Appendix — Fusari v. Steinberg
Supreme Court brief1975
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¢ABLE OF CONTENTS
. Relevant Docket Entries
. Exhibit B of O-iginal Complaint
. Ameaded Cc mplaint
. Answer to Amended Complaint
. Stipulation to Facts
. Stipulation as to Plaintiffs’ Exhibits
. Stipulation to Depositions
. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 9 (Deposition of Eleanor
. 14 (Letter dated December
. 1S (Letter dated February
. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No
20,
. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 27 (UC Form 45 and
Memorandum dated June 30, 1972)
. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 28b (Letter dated May
19, 1953)
. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 28c¢ (Letter dated November
GD, FURIE ccancccsessevecnsscsseenesseusecnnese- supennaceceoceytttapebers
. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 28d (Letter dated April
17.
19.
21.
26.
27.
i
Page
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 28e (Letter dated May
BR, Sie enincichtcteeateinssnitiiusiinencbanintateptiietishaittaiinniininbbicaiiptie 129a
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 29m (Memorandum dated
I Ui SIIUTI iniiecasiennncunieinsabatiresiinendaialandieneebtiiaben I3la
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 290 (Memorandum dated
PRG BG, Fe iccscecvctncdsccttsisdecivcbsetccetenaninictents 132a
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 31 (Time limitations on
deciding appeals to the Unemployment Compen-
Sation COMMISSION ..................cccccccseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 133a
Piaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 32 (Affidavits and Supple-
mentary Affidavits of Delia Triana and Juan Mi-
RAE TMV ej 5 AES SNES BUA A, 135a
Defendant's Exhibit A (Affidavit of Carl D.
I ck senciictcuhecinticebicirininciceehitlbedaniinsitigiabsiciviakiiininiebion 143a
Defendant's Exhibit B (Affidavit of Petra Collazo). 145a
Letter from Attorney General to Three-Judge Dis-
I Ge erasntinrineastertihnatetiantiancatanuanatiotiiitiinntinaice 147a
Proposed Consent O9der ............ccccccccccceeeeeeeeeeneeeeees 149a
Affidavit of Theodore W. Hatcher ...................000008 150a
Transcript of Proceedings of May 14, 1973
(Proceedings Prior to Testimony of Theodore
Wes Naish ta innchucibineatitinttindalhnddihathiasindincenteanteatiads 1Sla
Transcript of Proceedings of May 14, 1973
(Testimony of Theodore W. Hatcher) ................-:++ 159a
Defendant's Exhibit C (Unemployment Compen-
sation Booklet — “Your Rights and Responsibilities
under the Connecticut Unemployment Compensa-
gy RARE Sake LS Tl Ee Ra 228a
31.
33.
iii
Page
Re RAN GA Sed sR a al tl 25Sa
Motion for Suspension of Injunction Pending
PRD eicigpncsenindiabanbanidavennimenaaaniitsigeahenbisiuisnesitinmunzecs 256a
Court’s Order re Motion for Suspension of Injunc-
tion Pending Appeal..................cccccccccsseeeeceeeeeeceeceees 257a
Court's Order re Motion for Proceeding in forma
PEGE cetetcccctttsctentninnistenseerenctnendiicinictataniineesiiieniinasia 258a
JACK A. FUSARI, Commissioner of Labor of the State of
Connecticut, Administrator, Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act.
Appellant,
LARRY STEINBERG, et al
Appellees.
Relevant Docket Entries
* * * *
1972
6/12 Complaint filed. -
8/ 7 Motion to Dismiss filed.
8/ 7 Motion for Order Determining this Action is not a
Class Action filed by defendant.
9/11 Motion to Intervene filed by Mary Delicato, Dilly La-
Pietra, Margaret Hoadley, Judith Roy, Shirley Gon-
zales and Leo E. Hart.
9/18 Motion to Determine the Propriety of Class Action filed
by plaintiffs.
9/19 Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs filed by Delia Triana,
Luis Rodriguez, Primitivo Comacho and Juan Miranda.
9/19 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Delia Triana,
Luis Rodriguez, Primitivo Comacho and Juan Miranda.
9/19 Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs filed by Jose M. Lo-
pez and Juan Lopez.
9/19 Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Jose M.
9/22
9/25
10/ 2
10/10
10/16
10/19
10/20
10/20
-2a-
Lopez and Juan Lopez.
Objection to Motion to Intervene filed by defendant.
Objection to Motion to Intervene filed by defendant.
Hearing on (1) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss; (2) De-
fendart’s Motion for Order Determining this Action
is not a Class Action; (3) Motion of Mary Delicato,
Dilly LaPietra, Margaret Hoadley, Judith Roy, Shirley
Gonzales and Leo E. Hart to Intervene; (4) Plaintiffs’
Motion to Determine the Propriety of Class Action;
(5) Motion of Delia Triana, Luis Rodriguez, Primitivo
Comacho and Juan Miranda to Intervene as Plaintiffs;
(6) Motion of Delia Triano, et als for Preliminary In-
junction; (7) Motion of Jose M. Lopez, et al for Pre-
liminary Injunction; (8) Motion of Jose M. Lopez, et
al for Preliminary Injunction; * * * (10) Defendant's
Objection to Motions to Intervene dated 9/7/72; and
(11) Defendant's Objection to Motion to Intervene
dated 9/19/72; * * * Decision Reserved on all eleven
motions. Newman, J. M-10/ 3/72.
Motion for Hearing to Present Testimony Regarding
Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Notice of Mo-
tion, filed by defendant.
Hearing re Defendant's Motion to Present Testimony
regarding Motions for Preliminary Injunction. Affi-
davits of D. S. Ballew and Delia Triana, filed by De-
fendant. Defendant's witnesses Mrs. Vivienne Gold-
stein, Mildred P. Cogswell and Carl D. Eisenman
sworn and testified, * * * Decision Reserved. New-
man, J. M-10/ 17/72.
Affidavit of Carl D. Eisenman filed.
Affidavit by Juan Lopez filed.
Application for Convening of a Three-Judge District
Court, filed by plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs.
10/20
10/20
10/20
1l/ 6
11/13
11/13
11/30
12/ 4
12/ 4
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Supplementary Affidavit of Primitivo Comacho filed
Supplementary Affidavit of Juan Miranda filed.
Supplementary Affidavit of Delia Triana filed.
Hearing on Plaintiffs’ and Intervening Plaintiffs’ Appli-
cation for Convening a Three-Judge Court. Plaintiffs
and Intervenors orally withdraw their claims for retro-
activity. Decision Reserved. Newman, J. M-11/6/ 72.
Memorandum of Decision ou Motions to Convene
Three-Judge Court, to Intervene, to Dismiss and for
Temporary Injunction, entered. Plaintiffs’ request for
determination of this suit as a class action will be de-
ferred for consideration by the Three-Judge Court. The
motions to intervene filed by Hart, Gonzales, Roy,
Hoadley, LaPietra, Delicato, Comacho, Rodriguez,
Jose Lopez, and Juan Lopez are denied; the motion to
intervene as plaintiffs filed by Miranda and Triana are
granted; the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied;
the plaintiffs’ motion to convene a three-judge court
is granted; and the intervening plaintiffs motion for
temporary injunctive relief is denied. Newman, J.
M-11/ 14/72.
Intervening Complaint of Delia Triana and Juan Mi-
randa filed. * * *
Motion for Production of Documents filed by plain-
tiffs. ~'
Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Matter in an
Amended Complaint, endorsed as follows: “Motion
granted, absent objection.” Newman, J. M-12/4/72.
Amended Complaint filed.
12/
12/18
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Interrogatories to the Defendant and Requests to Pro-
duce filed by plaintiffs.
Objection to Interrogatories and Requests to Produce
filed by defendant. * * *
Answer to Amended Complaint filed by defendant.
Answer to Motion for Production of Documents filed
by defendant.
Answer to Interrogatories and Requests to Produce to-
gether with documents, filed by defendant.
Claim for Three-Judge Court Trial List filed by plain-
tiffs.
Tapes of Depositions of Eleanor H. Smarz and Com-
missioner Loughlin filed.
Deposition of Eleanor H. Smarz filed.
Deposition of Commissioner Loughlin filed.
Motion to Redetermine the Propriety of a Class Ac-
tion filed by plaintiffs.
Objection to Motion to Redetermine the Propriety of
a Class Action filed by defendant.
Hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Re-Determine the Pro-
priety of a Class Action. Decision Reserved. * * *
Newman, J. M-4/ 18/73.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Redeteimine the Propriety of a
Class Action, endorsed as follows: “Motion referred
for consideration by the three-judge court.” Newman,
J. M-4/ 17/73.
5/14
5/17
6/ 5
6/ 5
9/17
Three-Judge Court Hearing on the Merits. | Plaintiff's
witness sworn and testified. Stipulation to facts filed.
Stipulation as to Plaintiffs’ Exhibits filed. Stipulation
to Depositions filed. (Exhibits 8 and 9) Plaintiffs’ Ex-
hibits | thru 31 filed. Plaintiffs’ List of Exhibits 1-30
filed. Defendant's Exhibits A thru E filed. | Defend-
ant’s witness sworn and testified.
Affidavit of Juan Miranda, Sept. 6, 1972; Supplemen-
tary Affidavit of Juan Miranda, Oct. 18, 1972; Affi-
davit of Delia Triana, Sept. 12, 1972; and Supplemen-
tary Affidavit of Delia Triana, Oct. 18, 1972 to be
marked as Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 32, filed by plaintiff.
Proposed Consent Order filed by Defendant.
Affidavit of Theodore W. Hatcher filed by Defendant.
Memorandum of Decision entered. “This suit presents
the question of whether either the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, or § 303 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 503 (a) (1), requires that recipients of Conn. unem-
ment compensation benefits be afforded a Goldberg v.
Kelly (397 U.S. 254 (1970)) hearing prior to being de-
prived of such payments, etc. ***, we conclude that
the Connecticut System fails to meet minimal due
process standards and therefore must be enjoined. Rule
23 (b) (2)’s requirement are met, and we designate this
a class action. In summary, we find that the “seated
interview” system as currently used for terminating or
suspending the payment of unemployment compensa-
tion benefits does not provide minimal due process
under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. We
accordingly enjoin the defendant Administrator, his
successors in office, agents, etc. from administering
Chapter 567, Conn. Gen. Stat. (§ 31-222 ef seg.) in such
a manner as to deprive members of the plaintiff class
of unemployment benefits without first according
9/25
9/25
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them a constitutionally sufficient prior hearing. This
opinion shall serve as the Court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).” Smith,
C. J.; Blumenfeld, D. J.; Newman, D. J. M-9/17/73.
es
Motion for Suspension of Injunction Pending Appeal
filed by defendant.
Judgment entered that the defendant Administrator, his
successors, etc. are enjoined from administering Chap.
567, Conn. Gen. Stat. (§ 31-222 ef seq.) in such a man-
ner as to deprive members of the plaintiff class of un-
ployment benefits without first according them a con-
Stitutionally sufficient prior hearing. Markowski, C.
Approved: Smith, C. J. ; Blumenfeld, D. J.; Newman,
D. J. M-9/25/73.
Hearing on Motion for Stay Pending Appeal to Su-
preme Court. Argument by Counsel for Plaintiff and
Defendant. Decision Reserved. Newman, J. M-10/ 2/73.
Order entered that the injunction issued by this Court
on September 17, 1973, is stayed pending disposition
of defendant's appeal by the Supreme Court, provided
that defendant file a notice of appeal with this Court
by October 9, 1973, and file a jurisdictional statement
with the Supreme Court by November 9, 1973. Smith,
C. J.; Blumenfeld, D. J.; Newman, D. J. M-10/4/73.
* > * >
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States filed by defendant.
Appeal docketed.
Clerk's Certificate.
Jurisdiction noted.
Order entered granting Motion to Proceed in forma
pauperis.
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EXHIBIT B
Case 1161-B-71 UNEMPLOYMENT
COMMISSION
LARRY S. STEINBERG
Rt. 44, RFD No. | SECOND DISTRICT
West Willington,
Connecticut 06279
045-36-2590
Mailing date
vs. May 10, 1972
THE ADMINISTRATOR
UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION ACT Local office 18
APPEARANCES: Douglas M. Crockett, Esq. for the claim-
ant. Bernard Gerling for the Administrator.
The claimant registered for work and filed a new claim for un-
employment benefits as of April 11, 1971. On November | the
examiner disapproved claims from October 10 on the ground of
unavailability. The claimant's appeal, dated November 5, was
assigned for hearing on December 2, 1971, postponed at the re-
quest of the claimant and held on January 13, 1972 at Willi-
mantic, Connecticut.
FINDING OF FACTS
1. The claimant is a single man 25 years old. He has a
bachelor’s degree from the University of Connecticut. His major
field of study was geography.
2. He worked as an.ironmaker for Scherer Steel Compaay
from sometime in 1969 to May, 1970.
3. The claimant registered for work and filed a new claim
for unemployment benefits as of April 17, 1971. In the interim
after May of 1970 he had been ill.
Sa-
4. On April 26, 1971 the claimant was seated and was in-
terviewed by an examiner who told him of his rights and re-
sponsibilities under the Unemployment Compensation Law, in-
cluding the responsibility to reasonably seek work during every
week for which benefits are claimed.
5. The claimant then received benefits for 26 weeks at $82
a week, through October 9, 1971.
6. On June 29 the claimant was again seated and inter-
viewed by an examinez, who told him to keep a list of places
where he looked for work.
7. On Aveust 24 he was again seated and interviewed by
an examiner who told him he must expend the scope of his ef-
forts to find work, which up to that time had been mainly to
telephone or go to Locals 37 and 424 of the lronworkers Union.
8. On October 27 the claimant was again seated and in-
terviewed by an examiner. He told the examiner that except
for an inquiry at Brand Rex in May, 1971, all his efforts to ob-
tain work had been through the hiring halls of the Ironworkers
Union. In the week ending October 23 he had gone to the hall
of Local 37 in Providence and had telephoned to Local 424 in
New Haven and Local 15 in Hartford. He stated that he would
accept only union work. He is not a union member but can
work on a permit after all union card holders who want work
are placed.
9. The above was summarized in writing and the claimant
signed the information as true and correct.
10. The claimant was not given unemployment checks on
October 27 for the weeks ending October 16 and 23, 1971, which
would have been given to him if his claims had been approved
as they had been in previous weeks back to April 26. He was
told that his checks would be held and that he would get a de-
cision in the mail.
11. If the claimant had asked for an immediate written
decision on the disapproval of his claims it would have been
given to him on that day. This is the policy and practice of the
Unemployment Compensation Department.
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12. Because he did not ask for a writien decision on that
day the examiner mailed him a decision on November | disap-
proving his claims from October 10. From this decision the
claimant appealed on November 5.
13. A hearing of this appeal was assigned for December
2, 1971. At the claimant's request the hearing was postponed to
January 13, 1972.
14. The claimant worked for Trahan Seafoods from No-
vember 22 to December 22, 1971. He was laid off due to lack
of work.
1S. He filed a partial claim for the week ending Decem-
ber 25, 1971 which was paid in the amount of $53.
16. He received unemployment benefits in subsequent
weeks and has continued to receive them to the date of this
finding of facts, at $82 a week.
17. The claimant contends that he had no opportunity to
be heard prior to the stopping of his benefits effective October
10, 1971.
18. Notice is taken here of the policy and practice of the
Unemployment Compensation Department. The policy is never
to disapprove a claim until after at least one seated interview.
At periodic interviews the examiner inquires of the claimant
about any restrictions he may be placing on his availability in
the labor market. The examiner also inquires where the claim-
ant has looked for work. The claimant is informed that the Law
requires he look for work. He is also informed that if he does
not meet the eligibility requirements of the Law he will not re-
ceive checks.
19. This policy and practice was followed with this claim-
ant.
20. The claimant was given not one but several hearings
on his benefit eligibility status. At each of the seated interviews
on April 26, June 29, August 24 and October 27 the claimant
had every opportunity to present information favorable to his
version of the facts in his situation.
21. The claimant's contention that he had no opportunity
to be heard prior to the stopping of his benefits effective Oc-
tober 10 must fall in the light of the facts found. The Depart-
ment’s policy and practice are reasonably calculated to ensure
that benefits are paid when due.
22. It is further found that had he continued to receive
benefits he would not have made any more efforts to obtain
work in subsequent weeks than he had made up to Octoher 27.
23. His failure to make greater efforts to obtain work
than he did make, after having been unemployed for a year and
five months, leads to the conclusion that the claimant was re-
stricting himself to employment as a union ironworker. He
failed to expose himself unequivocally to the labor market and
rendered himself unavailable for work within the meaning of
the Law, because he was not ready, willing and able to accept
work which he did not have good cause to refuse.
24. It is further found that the claimant, during the weeks
in issue, from October 10 to November 20, failed to make rea-
sonable efforts to obtain work.
