Petition — Bias v. Ohio

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1975

No. é 4 = -F

EILMER BIAS and LEON BIAS.

Petitioners.

VS

STATE OF OHIO.

Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Court of Appeals

Eighth Judicial District of Ohio

Rocco .J. Russo, Esa.

300 Engineers Building

1365 Ontario Avenue

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

216) 696-7664)

Attorney for Petitioners

JOHN T. CorrIGAN

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor

Criminal Courts Building

1560 East 21st Street

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

(216) 771-0660

Attorney for Respondent

THE GATES TEGAL PURLISHING COO. CTEVELAND, ORIO—TEL. (917) @21-5847

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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I

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ........

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I ai al alee

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dence seized therefrom must be suppressed ........

III - cccussicsivchchltciineinibeieiiaiineaniasiaieniiitelaitnaablaeie

Appendices:

A. Opinion and Journal Entry of the Court of

ID .. siscisiseiecinseenttittaioitiiiteiapaainieninaiiininsnaaiaidiesbiibliinie

Bb. Entry of Supreme Court of Ohio Denying Leave

EF IIIS sesinidicinpierisciniescctsiieiinndenaitiniemimieianduainkiniie

C. Entry of Supreme Court of Ohio Dismissing

BI: cscaniicecccnisiaiigunniceiciimsseniansnssniiinnliimaisammiiets

D. Journal Entry of Common Pleas Court (relat-

I a ia

E. Journal Entry of Common Pleas Court (relat-

Where police officers enter a business estab-

lishment without a warrant to arrest or search

and thereafter search a restroom located in the

basement portion of the said business estab-

lishment without warrants and in the absence

of exigent circumstances such a search is in

violation of the Fourth Amendment of the

Constitution of the United States and all evi-

Be eI MEINE viicscstuhibcccindsccinsceicstcinantipteisbaisabatidoaeiebis

II

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 0... 12

Laverne v. Corning, 316 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. N.Y. 1970) 11

Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) 200 13

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) ............ 14

People v. Baker, 90 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Cal. App. 1970) .... 11

People v. Grossman, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

DIU ‘oenbeciiklinitdii aah aia er ee a i oa 11

People v. Ramsey, 77 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Cal. App. 1969) .... 11

See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) oo ececccecece ee 9

State v. Dias, 470 P.2d 510 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 1970) ........ 12

State v. LaDuca, 214 Atl. 2d 423 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1965) 10

United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1970) .... 14

United States v. McCarthy, 292 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.

SUN MUTE sivtihcinsiesidicimladaselodigineliiasdneanaamialdiademcabiaaeaeins 11

United States v. Raidl, 250 F. Supp. 280 (N.D. Ohio

PIPTITD) ciicssscctsrtnesiniiteidaisechisisientiaeiadiiacaiabidiiidbinpinanameiniamaenitaidaaad 9,10

United States v. Rosenberg, 416 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1969) 11

United States v. Small, 297 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Mass.

ETT? . sansavelieievindaniasesbbinecdabibiaesesiesiishdeltheliaiebtesiahinssiddaaisenia 11

Constitution

Constitution of The United States, Amendment IV ....

sisoeceniaeetaelaisidiaiplsaiveaiaiati dee a ae ed 2, 3,9, 10, 11, 13

Statutes

Ohio Revised Code, Section 2905.01(A) (4) cooceccccccscsoe.-. 3

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1975

No. .

ELMER BIAS and LEON BIAS,

Petitioners,

Vs.

STATE OF OHIO,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the Court of Appeals

Eighth Judicial District of Ohio

To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices

of the Supreme Court of the United States:

The petitioners, Elmer Bias and Leon Bias, pray that

a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the

Ohio Court of Appeals, which judgment became final on

March 28, 1975, when the Supreme Court of Ohio denied

further appellate review.

OPINIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW

The opinion and journal entry of the Ohio Court of

Appeals, the judgment to which this petition is directed, is

attached hereto as Appendix “A”, infra, at page Al. The

judgment entries of the Supreme Court of Ohio denying

further appellate review are Appendices “B” and “C”,

infra at pages A3 and A4. The journal entires of the Com-

mon Pleas Court (the trial court) are Appendix - and

“E”’, infra, at pages A5 and A7.

STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT IS INVOKED

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio was

entered on March 28, 1975. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under Title 28, U.S.C. § 1257(3), on the basis

that rights, privileges, and immunities under the United

States Constitution are contended to have been violated.

STATEMENT OF QUESTION INVOLVED

1. Does the Fourth Amendment’s protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures apply where police

officers enter a business establishment without a warrant

to arrest or search, and thereafter search a restroom located

in the basement portion of the said business establishment,

without said warrants and in the absence of exigent cir-

cumstances?

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

WHICH THE CASE INVOLVES

Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their per-

sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, sup-

ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-

scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.

Ohio Revised Code Section 2905.01 (A) (4):

No person, by force, threat, or deception, or, in

the case of a victim under the age of thirteen or

mentally incompetent, by any means, shall remove

another from the place where he is found or restrain

him of his liberty, for any of the following reasons: To

engage in sexual activity, as defined in Section 2907.01

of the Revised Code, with the victim against his wiil.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Leon Bias and Elmer Bias, the petitioners herein, were

convicted in Case No. 88886, for the crime of rape.

Following their convictions, petitioners were sentenced

to the Ohio Penitentiary. The appeal on questions of law

from the judgment entered on those verdicts, resulted in

affirmance by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court

of Ohio denied leave to appeal. This action is a result of

the judgment of the Ohio Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND EVIDENCE

On December 24, 1967, the defendant, Leon Bias, was

arrested at his brother Herbert’s shoe shine parlor after

a warrantless search of the basement of that premises by

six police officers. As a result of that search, photographs

were taken and certain articles were seized. Prior to the

search and seizure, the defendant was never informed of

his right to an attorney. Leon Bias’ brother, Elmer Bias

was later arrested and tried as a co-defendant.

At the first trial in February, 1969, the jury was dis-

charged after being unable to reach a verdict (R. 4). At

the second trial in May, 1969, the trial court overruled the

motion of the petitioners to suppress the evidence seized

as a result of the search of the basement.

At the petitioners’ trial, the evidence indicated that

Detective Donald Ferris, who first investigated the alleged

rape, went to the shoe shine parlor and found it closed

(R. 53). He wanted to see the basement to complete his

investigation and to corroborate the complainant’s testi-

mony. According to Detective Ferris’ testimony, he

couldn’t know whether anything was in the basement until

he looked at it (R. 54):

. “Q. The reason you went to the shoe shop first

is because you wanted to see the basement, didn’t

you?

A. Yes.

Q. You wanted to complete your ji igati

r invest

didn’t you? ” =

A. Yes.

Q. And in order to corroborate her testimony to

-—, you would have to see the basement, wouldn’t

you’

A. Yes.

Q. Because, Officer, maybe nothing was in the

basement, it could have happened, because you didn’t

know, did you?

A. No.

Q. You didn’t know until you could have seen

the basement, could you?

A. Right.” (R. 53, 54)

The assignment had been received at 11:32 P.M. on De-

cember 23, 1967; the second visit to the store occurred

approximately eight or ten hours later (R. 21). During

that period of time, no search warrant was applied for or

obtained, the thin excuse being given that December 24,

1967, was a Sunday, and the following day was Christmas

(R. 25, 26).

On the morning of the search, Leon Bias was working

in his brother’s shoe shine parlor. At approximately 10:00

A.M., four police officers—two detectives and two uni-

formed police officers—entered the store, approached the

defendant, questioned him as to his identity, and as to

whether he knew a girl named Betty Forrester (R. 60, 10,

11, 36, 37). According to the testimony of Detective Ralph

Howard, he told the petitioner Leon Bias that a complaint

had been made, and that the complainant had alleged that

a crime had occurred in the basement of the store (R. 12).

The police officers were without a search warrant.

Detective Howard, after asking if he could look in the base-

ment, told the petitioner Leon Bias that he didn’t have to

let them go down there, but that they’d be back with a

search warrant (R. 12,13). At no time prior to the search

and his subsequent arrest was the petitioner Leon Bias in-

formed of his right to counsel (R. 13, 14), even though

Detective Howard claimed that the intention of the police

was to arrest the petitioner Leon Bias no matter if the

6

basement had not conformed to the complainant’s descrip-

tion (R. 19, 21).

