Appendix — Wood v. General Motors Corp.

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IN THE

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

PATRICIA M. WOOD , et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Respondent

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

Arthur H. Bryant

(Counsel of Record)

Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, |

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W

Suite 100

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 797-8600

Alan B. Morrison

Public Citizen Litigation

2000 P St., N.W., Suite 7

Washington, D.C

(202) 785-3704

Edmund P. Daley

Moquin & Daley

388 Commonwealth Av

Boston, MA 02215

(617) 536-0606

Attorneys for Petitioner

Balmar Legal Publishing Division, Washington, D

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Majority and Dissenting Opinions of the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the First Circuit

py Re ere

Memorandum Opinion of the U.S. District Court

for the District of Massachusetts (May 8, 1987)

Judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit (December 28,1988) ..........

Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit Denying Petition for Rehearing

ll 8 ee a ee

Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit Denying Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc

fog A a ae

Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit Denying Motion to Withdraw the Mandate

and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc

SEE a digs sae @ else & 6 4 0:04.60 «

Excerpts from 49 C.F.R.§ 571.208 ......

Page

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102a

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 87-1750

Patricia M. Wood, ET AL.

Plaintiffs, Appellees

v.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

(Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge}

Before Campbell, Chief Judge, Selya, Circuit Judge,

and Laffitte, * District Judge.

David M. Heilbron with whom Leslie G. Landau, McCutchen,

Doyle, Brown & Enersen, Patrick F. McCartan, Stephen J. Brogan,

Marc L. Swartzbaugh, Jones Day Reavis & Pogue, John P. Raleigh,

Nicholas J. Wittner, Richard P. Campbell, John A.K. Grunert, and

Campbell and Associates, P.C., were on brief for appellant.

Paul M. Bator, Stephen M. Shapiro, Kenneth S. Geller,

Kathryn A. Oberly, Mayer, Brown & Platt, William H. Crabtree, and

Edward P. Good on brief for the Product Liability Advisory Coun-

cil, Inc., the Automobile Importers of America, Inc., and the Motor

Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc.,

Amici Curiae.

Edmund P. Daley with whom Moquin & Daley and Arthur H.

Bryant, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, were on brief for appel-

lees. 3

Larry E. Coben, Litvin, Blumberg, Matusow & Young and

Eugene Pavalon on brief for The Association of Trial Lawyers of

America, Amicus Curiae.

Joshua R. Kratka on brief for Massachusetts Public Interest

Research Group, Amicus Curiae.

December 28, 1988

*Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

2a

CAMPBELL, Chief Judge. The question before us is

whether federal safety regulations preempt a state law claim,

asserted in a federal diversity action, that a motor vehicle was

defective because it lacked air bags.

This is an interlocutory appeal in a product liability

diversity action brought in the United States District Court

for the District of Massachusetts by plaintiff-appellee

Patricia Wood against defendant-appellant General Motors

Corporation. Wood has alleged that under Massachusetts

law a vehicle manufactured by General Motors was defective

because it was equipped with seat belts rather than air bags

or some other type of “passive restraint.” General Motors

moved for summary judgment on the ground that Wood’s

state claim is preempted by the National Traffic and Motor

Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seg. (1982), and

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards promulgated under

the Act. The district court denied the motion, Wood v.

General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987),

and we have agreed to hear, in part, General Motors’s

interlocutory appeal from the court’s action. 28 U.S.C. §

1292(b) (1982).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts and Procedural History

On May 19, 1981, appellee Patricia Wood was on her

way home from school, riding in the front passenger seat of

a 1976 Chevrolet Blazer. The Blazer, manufactured by ap-

pellant General Motors, was equipped with seat belts and

complied with all applicable federal motor vehicle safety

regulations. Wood was not, however, wearing her seat belt.

For some reason other than a defect in the vehicle, the Blazer

left the road and collided with a tree. Suffering severe

injuries, Wood was rendered quadriplegic.

teeta nine. -

3a

In May 1984, Wood brought an action for damages in

the United States District Court for the District of Mas-

sachusetts, claiming that General Motors was liable for her

injuries under Massachusetts state law theories of negligent

design, negligent manufacture, and breach of implied and

express warranty. One paragraph of the complaint alleged

that:

Defendant negligently failed to provide reasonably

safe and adequate safety devices, which include but

are not limited to “air bag” devices, to protect

passengers and minimize the seriousness of in-

juries in reasonably foreseeable circumstances

which include collisions{.]

General Motors moved for summary judgment on all claims.

It characterized Wood’s complaint as being wholly depend-

ent on the theory that the Blazer lacked passive restraints

(Le, safety devices that do not require any action by the

passenger, e.g., air bags or automatic seat belts), and was

therefore defectively designed. Such a theory, General

Motors argued, was both preempted by federal safety

regulations and invalid under the Massachusetts law of

product liability. After briefing and argument, the district

court denied General Motors’s motion for summary judg-

ment.

General Motors then moved for immediate inter-

locutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district

court found that its denial of the motion for summary judg-

ment met the statutory requirements, and authorized an

immediate appeal. We granted in part General Motors’s

petition for immediate appeal, limiting our review to

the question whether federal law preempts a state

law product liability claim against a motor vehicle

4a

manufacturer based on its installing seat belts,

rather than airbags, in a motor vehicle.!

B. The Safety Act

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of

1966 (the “Safety Act” or “Act”) was enacted by Congress in

response to the “soaring rate of death and debilitation on the

Nation’s highways,” S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 1,

reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2709,

2709 [hereinafter “Senate Report”]. The Safety Act sought

to increase automotive safety by authorizing the promulga-

tion of federal “motor vehicle safety standards,” hereinafter

referred to as “FMVSS.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391(2), 1392(a)

(1982). The FMVSS, to be written and administered by the

Secretary of Transportation,” were to be mandatory stand-

' This claim, under Massachusetts law, is a warranty claim for inade-

quate design. Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 642, 378 N.E.2d 964,

970 (1978). The jury would be asked to determine on the basis of factors

such as the gravity of the danger of the challenged design, the feasibility

and cost of a safer alternative design, and the consequences to consumers

of an alternative design, whether the present design was adequate. /d

While such a lawsuit, if successful, would not impose a legal duty, as such,

upon the manufacturer to add air bags to other vehicles, it would

obviously create a very strong reason to do so, since other accident

victims could be expected to claim that their vehicles, too, should have

had airbags and, if lacking them, were improperly designed.

2 When passed, the regulatory authority under the Safety Act was

delegated to the Secretary of Commerce. However, within several weeks

of the Safety Act’s passage, Congress created the Department of

Transportation and transferred the administration of the Safety Act to

the new department. See Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L.

No. 89-670, § 6(a) (6) (A), 80 Stat. 931 (1966).

Within the Department of Transportation, the responsibility for

writing FMVSS was at first delegated to the National Highway Safety

Bureau. Exec. Order No. 11,357 (1967). In 1970, Congress transferred

the administration of the Safety Act to the newly created National

Highway Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). See High-

way Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 202(a), 84 Stat. 1713,

Sa

ards which would apply to all new motor vehicles. The

delegation was broad; the new law stated only that each

FMVSS “be practicable, shall meet the need for motor

vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms.” 15

U.S.C. § 1392(a).

Congress envisioned that the FMVSS would be ad-

dressed to two types of dangers: 1) vehicle defects which

caused accidents, and 2) vehicle defects that aggravated

injuries to the occupants once an accident had occurred.

The latter problem, sometimes labeled “crashworthiness,”

received special attention from Congress. Senate Report,

1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2712. Within the

field of crashworthiness, Congress focused especially on the

problem of the “ ‘second collision” — the potentially devas-

tating impact between the vehicle’s occupants and the

vehicle’s interior.> The Senate Committee noted that the

“ ‘second collision’ .. . has been largely neglected,” and that

“{rjecessed dashboard instruments and the use of seat belts

can mean the difference between a bruised forehead and a

fractured skull.” Id. at 2710-11. This appeal concerns

FMVSS 208, which is the most important FMVSS addressed

to the problem of the second collision.

When framing the Safety Act, Congress indicated clear-

ly its intention that the primary responsibility for setting

standards regulating the nationa! automobile manufacturing

industry rested upon the federal government, not the states.

The Senate Report stated,

While the contribution of the several States to

automobile safety has been significant, and justifies

1739. The current delegation to NHTSA is found at 49 U.S.C. § 105, 49

C.F.R. § 501.2(a) (1987).

> “Crashworthiness” encompasses more than protection from the

second collision. See, e.g, FMVSS 216, 49 C_F.R. § 571.216 (1987) (roof

crush resistance); FMVSS 301, 49 C.F.R. § 571.301 (1987) (fuel system

integrity).

6a

to the States a consultative role in the setting of

standards, the primary responsibility for regulating

the national automotive manufacturing industry

must fall squarely upon the Federal Government.

Id. at 712 (emphasis added). The limited, consultative role

of the states is reflected in two provisions of the Safety Act.

First, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f) states that in prescribing FMVSS,

the Secretary “shall... consult with the Vehicle Equipment

Safety Commission, and such other State or interstate agen-

cies (including legislative committees) as he deems ap-

propriate ....” Second, the Safety Act contains a preemption

provision which explicitly preempts any state safety standard

— even state standards which are more stringent than the

federal standards — which covers “the same aspect of per-

formance” as a federal standard but which is “not identical”

to the federal standard. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d).

With respect to safety standards implied under state tort

law, however, the Safety Act’s allocation of exclusive federal

authority to establish automotive safety standards is less

clear. Notwithstanding the above preemption provision, the

Safety Act also contains section 1397, with the following

general “savings clause”:

Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety

standard issued under this subchapter does not

exempt any person from any liability under com-

mon law.

15 U.S.C. § 1397(c). The Safety Act is thus ambiguous as to

the current issue, to wit, whether a state product liability

claim alleging improper design — which seeks to hold an

automotive manufacturer liable for failing to adopt a stand-

ard “not identical” to a federal safety standard covering the

“same aspect of performance” — is preserved by section

1397(c) and not preempted by section 1392(d), as would be

the case were a Massachusetts law or regulation to have

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a a ed

required adoption of the very same standard (i.e., provision

of an air bag).

C. FMVSS 208

FMVSS 208, entitled “Occupant crash protection,” has

an intricate and contentious history of over 20 years. See

generally State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.

Department of Transportation, 680 F.2d 206, 209-18 (D.C.

Cir. 1982) (hereinafter “State Farm I”), vacated and

remanded sub nom. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-

tion v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463

U.S. 29, 34-38 (1973) (hereinafter “State Farm IT”); State

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474,

477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1616 (1987)

(hereinafter “State Farm III’). In this period, all three

branches of the federal government have considered and, at

times, forced changes in various aspects of the regulation.

On at least three occasions, federal courts of appeals have

considered the legality of FMVSS 208 under the Administra-

tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 etseg. See Pacific Legal

Foundation v. Department of Transportation, 593 F.2d 1338

(D.C. Cir. 1979) (upheld); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of

Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972) (upheld in part

and vacated in part); State Farm III. 802 F.2d at 474 (upheld).

The Supreme Court, see State Farm II, 463 U.S. at 57, has

vacated and remanded the standard. Congress, in oversee-

ing its original delegation of authority in the 1966 Safety Act,

has struck down a portion of FMVSS 208. See Motor

Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.

No. 93-492, § 109, 88 Stat. 1482 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §

1410b) (instructing the Secretary to amend FMVSS 208, and

forbidding the Secretary from requiring, or permitting com-

pliance by means of, ignition interlocks). In addition, Con-

gress has amended the Safety Act so that the Secretary may

not require any restraint system other than a seat and

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shoulder belt system without giving Congress the oppor-

tunity to exercise a legislative veto. See 15 U.S.C. §

1410b(b). Finally, the Department of Transportation has

drastically reversed the course of FMVSS 208 on at least two

occasions,* and has made numerous less radical amend-

ments.°

* The first reversal occurred between the Ford and Carter administra-

tions. In the twilight of the Ford administration, Secretary of Transpor-

tation Coleman reached a decision on the long-term version of FMVSS

208. See 42 Fed Reg. 5071 (1977) (regulation issued on January 19,

1977). The Secretary chose to retain what was formally labeled an

“interim” version of FMVSS 208, in which auto makers could choose

between manual seat belts or passive restraints. In March 1977, the

Carter administration reversed course and proposed a version of

FMVSS 208 which would require passive restraints. 42 Fed. Reg. 15,935

(1977). A final ruie requiring passive restraints was issued in July 1977.

42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (1977).

The second reversal occurred soon after the Reagan administration

assumed office. In February 1981 Secretary of Transportation Lewis

reopened rulemaking on FMVSS 208. Two months later the Secretary

proposed a rescission of the passive restraint requirement, and the

proposal was finalized in October 1981. See State Farm I, 680 F.2d 206.

The Supreme Court ordered the Secretary to vacate rescission of the

passive restraint requirement because the “agency failed to supply the

requisite ‘reasoned analysis.’ ” State Farm II, 463 U.S. at 57.

In addition, the Ford administration’s decision not to require passive

restraints could be considered a reversal of sorts. Since 1970, the

Department of Transportation had always stated that the “final” version

of FMVSS 208 would require some sort of passive restraint. See e.g., 35

Fed. Reg. 16,927 (1970) (promulgating a version of FMVSS 208 which

required all passenger cars manufactured after July 1, 1973, to be

equipped to protect vehicle occupants from crash-related injuries by

means that required no action by the occupants).

* As of 1983, the Supreme Court counted about 60 rulemaking notices

on FMVSS 208. State Farm II, 462 U.S. at 34.

9a

Most of this national controversy has concerned the

very issue which underlies Wood’s state law claim, namely,

whether seat belts are adequate to protect occupants from

the harmful effect of the “second collision,” or whether

vehicles should be equipped with “passive restraints,” Le.,

safety devices such as air bags that operate without the

occupants’ participation. Until recently, however, the con-

troversy has not dealt with the role of state product liability

law. In fact, the long, convoluted history of FMVSS 208

contains only a single, unhelpful reference to state design

defect suits predicated on the theory that a car is defective if

it lacks air bags.®

Despite this complex regulatory history, the portion of

FMVSS 208 applicable to the 1976 Chevrolet Blazer has, for

relevant purposes, remained unchanged since 1976. For the

purpose of our preemption analysis, FMVSS 208 is the same

whether one takes the regulation at the time of the Blazer’s

manufacture, at the time of the accident, at the time Wood’s

suit was filed, or at the time of decision. Under FMVSS 208,

the 1976 Chevrolet Blazer is classified as a “multipurpose

passenger vehicle, with GVWR [gross vehicle weight rating]

of 10,000 pounds or less.” 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, $4.2.2 (1987).

For the protection of front seat passengers, manufacturers

of such vehicles are given three separate options, compliance

with any one of which will satisfy FMVSS 208:

1) passive protection from frontal and angular

collisions;

2) passive protection from head-on collisions, sup-

° In the NHTSA’s July 1984 “final rule” on modifications to FMVSS

208, NHTSA included a “Summary of the Public Comments.” NHTSA

reprinted one commentator’s prediction that manufacturers would be

held liable for failing to install air bags. However, NHTSA made no

indication whether it agreed or disagreed with the statement. See 49 Fed.

Reg. 28,962, 28,972 (1984).

10a

plemented by seat belts and a belt warning system;

or

3) lap and shoulder belts, plus a belt warning

system.

49 CE.R. § 571.208, $4.2.2 (1987) (referring to $4.1.2.1,

S4.1.2.2, and $4.1.2.3); see also 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, $4.2.2

(Oct. 1976).