DECISION
The Unemployment Compensation Law provides, among
its conditions of eligibility for benefits, that a claimant must be
available for work and that he must make reasonable efforts to
obtain work during each week for which benefits are sought.
The claimant, during the period at issue, is found not to have
met this condition. It is held that he was correctly declared in-
eligible for benefits from October 10 through November 20,
1971. The examizer’s decision is affirmed.
THappeus J. PAWLOWSKI!I
Commissioner, Second District
The only appeal from this decision is to Superior Court.
Six copies of such appeai must be filed with the Unemploy-
ment Commission within 14 days of the date of this decision.
Such appeal must state the grounds on which you assert that
the decision is incorrect.
MEMORANDUM
The question raised by counsel as to whether due process
of law was denied to the cleimant by reason of his checks for
unemployment benefits being withheld from him without a hear-
ing, is one of deep interest. Notice has been taken of the policy
and practice of the Unemployment Compensation Department
as being reasonably calculated to ensure payment of benefits
when due. Attention should be given to the phrase any week with
respect to (Section 31-325) Connecticut General Statutes. Bene-
fits are paid or denied based on what happens during a given
week. If a claimant has not met the benefits eligibility condi-
tions, benefits are not due. Only after the week has elapsed can
a decision on entitlement for such week be made. The Depart-
ment takes pains and expends time and energy to inform all
claimants of what their rights and responsibilities are under the
Law. As to the claimant's contention that he was not heard, he
is a college graduate and if he did not understand what the ex-
aminer said to him on four different occasions, he was not pay-
ing attention.
<12a-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
(Title Omitted in Printing)
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Introduction
Plaintiffs bring this suit to challenge several aspects of
Connecticut's unemployment compensation procedures. First,
plaintiffs challenge Connecticut's policy of terminating, with-
holding, or suspending unemployment benefits of persons who
have been determined eligible and subsequently ineligible pur-
suant to an administrative decision without a prior hearing
which meets the due process requirements set forth in Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254. Plaintiffs maintain that this policy,
a*borized by Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-241 and 31-243 denies
Pp fs due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
An.. .ment of the United States Constitution and further vio-
lates the “payment when due” provision of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. §503 (a)(1). Second, plaintiffs challenge ihe “work
effort” provisions of Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-235(a) and 31-236(1)
and defendant's implementation of said statutes on the ground
that these provisions, as enacted and as applied to plaintiffs
and others similarly situated, are unconstitutionally vague, have
operated to deny plainiffs unemployment benefits without due
process of law and as enacted and applied conflict with §503(a)(1)
of the Social Security Act.
1. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others si-
milariy situated, bring this suit to redress the deprivation of
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and by the Social Security Act of 1935, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §501 et seq.
2. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment declaring Conn.
Gen. Stats. §§31-235(2), 31-236(1), 31-241 and 31-243 uncon-
stitutional as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and invalid
as inconsistent with the Social Security Aci, 42 U.S.C. §503(a)(1).
Plaintiffs further seek an injunction enjoining defendant from
-I3a-
suspending, terminating, or withholding the unemployment
benefits of persons who have filed, or will file, valid initiating
claims pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-230, 31-235(1)(3)
and 31-241 without affording said persons a prior hearing which
satisfies the due process requirement set forth in Goldbers; v.
Kelly. (Copies of Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-230, 31-235, 31-220(1),
31-241 and 31-243 are attached to this Amended Complaint as
Attachment A).
3. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Title 28
U.S.C. §1343.
4. Plaintiffs’ action for injunctive and declaratory relief
is brought pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, 28 U.S.C. §§2201
and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of
themselves and all persons similarly situated. The members of
this class are so numerous as to make joinder of all of theia im-
practical. The class is composed of all present and future un-
employed workers in Connecticut who have filed valid initiating
claims for unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-230, 31-235(1)(3) and 31-241 and whose
benefits have been or will be terminated, suspended, or with-
held by defendant pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-241 and
31-243 without atfording said persons a Goldberg v. Kelly prior
hearing, excepting those persons who from time to time exhaust
their entitlement to those benefits by virtue of the operation of
Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-236. This class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticaf, there are questions of law and
fact common to the class; the claims of the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class
and; the defendant and his agents and employees have acted
and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class
thereby making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief
with respect to the class as a whole.
PARTIES
6. Plaintiff Larry Steinberg is a citizen of the United States
and a resident of West Willington, Connecticut.
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7. Plaintiff Cecil Paskewitz is a citizen of the United
States and a resident of Somers, Connecticut.
8. Plaintiff Juan Miranda is a citizen of the United States
and a resident of Bridgeport, Connecticut.
9. Plaintiff Delia Triana is a refugee from Cuba who has
applied for permanent residency in the United States. She re-
sides in Bridgeport, Connecticut.
10. Defendant Jack A. Fusari, sued in his individual
and official capacity, is the Commissioner of Labor for the State
of Connecticut. Under Connecticut Genera! Statutes, §31-1, he
is designated as the individual responsible for administering the
Unemployment Compensation Act of the State of Connecticut.
11. Under the Connecticut Unemployment Compensation
Statute, Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-222 et seq., an initial determina-
tion of eligibility is made after an unemployed claimant files an
initiating claim and a claim examiner determines, pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-241, that the claim is valid.
_ 12. The statutory provisions relating to the initial deter-
mination of eligibility provide, in relevant part, as follows:
Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-230
...+ As used in this section an initiating claim shall be
deemed valid if the claimant is unemployed and meets
oe anetensge of subsections (1) and (3) of section
Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-235 — Benefits eligibility conditions;
qualifications.
An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive
— with respect to any week only if it has been found
that:
(1) he has made claim for benefits in accordance with
the provisions of section 31-240 and has registered for
work at the public employment bureau or other agency
designated by the administrator within such time limits,
with such frequency and in such manner as the admin-
istrator may prescribe, provided failure to comply with
-1Sa-
this condition may be excused by the administrator upon
a showing of good cause therefor; .... .
(3) he has been paid wages by an employer who was
subject to the provisions of this chapter during the base
period of his current benefit year in an amount at least
equal to thirty times his benefit rate for total unemploy-
ment, some part of which amount has been paid or was
earned in at least two different calendar quarters of such
base period.
Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-241 — Initial determination
The administrator, or a deputy or representative desig-
nated by him and herinafter referred to as an examiner,
shall promptly examine the initiating claim and, on the
basis of the facts found by him, shall determine whether
or not such claim is valid and, if valid, the weekly amount
of benefits payable and the maximum possible duration
thereof.
13. After an initial determination of eligibility is made
by defendant, the claimant customarily reports bi-weekly at his
local unemployment compensation office to receive his benefit
checks for the preceding two-week period.
14. Plaintiff Steinberg filed an initiating claim for unem-
ployment benefits on or about April 17, 1971, was declared
eligible and received weekly benefits through October 9, 1971.
15. On October 27, 1971, plaintiff Steinberg reported to
the unemployment compensation office to receive his benefits
for the weeks ending October 16 and 23, 1971. Following an
informal discussion with an unemployment office “interviewer”
in November, Mr. Steinberg was told he would not receive his
unemployment checks.
16. On November 16, 1971 Steinberg received written no-
tice that he was disqualified retroactive to October 10, 1971 for
failure to be “available for work” and make “reasonable efforts
to obtain work”, as required by Conn. Gen. Stats. $31-235(2).
17. On November 5, 1971 plaintiff Steinberg appealed
the termination of benefits. A hearing was held before an ap-
-l6a-
peals Commissioner on January 3, 1972 and the Commissioner
subsequently upheld the termination of benefits.
18. Plaintiff Paskewitz filed an initiating claim for un-
employment compensation benefits in August, 1971, was de-
clared eligible and received benefits until February, 1972.
19. On February 16, 1972, Paskewitz's application for ex-
tended benefits pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-232(b) was
approved.
20. On March 2, 1972 plaintiff Paskewitz went to the
Enfield Unemployment office to collect his first checks for Ex-
tended Benefits and was told that his payments were being sus-
pended or terminated as the Unemployment Compensation
Department had made an error in the determination of his
eligibility. When Mr. Paskewitz inquired as to the specific reason
for this action, he was told that his case was being “investigated”.
21. Plaintiff Paskewitz appealed this termination on
March 2, 1972. A hearing was scheduled in August, 1972 but
was postponed at the request of Mr. Paskewitz’s attorney. The
appeal was heard on October 11, 1972, but to date, the Com-
missioner has not rendered a decision.
22. Plaintiff Triana filed an initiating claim for unem-
ployment benefits on or about June 18, 1972, was determined
eligible, and received weekly benefits through July 8, 1972.
23. On July 27, 1972, Mrs. Triana went to the Bridgeport
Unemployment Compensation office to receive her benefits
checks for the weeks ending July 15 and July 22, 1972.
24. After speaking briefly with an unemployment office
“interviewer”, Mrs. Triana was told that her benefits were being
terminated indefinitely, retroactive to July 9, 1972, because she
had not made “reasonable efforts to find work”. (Plaintiff
Triana’s affidavit, dated September 12, 1972, already on file with
this Court, is hereby incorporated as if fully pleaded herein).
25. On or about August 7, 1972, Triana filed an appeal
on the termination of benefits. Because of the large backlog of
pending appeals, totaling 6,100 state-wide as of August 31, 1972,
-17a-
her appeal was not heard by an unemployment Commissioner
until October 27, 1972.
26. On November 10, 1972, the Commissioner rendered
his decision. The Commissioner's findings of fact included a
finding that Mrs. Triana “was desperate for work and sought
all types of work in the local labor market.” The Commissioner’s
decision was that Mrs. Triana was incorrectly declared ineli-
gible for the four weeks between July 29, 1972 and August 18,
1972 and that she was entitled to benefits for that period. (A
copy of the Commissioner’s decision is attached to this
Amended Complaint as Attachment B).
27. Plaintiff Triana was scheduled to receive the wrong-
fully withheld benefits on November 27, 1972 but on that date
was told that release of the checks had not yet been approved.
28. Plaintiff Miranda filed an initiating claim for unem-
ployment benefits on July 2, 1972, was determined eligible and
received benefits through August 12, 1972.
29. On August 27, 1972, Mr. Miranda reported to the
Bridgeport Unemployment Compensation office to receive his
benefit checks for the weeks ending August 19 and 26, 1972.
Foliowing a brief discussion with a department examiner, Mr.
Miranda was told that he would no longer receive benefits be-
cause he had not made “reasonable efforts to find work”. (Plain-
tiff Miranda’s affidavits, dated September 6, 1972 and October
18, 1972 which are already on file with this Court, are hereby
incorporated as if fully pleaded herein.)
30. On September 11, 1972, Miranda received written no-
tice that all claims from August 13, 1972 were disapproved and
on September 13, 1972 Miranda filed an appeal.
31. A fact-finding appeal hearing was held before an Un-
employment Commissioner on October 17, 1972.
32. On October 24, 1972 the Commissioner rendered his
written deicision and held that during all periods in question
Mr. Miranda had “demonstrated a sincere effort to seek em-
ployment within the meaning of the Unemployment Compen-
sation Act” and therefore was eligible for benefits withheid for
-l8a-
the eight week period from August 13, 1972 to the date of the
appeal hearing. (A copy of the appeal decision is attached to
the Amended Complaint as Attachment C.)
33. On November 23, 1972, plaintiff Miranda received
the unemployment compensation benefits which had been wrong-
fully withheld from him.
34. The weekly benefits of each plaintiff were termmated,
suspended, or withheld without a prior due process hezring
pursuant to defendant's statewide policy, authorized by Corn.
Gen. Stats. §31-241 which provides in pertinent part as follows:
The administrator, or deputy or representative desig-
signated by him and hereinafter referred to as an exam-
iner shall promptly examine each claim for a benefit
payment for a week of unemployment and, on the basis
of facts found by him, shall determine whether or not
the claimant is eligible to receive such benefit payment
for such week and the amount of benefits payable for
such week... .. Such decision shall be final and benefits
shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith unless
the claimant . . . . within seven days after such notifica-
tion was mailed to his last known address . . . . files an
appeal from such decision and applics for a hearing.
35. Plaintiffs Steinberg, Triana and Miranda were denied
unemployment benefits for allegedly failing to comply with the
statutory “work effort” requirements as set forth in Conn. Gen.
Stats. §§31-235(2) and 31-236(1):
§$31-235(2)
An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive
benefits with respect to any week only if it has been
found that...
(2) he is physically and mentally able to work and is
available for work and has been and is making reason-
able efforts to obtain work.
§31-236 — Disqualifications
“An individual shall be ineligible for benefits (1) If the
administrator finds that he has failed without sufficient
cause cither to apply for available, suitable work when
-19a-
directed so to do by the public employment bureau or the
administrator, or to accept suitable employment when of-
fered him by the public employment bureau or by an em-
ployer, such ineligibility to continue for the week in which
such failure occurred and for the next four following weeks.
Suitable work shall mean either employment in his usual
occupation or field or other work for which he is reason-
ably fitted, provided such work is within a reasonable dis-
tance of his residence, and, in determinating whether or
not any work is suitable for an individual, the adminis-
trator may consider the degree of risk involved in his
health, safety and morals, his physical fitness and prior
training and experience, his skills, his previous wage level
and his length of unemployment.
36. Upon information and belief defendant has no written
standards or regulations with respect to Conn. Gen. Stats.
§§31-235 (2) and 31-236(1) and the application of said statutes
is left to the subjective determinations of numerous interview
and claim examiners employed by defendant.
37. The lack of written standards and regulations with
respect to Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-235(2) and 31-236(1) make it
difficult for claimants who are adversely affected by the opera-
tion of said statutes to receive a meaningful, due process appeal
hearing before an Unemployment Commissioner.
38. Conn. Gen. Stats. $§31-235(2) and 3 1-236(1) are vague
and arbitrary and, as enacted and as applied to Plaintiffs and
members of their class, have operated to deprive them of pro-
perty without due process of law.
39. Defendant's policy and practice of terminating or
withholding claimants’ panto Man benefits without a prior
due process hearing and the overburdened appeal process,
operates to deny plaintiffs and members of their class their
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. Said poli-
cy and practice is also in conflict with the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. §503(a)(1) which provides in relevant part:
; : f
The Secretary of Labor shall make no certification o
payment to any State unless he finds the law of such
State, approved by the Secretary of Labor under the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act, includes provisions for
-20a-
(1) such methods of administration as are reasonab/y
calculated to ensure full payment of unemployment com-
pensation when due. (Emphasis added).
40. Plaintiff and members of their class have suffered and
will continue to suffer irreparable injury until the Defendant's
above described practices and the Connecticut Statutes which
authorize said practices are declared illegal and unconstitutional
and are enjoined by this Court.
41. Plaintiffs and their class have no adequate adminis-
trative remedy or remedy at law.
WHEREFORE,
Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated respectfully pray that this Court:
1. Assume jurisdiction of this case and set this case down
for a prompt hearing;
2. Certify, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) F.R.C.P.
that this case may proceed as a class action;
3. Enter a final judgment declaring that:
(a) Defendant's practice of terminating, suspending,
withholding or reducing unemployment compensation benefits
of plaintiffs and members of their class who have been deter-
mined eligible and subsequently ineligible pursuant to an ad-
ministrative decision without a Goldberg v. Kelly prior hearing,
is invalid under the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. §503(a)\(1)
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
(b) Conn. Gen. Stats. §§31-241 and 31-243, insofar as
they authorize defendant's practice of terminating, suspending,
withholding or reducing unemployment benefits without a Gold-
berg v. Kelly prior hearing, conflict with the Social Security Act
42 U.S.C. §503(a)(1) and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and are, therefore, invalid.
(c) Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-235(2) insofar as it provides
that:
An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive
benefits with respect to any week only if it has been
found that...
-2la-
(2) he is . . . available for work and has been and is mak-
ing reasonable efforts to obtain work.
conflicts with §503(a)(1) of the Social Security Act and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore,
inva!id.
(d) Conn. Gen. Stats. §31-236(1) insofar as it pro-
vides that:
§31-236 Disqualifications
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits (1) If the ad-
ministrator finds that he has failed without sufficient
cause either to apply for available, suitable work when
directed so to dd by the public employment bureau or
the administpator, or to accept suitable employment
when offered him by the public employment bureau or
by an osiptoyer, such ineligibility to continue for the
week in which such failure occurred and for the next
four following weeks. Suitable work shall mean either
employment in his usual occupation or field or other
work for which he is reasonably fitted, provided such
work is within a reasonable distance of his residence and,
in determining whether or not any work is suitable for an
individual, the administrator may consider the degree of
risk involved in his health, safety and morals, his physi-
cal fitness and prior training and experience, his skills,
his previous wage level and his length of unemployment.
conflicts with §503(a)(1) of the Social Security Act and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is, therefore,
invalid.