In response to the detective’s request to search, the

petitioner Leon Bias, obeying the authority of the four

law officers, told the officers to go ahead. As Detective

Howard testified, “. . . he didn’t talk much at all, very

quiet, he responded practically only to when we asked him

something, that is when he responded.” (R. 35). Comply-

ing with the request, the defendant turned on the basement

light, showed the police officers the way downstairs, es-

corted them down into the basement, and then returned

upstairs alone (R. 14, 24). As the defendant testified,

“They said they wanted to see the basement, and I gave

them my respect and let them see it.” (R. 42).

Detective Howard telephoned for the Scientific Iden-

tification Unit to come to the store with a camera to take

pictures. Detective Stanley Marvin and his partner, De-

tective Ashcroft, responded to the call (R. 15, 55, 58).

The two SIU men proceeded to the basement and con-

ducted their investigation (R. 56).

Detective Howard testified that they arrived at the

‘premises at approximately 10:00 A.M. (R. 10). Detective

Marvin testified that he and his partner arrived at the

store at approximately 11:15 A.M. with their photographic,

fingerprint, and other investigative equipment (R. 56).

Thus, it can be readily ascertained that this search of un-

limited scope, conducted both without a warrant and with-

out the petitioner’s presence, extended not only throughout

the entire basement, but throughout a timespan of well

over one and one-quarter hours as well.

“Q. And while you were down in the basement

he was upstairs, isn’t that right?

A. Yes.” (R. 27)

7

In the meantime, Detective Howard and the other

police officers, never having informed the petitioner as

to exactly what articles they were looking for, searched

the basement. As a result of the undefined search, they

seized two pairs of lady’s stockings, three or four rubber

prophylactic wrappers, a white sheet, a red apron, and a

portion of electric wire cord (R. 16,17). They did not give

the defendant, Leon Bias, a receipt for these items (R. 16).

Significantly, it was only after the detectives found the

basement to be the way the complainant had described it,

and after they had seized the above items and had taken

the photographs, that they went back upstairs and in-

formed the defendant that he was under arrest:

“Q. When did you arrest the defendant?

A. When we found that the pictures, or excuse

me, when we found that the basement was as our

victim had described it, and the evidence that indi-

cated the crime had occurred, as she had related it

to us, and upon—

Q. So you—

A. Upon completion, when the SIU, when the

photograph men got there, took their pictures, we

then went up and told him we had to take him with us.

Q. So you arrested him after you took the pic-

tures and got all your evidence, is that correct?

A. Yes.” (R. 16)

ARGUMENTS RELIED ON FOR

ALLOWANCE OF WRIT

Preliminary Statement

In its slip opinion of February 25, 1971, the Ohio Court

of Appeals upheld petitioners’ position with respect to

those points argued before it but found that:

Nevertheless, the evidence secured in this case is

not suppressible because the record shows that it was

lying in plain view of anyone proceeding to the public

restroom area in the defendant’s business establish-

ment. A policeman does not need a search warrant

for evidence which is in plain view. A policeman is

not foreclosed from entry into a public area simply

because he is a policeman and no warrant is neces-

sary for such entry.

It is now petitioners’ position that (1) while the shop itself

was open for business, only those portions of the premises

used for the specific business of shining shoes were open

to the public; (2) the basement area was not noticeably

open to public use and traffic, but entrance thereto re-

quired the discriminating permission of the owner or his

delegate; and (3) as such, it was not generally open to all

but only to whomever the premise holder selected, and

absent that permission, the area was considered to be pri-

vate; and (4) the Ohio Court of Appeals decided a consti-

tutional question not in accordance with applicable deci-

sions of this Honorable Court.

Where police officers enter a business establish-

ment without a warrant to arrest or search, and there-

after search a restroom located in the basement por-

tion of the said business establishment, without said

warrants and in the absence of exigent circumstances

such a search is in violation of the Fourth Amendment

of the Constitution of the United States and all evidence

seized therefrom must be suppressed.

It is clear from the record below that, at the time

that Detective Ralph Howard and the other officers of

the Cleveland Police Department arrived at the defendants’

place of business, it was open for business (R. 19-11, 214).

This fact alone, however, does not mean that those on

the premises are denied the protection of the Fourth

Amendment nor does it mean that those premises may

be searched indiscriminately.