It is uncontroverted that the Blazer complied with the

third option (lap belts, shoulder belts, and a warning system)

and, for that reason, complied with FMVSS 208. Wood’s suit

alleges, in effect, that the Blazer was defectively designed

because it complied only with this third option, rather than

with the first or second option, which calls for one or another

form of passive restraint, e.g.. an air bag.

D. The District Court Opinion

The district court denied General Motors’s motion for

summary judgment based on federal preemption. General

Motors had argued that under theories of “express

preemption” or “implied preemption,” or both, the Safety

Act and FMVSS 208 preempted Wood’s Massachusetts

product liability claim. First, General Motors argued that

section 1392(d) expressly preempted the state claim because

it would, in the words of section 1392(d), “establish . . . [a]

safety standard” which was not identical to FMVSS 208. The

district court rejected this argument, reasoning that 1) the

language of section 1392(d) seemed to apply to state regula-

tions, and not to actions at law; 2) if Congress had meant to

preempt defective design actions, it would explicitly have

mentioned them in section 1392(d); 3) the savings clause,

section 1397(c), refuted any express congressional intent to

preempt product liability actions; and 4) the existence of a

presumption against preemption.

4

lla

Second, General Motors argued that a state action

based on a failure to install air bags would produce an

irreconcilable conflict with FMVSS 208 and would frustrate

the objectives of the Safety Act. The court rejected the

former argument, explaining that General Motors could

comply with both FMVSS 208 and the state standard simply

by installing air bags. The district court also used a broader

rationale purportedly based on the recent case of Silkwood

v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984): a product

liability action does not conflict with federal safety regula-

tions, the court thought, because even if a defendant

manufacturer has to pay a damages award in this case, it need

not alter its behavior in other instances. (Thus General

Motors could, if it wished, continue to sell vehicles without

passive restraints, taking its chances on future iawsuits

similar to this one.) The court held further that Wood’s claim

would not frustrate the objectives of the Safety Act nor of

FMVSS 208 because if it did have a regulatory effect, the

result would be safer cars. The district court also recognized

a “subsidiary purpose” of the Safety Act, namely,

“Congress’s intention that the safety standards be uniform

throughout the country.” It noted that the product liability

suit might create some “tension” with this subsidiary purpose

of the Safety Act, but held that under Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee

Corp., this tension was acceptable. It explained,

Congress passed the Safety Act fully aware that

damage suits would be initiated against parties who

complied with the federal regulations. [Citations

omitted.] This Court therefore concludes, as the

Supreme Court did in Silkwood, that Congress

recognized and sanctioned this “tension” between

compliance with federal regulations and state com-

mon law claims. See Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1179

(citing and following Silkwood for similar reasons

in not finding preemption by the Federal Cigarette

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Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-

41). 673 F. Supp. at 1117. The district court then

elaborated on its reasoning that both the majority

and dissenting opinions in Silkwood establish that

damages awards have very little regulatory effect.

E. Other Cases on the Same Issue

In addition to the present action, about two dozen other

suits have been recently filed claiming that an automobile

was defectively designed because it lacked passive restraints.

As yet, none of these cases has reached a federal appellate

court or state supreme court. Courts have found both for

and against preemption, with the majority ruling in favor of

preemption.’

Against this backdrop, we now turn to the question

certified to us.

Il. QUR CONCLUSIONS SUMMARIZED

In this interlocutory appeal, General Motors presses

the argument that Wood’s claim is both expressly and im-

pliedly preempted by FMVSS 208 and section 1392(d) of the

Safety Act. While we do not find an express preemption, we

agree that Wood’s claim is impliedly preempted.

Preemption is a matter of congressional intent. As a

unanimous Supreme Court recently said,

A pre-emption question requires an examination

of congressional intent. . . . Of course, Congress

explicitly may define the extent to which its enact-

; Finding preemption, e.g.: Baird v. General Motors Corp., 654 F.

Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761

(D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo.

1986).

Denying preemption, e.g.: Murohv v. Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F. Supp.

922 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).

l3a

ments preempt state law. See, e.g.. Shaw v. Delta

Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1983). In the

absence of explicit statutory language, however,

Congress implicitly may indicate an intent to oc-

cupy a given field to the exclusion of state law.

Such a purpose properly may be inferred where the

pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes

supplementation by the States, where the federal

interest in the field is sufficiently dominant, or

where “the object sought to be obtained by the

federal law and the character of obligations im-

posed by it . . . reveal the same purpose.” Rice v.

Santa Fe Elevator Corp.. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).

Finally, even where Congress has entirely dis-

placed state regulation in a particular field, state

law is pre-empted when it actually conflicts with

federal law. Such a conflict will be found “‘when it

is impossible to comply with both state and federal

law, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.

Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the

State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-

ment of the full purposes and objectives of Con-

gress, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67

(1941).’ ” California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite

Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1987), quoting

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248

(1984).

Schneiderwind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1150-51,

(1988) (citations modified).

We find the Safety Act facially ambiguous as to

Congress’s intent in the present situation. The difficulty

arises because section 1392(d) (the preemption clause) and

section 1397(c) (the savings clause) send conflicting mes-

Sages in these particular circumstances. For plaintiff Wood

l4a

to win on her design claim, it must be judicially determined

under state law that vehicles like hers are unsafe unless

equipped with air bags. That finding is tantamount to an-

nouncing a state safety standard (vehicles must have air

bags) that differs from the federal safety standard covering

the same aspect of performance (viz., the relevant federal

standard permits seat belts in lieu of air bags). 15 U.S.C. §

1392(d). Such a safety standard, if promulgated by state

statute or regulation, would be preempted by the clear com-

mands of section 1392(d). Is the same standard preempted

even though created by lawsuit? Section 1392(d) says noth-

ing about being limited to legislatively established state stand-

ards. However, section 1397(c) of the Safety Act provides

that compliance with a federal safety standard shall not be a

defense to common law liability. Arguably this “preserves”

a state or federal diversity court’s right to create such a

standard notwithstanding its conflict with the relevant

federal standard.®

Broadly speaking, two analyses are possible. The one

adopted by the court below — which has the virtue of

simplicity — is to harmonize sections 1392(d) (the preemp-

tion clause) and 1397(c) (the savings clause) by ascribing to

Congress an intent to preempt contradictory state safety

standards when promulgated by statute or regulation, but

not to preempt such standards when established in the

course of a lawsuit. Congress is said to welcome, for some

reason, the “tension” between the federal safety standards

8s we later discuss, this is not a case where compliance with the

federal standard is pleaded as a defense to plaintiff's tort claim. Rather

the argument is that because plaintiffs claim relates narrowly to design,

and because the alleged faulty design (no air bags) necessarily implies a

State standard requiring air bags, which standard flatly conflicts with a

relevant federal safety standard, the case raises an issue of preemption.

Preemption is a concept both narrower and different from an ordinary

defense. See Section IVD, infra.

1Sa

and any dissimilar state standards created by litigation —

even though Congress strictly forbade the states to create

dissimilar standards by statute or regulation.

The alternative analysis — which we prefer as being a

more plausible view of Congress’s intentions — begins with

an examination of the historical setting within which Con-

gress, in 1966, wrote the Safety Act. At that time, the only

kind of legal claim which could give rise to the present

dilemma — a cause of action based upon alleged automobile

design defects had yet to take its place in the arsenal of the

plaintiffs’ bar. We infer from this, as well as from the total

silence of the legislative record concerning the present

dilemma, that Congress simply did not anticipate the situa-

tion that now confronts us.? While Congress intended that

federal safety standards would not interfere with ongoing

state litigation as then understood, it did not foresee the

possibility of litigation that could, in practical effect, impose

a new and conflicting state safety standard on national

automobile manufacturers. Had Congress done so, we thittk,

the same logic that dictated the insertion of section 1392(d)

would inescapably have dictated that section 1392(d) extend

to this situation.

Nonetheless, given Congress’s failure to foresee this

problem, we are not persuaded that section 1392(d) can be

construed to manifest an express intention to preempt state

design lawsuits having the present effect. By the same token,

we do not construe the general language of section 1397(c)

as intended to preserve the narrow class of design lawsuits

that give rise to a conflicting state safety standard. We,

*Further diminishing foreseeability was the fact that the Safety Act

authorizes the promulgation of performance standards, rather than

design standards, so that, even if Congress had foreseen the existence of

defective design litigation, a direct conflict between a common law

design standard and a Safety Act performance standard — as exists here

— would be a rare event indeed. See Section IVC, infra.

l6a

therefore, reject General Motors’s argument that the Safety

Act works an express preemption, but we also reject Wood’s

contention that Congress meant by the savings clause to

express approval of the “tension” that would ensue if federal

safety standards and contradictory litigation-created state

design standards were to co-exist. Rather, we think Con-

gress simply overlooked the possibility of the present dilem-

ma, resulting in a statute that lacks clear and express

direction on the subject.

While we, therefore, do not find express preemption,

we are convinced that Congress’s purposes, as revealed in

the Safety Act and in the legislative history, plainly imply a

preemptive intent. The instant product liability claim alleg-

ing that the absence of an air bag rendered the vehicle’s

design faulty would, if upheld, clearly “stand as an obstacle”

to the regulatory scheme of the Safety Act. A state common

law action sustaining the theory that a vehicle was defective

because it lacked an air bag would, in effect, create a state

safety standard related to the same aspect of performance

of FMVSS 208 but not identical to FMVSS 208. Such an

action is, in our view, impliedly preempted because it would

effectively circumvent section 1392(d)’s prohibition of non-

identical state standards covering the same aspect of perfor-

mance as a federal safety standard. Allowing a common law

action holding manufacturers liable for failing to install air

bags in motor vehicles would be tantamount to establishing

a conflicting safety standard that necessarily encroaches

upon the goal of uniformity specifically set forth by Congress

in this area.1°

While our approach, as just stated, is clear, the argu-

ments pro and con involve countless details and byways. In

10 We, of course, do not imply that section 1392(d)’s prohibition

immunizes the manufacturer from liability for defective design of an air

bag.

:

a

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4

i

;

17a

the following sections of this opinion, we explore these mat-

ters extensively.

Ill. PREEMPTION

A. What Congress Meant

The ianguage of the Safety Act sends conflicting signals

on the preemption of state actions for faulty design that

could establish a safety standard not identical to a federal

standard. The potential for ambiguity in special circumstan-

ces like the present is reflected in the preemption clause and

the savings clause. The preemption clause provides:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard

established under this subchapter is in effect, no

State or political subdivision of a State shall have

any authority either to establish, or to continue in

effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of

motor vehicle equipment any safety standard ap-

plicable to the same aspect of performance of such

vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical

to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section

shall be construed as preventing any State from

enforcing any safety standard which is identical to

a Federal safety standard. Nothing in this section

shall be construed to prevent the Federal Govern-

ment or the government of any State or political

subdivision thereof from establishing a safety re-

quirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor

vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such

requirement imposes a higher standard of perfor-

mance than that required to comply with the other-

wise applicable Federal standard.

15 U.S.C. § 1392(d). The savings clause provides:

Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety

standard issued under this subchapter does not

18a

exempt any person from any liability under com-

mon law.

15 U.S.C. § 1397(c).

General Motors and Wood each use the provision

favorable to its or her viewpoint to construct arguments that

Congress expressly meant either to preempt or to preserve

the instant tort action. General Motors argues that as “no

State ... shall have any authority ...to establish . .. any safety

standard applicable to the same aspect of performance...

which is not identicai to the Federal standard,” id § 1392(d),

and as an air bag suit would create a state air bag standard

nonidentical to FMVSS 208, Congress expressly meant to

preempt this type of action. Wood argues that preempting

her theory of liability would effectively “exempt” General

Motors from liability, and that Congress has expressly for-

bidden such a result: “compliance with any Federal motor

vehicle safety standard ... does not exempt any person from

any liability under common law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c). The

district court accepted this latter reading of congressional

intent. It expressed the view that

Congress passed the Safety Act fully aware that

damage suits would be initiated against parties who

complied with the federal regulations. . . . This

Court therefore concludes, as the Supreme Court

did in Silkwood, that Congress recognized and

sanctioned this “tension” between compliance

with federal regulations and state common law

claims.

673 F. Supp. at 1117.

We agree with neither General Motors’s reading of

Congress’s express intent nor with that of Wood and the

district court. We instead reach a third conclusion: Cor-

gress in 1966 did not contemplate the likelihood that there

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19a

would be a state tort action that would effectively create a

state design standard conflicting with a federal safety stand-

ard. As it did not envisage this peculiar type of lawsuit, and

as no reason appears in the legislative history or comes to

mind as to why Congress would have meant to endorse a

state claim having the same effect as a forbidden state

regulation, we do not find that Congress meant to sanction

the “tension” between the FMVSS and state common law

existing in the current situation.!! This interpretation of the

Safety Act and of Congress’s intent is first suggested by the

very fact that the two provisions, read alone, yield such

different results. If Congress had considered the instant type

of tort claim in these facts, it would scarcely have left unex-

plained such a glaring ambiguity. Our reading is supported

by the state of tort law when the Safety Act was passed in

1966 and the legislative history of the Act.

1. Common Law in 1966

In determining questions of preemption, a court “must

examine the [act’s] language against the background of its

legislative history and historical context.” California Federal

Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 691

(1987). Examining the historical context of the Safety Act’s

enactment in 1966, we find it unlikely that anyone in Con-

gress would have considered the possible preemption of

certain defective design actions because there was, up to

1966, hardly any experience at all with cases of that type.

Until the Eighth Circuit’s seminal decision in Larsen v.

General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (alioving

the jury to decide whether a vehicle with a rigid steering

linkage which caused severe injuries to the driver in a front-

end collision was defectively designed), persons injured in

'! We thus disagree with the district court’s assertion that Congress

was “fully aware” of this type of damages action. All the evidence seems

to us strongly to the contrary. See infra.

20a

automobile accidents seldom sued manufacturers on a

theory of design defect, and with the exception of one

decision involving a bus, see Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton

Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954), they did not prevail.

As one commentator noted in 1956, “[t]here is a dearth of

reported cases where negligence in design was urged by

plaintiff as a basis for liability.” Katz, Liability of Automobile

Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 Harv.

L. Rev. 863, 863 n.5 (1956). The commentator concluded

that “[i]t is indeed striking to observe how ineffective the law

has been to date in doing anything about effectuating im-

provements in design to alleviate the daily ‘blood bath of

automobile inspired tragedy.’ ” Jd. at 873 (citation omitted).

Courts were hardly more active in the ten years between

the writing of that comment and the passage of the Safety

Act. In 1967, an article co-authored by Ralph Nader decried

the failure of courts to promote automotive safety:

However, this trend [toward increased liability]

has not extended to automobile manufacturers’

liability for unsafe design of passenger cars. While

a number of suits involving unsafe design have

been settled, plaintiffs have had little luck on the

trial court level. On appeals, plaintiffs are batting

zero. The appellate courts have yet to reverse a

judgment for a manufacturer or affirm a judgment

for a plaintiff in a case involving a traffic accident

allegedly caused by the unsafe design of an

American passenger car.

Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process,

55 Calif. L. Rev. 645, 645-46 (1967). See also Recent Cases,

80 Harv. L. Rev. 688 (1967) (case comment on Evans v.

General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966)); Note,

Manufacturer’s Liability for an “Uncrashworthy” Automobile.

52 Cornell L.Q. 444 (1967). Seen in this context, it would

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4

2la

not be surprising for the Congress which enacted the Safety

Act to have failed to perceive the possible conflict between

state defective design suits and the new federal motor vehicle

safety standards.

