Appendix — Roe v. Norton
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APPENDIX
Ocrozer Term, 1973
No. 73-6033
SHARON Rog AND Dororuy Pog, on Bear or THEMSELVES
AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, APPELLANTS
v.
NIcROLASs Norton, INDIVIDUALLY, AS COMMISSIONER OF WEL-
FARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AND ON BEHALF OF
OrHeErs SIMILARLY SITUATED, APPELLEE
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
INDEX
Relevant docket entries in case No. 15579. „
Relevant docket entries in case No. 15589 *
Complaint and exhibits A and B *
Designation of judges *
Order for consolidation — in
Ruling on application for a preliminary injunction_
Substitute complaint *
Letter appointing counsel for the children.
Notice of filing affidavits as evidence, together with eummary and
categorization and affidavits of x
4 ———— 1
ii. “Rena Roe“ — 2
=
H
‘
1
i
8 888 ERES E 2 8 E 8 .
2
Page
Answer of the defendant 1 . 55
Stipulations of the parties_...-....--.----------------------------- 56
Defendant’s exhibit A.....................--.---..--------------- 5
The children's exhibits 1 through 592 62
1. Deposition of Albert J. Solnit, M.D. oats ae
2. Deposition of Caroline Packard F 72
3. Deposition of John A. Nadolski 3 93
4. Deposition of Joseph Mancini 103
5. Affidavit of Edward Zigler.._.........-.---------~.------- — 123
Memorandum of decision, findings of fact and conclusions at law — 129
Judgment 159
Orders granting motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
noting vrobable jurisdiction 160
A Docker Entries Unver Doe v. Norton, CIWII No. 15579
— PROCEEDINGS
1/29 Complaint Request for 3-Judge Court, Affidavits of Raymond J. Kelly,
Robert C. Beckman, Sally Smith, Motion for Permission to Proceed
in Forma Pauperis an Order Permitting same (Blumenfeld, J.),
Certificate of Counsel, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
filed and entered at Hartford.
1/29 Order to Show Cause entered for appearance at Hartford on Feb. 13,
1973 at 2:00 P.M. Blumenfeld, J. M-2/2/73
1/29 Summons issued and together with copies of same and of Complaint,
Affidavits, Motions and Orders, handed to the Marshal at Hartford
for service.
2/5 Marshal's Return Showing Service, filed—Summons, Complaint &
osc
2/7 Appearances of James M. Higgins and Michael Anthony Arcari,
Asst. Attys. General entered for defendant.
2/ 8 Motion to Separate Causes of Action, Motion to Dismiss and Notice
of Motion, filed by defendant at Hartford.
2/13 Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of their Motion for Temporary Relief,
filed at Hartford.
2/13 Statement of Raymond J. Kelly re: Donna and Ellen Doe, filed at
Hartford.
2/13 Motion for Protective Order Re: Identity of Named Plaintiffs, filed
at Hartford.
2/13 Hearing on (1) Order to Show Cause; (2) Application to Convene a
Three-Judge Court; (3) Defendant's Motion to Separate Causes
of Action; and (4) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Decision Re-
served on all 4 motions. Blumenfeld, J. M-2/14/73
2/21 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Temporary Restraining
Order, filed by plaintiffs.
2/26 Designation of Judges: Hon. William H. Timbers, C.J.; Hon. M.
Joseph Blumenfeld, D.J.; Hon. Jon 0. Newman, D.J., entered.
Friendly, C. J., U.S. C. A. M-2/26/73. Copies mailed to all counsel
and to 3 Judges.
Date
1973
2/26
2/28
37 5
3/ 9
3/9
8/12
3/12
3/19
3/19
3
PROCEEDINGS
Order entered in Civil Action No. 15589 consolidating that action
with Civil No, 15579. Newman, J. M-2/26/73. Copies mailed to all
counsel and to 3 Judges.
Ruling on Application for a Preliminary Injunction, entered. The
application for a preliminary injunction is denied. However, the
Court, as soon as it is designated, will expedite a hearing on the
merits. So Ordered. Blumenfeld, J. Copies mailed from Hartford
to all counsel. M-3/1/73. Copies to 8 Judges.
Copies of file in Civil Nos. 15579 and 15589 mailed to 3 Judges.
Substitute Complaint, filed by plaintiffs. Copies to 3 Judges.
Incorporation of Exhibits, filed by plaintiffs. Copies to 3 Judges.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Take Depositions by Means of a Tape
Recorder, filed. Copies to 3 Judges.
Copy of Letter from Judge Newman to Attorneys David Rosen, Esq.
and Edward Dolan, Esq., appointing said attorneys to represent
the children and enclosing copies of court's files, filed. Copies mailed
to 3 Judges Copies to counsel.
Notice of Hearing Re Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Take Deposi-
tions by Means of a Tape Recorder, filed. Copies to 3 Judges.
Motion to Permit Introduction of Plaintiffs’ Depositions, Notice of
Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion, filed. Copies to 3
Judges.
B DONNA DOE, LINDA LOE, RENA ROB, SALLY SMITH ind all
others similarly situated vs. NICHOLAS NORTON, Ind. and is Com-
missioner of Welfare of the State of Connecticut.
3/26
4/16
4/16
77 2
(1) Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to take Depositions by Means of a
Tape Recorder; (2) Plaintiff's Motion to Permit Introduction of
plaintiff's Depositions—-calendar endorsement as follows: “Dis-
posed of by conference.” Both motions endorsed as follows: “Off”
Blumenfeld, J. M-3/27/73. Copies to all counsel.
Summary of Affidavits, filed by plaintiffs. Copies to 3 Judges.
Notice of Filing of Affidavits as Evidence, filed by plaintiffs. Copies
to 3 Judges.
Plaintiff's Brief, filed. Copies to 3 Judges.
Stipulation filed at Hartford.
Motion of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union te File Brief Amicus
Curiae, filed at Hartford. .
Brief on Behalf of Children, filed at Hartford.
History of the Statute, filed at Hartford.
Answer of the Defendant, filed at Hartford.
Answer of the Defendant (Civil No. 15689), filed at Hartford.
3-Judge Court Hearing on the Merits. Argument by Counsel for
Plaintiffa, State ( Deft.) and Children. Defendant's Exhibit A, filed.
Children’s Exhibits 1 thru 5 filed. Decision Reserved. Timbers, C. J.;
Blumenfeld, D. J.; Newman, D. J. M-5/2/73.
Motion of “Y” to Intervene as Plaintiff, Motion for Permission to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Affidavit, filed. Copies mailed to
3 Judges.
Plaintiff's Response to HEW Regulation 45 CFR Sec. 233.90, filed.
Copies to 3 Judges.
Date
41973
97 5
117 6
12/28
4
PROCEEDINGS
Memorandum of Decision Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
filed and entered. Application for a permanent injunction is denied
and the case is dismissed. So Ordered. Timbers, V. S. C. J., Blumen-
feld, U. S. P. J., Newman, I. . D. J. M-0/6/73. Copies mailed to ail
counsel and 3 judges by Htfd. office. Copy to Judith Mears.
Judgment entered that the application for a permanent injunction is
denied and that this action be dismissed. Markowski, C. M-9/7/73.
Copies mailed to all counsel and to 3 Judges.
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States filed by
plaintiffs. Copies to all counsel and to 3 Judges.
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States filed by
children of Donna Doe, Linda Loe, Rena Roe and Sally Smith
plaintiff«. Copies to all counsel and to 3 Judges.
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, filed by plaintiffs. Copies to 3 Judges.
Order entered on plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal granting same.
Timbers, I. S. C. J., Blumenfeld, L. S. D. J., Newman, I. S. P. J.
M 12/17/73. Copies mailed to all counsel and to 3 Judges.
Docker Entaics Urn Roe v. Norton, CI. No. 15589
Complaint, Request for 3-Judge Court, Motion for Waiver of Fees
and Order thereon granting same (Newman, J.) and Affidavits
filed an entered, Summons issued and together with copies of same
and of complaint, Motion, Order and Affidavits, handed to the
Marshal for service. M-2/6/73
Application to Convene Three-Judge Court, filed by plaintiffs.
Motion to Seal Affidavits, filed by plaintiffs. “Motion Granted Ex
Newman, M-3/5/7 Copies
Appearance of James M. Higgins and Michael Anthony Arcari,
entered for defendant Nicholas Norton.
Hearing on Application to Convene a Three-Judge Court. Decision
Reserved, Newman, J. M-2/20/73
Order entered consolidating action with Civil No. 15,579, and denying
application to convene a separate three-judge court as unnecessary.
Newman, J. M-2/26/73. Copies matied to all counsel.
Marshal's Return Showing Service, filed.—Summons & Complaint.
Make docket entries in Civil No. 15579
5 Memorandum of Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
filed and entered. Application for a permanent injunction is denied
and the case is dismissed. So Ordered. Timbers, U. S. C. J., Blumen-
feld, U.S. D. J., Newman, U.S. 9. J. M-9/6/78. Copies mailed to all
counsel and 3 Judges by Htf. office.
Judgment entered that the application for a permanent injunction is
denied and that this action be dismissed. Markowski, C. M-9/7/73.
Copies mailed to all counsel and to 8 Judges.
Wotiee of Aggest to the Bupeune Court of tho Culted Gtuten died by
plaintiff. Copies to all counsel.
Motion for Permission to Docket Appeal in Forma Sanpeste and
Affidavit, filed by Plaintiffs.
— — — e
Filed 31, 1973
1 In the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut
Civil No. 15589
Suaron Roe, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON Benatr or Her Depenp-
ENT Mrnor CHILD AND ON BEHALF OF ALL Orners SIMILARLY
SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS
v.
Nicholas Norton, INpIvIpUALLY, as CoMMISSIONER Or Wet-
FARE oR State or CoNNectTicuT, AND oF BeHaLr OrnHers
SIMILARLY SITUATED, DEFENDANTS
Complaint
1. This is an action for and injunctive relief
authorized by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to redress the deprivation
of rights, privileges and immunities secured to the plaintiffs
and all others similarly situated by Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment,
the Ninth Amendent, all of the United States Constitution
and the Social Security Act, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1352 et seq., and
regulations promulgated thereunder.
2 2. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Title 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343.
3. This is a proper case for determination by a three-judge
court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2281 and § 2284, in that it
seeks an injunction and declaratory jun nent to restrain the
defendants from applying, enforcing and implementing Con-
necticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) (1971 Public Act 439),
on the grounds that said statute violates the right of privacy
of the class of plaintiffs, and denies them equal protection of
the laws. Copies of said statute and regulations issued there-
— * attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibits
4. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated. A person is similarly situated if
she is the mother of any child born out of wedlock or the
mother of any child born to any married woman during mar-
— . to be iavee if the merriaes
by any court of compete t jurisdiction.
The persons in the class are so numerous as to make joinder
impracticable; there are common questions of law and fact;
plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class; and
the representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. The parties opposing the claims have
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
3 5. Sharon Roe and Dorothy Roe are the pseudonyms
of real persons, members of the class, adult citizens of the
United States of Connecticut and residents of the City
of New Haven; they and their families receive benefits under
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) by the
Connecticut State Welfare Department. ,
6. Defendant Nicholas Norton, is Commissioner of Welfare
of the State of Connecticut, and in said capacity is charged with
administering the welfare laws of the State of Connecticut. His
claims and defenses which would be available to the selectment
of any town and of any guardiano ad litem of children ap-
pointed by any court of competent jurisdiction, all persons en-
powered to act under C.G.S. § 52-440(b).
7. Plaintiffs Sharon Roe and Dorothy Roe are recipients of
assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program operated by defendant Nicholas Norton. Each has
given birth to a child who is not issue of a marriage, and each
has been served with a citation prepared by his agent Sheldon
Messinger under the authority of C.G.S. § 52-440(b). The
Cireuit Court has not disposed of said citations to the date
8. To the date hereof, each named plaintiffs has refused to
disclose the name of the putative father of her children, claim-
ing that her right to privacy makes such information privileged.
Unless enjoined by this Court from doing so, each of the
4 plaintiffs will be forced to choose between her privacy
and being found in contempt of court.
9. If either plaintiff is found in contempt of court, imprison-
ment for up to one year could follow; in all probability dis-
memberment of their families and consequent termination of
the plaintiffs eligibility under the AFDC program would result.
COUNT I
The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 are incorporated
t. erein by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full.
7
10. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) and the regu-
lations issued by the Connecticut State Welfare Department
violate plaintiffs right to privacy guaranteed by the First,
Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
COUNT II
The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 are incorporated
herein by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full.
11. The defendant welfare commissioner was enjoined from
creating an additional condition of eligibility for Aid to Families
with Dependent Children through the use of a requirement that
a mother name the pvtative father of her illegitimate child;
Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dis-
missed, 396 U.S. 488 rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 970 and Doe v.
Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (1969).
12. The practices and policies of the Connecticut State Wel-
fare Department pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut
General Statutes violate the following sections of the
5 Social Security Act of 1935 and related regulations in
the following specifics:
a. 42 C. F. R. 250.50(a) and 42 U.S.C.A. 602 which protect
publie assistance recipients from the public disclosure of
confidential information.
b. 42 U.S. C. A. 602(a) (9), 42 CF. R. 206.10(a) (10) which
of eligibility “will not result in practices that violate the
individual’s privacy or personal dignity or harass him.”
c. 42 U.S.C.A. 601 and 42 U.S. C. A. 602(a) (14) requiring
encouragement of the care of dependent children in weir
own or relative’s homes, to help maintain and strengthen
family life, and to continue parental care and protection.
See also, 42 C. F. R. 220.16 and related sections.
13. The practices and policies of the Connecticut State Wel-
fare Department pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut
General Statutes are not saved by or in compliance with 42
US.C.A. 602(a)(17) which requires the development of an
agency program to establish paternity and support for AFDC
children born out of wedlock since:
a. C.GS. § 52-440(b) and the regulations issued there-
under do not comply with other provisions of the Social
Security Act as detailed paragraph 12 supra.
6 b. C. GSS. § 52-440(b) is not part of a general plan
which has been submitted for approval under said
subsection.
e. The 42 U.S. C. A. 602(a)(17) requirement of a single
agency organizational unit responsible for such a plan has
not been met.
d. C.G.S. § 52-440(b) threatens to remove the mother
from the household in violation of the purposes of Title
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17).
COUNT III
The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 of the complaint
are hereby incorporated by reference, the same as though
pleaded in full.
14. C.GS. § 52-440(b) does not affect mothers or children
born out of wedlock unless such persons are recipients of assist-
ance from the State Welfare Department or general assistance.
15. Said statute invades the privacy of persons receiving such
assistance, hereby denying them the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
Wherefore: Plaintiffs respectfully pray, on behalf of them-
selves, their minor children and all others similarly situated,
that this court:
1. Assume jurisdiction of this claim, convene a three-judge
district court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2281 to deter-
nh,, oe eae Sr Seay
ng:
7 2. Certify, pursuant to Rule 23 F.R.C.P. that this
claim may proceed as a class action;
3. Pending a hearing and determination by a three-judge
court, grant temporary relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
2284(3) restraining defendants, their successors in office, agents
and employees and all other persons acting in concert and par-
ticipation with them trom causing irreparable harm to plain-
tiffs by acting pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut Gen-
eral Statutes and related policies and practices.
4. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions, pursuant
to Rule 65 F.R.C.P. enjoining the defendant, his successors in
in office, agents and employees from causing irreparable harm
to plaintidis by esting pursuant to Section 2
mr dl. 2 —
cut General Statutes and related departmental policies and
ices.
5. Enter final judgment declaring Section 52440 (b) of the
Connecticut General Statutes and all related state policy and
practices invalid under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Social Security Act of 1935 and
violative of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Social
Security Act of 1935.
6. Pursuant to Rule 54(d) F.R.C.P., grant plaintiffs
such additional relief, including payment of all monies wrong-
fully withheld, as this Court may deem just, proper, and
equitable.