The business man, like the occupant of a residence,

has a constitutional right to go about his business

free from unreasonable official entries upon his private

commercial property. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543

(1967).

As stated by the Court in United States v. Raidl, 250

F. Supp. 280 (N.D. Ohio 1965):

We do not think however, that the mere fact

that the store was open for business is sufficient to

open the door to deprivation of an otherwise inviolate

constitutional right. It is true, as the Government

contends, that the agents could have been on the prem-

ises as business invitees of the petitioner. But an

invitation to do business is not equivalent to an in-

vitation to ignore the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment

10

rights. Therefore we cannot accept the Government’s

contention that they needed no warrant to search the

petitioner’s place of business.

In Raidl the Court held that the Government could not,

without benefit of a search warrant, enter into the defen-

dant’s gun shop and encroach upon areas considered by

the defendant to be off-limits to his customers.

Similarly in State v. LaDuca, 214 A.2d 423 (N.J. Sup.

Ct. 1965), the Court was confronted by the' warrantless

search of a barber shop and persons therein. The State

contended that the search and subsequent seizure of some

betting slips “‘took place on the premises of the barber shop

which is a public place. . .” (page 423) and, therefore,

not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. The Court

stated preliminarily:

It has never been held that a place of business

of a private person or concern open to the public

for purposes of doing business is beyond the protec-

tion of the Fourth Amendment, although the nature

of a place of business as open to the public clearly

is a factor in adjudging the reasonableness of an entry

thereon by police officers. Private places of business,

although open to such members of the public as had

business with the owners, have repeatedly been held,

or have been assumed without argument to the con-

trary, to be within the protection of the Fourth Amend-

ment... (p. 425)

1. The officers in the case had obtained a warrant which

was so patently invalid that the State did not even urge its

propriety. LaDuca turned upon whether the barber shop was

so public as to be without the protection of the Fourth Amend-

ment and whether the defendants were subjected to search inci-

dent to valid arrest.

11

and acknowledged:

... that a private business whose doors are open

to the general public is also to be considered open

to entry by the police for any proper purpose not

violative of the owner’s constitutional rights—e.g., pa-

tronizing the place or surveying it to promote law

and order or to suppress a breach of the peace

... (p. 426)

but held ti. t:

Without a valid warrant, without any arrest of

anyone, and without the prior observation of the com-

mission of any crime therein, the police took the en-

tirely illegal action of, in effect, seizing possession

of the defendant’s barber shop. .. (p. 426)

The Court reversed the defendants’ conviction below stat-

ing that evidence so obtained from the barber shop and

those people therein was illegal and suppressible.

The principle to be gleaned is two-pronged: inviting

pedestrian traffic to a portion of premises does not

divest the entire building of Fourth Amendment protection;

similarly, an area may be an island surrounded by a public

area, yet the owner’s expectation of privacy can protect

it from intrusion.?

2. Cf. also: protection granted to a locker in a bowling alley

(People v. Baker, 90 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Cal. App. 1970) ), a locker ina

bus station (United States v. Small, 297 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Mass.

1969) ), the private office of a gasoline filling station (People v.

Grossman, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965)), a commercial

building (United States v. Rosenberg, 416 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.

1969) ), an industrial complex (People v. Ramsey, 77 Cal. Rptr. 249

(Cal. App. 1969)), and an art studio (Laverne v. Corning, 316

F. Supp. 629 (S.D. N.Y. 1970)). In short, the Fourth Amendment

encompasses whatever a person seeks to preserve as private.

United States v. McCarthy, 292 F. Supp. 937 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).

12

The expectation of privacy—or lack of it—is the crux

of the question. For example, in State v. Dias, 470 P.2d

510 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 1970), the defendants were arrested

in a passageway between two buildings; a search of this

area produced evidence which resulted in their convictions

for drug offenses. The Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed:

The group of people stood between the two apart-

ment suildings in the common passageway which was

private property, although not theirs. While the space

between the apartments was open to the plain view

of the officer, it was not open to unlimited govern-

mental intrusions such as the search which ensued.

