Appendix — Wood v. General Motors Corp.
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Supreme Court, U.S,
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IN THE
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Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
PATRICIA M. WOOD , et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Respondent
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
Arthur H. Bryant
(Counsel of Record)
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, |
1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W
Suite 100
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-8600
Alan B. Morrison
Public Citizen Litigation
2000 P St., N.W., Suite 7
Washington, D.C
(202) 785-3704
Edmund P. Daley
Moquin & Daley
388 Commonwealth Av
Boston, MA 02215
(617) 536-0606
Attorneys for Petitioner
Balmar Legal Publishing Division, Washington, D
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Majority and Dissenting Opinions of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit
py Re ere
Memorandum Opinion of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts (May 8, 1987)
Judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit (December 28,1988) ..........
Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit Denying Petition for Rehearing
ll 8 ee a ee
Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit Denying Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc
fog A a ae
Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit Denying Motion to Withdraw the Mandate
and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc
SEE a digs sae @ else & 6 4 0:04.60 «
Excerpts from 49 C.F.R.§ 571.208 ......
Page
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102a
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 87-1750
Patricia M. Wood, ET AL.
Plaintiffs, Appellees
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
(Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge}
Before Campbell, Chief Judge, Selya, Circuit Judge,
and Laffitte, * District Judge.
David M. Heilbron with whom Leslie G. Landau, McCutchen,
Doyle, Brown & Enersen, Patrick F. McCartan, Stephen J. Brogan,
Marc L. Swartzbaugh, Jones Day Reavis & Pogue, John P. Raleigh,
Nicholas J. Wittner, Richard P. Campbell, John A.K. Grunert, and
Campbell and Associates, P.C., were on brief for appellant.
Paul M. Bator, Stephen M. Shapiro, Kenneth S. Geller,
Kathryn A. Oberly, Mayer, Brown & Platt, William H. Crabtree, and
Edward P. Good on brief for the Product Liability Advisory Coun-
cil, Inc., the Automobile Importers of America, Inc., and the Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc.,
Amici Curiae.
Edmund P. Daley with whom Moquin & Daley and Arthur H.
Bryant, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, were on brief for appel-
lees. 3
Larry E. Coben, Litvin, Blumberg, Matusow & Young and
Eugene Pavalon on brief for The Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, Amicus Curiae.
Joshua R. Kratka on brief for Massachusetts Public Interest
Research Group, Amicus Curiae.
December 28, 1988
*Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
2a
CAMPBELL, Chief Judge. The question before us is
whether federal safety regulations preempt a state law claim,
asserted in a federal diversity action, that a motor vehicle was
defective because it lacked air bags.
This is an interlocutory appeal in a product liability
diversity action brought in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts by plaintiff-appellee
Patricia Wood against defendant-appellant General Motors
Corporation. Wood has alleged that under Massachusetts
law a vehicle manufactured by General Motors was defective
because it was equipped with seat belts rather than air bags
or some other type of “passive restraint.” General Motors
moved for summary judgment on the ground that Wood’s
state claim is preempted by the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seg. (1982), and
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards promulgated under
the Act. The district court denied the motion, Wood v.
General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987),
and we have agreed to hear, in part, General Motors’s
interlocutory appeal from the court’s action. 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b) (1982).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedural History
On May 19, 1981, appellee Patricia Wood was on her
way home from school, riding in the front passenger seat of
a 1976 Chevrolet Blazer. The Blazer, manufactured by ap-
pellant General Motors, was equipped with seat belts and
complied with all applicable federal motor vehicle safety
regulations. Wood was not, however, wearing her seat belt.
For some reason other than a defect in the vehicle, the Blazer
left the road and collided with a tree. Suffering severe
injuries, Wood was rendered quadriplegic.
teeta nine. -
3a
In May 1984, Wood brought an action for damages in
the United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts, claiming that General Motors was liable for her
injuries under Massachusetts state law theories of negligent
design, negligent manufacture, and breach of implied and
express warranty. One paragraph of the complaint alleged
that:
Defendant negligently failed to provide reasonably
safe and adequate safety devices, which include but
are not limited to “air bag” devices, to protect
passengers and minimize the seriousness of in-
juries in reasonably foreseeable circumstances
which include collisions{.]
General Motors moved for summary judgment on all claims.
It characterized Wood’s complaint as being wholly depend-
ent on the theory that the Blazer lacked passive restraints
(Le, safety devices that do not require any action by the
passenger, e.g., air bags or automatic seat belts), and was
therefore defectively designed. Such a theory, General
Motors argued, was both preempted by federal safety
regulations and invalid under the Massachusetts law of
product liability. After briefing and argument, the district
court denied General Motors’s motion for summary judg-
ment.
General Motors then moved for immediate inter-
locutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district
court found that its denial of the motion for summary judg-
ment met the statutory requirements, and authorized an
immediate appeal. We granted in part General Motors’s
petition for immediate appeal, limiting our review to
the question whether federal law preempts a state
law product liability claim against a motor vehicle
4a
manufacturer based on its installing seat belts,
rather than airbags, in a motor vehicle.!
