2% of the total to 38.2% of the total (II Tr.

90-91). This competition with which railroads are en-

gaged is pervasive and reaches almost all commodities

which could be carried by rail.

In Tennessee there are three major railroads and

perhaps 20 smaller ones; they compete with approx-

imately 2,000 truck lines and the competition extends

into all parts of the State (III Tr. 140) . This is to be

contrasted, in Tennessee, with fewer than 100 natural

gas distribution companies, each of which has a

monopoly within the territory assigned to it (IIT Tr.

142) ; with electric companies, which have a monopoly

on the provision of electricity within the particular

territory (III Tr. 145-146); and with the telephone

industry where there is monopoly within the service

territory and where one company owns about 85% of

the telephones in the State (III Tr. 156).

Such factors as these cause railroads to have a

much greater risk as investments than is the case with

public utilities (II Tr. 85), thus further differentiating

them from public utilities.

The receipt of substantial benefits and subsidies

from the government is no longer limited to the rail-

road industry, as was alleged many years ago when

classification of railroads was being upheld. Fran-

7

chises and special benefits are pervasive throughout the

commercial and industrial field. For example, radio

stations and television stations in Tennessee are classi-

fied as commerical and industrial property for pur-

poses of ad valorem taxation (Appendix C); yet they

possess exclusive franchises with respect to certain

channels of communication. Tennessee offers many

benefits, advantages and subsidies to non-railroad in-

dustries generally to induce them to locate within the

State. An example is found in the availability of tax-

free financing for the construction of plants on land ac-

quired for the industry at public expense, often through

the use of the public power of eminent domain. Lower

interest rates available to governmental agency bor-

rowers redound to the benefit of the industry through

reduced rental payments. The result is a substantial

cost saving to private industry, financed by the public

in the form of higher taxes on other property to offset

the lower taxes or tax-free situation of the new in-

dustry (III Tr. 168-170).

The power of emineit domain is available to a

great variety of industrial and commercial enterprises

(Frye, 5-6). Through the use of the power, downtown

areas have been acquired by governmental corpora-

tions, cleared, and sold to private commercial and in-

dustrial firms. Usually the private purchaser would

have been unable to acquire the property, and cer-

tainly not at the price available to the public agency

through the power of eminent domain. The practical

result is the same as if the power of eminent domain

had been possessed by the ordinary industrial or com-

8

mercial establishment. It has benefitted directly from

the ouster of the previous owner and the taking of his

property.

The era when railroads were generators of large

streams of income has long since vanished. Railroads,

as a whole, have not earned as much as 4% on net

investments since 1955 (I Tr. 12). A study of some

45 industries showed that the railroads earned the low-

est return of all, 2.9% in 1972 and 3.5% in 1973

(II Tr. 78). Thus, railroads are the least able to bear

excessive burdens of government which, in another

time, were justified as being imposed upon railroads

because of their productivity and of their alleged

ability to bear a disproportionate part of the burden

of government.

An argument advanced for classification of rail-

roads for disproportionate ad valorem taxation has

been that they allegedly are relatively great burdens

upon society. But the record demonstrates, for ex-

ample, the relatively low pollution by railroads as com-

pared with other sources, For instance, railroads

produce 0.5% of particulates placed in the air, while

non-transportation industrial sources place 87.5% in

the air (II Tr. 5).

Railroads are energy-conserving, moving three

times as much freight per gallon of fuel as do big

trucks (Frye, 33), and their safety record as a carrier

of passengers far surpasses that of other modes of

transportation (II Tr. 4-5) . The land area consumed

by highways is many times that used by the railroads,

and railroads are not a depletive industry producing

from a non-replenishable source,

9

Through Witness Frye, Appellant showed that the

evidence applied not only to the railroad industry in

general but also to Appellant, in particular, in Ten-

nessee,

The record below establishes the absence of any

correlation between the characteristics of railroads,

including Appellant, their position in the economy and

society, and the extraordinary burden placed upon

them by virtue of the action of the Tennessee legisla-

ture. It shows that in the significant respects, the

characteristics of railroads are those of non-utility in-

dustrial and commercial concerns and not those of pub-

lic utilities which, for example, possess effective monop-

olies and the near-guaranteed rates of return which

result from such a monopoly. Railroads no longer

possess those ‘distinctive characteristics and fune-

tions’? which must be found to exist before classifica-

tion may be sustained, New York Rapid Transit Corp.

v. New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938).

THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

Appellant brought this suit to contest action of the

Tennessee legislature and of the assessing bodies in

classifying properties of Appellant and other railroads

in Tennessee with public utilities, rather than with

other commercial and industrial properties, for the

purpose of ad valorem taxation, ‘The practical result

of the legislature’s action is to cause the real property

of Appellant in Tennessee to be taxed at a level 37.57

greater than the level at which the real property of

10

non-railroad, non-public utility industrial and com-

mercial concerns in Tennessee is taxed, and at an even

greater disproportion in respect of personal property.

The case is of national significance. Appellant chal-

lenges here a practice which extends throughout the

United States. Appellant believes that every major

railroad in the country operates in more than one

state which discriminates against railroads in its ad

valorem tax system. The Senate Committee on Com-

meree concluded in 1972 that the discrimination

amounted to at least $54 million in 1970, Senate Com-

MITTER ON COMMERCE, DISCRIMINATORY State TAxa-

TION OF InvERSTATE Carriers, 8S. Rep. No, 92-1085,

92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).

This challenge is brought after years of change in

the economic position of the railroads, culminating

in the current situation of railroad bankruptcies in

the Northeast and Midwest. One of the economist wit-

nesses in this proceeding listed three factors which, in

his opinion, are responsible for the financial decline of

railroads, One of those factors was discriminatory

state and local property taxation (II Tr. 98-99),

The record in this ease demonstrates that there is

no rational relationship between the characteristics and

economic condition of Appellant and the object of the

legislation complained of, namely, the proper distribu-

tion of the burden of taxation, to justify the classifi-

cation of Appellant and the railroads for disproportion-

ate property taxation,

Classification must ‘rest on real and not feigned

differences . . . [T]he distinetion [must] have some

11

relevance to the purpose for which the classification

is made, and . . . the different treatments [must |

be not so disparate, relative to the difference in classi-

fication, as to be wholly arbitrary.’’ Walters v. City

of St. Louis, 347 U. 8, 231, 287 (1953).

Classification must be upon a reasonable ground,

some difference which bears a just and proper relation

to the attempted classification, and arbitrary selection

can never be justified by calling it classification. Gulf,

C.& 8. F. Ry. Co. vy. Ellis, 165 U. 8. 150 (1897), All

persons similarly cireumstanced must be treated alike.

Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S, 412 (1920).

This discriminatory taxation of railroad property

has attracted the concern of successive Congresses and

national administrations. Under both Presidents

Nixon and Ford, legislative proposals have been made

to forbid such discrimination. See, e.g., Title II, H. R.

5385, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H. R. 12891, 93rd

Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); 8. 1876, 94th Cong., 1st Sess,

(1975), and President Gerald Ford’s Message to Con-

gress sending the Railroad Revitalization Act, H. R.

Doc, No, 94-155, 94th Cong., Ist Sess, (1975), 121 Cong,

Ree, H 4212 (daily ed. May 19, 1975), in which the

matter of discriminatory state property taxation is

specifically mentioned,

This case, therefore, involves questions of broad

significance to the country as it undertakes to deal with

multiple railroad reorganizations and with legislative

proposals to prevent further deterioration within the

industry,

12

An example of that significance may be seen in the

fact that if federal loans or grants were made to rail-

roads, as is presently being proposed, Congress would

be, in effect, providing funds to make up for money

diseriminatorily and unconstitutionally (if Appellant

is correct about the law) taken away by states and

localities in the form of property taxes—money which,

if not so unconstitutionally exacted, would have reduced

or eliminated the need for federal assistance,

The conflict between congressional exercise of the

commerce powers in furtherance of a National Trans-

portation Policy and discriminatory state action in

plain contradiction of that congressional purpose merits

the analysis of this Court.

The case is additionally important because it pre-

sents questions of the proper application of Rule 52(a)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring

findings of fact, and of earlier decisions of this Court

exemplified by Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters,

294 U. 8. 405 (1935).

The District Court’s comments on the evidence are

limited to a few lines;

13

‘At best, the Plaintiff’s proof, although volumi-

nous, tends to show only that railroads in general

are not as profitable as before and that certain

benefits and powers peculiar to them, such as the

right of eminent domain, are not as useful or as

used as they once were . . . Given the charac-

teristics of railroads, it was of course eminently

reasonable for the General Assembly to designate

railroads as public utilities; anc the economic con-

dition of the railroad industry and its competition

with others does not destroy such designation as

being palpably arbitrary or invidiously discrim-

inatory.’’ (Appendix A, pp. 25-26)

The foregoing is the extent of the lower court’s

treatment of the evidence, which filled some 400 pages

of typed depositions and well over 100 pages of writ-

ten statements submitted as direct testimony.