N 7. Such other and further relief as law and equity
may provide.
The Plaintiffs:
(8) Frank Cocwrayn,
795 Grand Avenue,
New Haven, Connecticut 06511
(203)-777-5428.
Their Attorney,
Certification (omitted in printing)
9 Exuisit A
Sec. 52-440b. disclosure of name of putative
father and institution of action. (a) If the mother of any
child born out of wedlock, or the mother of any child born
to any married women during marriage which child shall be
found not to be issue of the marriage terminated by a divorce
decree or by decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, fails
or refuses to disclose the name of the putative father of such
child under oath to the welfare commissioner, if such child is
a recipient of public assistance, or to a selectman of a town in
which such child resides, if such child is a recipient of general
assistance, or otherwise to a guardian or a guardian ad litem
of such child, such mother may be cited to appear before any
judge of the circuit court and compelled to disclose the name of
the putative father under oath and to institute an action to
establish the paternity of said child.
(b) Any woman who, having been cited to appear before a
judge of the circuit court pursuant to subsection (a), fails to
appear or fails to disclose or fails to prosecute a paternity action
10
may be found to be in contempt of said court and may be fined
not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more
than one year or both.
(1971, P.A. 439, S. 4.)
10 Exuisir B
(Connecticut State Welfare Department Social Service Pol-
icies—Fublic Assistance: Manual Vol. 1, Effective 81-72)
Euierpsrtity Provisions—Cuitp Born Our or Weplock—
3460.22
3460.22 RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORT AND ESTAR!)ISHMENT OF
PATERNITY
If the mother decides to keep the child or to place him in a
relative’s home, both parents are responsible for support and
proceedings for the establishment of paternity are initiated.
Information about the alleged father is obtained from the
mother of the child. If he resides in the State, an interview is
held to discuss the situation and to secure his Acknowledgement
of Paternity.
The mother is encouraged to name the father, by Affirmation
of Paternity, under oath and to file a petition to establish
paternity and support.
If the mother is unwilling or unable to name the father, she
is still eligible for assistance to meet her own needs, the needs
of the child in question, and the needs of any other children in
the family, provided all other eligibility requirements are met;
however, if she is unwilling to name the father, she is informed
that she is subject to be cited to appear before any judge of the
Cireuit Court, be compelled to name the putative father and to
institute an action to establish paternity of the child.
In all situations, assistance is granted promptly when all
eligibility requirements are met, whether or not Court action is
pending to establish paternity or to secure support.
In situations where the mother names the father, but then is
unwilling or neglects to file a petition or to pursue a petition
she started, the Department, under Section 52-440a of the
Connecticut Statutes, institutes such proceeding. In this
instance, the mother may be subpoenaed to testify and treated
as a hostile witness.
11
11 2. Paternity Not Alleged by the Mother
a. If the mother is unwilling to name the putative
father she is informed by the worker that she will be cited to
appear before any judge of the Cireuit Court and compelled to
disclose the name of the putative father and to institute an
action to establish the paternity of the child. The worker refers
the matter to the Resource worker on a Form W-109. Central
Office will provide a list of attorneys to each Resource Unit; re-
ferral will be made to an attorney on the list for the purpose of
citing te mother to appear before the Court. The fee for this
service will be $75 if the mother names the father after the
attorney prepares the petition and prior to a court hearing and
$150 if the matter goes to a full hearing before the Court. The
same fee prevails regardless of the number of children and/or
fathers involved. If, after the hearing, the mother decides to
cooperate and initiate the paternity action herself, she is of
course free to contact an attorney of her own choice. A fee
schedule has been established for attorney’s fees in connection
with paternity proceedings when the mother has named the
father (see Index No. 3460.24). If she refuses to cooperate, the
Department will initiate a paternity action under the terms of
Section 52-440a (see Index No. 3460.1). The same attorney
who cited the mother into court will be used to bring the
paternity action in such cases.
b. When paternity is established and the Court has deter-
mined the amount of support to be paid, payments are made to
the Department of Finance and Control and the State Welfare
Department meets the continuing needs of the eligible members
fully.
c. If the mother is unable to name the putative father, this
is recorded in the case record.
3. Referral to the Circuit Court
When the hospital cost has been paid by the Department, the
worker directs a memorandum to the Medical Payments Sec-
tion, Central Office, requesting a statement of hospital charges.
The worker then forwards the following to the liaison worker
of the Resources Unit by means of a Form W-109 for referral
to the Circuit Court in which the mother resides:
a. The executed Form W-161, “Acknowledgement of Pater-
nity and Affirmation ef Paternity” ;
12
12 b. The amount of hospital charges;
c. Form W-326, “Referral to the Family Relations
Division of the Circuit Court“;
d. The amount of assistance paid for the care of the child in
question ;
e. Pertinent information regarding the acknowledged father's
financial circumstances.
4. Support Payments
When paternity is established and the Court has determined
the amount of support to be paid, payments are made to the
State and the Department meets the continuing need of the
eligible members fully.
Effective 8-1-72
13 Filed, February 26, 1973
In the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut
Designation of Judges
Civil No. 15,579
Donna Dor, LINDA Log, Rena Roe, SALLY SMITH AND ALL
Oruers SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS
U.
NichotaAs Norton, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS COMMISSIONER OF
WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEFENDANT
Having been notified by the Honorable M. Joseph Blumen-
feld, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut, that an application has been filed in the above
matter for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2254, I
hereby designate the following judges, in addition to the Hon-
orable M. Joseph Blumenfeld, to hear and determine said cause
as provided by law: Honorable William H. Timbers, United
States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and Honorable Jon O. Newman, United States
13
District Judge, United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this order be filed in the
above matter in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Connecticut.
/s/ Hewry J. Farenp ty,
Chief Judge,
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
New York, N.Y., February 20, 1973.
14 In the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut
Civil No. 15,589
SHaron Roe AND Dororny Por, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
or Orners SIMILARLY SITUATED
v.
Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND As COMMISSIONER OF
WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AND ON BEH *LF OF
Orners SIMILARLY SITUATED
Order for Consolidation
Plaintiffs seek the convening of a three-judge court pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 in a suit challenging, on constitutional
and statutory grounds, the enforcement of Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 52-440(b), Public Act 439, 1971. Since a three-judge court
has already been convened in Doe v. Norton, Civ. No. 15,579,
to consider the same claims raised by these plaintiffs, this action
is hereby ordered consolidated with Civ. No. 15,579, and the
application to convene a separate three-judge court for Civ.
No. 15,589 is denied as unnecessary as a result of the consoli-
dation.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 26th day of Febru-
ary, 1973.
(S) Jon O. Newman,
United States District Judge.
14
15 In the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut
Civil No. 15,579
Donna Dog, ET AL.
U.
NicRolAs Norton, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS COMMISSIONER OF
WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Ruling on Application for a Preliminary Injunction
The plaintiffs,’ all allegedly eligible to receive public assist-
ance from the Connecticut State Welfare Department, have
initiated this suit to challenge the constitutionality of
16 Conn. Gen. Stats. § 52-440b.’ This statute is part of a
comprehensive statutory scheme whereby the mother
of any illegitimate child may be compelled by the appropri-
ate authorities to disclose the name of the child’s putative
father, and to institute a paternity action. Failure to comply
with this statute may result in a fine of not more than $200
and/or imprisonment for not more than one year. The defend-
Because of the special circumstances of this case, plaintiffs sue under
fictitious names. They are all mothers of illegitimate children who sue on
their own behalf as well as on behalf of their minor children.
* Conn. Gen. Stats. § 52-440b provides :
“(a) If the mother of any child born out of wedlock, or the mother of any
child born to any married woman during marriage which child shall be found
not to be issue of the marriage terminated by a divorce decree or by decree
of any court of competent jurisdiction, fails or refuses to disclose the name
of the putative father of such child under oath to the welfare commissioner,
if such child is a recipient of public assistance, or to a selectman of a town
in which such child resides, if such child is a recipient of general assistance,
or otherwise to a guardian or a guardian ad litem of such child, such mother
may be cited to appear before any judge of the circuit court and compelled
to disclose the name of the putative father under oath and to institute an
action to establish the paternity of said child.
“(b) Any woman who, having been cited to appear before a judge of the
circuit court pursuant to subsection (a), fails to appear or fails to disclose
or fails to prosecute a paternity action may be found to be in contempt of
said court and may be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned
not more than one year or both.”
15
ant is the Commissioner of Welfare, Nicholas Norton, sued in
his individual and representative capacity.
The plaintiffs allege that, as applied to them, this statute
violates their constitutional rights to equal protection, due
process, and privacy, and is inconsistent with and contravenes
the underlying policies of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601 et seq. They rely upon the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, for a cause of action, and upon 28 U.S. C. § 1343(3) for
this court’s jurisdiction. They seek the convocation of a three-
judge district court, 28 U.S.C. § 2281; preliminary injunctive
relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2284; certification of the suit as a class action,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; and declaratory and permanent injunctive
relief. ;
17
Turee-Jupce Districr Courr
Because these plaintiffs seek to restrain the operation of a
state statute, this case can only be decided by a district court
of three judges, 28 U.S.C. § 2281, unless their claim is insub-
stantial. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1934). The Supreme
Court has recently reiterated the limited power of a district
judge to dismiss as insubstantial a claim otherwise appropriate
for consideration by three judges:
A claim is insubstantial only if “its unsoundness so
clearly results from the previous decisions of this Court
as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the
inference that the question sought to be raised can be
the subject of controversy.” Goosby v. Osser, 41 U.S.L.W.
4167, 4169 (Jan. 17, 1973) (citations omitted).
There is little doubt that the constitutional claims herein
presented are not “insubstantial.” * Accordingly, a three-judge
district court will be convened to adjudicate the merits of this
case.
The motion to certify the class action aspect of this case will
be reserved for the three-judge district court.
Counsel for defendant Norton does not contest the need for a three judge
district court.
16
18 II
PRELIMINARY RELIEF
It does not follow from the determination that the con-
stitutional questions herein presented are not so “insubstan-
tial” as to foreclose the need for a three-judge district court
to resolve them that the plaintiffs have demonstrated that
they are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. The standard
which informs the exercise of judicial discretion in the award
of preliminary relief focuses on different considerations.
Though the defendant contests the propriety of preliminary
injunctive relief in this case, the parties do not dispute the
applicable standard which controls the proper resolution of this
facet of the dispute. In this circuit, it is settled that:
(t)he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to main-
tain the status quo pending a final determination of
the merits. It is an extraordinary remedy, and will not
be granted except upon a clear showing of probable suc-
cess and possible irreparable injury. However, the bur-
den (of showing probable success) is less where the
balance of hardships tips decidedly toward the party
requesting the temporary relief.” In such a case, the
moving party may obtain a preliminary injunction if
he has raised questions going to the merits so serious,
substantial, and difficult as to make them a fair ground
for litigation and thus for more deliberate investiga-
tion. Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F. 2d
319, 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
19 The elements on which the issuance of a temporary in-
junction depends will be considered separately.
A. PROBABLE SUCCESS ON THE MERITS
Since factual issues are minimal, the clear showing which
the plaintiffs are required to make is that they will prevail on
the issues of law which are presented by this case. In order
to determine what they are, it will be helpful to delineate first
what is not involved.
Despite the plaintiffs’ facile invocation of the constitutional
rights to equal protection and due process, it does not appear
that the operation of this statute violates those constitutional
17
rights. Their resort to the fifth amendment's protection against
self-incrimination would similarly appear to be of no avail.
For any action taken under the statute, immunity from crim-
inal prosecution is granted to both the mother and the putative
father for any act about which either testifies in such pro-
ceedings, or for any statement made with respect to paternity
prior to such proceedings. Conn. Gen. Stats. §§ 52-435b, 435c.
Nor are the statutory rights of the plaintiffs to welfare bene-
fits jeopardized by the operation of this statute. A three-judge
district court in this district has held that the state may not
withhold AFDC benefits to an otherwise qualified child, Doe
v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal
20 dis missed, 396 U.S. 488, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 970
(1970), or to his“ mother, Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp.
302 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 902 (1970), because
of a mother’s refusal to comply with state regulations’ re-
quiring her to reveal the name of the child's father or to par-
ticipate in paternity proceedings against him. That issue is
well settled. See cases cited in Saiz v. Hernandez, 340 F. Supp.
165, 166 (D. N. Mex. 1972). With these threats to the eligibility
of the plaintiffs to receive welfare benefits removed from the
case, the only discernable interest which remains, and what
the plaintiffs singled out in argument at the hearing as having
alleged constitutional significance, is founded on the desire
of each mother to keep secret the name of her child’s father.
That a constitutional right of personal privacy exists
21 is not contested. Recent cases, e.g., Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), demonstrate that
(although) (t)he Constitution does not explicitly men-
tion any right of privacy . . (there is) a line of de-
cisions . . (wherein) the Court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas
*For convenience, the masculine gender is used to refer to children of
either sex.
See Connecticut State Welfare Department Social Service Policies—
Public Assistance: Manual Vol. 1, Index No. 3460.22 which presently pro-
vides:
“If the mother is unwilling or unable to name the father, she is still
eligible for assistance to meet her own needs, the needs of the child in
question and the needs of any other children in the family providing all
other cligibility requirements are met:
See also, Welfare Department Memoranda dated April 12, 1972, January
6, 1973, and February 13, 1973, reiterating this policy.
552-950--14——2
18
or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.
. . These decisions make it clear that only personal
rights that can be deemed “fundamental” or “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,” are included in this
guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear
that the right has some extension to activities relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, and child rearing and education. Roe v. Wade,
41 US.L.W. 4213, 4225 (Jan. 22, 1973) (citations
omitted).
What is protected is the individual’s personal right to privacy,
notwithstanding the fact that by its very nature the exercise of
the right may require the par’ ‘ipation of another individual.
Accordingly in striking dowr hibition on the access to the
use of contraceptive devices as u denial of equal protection the
Court in Fisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), noted:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from un-
warranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child. (citation omitted).
Thus, the constitutional question presented is whether at this
time a mother’s desir. to keep the name of the child’s father
secret is so “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept
22 of ordered liberty” as to require constitutional protec-
tion. Roe v. Wade, supra, 41 U.S.L.W. at 4225. The
contention of each plaintiff mother is that, because her par-
ticipation in legal action to establish the paternity of her child
may result in additional strains in family relationships within
the home, or may unwisely force the permanent severance of
relationships with his father, her right to decide for herself
whether a paternity action should be brought is so “funda-
mental” as to be included in the constitutional guarantee of
personal privacy. This contention calls for further examination.
The rights of a person arising out of a family relationship are
necessarily interrelated with those of other members of the
family. Whatever interest a mother may have in not disclos-
ing her knowledge of the identity of her child’s father is inter-
twined with, and has a material effect upon, the interests of
her child. To discern more accurately the nature of a mother’s
— it will be helpful to distinguish it from those of her
child.
19
Some light is thrown upon the particular interest of the child
by the way in which our society considers the plight of a child
who has not been acknowledged by his father. Rather than
branding it as manifestly evil, a theme which one must be
prepared to concede is subject to the influences of changing
social trends. the child’s relationship to his unnamed
23 father has been imbued with a sense of responsibility.
The responsibility of a father to support his child, and a
cause of action to enforce that responsibility, have existed in
Connecticut from its earliest days.’ In obtaining support for
their children, the plaintiffs do not hesitate to disclose publicly
to the state and others that their children are illegitimate. At
the same time, they argue that the failure to disclose the name
of the father brings strength to the family, although that will
shield the father against his obligation to support his own child.
There is an inconsistency here in keeping two contradictory
ideas in play at the same time.