We do not mean to suggest that broadened design

liability, as reflected by Larsen v. General Motors Corp., was

entirely unforeseeable. At least since 1916 manufacturers

had been held liable for manufacturing defects which caused

accidents. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,

111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Furthermore, the Restatement of

Torts contained a general principle of liability for defective

design. See Restatement of Torts § 398 (1938).}2

However, despite the theoretical possibility of bringing

them, defective design actions against automobile manufac-

turers were an unpromising and for that reason, virtually

non-existent breed in 1966. First, it was not at all clear just

how the law relative to design would be applied. In an early

article advocating increased liability for defective design,

Professor Noel noted that

in the design cases, particularly those involving

widely-used products made by established

manufacturers, judges and juries have been under-

standably hesitant to impose liability. This hesita-

tion results partly from a reluctance to let a jury

pass on a product prepared by experts in the field,

2 The section provides that

A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design

which makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufac-

tured is subject to liability to others whom he should expect

to use the chattel lawfully or to be in the vicinity of its

probable use for bodily harm caused by his failure to exercise

reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design.

Restatement of Torts § 398 (1934). See also Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 398 (1965).

22a

and partly from the realization that a judgment for

a particular plaintiff may open the door to many

additional claims and suits.

Noel, Manufacturer’s Negligence of Design or Directions for

Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816, 816 (1962). See also

Nader & Page, 55 Calif. L. Rev. at 653-54 (noting that

although-courts recognize “some sort of duty with respect to

design,” “a duty with respect to design which is defined in

terms so narrow as to eliminate virtually any possibility of

finding breach of duty differs little from a judicial determina-

tion that no duty exists.”). Indeed, as of 1966, no plaintiff

had yet prevailed on a claim that an automobile was defec-

tively designed. In the legal climate of 1966 one could not

tell to what degree, if any, design defect suits would ever have

an effect on automobile safety.

Furthermore, prior to the Larsen decision, plaintiffs had

an especially tough burden if they alleged not that the design

defect caused the accident but that a design defect made a

car less safe in an accident or in other situations of misuse —

types of defects which, as noted above, were a special con-

cern of the Safety Act. Under either the theory of “intended

use” or “patent danger,” see Note, 52 Cornell L.Q. at 447-49,

a plaintiff would likely lose because the automobile was not

intended to be misused or because plaintiff should have been

aware of the alleged defect and was thus solely at fault. See,

e.g., Amason v. Ford Motor Co.. 80 F.2d 265 (Sth Cir. 1935)

(alleged defective design was passenger door hinged at the

rear and a door handle which could catch a passenge®’s hand,

resulting in the death of plaintiff when he tried to open and

shut the door while the car was moving at high speed; sum-

mary judgment affirmed for defendant because decedent’s

actions were not “ordinary use” and decedent should have

known of the danger); Poore v. Edgar Brothers Cw, 33 Cal.

App.2d 6, 90 P.2d 808 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (alleged

Se

23a

defective design was the use of plain glass rather than safety

glass in automobile door; demurrer upheld for defendant

because “the glass in [automobile] windows is not intended

to withstand blows as part of its ordinary use”) ; Muncy v.

General Motors Corp., 357 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)

(alleged defective design was ignition key switch which al-

lowed key to be removed while car was running and in gear,

resulting in accidental injury to a pedestrian; plea of privilege

upheld for defendant because driver was “well aware” of the

design of the key switch and because driver failed to use the

car for its intended purpose).!3

In fact, the very year that Congress passed the Safety

Act, a federal appeals court ruled that a plaintiff had failed

to state a claim by alleging that a car was uncrashworthy. See

Evans v. General Motors Corp.. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied. 385 U.S. 836 (1966) (alleged design defect was the

use of an X-shaped frame which lacked protective side rails).

The court invoked the doctrines of intended use — “The

intended purpose of an automobile does not include its

participation in collisions” — and patent danger — “A

manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile

accident-proof or fool-proof; nor must he render the vehicle

‘more’ safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all.”

Id. at 824-25. The Evans court explained that requiring

manufacturers to design crashworthy cars might be a

desirable goal, but that “that would be a legislative function,

not an aspect of judicial interpretation of existing law.” Jd. at

824.

Congress may or may not have known of the Evans

decision when it passed the Safety Act, but Evans plainly

shows that in the historical context of 1966, persons then

'3 One decision did allow aclaim thata manufacturing defect rendered

a vehicle uncrashworthy. See Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th

Cir. 1959).

24a

concerned with automobile safety would likely have attached

little practical importance to claims of design defects alleged

to have rendered a car uncrashworthy.

Even if Congress foresaw defective design lawsuits, a

further reason Congress would not have anticipated the

current preemption problem is that, even among the body

of lawsuits claiming defective design, only a few would be

likely, as here, to establish what is in practical effect a new

safety standard. This is so because the Safety Act authorizes

promulgation of “performance” rather than design stand-

ards as such. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2). Although, as this case

shows there can be a direct clash between a standard for

performance and for design, see Section IVC, D, supra, it will

be rare that a design standard established in a lawsuit will

overlap and conflict with a performance standard estab-

lished under the Safety Act.

We conclude that it is unrealistic to ascribe to the

authors of the Safety Act, and to Congress generally, an

awareness that in the years ahead a new breed of state tort

actions would be developed from which design standards

might emerge that, on some rare occasion, might create a

direct conflict with a particular FMVSS. Thus when Con-

gress inserted the savings clause, it did not contemplate that

lawsuits would be brought with the potential to give rise to

the current dilemma.

2. The Legislative History

The legislative history of the Safety Act likewise indi-

cates that neither the preemption clause nor the savings

clause Specifically addressed the status of conflicting design

standards established through the mechanism of common

law suits for defective automobile design. Neither party has

directed us to a single legislative reference to actions for

design defects. Instead, the legislative history, like the

savings clause itself, employs more general terms such as

25a

“common law standards of care,” Senate Report, 1966 U.S.

Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2720, “rights of parties under

common law particularly those relating to warranty, con-

tract, and tort liability,” H. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d

Sess. 24 (1966), “common-law remedy,” 112 Cong. Rec.

19,663 (1966) (remarks of Representative Dingell), and

“common law on product liability,” 112 Cong. Rec. 14,230

(1966) (remarks of Senator Magnuson). These, as indicated

above, would not before 1966 have been based upon claims

of inadequate design.

The fullest discussion in the legislative history of the

Safety Act’s impact on state law leaves the exact same am-

biguity as the Act’s conflicting preemption and savings

clauses. The Senate Report has a brief section with the

promising title, “Effect on State Law”:

EFFECT ON STATE LAW

The centralized, mass production, high

volume character of the motor vehicle manufactur-

ing industry in the United States requires that

motor vehicle safety standards be not only strong

and adequately enforced, but that they be uniform

throughout the country. At the same time, the

committee believes that the States should be free

to adopt standards identical to the Federal stand-

ards, which apply only to the first sale of a new

vehicle, so that the States may play a significant

role in the vehicle safety field by applying and

enforcing standards over the life of the car. Ac-

cordingly, State standards are preempted only if

they differ from Federal standards applicable to

the particular aspect of the vehicle or item of

vehicle equipment (sec. 104).

26a

The States are also permitted to set more

stringent requirements for purposes of their own

procurement. Moreover, the Federal minimum

safety standards need not be interpreted as

restricting State common law standards of care.

Compliance with such standards would not neces-

sarily shield any person from product liability at

common law.

Senate Report, 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at

2720. On the one hand, “State standards are preempted only

if they differ from Federal standards.” On the other hand,

the Safety Act “need not be interpreted as restricting State

common law standards of care.” The dichotomy, we believe,

reflects a Congress that never had occasion to consider what

would occur if a state product liability action itself created

an overlapping automobile design standard so similar to

FMVSS as to raise the question of the former’s preemption

by the latter.!4 Instead Congress had in mind the then cus-

l47he statements of Senator Magnuson and Representative Dingell

cited in Wood’s brief are no more illuminating than the Senate Report.

Senator Magnuson’s statement that “compliance with Federal standards

would not necessarily shield any person from broad liability at common

law” is paired with the observation that “(t]he centralized, mass produc-

tion and high volume character of the manufacturing industry requires

that the safety standards be not only strong and adequately enforced but,

as I say, also uniform.” 112 Cong. Rec. at 14,230. Representative

Dingell stated that “we have preserved every single common-law remedy

that exists against a manufacturer for the benefit of a motor vehicle

purchaser. This means that all of the warranties and all of the other

devices of common law which are afforded to the purchaser, remain in

the buyer, and they can be exercised against the manufacturer.” Jd at

19,663. However, Representative Dingell’s remarks were made in op-

position to an amendment which would have provided criminal penalties

for manufacturers who violated the federal safety standards. He argued

that state tort suits would be an additional incentive for manufacturers

to comply with federal standards, and thus that criminal penalties were

not required. In this context, Representative Dingell’s remarks refer to

27a

tomary “State common law standards of care” pertaining to

the negligent operation or manufacture of vehicles, coupled,

no doubt, with warranty claims then customary, none of

which had the potential to create the present problem.

We accordingly divine no specific congressional intent

in section 1392(d) expressly to preempt an action of the

present type. Nor do we construe the savings clause (section

1397(c)) as reflecting any specific congressional concern to

preserve design actions such as the present which would, in

effect, create standards different from federal safety stand-

ards promulgated under the Safety Act.

B. Implied Preemption

Having found that Congress did not, in the language of

the Safety Act, make an explicit statement regarding

preemption of state claims that create, in effect, a state

design standard not identical to a federal standard, we turn

next to whether the Safety Act impliedly preempts the

present action. Cf. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107

S. Ct. 805, 812 (1987) (“Given that the Act itself does not

speak directly to the issue, the Court must be guided by the

goals and policies of the Act in determining whether it in fact

preempts [state law].”).!5 The kind of implied preemption

that would be applicable here is “where the state law stands

as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes

and objectives of Congress.” Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline

State tort suits which enforce federal standards, and not to suits which

would create different standards..

| Wood argues that the savings clause, section 1397(c), precludes any

use of implied preemption analysis. We have already touched upon this

above, pointing out Congress’s unawareness in 1966, when the savings

clause was enacted, that lawsuits would give rise to what are, in effect,

state design standards. For this and other reasons discussed at length

| later in this opinion, we reject Wood’s argument that the savings clause

precludes implied preemption. See Section IVB, infra.

28a

Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1151 (1988) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz,

312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). See, e.g. Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v.

Connolly. 839 F.2d 837 (Ist Cir. 1988) (holding that the

Williams Act preempted the Massachusetts anti-takeover

statute; the state law stood as an obstacle to Congress's

preferred balance between management and shareholders);

Hernandez-Colon v. Secretary of Labor, 835 F.2d 958 (Ist

Cir. 1988) (holding that the Job Training Partnership Act

preempted a Puerto Rico law giving the Governor veto

power over the formation of intermunicipal bodies; the state

law stood as an obstacle to the federal law’s equilibrium

between state and local interests).

in a case decided after the district court had ruled on

General Motors’s motion for summary judgment, the

Supreme Court made clear that in implied preemption

analysis, one must look to interference with Congress's

chosen method as well as to the ultimate goal of the statute.

See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).

Quellette dealt with the implied preemption of common law

water pollution suits by the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The

Court explained,

In determining whether Vermont nuisance law

“stands as an obstacle” to the full implementation

of the CWA, it is not enough to say that the ultimate

goal of both federal and state law is to eliminate

water pollution. A state law also is preempted if it

interferes with the methods by which the federal

statute was designed to reach this goal.

Id. at 813 (citing Michigan Canners & Freezers Association v.

Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 477

(1984)).

We believe that this “stand as an obstacle” type of

preemption preempts Wood’s design defect claim based on

the absence of an air bag. Even though the goal of Wood's

29a

design defect action might be the same as that of the Safety

Act — that is, to increase automobile safety — Wood’s

theory of recovery is preempted by FMVSS 208 and the

Safety Act because it interferes with the method by which

Congress intended to meet this goal.

Our analysis, set out below, has three steps. (1) Astate

regulation requiring passive restraints would be expressly

preempted by section 1392(d) of the Safety Act. (2) Wood’s

state law tort action would have an effect similar to such a

prohibited state regulation. (3) As Wood’s design defect

claim, if successful, would have the same effect as an imper-

mussible state regulation, it is preempted because it stands as

an obstacle to Congress’s chosen method for achieving auto

Safety.

1. A State Air Bag Regulation

Would Be Preempted

There is no question but that a nonconforming air bag

or other passive restraint regulation issued by the Mas-

sachusetts legislature or state or local agency would be ex-

pressly preempted by section 1392(d) of the Safety Act. The

State regulation might provide, for example, that “all vehicles

registered in this State must be equipped with passive

restraints.” The federal standard, as applicable to multipur-

pose vehicles like the Blazer, has three optional modes of

compliance, any one of which would be acceptable: vehicles

must be equipped with seat belts and shoulder harnesses,

with passive restraints, or with some combination of lap belts

and passive restraints. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, $4.1.2. Com-

paring the federal standard and hypothetical state regula-

tion, the state regulation is “applicable to the same aspect of

performance” as the federal standard, but is “not identical”

to the federal standard. Whereas the federal standard al-

lows seat belts and shoulder harnesses alone, the hypotheti-

cal state regulation requires passive restraints. Thus. the

30a

state standard is expressly preempted by section 1392(d),

which provides that “no State or political subdivision of a

State shall have any authority either to establish, or to con-

tinue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of

motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to

the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of

equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.”

In the hypothetical regulation presented, which is

directly applicable to the present case, application of section

1392(d)’s preemption of standards “applicable tw the : sme

aspect of performance” as a federal standard is neither

difficult nor controversial. However, in order to show the

high degree of conflict between such a state standard and

FMVSS 208, we elaborate on just why a state air bag regula-

tion is preempted by section 1392(d) and FMVSS 208.

The key issue in deciding whether a state regulation is

preempted by section 1392(d) is defining the “aspect of

performance” addressed by the applicable FMVSS. The

question is difficult and important: depending on how

broadly one defines the “aspect of performance,” the federal

regulation will have either a broad or narrow scope of

preemption. Fortunately, in Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416

F.2d 319 (Ist Cir. 1969), this court already has outlined the

procedure for deciding the “aspect of performance” of a

FMVSS.

In Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, the question was whether

a New Hampshire regulation prohibiting the sale of cars

equipped with a supplementary light for night driving (the

“Super Lite”) was preempted by FMVSS 108, which regu-

lated “lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment.”

FMVSS 108 had no provisions directly addressed to the

Super Lite. Nonetheless, Chrysler claimed that the New

Hampshire regulation was preempted by FMVSS 108 and

section 1392(d). Chrysler argued that the “purpose and

3la

scope” section of FMVSS 108 established the “aspect of

performance” for purposes of preemption under section

1392(d). FMVSS 108, section 1, provided:

Purpose and scope. This standard specifies require-

ments for lamps, reflective devices, and associated

equipment, for signalling and to enable safe opera-

tion in darkness and other conditions of reduced

visibility.

416 F.2d at 322. Relying on this section, Chrysler argued that

the “aspect of performance” addressed by FMVSS 108 was

“safe operation in darkness,” and that a state regulation

covering the Super Lite was preempted because it too re-

lated to safe operation in darkness. We rejected this argu-

ment.

While “the purpose and scope” section of a federal

standard may well be the starting point in defining

“aspect of performance,” the inquiry cannot end

there. In our view, resort must be had to the

specific requirements and categories of the stand-

ard....