4. Issue a permanent injunction pursuant to Rule 65
F.R.C.P. enjoining defendant, his successors in office, agents,
employees and all other persons acting in concert with them
from:
a) S nding, withholding, terminating or reducing
the Bh ba benefits of plaintiffs and members of their
class who have been determined eligible and subsequently in-
eligible pursuant to an administrative decision without a Gold-
berg v. Kelly prior hearing, and
-22a-
(b) Suspending, withholding, terminating or reducing
the unemployment benefits of plaintiffs and members of their
class on the basis of Conn. Gen. Stats. §$§31-235(2) and 31-236(1).
5. Allow plaintiffs their costs herein and grant such other
and further relief as may be just and proper.
» (Signatures of Counsel Omitted in Printing)
-23a-
ATTACHMENT A
§ 31-230. Benefit year and base period
An individual's benefit year shall commence with the begin-
ning of the week with respect to which he has filed a valid initi-
ating claim and shall continue for the remainder of the calendar
quarter in which such week begins and for the next three calen-
dar quarters, plus the remainder of any uncompleted calendar
week at the end of such period. The base period of a benefit
year shall be the first four of the five most recently completed
calendar quarters prior to such benefit year. As used in this
section, an initiating claim shall be deemed valid if the claimant
is unemployed and meets the requirements of subsections (1)
and (3) of section 31-235. The base period of an individual's
benefit year shall include wages paid by any nonprofit organiza-
tion electing reimbursement in lieu of contributions, or by the
state and by any town, city or other political or governmental
subdivision of or in this state or of any municipality to such per-
son with respect to whom such employer is subject to the provi-
sions of this chapter.
(1949 Rev., § 7503, 1949. Supp. § 631a; 1953, Supp. § 2308c; 1955, Supp.
§ 3068d; 1969, P_A. 700, § 4; 1971, P_A. 835, § 12, eff. July 1, 1971.)
§ 31-235. Benefit eligibility conditions; qualifications
An unemployed individuai shall be eligible to receive bene-
fits with respect to any week only if it has been found that
(1) he has made claim for benefits in accordance with the
provisions of section 31-240 and has registered for work at the
public employment bureau or other agency designated by the ad-
ministrator within such time limits, with such frequency and in
such manner as the administrator may prescribe, provided fail-
ure to comply with this condition may be excused by the admin-
istrator upon a showing of good cause therefor;
(2) he is physically and mentally able to work and is avail-
able for work and has been and is making reasonable efforts to
obtain work.
-24a-
_ (3) he has been paid wages by an employer who was sub-
ject to the provisions of this chapter during the base period of
his current benefit year in an amount at least equal to thirty
times his benefit rate for total unemployment, some part of
which amount has been paid or was earned in at least two dif-
ferent calendar quarters of such base period.
(1949 Rev., § 7507; 1953, Supp. § 2312c; 1955, Supp. § 3072d: 1965, P.A. $50
§ 4, eff. July 8, 1965; 1967, P.A. 790, § 13; 1967 Public Act 790, § 23, eff. July
1, 1967; 1971, P.A. 835, § 14, eff. July 1, 1971.)
§ 31-236. Disqualifications
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits
(1) If the administrator finds that he has failed without
sufficient cause either to apply for available, suitable work when
directed so to do by the public employment bureau or the ad-
ministrator, or to accept suitable employment when offered him
by the public employment bureau or by an employer, such in-
eligibility to continue for the week in which such failure occurred
and for the next four following weeks. Suitable work shall mean
either employment in his usual occupation or field or other
work for which he is reasonably fitted, provided such work 1s
within a reasonable distance of his residence, and, in determin-
ing whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the
administrator may consider the degree of risk involved to his
health, safety and morals, his physical fitness and prior training
and experience, his skills, his previous wage level and his length
of unemployment, but, notwithstanding any other provision of
this chapter, no work shall be deemed suitable nor shall benefits
be denied under this chapter to any otherwise eligible individual
7 refusing to accept work under any of the following condi-
ions:
_ (a) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a
strike, lockout or other labor dispute;
(b) if the wages, hours or other conditions of work
offered are substantially less favorable to the individual
than those prevailing for similar work in the locality;
(c) if as a condition of being employed the indivi-
dual would be required to join a company union or to
resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor
organization,
-2Sa-
(d) if the position offered is for work which com-
mences or ends between the hours of one and six o'clock
in the morning if the administrator finds that such work
would constitute a high degree of risk to the health,
safety or morals of the individual, or would be beyond
the physical capabilities or fitness of the individual or
there is no suitable transportation available from the
claimant's home to or from his place of employment.
§ 31-241. Initial determination
The administrator, or a deputy or representative designated
by him and hereinafter referred to as an examiner, shall prompt-
ly examine the initiating claim and, on the basis of the facts
found by him, shall determine whether or not such claim is
valid and, if valid, the weekly amount of benefits payable and
the maximum possible duration thereof. He shall promptly no-
tify the claimant of the decision and the reasons therefor, which
notification shall set forth the provision of this section for ap-
peal. The administrator, or deputy or representative designated
by him and hereinafter referred to as an examiner, shall
promptly examine each claim for a benefit payment for a week
of unemployment and, on the basis of the facts found by him,
shall determine whether or not the claimant is eligible to receive
such benefit payment for such week and the amount of benefits
payable for such week. He shall promptly notify the claimant,
and the employers against whose merit rating accounts compen-
sable separations due to any benefits awarded by the decision
might be charged, of the decision and the reasons therefor,
which notification shall set forth the provision of this section for
appeal, provided any employer who claims that the claimant is
ineligible for benefits because his unemployment is due to the
existence of a labor dispute at such employer's factory, estab-
lishment or other premises, shall be notified of the decision and
the reasons therefor, whether or not a compensable separation
due to benefits awarded by the decision might be charged
against such employer's merit rating account. The state and
any political subdivision subject to this chapter shall be notified
of any decision on a claim in which it is designated as a base pe-
riod employer. Such decision shall be final and benefits shall be
paid or denied in accordance therewith unless the claimant or
any of such employers, within seven days after such notification
-26a-
was mailed to his last-known address, exclusive of any Sundays
or holidays falling within such period, files an appeal from such
decision and applies for a hearing. If the last day for filing an
appeal falls on any day when the offices of the employment se-
curity division are not open for business, such last day shall be
extended to the next business day. Where the administrator or
examiner has determined that the claimant is eligible for bene-
fits and the employer has initiaied an appeal under the provi-
sions of section 31-242, a hearing shall be forthwith granted
upon the application of the claimant to the administrator or ex-
aminer concerned for the payment of benefits during the pen-
dency of the appeal before the unemployment compensation
commissioner. For good cause shown the administrator or ex-
aminer may allow the payment of benefits, as long as the claim-
ant shall be otherwise eligible therefor, during the pendency of
the appeal before the unemployment compensation commission-
er, and until such time as the said commissioner has rendered
his decision on appeal. No examiner shall participete in any
case in which he is an interested party. Any person who has
filed.a claim for benefits pursuant to an agreement entered into
by the administrator with the proper agency under the laws of
the United States, whereby the administrator makes payment of
unemployment compensation out of funds supplied by the United
States, may in like manner file an appeal from the decision on
such claim and apply for a hearing, and the United States or the
agency thereof which had employed such person may in like
manner appeal from the decision on such claim and apply for a
hearing.
(1949 Rev., § 7513; 1955, Supp. § 3077d; 1957, P.A. 596, § 5; 1965, P.A. 347;
1967, P.A. 790, § 1S; 1971, P._A. 835, § 22, eff. July 1, 1971.)
§ 31-243. Continuous jurisdiction
Jurisdiction over benefits shall be continuous but the initiat-
ing of a valid appeal under section 31-242 or the pendency of
valid appellate proceedings under section 31-249 shall, if the ap-
pellate tribunal has taken jurisdiction, stay any proceeding here-
under, but only in respect to the same period and the same par-
ties, but shall not cause the cessation of payment of benefits as
provided by section 31-242. Upon his own initiative, or upon
application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change
in conditions, the administrator, or the examiner cesignated by
-27a-
him, may, at any time within six months after the date of the
original decision, or within such other time limits as may be ap-
plicable under section 31-273, review an award of benefits or the
denial of a claim therefor, in accordance with the procedure pre-
scribed in respect to claims, and may issue a new decision, which
may award, terminate, continue, increase or decrease such bene-
fits. Such new decision shall be appealable under the provisions
of section 31-242 within the time prescribed in section 31-241,
and where the claimant has been free from fault, a redetermina-
tion or new decision shall not affect benefits paid under a prior
order.
(1949 Rev., § 7515; 1971, P.A. 835, § 24, eff. July 1, 1971.)
-28a-
ATTACHMENT B
Case No. 2671-D-72
285 Golden Hill Street
Delia F. Triana Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604
153 Lewis Street
Bridgeport, Connecticut
SS No. 048-48-0259
vs
The Administrator
Unemployment
Compensation Act
LOCAL OFFICE NO. 2
Mailing Date
November 10, 1972
APPEARANCES: The claimant, together with Mrs. Mar-
garita Torres, interpreter, and Attorney
John Creane, from Legal Services. Mr.
John Blair, Fact Finding Examiner, for
the Administrator.
The ciaimant filed a Total Additional Claim for benefits as
of June 18, 1972. On July 27, 1972, the Administrator disap-
proved all claims from July 9, 1972 to Indefinite. Claimant's ap-
“¥ dated August 7, 1972, was heard in Bridgeport on October
7, 1972.
FINDING OF FACTS
1. Claimant is forty-five years of age, married, four chil-
dren, ages eight, ten, thirteen, and fifteen.
2. Claimant is not employed at present, and is available
for full-time work on all shifts.
3. Claimant uses public transportation or walks to and
from placé of employment.
4. Claimant's husband has a car, worked three to eleven
shift.
5. Claimant has a language barrier and uses her fifteen
year old son as an inierpreter when seeking employment.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMMISSION
. -29a-
6. Unemployment Rules and Regulations were explained
to claimant at interview with Connecticut State Employment
Service, by Spanish Interpreter.
7. Claimant sought employment in the local labor market,
submitted lists of names of prospective employers whom she
had contacted.
8. Claimant was desperate for work, sought all types of
work in the local labor market.
DECISION
To be eligible for benefits under the Unemployment Com-
pensation Act, an individual must make a sincere and honest
effort to obtain employment. Since the efforts of the claimant
for the weeks ending July 15, 1972 and July 22, 1972 were ne-
gligible she was correctly declared ineligible for benefits. Since
the efforts of the claimant during the four weeks following —
weeks ending July 29, 1972 to August 18, 1972, had greatly im-
proved, and as she had exposed herself to the labor market, she
was incorrectly declared ineligible for this four week period.
The decision of the Administrator for the weeks ending
July 15, 1972 and July 22, 1972 is affirmed. For the weeks end-
ing July 29, 1972 to August 19, 1972 the decision of the Ad-
ministrator in denying benefits is reversed.
TimoTuy J. LOUGHLIN
Commissioner
The only appeal from this decision is to the Superior Court
and such appeal must be taken within fourteen days from the
date of this decision. Six copies of this appeal stating the grounds
on which you assert this decision is incorrect must be filed in
this office within the aforesaid fourteen days.
-Wa-
ATTACHMENT C
Case No. 3323-B-72 UNEMPLOYMENT COMMISSION
285 Golden Hill Street
Juan Miranda Bridgeport, Connecticut
749 Hallet Street
Bridgeport, Connecticut Local Oflice No. 2
SS No. 581-64-7882
vs.
The Administrator Mailing Date
Unemployment October 24, 1972.
Compensation Act
APPEARANCES: The claimant, together with Attorney John
Creane, Esq. Counsel
The claimant filed a Total claim as of July 2, 1972. On
September 11, 1972 the Administrator disapproved all claims
from August 13, 1972. Claimant's appeal dated September 13,
1972, was heard in Bridgeport on October 17, 1972.
FINDING OF FACTS
1. Claimant is a married man, aged thirty-eight, with two
children.
2. Claimant was last employed at the Felix Brass Com-
pany for a period of one year and his date of termination was
June 29, 1972.
3. Claimant was disqualified by the Administrator on the
issue of effort.
4. During the eight week period of time in question, the
claimant has sought employment at least twenty-four places
within the labor market.
DECISION
.
The Unemployment Compensation Law provides that to
be available for work within the meaning of the unemployment
-3la-
compensation statute, a claimant must be ready, able and will-
ing to accept suitable employment and must expose himself
unequivocally to the labor market. .
The claimant, during the period of time in question, has
demonstrated a sincere effort to seek employment within the
meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Law and is
eligible for benefits for the period of time in question.
The decision of the Administrator in denying benefits is
reversed.
Peter J. IASSOGNA, Commissioner
Fourth District
The only appeal from this decision is to the Superior Court -
and such appeal must be taken within 14 days from the date of
this decision. Six copies of this appeal stating the grounds on
which you assert this decision is incorrect, must be filed in this
office within the aforesaid fourteen days.
-32a-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
(Title Omitted in Printing)
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
No answer is made to the “Introduction” as no answer
seems to be necessary.
1. The defendant denies that part of paragraph | which
alleges or implies that this is a class suit. The rest of said para-
graph is admitted.
2. Although paragraph 2 seems to be a prayer for relief,
it is admitted solely to the extent that it alleges what the plain-
tiffs are seeking.
3. Paragraph 3 is denied.
4. As to paragraphs 4 through 9 inclusive, this defendant
has no knowledge or information, and, therefore, leaves the
plaintiffs to their proof.
5. So much of paragraph 10 as alleges that the defendant .
was sued in his individual capacity is denied. The rest of said
paragraph is admitted.
__6. Paragraph 11 is denied. (An initial determination of
eligibility is made after a claim is determined to be valid.)
7. Paragraph 12 is admitted except for the implication
that the statutes cited are the sole provisions relating to the
initial determination of eligibility; said implication is denied.
8. Paragraph 13 is admitted except for the word “cus-
tomarily” which is denied.
9. Paragraph 14 is admitted.
10. The first sentence of Paragraph 15 is admitted. As for
the rest and remainder of said paragraph it is denied.
-33a-
11. The date of November 16, 1971 cited in paragraph 16
is denied. The rest of said paragraph is admitted.
12. The date of January 3, 1972 cited in paragraph 17
is denied. The rest of said paragraph is admitted.
13. Paragraphs 18 and 19 are admitted.
14. As to paragraph 20, the defendant has no knowledge
or information, and, therefore, leaves the plaintiffs to théir
proof.
15. Paragraph 21 is admitted.
16. As to paragraphs 22 through 24 inclusive, this de-
fendant has no knowledge or information, and, therefore, leaves
the plaintiffs to their proof. Paragraphs 5 and 7 of the plain-
tiff Triana’s affidavit of September 12, 1972, cited in paragraph
24 of the Amended Complaint, are denied. As to the rest of
the affidavit, the defendant has no knowledge or information,
and, therefore, leaves the piaintiffs to their proof.
17. Paragraphs 25 and 26 are admitted. Any implication
in paragraph 26 to the effect that the Commissioner's Decision
was completely in Mrs. Triana’s favor is denied.
18. The word “wrongfully” in paragraph 27 is denied.
As to the rest of said paragraph, the defendant has no knowl-
edge or information, and, therefore, leaves the plaintiffs to their
proof.
19. Paragraph 28 is admitted.
20. As to the first sentence in Paragraph 29, the defend-
ant has no knowledge or information, and, therefore, leaves the
plaintiffs to their proof. The rest of said paragraph is denied,
as is paragraphs 5, 10 and I! of the plaintiff Miranda's affi-
davit of September 6, 1972 and paragraphs 3 and 4 of his affi-
davit of October 18, 1972. As to the rest and remainder of said
paragraphs of the affidavits, the defendant has no knowledge
or information, and, therefore, leaves the plaintiffs to their proof.
21. Paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 are admitted.
-34a-
22. As to paragraph 33, the defendant has no knowledge
or information, and, therefore, leaves the plaintiffs to their
proof.
<3. So much of paragraph 34 as states “without a prior
due process hearing™ is denied. The rest of said paragraph is
admitted. Any implication in said paragraph to the effect that
Section 31-241 Conn. Gen. Stats. is the only statutory basis for
the defendant's decision to terminate, suspend, or withhold
benefit payments is denied.
24. The word “allegedly” cited in paragraph 35 is denied.
The rest of said paragraph is admitted. Any implication in said
paragraph to the effect that the quoted provisicns of Section
31-236 Conn, Gen. Stats. are the only statutory requirements
pertinent to the denial of benefits to the plaintiffs Steinberg,
Triana and Miranda is denied.
25. Paragraphs 36, through 41 inclusive are denied.
(Signature of Counsel and Certification Omitted in Printing)
-3Sa-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
(Title Omitted in Printing)
STIPULATION TO FACTS
The undersigned parties stipulate and agree to the follow-
ing facts for the purpose of aiding the court in deciding the
above-captioned case on the merits.