The legitimate children in the family unit, if any there are,
are not disadvantaged, for they still have their father to look
to for support. Whatever unique stigmata of suffering may be
carried by a child because he has been denied the same charter
that the other children in the family take from birth may not
be wholly relieved by disclosure of the name of his father; but
if paternity is not established, he is subjected to the additional
risk thet he will be forever deprived of many rights he
24 is qualified to receive, even though an illegitim:ate child
of his father. Except for special situations, e.g., to in-
sure noble lineage and the stability of titles, and the prompt
and definitive determination of valid distribution of property
left by decedents, Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), the
trend of the law is to separate the label “illegitimate” from the
word “child” to prevent their exclusion from benefits to chil-
dren. E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1971)
(workmen’s compensation benefits); Glona v. American Guar-
antee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful death
statute); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 US. 68 (1968) (wrongful
death statute); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D.
Conn.) (3-Judge District Court), aff'd, 41 U.S. L. W. 3345 (1972
In addition to this responsibility, it is not amiss to note that history and
literature are replete with examples of the anguish suffered by illegi-
timate children denied the satisfaction of knowing their parternity. See, e..
The Right of Ilegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 Harv. I. Rev. 337
(1962). Three bastardy actions are reported in the first volume of Con-
necticut’s Reports. See Vol. 1 of Roots Reports 1789-08.
(social security death benefits); Ballentine v. DeSylva, 226 F.
2d 623 (9th Cir. 1955) (copyright statute); Middletown v.
Luchenbach S. S. Co., 70 F. 2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 293 US.
577 (1934) (death on the high seas, “children” includes illegiti-
mates); Turner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d
862, 133 Pac. 2d 859 (1943) (“children” in life insurance policy
includes illegitimate children). In all of the foregoing cases the
interest of the father was only tangential to that of his illegiti-
mate child, for the benefit to the child was not at the expense of
his father. But in Gomez v. Perez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4174 (Jan. 17,
1973), where the same interest of the father as in these
25 cases was at stake, the Supreme Court held that it was a
denial of equal protection for a state to exclude illegiti-
mate children from the obligation of a father to support his
children.
Assuming, arguendo, that the enforced disclosure by the
plaintiffs of the names of the fathers of their illegitimate chil-
dren results in an injury which is irreparable, the foregoing
analysis of the relative rights of the members of their families
persuades me that they have not made a sufficiently clear show-
ing of probable success on the merits as to warrant preliminary
injunctive relief under the traditional standard. However, since
they have “raised questions going to the merits so serious, sub-
stantial, and difficult as to make them a fair ground for litiga-
tion . . I I turn next to consider whether the balance of
hardships tips so decidedly toward them as nonethelese to war-
rant the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction.
Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., supra, 405 F. 2d at
323.
B. BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS
In balancing the hardships, it must be remeinbered that
(t)he requirement that a party seeking a preliminary
injunction demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief necessitates
more than a mere showing that the party seeking
26 relief will see its relative position deteriorate. Pre-
liminary injunctive relief is extraordinary relief.
It requires a convincing demonstration that the balance
of hardships tips decidedly toward the moving party.
Sanders v. Air Line Pilots Assoc. Int'l, Dkt. No. 72-1878
(2d Cir., Dee. 4, 1972), slip op. at 715, 722 (citations
omitted).
— — — z :: ?—:
21
Normally the court is called upon to balance the harm which
a plaintiff will suffer if an injunction is not granted against the
harm that a defendant will sustain if it is. More is involved
here. There are special circumstances in this case which make
a great difference in considering hardships. As already indicated,
the “right of privacy” is invoked by the plaintiff mothers to
protect their desire to keep secret the name of their children’s
father lest its disclosure have some adverse effect upon future
relationships within the home. Not every one will agree on what
are good amenities and conduct in such a situation. But if the
family is to be taken into account, and it must be, hardship
to the child cannot be left out of consideration.
As noted above, these children stand to reap significant
benefits if paternity is established.
When the effect of the continued denial of the right to sub-
stantial benefits accorded to children generally is balanced
against the effect which disclosure of the name of a child's
father will have on any future relationships with him, the
hardships fall more heavily on the child than on his
27 mother.
Another factor militating against the grant of a pre-
liminary injunction is the presence of a statute of limitations
which provides that a paternity suit must be brought within
three years from the date of the child’s birth.’ Once the third
birthday of a child has passed without action, the name of his
father may never be disclosed to him. Even if it is disclosed
thereafter, years may go by before there is an opportunity to
make a claim to a benefit derived through his father, and the
more stale such a claim is the more difficult it will be to prove
it. The problems with respect to proof of paternity are formi-
dable in any case.
For the foregoing reasons, the application for a preliminary
injunction is denied. However, the court, as soon as it is desig-
nated, will expedite a hearing on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, this 27th day of February,
1973.
(S) M. Josarnx BLUMENFELD,
Chief Judge.
"The plaintiffs suggest that a temporary injunction by this conrt would
effectively toll the state’s statute of limitations, but they have not furnished
the court with any authority to support that proposition.
22
28 In the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut
Civil No. 15,579
Donna Dok, Er AL., ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS
U.
Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF
WELFARE OF THE State OF CONNECTICUT, DEFENDANT
Civil No. 15,589
SHA RON Rog, Er AL., ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS
v.
Nicuo.tas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF
WELFARE OF THE State or CONNECTICUT, A ON BEHALF
or Orners SIMILARLY SITUATED, DEFENDANT
Substitute Complaint—Filed March 9, 1973
1. This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
authorized by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to redress the deprivation
of rights privileges and immunities secured to the plain-
29 tiffs and all others similarly situated, by Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment, the
Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment and the Ninth
Amendment, all of the United States Constitution, and the
Social Security Act, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1352 et seq., and regu-
lations promulgated thereunder.
2. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Title 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and § 1343.
3. This is a proper case for determination by a three-judge
court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2281 and § 2284, in that it
seeks an injunction and declaratory judgment to restrain the
defendants from applying. enforcing and implementing Con-
necticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) (1971 Public Act 439),
on the grounds that said statute violates the right of privacy of
the class of plaintiffs, and denies them equal protection of the
laws, and constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment. Copies
to be issue of the marriage by any court of competent
jurisdiction.
The persons in the class are so numerous as to make joinder
impracticable; there are common questions of law and fact;
plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class;
30 and the representative plaintiffs will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class. The parties op-
posing the class have acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the class as a
whole.
5. a. The plaintiffs, Donna Doe, Linda Loe, Rena Roe, Sally
Smith, Sharon Roe and Dorothy Poe and their children are all
eligible to receive public assistance benefits from the Connecti-
cut State Welfare Department.
b. Plaintiff Donna Doe and the subclass of persons she rep-
resents have been refused or have been threatened with refusal
of public assistance for failure to comply with Section 52-
440(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes.
e. The dependent children of plaintiffs Linda Loe, Rena Roe.
Sally Smith, Sharon Roe and Dorothy Poe, are in danger of
having their parental care eliminated by the welfare department
by virtue of a court citation subjecting their mothers to a maxi-
mum penalty of one year’s imprisonment under Section 52-
440(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes.
d. Each plaintiff is a resident of the State of Connecticut.
e. The plaintiffs’ Affidavits, attached to the Complaint as
Exhibits B, C, D, and E and incorporated herein by reference
as if they were fully pleaded, detail their individual factual
situations and the effects of the defendant's policies upon
them.
31 6. Defendant Nicholas Norton, is Commissioner of
Welfare of the State of Connecticut, and in said ca-
pacity is charged with administering the welfare laws of the
24
State of Connecticut. His claims and defenses which would be
available to the selectmen of any town and of any guardian ad
litem of children appointed by any court of competent juris-
diction, the class of persons empowered to act under C. G. S.
§ 52-440(b).
7. Plaintiffs Sharon Roe and Dorothy Poe are recipients of
assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program operated by defendant Nicholas Norton. Each has
given birth to a child who is not issue of a marriage, and each
has been served with a citation prepared by his agent Sheldon
Messinger under the authority of C.G.S. § 52-440(b). The Cir-
cuit Court has not disposed of said citations to the date hereof.
8. The defendant welfare commissioner, through private
counsel retained by the welfare department, has notified Linda
Loe and Rena Roe that they will be subjected to court citation
which would make them vulnerable to possible imprisonment
and fine for their failure to name their children’s putative
father. (See the department's notifications to the mothers. Ex-
hibits F and G.)
9. To the date hereof, each of said named plaintiffs has re-
fused to disclose the name of the putative father of her child.
claiming it is in the best interests of both mother and child
not to make the disclosure. Unless enjoined by this Court from
doing so, each of the plaintiffs will be forced to choose between
doing what she feels in the best interests of the family and
being found in contempt of court.
32 10. The defendant welfare commissioner, through pri-
vate counsel retained by the welfare department, has
notified Sally Smith that she will be subjected to court citation
and possible imprisonment for her failure to sign an acknowl-
edgement of paternity form with the previously divulged name
of her child's putative father. (See department's notification.
Exhibit I.)
11. If any of these named plaintiffs is found in contempt of
court, imprisonment for up to one year could follow; in all
probability dismemberment of their families and consequent
termination of the plaintiffs eligibility under the AFDC pro-
gram would result.
COUNT I
The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 are incorporated
herein by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full.
25
12. In the event that plaintiffs Linda Loe, Rena Roe, Sally
Smith, Sharon Roe and Dorothy Poe are compelled to testify
in the Cireuit Court, each of them may be asked any and all
details of her sexual conduct, may be questioned about her
relationship with the putative father, may be forced to insti-
tute a paternity action or to testify in such an action brought
by the Commissioner of Welfare; all of said possibilities being
public record.
13. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) and the regu-
lations issued under it remove members of the plaintiff class
from the position of determining the best interests of
33 their children without requiring as a precondition, an
individual due process hearing and finding that the
child’s interests are being neglected by the plaintiffs.
14. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) is not re-
stricted in application to those cases in which it may be possi-
ble subsequently to bring a paternity action.
15. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) and the reg-
ulations issued by the Conrecticut State Welfare Department
violate plaintiffs right to privacy guaranteed by the First.
Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
COUNT II
The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14 are incorporated
herein by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full.
16. Connecticut General Statutes § 52-440(b) and the reg-
ulations issued by the Connecticut State Welfare Department
constitute a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as ap-
plied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
COUNT III
The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 are incorporated
herein by reference, the same as though pleaded herein in full.
17. The practices and policies of the Connecticut State Wel-
fare Department pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut
General Statutes violate the Social Security Act of 1935 and
related regulations in the following specifics:
a. 42 C.F.R. 250.50(a) and 42 U.S.C.A. 602 which
protect public assistance recipients from the public dis-
closure of confidential information.
26
34 b. 42 U.S. C. A. 602 (a) (9), 42 C. F. R. 206.10(a)
(10) which requires that standards and methods
for the determination of eligibility “will not result in
practices that violate the individual's privacy or per-
sonal dignity or harass him.”
c. 42 U.S. C. A. 601 and 42 U.S.C.A. 602(a)(14) re-
quiring encouragement of the care of dependent chil-
dren in their own or relative's homes, to help maintain
and strengthen family life, and to continue parental
care and protection. See also, 42 C.F.R. 220.16 and re-
lated sections.
d. The department is creating an additional condi-
tion of eligibility for mothers of dependent children
who refuse to name putative fathers.
e. The 42 U.S. C. A. 602 (4) (17) requirement of a single
agency organizational unit responsible for such a plan
has not been met.
f. C.G.S. § 52-440(b) threatens to remove the mother
from the household inviolation of the purposes of Title
42 U.S.C. § 60.
COUNT IV
The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 are hereby in-
* by reference, the same as though pleaded herein
in full.
_ 18. C. GS. § 52-440 (b) has not been applied to and was not
intended to apply to mothers of children born out of wedlock
unless such persons are recipients of assistance from the State
Welfare Department or general assistance.
35 19. Said statute invades the privacy of persons re-
ceiving such assistance, hereby denying them the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.
COUNT V
The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 are hereby in-
— by reference the same as though pleaded herein in
ull.
27
20. C. G. S. § 52-440b creates an irrebutable presumption that
failure or refusal of a plaintiff mother to disclose the identity
of her child's father is not in the best interests of the child,
when in fact such disclosure may or may not be in the child’s
best interest. Said presumption violates the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
36 WHEREFORE:
Plaintiffs respectfully pray, on behalf of themselves,
their minor children an all others similarly situated, that this
court:
1, Assume jurisdiction of this claim, convene a three-judge
district court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2281 to
determine this controversy and set this case down for a prompt
hearing:
2. Certify, pursuant to Rule 23 F.R.C.P. that this claim may
proceed as a class action ;
3. Pending a hearing and determination by a three-judge
court, grant temporary relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
2284(3) restraining defendants, their successors in office, agents
and employees and all other persons acting in concert and
participation with them from causing irreparable harm to
plaintiffs by acting pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut
General Statutes and related policies and practices.
4. Enter preliminary and permanent injunctions, pursuant to
Rule 65 F. R. C. P. enjoining the defendant, his successors in
office, agents and employees from causing irreparable harm to
plaintiffs by acting pursuant to Section 52-440(b) Connecticut
General Statutes and related departmental policies and prac-
tices.
5. Enter final judgment declaring Section 52-440(b) of the
Connecticut General Statutes and all related state policy and
practices invalid under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Social Security Act of 1935 and
violative or regulations promulgated pursuant to the Social
Security Act of 1935.
37 6. Pursuant to Rule 54(d) F.R.C.P., grant plaintiffs
such additional relief, including payment of all moneys
wrongfully withheld, as this court may deem just, proper, and
equitable.
A other and further relief as law and equity may
By Fnaxk Cocnran,
169 Starr Street,
New Haven, Connecticut 06511
203-772-1873.
Doveitas M. Crocker,
Raymonp J. KIL x,
746 Main Street,
Post Office Box D,
Willimantic, Connecticut 06226
203-423-8425
Ropert BeckMAN,
342 Atlantic Street,
Stamford, Connecticut 06901
Their Attorneys.
38 In the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut
Civil Action No. 15,579
Don, r AL., PLAINTIFFS
v.
NORTON, DEFENDANT
Civil Action No. 15,589
Roe, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
V.
NORTON, DEFENDANT
Incorporation of Exhibits—Filed Mar. 9, 1973
1. Exhibit A to this Substitute Complaint consists of the ma-
— —— A and B to the Complaint in Roe v. Norton,
are hereby incorporated by reference the same
— het by the as though
2. ibits B. C, D, and E to this Substitute Complaint con-
sists of the materials with those designations to —
20
in Doe v. Norton, which are hereby incorporated by reference
the same as though attached hereto.
Plaintiffs:
By Frank CocHRAN,
Dove Las Crockert,
RaymMonp KELLy,
Rosert BECKMAN,
Their Attorneys
39 Certification (omitted in printing).
40 Unrrep States District Court,
District or CoNNECTICUT,
Cuambers or Jupce Jon O. NEwMAN,
Hartford, Conn., March 12, 1973.
Re Donna Doe, et al v. Nicholas Norton, ete. Civil No. 15,579.
Sharon Roe, et al v. Nicholas Norton, ete. Civil No. 15,589
Davip Rosen, Esa.
AND Epwarp Do.an, Esq.
265 Church Street,
New Haven, Conn.
Dear Sms: I understand that you are willing to serve as
counsel for the children in the above-captioned three-judge
court cases. Enclosed please find copies of the Court's files.
The Court appreciates your willingness to serve as counsel,
and this letter is your appointment as such.
Sincerely,
Jon O. NEwMAN,
United States District Judge.
41 In the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut
Civil Action No. 15,579; April 10, 1973
Donna Dor, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS
v.
NicHo.tas Nokrox, DEFENDANT
Notice of Filing of Affidavits as Evidence
Pursuant to the agreement reached by counsel for all parties
in this action at the pre-trial conference presided over by Judge
7. Such other and further reli i
bd relief as law and equity may
The Plaintiffs:
By Frank Coch Rax,
169 Starr Street 7
New Haven, Connecticut 06511
208-772-1873.