B. The Safety Act
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 (the “Safety Act” or “Act”) was enacted by Congress in
response to the “soaring rate of death and debilitation on the
Nation’s highways,” S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 1,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2709,
2709 [hereinafter “Senate Report”]. The Safety Act sought
to increase automotive safety by authorizing the promulga-
tion of federal “motor vehicle safety standards,” hereinafter
referred to as “FMVSS.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391(2), 1392(a)
(1982). The FMVSS, to be written and administered by the
Secretary of Transportation,” were to be mandatory stand-
' This claim, under Massachusetts law, is a warranty claim for inade-
quate design. Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 642, 378 N.E.2d 964,
970 (1978). The jury would be asked to determine on the basis of factors
such as the gravity of the danger of the challenged design, the feasibility
and cost of a safer alternative design, and the consequences to consumers
of an alternative design, whether the present design was adequate. /d
While such a lawsuit, if successful, would not impose a legal duty, as such,
upon the manufacturer to add air bags to other vehicles, it would
obviously create a very strong reason to do so, since other accident
victims could be expected to claim that their vehicles, too, should have
had airbags and, if lacking them, were improperly designed.
2 When passed, the regulatory authority under the Safety Act was
delegated to the Secretary of Commerce. However, within several weeks
of the Safety Act’s passage, Congress created the Department of
Transportation and transferred the administration of the Safety Act to
the new department. See Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L.
No. 89-670, § 6(a) (6) (A), 80 Stat. 931 (1966).
Within the Department of Transportation, the responsibility for
writing FMVSS was at first delegated to the National Highway Safety
Bureau. Exec. Order No. 11,357 (1967). In 1970, Congress transferred
the administration of the Safety Act to the newly created National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA"). See High-
way Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, § 202(a), 84 Stat. 1713,
Sa
ards which would apply to all new motor vehicles. The
delegation was broad; the new law stated only that each
FMVSS “be practicable, shall meet the need for motor
vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms.” 15
U.S.C. § 1392(a).
Congress envisioned that the FMVSS would be ad-
dressed to two types of dangers: 1) vehicle defects which
caused accidents, and 2) vehicle defects that aggravated
injuries to the occupants once an accident had occurred.
The latter problem, sometimes labeled “crashworthiness,”
received special attention from Congress. Senate Report,
1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2712. Within the
field of crashworthiness, Congress focused especially on the
problem of the “ ‘second collision” — the potentially devas-
tating impact between the vehicle’s occupants and the
vehicle’s interior.> The Senate Committee noted that the
“ ‘second collision’ .. . has been largely neglected,” and that
“{rjecessed dashboard instruments and the use of seat belts
can mean the difference between a bruised forehead and a
fractured skull.” Id. at 2710-11. This appeal concerns
FMVSS 208, which is the most important FMVSS addressed
to the problem of the second collision.
When framing the Safety Act, Congress indicated clear-
ly its intention that the primary responsibility for setting
standards regulating the nationa! automobile manufacturing
industry rested upon the federal government, not the states.
The Senate Report stated,
While the contribution of the several States to
automobile safety has been significant, and justifies
1739. The current delegation to NHTSA is found at 49 U.S.C. § 105, 49
C.F.R. § 501.2(a) (1987).
> “Crashworthiness” encompasses more than protection from the
second collision. See, e.g, FMVSS 216, 49 C_F.R. § 571.216 (1987) (roof
crush resistance); FMVSS 301, 49 C.F.R. § 571.301 (1987) (fuel system
integrity).
6a
to the States a consultative role in the setting of
standards, the primary responsibility for regulating
the national automotive manufacturing industry
must fall squarely upon the Federal Government.
Id. at 712 (emphasis added). The limited, consultative role
of the states is reflected in two provisions of the Safety Act.
First, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f) states that in prescribing FMVSS,
the Secretary “shall... consult with the Vehicle Equipment
Safety Commission, and such other State or interstate agen-
cies (including legislative committees) as he deems ap-
propriate ....” Second, the Safety Act contains a preemption
provision which explicitly preempts any state safety standard
— even state standards which are more stringent than the
federal standards — which covers “the same aspect of per-
formance” as a federal standard but which is “not identical”
to the federal standard. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d).
With respect to safety standards implied under state tort
law, however, the Safety Act’s allocation of exclusive federal
authority to establish automotive safety standards is less
clear. Notwithstanding the above preemption provision, the
Safety Act also contains section 1397, with the following
general “savings clause”:
Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety
standard issued under this subchapter does not
exempt any person from any liability under com-
mon law.