1. Unemployment insurance benefits in Connecticut are
paid entirely out of a trust fund maintained solely by contribu-
tions, interest and penalties paid by employers in Connecticut.
If the Connecticut program is in compliance with provisions of
Federal law, the Federal government pays the costs of adminis-
tration. 42 U.S.C. Section 502, 503.
THE DEPARTMENT'S PROCEDURES FOR INITIAL
BETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY
2. In order for a claimant to be found initially entitled to
unemployment compensation benefits, he must meet the require-
ments of various sections of Chapter 567 of the Connecticut
General Statutes. Connecticut General Statutes, Section 31-241
provides:
Initial determination:
The administrator, or deputy or representative desig-
nated by him and hereinafter referred to as an examiner,
shall promptly examine the initiating claim and, on the
basis of the facts found by him, shall determine whether
or not such claim is valid and, if valid, the weekly
amount of benefits payable and the maximum possible
duration thereof.
A valid initiating claim is defined in Connecticut General
Statutes, Sections 31-230 and 31-325(1)(3) as follows:
Section 31-230.
... As used in this section, an initiating claim shall be
deemed valid if the claimant is unemployed and meets
the requirements of sub-section (1) and (3) of section
31-235.
~3%6a-
— 31-235. Benefits tligibility C, onditions; Qualfica-
si ra pe individual shall be eligible to receive
~ st donee to any week only if it has been
hat: as made claim for benefits ; -
a Beng de ae of Section 31-240 and ge
work at the Public yment Bu ‘
reau
other agency designated by the Administrator within
(3) he has been paid Deee
; aid wages by an em
st ss the provisions of this degedenen ‘pa
equal to abirty tanee' i bencitt rate far amount at leas
men . it rate for total u "
anne Part of which amount has been paid or ~-
ute 6. The disqualifications include
limited to, (1) leaving suitable work voluntarily He ee we
= reek wages since the commencement of said prior
poets Piseas an amount equal to at least one-hundred fifty
00) and: (5) Participating or Supporting a strike
_ 4 When a claimant applies for unemplo
. me z
ee benefits, he files a form entitled “New Clane ny
: yeyors Compensation” (Form U.C.-15) and is inter-
neat ra employee of the department. This interview is
necessary to determine, in part, if the claim is a “valid initiating
5. A check of the claimant’ i
‘ANUS Wage credits is then
he department Prior to an initial determination of eligibiline
renee
att
~37a-
The claimant is assigned a day of the week, based upon the
claimant's social security number, to report to the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Office; when he does so the department, if
it has found him to be eligible, then issues a “claim for first
benefit payment” which is signed by the claimant and which
authorizes the first payment of benefits to the claimant.
CONTINUED ELIGIBILITY PROCEDURE
6. Thereafter, claimants who have been initially deter-
mined eligible report bi-weekly to the local unemployment com-
pensation office to file a “Continued Claim for Unemployment
Compensation” (U.C.-46). On the back of this U.C.-46 form
the claimant declares under oath that during the calendar weeks
for which he is claiming benefits he has been able to work,
available for work and made reasonable efforts to find work,
was not engaged in self-employment; did not receive other states
or federal unemployment benefits, and; did not attend school
during the calendar weeks for which he is claiming benefits.
7. Prior to signing any statements that he had made rea-
sonable efforts to obtain work and has been available for work,
a claimant, if department policy has been followed in his case,
has been supplied with a booklet entitled “Your Rights and Re-
sponsibilities Under The Connecticut Unemployment Law.” In
this booklet, the terms “available for work”, and “reasonable
efforts to find work” are defined on page 2! as follows:
“AVAILABLE FOR WORK. You must be ready, will-
ing and able to take any suitable job on a full-time basis.
“REASONABLE EFFORTS TOFIND WORK”. Your
efforts to get a job must be the efforts which a person
out of a job would make if he is sincerely looking for
work.
8. Since June, 1972, claimants have been required to sub-
mit a “Continued Claim Work Effort Information Form”, (Form
U.C.-45) when filing their claim for bi-weekly benefits. This
form is submitted in addition to the sworn statement on Form
U.C.-46 concerning reasonable efforts to find work. '
-38a-
9. At each bi-weekly visit to the unemployment com-
pensation office, the claimant presents completed forms U.C.-
45 and U.C.-46 in the Cluims Line to a department employee
and is routinely given his benefit checks for the two-week peri-
od unless the department employee raises an issue of disqualifi-
cation.
10. If a question of possible disqualification arises the
claimant is not given his benefit checks but instead is referred
to another line for a “seated interview”.
11. After reaching the head of the “seated interview”
line, the claimant is interviewed by a claims examiner. The
claims examiner ascertains from the claimant facts as to pos-
sible disqualification. If the claims examiner determines that the
claimant is eligible, the claimant is referred back to the Claims
Line to pick up his checks. If however, the claims examiner de-
termines that he has not met the statutory requirements, the
claimant does not receive his benefit checks and is told that he
will receive written notification of the department's decision
concerning his eligibility for the weeks in question. This notice
is a letter stating the reason for the non-payment citing a sta-
tutory provision therefor, and informing the claimant of his
’ right to appeal. These letters are sent out under the signature
of the office manager.
12. If a question arises during the “seated interview”
which involves third party information, the department employee
will make an attempt to contact the third party, generally an
employer, while the claimant is present and will take into con-
sideration the third party information in reaching a decision.
However, if the third person cannot be reached at that time, the
claims examiner will proceed to make a determination as to
whether the person will receive benefits for the two-week period.
13. By an Interoffice Memorandum dated April 2, 1973,
procedures were established whereby the Employment Service
office employee who has stated, by memorandum, that a claim-
ant has refused to accept a job referral, is required to be present
when the claimant comes in for his interview. The claimant thus
has the opportunity to confront this person and respond to his
statements concerning the alleged refusal.
-39a-
_ 14. The most common reason for denying benefits to a
claimant who has been initially determined eligible to receive
benefits is an alleged failure to comply with the “reasonable
effort” and “able and available” section of Connecticut General
Statutes, Section 31-235(2). These reasons generally account for
between 60 and 70 percent of the denial of benefits resulting
from “seated interviews”. Other common reasons for denial of
benefits on a continuing eligibility claim include refusal of a
suitable job offer and disqualifying or deductible income.
15. Eligibility is determined on week-to-week basis even
though the claimant may visit the office only bi-weekly. When
a claimant is denied benefits for one or both weeks in a two-
week claims period, the Defendant's written policy is that the
claimant will remain eligible for subsequent time periods so
long as he satisfies eligibility requirements for those periods. In
actual practice, however, some claimants who were found in-
eligible for one claims period and who filed appeals to the Un-
employment Compensation Commission were denied benefits
for later periods on the grounds that “they have appeals pend-
ing”, in violation of the department's written policy.
PARTIES
16. Plaintiff Delia Triana filed a valid additional claim
for unemployment compensation benefits on June 18, 1972 in
Bridgeport, Connecticut, was determined eligible, and received
weekly benefits through July 8, 1972.
17. On or about July 24, 1972, Mrs. Triana reported to
the Bridgeport Unemployment Compensation office to file for
and receive her benefit checks for the weeks ending July 15th,
and July 22nd, 1972.
18. On that day, Mrs. Triana reported to the Claims Line
to pick up her checks. After submitting her U.C.-45 and U.C.-
46 forms, she was told by a department employee that there
was a question as to her eligibility for the two-week period and
that she should get in a different line for a “seated interview”.
19. After waiting in the “seated interview” line, Mrs. Tri-
ana spoke with a department claims examiner who discussed
A0a-
her efforts to obtain work during the two-week period ending
July 22, 1972.
20. The claims examiner, determined that she had failed
to comply with Connecticut General Statutes, Section 31-235(2)
which requires making “reasonable efforts to obtain work”
and she did not receive her checks for the weeks ending July
1Sth and July 22nd, 1972 at that time. At two subsequent bi-
weekly appointments at the Bridgeport Unemployment office,
Mrs. Triana was disqualified from receiving benefits for the
four-week period between July 29, 1972 arfd August 18, 1972
on the grounds that she had failed to make “reasonable efforts
to obtain work”.
21. On or about July 27, 1972, written notice was sent by
the Department to Mrs. Triana in a letter signed by Mrs. Smarz,
the manager of the Bridgeport Unemployment Compensation
office, informing her that she was disqualified indefinitely from
July 9, 1972 because she failed to satisfy the “reasonable ef-
forts to obtain work” section of Connecticut General Statutes,
Section 31-235(2). On or about August 7, 1972, Mrs. Triana
filed an appeal on the termination of her benefits. Because of a
large backlog of pending appeals, totaling 6,100 state-wide as of
August 31, 1972, her appeal was not heard by an Unemployment
Commissioner until October 27, 1972.
22. On November 10, 1972, the Commissioner rendered
his decision on Mrs. Triana’s appeal. The Commissioner's find-
ings as fact included the finding that Mrs. Triana “was desper-
ate for work and sought ail types of work in the local labor
market”. The Commissioner's decision was that Mrs. Triana
was correctly denied benefits for the first two weeks in question
and was incorrectly declared ineligible for the four weeks be-
tween July 29, 1972 and August 18, 1972, and that she was en-
titled to benefits for the latter period. She was paid accordingly
and neither Mrs. Triana nor the Department of Labor appealed
the Commissioner's decision to Superior Court.
23. Plaintiff Juan Miranda filed an initiating claim for
unemployment benefits effective July 2, 1972 in Bridgeport,
Connecticut, was determined eligible and received benefits
through August 12, 1972. On or about August 30, 1972, Mr.
Miranda reported to the Bridgeport Unemployment Compensa-
-4la-
tion office to receive his benefit checks for the weeks ending
August 19th and 26th, 1972.
24. On that day, Mr. Miranda went to the Claims Line
to pick up his checks but after showing his U.C.-45 and U.C.-
46 forms he was told by a department employee that there was
a question as to his eligibility for the two-week period and that
he should get in a different line for a “seated interview”.
25. After waiting in the “seated interview” line, Mr. Mi-
randa spoke with a department c!aims examiner who discussed
Mr. Miranda’s efforts to obtain work during the two-week peri-
od ending August 26, 1972.
26. The claims examiner determined that he had failed to
make “reasonable efforts to obtain work” and therefore failed
to satisfy the statutory requirement of Connecticut General
Statutes, Section 31-235(2), and he did not receive his checks
for the weeks ending August 19, and August 26, 1972 at that
time.
27. On September 11, 1972, written notice was mailed
from the Department, signed by Mrs. Smarz, the manager of
the Bridgeport Unemployment Compensation office, that all
claims from August 13, 1972 were disapproved and on Sep-
tember 13, 1972 Mr. Miranda filed an appeal to the Unemploy-
ment Commissioner.
28. Said appeal was heard before an Unemployment
Commissioner on October 17, 1972.
29. On Octobcr 24, 1972, the Commissioner rendered his
decision and held that during all periods in question, Mr. Mi-
randa had “demonstrated a sincere effort to seek employment
within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act”
and therefore was eligible for benefits withheld for the eight-
week period from August 13, 1972 to the date of the appeal
hearing. The Department of Labor did not appeal this decision
and Mr. Miranda subsequentty received the eight-weeks of
benefits.
30. Plaintiff Larry Steinberg filed a valid initiating claim
for unemployment compensation benefits in Willimantic, Con-
-42a-
necticut on or about April 17, 1971. was declared eligible and
received weekly benefits through Octover 9, 1971. On October
27, 1971, Mr. Steinberg reported to the Willimantic Unemploy-
ment Compensation office to file for and receive his benefit
checks for the weeks ending October 16, and October 23, 1971.
31. On that day he reported to the Claims Line to file for
his benefits but was informed by a department employee that he
should stand in a different line for a “seated interview”. After
discussing his efforts to obtain work with a Department claims
examiner, Mr. Steinberg was informed orally that he would rot
receive his unemployment benefit checks for the weeks ending
October 16, and October 23, 1971 because he had failed to use
“sufficient efforts to obtain work”.
32. On or about November |, 1971, Plaintiff Steinberg
received written notice from the Willimantic Unemployment
Compensation office that he was disqualified retroactive to Oc-
tober 10, 1971 for failure to be “available for work” and failure
to make “reasonable efforts to obtain work” as required by
Connecticut General Statutes, Section 31-235(2).
33. On November 5, 1971, Plaintiff Steinberg appealed the
termination of his benefits to the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Commission. On January 13, 1972 a hearing was held be-
fore an Unemployment Commissioner and on May 10, 1972 the
decision upholding the termination of benefits by the unem-
ployment compensation office was issued by the Commissioner.
The Commissioner's finding as fact included the findings that
Mr. Steinberg” . . . was given not one but several hearings on
his benefit eligibility status . . .”, that he “. . . had every oppor-
tunity to present information favorable to his version of the
facts in his situation . . .”, and that “On August 24, he was again
seated and interviewed by an examiner who told him he must
expend (sic) the scope of his efforts to find work, which up to
that time had been mainly to telephone or go to Locals 37 and
424 of the Iron Workers Union”. Mr. Steinberg did not appeal
the Commissioner's decison to the Superior Court.
34, Plaintiff Cecil Paskewitz filed an initiating claim for
unemployment compensation benefits on August 16, 1971, in
Enfield, Connecticut. On or about October 14, 1971 he was
declared eligible for benefits retroactive to August, 1971 and
received weekly benefits until February, 1972.
-43a-
35. On February 16, 1972, Mr. Paskewitz’s application
for extended benefits pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes,
Section 31-232, was approved by the Enfield Unemployment
Compensation office.
36. On March 2, 1972, Mr. Paskewitz went to the En-
field Unemployment office to collect his checks for extended
benefits and was told by a department employee that he was
no longer eligible and would not receive extended benefits.
37. Mr. Paskewitz appealed this termination of benefits
on March 2, 1972. A hearing was schecluled in August, 1972
but was postponed at the request of Mr. Paskewit7’s attorney.
The appeal was heard on October 11, 1972, but to date, the Un-
employment Commissioner has not rendered a decision on the
appeal.
38. The weekly unemployment benefits of each Plaintiff
were terminated or withheld pursuant to Defendant's state-wide
procedure authorized by Connecticut General Statutes, Section
31-241 which provides in pertinent part as follows:
The administrator, or deputy or representative designated
by him and hereinafter referred to as an examiner, shall
promptly examine each ciaim for a benefit payment
for a week of unemployment and, on the basis of facts
found by him, shall determine whether or not the claim-
ant is eligible to receive such benefit payment for such
week ... Such decision shall be final and benefits shall
be paid or denied in accordance therewith unless the
claimant . . . within seven (7) days after such notification
was mailed to his last known address . . . files an appeal
from such decision and applies for a hearing.
39. The State cf Connecticut does not presently partici-
pate in the Aid To Families With Dependent Children-Unem-
ployed Parent Program. (AFDC-UP).
44a-
By:
By:
THE PLAINTIFFS,
JOHN M. CREANE
285 Golden Hill Street
Bridgeport, Connecticut
Tel: (203) 336-0141
RAYMOND J. KELLY
Tolland-Windham Legal
Assistance Program,
35 Village Street, P.O. Box 358
Rockville, Connecticut
Tel: (203) 872-0553
THEIR ATTORNEYS
THE DEFENDANT,
DONALD E. Wasik
Assistant Attorney General
Employment Security Division
Labor Department (AG-7)
Hartford, Connecticut
Tel: (203) 566-3990
45Sa-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
(Title Omitted in Printing)
STIPULATION AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ EXHIBITS
it is hereby stipulated by and between the parties that the
Plaintiffs’ exhibits Numbers | through 30 described in Plaintiffs’
List of Exhibits, dated May 3, 1973, be admissible, saving any
and all objections to relevancy.
It is further stipulated that xerographic copies of these ex-
hibits may be submitted in place of the originals.
PLAINTIFFS,
By: JoHN M. CREANE
285 Golden Hill Street
‘Bridgeport, Connecticut
(203) 336-0141
RAYMOND J. KELLY
Joun A. DZIAMBA
Tolland- Windham
Legal Assistance
746 Main Street, P.O. Box D
Willimantic, Connecticut
(203) 423-8425
DEFENDANT,
By: DonaLp E. WAsIK
Assistant Attorney General
Employment Security Division
Labor Department (AG-7)
Hartford, Connecticut
(203) 566-3990
-4ba-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
(Title Omitted in Printing)
STIPULATION TO DEPOSITIONS
1. The undersigned parties stipulate and agree that the
Deposition of Eleanor Smarz, (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 9.) February
8, 1973, and Timothy J. Loughlin ( Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 8.) Febru-
ary 8, 1973 reflect Department policy and are admissible as
evidence in the above entitled case.