Dove.ias M. Crockerr,
Raymonp J. KxLLx,
746 Main Street,
Post Office Box D,
Willimantic, Connecticut 06226
203-423-8425
Rosert BeckMan,
342 Atlantic Street,
Stamford, Connecticut 06901
Their Attorneys.
38 In the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut
Civil Action No. 15,579
Dog, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
v.
NorTON, DEFENDANT
Civil Action No. 15,589
Rog, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS
v.
NORTON, DEFENDANT
Incorporation of Exhibits—Filed Mar. 9, 1973
1. Exhibit A to this Substitute Complaint consists of the ma-
terials Exhibits A and B to the Complaint in Roe v. Norton,
which are hereby incorpora
attached hereto. ted by reference the same as though
2. Exhibits B, C, D, and E to this Substitute Complai
C. P. a 8 plaint con-
sists of the materials with those designations to the complaint
20
in Doe v. Norton, which are hereby incorporated by reference
the same as though attached hereto.
Plaintiffs:
By Frank CocHRAN,
DoudlAs Crockett,
RaymMonp KELLY,
Ropert BECKMAN,
Their Attorneys
39 Certification (omitted in printing).
40 Unrrep States District Court,
District or CoNNECTICUT,
CuHaAMBers or Jupce Jon O. NEWMAN,
Hartford, Conn., March 12, 1973.
Re Donna Doe, et al v. Nicholas Norton, ete. Civil No. 15,579.
Sharon Roe, et al v. Nicholas Norton, ete. Civil No. 15,589
Davin Rosen, Esa.
AND Epwarp Do.an, Esa.
265 Church Street,
New Haven, Conn.
Dear Sirs: I understand that you are willing to serve as
counsel for the children in the above-captioned three-judge
court cases. Enclosed please find copies of the Court’s files.
The Court appreciates your willingness to serve as counsel,
and this letter is your appointment as such.
Sincerely,
Jon O. NEWMAN,
United States District Judge.
41 In the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut
Civil Action No. 15,579; April 10, 1973
Donna Dog, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS
v.
Nicholas Norton, DEFENDANT
Notice of Filing of Affidavits as Evidence
Pursuant to the agreement reached by counsel for all parties
in this action at the pre-trial conference presided over by Judge
Blumenfeld on March 12, 1973, plaintiffs are filing as eviden
affidavits of plaintiffs and others similarly situated. For —
venience, attached to the affidavits is a Summary and Categori-
— to relate the lengthy affidavits to the legal issues in this
43 In the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut
Civil Action No. 15,579; April 13, 1973
Donna Dos, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS
v.
NICHOLAS NORTON, DEFENDANT
. Summary of Affidavits
1. No explanation by Welf ild’
sa pater — — y are Department of her child's
Jo contact with father since mother became pregna
3. She feels that any further contact wi —
be detrimental to her child and toher, a eres eee
II. RENA ROE:
1. Noexplanation by Welf ild’
pa dae by Welfare Department of her child’s legal
, er has mad i
— 24 — e 8 threats of physieal harm to mother
3. No interest was sh
Ps phen 2 own in the child by the father who
4. Mother has plans for a future marriage
adoption of the child by her intended husband. ce
III. LINDA LOE:
* Her two illegitimate children were born over three years
2. She was divorced more than three
years ago.
3. No paternal support or paternal — —
4. i
a — by Welfare Department of children’s legal
31
IV.A:
1. One year old illegitimate child.
2. A is now planning to marry putative father and she .eels
that Section 52-440b legal action could destroy the possibility
of marriage.
3. A has written acknowledgement of paternity and is in the
process of having the child’s name changed to that of the father.
4. No explanation to A by Welfare Department of her child’s
legal paternal rights.
V. MARY BROWN:
1. No explanation by Welfare Department of her child’s legal
paternal rights.
2. Planning to marry man who is not the putative father but
whom most believe to be the father.
45 4. Written acknowledgement of paternity by putative
father.
VI. MILDRED WALTER:
1. Gave name of putative father to Welfare Department.
2. Fears putative father because of prior beatings and phys-
ical abuse. The father was arrested and plead guilty to assault
against her. Afraid to place her own life and that of the child
in danger by signing a paternity petition.
3. She has no objection to Welfare Department initiation of
paternity action against putative father.
4. She has received four Welfare Department letters indicat-
ing her welfare benefits will be terminated if she does not sign
a paternity petition.
VII. M.
1. Six month old illegitimate daughter.
2. M plans to marry the putative father.
3. Fears that paternity action will destroy possibility of
marriage.
4. No explanation to M by Welfare Department of her
child’s paternal benefits.
VIII. DONNA DOE:
1. Seventeen month old illegitimate child and two other legit-
imate children.
46 2. November, 1972, Doe’s application for AFDC was
denied for failure to disclose putative father but since
32
the initiation of this action she has been declared eligible for
welfare benefits.
3. No explanation from Welfare Department of her child’s
paternal legal rights.
4. Stability of family from non-disclosure because :
a. Doe and children are devout members of Seventh
Day Adventist Church.
b. Strong emphasis of church on family participation in
Sabbath programs and services.
e. Weekly attendance by Doe and family mutual family
happiness and strength.
6. Putative father is Roman Catholic and opposes religious
training that his child is now receiving and has expressed his
feelings on matter to Doe.
7. Disclosure will jeopardize church membership—one of
church’s prohibitions is premartial sexual intercourse. Violation
is ground for disfellowship. Only a few church elders know real
situation rest of Congregation is ignorant of the facts.
IX. FRANCES FOE:
1. Does not know father but knows that her child is the re-
sult of either an incestuous union or one with a mentally un-
stable — whose whereabouts are unknown to
er.
47 2. No explanation by Welfare Department of her
child’s legal paternal rights.
X. SALLY SMITH:
1. She has divulged the putative father’s name to the Welfare
t.
2. Birth certificate signed by father and child bears his name.
3. Child supported by father and only receives Title XIX not
4. Welfare Department wants her to sign paternity petition.
XI. DOROTHY POE:
1. Because she is undergoing psychiatrie treatment and has
a possible heart condition she does not feel it is in her best in-
terest or her child's to expose herself to the additional stress
of testifying in court.
2. No explanation by Welfare Department of her child's legal
paternal rights. *
— ——
XII. C:
1. She has told the welfare department that the father is one
of three men. She has never refused to divulge those names to
the department, but rather offered to submit all three names
to the Welfare Department after tue birth of her child.
48 2. She has received a citation to appear in Circuit
Court and a continuance was obtained until April 28,
1973.
3. The Welfare Department explained the potential social
security benefits her child might be able to obtain if paternity
was established.
XIII. SHARON ROE:
1. She has received a citation to appear in Circuit Court but
the matter is still pending.
2. She refuses to disclose the name of the child’s father be-
cause of her right to sexual privacy, and the putative father
has threatened to leave the state and thus sever the relation-
ship with their daughter if his name is disclosed.
XIV. D:
1. No explanation by the Welfare Department of her child’s
potential legal paternal rights.
2. D’s illegitimate child is over 4 years old.
3. D worked a third shift to enable her te support and care
for her child until her failing health prevented her from con-
tinuing to work.
4. The three year statute of limitations on paternity actions
has ,
5. D feels disclosure of the father’s name would invade her
privacy, interfere with her relationship with her daughter,
and serve no useful purpose.
49 XV. KATHERINE LOPES:
1. Was forced by the welfare department to initiate
a paternity action.
2. The paternity trial was a humiliating experience which
forced her to publicly disclose details of her private sexual and
personal life.
552-950—74——-3
50 In the United States District Court
for the
District of Connecticut
Civil Action No. 15,579; April 13, 1973
Donna Don, Er Al., PLAINTIFFS
v
NicHOLAS NorTON, DEFENDANT
Affidavit Categorization
I. The illegitimate child will not lose potential monetary
rights from the putative father if a paternity action in the
mother’s name is not initiated.
A. The paternity action statute of limitations has run.
1. III
2. XIV
B. The mother had a written acknowledgment of pa-
ternity from father.
Se »
B Vv
3. X*
51 C. The mother has divulged or had offered to di-
vulge the putative father’s name to the welfare
department. The welfare department is able to bring a pa-
ternity action in its own name.
1. VI“
2. x°
3. XII
D. The putative father’s name is unknown to the
mother.
.
2. XII“
If. The mother has made a decision based on reasonable
grounds that divulging the putative father’s name to the wel-
fare department or initiating a paternity action in her own
name will not be in her child’s best interests.
A. Mother fears physical retaliation from the father.
. =
2. VI“
*The asterisk denotes the affidavit falls into more than one of categoriza-
tions I and II.
B. Future contact with father or public disclosure of
status of illegitimacy would be detrimental to both mother
and child.
1. I (father has never contacted mother
since pregnancy )
52 2. VIII (public knowledge of illegitimacy
could cause excommunication )
3. XI (mother’s psychiatrie and possible heart
condition preclude paternity trial )
4. IX“ (father a close relative or mentally un-
stable)
5. XIII (paternity action could destroy father-
daughter relationship)
C. The mother intends to marry the father and believes
that a paternity action would jeopardize the child’s chances
and her chances for a warm and permanent relationship
with the father.
1. VII
2. IV“
D. The mother intends to marry shortly and her husband
would adopt the illegitimate child. A paternity action
would va the chances for this arrangement.
a
2. II“
III. i 1 of child's potential paternal legal rights.
IV. Explanation of child's possible potential social security
benefits.
1. XII
Plaintiffs,
By Dovcias M. Crocxerr,
Their Attorney.
See footnote p. 34.
36
o4 I
AFFIDAVIT
WiLurantic, March 1 2, 1973.
State or ConNECTICUT,
County of Windham, ss:
B and her child reside in West Willington: Connecticut, and
are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the Connecticut
State Welfare Department. B received a letter dated Decem-
ber 7, 1972, from an attorney retained by the Welfare Depart-
ment which stated that legal action would be instituted against
her if she failed to disclose the naine of her child’s father.
No welfare department representative, employee, or attorney
has ever explained to B that her child could obtain benefits
from her putative father if paternity was established other than
her social worker who informed B seventeen months ago that
she would be entitled to receive support payments for her
child. However, the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a
Preliminary Injunction which outlined support and other po-
tential benefits was explained to her in detail.
B has a verbal acknowledgement of paternity by her child’s
putative father. In light of this verbal acknowledgement of
paternity, B feels it is in her child’s best interest not to name
the father and initiate a paternity action at this time.
55 She has had no contact with her child’s putative father
since she became pregnant and feels that any future con-
tact would be severely detrimental to both herself and her child.
The individual referred to as B has personally appeared be-
fore me, this day March 12, 1973, and under oath, has sworn
to the accuracy of the above statement.
Dovetas M. Crockett,
Commissioner of Superior Court.
37
56 II
AFFIDAVIT =
Witurmantic, March 12, 1978.
STATE or CONNECTICUT,
County of Windham, ss:
RENA ROE and her illegitimate child reside in Willimantic,
Connecticut, and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from
the Connecticut Welfare Department. On December 7, 1972,
RENA ROE received a letter from an attorney retained by the
welfare department which stated that § 52-4406 legal action
would commence if she failed to disclose the name of her child’s
father.
No welfare department representative, employee, or attorney
has ever explained to RENA ROE that her child could obtain
benefits from his putative father if paternity was established.
However, the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a Pre-
liminary Injunction which outlined these potential benefits
was explained to her in detail.
RENA ROF feels it is in her child’s best interest that she and
her child do not have any further contact with the father. The
father has threatened RENA ROE with physical harm if she
divulges his name. He has never shown any interest in his child
and has consistently denied fathering the child. The
57 chances for financial recovery from the father are mini-
mal since he works irregularly.
RENA ROE hopes to marry at some time in the future and
she hopes her husband would adopt the child. She feels it is in
her child’s best interest to minimize any contact with the child's
father. The father’s character is such that he would be a detri-
mental influence on his child and on the mother/child rela-
tionship.
The individual referred to as RENA ROE has personally ap-
peared before me and, under oath, has sworn to the accuracy of
the above statement.
By Dovetas M. Crockett.
Stamrorb, March 12, 1973.
Strate or ConNECTICUT,
County of Fairfield, ss:
LINDA LOE, a plaintiff in this action whose real name and
identity are known to me, appeared before me and swore to the
truth of the following statements:
1. That she and her two children reside in Stamford, Con-
necticut, and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the
Connecticut Welfare Department.
2. That her children were born more than three years ago,
and are not the children of her former spouse from whom she
was divorced more than three years ago.
3. That there has been no paternal support, or acknowledge-
ment of paternity of her children.
4. That there has been no institution of any action to estab-
lish the paternity of her children.
5. That on December 4, 1972, an attorney retained by the
Connecticut Welfare Department sent her a letter stating that
he would commence legal action if she failed to disclose the
name of the father of her children.
6. That no representative, employee or attorney of the Con-
necticut Welfare Department has ever explained to her what
benefits her children could obtain if their paternity were estab-
lished, but that her counsel has fully explained to her
59 such benefits as outlined in the Doe v. Norton Ruling on
Application for Preliminary Injunction.
7. That after full consideration of the possible potential bene-
fits to her children, the reasons she had previously chosen not
to disclose the name of the father of her children, and the fact
that actions may no longer be commenced to establish the
paternity of her children because they are over three years of
age, she believes it is in the best interests of her children that
she not disclose the name of the father of her children at this
time.
Rosert C. BECKMAN,
Commissioner of the Superior Court.
39
60 IV
AFFIDAVIT
Wiurmantic, March 12, 1973.
State or CONNECTICUT,
County of Windham, ss:
A and her one year old illegitimate child reside with A’s
mother in Willimantic, Connecticut, and are currently receiv-
ing AFDC benefits from the Connecticut Welfare Department.
On November 17, 1972, she received a letter from an attorney
retained by the Welfare Department that Section 52-440b legal
action would commence if she failed to disclose the name of
her child’s father.
A and the child’s father are planning to marry. She is afraid
that if she discloses his name, subsequent legal action could
jeopardize their relationship and the possibility of marriage.
A has obtained a written acknowledgement of paternity from
the father and is in the process of obtaining an application to
have her child’s last name changed to the father’s last name.
No welfare department official has ever explained to A that
her child could obtain benefits from his putative father if pater-
nity was established. However, the Doe v. Norton Ruling on
Application for a Preliminary Injunction which outlined
61 these potential benefits was explained to her in detail.
In light of her possible marriage and the possible
change of her child’s last name, and the written acknowledge-
ment of paternity, she feels that it is not in her child’s best
interest to name the father to the Welfare Department.
The individual referred to as A has personally appeared
before me, and, under oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the
above statment.
Dovdlas M. CrockKerr,
Commissioner of Superior Court.
40
62 Vv
AFFIDAVIT
Wiuurmantic, March 12, 1973.
State or CoNNECTICUT,
County of Windham, ss:
MARY BROWN and her child reside in Willimantic, Con-
necticut, and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the
Connecticut Welfare Department. On February 9, 1973, MARY
BROWN received a letter from an attorney retained by the
welfare department which stated that legal action would com-
mence if she failed to disclose the name of her child’s father.
MARY BROWN is planning to marry a man who is not the
father of her illegitimate child. Most people believe that this
man is in fact the father of the child. MARY BROWN believes
that after the marriage her husband will adopt the child.
do welfare department representative, employee, or attorney
has ever explained to MARY BROWN that her child could
obtain benefits from his putative if paternity was established.
However, the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a Pre-
liminary Injunction which outlined these potential benefits was
explained to her in detail.
MARY BROWN has an acknowledgement of paternity in
writing by her child’s putative father.
63 In light of her possible marriage and her child’s possi-
ble adoption and the written acknowledgement of pa-
ternity, MARY BROWN feels it is in her child’s best interest
not to name the father and initiate a paternity action at this
time.
The individual referred to as MARY BROWN has personally
appeared before me and, under oath, has sworn to the accuracy
of the above statement.