Id. at 325. As FMVSS 108 had no specific requirements

addressed to items like the Super Lite, we held that the New

Hampshire regulation was not preempted.

In this case, the state air bag regulation is not preempted

solely because it falls within the broad purpose and scope

provisions of the federal standard.!6 Rather, the air bag

16 FMVSS 208 has separate “scope” and “purpose” sections:

Sl. Scope. This standard specifies performance requirements

for the protection of vehicle occupants in crashes.

S.2. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to reduce the

number of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity of

injuries, by specifying vehicle crashworthiness requirements

in terms of forces and accelerations measured on anthropo-

regulation is preempted because it is addressed to “the same

aspect of performance," no matter how narrowly one defines

that term, as the federal regulation. First, by including pas-

sive restraints as an option for complying with FMVSS 208,

NHTSA has left no doubt that passive restraints are within

the “aspect of performance” addressed by the federal stand-

ard. Furthermore, the history of FMVSS 208 shows ir-

refutably that passive restraints are within the “aspect of

performance” covered by the standard. All of the regulatory

changes, lawsuits, and congressional actions have focused on

the same question as that presented by Wood’s lawsuit: are

seat belts adequate to protect occupants in crashes, or are

passive restraint required? See pages 8-11, supra. In these

circumstances, we have no doubt that a hypothetical state air

bag regulation would be addressed to the same “aspect of

performance” as FMVSS 208, and would thus be expressly

preempted by section 1392(d) of the Safety Act.

2. Wood’s Tort Action Would Have An

Effect Similar To A State Regulation

If Wood prevailed in her defective design claim, the

effect would be similar to state promulgation of the

hypothetical state air bag regulation discussed above. The

Supreme Court has recognized the regulatory effect of

damages awards.

{R]egulation can be as effectively exerted through

an award of damages as through some form of

preventive relief. The obligation to pay compen-

sation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent

method of governing conduct and controlling

policy.

morphic dummies in test crashes, and by specifying equip-

ment requirements for active and passive restraint systems.

49 C.F.R. § 571.208.

33a

San Diego Building Trades Council v.Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,

247 (1959). In Palmer v. Liggett Group. Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (Ist

Cir. 1987), this court recently held that a state tort suit was

preempted because it had a regulatory effect. Palmer in-

volved the preemptive scope of the Federal Cigarette Label-

ing and Advertising Act as applied to a state tort suit based

on a theory of inadequate warning. Like the Safety Act, the

Labeling Act forbade states from imposing different labeling

requirements, but did not expressly mention state tort suits.

We thus accepted plaintiff's argument that the tort suit was

not expressly preempted. Nonetheless, we ruled that the suit

was impliedly preempted because it had a similar effect to

direct state regulation. We explained that if this suit were

not preempted, it would “arrogate[] to a single jury the

regulatory power explicitly denied to all fifty states’ legisla-

tive bodies.” Jd. at 628.17

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has similar-

ly acknowledged that the purpose of automobile design

defect suits is to set state design standards, and that such suits

have much the same effect as legislative standards. In Smith

v. Anens, 375 Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d 954 (1978), the

Supreme Judicial Court considered whether it would follow

Evans v. General Motors Corp. (not allowing suits based on

uncrashworthiness) or Larsen v. General Motors Corp.

(seminal case allowing suits based on uncrashworthiness, see

supra). The court decided to follow Larsen, explaining as

follows:

The major argument against the imposition of

liability for negligent design which results in en-

\7 We are well aware, as Wood vigorously asserts, that Palmer is

distinguishable from the present case. Unlike the Safety Act, the Label-

ing Act was designed to protect the tobacco industry as well as to increase

safety. In addition, the Labeling Act had no savings clause. However,

with respect to the regulatory effect of a state tort suit, Palmer is directly

applicable.

34a

hanced injury is that the Legislature, rather than

the judiciary, should determine design standards.

See Evans v. General Motors Corp. . .. However,

as noted in Larsen, “{t]he common law is not

sterile or rigid and serves the best interests of

society by adapting standards of conduct and

responsibility that fairly meet the emerging and

developing needs of our time. The common law

standard of a duty to use reasonable care in light

of all the circumstances can at least serve the needs

of our society until the legislature imposes higher

standards.”

Smith v. Ariens, 375 Mass. at 624-25, 377 N.E.2d at 957

(citing Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d at 506).

Wood argues that her suit will have no regulatory effect

because General Motors has the choice of paying the

damages award without modifying the design of its vehicles.

This argument might have some force in certain cases, if, for

example, the claimed design defect was highly particular to

the vehicle involved, or the accident was in some way un-

usual. With respect to a claim that a vehicle is defective

because it lacks air bags, however, it seems obvious that a

damages award will have a pronounced effect on the

manufacturer’s future conduct. The same theory of recovery

could be pursued by every front seat occupant injured in a

multipurpose vehicle. It is well known that injuries to front

seat occupants are frequent; well over 20 lawsuits have been

filed on the theory of absence of air bags in the last two years.

See section ILE supra. In these circumstances, General

Motors’s choice to avoid modification of its design “seems

akin to the free choice of coming up for air after being

underwater.” Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627.

We also disagree with the district court’s statement that

in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 464 U.S. 238 (1983), the

35a

Supreme Court “found that the impact of such [tort] awards

should be considered narrowly.”!8 673 F. Supp. at 1117.

Silkwood, in fact, affirms that tort awards have regulatory

effect. The issue in Silkwood was the preemptive scope of

federal nuclear safety regulations on state tort law. Nuclear

safety was a difficult area because Congress had enacted two

potentially conflicting sets of laws. On the one hand, the

Supreme Court had recently decided that federal safety

regulations occupied the field of nuclear safety, precluding

any direct state regulation. 464 U.S. at 240-41. On the other

hand, Congress had enacted the Price-Anderson Act, 42

U.S.C. § 2210 (1982), which limited the aggregate liability of

nuclear facilities resulting from accidents. The very exist-

ence of the Price-Anderson Act implied that Congress in-

tended that nuclear facilities be liable for damages caused

by nuclear accidents.

The specific issue in Silkwood was whether a plaintiff

could receive punitive damages; her right to compensatory

'8 This court has already indicated our disagreement with this inter-

pretation of Silkwood. The district court's reading of Silkwood was

adopted at least in part from the district court’s opinion in Palmer (the

Cigarette labeling case). The Palmer district court had argued that

Silkwood discredited the Garmon reasoning that tort suits have a

regulatory effect. In reversing the Palmer district court, we rejected this

argument:

The district court evidently believed that Garmon’s reason-

ing had been discredited by the Supreme Court's decision in

Silkwood — even though nothing in Silkwood even remotely

suggests that Garmon has been qualified or overruled, and

even though the Court in Silkwood stated that federal law will

“preempt the recovery of damages based on state law” when-

ever “imposition of a state standard in a damages action

would frustrate, the objectives of the federal law.”

Palmer, 825 F.2d at 628 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.

at 256).

36a

damages was unquestioned. The defendant argued that as

punitive damages are imposed solely to change conduct,

these types of damages were impliedly preempted. In a 5-4

decision, the Court found that punitive damages awards

were not preempted.

The Court’s reasoning, however, affirmed that compen-

satory damages awards have a regulatory effect. It agreed

with the defendant that “there is a tension between the

conclusion that safety regulation is the exclusive concern of

the federal law and the conclusion that a State may

nevertheless award damages based on its own law of

liability.” 464 U.S. at 256. The “tension” was that “the award

of damages based on state law is regulatory in the sense that

a nuclear plant will be threatened with damages liability if it

does not conform to state standards.” Silkwood does not

support the proposition that damages awards lack regulatory

effect.19

19 The district court also relied upon a partial sentence in a footnote

in a dissent joined by four members of the Court - “[t]here is no element

of regulation when compensatory damages are awarded.” Silkwood, 464

U.S. at 276 n.3 (Powell, J.). Aside from the general problem with

drawing principles of law from dissents, the district court quoted the

statement out of context. Justice Powell, in dissent, was attempting to

highlight the differences between compensatory damages (which all

Justices agreed to be permissible) and punitive damages. In making this

argument, he wrote,

The distinction in this case between the two types of damages

is of major importance. There is no element of regulation

when compensatory damages are awarded, especially when

liability is imposed without fault as authorized by state law.

Id. This statement does not apply to all suits for compensatory

damages, but to those areas of law, like nuclear power, where the

defendant may be found liable without any finding of fault. See generally

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (the general principle of abnormally

dangerous activities). In contrast, automobiles are not “abnormally

dangerous,” and General Motors in this case can only be found liable if

37a

We recognize that in Silkwood, after thoroughly ex-

amining the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act, the

Court held that Congress intended that there be a “tension”

between the Price-Anderson Act and the exclusive federal

control of nuclear safety. As the Court explained, since

Congress decided to tolerate this tension, “[w]e can do no

less.” Wood insists that the present case is just iike Silkwood

— Congress intended there to be a tension between the

Savings clause (section 1397(c)) and the preemption

provision of the Safety Act, and it is the courts’ duty to abide

by this congressional @ecision favoring tension. We find no

parallel, however, between the circumstances here and in

Silkwood. Wood is unable to suggest any convincing reason

why Congress would want to encourage states to impose an

inconsistent safety standard of this nature by lawsuits but not

by regulations. We shall discuss this further below.

3. The Air Bag Suit Is Impliedly Preempted

We think it plain that Wood’s action, if successful, would

stand as an obstacle to Congress’s chosen method of increas-

ing automobile safety. See Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. at 813. While

“courts should not lightly infer preemption,” Wood’s

product liability action must bow to the supremacy of federal

law because it disturbs the Safety Act’s allocation of

authority between the federal government and the states. Jd.

at 811.

Congress, in enacting the Safety Act, set up a clear

division of authority between the states and the federal

government. If the federal government has not issued a

safety standard on a certain aspect of performance, the

states are allowed to set their own standards in these areas.

the jury finds that the Blazer was defective because it lacked air bags. If

indeed Massachusetts law did place accident liability on automobile

manutacturers regardless of whether the vehicle was defectively designed,

then compensatory damages would have less of a regulatory effect.

38a

However, Congress decided that once the federal govern-

ment had promulgated a standard, the states’ usual role in

setting safety standards was subordinated in the interest of

national uniformity. When a federal standard is in effect, the

states are prohibited from establishing a nonidentical stand-

ard, see 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) ; and their role is then limited to

enforcing the federal standard, id. and to issuing higher,

standards for vehicles procured for their own use. Jd. The

states are also free to consult with federal authorities. Jd. at

§ 1392(f). aie

This division of authority between state and federal

government was part of Congress’s chosen method for im-

plementing the Safety Act. Congress believed that for the

federal standards to be effective, they had to be uniform

throughout the country. See 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d); Senate

Report, 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2720

(“The centralized, mass production, high volume character

of the motor vehicle manufacturing industry in the United

States requires that motor vehicle safety standards be not

only strong and adequately enforced, but that they be

uniform throughout the country.”).

Congress thus inte.ded that all of the FMVSS, includ-

ing FMVSS 208, be uniform national standards. A state

regulation requiring passive restraints would be expressly

preempted because it would destroy the uniformity of the

federal standard, and exceed the Safety Act’s prescribed role

for state regulation. By the same token, a defective design

action which, if successful, effectively would require the

installation of passive restraints, would likewise destroy the

national uniformity of the federal standard and exceed the

state’s authority. Thus, although Wood’s air bag suit is not

expressly preempted by the Safety Act, it is impliedly

preempted because it presents an “actual conflict” with the

Safety Act — specifically because it “stands as an obstacle”

39a

to Congress’s determination that safety is best served by

having uniform national standards.

Wood’s response, as aiready indicated, is that Congress

manifested its intent via the savings clause to allow Wood's

air bag suit notwithstanding its direct impact on the unifor-

mity of federal standards, and notwithstanding Congress’s

refusal to allow the states to mandate air bags through direct

regulation. As preemption is always a question of congres-

sional intent, we would, of course, find no preemption if we

were Satisfied that Congress did, in fact, intend to allow the

courts to accomplish what a state was otherwise prohibited

from doing. We are not, however, so convinced.

The Supreme Court in Silkwood did not lay down some

kind of general rule that “tension” between federal regula-

tion and clashing state product liability law is generally

favored. Silkwood merely held, on its own facts, that such

tension was there envisaged by Congress. In Silkwoud, the

Court had the entire Price-Anderson Act as evidence that

Congress intended that nuclear facilities would be subject to

common law liability. The availability of state actions for

compensatory damages was, indeed, uncontested. The only

issue was the availability of punitive damages, and the Court

observed that “punitive damages have long been a part of

traditional state tort law.” In contrast, the only evidence here

of a possible congressional intent to sanction the handful of

design defect actions that might create standards which clash

directly with federal standards is section 1397(c), a general

savings clause which applies to the universe of state tort

actions. As earlier explained, automobile design defect ac-

tions, particularly ones based on a theory of uncrashworthi-

ness, were not in 1966 an established “part of traditional tort

law,” and the legislative history gives no evidence that Con-

gress anticipated the present dilemma. For this and other

reasons discussed below, the language in the savings clause

40a

retusing to exempt persons from liability under common law

because of compliance with a safety standard does not reflect

Congress’s intention to avoid preemption of those few and

unique design actions that would have the effect of creating

a state safety standard in direct conflict with an existing

FMVSS.

In Silkwood, moreover, regulations implementing the

Price-Anderson Act specifically mentioned punitive

damages, indicating that the federal agency believed that

punitive damages were allowed Jd. at 255. In this case,

there is no comparable signal from NHTSA indicating that

state product liability actions should be allowed to establish

state safety standards that conflict directly with relevant

federal standards.

Less obvious, but even more important, the preemption

claimed by the defendant in Silkwood was more akin to the

“occupy the field variety” than the “actual conflict” type

(which applies in this case). In Silkwood, the theory of

liability did not focus on any specific portion of the nuclear

facility’s design nor on any particular procedure of the defen-

dant. Accordingly, the suit had little potential for estab-

lishing a state safety standard; the opinion never discusses a

single federal safety standard that was potentially threatened

by a judicially created state standard. The court was careful

to state that if a common law suit did present an actual

conflict with federal law, the suit would be preempted.

We do not suggest that there could never be an

instance in which the federal law would pre-empt

the recovery of damages based on state law. But

insofar as damages for radiation injuries are con-

cerned, pre-emption should not be judged on the

basis that the Federal Government has so com-

pletely preoccupied the field of safety that state

remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an

4la

irreconcilable conflict between the federal and

state standards or whether the imposition of a state

standard in a damage action would frustrate the

objectives of federal law. We perceive no such

conflict or frustration in the circumstances of this

case. ;

Id. at 256. We believe the Court would be much less willing

to find that Congress created a “tension” between federal

law and state common law when the state law, as here,

evidences an actual conflict. Where Wood’s action creates

an actual conflict, Silkwood offers little support for Wood’s

contention that Congress intended state product liability

Suits to impose standards that would disrupt the uniformity

of federal safety standards.

We conclude that the air bag claim, being in direct

conflict with federal safety standards, is impliedly preempted

by the Safety Act, and that the savings clause does not

evidence a contrary congressional intention.

IV. OTHER ARGUMENTS

A. The FMVSS are Not Merely Minimum

Standards

Wood argues that because the Safety Act defines the

FMVSS as minimum standards, they cannot preempt more

stringent state standards.” This argument has no merit.