By:
THE PLAINTIFFS,
RAYMOND J. KELLY
Joun A. DZIAMBA
Tolland-Windham
Legal Assistance Program
35 Village Street, P.O. Box 358
Rockville, Connecticut
Telephone (203) 872-0553
JOHN M. CREANE
285 Golden Hill Street
Bridgeport, Connecticut
Telephone (203) 336-0141
THEIR ATTORNEYS
THE DEFENDANT,
: Donato E. Wasik
Assistant Attorney General
Employment Security Division
Labor Department (AG-7)
Hartford, Connecticut
Telephone (203) 566-3990
Pl. Bx. 9
LARRY STEINBERG, CECIL PASKEWITZ,
DELIA TRIANA, and JUAN MIRANDA
JACK A. FUSARI, Commissioner of Labor
The Administrator, The Unemployment
Compensation Act, State of Connecticut
APPEARANCES:
.
i bans SFORT OVE
-47a-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CIVIL ACTION WO. 15,204
vs. PEBRUARY 8, 1973
MPLOVEENT COMPEN
JOHN M. CREANE
DONALD H. TAMIS, “Esa,
412 East “ain Stre
Pet Ageport, Gelinestieut 06608
RAY KELLY, ESQ.
35 Villaze Street
P. O. Box 353
Rockville, Connecticut 06606
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DONALD E. WASIK, FSQ.
Assistant Attorney General
Labor Department (AG-7)
Employment Security Division
Hartford, Connecticut
Attorney for Defendant
= Poe reo eee
ee ES
Fee +7
{2))
«+++ Deposition of Eleanor H. § » taken on behalf
of the olaintiffs in the hereinbefore entitled action, oursuant
to Rule 30 (a) and (b) (1) and Rule 30 (b) (4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave To
‘ake Depositions By Means Of A Tape Recorder was granted with-
out objection January 15, 1973 by Judge Newman. The deposition
was recorded simultaneously on two tape recorders and this
verbatim transcript was typed by an employee of Bridgeport “eral
Services, Inc., Margarita Torres, who was present at the ta!:in-
of the deposition at the office of Bridgeport Leal Servicer, ine
412 East Main Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut, commencing at
1:45 p.m. on Thursday, February 8, 1973.
OATE AND STIPULATIONS
MR. CREANE: The oath and deposition of
Mrs. Smarz will be administered by agreement of she
parties by Attorney Ira Horowitz, a Commissioner of
the Superior Court.
MR. HOROWITZ: Raise your right hand: Do
you swear that the statements you will give in this de-
position are the truth, the whole truth and nothine but
the truth, so help you God?
MRS. SMARZ: I do.
MR. CREANE: The customary stipulations,
which I'll read into the record, have been agreed to by
the parties.
—
C3)
? TIONS
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and among counsel
for the respective parties that all formalities in connection
with the taking of this deposition, including time, place,
sufficiency of notice, and the authority of the officer before
whom it is being taken may be and hereby are waived;
It is further stipulated and agreed that objections other
than as to form are reserved to the time of trial;
It is further stipulated and agreed that the reading and
signing of said deposition by the witness is hereby waived.
MR. CREANE: (directed to Mr. Wasik) The
" initial questions will be asked by Ray and then I'il
have some questions and then, of course, you have the
right to cross-examinewhen we're through.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KELLY:
Q Mrs. Smare, will you give us your full name and
address, please?
A Miss Bleanor Helen Smarz, 120 Cliff Street, Shelton,
Connecticut.
Q And would you tell us your job and the title that
you hold?
A I'm the manager of the Unemployment Compensation
Department in Bridgeport, Connecticut.
Q@ Would you please tell us how many people work for vou,
2
(4]
-50a-
at the Bridgenort Office?
A At oresent there are 33, plus some that are on loan
from the Connecticut State Employment Service.
© Of these 33 personnel that work in the Bridgeport
Unemployment Compensation Office, how many of them are fact-
finding examiners?
A Te the best of my knowledce I think I have 9 at
present. We've had some changes.
© How many employment security aides do vou have in tae
Bridgeport Office and by that I mean level, one, two and tree?
A I don't, I'm not sure of the levels. I believe that
there are four.
© Of those...
A Wait a minute, I'm sorry, I could have broucht these
figures more accurately with me. We've had some chances that
have taken place, that I'm...
& Would you be able to supply those figures for us?
A I ean very easily if you want them and then you will
have thom accurately.
© Alright. Of the nine fact-finding examiners, or tue
nine people that you said conduct fact-findine examinations, are
they all entitled-is their job Gescription, fact-finding exasiner;
or do they have other job titles?
A At present they all are fact-finding examiners.
re
————s
Cs]!
-Sla-
Q They're paid under that salary scale?
A Salary scale, yes.
Q Of the other 24 employees that work in the Bridgeport
Office Go any of them also conduct fact-finding examinations?
A Om occasions.
Q Under what circumstances would they be required to do
fact-finding examinations?
A If its, if we're under extreme pressure and we have
a large number of fact-findings to do there is some selective
interviewing that they can do.
Q During the past year were some of these personnel
used as fact-finding examiners, over and above the nine that
are Cesignated fact-finding examiners?
A Yes
Q How many?
A I ean't give you the exact figure, but I could obtain
that for you at the office.
Q On a, well, for the purposes of an example. Ona
busy day, how many people would you switeh over to become fact-
finding examiners out of the rest of your staff?
A Well anywhere from say 2 to possibly 6 or more.
couldn't tell you that exactly depending on what the circun-
stances were and where they were needed at the time.
Q@ O.K. Would you explain for us now, how exactly a
fact-finding determination is conducted?
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ESS Oe
A Wow in what instance are you referring to?
Q Say a man comes in who is, or a woman, who is
already been determined eligible and there's a question now as
to their eligibility and this is a non-monetary determination.
What is the procedure that is normally followed?
A If an issue arises, he is seated, he is asked to be
seated for an interview and then he is called, in turn, by a
fact-fincger for an interview.
® What would start in motion the determination that
taere had to be a fact-finding on the person?
A The interviewing that occurred on the claim line, is
that what you are referring to?
Q Yes
A Possibly an issue of availability on the claim line
may cause this. —
© ©.K. Going back one step then. Does normally the
question of eligibility arise when the person goes up to cet
his check?
A. Yes
Q What, does he have to present any form to show that
he has complied with the unemployment compensation law?
A He presents an effort forn.
Q And what is that form?
A That he has made effort to obtain employment in the
(9
-§ia-
the past two weeks. These forms are issued to them each week
when they file and they take it home with them, complete it
at home, and return it with them on their next visit.
Q Is that the form that's known as UC-45?
A Yes.
Q@ And all claimants have to present their UC-45 form
before they can get their checks?
A When they're filing their claim, ves.
Q There is, there. If the line or the number of claimant
that day was very great, is the requirement of presenting the
UC-45 form ever waived?
A Wo.
© It is required in every case before the claim can
be filed?
A Yes.
© Wow the person who first examines that UC-45 claim,
what is their job title and position?
& It would be either an employment security aide or an
em,loy nent security interviewer.
© And if they find some non-compliance or some problem
about availability for work, then the person is directed?
A ‘oe go to the fact-finding to have a seat.
© And what occurs during the actual fact-finding pro-
cedure?
tum Paes
(8)
-Séa-
A The fact-finder will call then to the desk, reviow
whatever the issue is and discuss the circumstances with them.
2 If the issue involves the failure to make a reason-
able effort to find work, how will the fact-finder ceterminc
whether there has been compliance or not? What standards, or
guidelines does he use?
A Well, each case has to be handled on its own merits.
Ané they have to take into consideration the individual taat
they are interviewing. It's difficult to establish this witout
a specific case. Do you want to cite a case for me and perhaps
I can--
© If we could use a hypothetical case, where a man has
filled out six places on his UC-45 form and there is some questi
in the employment security aide's mind whether or not these
might have been the same places that he went to the week bcfore,
or whether she's seen these on his previous UC-45 forms, what
would the fact-finding examiner look for to determine the
validity of the search for employment by the claimant?
A Well they take into consideration the man's skills,
the type of work he's seeking, his availability, the hours that
he's available for work and his, the actual contacts that he's
made to get the job. If it's a repeated effort, he would be
asked, why. This is not always considered unreasonable. The
man may be asked to return to this place at a specific time and
(9)
-5Sa-
this is all taken into consigeratics a *s on this basis that
the bene*its would be either approved or denied.
Q Would there be any checking by the fact-findirg de-
terminer to see if the person did go to where they said?
A There may be, yes. If they stated they filed applica-
tions and this occured at an interview and to determine whether
or net it's valid, they may contact the employer to find out
what actually occurred.
Q Would that be, would that contact occur while the
claimant was there, being interviewed?
A Yes, if its nossible for the interviewer to contact
the employer at that time. Sometimes they can't reach the
employer at that speeific time or there may be extreme pressure
and they can't reach the employer. They haven't the time to
contact the employer so it would be delayed.
Q If a question of eligibility still arises and the
employer is not able to have been cortacted, will the man
receive his benefits for that week if there's still a question
in the fact-finder's mind?
A Oh, he may or may not depending on what the other
circumstances there are involved, in a situation. I couldr't
answer that with a direct yes or not. Let me say this, that in
many instances, the claimant is given benefit of the doubt. but
to say, you know, it's difficult to give you a direct yes or no
answer ia any of these instances because I don't know the exact
circumstances of the case.
Ve}
noon or the next day?
Q If a claimant came in with only three jobs that he
had applied at, and a determination was made by the fact-finder
that this was not sufficient effort to find work and the
claimant said that he had a person who is not with him at the
present time, who could verify that he had been to three other
places, would the man be entitled to his check in that instance;
or would his check be withheld until he produced the other
evidence?
& In all probability it may be withheld until he pro-
duced the other evidence.
@ Would the man have to wait until the next two-week
eligibility?
A Oh no. As soon as he produced the evidence.
Q He coule bring, if he got the individual that after-
A That's right. Now if he knew of the Places that he had
been and he has spoken to someone at these places, it wouldn't
be necessary for him to bring the person, because if they could
verify it they would. In some instances it will expedite it
faster if they present the person if they can do it.
Q Are some claimants chosen for fact-finding interviews,
on a random basis, being taken out of the claim line?
A On what basis do’ you mean that?
Lv]
-S7a-
9 Is there a periodic redetermination by the Unemploy-
ment Compensation office of people in the benefit line, the ones
that are waiting on line to get their checks?
A You mean do we pick specific ones out to interview
at a time?
Q Yes. Are there any standards that are applied. Do
you pick cut every seventh individual?
A On, no.
® Do you have any guidelines that require you to re-
determine certain individual's eligibility?
A ‘ot, oh it's difficult for me. I don't understand
wnat you mean.
© Would you redetermine, would you seek a redeterminatio:
on specific individuals every two months?
A Depending on what the circumstances are and thcir
availability. Well let me cite an example. I may check on a
woman's availability for employment, say if she had several
children and there's a, and she may have babysitting problems,
something to that effect, more often than I would on an in-
dividual who is laid-off for lack of work and was seekinr
continual work and there is definitely no problem on his availabil
ity for employment. Is that wnat you mean?
La]
Q Yes.
A That's what you're referring to?
Q Yes. but also will there be a closer scrutiny of
claims that have continued over a longer period of time?
A There might be, trying to determine as to why this
individual is having more difficulty obtaining employment than
someone else.
© Are there any regulations, guidelines or standards
that require a periodic redetermination of long-term claimants?
A Nothing definite, No.
Q Wo regulations that you could say, regulation B?
A There is an old DM memorandum that we had several
years ago that we use to refer to, but that more or less is
for periodic re-interviews. But that more or less has gone by
the board. We use it occasionally as a sort of a general cuide-
line.
Q Therefore, is it your statement that there is not
any set standard of redetermination for claimants?
A Well during periods.. Policy will determine more or
less how we will interview the claimants. We will receive a
policy or an instruction from Hartford as to what we are goinz
to Go. It would be Hartford that would determine it to a certain
extent.
[3]
-59a-
Q Is there any policy in the Bridgeport Office that
every tenth or twentieth claimant is eligible for, I mean, is
required to be redetermined by the fact-finder?
A Every tenth or twenieth claimant?
© This would be left up then to the discretion of the
Employment Security Aide who reviewed the UC-45 form when the
claim was presented?
A Each case is handled individually on its own
individual merits.
Q And you testified earlier that all claimants have to
have their UC-45 slips checked before they can receive their
benefits?
A Yes they all present one when they're filing for
benefits.
Q Mrs. Smarz, something I neglected at first. How leon
have you been the manager of the Bridgeport Office?
A I became manager, December 1, 1971.
© How lore have you worked for the Unemployment Con-
pensation?
A I started in 1945. I worked until June, I belicve,of
1946. I was terminated temporarily came back in 1947, went on
active duty during the Korean conflict and returned after that
and worked for the State ever since.
Q Have you always worked in the Bridgeport officc?
A No.
aes
ua
=——_—, eS =
% What other offices have you worked?
A Well for a short period, I worked in the Ansonia
office. That was for a very short period of time, way back in
the 1940's. I managed the Norwalk office from, I believe,
August of 1962 until May, I think, or June of 1970. ‘then I
became manager of the Stamford office, then transferred to
Bridgeport. I'm not sure of the exact dates but that's about
the length of time.
© Se your managerial experience has been both in Pride;
port and in Stanford?
A And in Norwalk.
© And in Norwalk. Did you hold other positions below
that of manager when you worked in the other offices and even
in the Dridsevort office?
A Well in the other office for the short stay. On,
well I was also in New Haven. I was a claim-examiner at that
time. I was a super-claims examiner, a fact-finder and a
Supervisor while in the Bridgeport office.
© You testified earlier that some times personnel of
the department other than fact-finders will be called unon to
do fact-finding examinations or determinations when there is a
need. Do you ever do fact-finding determinations?
-6la-
At present?
Yes.
> DOD >
Once in a great while.
Q Do you review the fact finding determinations made
by your fact-finders?
A My supervisor usually reviews all the cases that xo
on appeal or any case that one of the fact-finders will reouest
and on occasions I will review also.
© You said your supervisor. Is there another manager?
A I have an assistant manager in the Bridgeport office
who is in charge of the fact-finding.
Q But he is under your authority?
A Yes.
@ So he would be the one. Does he review all fact-
finding determinations?
A Wot all fact-finding determination, no.
Q Is there any criteria by which a fact-finding de-
termination is review by a supervisor?
A No there isn't. On occasions when a situation will
arise where we will do a review of certain instances or certain
issues in your fact-finders records.
that they would understand policy. And if there is any question-
able case or a case that is going on appeal or dispute, if we ha
some issue involved, it would be reviewed.
blems that occur in the office we'll forward a report to the
Cases are reviewed to see
If we have any pro-
[teT
a
-62a-
adjudicat‘onunit in Hartford for a decision.
Q Does your fact-finding supervisor ever overturn
Cecisions by the fact-finder?
A Yes
® Is there any criteria or standard for that?
A Well, I think the main issue would be that there was
some misunderstanding on the policy and he felt that the
examiner was making the wrong decision.
O Supposing the converse that there was a claim Jound,
& Claimant found eligible. Are there ever times when the
ciaimants, when a fact-finder determination would be overturned |
by the supervisor, on a finding of eligibility?
You mean to make him ineligible?
Yes
There may be an instance. ,
an >} DY
But it, it was your testimony previous that it's not |
normally the procedure to review all fact-finding determina Lone’
& It's impossible. |
© Do you have any bi-lingual fact-finders in the
Bridgeport office?
A Xo. Do you mean that would speak other than Un=lish?
2 Specifically, Spanish-speaking fact-finders?
A I have one young man that's attending school now
Studying Spanish. I don't know if the others have are able to
o« ~~
ee
= ~
ae
-HiAa-
speak other languages besides Cnalish and understand it.
© Is there any provision made that if a fact-findin:
determination is required in a case for a person who does not
speak Enclish, that a translater will be provided by the De-
partment?
A For Spanish-speaking people I have two employment
security aides that speak and understand Spanish, and they've
been used for translating.
© However, they do not do the fact-finding themselves?
A They do not do the fact-finding. ‘hey come into the
back field and they will translate, both to the claimant and to
the fact-finder. I have one or two people, I believe, that can
speak some Italian. ‘hon the issue arises they can hely. I
myself can speak Ukranian. Well, not that fluently, i taxe it
back. And sone Polish, but enouch to understand the individual |
or so that they can bring semeone with them on their next visit
to help them in internreting. "t has always been my policy, the
policy of the Department, to try to assist these peonle when
they come into the office. Unfortunately, we cannot provide
enourh intervreters for them, but we do try to make arranctements
for them if at all cossible to bring someone with them. Some-
times there in a claimant that's available and is filing for
benefits too. They will assist you. People are very cooncrative
in thet manner, in trying to help one another and we try to helo
then.
ee J
[al
—= SS
Q Mrs. Smarz would you please explain what is the
practice and procedure followed in employing a pre-termination
hearing by the office. What sets it in motion and what exactly
is it?