Dovetas M. Crockett,
Commissioner of Superior Court.
Fesruary 23, 1973.
Srate or ConNECcTICUT,
County of Tolland, Rockville, ss:
I, Mildred Walter being first duly sworn according to law,
hereby depose, swear and say:
1. That i live at 66 Union Street in Rockville and receive
welfare assistance under the AFDC program for myself and my
minor daughter Tammy Jean Walter.
2. That I have given the name of the father of my child to
the Welfare Department, so they can institute paternity and
support proceedings against him.
3. That due to the violent nature of Tammy’s father, I have
refused to start paternity proceedings against him but have
supplied the Welfare Department with all the information
about this man.
4. That during the months of January and February 1973,
I have received four letters from the Manchester office of the
State Welfare Department informing me that unless I agreed
to sign paternity papers and testify in court proceedings
brought against the father of Tammy, they would cut off my
welfare checks immediately.
5. I have tried to cooperate in any way possible with the
Welfare Department concerning this matter, but I can-
65 not testify or sign papers that may place my life and
that of my child in danger.
6. My fear of this man is due to the beatings and physical
abuse he inflicted on me when he was in Rockville.
7. On one occasion, in January 1972, the father of Tammy,
dragged me by the hair and kicked me down Union Street in
Rockville when I was 9 months pregnant.
8. He was arrested by the Rockville police charged with as-
sault, plead guilty and placed on two years probation for
those acts against me.
42
9. Because of incidents like this which also occurred on other
occasions in 1972, I am deathly afraid of this man and do not
wish to be involved in any situation with him because of his
e~plosive temper. '
10. I do not feel the Welfare Department should place these
unreasonable and distressing demands upon me where they
have the father’s name and address in their files.
MiLprep WALTER.
Subscribed to and sworn before me this 23rd day of February
1973.
Raymonp J. Ketty,
Commissioner of Superior Court.
66 VII
AFFIDAVIT
RockviILLx, March 20, 1973.
Strate or ConNECTICUT,
County of Tolland:
M and her six month old daughter reside in Manchester, Con-
necticut and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the
Connecticut Welfare Department. On February Ist, 1973, she
received a letter from an attorney retained by the Welfare
Department that told her she would be cited into Circuit Court
to name the putative father of her child if she failed to disclose
his name.
The father of the child recently served seven months of a
years sentence in Seyms Street jail for criminal non support.
He has served time in jail for non support on two other occa-
sions. Since his release from jail the father of the child has
contacted an attorney to begin divorce proceedings against his
present wife.
M and the putative father plan to marry as soon as he is di-
vorced from his present wife. M is afraid that if she discloses his
name, subsequent legal action could jeopardize their relation-
ship and the possibility of marriage. If the putative father’s
present wife learns of this paternity action, she will attempt to
frustrate any divorce action started by the putative father. M
has an oral acknowledgment of paternity from the father.
43
Although M has been contacted by welfare workers to name
the putative father of her child, no welfare department
67 official, or employee has ever explained to M that her
child could obtain benefits from her putative father if
paternity was established. However the Doe v. Norton ruling
on Application for a Preliminary Injuction which outlined
these potential benefits, were explained to her in detail.
In light of her possible marriage, and the pending divorce
action of the putative father M feels it is in her childs best
interest not to name the father and initiate a paternity action
at this time.
The individual referred to as M has personally appeared
before me and under oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the
above statement.
RayMonpD J. Keiuy,
Commissioner of the Superior Court.
68 Vill
AFFIDAVIT
Rockvitie, March 19, 1973.
STaTe or CONNECTICUT,
County of Tolland, ss:
Donna Doe and her 17 month old illegitimate child reside in
Manchester with her two other children by a previous mar-
riage. She is currently receiving AFDC benefits from the
Connecticut Welfare Department for her entire family. On
November 3, 1972 Donna Doe’s application for welfare bene-
fits was denied for failure to name the youngest child’s puta-
tive father pursuant to Section 52-440b of the Connecticut
General Statutes. Since that time the State Welfare Depart-
ment has acknowledged its error in refusing Donna Doe bene-
fits (see Defendant's affidavit of Nicholas Norton Welfare
Commissioner February 5th 1973) and has placed her entire
family on assistance. Since being placed on AFDC, plaintiff
Donna Doe has been contacted by her caseworker to name the
father of her youngest son, or she will be compelled to name
the father in Court pusuant to 52-440b Connecticut General
Statutes.
— en waa GH *6
44
No welfare department representative, employee or attorney
has ever explained to her that her child could obtain benefits
from his putative father if paternity was established. However
the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a Preliminary
Injunction which outlined support and other potential bene-
fits was explained to her in detail.
69 Nonna Doe has a verbal acknowledgement by her
youngest child’s putative father. Despite this verbal ac-
knowledgement she feels her child’s best interest and the sta-
bility of her family would be best served by non-disclosure for
the following reasons:
Donna Doe and her children are practising members of the
Seventh Day Adventist Church. She and her family attend re-
ligious exercises, community discussion groups, recreation and
games for the children of Church members. Strong emphasis is
placed by the Church on family participation in Sabbath pro-
grams and services. Weekly attendance by Plaintiff Doe and
her three children at these services has provided an atmosphere
of mutual family happiness and strength for them. Donna Doe
feels the religious experience and emphasis on family participa-
tion that the Adventist Church encourages has been a strength-
ening factor in her relationship with her children. Her two
older boys presently attend an Adventist school.
The putative father of Donna Doe’s youngest child is a
Roman Catholic. He is very opposed to the religious training
that is being provided to the youngest Doe boy. He wou'd
rather the child be raised a Roman Catholic. He has made his
feelings on this matter of religious up bringing made very clear
to Donna Doe.
It is because of the putative father’s opposition to the re-
ligious training being given the youngest Doe child that Donna
Doe does not wish to identify him.
70 Donna Doe is also concerned that the public disclosure
of the illegitimacy of her youngest child will jeopardize
their church membership. It has been explained to her by her
Pastor that an illegitimate child reflects poorly on the moral
character of the mother in the eyes of the Church. The Seventh
Day Adventist Church does not permit premarital sex, smok-
ing or drinking. Violation of these rules are grounds for “dis-
fellowship” i.e. excommunication or expulsion from Church
membership and services. Donna Doe fears that being com-
45
pelled to name the putative father will result in possible “dis-
fellowship” from her Church, or at the very least injure her
standing and reputation within the Church community. At the
present time only a few Church elders know of her situation.
All other Church members assume her three children are issue
of her previous marriage.
In view of the difficulties that naming the putative father
would present to continued Church membership for Donna
Doe and her family she feels it is in their best interest not to
name the father of her youngest child. Disclosure of his identity
could only lead to disruption of the family and Church life that
have provided such strength and stability to them. The putative
father’s expressed desire to raise the youngest child in an-
other religion presents a source of disruption and anxiety to the
entire family. It is Donna Doe’s firm belief that compliance
with 52-440b will produce more harm than good to her young-
est boy and the rest of her children.
71 The individual referred to as Donna Doe has person-
ally appeared before me and under oath, has sworn to
the accuracy of the above statement.
By Raymonp J. Key.
72 IX
AFFIDAVIT
Marcu 22, 1973.
Strate or CoNNECTICUT,
County of New London, ss, Norwich, Ct.
FRANCES FOE, whose real name and identity are known
to me appeared before me and swore to the truth of the fol-
lowing statements:
1. That she and her minor child reside in Norwich, Connecti-
cut and are recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program of the Welfare Departinent of the State of
Connecticut.
2. That she was advised by her caseworker that she had to
name the father of her child in order to receive welfare benefits.
3. That she has chosen not to give information regarding
the paternity of the child because:
(a) she is uncertain as to who the true father of the
child is.
(b) that the child was conceived either under incestuous
conditions or by a person who is emotionally unstable and
whose whereabouts are unknown to her.
46
(c) that neither of the persons involved are aware that
conceivement took place as she left the area unaware that
she had become pregnant.
(d) that she chooses not to make the existence of her
child known to either party and desires to complete her
high school education and assume full financial respon-
sibility of her child through gainful employment.
73 4. That her caseworker did not explain the benefits
the child may some day be eligible for under the Social
Security Act if paternity was established.
5. That I explained said rights of the child to said recipient
and she continued to choose not to name the father of the child
for reasons set forth in paragraph three section (d) on page
one of this affidavit.
Patricia Paquette,
Notary Public.
74 X
AFFIDAVIT
I, SALLY SMITH, being duly sworn depose and say:
1. On or about December 8, 1972 I received a letter from
Attorney Francis Foley, III of 22 Shetucket Street, Norwich,
Connecticut advising me to make an appointment with his
office for the purpose of ascertaining the name of the father
of my child.
2. On December 19, 1972 I appeared in Mr. Foley’s office to
be advised of my legal rights in that regard as per the implica-
tion of his letter to me dated December 7, 1972.
3. On December 19, 1972 Mr. Foley advised me that if I did
not sign “Acknowledgement of Paternity” papers which were
available in his office that I would be brought to Court and
made to sign the papers in the Court and answer under oath
as to the name of the father of my child.
4. I indicated to Mr. Foley that I had previously named the
father of my child in question to the State Welfare Department
and that the father signed the birth certificate at the hospial.
5. Mr. Foley then checked his file and confirmed that the
child carried its father’s legal name in the records made avail-
able to him by the Department of Welfare.
6. I further advised Mr. Foley that the child in mention is
not a recipient of Welfare under my AFDC Budget as the puta-
47
tive father is supporting the child, and that the only benefits
I am seeking for the child are Title XIX, medical and dental
benefits.
7. I feel this action by the State of Connecticut is an invasion
of my privacy and in violation of equal protection under the
civil rights laws.
Sur Smiru,
Pseudonym.
Jaxu Ax 24, 1973.
75 Srarx or CONNECTICUT,
County of New London, ss, Norwich:
Personally appeared, SALLY SMITH, signer in the fore-
going instrument, personally known to me and referred to in the
foregoing affidavit as SALLY SMITH. Subscribed and sworn
to before me this 24th day of January, 1973.
Patricia PAQUETTE,
Notary Public.
XI
AFFIDAVIT
70 «Strate or Connecticut,
County of New Haven, ss, New Haven:
I, DOROTHY POE (a pseudonym I have chosen in order to
protect my privacy), being first duly sworn, depose and say:
1. I am a plaintiff in the case of Roe et al v. Norton, Civil
Action No. 15,589 (United States District Court, District of
Connecticut).
2. My children and I are recipients of assistance from the
Connecticut State Welfare Department under the Aid to Fami-
lies With Dependent Children Program (AFDC), a resident of
New Haven, Connecticut, and a citizen of the United States
and the State of Connecticut.
3. On January 24, 1971, my daughter was born. She is not
issue of any valid marriage. On several occasions since her birth,
various workers at State Welfare have asked me whether I
wanted to name the baby’s father. I have declined to do so, and
until December, 1972 I was never pressed further.
4. On December 19, 1972, I was served with a petition and
subpoena requiring me, under authority of Connecticut General
Statutes § 52-440b to appear in the Sixth Circuit Court and
disclose under oath the name of my daughter's father. As of
this date said petition remains pending in that court.
77 5. I have been informed by my attorney that the pos-
sible penalties for refusing to so testify are a $200. fine
and/or one year in jail.
6. My attorney has also informed me that there are possible
advantages for my daughter and myself if I tell Welfare her
father’s name, including possible financial support if I go off
Welfare and benefits under Social Security and other govern-
ment programs. Nobody at the Welfare Department had ever
informed me of that.
7. After my first child was born, I gave the Welfare Depart-
ment her father’s name. They have never taken any action to
get him to pay support. I later realized that he would make a
lot of trouble, had other dependents and had little money any-
way. For those reasons I didn’t want to pursue him for support.
The Welfare Department never took any action against him
after I gave them his name.
8. The main reason I don’t want to give the Welfare De-
partment my younger daughter’s name is that I am very nerv-
ous. I go to a psychiatric clinie where I have been advised not
to work because of my condition. I may also have a heart con-
dition; the Doctor’s aren’t sure yet. For both psychiatrie and
medical reasons I do not want to be put in a position of great
pressure such as testifying in court.
78 9. In addition I feel that whether to pursue support
from my child’s father is something I should be able to
decide according to whether I think he will pay, whether he
will make trouble for me, how likely we are to receive other
. and how much strain I would have to go through to
it.
10. I have been advised by the psychiatrie elinie J attend,
that it is generally good for children to know who their father
is. For reasons of my own I accept this advice in one case and
reject it in the other.
Dororrry Por,
A pseudonym.
: a to and subscribed before me this 26th day of March,
Commissioner of the Superior Court.
AFFIDAVIT
Witurmantic, March 27, 1973.
STATE OF — —
nty of Wi , 88: i ;
a — are two month old child reside in Willimantic, —
necticut, and are currently receiving AFDC benefits from the
i t.
r C was informed by an >
ployee of the Connecticut State Welfare Department at the
time she was applying for AFDC benefits that if paternity —
established, her child would be entitled to Social 8 : —
fits from the putative father. However, the Doe * or —
Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Application for a ä * —
which outlined other potential benefits was explain vd
in detail by a law clerk from this office. C told this . oy ;
that there were three possible fathers of her child be —
immediately after the birth of the child she would disc —
three names to the Welfare Department. She was 3 a!
the Welfare employee that paternity could not be esta —
through blood tests and without direct knowledge or a wr
acknowledgement of paternity, disclosure would be ——
On or about February 27, 1973, C received a letter te
Raymond J. Chabot, Esquire, a private attorney retain
81 by the Connecticut State Welfare Department, *r
ing C to call his office. C telephoned Mr. Cha ö ad
requested her to disclose to him the name of her child I ‘
tive father. At that time C told Mr. Chabot that A i pe
know the identity of her — ie oc father and upon
i ting that fact. ;
eae igen — amk a petition compelling her
appearance before the Connecticut Circuit Court for the 5
th Circuit and disclose the name of the child’s putative f 8
ad to institute an action to establish the paternity of =
child pursuant to Section 52-440b of the Connecticut Gen
Statutes. 1 e
e Circuit Court for the Eleventh Cireuit gran
. for a continuance of the Court's order to appear based
6626607.
50
upon the pendency of Doe, et al v. Norton, Ci
(D. Conn.) until April 27, 1973. e lami
e individual referred to as C above has
( personally a
peared before me this 28th day of March, 1973, and, Ae
oath, has sworn to the accuracy of the above statement.
Dovuacias M. Crocxerrt,
Commissioner of Superior Court.
81 XIII
AFFIDAVIT
Strate or CoNNECTICUT,
County of New Haven, ss, New Haven:
I, SHARON ROE, (a pseudonym I have ch
. . , t
my privacy), being first duly sworn, depose 2 9 en
1 2 onc ae — of Roe et al v. Norton, Civil
. 15, ni tates Distri istri
8 District Court, District of
2. My children and J are recipients of assistan
ce from th
Connecticut State Welfare Department under the Aid to F —
1 wa) sg . — Children Program (AFDC), a resident
of New Haven, Connecticut and a citi ni
and the State of Connecticut. nme
3. On October 27, 1972, d i
3 — my daughter was born. She is not
4. Shortly after my daughter's birth, I appli i
„applied for assist
—— the AFDC Program. At that time, I was referred to the
2 r ao of the Sixth Cireuit Court in New
n. There I was asked 0
2 to name my daughter's father and
5. On December 20, 1972, I was served with iti
De , ‘ a petit
— requiring me, under authority of 9
tatutes § 52-440b to appear in the Sixth Circuit Court
* — ae <— 2 the name and whereabouts of my
hter’s er. As of this date said petiti mains
pending in that court. *
6. I have been informed by my attorney, that the possible
penalties for refusi i
may ae refusing to so testify are a $200. fine and/or one
51
7. My attorney has also informed me that there are possible
advantages for my daughter and myself if I give her father’s
name, including possible finaneial support when I go off Wel-
fare and benefits under Social Security and other government
programs.