The Court, after explaining that its decision was compelled

by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) held that:

Accordingly, the test is not whether the members

of the group in the passageway were technically “tres-

passers,” “licensees,” or “invitees.” It is one of reason-

able expectations of privacy. Every individual has

expectations of privacy with regard to his person wher-

ever he may go, be it a public park or a private

place; yet this is not so with regard to places where

an individual happens to be. This place must be of

such a character as to give rise reasonably to these

expectations of privacy. Since the passageway was

located on private property, the group which met and

socialized there had every expectation of freedom from

governmental intrusion as to the premises and the

protection of the Fourth Amendment therefore applies.

How can it be said that the record demonstrates no

expectation of privacy when everything points to the con-

trary? The police certainly considered the basement pri-

vate, probably because it appeared to be private. The

only reference to customer use of the toilet facilities was

13

by Leon Bias, who stated that he gave permission to those

who asked. Does this speak of openness? Does the closed

door indicate a public invitation?

If we consider the basement as a work area adjunc-

tive to the shoe shine parlor (per William Ellis’ testimony)

open to use by all working there, this does not diminish

the quality of protection required. In Mancusi v. DeForte,

392 U.S. 364 (1968), the defendant was a union official

who shared a large room with several other union officials.

State officials came there with a subpoena for certain

records which were taken from DeForte and subsequently

used against him in a criminal prosecution. The Supreme

Court held that this common work area—and all who

worked there—were clothed with Fourth Amendment pro-

tection.

It seems to us that the situation was not funda-

mentally changed because DeForte shared an office

with other union officers. DeForte still could reason-

ably have expected that only those persons and their

personal or business guests would’ enter the office,

and that records would not be touched except with

their permission or that of union higher-ups. This

expectation was inevitably defeated by the entrance

of state officials, their conduct of a general search,

and their removal of records which were in DeForte’s

custody.

14

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing analysis we are thus led back

to the precipital question: were the officers entitled to

enter the petitioners’ basement? If not, then the fact

that the items seized were in open view to anyone in

the basement is to no avail; if an officer invades a con-

stitutionally protected area to secure his view, evidence

thus obtained is suppressible. United States v. Davis, 423

F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1970). Cf. also McDonald v. United

States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).

For this and all of the other reasons argued above,

the petition for writ of certiorari should be granted. Fur-

ther, upon review by this Court, these convictions should

be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Rocco J. Russo

300 Engineers Building

1365 Ontario Avenue

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

(216) 696-7661

Attorney for Petitioners

Al

APPENDI, A

Court of Appeals No. 29981

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO,

EIGHTH District, CUYAHOGA CouNTy

STATE OF OHIO,

Appellee,

vs.

ELMER BIAS AND LEON H. BIAS,

Appellant.

JOURNAL ENTRY

(Entered January 10, 1972)

The journal entry under the O.S.J. procedure has not

been complied with although entry by this Court was

recorded on February 25, 1971, and was communicated

to the parties. Therefore, under Rule 33, Appellate Rules,

and Rule 8, Rules of the Court of Appeals in effect before

July 1, 1971, this Court sua sponte, makes the following

entry:

Judgment affirmed. In this case there was no arrest

prior to the search and therefore no search incidental

to arrest. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 4 L. ed.

2d 668 (1960). In any event, had there been a valid

arrest, the search was overbroad. Cf. Chimel v. California,

395 U.S. 752, 23 L. ed. 2d 685 (1969). Nor did this case

fall within the hot pursuit exception to a warrantless

search—Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 18 L. ed. 2d

782 (1967), nor the moving vehicle exception, Carroll v.

United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed. 543 (1925). It is

A2

at least dubious whether the search could be justified

under the consent exception, see Judd v. United States,

190 F. 2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951), and since we have indicated

that the search was in no event incidental to the arrest,

that exception is not available, Abel v. United States,

id., even if the search were limited enough to satisfy the

standards of Chimel v. California, id.

Moreover, in our view in the lapse of time between

police entry into the case and the search in issue there

was ample time to secure a warrant and where there

is time to secure a warrant it should be done. Trupiano

v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 92 L. ed. 1663, limited

by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66, 94 L.

ed. 653, 660 (1950) which was in turn limited by a case

which seemed to approve Trupiano, Chimel v. California,

id. at pages 758-760, 768, 23 L. ed. 2d at 691-692, 696-

697. The absence of warrant procedure is a per se viola-

tion of the Fourth Amendment unless there is an appli-

cable exception. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357,

19 L. ed. 2d 576, 585 (1967).

Nevertheless, the evidence secured in this case is not

suppressible because the record shows that it was lying

in plain view of anyone proceeding to the public restroom

area in the defendant’s business establishment. A police-

man does not need a search warrant for evidence which

is in plain view in a public place. A policeman is not

foreclosed from entry into a public area simply because

he is a policeman arid no warrant is necessary for such

entry. Costs to be assessed against appellant. Exc. Man-

date to Issue.