A A predetermination hearing is done in reference to
& separation of employment, is that what you're referring to?
© Yes, excuse me. The redetermination hearing we're
talking.. The pre-termination hearing, not re-deternination,
unless our terms are somewhat different. In a pre-termination
hearing, after a person has been found initially eligible, what
exactly is the practice or procedure that is followed, and when
aid this type of hearing start?
A Are you referring now *o separation, to refusals of
referral by the Employment Serv‘ve?
© Yes. '
A That type of hearing?
Q Yes, and what other circumstances would necessitate
& pre-termination hearing?
A Well there are, if @ claimant reports to the office ani
files a claim and is separated from employment for other tan
lack of work and it's determined by the reason for separation,
that a hearing must be scheduled for the employers involved. !
— |
ER ee ee
(79)
He is at that time notified and we have what we call @ pre-
determination hearing form, which is mailed to the employer with
a supplementary fact-finding report and a slip is given to the
individual, scheduling him for a hearing and a time that he will
report and the separation from employment be discussed at that
time.
© Do pre-determination hearings ever occur after a
person has been found eligible for benefits and has berun to
receive checks?
A If there, now lot me see if there is an instance.
I'm trying to think. Now if a claimant refuses * referre) by
the Employment Service, and it is determined that a hearine is
necessary, at that time there is a hearing scheduled. A Foute
Slip is received from the Employment Service, and we send to the
individual a hearing notice scheduling a hearing for him to cone
in ond the hearing notice explains what the situation is. That
there is a hearing scheduled ‘or him and he reports at that time
and we have a hearing regarding the separation or the refusal of
referral, I'm sorry.
Q O.K. Dealing with a specific tesue of refusal to o
certain referral. Until such time as a pre-determination
hearing is rendered, is the man or woman still entitlec to
collect denefits?
_-
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!
|
A Yes, I dDelieve so. The, he is receivine hi- i]
We are notified by the Eaployment Service that he has refused
a referral and we immediately notify him to report for a
hearing by a five-day period.
Q What form does this pre-determination hearinr tac,
is it the same as a fact-finding?
A Yes, it's a fact-finding. It's a fact-findin= inter-
vier.
© Is there the necessity to check third-party
information, not present when the hearing is goin on?
A Well there may be if the individual disnutes the fact
that he did report on this specific referral. And then if the
employer contact is made and it's determined that the todividual
was there and some error, we were notified that he fa‘led to
report, that would be your third party. If he was there and
the jJoD wasn't suitable for him then perhans the claim for
benefits are paid. But, that would be your third party.
Sometimes there may be a cuestion arising where they have to
contact the Employment Service interviewer that made the route
slip.
mee oe ee ewe owe ee ee eww
Q If there is a conflict between the statement of the
claimant and the statement of the party that the claimant was
referred to, how does the person who hears the pre-detcrmination
hearin, how do they render a judgement?
[3]
7a-
A Only on the facts that they have before them, to
determine whether they can approve or deny.
Q@ But if for example, a man claims that he went to the
place, the job that he was referred to, and that they told him
that no jobs were available, later on a call comes in from that
employment, that possible place of employment, stating that the
man was never there. After an initial check, the man claims
that he went there but they didn't take his name down and they
possibly forgot him. Is there any standard or guideline?
A Yes. Very often an individual, if he has been to this
place can describe some conversation or some individual that he
saw there and he's given benefit of the doubt on the basis that
he was there.
Q How long have these pre-determination hearing been
in effect?
A I @on't remember exactly when we started using then.
Q Is it, are they fairly recent? Within the last two
years?
A Por separations, I believe they've been, well since.
Do you know, Mr. Wasik? I'm sorry. I have to direct it to hin.
Was it about June of 1970 that we went in for pre-determination
hearings on separations and then at a later date on the refusals
of a route slip from the Employment Service? The exact date I
can't tell you. I would almost say, I'm trying to think now.
>) i ed el
[aa]
© This isn't a long-standing practice that's been in
effect for, like ten or fifteen years?
A No, definitely not. No this all stems from Java.
Q Alright. o.k. Thats..
A That's what you want?
.
tion hearings?
A I don't understand.
What employees are eligible to handle pre-dctermina-
Q Ape there situations, as with the fact-findin-,
where the employment security aide would be able to do a ore-
Getermination hearing?
A An employment security aide?
Q Yes.
A There may be an instance where they may do it, tut
its doubtful.
Q In other words, normally an employtent security atce,,
either of level one or two, would orobably not do a ore-
determination hearin«?
A That's right.
® Normally then would it be the practice that only an
employment security aide number three, one with experience,
might be called upon to do a pre-determination hearinc?
i A A
oe oe ee
——
No, its.
Is it rather unlikely?
A It's unlikely, unless there is an extreme emerrency.
But it's unlikely.
Q Is the level of expertise and knowledge required for
a pre-determination hearing, higher than for a fact-findtar
determination?
A Well, they have to be. I would say so.
© rat there is the necessity of a hisher expertise
for that type of pre-determination hearing?
A Yes.
Q Mrs.
—< ee a
Smarz, is the manual that entitled Unemloyrens ;
Cc nsat! t used by the versonnel in your office? |
I'm referring to that yellow paperback pamphlet that was..
A Yes.
Q That is used. Is that available to all fact-fincers |
and redetermination, veople who handle redetermination hearinss,
pre-determination hearings?
A Under the UC law they are availabic.
Q Does each fact-finder also have a copy of the
Interoretive Direst on court decisions?
A I have a master copy in the office that's accessible |
te everyone. '
Q So there's only one copy in the office?
nthe 4
[24]
A I have one copy.
© Do you all, does your office also have a copy of the
cCiaims policy letters?
\ Yes, fact-finders have copies also.
O The fact-finders each have individual copies?
A&A Yes, I believe they all have copies. We try to
obtain one for everyone.
® And the two booklets that have both the unemployment
compensation laws, and the one, the yellow one, with the
vezulations are also contained by, are also kent by the fact-
findins?
A They should each have one. I would say that.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. CREANE
Q Mrs. Smarz, you indicated that when you have a heavy
backlog of fact-findin~ decisions to make that you're forced to
use persons in the office other fact-finders. Would those be
employment security aides, more exnerienced ones?
A Do you mean employment security aides or do you mean
employment security interviewers?
Q Well, what is the distinction?
A An employment security interviewer is the title of.
The employment security aides are a group of people that were
[as]
|
-Tla-
appointed < believe, within the past two or three years and they're
GS D1, 2, and 3. Now employment security interviewers were
formally known as claims examiners and their titles were chanzed
to employment security interviewers. Wow there were also what
we had, intermittent claims examiners which were our part-time
people.
© Alright, well suppose you, I'll just let you answer
the question. Which of those persons, from which of those
groups, would do, be pressed into fact-finding service if there
was a large backlog?
A Employment interviewers, some of the intermittents.
Q Would be intermittens claims?
A Claims interviewers, with experience; mood experiences
the claims examining and possibly even an employment security
aide, if necessary. But I can't recall ever needinz to use
them, although I have asked them if they were interested, they
can do it.
Q When a person who has been initially determined
eligible and is receiving benefits goes into the office on a
regularly scheduled bi-weekly appointment, when they =o, who
do they show their UC-45 form to? Is it a claims' interviewer,
| or an employment security aide?
[ze]
-72a-
A Either one who is operating that particular claim
line.
So they, their work is interchangable at that point?
Yes.
Q Is it possible for a person to collect 26 weeks of
benefits which is the maximum under law right now. Is it
possible for him to receive 26 consecutive weeks without a
redetermination being made as to his eligibility, so long as
at none of his appointments was any question raised by an
employment security aide or the claims interviewer that weuld
require him being referred for a fact-finding?
A Yes.
Q@ So there's no procedure for periodic redeterminations
of individuals who are collecting benefits?
A io.
© Did every person who applied at the Bridgeport
unemployment office during June, July and August of 1972
receive a benefit rights interview?
A No, I couldn't say they dic. Not every person, no
I wouldn't say that.
Q In fact, wasn’t there a memorandum sent to the office
managers in October, indicating that, now that the rush was over,
or the heaviest load of work during the Summer, that it was
exnected that everyone would now receive a benefit rights inter-
view? I'm referring, I can show you the memorandum. It says,
“Memorandum To All UC Staff Members And Local Office Managers”
[37)
-73a-
dated October 5, 1972, signed by Mr. Hatcher. Do you recall
receiving that memorandum?
A I probably have it in my file.
Q So apparently when there is a heavy influx of new
claimants or very large list of continuing claimants, it's not
always assured that a person will get what you term the benefit
rights interview?
A That's right. It's impossible. We're not staffed
sufficiently to be able to handle all of that, to do it all.
Q How many employees approximately did you say, are
employed there now?
A I have, I think its 33 or 34, I'm trying to determine
because we lost one or two.
Q Do you recall approximately how many employees there
were six months ago, and a year ago? Whether there were more or
less?
A Oh there were more. And I think we had a staff of
anywhere from 40 to 44, intermittents included in that group.
Do you have any intermittents examiners now?
No intermittents working now.
They've all been laid-off?
> DBD > DOD
Yes.
[38
]
-7ée-
© You indicated that either a pre-termination or nre-
determination hearing, in any event, a fact-finding hearin;r is
given when there is an issue of a person refusine a referral by
the Employment Security Division?
A Yes.
Q Are there any other type of circumstances where this
type of hearing would be given before the person's benefits
were terninated?
A ‘Yell is they are seated for an interview and there is
some gGuestion that's goint to arise we ask them if they want to
have the interview then or if they want to, would like to save a
nearine scheduled. We zive them that option.
© But if they choose to have a later hearing, they would
not get...
A They woulé schedule another nearine for then.
© Whey would not get their benefits in the meantime, T's:
sorry, I didn't hear the answer?
A No.
Q When a hearinr is given involving a referral or refusal
of 2 referral by the Employment Division, that would involve
a@ cuestion of whether the applicant or the Claimant had ‘n
fact refused it, whether it had in fact been offered, wheter
in fact he had a valid reason for refusing it if indeed
he did refuse it. Are any
-1$a-
of these issues ever involved on a, when a fact-findine decision
is made that a person had not used reasonable efforts to find
work, would any of these factual issues ever be present in that
type of cases?
A I don't understand what you mean. Our issue at and
4s the fact that he refused a referral.
© Right. In that case, he is generally given notice anc
a: opportunity to have a hearing and to present evidence if he
chooses to vefore the decision is made?
A Yes.
O On the reasonable effort fact-findinre decisions, those
are generally conducted the day that the person comes in to pick
un their check. Isn't it true that in some of those cases,
nie will be factual issues involved, such as whether or not
the man had in fact gone to several places that he had liste
on the UC-45 form?
A Yes.
Q In those cases. you indicated that the fact-finder
would try to confirm whether in fact he had rone to the places
he listed or stated that he went to, but it wasn't always rossibl):
to reach the employer. Isn't that correct?
A Yes.
© And that “he fact-finder would make his decision based
on facts that he could confirm on the spot. What I am askin= you
(271 |
ec oer
Le!
-76a-
is whether or not you see any significant difference between
factual issues that might be involved in the reasonable effort
decision, as opposed to factual issues that might be involved
in a refusal of referral by the employment service. In other
words why are hearings given before the perron is terminated
on refusal cf referral by Employment Service but not on reason-
able effort issues?
A I can only say it's been procedure.
& On the issue of the reasonable effort to obtain work,
which “ir. Kelly went into, some of it, when he was questionins
you earlier, I'd like to go into that in some more detail. ‘os
your knowledge is the statutory requirement of reasonable effort
snecifically defined in any department written rerulation or
policy letter?
A Ho, not. You mean like a number, so many contacts is
considered reasonable effort or what have you. No, not to my
xnowledze. It's,each effort case is handled by its own in-
dividual merits.
® You indicated that,what I'd like to ask you, you
talk to your fact-finders, do you not, when you are training them
before they begin their duties?
A Yes.
GH)
-?7a-
Q@ And I assume you would have periodic meetings to
go over new regulations or policy letters you might get. You
also indicated that occasionally you give, or sometimes you «ive!
the benefit of the doubt to the claimant when there is a question
of whether he had made reasonable efforts. Is there any sincle
standard that is used by the fact-finding examiners on decidinn
one way or the other, on whether the person gets their benefits?
A You mean on giving them benefit of the doubt?
Q Are they told that they are to apply « specific
standard, such as the person gets benefits if they have 4 reasons
able doubt that the person had not made sufficient efforts? Is
there any type of standard, a single, uniform standard that they
are asked to apply, when they have a doubt in their mind?
A It all depends on why there is any doubt in their
mind as to whether they had made a reasonable effort. o,
there's, I'm sorry I don't understand you. If its handled on
its own individual merits and there is some doubt as to why,
as to whether or not this individual should be paid, then the
doubt would either stem from the fact that the individual doesn't
understand the eireumstances or there is somereason why he
nasn't looked for work, which may create an issue of availability!
Or there may be an issue that possibly he had a job pendine and |
it didn't materialize for him and if this could be verified, co
be given benefit of the doubt and paid benefits. it's so senera),
(321
at
==.
=
It's dirficult because everythine is handled on,each case varies.
© ‘That's true. And isn't it true that, et least in
some cases, the identical set of facts presented to the nine
eifferent fact-finders who are emnloyed rieht now, that there
might very well, on questionable cases, there micht very well
be a different decision reached by different fact-finders ?
A ‘Snere might be.
9 Are you familiar, ‘rs. Smarz, with a policy letter,
whieh i'll show vou in a moment, I believe the date of it is
1956, relating te the statutory requirement of reasonable efforts
to obtain work. I'll show it to you and ask you if you are
familiar with it?
A I'm familiar with it.
and re-read them and review them.
Every so often I take them
© Yor the record I'm referring to a “Disputed Clains
Policy Letter", with the identifvine number SRU,A60H directed
to all unemployment compensation manarers signed by Ceorre
Walker, Director. The date of the policy letter is October 22,
1956 and the policy letter attempts, does it not, to define what
constitutes reasonable effort?
A That's it's not a hard and fast rule, yes.
© Now this policy letter indicates a number of variables
or factors that might influence whether or not the person had
made reasonable effort and I'd like to go into that a little hit,
133]
not just what's in the letter but what actually comes up in
your office as cases come in. Would one factor that would be
taker, into account by the fact-finding examiner to determine
whether or not reasonable effort had been made, be whether or
not the person had a car?
A It might be, yes.
© Would a person who had a car be expected to qo to
more places than a person who did not have a car? To conduct
amore far-ranging search for work?
Q Perhaps a more far-ranging one.
@ Would a person who had access two days a week to the
use of a car of a friend or of a relative be held to a higher
standard on working than a person who did not have a car at all?
A Well there would probably be other factors that
would enter into that also.
Q But that could be one of the factors that would have
to be weighed by the fact-finding examiner?
A Maybe. Yes.
OQ I'm sorry, are you saying that he should, but mirht
not? Or that maybe he would and maybe he wouldn't?
A That would be one of the factors but then, in addition|
to that there would be other factors that would determine the
decision also.
Q What type of weight?
A The tyve of work that the individual does would enter
into that.
© What was the employment situation in Bridrenort durin:
June, July and August of this summer? Would you describe it as,
many Jobs available, or fewer than usual, or a very tight labor
market with few jobs available?
A There were some jobs that were available. .
© But would you deseribe it as a fairly, as a ticht
labor market? Do you know what the unemployment rate was in
Bridcenort during June, July and August?
A I would say that, oh, I'd have to check the statistical’
fieures.
Q But did you, was that information nassed on to the
fact-finding examiners during each month? Are they informed
of what the unemploynent rate is?
No.
They're not?
Not the percentage ficure, no.
In the policy claims letter referred to earlier dateu
October 22, 1956, it states that it is not intended to recy ire
So >» BD
claimants to make futile trios to employers’ »Sirine balls Just
for the sake of building up a record of job seeking when there
are not many joteavailable. Do your fact-finders take into
account the job market when they're making a determination as
to reasonable effort?
|
C—O ee
efforts.
Bla-
A ‘%o a certain extent.
2 But they are not given the information on a revular
basis of what the economic indicators show for availability of
jobds?
A Well they may have a general idea, in discussion, but
I don't actually give them the information on a percentare
basis, the actual statistics.
© So that you're not sure to whet extent they takethat
into account on their fact-finding decisions?
& (unintelligible)
Q Have you ever seen it described as one of the factors
that influenced the decision of a fact-finder when he writes nis
fact-findinr report, as being the basis for his decision, or one
of the factors?
A Not thet I remeuicr.