8. I do know and could probably prove who my daughter’s
father is. When she is older I plan to let her know as well,
whether or not she is receiving financial support from him.
9. I have several reasons for refusing to give the name to the
Welfare Department.
First, the question of with whom I have had sexual inter-
course is private; I don’t feel I should be forced to tell any
go ‘ernment agency that,
second, my daughter's father has no fixed address. My at-
torney has informed me that if I so testify, I will be subject
to unfriendly cross-examination and embarrassment in open
court.
Third, I have seen him since her birth and he has started to
develop a good relationship with her; he plays with her. If I
were to give his name he would leave the state and break off
the relationship.
83 Fourth, the only reason I have been given that the
Welfare Department wants to know his name is to try
to get support money from him. He has irreguiar earnings at
best and has said that he would leave the state if I push him.
Furthermore, while I am on the State, I would receive the same
amount of money for her total support whether or not he is
contributing to it. :
Finally, I think I have, and my attorney has advised ine that
he thinks I have a constitutional right to decide whether it is
worth while to seek financial support from iny daughter’s
father.
SHARON Rox.
Pseudonym.
Personally appeared the person known in these proceedings
as Sharon Roe who is personally known to me, and subscribed
and sworn to this affidavit before me this 31st day of March,
1973.
Commissioner of the Superior Court.
Apri 2, 1973.
Staie or ConNECTICUT,
County of Windham, ss, Killingly:
D and her child reside in the Borrough of Danielson, Con-
necticut, and are currently receiving A. F. D. C. benefits from the
Connecticut State Welfare Department. D received a letter
dated February 26, 1973 from an attorney retained by the
Welfare Department which stated that legal action would be
instituted against her if she failed to disclose the name of her
child’s father.
No Welfare Department representative, employee, or at-
torney has ever explained to D that her child could obtain
benefits from her putative father if paternity was established.
However, the Doe v. Norton Ruling on Application for a Pre-
liminary Injunction which outlined support and other potential
benefits was explained to her in detail.
D has worked the third shift (12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.) for
three years to support herself and her child. D is no longer
physically able to work the third shift and provide proper care
for her child.
D's child is four years old and the statute of limitations re-
garding paternity has elapsed.
85 D has a verbal acknowledgment of paternity by her
child’s putative father. To the best of her knowledge,
the putative father no longer resides in the State of Connecticut.
In light of the fact that D has supported her child for three
years without the assistance of anyone, and in view of the facts
that the putative father is most likely out of state and the
statute of limitations has lapsed, D feels that instituting a
paternity action would serve no useful purpose except that of
invading her privacy and adversely affecting the family rela-
tionship which she has fought so long to protect.
The individual referred to as D has personally appeared be-
fore me, the day of April 2, 1973, and under oath, has sworn to
the accuracy of the abo statement.
Raymonp RicHarp Norko,
Commissioner of Superior Court.
53
86 XV
AFFIDAVIT
State or ConNECTICUT,
County of New Haven, ss:
I, KATHERINE LOPES, being first duly sworn, depose and
say:
1. I am the mother of two children who were born out of wed-
lock. The same man fathered both children.
2. Their father acknowledged paternity of the older child,
and the acknowledgement was filed with the Connecticut Cir-
cuit Court for the Sixth Circuit. Enforcement of its support
provisions is supposed to be handled by the Family Relations
office of that court.
3. I have at different times since the birth of my last child
applied for and r-ceived benefits from the Connecticut State
Welfare Department under the Aid to Families with Depend-
ent Children (AFDC) program. When my youngest child was
born, five years ago, the Welfare Department made me reveal
his father’s name in order to receive welfare benefits.
4. On at least two occasions, the Welfare Department has
made me go to Family Relations to sign affidavits for non-
support warrants. Although I have done so, to the best of my
knowledge Family Relations has never had him arrested. I
have not received any support money from him during the time
I have not been receiving AFDC.
5. I was told that I must bring a paternity action, and given
a list of three (3) local attorneys to choose from to represent
me, which I did later, my son and I were ordered to go
87 to Yale-New Haven Hospital for a blood test. Although
the people at the hospital were very pleasant, they knew
we were there because of the paternity action, and said so in
front of my son, who was then about two (2) years old. This
made me feel uncomfortable.
6. My son’s father denied paternity and there was therefore
a trial before the Sixth Cireuit Court (New Haven). The trial
was held in the regular civil courtroom with several people
present who had nothing to do with the case.
54
7. When I testified, there was a long cross-examination by
Edward Dolan, the father’s lawyer. I don’t remember now ex-
actly what he asked; I seem to have blocked it from my
memory. It must have been about my sexual relationship with
my son’s father and whether I had had other sexual relations
during that time.
8. I remember that the judge who was hearing the case
looked bored most of the time. I felt embarrassed and uncom-
fortable ; for that reason I would drop my voice. But every time
I did that the judge would tell me to keep my voice up so
that everyone could hear.
9. My son’s father also testified, denying that he was the
father. I felt both angry at him for lying and very humiliated.
10. A year later the judge ruled against me, so that we have
received no support or other benefits as a result of that
proceeding.
11. The whole experience left me feeling dirty, as though I
were a bad person for having had, my son. At the time, I was
worried about that feeling would make me feel and act toward
him. Now, although I still feel embarrassed and humiliated
whenever I think about it, I don’t think it has made me love
him any less.
88 12. I don’t think I would be willing to go through that
kind of experience again.
Katuerine Lopes.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 31st day of March,
1973.
Commissioner of the Superior Court.
55
89 In the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut
Civil No. 15589
SHaron Roe AND Dororuy Por, UNDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
or Oruers SIMILARLY SiTUATED
v.
Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF
WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AND ON BEHALF
or OrHers SIMILARLY SITUATED
Answer of the Defendant
COUNT I
Par hs 5, 6, 7 and 8 are admitted.
4 he — a 1, 2, 4, and 9, the defendant has insuffi-
cient knowledge or information to form a belief, and leaves the
intiffs to their proof. *
* So much of paragraph 3 as alleges that this is a proper
case for a three-judge court is admitted, but the remaining
allegation is denied i.e. “. . . on the grounds that said statute
violated . . . equal protection of the laws.”
COUNT II
4. Paragraph 11 is admitted. ;
5. Paragraphs 12 and 13 are denied.
90 COUNT III
. Paragraphs 14 and 15 are denied.
: The Answers to paragraphs apply as they are incorporated
in all counts.
Defendant:
By (s) James M. Hicarns,
Assistant Attorney General,
75 Meadow Street, 1
a East Hart ſoru, Connecticut 06108,
Tel. (203) 3
i f provided to counsel of record on April 30, 19
9 (s) James M. Hiccins,
Assistant Attorney General.
56
91 Civil No. 15,589
Donna Don, LINDA Log, Rena Rox, Satty SmMirH, AND ALL
Orners SimiILaRLy Surrep
v.
Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF
WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Civil No. 15,589
SHaron Roe AND Dororny Por, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
or OrHers SrmiLaRLy SIiTvuaTep
v.
Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF
WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, AND ON BEHALF OF
OrHers SIMILARLY SITUATED
Stipulations
It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties as follows:
1. It is the intent of § 52-440 b and the practice of the Con-
necticut State Welfare Department in each and every case in
which the mother of an illegitimate child fails or refuses to name
the putative father of the child to retain an attorney for the
purpose of citing the mother court if she persists in refusing to
name the probative father.
2. § 52-440 b in the opinion of counsel for all the parties is a
civil statute. A contempt committed under this section can be
purged at any time by naming the putative father, i.e. putative
father, in the opinion of counsel of record herein.
92 DerenDant’s ExR MTT A
Strate DepaRTMENT oF HEALTH,
Hartford, Conn., March 16, 1978.
Mr. James Hiaorns,
Office of Finance and Control,
76 Meadow Street,
East Hartford, Conn.
Dear Mr. Hiddixs: I enclose tables of resident live births in
Connecticut by legitimacy. Table IV is a continuation of the
time interval to the latest year available (1971). The percent-
age of illegitimate births are broken first by age of mother sind
by race.
Very truly yours,
Epwarp C. AvuBIN,
Research Analyst, Public Health Statistics Section.
Enclosure.
CONNECTICUT BIRTHS BY RACE AND LEGITIMACY, 1950-65
MOTHERS OF ALL AGES
Nonwhite births
Legiti-
mate
All races
Ihegiti-
mate
Year
SESRSSERTEIESS
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62
98-1 CHILDREN’s Exuisir 1
In the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut
Civil Action No. 15,579
Donna Don, Linpa Lon, Rena Rog, Satty SMITH, AND ALL
OrHers SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS
U.
NickrolAs Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND As COMMISSIONER OF
WELFARE OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEFENDANTS
March 28, 1973
Civil Action No. 15,589
SHaron Roe anv Dororuy Por, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
or OrHers SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS
V.
Nicholas Norton, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COMMISSIONER OF
WELFARE OF THE STATE or CONNECTICUT, DEFENDANTS
Deposition of Albert J. Solnit, M. D.
982 Appearances °
For THE I NYERESTS OF THE CHILDREN:
ROSEN AND DOLAN
By: DAVID N. ROSEN, ESQ.
EDWARD J. DOLAN, ESQ.
265 Church Street
New Haven, Connecticut
For THE PLAINTIFFS:
RAYMOND KELLY, ESQ.
35 Village Street
Rockville, Connecticut
MICHAEL ANTHONY ARCARI, ESQ.
76 Meadow Street
East Hartford, Connecticut
63
98-3 ALBERT J. SOLNIT, M.D.
witness called pursuant to agreement, being, first duly sworn
in the above cause, testified on his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Rosen:
Q. Doctor, by whom are you employed?
A. Yale University. pa
Q. And what is your position
A. I’ma Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry, and Director
of the Child Study Center, and Chairman of the Center for the
Study of Education. 7
Q. And can you state briefly your educational background!
A. Ves. I have a Bachelor's Degree from the University of
California, a Master of Arts from the University of California,
an M.D. from the University of California, and Honorary
Master of Arts from Yale University.
Q. And can you — 4 — professional background
and professional 1
98-4 A. Yes. After completing my medical school educa-
tion, I became fully trained in pediatrics, in psychiatry,
child psychiatry, and psychcanalysis. I’m certified in psyehiatry
and in child psychiatry. 6
I have the equivalency of—well, I’m called what's called
board eligible in pediatrics, and I’m a member of both the
American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy of
Child Psychiatry. Im President of the American Academy of
Child Psychiatry, and the past President of the American
Psychoanalytic Association and the Association for Child Psy-
choanalysis ; also, the Secretary-General of the International
Association for Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions.
Q. Now, Doctor, have I acquainted you with t. provisions
of Connecticut Statute 52-440b which relates to a requirement
that mothers, certain mothers, be required to name the puta-
tive father of children
A. Yes. ;
Q. —and institute paternity action?
A. Yes, you have.
64
Q. And have you, through your training and experience,
formed conclusions about what you think the implications of
this statute would be in situations for the children of such
mothers?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And you can state in as much length as you think
98-5 is necessary what you feel the major implications of the
statute may be in different situations for different chil-
dren?
A. Yes. I think the most important consequence of that act,
in terms of what serves children best, is the threat it offers to
the ability of the mother to provide care for the child by requir-
ing the mother to institute a paternity—what would you call
it
Q. Aetion.
A.—action. It seems to me that that action does not take into
account what the child’s needs are in a particular situation. The
child, from our best knowledge, requires a steady and affection-
ate relationship on a continuous basis to at least one parent.
And if this is jeopardized or stressed, then the most important
needs of the child are placed in jeopardy. By requiring the
mother to institute a paternity action in order to qualify for
economic support, I believe, from my clinical experience and
my work as a child psychiatrist, that that adds an unnecessary
stress to the mother’s capability of caring for her child. The
support for the child, the support for the intactness of that
family, should not, in my opinion, be conditional upon such a
requirement as that which the law has made necessary.
Q. What de you see as the possible advantages and disad-
vantages of such requirement with respect to the child’s re-
lationship with the child’s father?
98-6 A. I would not be able to judge that categorically
except in one way. A child thrives from an affectionate
relationship to both parents, especially if both parents have a
harmonious and an affectionate relationship to each other So
that the child’s opportunity for a continuous and meaning ‘ul
relationship to the father is very important, if it is not at the
65
it can in addition help — child have a better sense of himself
i father is also involved. ’
1 enor the law, it seems to me, doesn’t seem to . 415
a harmonious relationship between parents by requiring 1 *
mother to institute legal action against a putative father.
that sense it seems to me to work against the best n
the child, and especially in connection with wanting him to have
a good relationship to his father as well as his mother.
Q. Do you think that there might be possibilities—strike
that. Do you see a danger in some instances of fathers 8
resentful of mothers or children, and that being harmfu
"Fo could see the father would avoid contact with the
child which otherwise he might maintain, and he might
98-7 avoid contact with the mother which otherwise he might
maintain, if he feels that the condition for the relation
ship is one of economic—is one required by the law in yo’ to
provide economic support for the mother and child, or mother
*.* whe do you see as the implications for the child if a
mother is sent to jail for refusing to give the name of a father ?
A. That could be, and usually is, catastrophic. If there is a
good relationship between the mother and child and the aged
is truly the affectionate psychological parent, by putting 2
mother in prison we remove the most crucial support and gui ;
ing influence to assure the sound and 228 development o
i especially if it’s a young . N
* say the ——— is catastrophic. can you give
some estimate of how serious 4 — to a child to have a parent
i ear of its life
wee ake 4 the age of five or six to lose that person
on whom they count for support, for guidance, for protection
and for the stimulating, nourishing love on which a child —
pends for development, exposes them to, first of all, a feeling o
helplessness than which there is no more devastating feeling
for a child to have—a feeling of depression, a feeling that you
cannot count on your world to be a dependable or safe one. And
then in proportion to the adequacy of a substitute for
98-8 the mother, which is not guaranteed by our society at
this time, the child may have some recovery from that
devastating impact, but the degree of recovery is never whole,
it’s never a complete recovery, there's always some impairment,
552950 74 — 8
66
some vulnerability that is brought about with such an aban-
donment, because that is how the child experiences it—a young
child experiences that as an abandonment by the adult on whom
they have counted.
Chiidren of that age can endure other stresses, which I would
like to illustrate, much better than they can the loss of the
maternal love object, the meiernal loving person. They can
endure hunger, they can endure bombing raids, they can endure
natural catastrophies and come through them relatively un-
scathed psychologically, if they are physically all right. But they
cannot escape the devastating impact of the loss of the person
who has taken care of them since they were born, helpless as
an infant into this world.
Q. Have you found it to be true in many instances that chil-
dren who do not know who their father is are curious and have
a psychological need to know the identity of their father?
A. I would say it’s almost universal that a child whose father
is absent is a child who is curious, who tries to imagine, tries to
find ways directly and indirectly to understand who his father
or her father is, what they were like, how they grew up, what
they’re about, what they represent, and what kind of
98-9 guiding influence they could be for the child in future
experiences.
Q. Is it, in your opinion, invariably in the child’s best in-
terest to be told the name of the father?
A. No. I think there are instances in which it would appear
that the knowledge of who the father is, of knowing the father’s
name, is not guaranteed to serve the child’s best interest. There’s
a difference between knowing the father’s name and knowing
the father, and wanting to know who the father is, being cu-
rious and trying to fill in through one’s imagination or through
one’s sources of information who the father is and what he’s
like.
The difference is this: If you take the instance of adoption,
of children who are adopted from the earliest infancy on, many
of our societal customs, convictions are that it would be best,
since the true psychological parents are now the adopted par-
ents, to not complicate the child’s life or the lives of the two sets
of adults involved, by expecting the child to know who the bio-
logical parents were. Therefore, it is a custom, in some places
a law, that the actual identity of the biological parents is a
67
confidential matter not to be given to cither the adoptive par-
ents or the adopted children.