Although the standards are “minimum” in the sense that a

manufacturer may make a vehicle safer than required by

20 The definitional section of the Safety Act includes the following

provision:

“Motor vehicle safety standards” means a minimum standard

for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment

performance, which is practicable, which meets the need for

motor vehicle safety and provides objective criteria

15 U.S.C § 1391(2).

42a

federal law, the standards are not “minimum” in relation to

state law. Section 1392(d) provides that states are forbidden

from establishing standards not “identical” to a federal

standard. Thus section 1392 preempts state standards which

are either more or less stringent than the federal standard.

B. The Savings Clause Does Not Foreclose

Implied Preemption

Wood argues that two recent Supreme Court cases

establish the following “principle”: when a statute contains

a savings clause, “it is not within the province” of a court to

engage in implied preemption analysis. Applying this prin-

ciple, Wood argues that “Congress has expressly stated its

intention” to preserve the state air bag claim, and that we

should thus not look at implied preemption.

We disagree both with Wood’s “principle” and with the

proposed application of the principle to this case. With

regard to the latter point, the Safety Act, even on its face,

does not express an unambiguous intent to preserve a state

suit that conflicts with a federal safety standard. As noted in

Section ITIA, above, the Safety Act contains both a savings

clause which would preserve the claim and a preemption

provision that would preclude the claim. Neither provision

can be read in isolation, and thus we have no choice but to

look beyond the face of the statute to find Congress’s intent

with respect to preemption of the air bag claim. Thus even

if Wood’s principle were correct, it would not apply in the

present case.

Moreover, Wood’s proposed principle is not supported

by the Supreme Court cases on preemption. Wood mainly

relies on California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.

Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987), which addressed the preemp-

tive scope of the pregnancy discrimination provisions of the

Civil Rights Act. Wood in particular focuses on Justice

43a

Marshall’s statement?! that because the Civil Rights Act has

two savings clauses, “there is no need to infer congressional

intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions

of the [act].” Jd. at690. Wood fails to mention, however, that

one of the savings clauses in the Civil Rights Act provides, in

effect, that implied preemption analysis must be applied to

state laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (preempting state laws

that are “inconsistent with any purposes of this Act, or any

provision thereof’). Accordingly, Justice Marshall stated

that part of his inquiry was whether the state law was “incon-

sistent with the purposes of the statute.” Thus Wood’s

proposed principle — which applies in situations where a

savings clause arguably forecloses the use of implied

preemption analysis — has absolutely nothing to do with

Guerra — a Situation where the “savings clause” mandates

implied preemption analysis. In fact, it is ironic that Wood

cites Justice Marshall’s opinion to argue against implied

preemption — both Justice Scalia, concurring separately,

and Professor Tribe have criticized Justice Marshall’s

opinion for ranging too far afield in its implied preemption

analysis. See id. at 697 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-

ment); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Laws 6-26, at 482-

83 n.8 (2d ed. 1988).

The other case cited by Wood, California Coastal Com-

mission v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987), also fails

to support the principle that a savings clause prevents a court

from applying implied preemption analysis. Granite Rock

involved a facial challenge to a system of state mining permits

on the basis of preemption by several federal laws. One of

these laws, the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”),

had a broadly worded savings clause, and the Court relied on

this clause to hold that the CZMA did not preempt the state

2IThis quotation is taken from Part III-A of Guerra, which was joined

only by a plurality of the Court. Jd at 686.

44a

law in question. Jd. at 1430. However, as Granite Rock

involved a facial challenge to the state law, the Court only

held that the CZMA did not “occupy the field”; the Court

also stated that state law might be preempted if there was an

actual conflict with the CZMA. The Court wrote that the

CZMA did not preempt state law “except in cases of actual

conflict,” and that “the CZMA does not automatically

preempt all state regulation.” Jd. at 1430-31 (emphasis

added).

If there is a general principle with respect to the applica-

tion of implied preemption analysis to statutes with general

savings clauses, it may be closer to that advocated by amicus

curiae Product Liability Advisory Council: “general savings

clauses may not be read literally to permit common law

actions that contradict and subvert a statutory scheme.”

There are Supreme Court cases that support this view. In

Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.

(Abilene). 204 U.S. 426 (1907), the question was whether a

shipper’s common law suit to recover an unreasonably high

shipping charge was preempted because the railroad had

filed its rate schedule with the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission ("ICC"). The shipper, arguing against preemption,

relied on a savings clause in the “act to regulate com-

merce.” The clause provided

Nothing in this act contained shall in any way

abridge or alter the remedies now existing at com-

mon law or by statute, but the provisions of this act

are in addition to such remedies.

Id. at 446. In spite of this clause, the Court proceeded to

engage in-implied preemption analysis: a

[A]s it is conceded that the act to regulate com-

merce did not in so many words abrogate such

[common law] right, it follows that the contention

that the right was taken away by the act to regulate

45a

commerce rests upon the proposition that such

result was accomplished by implication.

Id. at 436. The Court went on to hold that the shipper’s

common law suit was “wholly inconsistent” with the ad-

ministrative scheme of the Commerce Act, and that the

shipper could not proceed with its suit.

In the recent Supreme Court decision addressing the

preemptive scope of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), the

Court again used implied preemption analysis despite the

presence of a broad savings clause. The issue in Ouellette

was whether interstate nuisance suits (Le., suits brought by a

oom, in one state against a polluter in another state) were

preempted by the CWA. The CWA contains two broad

savings clauses, including the following provision:

Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which

any person (or class of persons) may have under

any statute or common law to seek enforcement of

any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any

other relief ....

33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). Despite this provision, the Court held

that the CWA did “not speak directly to the issue” of

preempting interstate nuisance suits, because the provision

started with the words “nothing in this section” (which was

the only section dealing with private causes of action) rather

than the words “nothing in this law.” 107 S. Ct. at 812. The

Court then proceeded to apply implied preemption analysis,

and found that interstate nuisance suits were preempted

unless they employed the law of the source state. Otherwise,

the Court explained, the common law action would disturb

the balance between source states and affected states, and

would interfere with the CWA’s policy of having predictable

standards. Jd. at 814.

46a

Although the Court in Ouellette found some ambiguity

in the CWA’s savings clause, the decision shows a general

reluctance by the Court to follow a savings clause if state law

will actually conflict with a federal regulatory scheme. The

Court explained that “we do not believe that Congress in-

tended to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a

general saving clause.” Jd. at 812. The Court also implied

that in certain statutes the savings clause might be a

boilerplate provision that Congress did not mean to apply in

cases of actual conflict. The Court wrote:

The fact that the language of [the saving clause] is

repeated in haec verba in the citizen suit provisions

of a vast array of environmental legislation . . .

indicates that it does not reflect any considered

judgment about what other remedies were pre-

viously available or continue to be available under

any particular statute.

Id. at 812 n.14 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois. 451 U.S. 304,

329 n.22 (1981)).

Abilene and Ouellette belie the supposed principle that

a general savings clause precludes a court from looking into

implied preemption. On the other hand, we do not adopt

the opposite conclusion — that implied preemption always

applies.. Rather, in each case the question requires a close

reading of the statute and a thorough examination of con-

gressional intent. In this case, the ambiguity created by

section 1392(d) in combination with the savings clause, com-

bined with the paucity of design defect suits at the time the

Safety Act was passed, leads us to conclude that Congress

Ww ave intended to preempt any state standard like this

(ev ough established through the medium of a design

la rather than by a state regulation) that, in the parlance

of implied preemption analysis, “actually conflict[s]” with

the Safety Act.

47a

C. Performance Standards v. Design Standards

Plaintiff argues that a state product liability action can

never conflict with a FMVSS because product liability

actions establish design standards, while under the Safety

Act, NHTSA may only promulgate performance standards.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (“ ‘Motor vehicle safety standards’

means a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance,

or motor vehicle equipment performance ...”). A perfor-

mance standard establishes a test for a certain aspect of a

vehicle’s performance, without mandating how the vehicle

should be designed to comply with the test. As explained by

the Senate Report

The Secretary would thus be concerned with the

measurable performance of a braking system, but

not its design details. Such standards will be

analogous to a building code which specifies the

minimum loadcarrying characteristics of the struc-

tural members of a building wall, but leaves the

builder free to choose his own materials and

designs.

Senate Report, 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News

at 2714.22 In contrast, a design standard mandates how a

vehicle or item of vehicle equipment should be designed, and

does not dictate how the product should perform in response

to certain tests. We agree with Wood that the usual common

law action for design defect, like the present one claiming

that the Blazer was defectively designed because it lacked air

bags, creates a design standard rather than a performance

standard.

22Congress preferred performance standards, rather than design

standards, because “performance standards are .. . not intended or likely

to stifle innovation in automotive design.” Jd.

48a

Merely stating the difference between design and per-

formance standards, however, does not lead to the con-

clusion that a state design standard will never conflict with a

federal performance standard. First, although design and

performance standards are analytically distinct, in practice

the line is not so clear. For example, a performance standard

requiring that a vehicle’s driver should be able to see in

the dark is not very different from a design standard requir-

ing that a vehicle have lights. Similarly, although FMVSS

208 is a performance standard dealing with the protection of

occupants from the second collision, it specifies that vehicles

must either have seat belts meeting certain criteria or have

other safety equipment (passive restraints) that will protect

occupants from the second collision.?3 By requiring seat belts

Or passive restraints, FMVSS 208 has elements of a design

standard.

Second, although the Safety Act provides that NHTSA

should develop performance standards, the Safety Act’s

preemption provision is not limited to any one type of stand-

ard. Section 1392(d) provides that “any safety standard

applicable to the same aspect of performance” as a federal

standard is preempted. The above discussed hypothetical

state regulation — requiring all vehicles registered in the

state to be equipped with air bags — is a design standard.

Yet, as we discussed above, such a state standard is unques-

tionably related to the same aspect of performance as

FMVSS 208, and is thus expressly preempted by section

1392(d). Similarly, if a state product liability action would

establish a design standard related to the “same aspect of

performance,” as that term is defined narrowly in Chrysler v. -

Rhodes as a federal standard but not identical to the federal

standard, then it is impliedly preempted by the Safety Act.

3In FMVSS 208, a vehicle’s ability to protect occupants from the

second collision is stated “in terms of forces and accelerations measured

on anthropomorphic dummies in test crashes.” 49 C.F.R. § 571.208.

49a

D. Preemption v. Raising FMVSS as a Defense

to a Design Defect Claim

Wood claims that “General Motors’ preemption argu-

ment has been specifically addressed and rejected in other

Circuits.” The cases cited by Wood fail to support this asser-

tion. Not a single appellate decision addresses the question

of the implied preemption of a state law cause of action ‘hat

would effectively create a state standard not identical to a

federal standard, in violation of section 1392(d).

Instead, the cited cases hold that compliance with a

federal safety standard does not serve as a defense on the

merits of a defective design claim. See. e.g.. Shipp v. General

Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (Sth Cir. 1985); Sours v. General

Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir. 1983); Dawson

v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 957-58 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.

denied. 450 U.S. 959 (1981). In each of these cases, the

defendant manufacturer argued that the vehicle could not

have been defectively designed because it complied with

applicable FMVSS. This argument is summarily rejected,

usually in a single paragraph. See Shipp, 750 F.2d at 421 (“Of

course, compliance with such minimum safety standards

does not exempt or immunize a manufacturer from common

law strict liability”); Sours. 717 F.2d at 1517 (“[T]he very

federal safety statute upon which General Motors relies

makes it abundantly clear that compliance with the regula-

tions promulgated thereunder does not immunize a

manufacturer from common law liability.”); Dawson, 630

F.2d at 958 (“Compliance with the safety standards promul-

gated pursuant to the National Traffic Motor Vehicle Safety

Act, however, does not relieve Chrysler of liability in this

action.”). We have no quarrel with our sister circuits’ hold-

ings that compliance with a FMVSS is not a defense on the

merits to a claim of design defect.

50a

The issue in this case — implied preemption of a state

product liability suit that would stand as an obstacle to the

uniformity of federal standards — is distinct from a defense

on the merits. To be sure, the defendant manufacturer

would be happy to win on any theory. However, the road to

a successful defense based on preemption is entirely dif-

ferent, and is more unlikely to be found, than that to a

defense on the merits. The latter is much broader — the

manufacturer just claims compliance with a standard, and

argues that compliance proves that the car could not have

been defectively designed. To prove preemption, on the

other hand, the manufacturer must show 1) that the theory

of recovery advanced by the product liability suit is directed

at the same “aspect of performance,” as that term is narrowly

defined in Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (Ist Cir.

1969), as the federal safety standard, and 2) that the theory

of recovery is of sufficiently general applicability that a suc-

cessful tort suit would be equivalent to a state regulation.

We cannot say whether implied preemption would have

been a viable defense in any of the cited cases where FMVSS

were invoked as a defense on the merits. However, we do

not think it coincidental that defendants first raised, and

courts have first accepted, the preemption argument in the

unusual context of an air bag suit. Air bags suits are peculiar-

ly well suited to implied preemption. First, as discussed in

Section IVC above, the applicable federal regulation has

moved beyond a pure performance standard toward a design

standard. Product liability actions based on a theory of

defective design have a much greater potential to conflict

with a design-type standard because such an action will allege

that some specific aspect of the vehicle’s design was defec-

tive. Defective design actions will not ordinarily allege that a

vehicle should be manufactured to meet some hypothetical

performance standard. Second, air bag suits are of the

broadest general applicability — potentially affecting every

Sla

vehicle on the road —and thus are most similar to a state

regulation.

However, regardless of the applicability of implied

preemption to the defense on the merits cases cited by

plaintiff, these cases are not controlling as the issue of im-

plied preemption was never argued or addressed. =

E. Agency Capture

In contrast to our reading of the conflicting preemption

and savings clauses, plaintiff argues that the two provisions

embody Congress’s well thought out intent that the Safety

Act would create a dual system of regulating automobile

safety, where both state courts and a federal agency would

be free to extend the standards of care of the safe design of

automobiles. We find this argument utterly lacking in his-

toric or statutory support. However, we address it fully

because the policy implications of the argument have un-

doubted appeal, and may have influenced the district court.

Congress, plaintiff argues, believed that two institutions

— both state courts and a federal agency — were required

because the federal agency would be subject to “capture” by

the automotive industry. “Agency capture,” as explained by

legal scholars, is the undesirable scenario where the regu-

lated industry gains influence over the regulators, and the

regulators end up serving the interests of the industry, rather

than the general public. See generally Wiley, A Capture

Theory of Antitrust Federalism. 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 724-26

(1986); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administra-

tive Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1684-87, 1713-15 (1975).

This theory was applied to the Safety Act’s savings clause in

a 1967 article co-authored by Ralph Nader: ,

While there is much to be said for consistency and

uniformity, achieving these ends by making the

agency the sole and ultimate arbiter of design

\

52a —

standards ignores the political aspect of design

decisions. When the standard-setting function is

centered exclusively in a single agency, that agency

becomes the sole target for outside pressures.

There is only one battle to be won. The consider-

able power of the automobile industry, brought to

bear on the agency, will inevitably affect the stand-

ard-setting process. Therefore, a decentralization

of the decision-making function allows the creation

of countervailing pressures which can support or

prod the agency. This is perhaps what Congress

intended to be the thrust of section [1397(c)].

Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process,

55 Calif. L. Rev. 645, 676 (1967). Several explanations are

advanced for the considerable influence which industries can

exert on their regulators, including the following which, ar-

guably, could apply to NHTSA and the automotive industry.