° “rr. Blair is employed in your office, is he not?
Yes.
What is his..
Pact-fincer.
Ke described the fact-finding function on reasonable
e*fort to obtain work, in a heartns which is an exhibit in this
7 >? |B PF
case, as bein= basically a matter of jud-ment on the part of tne
fact-findin« examiner when he's making decisions on reasonsle
Would you concur with that description?
[30]
A What was his description?
@ That in the end it comes down to good judmment, on
whether they employ good judgment or not,on making a determina-
tion as to whether the person has used reasonable effort.
A Well the whole intent of reasonable effort is that
the individual is making efforts to obtain, making efforts, so
that he may obtain employment from these efforts in the future.
Ané this is all taken into consideration.
the judement of the interviewer as to whether or not this is
Now it would be on
actual reasonable effort.
Q Prom your experience what would you say would be the
average, if there is an average length of time for a fact-findine
interview on the issue of reasonable effort to obtain, to work?
Would it be 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 15 minutes?
A Well they vary.
10 minutes.
15 minutes to a half-hour, sometimes
© Do you keep figures on the number of fact-findine
interviews that are conducted in your office on a daily, weekly,
or monthly basis?
A Yes.
@ Do you know how many were conducted during the peak
periog of claims during this summer? Por example, do you know
approximately how many were conducteu Guring June, July or
August?
87)
83a-
No. I could get those figures.
Would you make a note?
You want them?
Yes. You keep them on monthly basis?
Yes, Hartford. Statistics would have that in
> DoD > GO
Hart ford.
MR. WASIK: You're talking about the
interviews?
THE DEPONENT: ‘es, they want the number
of interviews, the fact-finding interviews held during
June, July and August, of 1972.
MR. CREANE: Not all of them, really.
interested in the one that involves fact-finding inter-
views other than initial eligibility. We don't want the
fact-finding interviews or predetermination hearing on
We're
separation issues.
TKE DEPONENT:
I would have to check that.
I think they have a >reakcown
on that.
BY _“R. CREANE:
@. Do you know how many claims, initial and continuing
claims, were filed in your office last week or the week before
that, just approximately?
% oO) 24 ee
[33]
ee ee
—_—--s>
A Between 5,000 to 7,000.
Q That would be both new claims and continued?
& And continued. The figures varies, that's why I
can't give you a definite figure. Those are all obtainable.
Q There's a definition by the Department of reasonable
effort to obtain work, a statutory requirement for elicibility,
contained in this 1956 Policy Letter. I'll read it to you and
ask you if that is senerally the standard that you try to annly
and to have your fact-finding examiners apply. In paractranh two
S states, "reasonable efforts to obtain work are such effort as
we would ordinarily expect anyone to make who is honestly look-
ing for work".
A Yes.
Q That is a very difficult standard to apyly, isn't
it Mrs. Smarz, in all honesty?
A Is it difficult?
Q Yes.
A Yes, it is difficult. That's why I try to cay that
it has to be handled on each individual case.
Q In order to handle it on an individual case, to make
a fair determination on an individual case, the fact-finding
examiner would have to know quite a bit about the claimant, would
39]
-85a-
he not. He'd have to know the man's background, the size of his
family, his past work record, how badly he needs employment,
what type of man he is, his physchological makeup, he would have
to know quite a bit, wouldn't he, to make an individual deter-
mination? What is reasonable for that man might not be
reasonable for another man, isn't that right?
A Well it's impossible to know all that about an
individual as far as that's concerned, but the type of work
that he's seeking and something about his background in that
particular work and where it's available and what efforts he
has made to get that type of work would be my main concern.
Q There is in fact, no written list of all of the
factors which might influence a decision on whether a reason-
able effort to find work has been made, isn't that correct?
A Hot to my knowledge.
@ And in fact, such an exhaustive list would probably
not be possible, would it, since there are so many factors which
might influence a particular determination by 4 fact-finding
examiner?
A That's true.
Q To your knowledge, what written standards, relating
to reasonable efforts to obtain work, what writter standards or
policy letters are available to the fact-finding examiners in
your office other than this policy letter dated 1956?
[4]
To give them guidance in making their decisions?
A Why I'd have to check all my Policy Letters to de-
termine it, because I have a breakout on it. There's a recent
memorandum that came out over the signature of Carl Eiseman.
Q I can show you some recent Policy Letters and you
can tell me if there are any others, to your knowled¢e. [1'1l)
give you a moment to look them over. Is there a requirement,
written or unwritten at the Bridgeport unemployment office
that persons, when they fill out their UC-55 form, if they list
all of the places that they visited all in one day for that
two week period, that that would not be reasonable effort? In
other words @ person went to all in one day, the six places or
seven places?
A What I would be concerned about in that instance, anc
what we would question, is what about the other nine wrorkxin«
days in the week, in the two-week period, and why didn't they
make efforts during that period, because it mirht create an
issue of availability.
Q Were claimants told that they had to have at least
six employers sign the card in order to be eligible?
A The employer isn't required to sign the card.
|
|
!
|
2 To list six places of employment that they've visitec ,
were they told that they had to?
——_
(4)
as
-87a-
A Jt was not an official notification that they were
to tell these people, if that is what happened. But this is,
there's no official number or anything in reference to this.
Q Suppose a person, person A, went to six places and
listed them on his UC-45 form and made no other efforts to obtair,
work; person B went to 5 places, or four places, but also made
other efforts, they looked in the newspaper, they called friends,
they made a number of other efforts to obtain work. How would
a fact-finder arrive at a decision as to whether either or both
of those were eligible for benefits?
A We would just arrive at the #easonableness of the
situation in both cases.
Q The reasonableness being what the fact-finder feels
is reasonable? !
A That's right. In the particular instance.
talking about a man that lists four places and then he asx
friends. Say that this man is..
Q And he reads the newspaper everyday.
A And he reads the newspaper everyday and he has certain’
qualifying skills and he knows that there may be a job onen in ¢ |
plant and perhaps with asking friends he may get this position.
That's reasonable. Isn't that what you ~r I would do to obtain
You're
a position.
EE we
{42]
Q But isn't it also quite likely that the nerson who
had listed six places on their UC-45 form would have gotten his
check with no problem at all, as long as it was filled in pro-
perly. The employment security aide or the claims interviewer
in all likelihood would have, if the form was filled out proverly
have given him his check if no other question arose?
A It's possible.
© Whereas the person who had perhaps only filled in
four places might very well have been referred for a fact-finding
interview since he had not filled out the forms completely?
A It's possible. But on the basis after being inter-
viewed he was not denied benefits.
© Well, it is a hypothetical that I'm giving you.
A You know this could happen. Well yes, I know, I
understand that, but this does happen.
Q Is it possible that, of your nine fact-finding examincr-
|| we'll say, seven would feel that the «ffort was reasonable,
looking, reading the newspaper, and asking friends and that one
or two of the examiners might say, "Well, how do I imow that he
really cid that? He didn't fill out the form and ” find that
he did not use reasonable effort". Isn't that possible?
A It's possible, but I sure would question it.
Q But in all likelihood?
(431
MR. TAMIS:
MR. CREANE:
MR. TAMIS:
John, can I ask a question?
0.K.
Just a quick question.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. TAMIS:
© Is it the understanding of claimants in order to
collect cheeks on a bi-weekly visit that they have to oresent
the UC-45 form with at least six employers on it?
- MR. WASIK:
— —
She can't testify what the
understandine of a particular claimant is.
| MR. TAMIS: Well that's a good voint.
rephrase the question.
T*l2
BY MR. TAMIS:
© Is it the policy of the claims examiners on the beneti
line to give checks when the UC-45 form has six employers listed
on it spread across the ten working days that are in issuc?
A Yes, they probably will.
Q Alright, so we're starting from that supposition.
BY MR. CREANE:
Q On the other hand, it's not automatic proof that
you've satisfied the reasonable effort simply because it's filled
out. It does not automatically mean that you have to fet your
checks, does it? You indicated that there's no written policy on
3
s-o ¢<
PRES SLE ETT a
[44]
EE ee _
——
the number of employers that would be, that could be reouirce
that the person visit in order to get their checks?
A No, there's no written policy on the number of
employers.
Q So in fact one claims examiner, I mean fact-findine-
examiner, might feel that six pleces, spread evenly over tio-
week is a reasonable effort. Another fact-finding examiner
might feel that eight is a reasonable effort, or ten is a
— ee ee ee ee ee ee 5 ee ee ee
reasonable effort, isn't that correct?
A Well I can't tell you what the fact-findine, how
the fact-finding examiner feels because I don't know all the
circumstances for this specific case that you're referrince to.
There's more involved in these situations other than Just the
fact that this man went out to look for a job. Or that he had
listed six or ten or twelve places to seek employment because
there's many other factors that are taken into considerat‘on al-o.
Q And the list of other factors that can be ta*en invo
consideration is listed nowhere in writing, isn't it correct?
A Wo I wouldn't say that. You have it in some of
your letters right there.
Q That indicates that at most, three factors will be
taken into account: the age of the person who is called the
claimant; the type of work that he had done previously, relatin= |
cy
Sla-
to the wares of the jobs that are available; and I believe, a
third factor discussed in many of the memorandums that I've seen
from the department are that senior citizens will be given
| special consideration, persons over 66 will not be required to
make a strenuous a work search because many places simply con't
hire anyone over 66 and they're not required to, isn't that
|| correct?
(
i Q Yes, and would you indicate the other two factors
A Just as the memorandum reads.
f whieh are discussed in the memorandum?
, A What are you referring to? Efforts to get emoloyment?
Q Yes, well you indicated in response to an earlicr
Rescttitel which was that there was an inexhaustable list of factors
which could influence the fact-finding examiner when he made a
determination as to whether a reasonable effort has been madc.
You seem to contradict an earlier statement when you indicaticd
that, in fact, the factors were spelled out in the memoranduns
- my point is that there are only three factors discussed in
the memorandum that you referred to.
A Alright, you have your age. You have your skills,
lene tyve of work. You have your memorandum on effort here in
your reasonableness. That's whet I was referring to.
;= 4
| Q Well the reasonableness definition, wouldn't you treat people fairly who come inte the office ané to maxe fair
arree simoly is: reasonable is what the fact-finding examirer Gecisions on fact-finding decisions?
determines to be reasonable under the circumstances? A Yes.
| A Under the circumstances. “Rh. CHRANS: Den, f have no further
Q So that there are many other factors which can questions at this time. De you have any questions?
influence whether or not the effort 1s found to be reasonable? “R. WASIK: Just @ couple, maybe.
7 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. WASIX:
\ ( For example, you indicated that a verson who went © During normal times, if there is such an animal,
back to a place that they had applied to at an carlier noint, ‘t oo Smart, is it a volicy of the department to have period:c
|
|| micht or mirht not be unreasonable for them to do that, to re-
ud o Se Fe ; interviews when people come in on interviews?
: A Yes, in normal times.
Q Yes, alricht. So that, is it correct to say that
! jduring the past year at least, with the unemployment situation
a job for him, it would be reasonable for him to return there. ' || tne way it's been, that these periodic interviews have not been
held, Dut that the interviews are only held when the intervicver
on the line feels that there is an issue as to a person's
j elicidility?
A That's right.
apply at factories that they had deen to at an earlier date?
A If an employer indicated that there may be enloy-
ment if he returned there again in two weeks, that he may have
Q Would the size of the factory that the person vet
dack to be a factor? In other words, if a person went dic:
ceriodically to a very large factory which was known to h're
periodically, that might be treated differently by the fact-
— examiner than revisiting a very small factory with a very '
Q As to the question of benefit rights interviers, will
a Spanish-sveaking person or anyone who has difficulty with tc
onelish language files a claim, is there any special effort or
policy in remard to giving these people denefit richts interviews?
A As I spoke of the two youns ladies that I have s.*
; ace Soanish in the office and if there is an issue arises where
| |
\
'
; low turnover of employees?
Swen se SSE SS
\
| A It might be.
© And that there are no, that you really rely on the
mood judrement and good sense of your fact-findine examiners to
—— ee ee ee ee ee ee = ©
its definite that the individual does not understand what is
trying to be explained to him, we do ask the interpreter to
come and speak for them. As far as another individual is con-
cernec, or other languages if it's at all possible and there's
iuse that individual or we would ask them to bring someone to
helo them.
|
| someone available that can help them, a claimant verhaps, we would
|
© But is it, is the person who acts as an interpreter
‘|whether its a department employee or a friend brought by the
iH
‘claimant, iy it, are the rights explained to the individual?
\
i
would be explained to the interpreter to explain it to the in-
dividual.
A If we're giving a benefit rights interview, yes. It
2 But is it a policy to give such a benefit richts
interview to such a person havine difficult understanding the |
eee tee te ee A
English language?
| A We try te give it to everyone we interview. Is that
© Yes. I understood your earlier testimony that there
|
lpeas, at least some period when not everyone received a benefit
712 you mean?
{
richts interview?
A During the crush period. They asked during Junc,
'
Puly, wasn't that your question. At the time, did everyone ret a |
\jpenefit right interview? They couldn't.
I;
Q@ How about the people who had difficulty with the
English language. Were they given a benefit rirhts intervicw?
A And there was a question of eligibility or availabil-
ity, we tried to give them to them, yes.
Q In other words, if a person came in with a UC-45
properly filled out, even though that person might not fully
understand English, if there was no question in the interviewer's
| mina, that person would be paid?
A Right.
© Even though that person might not have been given
a full benefit rights interview?
A That's right.
Q But if an issue of eligibility arose would that
person be given such an interview?
A We would try to explain the eligibility reouircwents
to them, yes.
Q Now I thought I understood you to say that when a
person is given an option of having a hearing that day or come
back a week later, that if he decided to come back at a later
time, that he would not be given his check, at that time. Is
that correct?
A I'm trying to think. They are to be paid their
benefits at that time. We have very few of these instances, that'b
[49]
[50]
-%a-
why it makes it so difficult. They usually will have the hearin:
while they're there. If someone has created the problem in the
past of not having the hearing or is collecting or is electine
to have the hearing at a future date, then we vay them their
Then they have the hearing later.
Q So they are paid?
A I know what you're talking adout.
They would be paid their checks},
benefits.
You're referrinr
to the question that arose there.
I have so few of them that actually occur.
MR. CREANE: I think we might have, there
might be a misunderstanding here.
sure that we're talking about the same situation.
you talked about a person being paid, pending a hearinc,
you're talking about * refusal of a referral, that tyne
of an issue, are you not? A refusal of the job offered
I just want to make
Waren
by the Employment Service?
THE DEPONENT:
benefits, right. And then if an issue occured where we
are going to deny the benefits when it would have be,
constitute an overpayment. You follow? Do you under-
stand what I mean?
MR. CREANE: Do you mind if I ask questions
Yes. They would be voaid their
to try to clarify? (Directed to Mr. Wasik).
fs)
-97a-
BY MR. CREANE:
Q A person comes in and is referred to a fact-finding
examiner because of a question of lack of reasonable effort, do
your fact-finding examiners, is there a written policy, do they
always tell the claimant, "you can have your hearing in a woek
or how ever long it will take you to get your witnesses together
You're not saying that those checks will be paid that day, are you
that a person can choose to have the hearing a week or two weeks
later?
A Well he can't choose to have it a week or two weeks
later, because the hearing would be scheduled five days hence
or what have you. I mean as far as that's concerned we would
schedule a hearing for him.
Q Or even one day hence. Are you Saying that the per-
Son will get their two checks for the period?
A If they, let me put it this way. If it's a question
that I want to mo home this afternoon and I can bring this
information back to you, we'd let him go home and bring the in-
formation back or he's coming back the next day, we would drinc
it back, he would bring it back the next day. So you would hold
payments for that period of time until he brought back the in-
formation. Now you have an issue of a hearing that's bein;
scheduled and I think that's what your referring to.
© A predetermination hearing or pre-termination hearing?
and you'll get your checks today, anyway, until you get the hearing?’
[52]
-98a-
A Well sometimes an individual will sit down and
they're advised that if they want you can interview them now on
the issue or you can interview them at a later time. If he
wants a hearing, if he wants a scheduled hearinc, as a rule,
they will have it then. If an issue arises where they want to
have it five days hence, you would pay them and schedule them
for a hearing. If an issue comes up where they are soins to be
denied benefits on the period, it would be an overpayment.
Now the, this, how can I say. This rarely happens.
Q Which rarely hanpens?
A To have a hearing scheduled once they, you know,
decide that they, once they are seated and they are being in-
terviewed. But if it does happen we schedule a hearing for them.
Q Under what circumstances would the Department be
authorized to pay those checks when there is a question of their
actual entitlement to those benefits? When would the verson
set the checks and get their hearing later on? This is an
imnrortant question.
A They want payment.
Q What?
A If he wants his payment of benefits.