I have found that that can work very well. And, indeed, if
that's the way people prefer it an it works out better, there
is no reason why a child cannot overcome and master and
thrive, through mastery of that absent knowledge, so
98-10 long as the adequacy of the parents who are in charge
of his upbringing from infancy on is an adequate one.
So in that sense it’s not required.
I also know many children who have been born out of wed-
lock where the mother and the father have decided to not be-
come married, where the mother has preferred to relate her child
to another male figure than the one who is the biological father.
And, again, although it may not be ideal, it is not a permanent
hindrance to an adequate development on the part of that
child.
Q. In your opinion, where do you think, from the perspective
of the child’s interests, where do you think the power io make a
decision about whether to pursue paternity proceedings ought
best to be placed?
A. From the point of view of the child, which is who I speak
for, it would be the mother who ought to make that decision.
Q. Why do you think so?
A. Because she’s the one who has the care and the respon-
sibility and the loving affectionate bond with that child, and
therefore a decision as to what’s in his best interests ought to
first come from her.
Mr. Rosen: Anyone who wants to question the doctor in the
next five minutes? Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Ys-11 By Mr. Arcart:
Q. Doctor, from your testimony I gather that you are
under the impression that section 52-440b is in existence purely
for economic reasons. Is that your opinion of it?
A. I have no comprehensive understanding what motivated
the people who drew up that law.
Q. In other words, I got the impression that you felt that Sec-
tion 52-440b was in existence or is in existence to allow anyone
pursuing that statute to obtain support for a child born out of
wedlock, or is the statute con i
—— cerned more with the support,
A. Right, I understood it to be more a matter of financi
support, but whether it had other motives in it, I didn’t eo
7 ban — — — — that if the mother
en i
— — — ame o ather this could cause
A. Yes, it could.
Q. —as far as the care of a child?
A. If it were forced upon the mother, yes.
Q. Now, there are some cases, I take it, where, if the child
knew his or her father, that the results might be beneficial?
A. I would not separate how that’s done from what is done.
In other words, if the mother, as an act of love toward
98-12 both the child and toward the father, arranged for that
father and child to know each other and be together,
yes, that would be favorable to the development of the child.
2 — — —— to do with the approach
. to do with the taneit i
it ＋ for loving —— *
Q. Right. And in this action where we're dealing in a
tionship between father and child, the — aban
velop a healthy normal relationship?
A. If it’s within a proper context.
Q. The only thing I want to clear up is, I believe you said—
correct me if I’m wrong—but I think you indicated that if a
child was told later, later on, the name of his or her father,
that this would not necessarily be—this would work against the
interests of the child. Am I correct in making that statement?
A. No. I didn’t take a stand on that.
2 I see.
simply said that a child can benefit from knowi
the father is. I also said a child can accept the — Ja os
frustration—frustration of not knowing who the father is—
and, with a proper kind of attachment to the primary psycho-
logical parent, be able to use that frustration in a way that’s
favorable to his or her development.
Q. Right. In accordance with those comments, I think
98-B you 2 ＋ 222 nee ible that a child, under the
ces, if the
father was cisclosed to the child, it could pe i ce
within the father against the mother?
A. It could be a negative factor because it could be done with
two influences that make it negative: One, the mother is com-
pelled to do it and does it out of fear of the law or the conse-
quences of not being able to comply with the law. That means
it’s already an act in which she’s doing it against her own free
choice or her own spontaneous impulse. And, secondly, it tends
to put the father—and this, I think, is a very detrimental
factor—it places the father in a negative light for the child and
says to him, “This is bad or this is undesirable, this has to be
required by the law,” and it gives him a negative image of the
father.
Q. Right. Well, in any event, you would have to be fair and
say that this does not necessarily happen in all cases. There
would have to be some cases where perhaps the father takes a
different view entirely. In other words, he doesn’t have a nega-
tive attitude towards——.
A. You mean where the mother would be required to.
Q. No, in any circumstances, whether the mother involved
voluntarily discloses the name or, in some cases, where she
might be forced to disclose the name.
98-14 A. Not where she’s forced to. I cannot see any way in
which that could be helpful to the child.
Q. In other words, you’re saying if the mother were forced
to diselose the name of the father involved, that, first of all,
would perhaps have a negative result on a child—I say
„perhaps.
A. Likely to.
Q. All right, likely to- but would it always have a negative
effect on the father where the resentment would show up? In
other words, I’m not saying in every case now.
A. Oh, yes, I think you can be fairly certain that the father
invariably is going to feel resentful and feel negative well, he’s
going to feel not only resentful but he’s going to feel unable to
invest in the relationship with his child and child’s mother in a
positive way. He’s going to tend to avoid that relationship
rather than to be available to it should it be desirable.
Mr. Rosen: Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Q. You're saying in every case the father would develop this
negative attitude. I just want a yes or no, Dr. Solnit, under the
so-called eireumstances
22
70
A. Well, in human behavi i
pm ’ —— or, you learn very quickly to never
. All right, almost always. We haven't pinned thi
a 8 . th
98-15 thing down as to time. In other words, dealing with the
example we had, if the mother were forced to give the
name of the father, and of course he took, in other words, a
negative attitude towards the relationship, if you recognized
—— ime at — oould this resentment be dissipated
ally a relationshi i
ao ae y onship could be built between the
A. It’s always possible for these thin
A gs to be overco
dissipated in the light of subsequent corrective — —
it's unlikely to, and it puts at a disadvantage, and at significant
— — — They will tend to always then be nega-
— an tend to be positive. So, yes, it's possible but
Mr. Rosen: Mr. Kelly has one question.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By Mr. Ketty:
Q. Doctor, would it ever be to a child’s ad if he’s i
a family situation where he has et *
Ne e know, they were born to the mother by a previ-
2 = — fm So Rees relationship—for him to know that
— — e same individual that fathered the first
A. That kind of knowledge need not be i
necessarily negative.
38 It has to be interpreted in the light of the — . ˖ the
context in which it takes place. It may be negative, it
8 may be positive. It often can be positive because children
8 to form a community of interests and tend to form friend-
N Pn which are terribly important to them
ore — * —
° neat 415 ey had different fathers, that's not necessarily
_Q. But if a child thought his father was the same
——— and sisters and that turns out — to be ‘om 7
fe * t often is a jolt and a child can overcome that jolt. It
pends on how it’s presented. If it's presented as something
that’s compelled by law——.
Q. If it were presented in a court situation?
71
A. In a court situation as compelled by law and with an
implied criticism, then it’s very detrimental because it means
somehow society is prejudiced against that child and his for-
bears. But if it’s presented as something which people come to
by themselves of their own volition and as a result of their own
experiences, there isn’t anything that necessarily says that
that’s negative. That’s what I meant by „context. When com-
pelled, when forced, then the child is very likely to experience
that as not only a negative but a threatening kind of experience.
Mr. Arcart: I do have a couple of quick questions. I think
the doctor can very quickly answer.
Mr. Rosen: Ask him one.
98-1 By Mr. Ancant (continued):
Q. Where a child does not know the name of his father,
can this build up stress in a child’s mind?
A. Where a child does not know the name of the father, it
tends to create a frustration, a challenge which the child can
overcome.
Q. And do you have any opinion as to what happens if the
child should find out who his father is later in life, anything
at all?
A. I think I’ve answered that by saying it depends on the
context in which it comes about. It can be a very positive thing
or it can be very stressful.
Q. Yes. And all your testimony today, this is based, I be-
lieve you indicated on clinical experience?
A. On clinical experience, on a wide reading of the subject, on
being the editor of a number of professional journals, which
I didn’t list because of the shortness of time. I’m the Chief
Editor of the “Psychoanalytic Study of the Child.” I’m on the
editorial board of “Pediatrics.” I’m on the editorial board of
“Children.” I’m on the editorial board of “Hospital and Modern
Psychiatry,” and a few others.
Q. But anyway, it’s partly clinical?
A. Partly clinical, partly out of my studies on the sub-
ject.
98-18 Mr. Arcart: That's all.
Mr. Rosen: Thank you very much, Doctor.
19-20 ° 1 n .
E
eee
72
99—1 CHILDRENS ExN rr 2
In The United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut
April 4, 1973
Civil Action No, 15, 579
Don, Er ALs., PLAINTIFFS
v.
NORTON, DEFENDANT
Civil Action No. 15, 589
Roe, Er Ats., PLAINTIFFS
v.
NORTON, DEFENDANT
Deposition of Caroline F. Packard
**
OR THE PLAUxTIrrs (Guardian ad li
ROSEN & DOLAN N
265 Church Street,
New Haven, Conn.
By: Edward Dolan, Esq.
* For THE Puaintirrs (Roe and Doe)
Raymond J. Kelly
35 Village Street,
Rockville, Connecticut
For THe Derenpant:
Michael Arcari, Esq.
Assistant Attorney-General
State of Connecticut
76 Meadow Street
East Hartford, Connecticut
Deposition of CAROLINE E. PAC
half of the Plaintiffs in the — yang mt —
and Doe, et als, are plaintiffs and Norton is Defendant, pend-
ing in the United States District Court, District of Connecticut
held on April 4, 1973, held at the offices of the Welfare De.
73
partment, State of Connecticut, at 1000 Asylum Street, Hart-
ford, Connecticut, before Paul D. Landman, a Notary Public
in and for the State of Connecticut, County of Hartford, pur-
suant to notice, at which time the parties were represented as
hereinbefore set forth .. .
STIPULATIONS
99-3 All objections, except as to form, are reserved for the
trial.
The reading and signing of the deposition are waived. For-
malities as to notice and proof of the authority of the Notary
Public are waived.
CAROLINE E. PACKARD
the witness named in the notice, having been duly sworn in
the above-entited cause, testified on her oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Douan:
Q. Mrs. Packard, who is your employer?
A. Connecticut State Welfare Department.
Q. How long have you been employed by that Department?
A. Since July of 1965.
Q. And in what capacity are you employed by the Welfare
Department at this time?
A. I am Chief of Policy Development and Staff Services.
Q. How long have you held this position?
A. I believe it was January, 1971 that I was appointed as
the Chief.
Q. How long have you been part of the staff with respect to
the development of policy?
90-4 A. Since July, 1965.
Q. Could you describe briefly, please, what your
duties are with respect to that job?
A. In general I direct the development of policy to imple-
ment Federal regulations, state laws, co-ordination of laws and
regulations, and I issue this material to the District Offices for
their operation of the policy, that is, in general.
2
74
Q. Thank you. While you have been i
. employed in that capac-
tty his the mamning of the futher of on Hlaghtmams ine te
uf ane ever been made « condition of eligibili ibility for that
Mr. Arcart: I’m sorry, excuse me.
2 ion off the record.)
The Wirness: I believe that at the time of the court injune-
tion, which I think was in 1968 when the — Sa gua
den ok require n mother to name the father, as we had done in a
ew previous cases when we did say it was a condition of eli-
gibility, then it was taken to court and there was an injunction
against this. Then we did not have a correct interpretation or
— 5 ( from the Attorney General's office so we continued to
— — — whee —— for the mother, but not the
, n was from that poi i
roel : — point on it has not
t was in this period I would have to check policy to
99-5 get the dates of when it was a condition of 1
— Q. Did you play a role in the development of that
A. All poliey since 1965, ineludi i
at Uhave played len. including that policy, has been one
. you tell us briefly what role i
development of that specific policy? *
2 for = oe condition Sulity?
policy — ition 2 -
8 f — of eligibility?
I'm sorry, I don't have those dates but a few months prior
to the time the case was heard in court there had been a change
in policy at the direction of the Attorney-General and the Com-
missioner of Welfare, to say that we must require that a mother
name the father of the child. Prior to that we had requested
that she name the father, but if there were some good reason
why the child’s father should not be named we had discretion
not to name the father, not to require the mother to name the
father. Then at the direction of the Attorney-General, the
— issioner followed his direction and we put in the policy
t she must name the father of the child.
Q. But did the Attorney-General request this on his own
8 initiative or did he issue this directive with respect to
making it a conditi igibili
—— — on of eligibility at the request of
75
A. We did not request him. I don’t know the background
and his discussion with the Commissioner at that time.
Q. Subsequent to that was the swearing out of warrants for
the arrest of the alleged fathers of illegitimate children ever
made a condition of eligibility?
A. I would have to check policy. You know, I can’t give a
definitive statement. I would rather not, you know, take a guess
and be wrong.
Q. Are you familiar with Section 52-440b of the Connecticut
General Statutes?
A. Which statute is that?
Q. This is the statute which seeks to compel the mother of
illegitimate children on welfare to name the father of such
children.
A. Yes.
Q. You are familiar with that?
A. Yes.
Q. What role did the welfare policy division play in the im-
plementation of that statute?
A. Well, after discussions on the top administrative level,
after the law was passed, and discussions with the Attorney-
General’s office as to ways to implement the law, I was then
given the direction that we should implement the law.
99-7 I worked, or people under my direction worked out the
procedural aspects of following the law.
Q. But did you play any role in the promulgation of this
law to the Legislature?
A. No.
Q. What was the planned effect of this law on the financial
structure of the Weliare Department?
A. I have no knowledge of the people who wrote the law,
what they had planned.
Q. Well, from the point of view of the policy department of
the Welfare Department, what effect did you expect that it
would have on the financial structure of the Department?
A. I wasn’t concerned with what effect it would have. We
would have to carry out the law so there was no study made to
my knowledge to see what effect there would be.
Q. Has any study been made since to determine what effect
this has had on the financial structure of the Welfare De-
partment?
76
a Not to my knowledge, and I do not believe there has been
Q. To the best of your knowledge did the Department
position with respect to the passage of such a law? en
A. No, not to my knowledge.
Q. To the best of your knowledge is there any statistical data
2 — 7 — —— —
st of collection against the amount of
raised in this kind of a situation? pee eer
8 — to my knowledge.
. Let me ask you, please, some questions with respec
your role in the actual implementation of the statute ine it
had been passed. Do you have with you the pertinent Welfare
Department regulations which were issued in the Welfare man-
ual subsequent to the passage of the law?
A. Yes.
2. — could we enter them as exhibits into the record?
Ves.
(The above-described eligibility provision Child born
of wedlock—was received and intiff’ bit 2
4 — marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2
. When the pertinent new sections of the Welf Depart
are -
ment Manual were added were there any additional instruc-
tions other than those which you have already made an exhibit
which were submitted to the District Offices?
A. There have been two memoranda sent to the District
— ce. One was completely related to the fact that it is not an
0 igibility requirement for the mother to name the father of
the child because in some districts, because of new personnel and
perhaps they are not familiar with policy, they had said that
— she would have to name them. So we sent a memo saying
— — was not a fact of eligibility. “You must follow
Then on another occasion this came to o i i
: ur attentio
= the policy had not been — —
e again said it was not a condition of eligibility and this
—. — it was not a factor of eligibility when the mother
is —.— that she is subject to being cited into court and com-
— 1973 ang te deb murt The latter memo is dated Janu-
12 — memo I referred to is April 12, 1972.
Mr. Arcart: The first one was January what?
77
The Witness: The first one I mentioned was April 12, 1972
and the second one was January 6, 1973.
Mr. Dotan: Could we also have those marked as Plaintiff's
Exhibits 3 and 4?
(The April 12, 1973 memorandum described above was re-
ceived and marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 for Identification.)
(The January 6, 1973 memo described above was received
and marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 for Identification.)
Q. In addition to the printed material which has already been
supplied and marked for identification, were any other instruc-
tions sent down from the main office to the departments with
to the implementation of this statute?
99-10 A. Not directly. I know that when any new policy goes
out, the district is expected to have their supervisory
meetings, or whatever kind of staff development program they
have. They will instruct the workers to follow the policy and
explain the policy. But there were no other specific directions.
They are expected to implement whatever policy is issued.
Q. Were there specific departmental staff meetings organized
at the local level to discuss the implications of this and the
method of implementation?