The division of responsibility between the regu-

lated firms, which retain primary control over their

own affairs, and the administrator, whose power is

essentially negative and who is dependent on in-

dustry cooperation in order to achieve his objec-

tives, places the administrator in an inherently

weak position. The administrator will, nonethe-

less, be held responsible if the industry suffers

serious economic dislocation. For both of these

reasons he may pursue conservative policies.

Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,

99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1685. The district court, in fact, seemed

influenced by the “agency capture” argument — at the hear-

ing on the motion for summary judgment, the court stated

If the [Safety Act] reads the way you [General

Motors] say it is, this statute, which is supposed to

be a safety statute, is an incredible piece of self-in-

53a

terest legislation on the part of the auto industry,

isn’t it?

Although plaintiffs “agency capture” argument may

have force in the field of public policy, it lacks persuasive

force in this case. Our task is to divine the legislative intent

behind the preemption and savings clauses, and neither the

text nor legislative history of the Safety Act indicate that

Congress was concerned with the “capture” of federal

regulators by the automobile industry. As noted above, the

legislative history of the Safety Act fails to even mention suits

for unsafe designs, no less the plaintiff's sophisticated dual

system of safety regulation based on state court defective

design suits and federal motor vehicle safety standards.

When Congress did mention another source of design

regulation — state government — it explicitly provided that

these institutions would only have a consultative role in areas

covered by federal standards. We find no indication that

Congress intended the dual regulatory scheme which now

seems so reasonable to plaintiff.

Furthermore, if Congress intended the savings clause to

create this dual system of regulation, plaintiff fails to explain

why Congress forbade state agencies from setting standards

nonidentical to the federal standards. Although state agen-

cies are also subject to “agency capture,” the automobile

industry would certainly have more difficulty capturing 50

states than one federal agency. And as state tort law was

ineffective in setting design standards prior to 1966, state

agencies were the only other source of regulation when the

Safety Act was passed in 1966. Thus if Congress really feared

agency capture, and wanted a dual system of safety regula-

tion, it would not have preempted state regulation.

54a

V.

We thus answer the question certified on interlocutory

appeal that federal law does preempt the Massachusetts

product liability claim in question against General Motors

based on its installing seat belts rather than air bags in the

motor vehicle in which plaintiff was injured.

Remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent

herewith.

Dissent follows.

SELYA, Circuit Judge (dissenting). My brethren today

espouse a vision of preemption that I find needlessly wide

and a conception of the common law that seemingly misper-

ceives tort as a regulatory system. What is more, this

espousal occurs in an arena fraught with political drama

— automobile safety regulation — where we should be espe-

cially reluctant to insulate administrative decisions from the

prophylaxis of the civil jury, thereby placing common law

protections beyond the reach of the motoring public. I am

not so naive as to question that Congress may, if it chooses,

shield its legislative product from unwanted state-law infr-

ingement. Short of that, however, the regulatory schematas

of administrative agencies should be no less subject to the

full panoply of democratic institutions than are the overt acts

of other governmental instrumentalities.

While jury verdicts have an admittedly anecdotal

quality, they are a core ingredient of our representative

democracy, signifying the considered judgment of citizens

forced to confront and define the scope of law in action.

Because I can discern neither a clear expression that this tort

action has been preempted nor any sufficient reason to imply

so drastic a result, I would answer the certified question in

the negative and affirm the decision below.

55a

I

We have been asked, in effect, to police the border

between two subsections of the National Traffic and Motor

Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, specifically 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d)

(preempting state automobile safety standards) and 15

U.S.C. § 1397(c) (preserving common law remedies).24 With

respect, the majority does not so much police the border as

displace it, claiming more territory for federal exclusivity

than the statute warrants.

My colleagues and I are not entirely at odds. I agree

with them that “[p]reemption is a matter of congressional

intent,” ante at 15, and that the statute sub judice is “facially

ambiguous”. Jd. at 16.4 I depart from their analysis, how-

ever, when they purport to resolve that ambiguity with a

sojourn through the unknown and the unknowable. I sub-

scribe instead to the Court’s teaching that “[t]he essence of

our federal system is that within the realm of authority left

open to them under the Constitution, the States must be

equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens

choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or

4The pertinent statutory text has been set out in the majority

opinion, ante at 20-21; it would be pleomastic to repeat it here.

ra does strike me as curious, however, that having found such

ambiguity, the majority expends little effort in trying to reconcile the

perceived conflict. See ante at 20-23. Instead, they presume that tort

liability in this case would have the same effect as a state safety standard,

and then argue that Congress “did not envisage this peculiar type of

lawsuit...” Jd. at 22. This breathtakingly broad approach seems to me to

skip the requisite step of analyzing the statute’s language. Moreover, it

dresses Congress in an oversized set of blinders; logically extended, the

majority’s methodology would freeze “saved” common law actions in the

form they existed, or could be envisioned, at the time an act was passed.

I refuse to believe that Congress need “envisage” every twist and turn of

evolving common law jurisprud ence in order to shelter tort liability

from preemption.

56a

unnecessary anyone else — including the federal judiciary

— deems state involvement to be.” Garcia v. San Antonio

Metropolitan Transit Auth.. 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985). I am

unwilling to find preemption in a case as charged with am-

biguity as this one. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,

746 (1981); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230

(1947). Rather, I believe, as did the court below that Mas-

sachusetts remains free to impose its common law concepts

of tort liability in this area.

The point of reasoned beginning in interpreting a law is

the language of the statute itself. United States v. James, 479

U. S. 597, 604 (1986). In construing statutes, our role is to

give effect to them as written and as a whole, not to enforce

one section at the expense of another. We must “assume

that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary

meaning of the words used." American Tobacco Co. v. Pat-

terson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982). That canon of construction

has particular pertinency here, where both the preemption

and savings clauses use the word “any.” The Supreme Court

has recently placed special emphasis on that term, remark-

ing that “[i]t is difficult to imagine broader language.” James,

479 U.S. at 604 (footnote omitted). Applying its analysis to

statutory language dealing with liability, the Court con-

tinued: “Congress’ choice of the language ‘any damage’

and ‘liability of any kind’ further undercuts a narrow con-

struction.” Jd. at 605. (emphasis supplied by the Court).

A savings clause exists as a specific exception to a

general preemption clause it is designed to save a specific

subset of legal expressions that would otherwise be

preempted.”6 Thus, while we are generally obligated to give a

26 One cannot sensibly reverse these roles and read the savings clause

as general and the preemption clause as specific. The savings clause,

after all, contains the general predicate, “[c]ompliance with and Federal

motor vehicle safety standard issued under this chapter....” 15 U.S.C. §

1397(c) (emphasis supplied). Section 1392(d) contains a second general

S7a

broad construction to the word “any” as used in the preemption

clause, we are specifically obligated to give great breadth to

its use in the savings clause.

Even if these canons of construction do not, in and of

themselves, suggest the proper resolution of the facial am-

biguity in the statute — and I believe they do — they at least

inform one’s reading of the legislative history. The majority

concludes that “Congress in 1966 did not contemplate the

likelihood that there would be a state tort action that would

effectively create a state design standard conflicting with a

federal safety standard.” Ante at 23. In arriving at this point,

my confreres first examine the “historical context of the

Safety Act’s enactment in 1966....” Jd. at 24. That approach

reverses the proper analytic sequence in two ways. For one

thing, the legislative history comprises the statements which

Congress itself deemed most relevant to statutory under-

standing. Both legal and historical research techniques sug-

gest that the most relevant materials be analyzed first.27 See

e.g. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). It is only if a

reviewing court needs enlightenment that “outside” histori-

cal sources must be plumbed to illuminate the language of

the legislative materials.

The second deviation from the proper norm is more

subtle. My brethren radically alter the inquiry’s focus by

defining the peek into the past in the narrowest conceivable

predicate, safety standards “in effect” preempting a State from “estab-

lish[ing], or ... continuing in effect” non-identical safety standards “ap-

plicable to the same aspect of performance” as the federal standard. The

savings Clause depends for its meaning on the factual predicates of

federal safety standards in effect, complied with, and covering the

relevant aspect of performance.

27The order of reference in California Federal Savincs & Loan Ass'n

v. Guerra. 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987), relied on by the majority, ante at 24,

seems to me no accident. A court “must examine the [act’s] language

against the background of its legislative history and historical context”.

Id.

58a

terms (e.g., the historical question deals with “possible

preemption of certain defective design actions... up to 1966,”

ante at 24), unabashedly presuming Congress to have been

nescient in the face of the dynamic evolution of tort law.

Given the level of generality in both the statutory language

and the legislative history — a level of generality which

appears conceded, see ante at 31 — I think that the better

approach is to ask what one means by the general language

in the context of legal history circa 1966. That approach

grounds the interpretative query in what Congress said,

rather than in the “precarious business” of attempting to

draw inferences from congressional silence, Symons v.

Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board, 670 F.2d 238, 242 (D.C.

Cir. 1981); see also Capitol Technical Services, Inc. v. FAA,

791 F.2d 964, 971 &n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same); cf D.

Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies 15-24, 47-48 (1970) (discussing

fallacies of fictional question, semantical question, and nega-

tive proof).

Try as I might, I can fathom no implicit exception for

design defects in the general statements contained in the

legislative history.

To the exact contrary, an unbiased glimpse of tort law

circa 1966 indicates to me that design defect litigation, al-

though then a relatively recent phenomenon, was not so new

as to catch the Congress unawares. Let me illustrate briefly.

By 1966, the judiciary had amassed a great deal of experience

with design defects in respect to a host of products. When

one looks to the intellectual world of tort at that time and

seeks to ascertain what was meant by generic references to

products liability, the sensible approach is to assume that

broad language derives its meaning from the commensurate-

ly broad universe of legal practice which informs it. When

my colleagues focus on the date of what they term the

“seminal decision” in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391

59a

F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), ante at 24, they imply that the

liability it imposed for negligent automotive design sprang

full-blown from the collective brows of the Eighth Circuit at

that moment. But Larsen did not emerge ex nihilo; the

Larsen court simply took what seemed the next logical step

in the evolution of tort law. See, e.g., 391 F.2d at 504

(automotive industry not “being singled out for any special

adverse treatment; liability for design defects predicated

upon established “general negligence principles”).

Fairly read, the Larsen rationale derived from cases,

annotations, legislative materials, and scholarly commentary

which, by and large, were available in 1966. Moreover, the

decision itself took note of the heavy criticism trailing in the

wake of Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 836 (1966), a pre-Safety Act case

holding that an automobile manufacturer could not be held

liable for negligence in design. Larsen. 391 F.2d at 505 n.9.

Even if we accept arguendo the majority’s isthmian frame of

reference, there is a great deal of evidence that when the

general words “common law liability” or “products liability”

were used in 1966, they could easily have embraced what the

Evans dissent characterized as a “broad national issue”-

automobile design defects. Evans, 359 F.2d at 828 (Kiley, J.,

dissenting). Significantly, Judge Kiley drew attention to the

extensive literature then available concerning automobile

“safety design and production,” id., and noted that the law

was clearly pointing “to[ward] greater responsibility of

manufacturers in designing ... products....” Jd. at 826.

Indeed, Larsen itself addressed the reiationship be-

tween NHTSA standards and common law liability with

some particularity. Discussing the savings clause, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1397(c), in the context of a design defect action, the court

invoked the general language of common law liability:

60a

It is apparent that the National Traffic Safety Act

is intended to be supplementary of and in addition

to the common Iaw of negligence and product

liability. The common law is not sterile or rigid and

serves the best interests of society by adapting

standards of conduct and responsibility that fairly

meet the emerging and developing needs of our

time. The common law standard of a duty to use

reasonable care in light of all the circumstances can

at least serve the needs of our society until the

legislature imposes higher standards or the courts

expand the doctrine of strict liability for tort. The

Act is a salutary step in this direction and not an

exemption from common law liability.

Larsen, 391 F.2d at 506. While I do not regard the Larsen

court’s discussion of the interplay among products liability,

tort, and regulation as dispositive, such expressions, nearly

contemporaneous with passage of the Safety Act, are ex-

tremely suggestive. At a distance of some twenty years, I fail

to see how we can construe the ordinary language of a statute

enacted in 1966 better than a court not twenty months

distant.

Given that courts both before and closely after the

passage of the Safety Act addressed the question of

automobile design defects in general terms, I believe we

ought to give the legislative history’s general language the

overall meaning that contemporary courts gave it. This is

especially so since Congress could hardly have been blind

and deaf to the transformation that tort law had undergone

in the preceding decades. Congress made no specific excep-

tion for products liability for design defects, and we deserve

the proper performance of our role by carving such an

exception against the grain of history. At the very least, the

usage of the times suggests sufficient ambiguity in legislative

Ky

w

61a

history and historical context to require us to resolve the

amphiboly based on the canons of statutory interpretation

earlier discussed. See supra at 71-72 & n.26. While I am not

an historian, I believe that the mood in 1966 was both dif-

ferent and more fluid than my colleagues portray when they

selectively scrutinize the history of design defect actions \

generally28 and then proceed to conflate that history with

developments in the automotive industry.

The history of tort law over the period in question has

been the subject of much scholarly attention in recent years.

The sum of the relevant scholarship makes me less sanguine

than my brethren that Congress, in 1966, was ignorant of the

impact of design defect actions. The general consensus

seems clear: “Since 1960, our modern civil liability regime

has experienced a conceptual revolution that is among the

most dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal

system.” Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Criti-

cal History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort

28No useful purpose would be served by overturning every stone upon

which the majority’s view of the mid-1960s rests. It suffices to say that

even the sturdiest of my colleagues’ supporting authorities yield inter-

pretations radically at variance with the ones proffered in the opinion.

See. e.g.. Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers For Unsafe Design

of Passenger Cars, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 863 n.5 (1956) (noting that,

although “[t]here is a deadth of reported cases where negligence in

design was urged by plaintiff as a basis for liability,... the successful

instances appear io be recent...;” the portion which I have underlined

plainly suggests a nascent trend which the panel majority inexplicably

discounts); Nader and Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process,

55 Cal. L. Rev. 645,645 nn. 3,4 (1967) (recognizing that design defect

actions in the automotive industry were, by 1966, at least occasionally

settled and not infrequently successful at the trial level); id. at 669-70

(concluding that inclusion of standards in the Safety Act will spur design

defect actions, inasmuch as “[t]he reluctance of the courts to recognize

these safety values should vanish, now that they are embodied in statute

and regulation”); id. at 674 (concluding that prospective design liability :

“played some role” in passage of the 1966 Safety Act).

———E

62a

Law, 15 J. Leg. Stud. 461, 461 (1985); G. White, Tort Law in

America: An Intellectual History 168-73, 197-208 (1980)

(similar). In Professor Priest’s view, product defect claims,

based on the theory that an enterprise should internalize the

costs of_accidents resulting from failings in its wares, were

fully “synthesized” and generally accepted by 1965. Priest,

op. cit. supra, at 505-18. And by then, although the definition

of defective design was not firmly established, the commen-

tators had begun to urge, and some courts had begun to

adopt, expansive definitions. Id. at 521-23; see also Noel,

_ Recent Trends in Manufacturer's Negligence as to Design,

Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw.L.J. 43, 47-48 51-60 (1965);

Noel, Manufacturer’s Negligence of Design or Directions for

Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816 (1962). The evolving

scholarship itself acted as a stimulus for rapid doctrinal

change in the area of products liability. See White, op. cit.

supra., at 168. The Safety Act was passed in the midst of just

such turbulent change. Had Congress wanted to separate

the spheres of common law and federal regulation complete-

ly, it knew how to do so. It chose instead repeatedly to use

the general language of tort, fashioning no such clear

dichotomy as my colleagues now divine. The statutory

framework, the language of the Act, the historical antece-

dents which pertain, and the tenor of the legal times coalesce

to convince me that Congress, when enacting this law, did

not intend to restrict the evolution of tort, much less to

restrict it by way of preemption.

i

Notwithstanding that the savings clause deserves fuller

effect, it can still be preempted if the cause of action which

plaintiffs endeavor to assert “stands as an obstacle to the

accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Con-

gress.” Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145,

63a

1151 (1988); see also San Diego Building Trades Council v.

Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959); Palmer v. Liggett Group.

Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (ist Cir. 1987). Yet, mindful that the

savings clause must, for the reasons stated in Part I hereof,

preserve the widest possible range of causes of action not in

conflict with the safety standard, I believe the plaintiff's

complaint passes muster.

Let me start this segment of the analysis by noting my

frank disagreement with the majority when it professes to

see no difference between direct regulation and the indirect

regulatory effect of tort law vis-a-vis this case. See ante at

40-51. While Lhave no wish to indulge — let alone sponsor

— an arid jurisprudential debate, I think there is a meaning-

ful distinction. Direct regulation comprises a set of com-

mands which all must obey, and thereby overrides both

economic and noneconomic considerations. Tort law regu-

lates not by obligation, but by suasion; though it lacks the

power to command behavioral modifications, it affects the

economics of production and consumption, thereby acquir-

ing considerable persuasive impact. The spectre of potential

tort liability forces a firm to choose how best to respond to

liability costs and, depending upon market conditions, how

to allocate those costs among consumers and shareholders.

Put another way, compliance with a course of action man-

dated by actual regulation is a given; compliance with a

course of action suggested by the spectre of tort liability, or

not, is a choice constrained by economic factors.

In that sense, tort operates to change the background

costs of the manufacturer’s design decisions. And, the resul-

tant choice — say, to install airbags or forgo them is not a

pure one — for one choice, for all background costs, not just

tort liability, influence design decisions. So viewed, every

election which a manufacturer makes among the options

64a

available under the safety standard is governed by a

variegated economic mix.

Because a manufacturer’s choice is in this sense never

a “free” choice, the analogy which the majority draws to the

colorful rhetoric of Palmer seems badly skewed.2? Palmer

was a Cigarette warning case where, absent preemption,

defendant would have been faced with a Hobson’s choice: it

could avoid future liability only by adding a new warning

label, one not within the prescription of 15 U.S.C. § 1333.

This case does not pose that sort of dilemma for General

Motors. Here, defendant can avoid liability by choosing an

option which NHTSA (and even Congress, see Pacific Legal

Foundation v. Dept of Transportation, 593 F.2d 1338, 1342 n.

29 (D.C. Cir.) (Congress did not exercise its option to veto

gradual introduction of passive restraints, including airbags)

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979)), has approved. Unlike

cigarette warnings — where the labels required would have

“contravene[d] the Act’s policy of uniform labelings,” 825

F.2d at 627 — the statute here in play provides only for

“minimum” safety standards. See 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2). I

fully agree that any state holding that covered the same

aspect of performance as the safety standard in question and

that would have the effect of requiring something other than

a permitted statutory option would — and should — be

preempted as non-identical. But that is some other case —

not this one. As the majority concedes, “the standards are

‘minimum’ in the sense that a manufacturer may make a

vehicle safer than required by federal law....” Ante at 52. The

instant case is thus at a sizable remove from Palmer. Ab-

solutely no conflict exists between federal law and state tort

law when the latter allows for the imposition of damages; the

2°The exact statement bears repeating. My colleagues argue that, if

plaintiffs could pursue this suit, “General Motors’ choice to avoid

modification of its design seems akin to ‘the free choice of coming up for

<*- ~fter being underwater.’ Palmar, 825 F.2d at 627.” Ante at 43.

65a

economic calculus changes, to be sure — but the change does

little more than counsel that the wiser course for the

manufacturer may be to alter or expand its selection among

the choices legitimately available to it.

Perhaps the root cause of my fellow panelists’ objection

to allowing a suit like this one to go forward is the concern

that different juries in different locales may choose different-

ly among the statutory options, see ante at 12-14, thus “re-

quiring” a manufacturer to implement all three of the

permissible safety systems. This, it is intimated, would

frustrate NHTSA’s apparent purpose of providing manufac-

turers a choice. But that objection is something of a heuris-

tic. In the first place, NHTSA’s method must be in service

to the aim of the statute. In the second place, the contention

that variation in verdicts would destroy uniformity holds very

little water. And finally, the effect of requiring any particular

option may be such as to allow a manufacturer to absorb or

pass along liability costs from suits based on lack of the

remaining options. Let me amplify on these three lines of

response.

1. Aim of the Statute. In line with the enabling legisla-

tion itself, NHTSA’s decision to allow manufacturers to

exercise an option must be designed to save lives and reduce

injuries. The regulation itself tells the tale:

The purpose of this standard is to reduce the num-

ber of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity

of injuries ... by specifying equipment requirements

for active and passive restraint systems.

49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1976). One searches in vain for any-

thing in the statute or the standard intimating that the

provision of choice to the manufacturer is an “objective of

federal law.” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,

256 (1984). If no such objective can be discerned, then a

fortiori, the statute cannot be frustrated by allowing state tort

66a

laws to operate. Given that the option is simply in service to

the statutory and regulatory objective actually stated, that is,

safety, I can perceive no irreconcilable conflict which would

stem from court decisions in cases like this one. Damage

suits will tend to encourage safety, not countervail it. Ad-

judications adverse to manufacturers would likely have the

effect of implementing the safety standard in toto.

Texas & Pacific Ry Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204

U.S. 426 (1907), is not to the contrary. Abilene arose out of

a scenario wherein the Interstate Commerce Commission

had been empowered to set “reasonable” freight rates and

railroads were required to charge accordingly. Id. at 437-38.

To allow juries to find other rates “reasonable” would have

resulted in the “absolute destruction of the act.” Jd. at 440.

But in the case at bar, unlike in Abilene, the suggested tort

action is not “wholly inconsistent with the administrative

power.” Jd. at 441. AsI have pointed out, all three options

contained in FMVSS 208 are statutorily and administratively

legitimate and, as the majority concedes, ante at 52, could be

utilized coactively by defendant if it chose to do so.

I am also unpersuaded that International Paper v. Ouel-

lette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), compels the majority’s result.

Ouellette is dependent upon the wording of the idiosyncratic

savings clause there at ssue and presents, at bottom, a

question of which state-law actions survive in the face of

federal regulation — not a question of whether any state-law

actions survive at all. Not only did the Ouellette Court act to

preserve certain state-law claims, but it also decreed Ver-

mont law preempted solely because its application would

“allow respondents to circumvent the NPDES permit sys-

tem, thereby upsetting the balance of public and private

interests so carefully addressed by the [Clean Water] Act.”

Id. at 494. In this case, General Motors cannot so facilely

escape the administrative scheme; all of its choices stem

67a

from acceptable options.The interest balance —

public/private — remains unaffected. Under the Clean

Water Act, after all, a state was given the right to exceed

federal standards for pollution sources within its jurisdiction.

Id. at 489-90. Under the Safety Act, the states lack even that

power; the sovereignty of each state, the implicit concern of

the Ouellette Court, id. at 495, remains uncompromised by

validating the tort law of Massachusetts.

2. Uniformity. I find my colleagues’ fear that main-

tenance of this action will destroy uniformity, see, e.g., ante

at 31-32, 46-50, to be unfounded. They point to nothing in

the voluminous record which so much as suggests that instal-

lation of any one or more of the proffered options makes

installation of any of the others impossible. Unless a

manufacturer wilfully attempted to engineer different

modes of compliance for each jurisdiction, an act which

would be tantamount to economic self-immolation, nothing

about the “centralized, mass production, high volume char-

acter” of the industry....,” ante at 47 (citation omitted), would

be compromised. A manufacturer would never be in the

position of having to implement contradictory safety fea-

tures, nor could it ever be faced with one state’s safety

“maximum” and another’s conflicting “minimum.” In no

meaningful sense would uniformity be threatened; in the

worst-case scenario — “worst” from the manufacturer’s

viewpoint — self-interest would require either concurrent

implementation of the FMVSS 208 options or payment of

whatever damage awards (if any) might accrue. Such a result

does not create an irreconcilable conflict between the

federal regulatory scheme and state common law. See Wood

v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108, 1114-16 (D.

Mass. 1987) (explaining why potential for damage award

under state law is not incompatible with FMVSS 208; citing

relevant authority).

68a

3. Cost Considerations. In the last analysis, the

likelihood that all three options could ever be required, in

the sense that tort law ever “requires” anything to be done,

seems remote. The synergy inherent in, for example, adding

airbags to an automobile that already has manual belts with

warning systems, would likely be enormous. Under such

circumstances, neglect to furnish the incremental protection

of the additional (third) option might well yield such small

liability losses that manufacturers could logically rate the

game as eminently worth the candle. This assertion, to be

sure, has a speculative quality. But that, perhaps, is the point:

it is no less problematic than the chain of conjectural inferen-

ces put together by my colleagues to the effect that a contrary

decision (1) will open the door to statelaw claims, which (2)

will be realized in this and countless other actions, (3) yield-

ing damage rewards so large as to force car manufacturers

to alter their behavior.°°

It

There is perhaps, one other observation which should

be made. The majority apparently agrees that “compliance

with a federal safety standard does not serve as a defense on

the merits of a defective design claim.” Ante at 61 (emphasis

in original). Yet the abundant caselaw supporting that

proposition cannot be reconciled with this court’s opinion

today. If compliance is not a defense on the merits, then

almost by definition, a successful common law action for

inadequate design could force manufacturers to go beyond

With respect, my brethren’s approach involves other large chunks

of surmise as well, assuming, for instance, that a decision in regard to a

1976 Blazer will be applicable to every car of every make of every year,

and that “passive restraints” within the meaning of plaintiffs’ claim in

this case will necessarily involve airbags rather than the less expensive

belt system.

69a

the safety standards in place under any imaginable federal

law. The effect, therefore, would be the same as requiring a

non-identical standard covering the same aspect of perfor-

mance. It would be a strange “savings clause” indeed which

could salvage an action on the merits in this fashion but be

impuissant to step preemption, when the effect on unifor-

mity of regulation and manufacture would be precisely the

same in either case. Cf. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d

950, 953 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that compliance with

NHTSA safety standards does not relieve an automobile

manufacturer of liability and noting “the troubling public

policy dilemma ... that under existing federal law individual

juries in the various states are permitted, in effect, to estab-

lish national automobile safety standards”), cert. denied, 450

U.S. 959 (1981).

IV

I need go no further. I recognize the closeness of the

question and the imprecisions of the statutory scheme. I

understand ful’ -vell that the balance of policy considerations

may have altered since the Safety Act of 1966 was passed.

And it can, I suppose, be hypothesized that automobile

safety is not today the pressing concern it was in 1966 (al-

though that is not a theorem to which I can willingly sub-

scribe). But the crux of the matter is not whether the

majority’s vision may best serve an era in which the regulated

are free both to choose safety options which exempt them

from the imposed wisdom of juries under the common law

and to safeguard their profit margins wherever Congress’s

speech is less than explicit. What counts, I suggest, is that

Congress did not originally, and has yet to, superimpose that

entrepreneurial vision on the Safety Act. Nor do I under-

stand the safety standard promulgated by NHTSA to have

done so. Because of those parallel truths, I would affirm the

70a

district court and aliow this suit to proceed. The plaintiff's

cause of action in tort, held by the trial judge to state a viable

claim under the common law of Massachusetts, 673 F. Supp.

at 1120, is not preempted.*!

I respectfully dissent.

3! The question of whether or not the plaintiffs complaint, preemp-

tion aside, adequately limns a state-law claim upon which relief can be

granted is not presently before us, and in dissenting, I take no view of

that question.

7Tla

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

PATRICIA M. WOOD,

FRANCIS X. WOOD, and

)

)

ELIZABETH WOOD, )

Plaintiffs, )

) CIVIL ACTION

) NO. 84-1566-Y

v. | )

GENERAL MOTORS )

CORPORATION, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

ON THE MOTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT TO DIS-

MISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

YOUNG, D.J. May 8, 1987

The plaintiffs Francis and Elizabeth Wood and their

daughter Patricia initiated this diversity action after Patricia

Wood suffered severe injuries as a result of an accident in an

automobile manufactured by the defendant General Motors

Corporation (“General Motors”).

I.

For the purposes of addressing the present motions to

dismiss and for summary judgment, the facts are straight-for-

ward and essentially undisputed. On May 19, 1981, Patricia

Wood was on her way home from school, riding as a pas-

senger in a 1976 General Motors Blazer. Wood was seated,

72a

apparently unbelted, in the front seat. The vehicle, while

travelling in excess of thirty miles per hour, collided head on

into a roadside tree. Wood suffered a broken neck and was

rendered quadriplegic. On May 18, 1984, she and her parents

commenced this action.

The Woods’ products liability action alleges that

General Motors’ automobile was, when manufactured and

released from the factory, in a defective condition and un-

reasonably dangerous to the user. The Woods’ theory is that

General Motors’ failure to install a passive restraint system,

specifically the failure to equip the automobile with air bags

or automatic seatbelts, rendered the car defective and this

defect caused the Woods to suffer their injuries. The Woods

claim that their injuries are due to General Motors’

negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchan-

tability, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 2-314(2)(c), and conduct

in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, §§ 2 and 9.

Moreover, Francis and Elizabeth Wood both claim injuries

based upon a loss of consortium theory. 1

General Motors has filed a motion for summary judg-

ment on the negligence, breach of warranty, and chapter 93A

claims and a motion to dismiss the loss of consortium claim.

General Motors contends that its summary judgment motion

should be granted because the Woods’ claims are preempted

by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act

(“Safety Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1420 (1982 & Supp. 1987)

and the regulations promulgated thereunder. General

Motors also contends that the tort law of Massachusetts

This Court has previously dismissed their claim for the negligent

infliction of emotional distress. For an excellent, nation-wide synthesis

of the evolving law in this area, see S . Plotkin, The Evolution of Tort

Liability for Psychic Injuries: A Prepesal to Protect Relational Interests

(1986) (unpublished thesis on file at the University of Virginia School

of Law).

73a

recognizes neither the claim that the lack of passive restraint

systems can render a motor vehicle unreasonably dangerous

nor, in the circumstances of this case, the claim for loss of

consortium. There is considerable thoughtful support for

General Motors’ position on the preemption issue,* no

specific Massachusetts guidance on the issue whether breach

of warranty can be premised on the absence of passive

restraints, and scant and contradictory lower court prece-

dent concerning the recognition of a claim for loss of consor-

tium in these circumstances. ~ Even so, after careful

Wuttelet v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. CV-85-054-GF, slip op. (D.

Mont. April 27, 1987)(order of court); Doty v. McMahon, No. 85-3591,

slip op. (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1987); Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., No. 84-1049,

slip op. (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 1987) (adopting Magistrate’s ruling that

decided issue on Connecticut state tort law grounds); Baird v. General

Motors Corp., No. 84-2874A, slip op. (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 1986); Cox v.

Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor

Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota,

Inc., No. 470771, slip op. (Minn. D. Ct. March 12, 1987). But see Murphy

v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. 84-4556, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1987)

(claim for defectively designed product on theory that seatbelts were

ineffective when used in a reclining position where there are no addi-

tional safety features such as airbags); see also Note, Air Bag Litigation:

Plaintiffs, Start Your Engines, 13 Pepperdine L. Rev. 1063, 1074 (1986)

(reasoning in a conclusory manner that compliance with the

Administrator’s safety standards does not exempt a manufacturer from

state tort law liability for failing to install an air bag system).

3Compare Prince-Jackson v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center, No.

72769 (Mass. Superior Ct. April 8, 1985)(Young, J.)(opinion recogniz-

ing a parent’ s right at common law to sue for loss of consortium arising

out of injuries to a minor child) with Schebel v. General Motors Corp.,

No. 85-1574 (Mass. Superior Ct. June 25, 1986)( Murphy , J .)(order

granting summary judgment against such a claim). See Rogers v. Baker

Industries, No. 86-0395-MA, slip op. (D. Mass. August 20, 1986)(con-

cluding, without reference to the decisions of the Massachusetts Supe-

rior Court, that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, when it

comes to address the issue, will not recognize such a claim).

74a

reflection this Court concludes that General Motors’ motion

ought be denied and the case ought stand for trial.

Il.

THE SAFETY ACT

Congress established the National Traffic and Motor

Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 -1420 (1966), in

response to the “soaring rate of death and debilitation on the

Nation’s highways.” S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.,

reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 2709, 2709

(hereinafter S. Rep. No. 1301). Section 1381, the Congres-

sional declaration of purpose, declares that the “purpose of

this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and

injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.” 15

U.S.C. § 1381 (1982). The legislation places the “primary

responsibility” for establishing safety standards on the

federal government. The role of the states in the motor

vehicle safety regulatory scheme is set forth in § 1392(d):

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard

established under this subchapter is in effect, no

State or political subdivision of a State shall have

any authority either to establish, or to continue in

effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of

motor vehicle equipment any safety standard ap-

plicable to the same aspect of performance of such

vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical

to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section

shall be construed as preventing any State from

enforcing any safety standard which is identical to

a Federal safety standard. Nothing in this section

shall be construed to prevent the Federal Govern-

ment or the government of any State or politi-

cal subdivision thereof from establishing a safety

taceiaieaaa anima eae

75a

requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor

vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such

requirement imposes a higher standard of perfor-

mance than that required to comply with the other-

wise applicable Federal standard.

Thus, states are not preempted from enforcing safety stand-

ards identical to federal standards. In essence, the states’

regulations should complement the federal regulatory

scheme. S. Rep. No. 505, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in

1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 3169, 3174. Not only do

states have the authority to establish identical regulations,

but also they may regulate on “aspects of performance” not

specifically established by the federal government. Chrysler

Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1969)(where federal

regulations did not deal with specific feature of safety lamp,

states may regulate area). It is only when a federal standard

deals with a specific “aspect of performance” of a vehicle or

item of equipment that nonidentical state regulations are

precluded. Jd. at 325. Finally, Congress explicitly intended

to retain state tort remedies. It enacted a “savings clause,”

§ 1397(c), which provides that “[c]ompliance with any

federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this sub-

chapter does not exempt any person from any liability under

common law.”

Congress implemented the motor vehicle safety stand-

ard plan by directing the Secretary of Transportation to

establish federal standards. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a). The

Secretary delegated this authority to the Administrator of

the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“Ad-

ministrator”).4 Pursuant to this authority, the Administrator

“This opinion uses the word “Administrator” generally to refer to the

Administrator himself and also to the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, its predecessor, the National Highway Traffic Safety

Bureau, the Department of Transportation, and the Secretary of

Transportation.

76a

issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 ("Stand-

ard 208"), entitled “Occupant Crash Protection.”

Standard 208 “bears a complex and convoluted his-

tory.” Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 35 (1983). As

originally issued in 1967, Standard 208 required only the

installation of seatbelts. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415 (1967).

Due to the low levels of seatbelt usage, the Administrator

amended Standard 208 in 1970 to include passive restraint

requirements. 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (1969). The two forms

of passive restraints considered were “passive seat-belts”

and airbags. Passive or automatic seatbelts are fastened to

the interior of the door and deploy automatically when the

door is closed by attaching to the car floor. Airbags are

inflatable devices concealed in the dashboard and steering

column that inflate automatically when a sensor indicates

that the “deceleration forces from an accident have ex-

ceeded a preset minimum." State Farm , 463 U.S. at 35.

In 1972, Standard 208 was amended to require the gradual

phasing in of passive protection for all cars. For models

made before August 1975, manufacturers were permitted to

use mapual belts with a warning or an “ignition interlock”

system, which prevented a car from starting until the belts

were fastened. For models made after August 1975, the rule

did not “dictate any particular form of passive protection,

[but] ... established minimum criteria that cars would have to

meet.” Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transpor-

tation, 593 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S.

The ignition interlock system was prohibited by Congress in 1974 in

an amendment to the Safety Act that also provided that any future safety

standards other than seatbelts would have to be submitted to Congress

where they would be subject to legislative veto. 15 U.S.C. § 1410(b).

The legislative veto provision is apparently unconstitutional in light of

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

77a

830 (1979). In 1975, the imposition of the mandatory passive

restraint system was postponed until August, 1976. 40 Fed.

Reg. 16,217 (1975).

Then, in June, 1976, the Secretary of Transportation

suspended the passive restraint requirement and extended

the optional alternatives indefinitely.° The Secretary feared

public hostility against the new systems State Farm, 463

US. at 37 (citing Secretary Coleman’s Decision of Dec. 6,

1976). The Secretary’s successor disagreed and reimposed

the mandatory requirement four months later.42 Fed. Reg.

34,289 (1976). The new standard mandated the phasing in

of passive restraints between 1982 and 1984. The standard

was submitted to Congress in accordance with 15 U.S.C. §

1410(b), where no action was taken. S. Rep. No. 481, 95th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (the Senate Committee on Com-

merce, Science, and Transportation held four Cays of hear-

ings and issued a report endorsing the standard).

In 1981, the Administrator rescinded the passive

restraint requirements. The Supreme Court, in State Farm,

held that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious and

remanded the matter to the Administrator for further con-

sideration. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57. In response, the

Administrator reimposed the passive restraint requirement

with phasing-in to begin on September 1, 1986 and becoming

mandatory by September 1, 1989 unless states with popula-

tions aggregating two thirds of the nation’s total population

pass mandatory seatbelt use laws by April, 1989. 49 Fed. Reg.

28,962, 28,963 (1984). A recent challenge to the

Administrator’s decision was judged not ripe by the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. State

General Motors, through the affidavit of Jeffrey L. Pearson, states

that the 1976 Blazer in question was assembled in August, 1976, making

the optional alternative regulations those applicable at the time of

manufacture.

78a

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dole, 802 ©.2d 474

(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, New York v. Dole, 55 U.S.L.W.

3661 (U.S. March 31, 1987).

The options provided by Standard 208 in August, 1976

are nearly identical to those applicable today. Standard 208

provides that manufacturers may comply by utilizing one of

several options. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1985).’? For

automobiles manufactured during the relevant time period

for this litigation, a manufacturer may comply by providing

a complete passive protection system, a head-on protection

system, or a lap and shoulder protection system. Jd §

571.208-S4.1.2. Simplified, the first option requires full air

bag protection; the second option requires only frontal air

bag protection; and the third option requires protection of

the occupant by a lap and shoulder belt apparatus Jd.

General Motors chose to comply with Standard 208 by

implementing the third option. Wood contends that the

1976 Blazer was unreasonably dangerous and defective be-

cause it was not equipped with a passive restraint system,

either under option one, two, or some other comparable

design. General Motors argues that it complied with a

federal safety standard option that preempts any state

regulation on the same aspect of performance, and that a

judgment of liability in tort for failure to provide air bags

would, according to General Motors, effectively impose a

nonidentical safety standard in contravention of the inten-

tion of Congress as expressed in 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d).

7General Motors’ 1976 Blazer, a multipurpose passenger vehicle

manufactured between January 1, 1976 and August 14, 1977, having a

gross vehic’e weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less, is covered by 49

C.F.R. § 571.208 - S4.2.2. (1985). The regulations applicable to the 1976

Blazer have remained essentially unchanged although the requirements

for the first option, $4.1.2.1., have been amended with respect to com-

plete automatic protection systems. This minor change is irrelevant for

the purpose of preemption analysis.

79a

PREEMPTION

Federal law may preempt state law in several ways.

First, Congress may include express preemption language in

the statute. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525

(1977). Second, if express preemption language is absent,

Congress may nonetheless imply preemption by evidencing

an intent to “occupy a given field” thereby precluding any

state law within that field. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464

U.S. 238, 248 (1984). Congress’ intent to occupy a field can

be determined by the pervasiveness of the federal scheme,

the dominance of the federal interest, or the objectives of the

federal law. Id.; Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. De

La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator

Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).8 Third, where Congress has not

entirely superceded state regulation in a specific area, “state

law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with

federal law.” Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248. Actual conflict arises

when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is

a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,

Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), or “where state law

stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress.” Silkwood, 464 U.S. at

248 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 [1941]). See

generally Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis, No. 86-

1575, slip op. at 3-6 (1st Cir. March 30, 1987).

5General Motors has indicated in its brief that this form of preemp-

tion is not relevant to the Safety Act. Given that Congress expressly

permitted identical regulation, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d), and that states may

regulate areas not specifically addressed by Congress, see Chrysler Corp.

v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1969), it is apparent that Congress did

not intend to occupy the entire field of motor vehicle safety.

80a

Before applying these principles, this Court notes that

federal regulations have the same preemptive effect as

federal statutes. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (Assuming

the regulatory agency did not exceed its authority, “[f]ederal

regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal

statutes.”).9 Also, when deciding whether Congress in-

tended to preempt state law, this Court must be mindful of

the presumption that “Congress did not intend to displace

state law,” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981),

and that it should not disturb unnecessarily the federal-state

balance. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171,

1173 (D. Mass. 1986) (citing Maryland v. Louisiana).

A. Express Preeinption

General Motors argues that § 1392(d) expressly

preempts “implicit regulation” based upon theories of com-

mon law liability such as that asserted in the instant case by

the Woods. The language of § 1392(d) does not compel

giving such a broad sweep to the concept of regulation by

means of safety standards. It states that “no States ... shall

have the authority ... to establish ... any safety standards

applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle

... not identical to the Federal standard.” Federal motor

vehicle safety standards are minimum standards for motor

vehicle performance. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2). The federal

standards are established by a regulatory agency, subject to

judicial review. Noncompliance with the federal safety

standards constitutes a violation punishable by civil penalties

In prescribing any standards under the Safety Act, the Administrator

must consider whether the proposed standard is reasonable, practicable,

appropriate, and whether it will contribute to carrying out the purposes

of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f). The Woods do not assert that the

Administrator exceeded his authority or that he in any way flouted the

statutory guidelines. Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (holding that

the Administrator acted capriciously and arbitrarily).

8la

and the imposition of injunctive relief. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392,

1394, 1398-99. Noncompliance with federal safety standards

prior to sale by a dealer also subjects the manufacturer to the

duty of repurchasing the vehicle or replacing the parts not in

compliance with appropriate equipment. 15 U.S.C. § 1400.

An award of common law damages does not invoke this

panopoly of sanctions and prohibitions. Rather, it is aimed

at compensating a victim injured by tortious conduct. The

manufacturer need not alter its future conduct but instead

may choose only to compensate the individual victim. This

is not the situation with a violation of the Safety Act. In the

case of noncompliance, the manufacturer must repurchase

the vehicle or, at its own expense, furnish conforming re-

placement parts. 10

Finally, the argument in favor of express preemption is

severely undercut by § 1397(c), the savings clause of the

Safety Act, which explicitly provides for the continuation of

common law liability: “Compliance with any Federal motor

vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not

exempt any person from any liability under common law.”

The statutory preemptive language of § 1392(d) does not

directly address state common law. Cf. Cippollone v. Liggett °

Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986)(failure of

preemptive language in federal Cigarette Labelling and Ad-

vertising Act to include a reference to state common law

claims militated against express preemption), cert. denied, 55

U.S.L.W. 3474 (Jan. 13, 1987); Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical

Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542-43 (D.C. Cir.)(same construction

10General Motors contends, nonetheless, that this Court should con-

clude that the Safety Act expressly preempts any putative award be-

cause it will have some regulatory impact on its conduct. This

argument is better conceptually understood as one calling for implied

preemption and is addressed therefore in that portion of this opinion.

See infra § B.2, pp. 18-26.

82a

applied to Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide

Act preemption claim), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).

Congress well knows how to expressly bar common law suits

when it so desires. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income

Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1144(a)(c)(1)(1985)(chap-

ter supercedes all state laws including “laws, decisions, rules,

regulations, or other State action having the effect of

law”)(emphasis added). The failure of this express exclusion

combined with the existence of the savings clause and the

presumption against preemption leads this Court to con-

clude that there is no express preemption here. Baird v.

General Motors Corp., No. C84-2874A, slip op. (N.D. Ohio

Oct. 31, 1986).11

B. Implied Preemption

Implied preemption based upon a conflict analysis is a

two-part inquiry. Under the first prong, General Motors

apparently argues that if it complies fully with federal Stand-

ard 208 and is nevertheless subjected to a state damage

award because it did not pursue some other option favored

by a jury, an “irreconcilable conflict” is produced, making it

physically impossible to comply with both federal and state

standards. Under the second prong, General Motors argues

that the imposition of a state standard by way of a damages

award would frustrate the objectives of the federal law. The

Court addresses each argument in turn.

1. Impossibility

The inquiry under this prong is “whether there exists an

irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state

1 Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986) held

that § 1392(d) did, in fact, expressly preempt state tort law liability in

this area but the Vanover court made no reference to the savings clause

and its discussion of the “regulatory impact” of a common law claim is

better addressed as an implied preemption claim. See infra § B.2, pp.

18-26.

83a

regulatory schemes. The existence of a hypothetical or poten-

tial conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of a

statute.” Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659

(1982)(In applying general preemption principles to an-

titrust law, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] party may

successfully enjoin the enforcement of a state statute only if

the statute on its face irreconcilably conflicts with federal

antitrust policy”)(emphasis added). The type of physical

impossibility rising to the level of irreconcilable conflict is

often presented where dual compliance with federal and

state regulations cannot be legally achieved. In Florida Lime

& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963), a

seminal case on conflict analysis, the Supreme Court gave an

example of physical impossibility: “[I]f, for example, the

federal orders forbade the picking and marketing of any

avocado testing more than 7% oil, while the California test

excluded from the State any avocado measuring less than 8%

oil content,” then physically impossible dual compliance

would be presented.

General Motors contends that the imposition of com-

mon law liability would have the practical effect of eliminat-

ing its federally guaranteed options in occupant crashworthy

restraint systems. Although such an imposition would not

appear to create an “irreconcilable conflict” whereby dual

compliance is “physically impossible,” General Motors

nonetheless argues that the imposition of such an award

would produce a conflict forbidden by the Supreme Court’s

holding in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. De La

Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). The Supreme Court, in De La

Cuesta, specifically stated, however, that compliance with

one of several options provided under the federal regula-

tions and also with the state common law rule “may not be”

a physical impossibility. Jd. at 155. In De La Cuesta, the

Supreme Court did not find preemption under the Avocado

Growers impossibility test but rather under the second prong

|

84a

of the conflict analysis. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312

U.S. at 67 (a state statute is pre-empted if it c

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Appendix — Wood v. General Motors Corp. · 494 U.S. 1065 | Frix