Q In other words, if a person comes in on reasonable
effort to obtain work and he has no signature or two sicnatures
listed on the card, he has an option of metting his checks that
[43]
Cay and getting a hearing later on? That those checks will be
paid even though the--
A I can't remember an incident occurring on effort,
let me put it to you that way. But if it would occur accordin~
to procedure, he would be paid and then he would be interviewed
anc if an overpayment would be set-up, if he would be determined
that he was ineligible for benefits.
© Is that written policy? Can you refer me to any
specific nolicy that would authorize the Department to do that?
A I don't know. I can't. Is there one on that, Mr.
Wasik?
MR. WASIK: There might have been, well, I
don't want to testify.
MR. CREANE: Well perhaps we can list that
as another--
THE DEPONENT: I'm trying to think of where
that--
“R. WASIK: That's my understanding of what
the policy is supposed to be.
BY MR. CROAIE:
Q Let me put it this way. To your knowledge, durinc
the past vear, has any person who has been referred to a fact-
[54]
finding examiner on the issue of reasonable effort to obtain
work, received his checks that afternoon and had a hearing
scheduled at a later date to determine whether he was actually
entitled to those checks?
A TI honestly can't remember.
Q You can't remember an instance?
A I can remember an instance on reasonable effort, in
all honesty.
Q Do your fact-finding examiners inform versons of their
right to postpone the hearing and that they will get their checks
in the meantime until the issue is settled?
A They do inform them. I can't say that they always
have on every case. I wouldn't say that.
Q Do you have any explanation as to why apparently so
few or maybe no claimants choose to receive their checks that
afternoon if they can have the hearing at a later date, if in
fact your fact-finding examiners are informing them of that
choice?
A Wo, I can't think of any.
Q@ Soin virtually all, perhaps all, instances of
reasonable efforts issues that go before fact-finding examiners,
the hearing is held that day and a decision is made that day on
eligibility or non-eligibility?
[ss]
-10la-
A Yes. Just about all instances, yes.
MR. CREANE: I want to ask Mr. Wasik, if
after checking with your clients in the devartment,
you can find any written regulations which cuthorizes
payment to claimants, that entitles them to postnone
the fact-finding hearing and to receive their benefits,
I would like to s¢e a copy of that.
MR. WASIK: You don't have it in the lctters
that we've given you already?
MR. CREANE: No. I'm sorry, Don, I |
interrupted you. Do you want to finish your questions.
SY MR. WASIK:
Q Is it a clear statement that in reasonable effort
cases as opposed to refusal of a job referral, that there seldom
are factual issues that have to be resolved with the help of
a third person?
MR. CREANE: I would object to the form of
varue a word.
Y MR. WASIK: H
Q The usual, what's the usual case? Is there a factual
issue in the usual reasonable effort case?
that question. I think to ask her to define seldom is tod
oe
peel 2c
[se]
-102a-
A Where a third person might be involved? You mean
when we would contact an employer to verify that a claimant was
there?
Something like that.
There are instances where we do it, yes.
But is it a general rule, or not the general rule?
How can I answer that? It derends on the individual.
a FF» DBD > PD
Based on your experience?
| A Based on experience, yes. And it would be on the
individual case. If there is some doubt in an examiner's m‘nd
to resolve an issue they may use that to verify it.
© I'm just wondering thourh, do you know how often this
might happen. If this is the usual case or that the usual cases
are that there is no question?
A The usual case.
MR. CREANE: TI have an objection to this onc.
I think she indicated that she couldn't really answer
that question. That she really couldn't give o fair
answer to it.
REDIRECT BY MR. CREANE:
© On, the question of translaters in your office, for
particularly Spanish-speaking claimants, whose responsibility is
oe wee eee eee ee woe
-103a-
this to provide an interpreter? Is it the claimant's respon-
sibility or the Denartment's responsibility?
A That's hard to say.
If we can assist the individual in any way, we would
I've never really thought of it
that way.
do it. If the claimant can bring someone with him, we just ask
them to bring him. I've never considered it being anyone's
responsibility other than an attempt to resolve the issue. We
try to help them in any way we can but, I've never even, I've
never thought of that. If its possible and we can resolve, we
can present them with someone to assist them we try to resolve
the issue. If we have someone that can do the interpretine in
the office, or assist it and he's in the processing of the clain,
we do it. If we can't do it we put the burden of responsibility
on the individual to present someone who can interpret for him.
Very often the examiner on the line, if he sees that there is
language barrier, will ask them to bring someone in to the officc.
Q What you're saying I believe, correct me if I'm wron-,
is that the Department will be as helpful as its resources will
[57]
permit, but that ultimately its the claimant's responsibility to
have someone there present, so that he will understand what is
Deine said to him and so that he can present his facts to the
Department?
A If we can help them we can. If we can't, we ask him
© bring someone, yes.
PEFR T UST ee
A>
(s¥1
Q And that if you can't help him and he doesn't brinc
anyone, in your opinion, its his responsibility and you've done
all you can?
A What else can we do?
© Well if you ask my opinion you could have sufficient
Snanish-speaking personnel so that the Spanish-speaking claimants
have the same access to the government services.
A I don't have a problem with Spanish-speakine rersonne
as far as that's concerned because as I said I have two youn
ladies that do speak fluent Spanish and they're very goo! in that
respect. We do have say, some Greek people that will come in
or Portugese and there just isn't any one that can speak the
language. You will get different dialects that are difficult
to understand and it's almost impossible to provide you with an
interpreter for ali of these.
Q Do you have any idea of the aporoximately the prer-
centare of your claimants that are Spanish-speakinc?
A No TI don't.
Q You couldn't hazard a rough guess?
A Wo.
Q The two Spanish-speaking employees that you have,
-10Sa-
assume are occasionally allowed to fo to lunch or they're sick
occasionally are they not? There isn't always someone there on
cuty all times is there.
A Wo.
Q I have no further questions. Do you “Mr. Kelly?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KELLY:
© I just wanted to ask, you mentioned that you had some
——— ee ew ee
| em>loyees who were working while they were soine to school. Are
the two Spanish-speaking employees full-time employees, or are
they working only on a vart-time basis?
A Pull-time basis.
Q Pull-time employees. How long have they been «ith
the Bridgeport office.
A They started I think in December of 1971 and January
of 1972, I think both of them came in.
© Prior to that time were there any Spanish-sneakin=
employees in the Bridreport office?
A I became manarer in December of 1971, so I can't.
© Did you work in that office before?
A Years aro.
© O.K. But in that period, say from December of 1/1,
back five years ago, you have no knowledge of what the employment
situation was?
[s9}|
!
[ec]
A No TI haven't. It wouldn't be, it was very vacue.
I wouldn't know of the staffing pattern.
Q What is the employment, what is their job title,
these two Spanish-speaking employees?
A Employment security aides.
Q Level?
A Yes, I think they're two.
Q Two. Both of them are level two?
A I think so.
Q And that they wouldn't be involved in fact-findinr
determinations?
A No.
Q I have no further questions.
BY MR. CREANE:
Q Just one final question. The fact-finding examiners
when they're hired, what type of training or experience are they
miven before they begin their actual duties?
A Well, it varies. There is a certain amount of train-
ing that I, as a manager, would give them.
© Would you deseribe that?
A They have the policy letters that I give them to
read and review. We have, they're acquainted with the Inter-
pretive Digest, the laws, the fact-fincing forms. Brief basic
[ei
-107a-
outlines as to what they would need to compile into a revort.
Discussions on the various types of fact-findines that may arise.
They're told about the inserts, I acquire some books for them on
interviewing. They start with some of the simpler cases, sort
of an on the job training. Their cases are reviewed by the super
visor and go through a six-month probationary period and any
unusual cases that arise are discussed. They're always free to
ask any questions that may arise, to check anything that we have
available in the office. If anything unusual comes up, it's
referred to the adjudication unit in Hartford.
Q Of the nine fact-finding examiners that are oresently
working there, how many have come to work in your office durins
the past year? liow many of them were working there a year a~o?
A I think 411 but one. They weren't all workin- in
the capacity of fact-finders. They were promoted. One eare fro.
another office up state. She was promoted and civen the annoint-
ment in the Bridgeport office. ‘The other..
© So, how many were working as fact-finders a year a-o?
If you don't know, don't answer.
A I'd say four or five.
@ Out of a total of how many fact-finders a year ano?
A Actual fact-finders, were two. There was another
title for a group that were brought in and they were brournt in
to train for fact-finding. I can't think of the title off-hand.
-_--
Weeeeiet
[e3]
MR. KELLY: Excuse me, were they called the
intermittent claims examiner?
TMé DEPONENT: Oh, no. I'll get that nane
i for you if vyou'a like because I know that they had a
different title for that. But then they were appointed,
they took the exam and were appointed as fact-finders.
They worked in the capacity of fact-finders.
BY MR. CREANE:
\
© You indicated in response to a question from ‘r.
| Wasik that in normal times, whatever they might be, that it is
the practice to give periodic redeterminations?
A Periodic interviews, yes.
© And what is the, how does that work?
A Well, initially--
Q By the way, are we in normal times now at the Bridce-
port office? Are neriodic redeterminations given on regularly
scheduled basis?
A Wot quite. The claimant is given a benefit richts
interview and all the eligibility requirements are explained to
them. Then they file their first compensable clain.
© And when the workload is not?
A When the workload is normal, we are operating normally
their eligibility requirements are all explained and during
(231
the course of this interview any questions that may arise with
them are discussed. All the, and the examiner will determine
at that time the type of work the individual is looking for, the
amount, the age of the individual, the marital status of woman,
man and whether or not there may be any factors that would in-
volve his availability for employment. And then they're coded
for periodic re-interviews.
Q How does that work, the periodic re-interviews?
A Well, say for a woman that has children and she's
seeking work. She was laid off, or she quit her job because she
has a problem, a babysitting problem, what have you. She quit
her job, she's now available for work and she's looking for work.
She meets the eligibility requirement at this time and we would
— re-code her for an interview every fourth week.
Q So that the re-coding for a periodic reintervicw--
She would be re-coded.
Would be if there was some special circumstances?
Special circumstances that may be involved.
2 >. >
But it doesn't mean that everyone would be coded
for a periodic interview?
A Every fourth week, no. And then an older person who
is available for work and making efforts to get work, seeking wor
we may code him or her every six or eight weeks depending, on what
the circumstances are.
Se eee. . b&b
{o4)
-110a-
© That answers my question.
A It would be set in that manner.
MR. CREANE: Don, do you have any further
questions.
“MR. WASIK: Wo. ,
MR. CREANE: Thank you very much Mrs. Smarz.
THE DEPONENT: Now you mentioned somevthinr,
let meclarifya point. You mentioned something about
the hearinrs and there was something that I wanted to
clarify with you. As I explained that when an individual
is seated for a hearing, now, and this is one point that
I try to stress with my people that they can have the
hearing now or the hearing, is they can have it scheduled
for them and if it is rescheduled they are paid their
benefits. You asked me why I thoucht there were so few
of those re-scheduled hearinss. Wasn't that one ecnebaed
that you asked?
MR. CREANE: Well, in fact, so few that vou
could not recall a single instance where on the issue
of reasonable effort.
THE DEPONENT: For reasonable effort it nas
arisen.
Gs
MR. CREANE: Yes.
THE DEPONENT: I can't really recall it.
We give them a brief explanation that they have the
right to have a hearing now or the hearing later and
they choose now, so we just proceed with it.
MR. CREANE: Do you know if your fact-findin‘
examiners always tell the person that they can ect their
checks now if they choose to have their hearing later?
THE DEPONENT: No, I can't honestly say that
they would probably say that. And this is one thinc I
wanted to clarify with you. But if an issue does arise,
and the individual does say that, does request to have a
hearing scheduled, he is paid and that's the procedure
that follows. If it's determined at the hearing that he
is ineligible for benefits an overpayment would be sct up,
MR. CREATE: But, that is, ordinarily, the
claimant would be told you can have the hearing now or
you can have it later?
THE DEPONENT: Then they elect.
MR. CREANE: O.K. Thank you very much.
-113a-
COMMECT] CUT
DEP RIMPNT
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ROA HEHE ;
Pl. Bx.
confereme of
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+ sorres
March 20, 1973 Bridgeport
-112a-
)
)
)
I, Margarita Torres, an employee of Bridgeport Legal
Services, Inc., do hereby certify that the deposition of
Dated At Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 20th day of
/
I further certify that the witness was sworn by
March, 1973.
to Rules 30 (a) and (b) (4) of the Pederal Rules of Civil
Procedure, at 412 East Main Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut
on Thursday, February 8, 1973 at 1:45 p.m.
MRS. ELEANOR H. SMARZ was taken under oath before me pursuant
counsel and her testimony was recorded on tape and was sub-
Attorney Ira Horowitz to tell the truth, was examined by
sequently transcribed by me as herebdefore appears.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
COUNTY OF FAIRFIELD
[ce]
- <r! --
-11Sa-
Pl. Ex.
70:
-114a-
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sat Pete
Ha iM Lt pea zhsgidc fied
ay et ls
me UR
ae.
iy
|
HT .
-117a-
Disputed Clains Policy Letter, SRU, A6OH
October 22, 1956
Lasca Durarrscmrer — Exrcovmaent Secuarry Drvmmon
92 Famemoron Avewun * Haarroan 15, Cosmrscncut
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
DEPARTMENT
February 27, 1956
In other situations, where the
claimant is obscure,
Fact finding examiners are urged to direct particular attention to fact find-
ing interviews in “leaving work” cases in the light of the above comments.
ALL U. C. MABAGERS
Efforts to Obtain Work"
of
i.
(s) George J. Walker
Director
il
il
With;
He a HT
et
pipes or
3. Procedural Application of “Reasonable Efforte” Requirenest
In connection with the application of the “reasonable efforts” require-
went of the law fron a » attention is directed to
the described in the Chief of Benefits’ Neworandu, Mo. 153,
DA 26, subject: “Procedure for Periodic Reinterviews,” dated June 30,
1954
* Re eet a gene
-119a-
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Ph. Bx. 17 LABOR DEPARTMENT
Baployment Security Division
Unemployment Compensation Department
92 Farmington Avenue
Hartford 15, Conn.
R & A Bulletin No. 20
August 20, 1958
ALL U. C. MANAGERS AND FACT FINDING EXAMINERS
Cases have come to our attention in which the claimant has been
Genied benefits because of an unreasonable restriction on his
availability and, upon filing a claim for the week immediately
following the disallowed claim, he advises the examiner of his
removal of the restriction in question. The claimant's claim
series is then reinstated and his eligibility is established.
In cases such as that described above, it is sometimes true that
if the claimant had been advised by the examiner that the re-
striction which he has imposed on his availability will require
a finding of ineligibility, the claimant would have immediately
reconsidered his employment desireg and withdrawn his stated
restriction. The withholding of benefits from the claimant for
one week without advising him of the reason for such action
before the issuance of the decision and the granting of benefits
for the next week in consequence of his declaration of compli-
ance with the availability requirement after being notified of
the reason for his ineligibility is neither an equitable nor a
realistic method of handling this situation. In any case in
which the claimant's expressed restriction on his availability
is such as to compel a finding of ineligibility, the fact find-
ing examiner must orally advise him, before issuing a written
decision of disapproval, that the restriction in question has
the effect of making him ineligible for benefits. If the claim-
ant, despite such advice, adheres to the restriction, a decision
of disapproval is in order. If, however, the claimant reconsiders
his employment desires and, in the light of the examiner's advice,
withdraws his restriction, thereby putting himself in compliance
with the availability requirement, an award of benefits is in
order.
e § «
R & A Bulletin No.
August 20, 1958
Cases have been observed in which the claimant is initiating a
claim series after childbirth and despite the fact that the end-
ing date of the two month period after childbirth falls within
the first benefit week for which a claim is filed, such claim is
approved by the local office examiner. The approval of such
claim is contrary to law.
Where the claimant is claiming benefits two months after child-
birth, the first week for which she may be eligible for benefits
is the week which, in its entirety (e.cietive of Sunday), is
beyond the ending date of the two mon:h period following the
date of childbirth. Thus, if the tw month period ends on Mon-
day of -the first week for whici. the claimant claims benefits,
the claimant is ineligible that wer <.
Morris E. Tonken
Review and Appeals
Agp roved:
Joseph J. Gibbons
Executive Director
20
ream esp. cs
mer. 78
-I2la-
Pl. Ex. 27
AMTEROPPICE memonandun
ALL LOCAL OFFICE MANAGERS, FIELD AND CENTRAL oaTe
OFFICE SUPERVISORS
JUME 30, 1972
John F. Pescatello, Chief of Benefits
eligibility.
Lines be held up for cleimants to fill out this
form. It be completed and signed by the claimant
before reporting to the office.
Claimants should be informed that employers are not required
to complete or make entries on this fora.
After the initial distribution supplies should be reordered
from the Stock R
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