A. I don’t really know what the districts actually did.
Q. Were there any form letters prepared to be sent to such
mothers as refused to provide the information requested in the
statute?
Mr. Arcart: One clarification. Form letters as to what? You
are talking about any form letter at all?
Mr. Dol ax: No. What I asked was, were there any form let-
ters prepared to be sent to mothers who refused to comply with
this statute informing them of what next steps would be taken
with respect to them.
The Witness: Not from this central office.
Q. Do you know of any which exist on the local level?
A. No, I don't.
Q. With respect to this statute and the implementation of it,
were there correspondences between the Department
99-11 and the Department of HEW?
A. I don’t recall any. When we do issue policy, how-
ever, we send a forma! submittal to them to advise them of the
issuance of new policy, so we would have that kind. But other
correspondence I don’t remember.
„
78
Q. If there had been any such
have ben + Hes — correspondence would they
ither through me generally, or if somebod
m , y else for some
+ *. — be writing, then generally it would be cleared
Q. And you remember no such i icatio
a — a specific commun n?
r. Dot ax: I don’t have any further questi
Mr. Keuty: I would like to ask some questions." 2
CROSS-EXAMINATION
By o KELLY:
d. Does the Department of HEW normall
policy statements that you may submit to them > 9
A. Yes, they either accept it or they don't accept it.
* _ they would send something back to you?
Ves.
Q. And you did not i hi i i
0.10. Aieeme receive anything with relation-
5 A. I would have to check to see.
Q. Would you check on that?
4 ey have to check to see if a submittal has been
Q. jee did you submit it to HEW?
* — — submitted it around the time that it was
Q. -_ when was that?
That was August of 72. Yes, it ffecti
1972 so it would have been sometime * — —— 10
Q. Mr. Dolan asked you earlier about policy that had been
promulgated back in 1968 involving the refusal to grant wel-
ree gg tha a recipient if they didn’t name the father of
— Did you also send those policies in to HEW at that
A. Ves.
0 * ro receive a response to those?
a Pree * — so. I can’t give you an answer unless I
Q. Has the Policy Development Secti i
tion which i
charge of done any studies to show what kind of ——
child can obtain under 54440b. and by that I mean Social
79
Security, Unemployment Compensation and Workmen’s Com-
pensation benefits?
99-13 A. I don't know what you mean by “studies.” We
haven’t had a formal study, but we do know that when
a child has a legal father he can get certain benefits.
Q. But there has been no formal study done to ascertain
dollar amounts that would come to the benefit of the child?
A. That's right. There has been no formal study made actual
dollar amounts study.
Q. And this policy has been in effect since August of 1972?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Is your department, your section of the Welfare Depart-
ment, the one that would normally issue such a study?
A. It would actually be conducted by some other section. If
a decision were made to make such a study, we could partici-
pate in setting up some kind of format for a study, if this were
to be, but we have a Research and Statistics Division that I
would assume would collect data, if a study were set up, and
they would collect the information.
Q. The authorization for a study on the financial impact
of 52-440b, as far as benefits to the child go, would come from
your office?
A. The Commissioner of Welfare would authorize the study.
Q. To your knowledge there has not been any study done?
A. To my knowledge there has been no study.
Q. Just to clarify another point, Mr. Dolan asked you
99-14 if the financial impact of 52-440b had been assessed
by the Welfare Department, and you stated, “No, not
to our knowledge.“?
A. That's correct.
Q. Is any study planned through your office?
A. No, not to my knowledge.
Q. You also mentioned earlier in discussing prior welfare
eligibility standards back in 1968 that there had been a policy
in the Welfare Department concerning when a mother would
not be required to name the father?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Do you remember what those reasons were? You men-
tioned “if there were good reasons.” I think that was your
wording.
A. I don’t remember the exact criteria. I remember it said in
the judgment of the worker, and there were some criteria spel-
80
led out, but I didn’t come prepared to answer that. I would
have to check.
Q. Would you check that also, please?
A. Yes.
Q. Are there any criteria under 52-440b to vest discretion in
the worker similar to that criteria of 1968?
A. Since the law doesn’t give any discretion there is no poliey
for discretion.
Q. Okay. Does your Policy Development Section keep any
statistics involving cases that have gone to court where
99-15 the mother has been compelled to name the father of the
child?
A. There is no collection of any such statistics at a central
location, in my Division or any other, to my knowledge.
Q. So there is no collection of raw data about these 52-440b
cases?
A. No, not to my knowledge.
Mr. Ke ty. I have no further questions.
(Recess. )
Mr. Arcart. No questions.
Mr. Dotan. I would like to ask a few more.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Dotan:
Q. First I would like the record to indicate that Miss Pack-
ard has agreed to provide all counsel of record with the three
following items: Number one, the Welfare Department policies
with respect to the naming of illegitimate children prior to the
court cases in Doe vs. Shapiro and Doe vs. Harder.
Two: All communications and replies between the Depart-
ment and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
with respect to the Welfare Department policies which led up
to the suits of Doe vs. Shapiro and Doe vs. Harder.
99-16 Three: The submittal and replies between the De-
partment and the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare with respect to the policy which came about as a
result of 52-440b.
Mr. Arcant. Let's say this means everything in relation to the
submittal, any reply in relation to the submittal.
Mr. Dotan. Fine.
Mr. Arcart. Can we put that on the record?
81
Mr. Dotan. I think it is. I would like to ask one final
— i i eading up to the
ted that prior to the regulations leading up
3 7 of Doe vs. Shapiro and Doe vs. Harder that there was an
area of discretion available to the Welfare worker, is that
correct?
. That’s correct.
@ Under $2 400 dealing with the compulsion we have —
discussing, does anyone in the Welfare Department at any leve
have the discretion to determine that the mother does not have
ify? f
0 N 1 — to read the law again to make sure which part —
the law is the part where the mother must be advised that —
is subject to be cited in the court because I think—in using the
numbers—I may be confused about what you have been re-
ferring to.
i ion off the record.)
oan — — This is the law that says if the mother
discloses the name of the father, such mother may be — —
appear before any judge of the Cireuit Court and compell
to disclose the name, under oath, but there is no =
rovided for in policy not to follow this direction from the law.
* Q. And that would apply to everyone at all levels of authority
in the Welfare Department?
A. That's correct.
Mr. Dotan. Thank you.
Mr. Arcart. I have no questions.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
By Mr. KELLY:
Q. May I ask one or two more questions? What =e
policy of the Welfare Department prior to alge ag 2
the injunctions against 8 eligibility on the n
child? moug t's
1 Cry — — came at different points in time. .
particular section of citing the mother to appear — ‘ —
judge came in 1971. Prior to that, to my knowledge, : ere .
nothing in the law that read just the way this was. * —
1968 when there was an injunction that said the —
99-18 Department may not make it a condition of eligibi i 4
have the mother name the father. At that poiat when
552-950—74——6
82
the injunction was issued saying that we could
not
her name the father, we did not make her name the 2—
a condition of eligibility. We would ask her if she refused to
name the father. If sh. id, we did nothing, not until the 1971
Legislature said that may be cited into court and
. . 4 com
to testify. We then implemented that law, and although —
not eite her in court, the provisions are made and we supply
her with an attorney so she may defend herself. We have fol-
* 1 law since this policy was issued.
. Let me clarify one thing: Was there a peri
: period after th
passage of 52-440b before you implemented the policy ——
nothing was done if a mother refused?
A. Yes.
Q. And are you also stating that the Welf
are Department
appoints an attorney to represent the mother of the child?
A. We refer it to an attorney who then is the one who, I
“— — the decision of bringing it into court.
E * 1 obviously that attorney does not represent the
A. No, I'm sorry, I used the wrong words.
Q. The purpose of that attorney is to act as an advocate of
the W elfare Department in the Circuit Court?
99-19 — — this is not + understanding. It is not the Wel-
partment who i iri
ä o is requiring her to go those are
2 — her?
. We are not the ones citing her i i
her to name the father. rr
Q. Who is?
A. It is the court tha i
cout 10 4— —— can compel her, that cites her into
ho brings the petition to ask the court to ci
te her?
A. Not the Welf 2 f
— are Department.
A. I don't know who does it.
3 * pays the attorney to cite the woman in before the
A. I think the Welfare Department
te : pays.
4 * So — t —— fair to say then that the Welfare De-
ent employs the attorn
— eno crwth ey as an agent to have the mother
A. I don't think so. We have to follow the law.
83
Q. But you pay the bill for the attorney?
A. That's right.
Mr. KrILx. That's all.
By Mr. ARCARI:
99-20 Q. When you pay the bill for the attorneys that you
refer this matter to, for the attorney to take action
whether or not the mother should be cited before the court, you
pay the bill due to the fact that the mother is on welfare as-
sistance, is that right?
A. That's right.
Q. She has no funds of her own except as Welfare provides
for her?
A. That's right.
Q. Just to clear this thing up a little bit, is it your under-
standing that if a mother refuses to disclose the name of the
father of a child in question—I’m talking about a mother re-
ceiving welfare assistance—the matter is generally referred to
an attorney and it is up to him to take action on the law?
A. That’s right.
Q. Once the matter is referred to the Circuit Court, if it goes
that far, it’s up to the Court to decide whether or not the
mother should disclose the name of the father?
A. That’s right.
(Discussion off the record.)
Q. In reference to Section 52-440b do you have any
knowledge whether or not that applies only to welfare
recipients?
99-21 A. My understanding is that it applies to everyone,
not just recipients.
Q. Therefore, let me know if this is correct or not, a correct
understanding on my part of your testimony, that a mother
who is not receiving welfare assistance can be referred to the
Circuit Court to disclose the name of the father, is that your
understanding of 52-440b?
A. Yes.
Q. And to go one step further, in that latter case I just
pointed out the Welfare Department would have nothing to
do with that type of case because the mother is not on welfare
assistance?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Since the Welfare Department was placed under an
injunction back at approximately 1968 when disclosure of the
PREM Re me
84
father was a condition of eligibilit, Depart
of y, the Welfare
— —— — injunetion, has been following —
e present time, i i
Peg deed amin me, including the law under 52-440b?
Q. One more question. After 52-440b i i
| ‘ came into exist
there a time period that was needed to develop the polie —
implement Section 52-440b? 0
A. Ves, that's right.
* 7 poe * talking about Welfare policy now.
Q. Is that usually the situation, th i
8 N ation, that any law affecting
— — has to have a period of time in order to develop the
8 That's correct.
Io issue it to various districts?
8 That's correet. pi
And when policy is worked u i
’ p under a icular law, i
other words, under a particular welfare law — —
it involve a substantial period of time?
A. Yes.
Q. Depending on what th ?
‘ — l e problems are?
. Correct me if I am wron i i
é g, but in 1971, I be ’
when —— 52-440b came into existence, was — ——
we — time when the flat grant system went into effect?
3 — — — — r it. It took a number of months, over
— ton — = working intensively all during the months
8 Wh “ . 247
dale en you say working on it“, you mean working on
There were many detailed things that had to be
to arrive at a flat — sya
— — system, and the Policy Section was
Q. And did this have a beari
888 5 ng on the work-up or
— — of the Welfare policy under Section 32
2 That's right.
Specifically could that have some
A. That, among other — 1
Mr. Arcart. I have no further questions.
85
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. DoLAx. That's all.
(The deposition ended at 3:15 PM.)
CERTIFICATE
99-24 Srare or CONNECTICUT
County of New Haven, ss:
I, Paul D. Landman, a Notary Public duly commissioned and
qualified in and for the County of New Haven, State of Con-
necticut, do hereby certify that pursuant to notice there came
before me on the 4th day of April, 1973, at the offices of the
State Welfare Department, 1000 Asylum Street, Hartford, Con-
necticut, the following named person, to wit, CAROLINE E.
PACKARD, who was by me duly sworn to testify to the truth
and nothing but the truth of her knowledge touching and con-
cerning the matters in controversy in this cause; that she was
thereupon carefully examined upon her oath, and her testimony
reduced to writing under my supervision ; and that the deposi-
tion is a true record of the testimony given by the witness; and
that the reading and signing of the deposition were waived by
counsel.
I further certify that I am neither attorney or counsel for,
nor related to or employed by, any of the parties to the action
in which this deposition is taken, and further that I am not a
relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by
the parties thereto or financially interested in the action.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
my notarial seal this 17th day of April, 1973.
Paul D. LANDMAN,
Notary Public.
My commission expires:
99-25 INDEX
Page
Direct Examination by Mr. Dolan......-.-++-+++++*: :
1
Cross Examination by Mr. Kelly.
Re-Direct Examination by Mr. D olan. 15
Re-Cross Examination by Mr. Kelly
By Mr. Arcar ii..
86
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
For the Plaintiff:
No. Description Page
2—Eligibility Provision (Child
3—Memo dated April A 1972 — d — ;
HA ny wove soho 2 — 9
Connecticut State Welfare Departmen
Social Service Policies Public —
99-26 {Manual Vol. 1]
ELIGIBILITY PROVISIONS
— —
Child Born Out of Wedlock
P3400
P-3460 Paternity Proceedings
Worker’s Re bility i isti
om poids — — 2 Assisting Mother to Plan for Her
1) Ifshe wishes to keep the child
~ ~ — revere to —— it with a relative
e is to surrender the child for adopti
Mother to Keep Child or Place in — ies
Since both parents are responsi proceed
for establishment are initiated. seth a 2
1. 1 Alleges Paternit
a. e mother is able to discuss her situati
ation free]
— — Mie and names the father, the worker — Ane
poe hard ew 4. child(ren) on the Form W-161
“oe — — is — 9 — tae
ne worker then interviews the father and endea
—— his voluntary acknowledgement of Berend ey
— copies of the form are required). oes
2 * instances the Resource Unit is asked to obtain the
— 3 — 8 1 The executed forms are then
f 83 —
by the liaison worker in ie aa arn —
87
b. If the father refuses to acknowledge paternity, he is ad-
vised that the Department will direct the mother to institute
court action. He is also advised that the Welfare Department is
legally authorized to institute and pursue proceedings to estab-
lish the paternity of any child supported in whole or in part
by the Department, if the mother fails to do so.
e. If an Acknowledgement of Paternity is taken prior to the
birth of the child, Form W-161 is completed and under the
heading “Birth Date”, the words “To Be Born on or About
” are inserted. After the child is born
the father is then requested to execute a current acknowledge-
ment of Paternity Form W-161 listing the name and birth date
of the child. The mother’s signature is secured on the Affirma-
tion of Paternity Section of the current Acknowledgement and
the Affirmation of Paternity is then notarized.
Effective: 8-17-71
99-27 3460 Paternity Proceedings
3460.1 Legal Provisions
1. State law
a. Sec. 52-435a “Complaint” states in part:
Proceedings to establish paternity of a child born or
conceived out of lawful wedlock, including one born to.
or conceived by, a married woman but begotten by a
man other than her husband, shall be instituted by a
verified petition of the mother, or expectant mother with
summons and order, filed in the circuit court for the cir-
cuit in which either she or the putative father resides
„No such petition shall be brought after three
years from the birth of such child, or after three years
from cessation of contribution toward support of the
child by the putative father, whichever is later; pro-
vided the provisions of Section 52-590 of the 1963 sup-
plement to the general statutes shall be applicable to this
section eee
b. Sec. 52-435b “Compelling Mother to Testify” as amended
by the 1971 General Assembly, states
The mother of any child for whom adjudication of pa-
ternity is sought in paternity wr shall —4.—
be prosecuted for any crim! al act abou i
rose’ N t which (1
testifies in connection with such proceedings, 2
any statement prior to such proceedings with re-
spect to the issue of paternity.
e. Sec. bt “Compelling Putative Father to Testify”.
putative father of any child for whom adjudica-
tion of paternity is sought in paternity 4
not be excused from testifying because his evidence may
2 on ineriennste him; nor shall he there-
8 prosecuted for any criminal act about
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