/s/ Jack G. Day

Chief Justice

Day, C. J., WASSERMAN, J., and KRENZLER, J. Concur.

A3

APPENDIX B

No. 75-67

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO

THE StTaTE or Ouro, Crry or CoLumsBus.

1975 Term

To wit: March 28, 1975

STATE OF OHIO,

Appellee,

vs.

ELMER BIAS ET AL.,

Appellants.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM

THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY

It is ordered by the Court that this motion is over-

ruled.

A4

APPENDIX C

No. 75-67

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

THE STATE oF On10, CrTy or COLUMBUS.

1975 Term

To wit: March 28, 1975

STATE OF OHIO,

Appellee,

vs.

ELMER BIAS ET AL.,

Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY

This cause, here on appeal as of right from the Court

of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, was heard in the manner

prescribed by law, and, no motion to dismiss such appeal

having been filed, the Court sua sponte dismisses the appeal

for the reason that no substantial constitutional question

exists herein.

A5

APPENDIX D

No. 88886

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

STATE OF OnIo, CuyaHoGa Counrry, ss.

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

ELMER BIAS,

Defendant.

JOURNAL ENTRY

(Entered September 10, 1969)

On this day this cause came to Court, with defendant

Elmer Bias, represented by counsel, for hearing of the

Psychiatric Clinic report, to determine whether defendant

herein is mentally ill.

Hearing was held, and the Court upon full considera-

tion of the Psychiatric Clinic Report and other evidence,

finds defendant is not eligible for commitment under the

Ascherman Act, RC. 2947.25.

Thereupon, the Court overruled defendant’s Motion

for a New Trial.

Whereupon, defendant who on a former day of Court,

having been found guilty of Rape, RC. 2905.01, as charged

in the indictment, was inquired of if he had anything

to say why judgment should not be pronounced against

him, and he having nothing but what he hath already

said:

A6

It is, therefore ordered and adjudged by the Court

that defendant Elmer Bias be imprisoned and confined

in the Ohio Penitentiary, Columbus, Ohio, for an indeter-

minate period and that he pay the costs of this prosecu-

tion, for which execution is hereby awarded.

Further order of the Court is that Execution of Sen-

tence is Suspended during pending of Appeal and defen-

dant is permitted to remain on same ($2500.00) Bond dur-

ing Appeal.

/s/ THomas J. PARRINO

Judge

A7

APPENDIX E

No. 88886

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

STATE OF Onto, CuyAHoca Counrry, SS.

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LEON H. BIAS,

Defendant.

JOURNAL ENTRY

(Entered September 10, 1969)

On this day this cause came to Court, with defendant

Leon H. Bias, represented by counsel, for hearing of the

Psychiatric Clinic report, to determine whether defendant

herein is mentally ill.

Hearing was held, and the Court upon full considera-

tion of the Psychiatric Clinic Report and other evidence,

finds defendant is not eligible for commitment under the

Ascherman Act, RC. 2947.25.

Thereupon, the Court overruled defendant’s Motion

for a New Trial.

Whereupon, defendant who on a former day of Court,

having been found guilty of Rape, RC 2905.01, as charged

in the indictment, was inquired of if he had anything

to say why judgment should not be pronounced against

him, and he having nothing but what he hath already

said;

A8

It is, therefore ordered and adjudged by the Court

that defendant, Leon H. Bias, be imprisoned and confined

in the Ohio State Reformatory, Mansfield, Ohio, for an

indeterminate period and that he pay the costs of this

prosecution, for which execution is hereby awarded.

Further order of the Court is that Execution of Sen-

tence is Suspended during pending of Appeal and defen-

dant is permitted to remain on same ($2500.00) Bond dur-

ing Appeal.

/s/ Tuomas J. PARRINO

Judge