In what ways the lower court believed railroads to

resemble telephone, water, and electricity companies,

those organizations most frequently springing to mind

when one uses the words ‘‘publie utilities’; what the

court thought to be the characteristics of a public utility

and what the characteristics of a non-public utility;

in what ways the court thought railroads to resemble

non-utility industrial and commercial concerns; what

the court thought to be the governing characteristics

for application of that reasonable discretion which the

legislature must exercise in making its classifications ;

and whether the court decided that circumstances had

not changed, or, though changed, did not establish in-

vidious diserimination—these, and many other ques-

tions, ure left without findings and unanswered,

14

Compliance with Rule 52(a) is mandatory. Feath-

erstone VY. Barash, 345 F. 2d 246 (10th Cir., 1965) ;

Woods Construction Co. v. Pool Construction Co., 314

F. 2d 405 (10th Cir., 1963); Kweskin v. Finkelstein,

993 F, 2d 677 (7th Cir., 1955). Yet the opinion of the

court below is bereft of vital findings of fact, either

subsidiary or ultimate. O’Neill vy. United States, 411

F, 2d 139 (3rd Cir., 1969).

The question before the court below was one of fact,

namely, have the characteristics of the railroads so

changed in the years since the inception of their being

treated separately or as public utilities for property

tax classification purposes as to make it unreasonable

to continue so to characterize and treat them rather

than as other commercial and industrial enterprises?

The precedents holding that reasonable classifications

by the legislature will be sustained necessarily turned

upon their facts. The burden which Appellant assumed

in undertaking to show that present facts are sufficient

to dictate a departure from the decisions upholding

such discriminatory classifications is a substantial one

and makes doubly important the fulfillment by the

lower -ourt of its duty of finding the facts. Judge

Frank’s comments in United States v. Forness, 125

F, 2d 928 (2nd Cir., 1942), at p, 942 are apposite:

“Tt is sometimes said that the requirement that

the trial judge file findings of fact is for the con-

venience of the upper courts. While it does serve

that end, it has a far more important purpose—

that of evoking care on the part of the trial judge

in ascertaining the facts. For, as every judge

15

knows, to set down in precise words the facts as he

finds them is the best way to avoid carelessness in

the discharge of that duty: Often a strong im-

pression that, on the basis of the evidence, the facts

are thus-and-so gives way when it comes to ex-

pressing that impression on paper.”’

To support conclusory determinations, **. . . there

must be findings, in such detail and exactness as the

nature of the case permits, of subsidiary facts on which

the ultimate conclusion of fairness can rationally be

predicated.” Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District,

319 U. S. 415, 420 (1943). “A conclusion of ultimate

fact without any subsidiary or basic findings of fact

upon which such conclusion is based is insufficient com-

plianee with Rule 52(a).”” Woods Construction Co.

vy. Pool Construction Co., 314 F. 2d 405, 406 (10th Cir.,

1963).

‘Statements conclusory in nature are to be eschewed

in favor of statements of the preliminary and basic

facts on which the District Court relied. . . . Other-

wise, their findings are useless for appellate purposes.”

Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. 8S. 15, 24, n. 8.

It is not the function of the reviewing court to pore

over the record below to answer questions such as those

meutioned above, Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dis-

trict, 319 U. S. 415, 421-422 (1943) ; B. F. Goodrich Co.

y. Rubber Later Products, Inc., 400 F. 2d 401 (6th Cir.,

1968) ; Woods Construction Co. vy. Pool Construction

Co., 314 F. 2d 405 (10th Cir., 1963), and cases cited

therein. That is the function of the trial court.

16

The purpose of Rule 52(a) is threefold—findings

of fact are an aid to the trial court’s process of adjudi-

cation and evoke care in that process; they make defi-

nite what is decided in order to apply the doctrines of

res judicata and estoppel; and they are an aid to the

appellate court on review. Featherstone v. Barash, 345

F. 2d 246 (10th Cir., 1965) ; 5A Moore’s Federal Prac-

tice 2706, 1 52.06[1]; Rule 52, Fed. R. Civ. P., Notes

of Advisory Committee.

None of these purposes has been served in this case.

Appellant believes that proper disposition of this case

rests upon a careful, thoughtful and almost ‘‘clean-

slate’ analysis and exposition of facts as they exist

today, comparing them with facts which existed 40 and

50 years ago. Such process can only be the slow and

deliberate one of finding just what the facts of today

are and of comparing them with vesterday’s facts. Yet

the opinion below has none of those findings of facts

which would have resulted from this vital process.

The opinion below is, with all respect to the court

below, of no significant value in respect of res judicata

and estoppel by judgment. There being no findings of

fact, it cannot be known in the future whether other

like contests can be progressed or not.

Lastly, the Supreme Court, which is the first and

last level of review in this instance, is confronted with

no findings to aid it in its process of review, no findings

which suggest to it the process by which the trial court

reached its conclusions as to the impact of the evi-

dence. The Supreme Court has said that it is partic-

17

ularly important that the trial court find the facts when

there is a direct appeal to the Supreme Court:

“| | [Findings of fact are] an essential aid

to the appellate court in reviewing an equity case

[citations omitted] and compliance with the rule is

particularly important in an anti-trust case which

comes to this Court by direct appeal from the trial

court.’’

Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. U. S., 304 U. 8. 56,

56-57 (1938).

Lastly, Appellant believes that the opinion below

represents a misconception of the breadth of the court’s

reach. In saying that—

“(T]he Plaintiff’s case is one for the legislature,

and its economic arguments are more appropri-

ately addressed to that body, for to grant the relief

requested in this case would take the Court out-

side the narrow confines of judicial review and

would, in effect, substitute its judgment for that

of the Tennessee General Assembly’’ (Appendix

A, p. 26),

the court below ignored the rule that changed condi-

tions may render invalid that which once was valid

aud that in such circumstances the court may intervene

to proiect against arbitrary or unreasonable action and

deprivation of constitutional rights. Nashville, C. &.

St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U. 8. 405 (1935). In essence,

18

its position seems to be that legislative rejection of

economic arguments, in enacting legislation, cannot

‘aise constitutional objections reviewable in the courts.

This is clearly erroneous.

The similarity of that case to the present one is

striking. Plaintiff there alleged that changed condi-

tions made invalid a statute valid when nacted, 294

U.S. at 414; Appellant alleges that changed conditions

make invalid the application to it of precedents decided

in quite different factual contexts. The Tennessee

Supreme Court in Walters had held the questioned

statute constitutional upon its face, 294 U. S at 414;

the lower court in this case found the Tennessee classifi-

cation scheme in the state constitution and the legisla-

tive determination as to the classification of railroads

as public utilities ‘‘not unconstitutional on its face’’

(Appendix A, p. 24). The Tennessee Supreme Court

in Walters found that it could not then decide whether

‘changed economic and transportation conditions”’

rendered the act burdensome or unreasonable, 294 U. 8S.

at 414; the court below said that Appellant’s evidence

of changed economic and transportation conditions

must be addressed to the legislature and for the court

to act upon them would take the court beyond its

proper role (Appendix A, p. 26).

Of the understanding of the Tennessee Supreme

Court, this Court said, in Walters: ‘‘A rule to the con-

trary is settled by the decisions of this court,’’ 294

U.S. at 415, and that unless the evidence were of such

a nature that it ‘‘could not conceivably establish” that

the State’s action complained of was arbitrary and un-

19

reasonable, there was error in refusing to consider the

evidence. 294 U. 8S. at 215-216. The case was re-

manded for further proceedings below. Such a dispo-

sition would be appropriate in this case. The evidence

in the record is of too great a volume and too high a

quality for it to be said that it ‘‘could not conceivably

establish’’ that Tennessee’s action in classifying Appel-

lant was arbitrary and unreasonable.

CONCLUSION

It is evident from the above that the questions pre-

sented are so substantial as to require plenary consid-

eration, with briefs on the merits and oral argument,

for their resolution.

Respectfully submitted,

Purr M. LANIeEr,

(Counsel of Record on Whom

Service is to be Made)

P. O. Box 1198

Louisville, Kentucky 40201

HARLAN Dopson,

(Counsel of Record on Whom

Service is to be Made)

P. O. Box 2524

Nashville, Tennessee 37201

Rosert C. Moore

Attorneys for Appellant

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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