15 U.S.C. § 1397(c). The Safety Act is thus ambiguous as to
the current issue, to wit, whether a state product liability
claim alleging improper design — which seeks to hold an
automotive manufacturer liable for failing to adopt a stand-
ard “not identical” to a federal safety standard covering the
“same aspect of performance” — is preserved by section
1397(c) and not preempted by section 1392(d), as would be
the case were a Massachusetts law or regulation to have
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a a ed
required adoption of the very same standard (i.e., provision
of an air bag).
C. FMVSS 208
FMVSS 208, entitled “Occupant crash protection,” has
an intricate and contentious history of over 20 years. See
generally State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Department of Transportation, 680 F.2d 206, 209-18 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (hereinafter “State Farm I”), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-
tion v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463
U.S. 29, 34-38 (1973) (hereinafter “State Farm IT”); State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474,
477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1616 (1987)
(hereinafter “State Farm III’). In this period, all three
branches of the federal government have considered and, at
times, forced changes in various aspects of the regulation.
On at least three occasions, federal courts of appeals have
considered the legality of FMVSS 208 under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 etseg. See Pacific Legal
Foundation v. Department of Transportation, 593 F.2d 1338
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (upheld); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of
Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972) (upheld in part
and vacated in part); State Farm III. 802 F.2d at 474 (upheld).
The Supreme Court, see State Farm II, 463 U.S. at 57, has
vacated and remanded the standard. Congress, in oversee-
ing its original delegation of authority in the 1966 Safety Act,
has struck down a portion of FMVSS 208. See Motor
Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-492, § 109, 88 Stat. 1482 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1410b) (instructing the Secretary to amend FMVSS 208, and
forbidding the Secretary from requiring, or permitting com-
pliance by means of, ignition interlocks). In addition, Con-
gress has amended the Safety Act so that the Secretary may
not require any restraint system other than a seat and
8a
shoulder belt system without giving Congress the oppor-
tunity to exercise a legislative veto. See 15 U.S.C. §
1410b(b). Finally, the Department of Transportation has
drastically reversed the course of FMVSS 208 on at least two
occasions,* and has made numerous less radical amend-
ments.°
* The first reversal occurred between the Ford and Carter administra-
tions. In the twilight of the Ford administration, Secretary of Transpor-
tation Coleman reached a decision on the long-term version of FMVSS
208. See 42 Fed Reg. 5071 (1977) (regulation issued on January 19,
1977). The Secretary chose to retain what was formally labeled an
“interim” version of FMVSS 208, in which auto makers could choose
between manual seat belts or passive restraints. In March 1977, the
Carter administration reversed course and proposed a version of
FMVSS 208 which would require passive restraints. 42 Fed. Reg. 15,935
(1977). A final ruie requiring passive restraints was issued in July 1977.
42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (1977).
The second reversal occurred soon after the Reagan administration
assumed office. In February 1981 Secretary of Transportation Lewis
reopened rulemaking on FMVSS 208. Two months later the Secretary
proposed a rescission of the passive restraint requirement, and the
proposal was finalized in October 1981. See State Farm I, 680 F.2d 206.
The Supreme Court ordered the Secretary to vacate rescission of the
passive restraint requirement because the “agency failed to supply the
requisite ‘reasoned analysis.’ ” State Farm II, 463 U.S. at 57.
In addition, the Ford administration’s decision not to require passive
restraints could be considered a reversal of sorts. Since 1970, the
Department of Transportation had always stated that the “final” version
of FMVSS 208 would require some sort of passive restraint. See e.g., 35
Fed. Reg. 16,927 (1970) (promulgating a version of FMVSS 208 which
required all passenger cars manufactured after July 1, 1973, to be
equipped to protect vehicle occupants from crash-related injuries by
means that required no action by the occupants).
* As of 1983, the Supreme Court counted about 60 rulemaking notices
on FMVSS 208. State Farm II, 462 U.S. at 34.
9a
Most of this national controversy has concerned the
very issue which underlies Wood’s state law claim, namely,
whether seat belts are adequate to protect occupants from
the harmful effect of the “second collision,” or whether
vehicles should be equipped with “passive restraints,” Le.,
safety devices such as air bags that operate without the
occupants’ participation. Until recently, however, the con-
troversy has not dealt with the role of state product liability
law. In fact, the long, convoluted history of FMVSS 208
contains only a single, unhelpful reference to state design
defect suits predicated on the theory that a car is defective if
it lacks air bags.®
Despite this complex regulatory history, the portion of
FMVSS 208 applicable to the 1976 Chevrolet Blazer has, for
relevant purposes, remained unchanged since 1976. For the
purpose of our preemption analysis, FMVSS 208 is the same
whether one takes the regulation at the time of the Blazer’s
manufacture, at the time of the accident, at the time Wood’s
suit was filed, or at the time of decision. Under FMVSS 208,
the 1976 Chevrolet Blazer is classified as a “multipurpose
passenger vehicle, with GVWR [gross vehicle weight rating]
of 10,000 pounds or less.” 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, $4.2.2 (1987).
For the protection of front seat passengers, manufacturers
of such vehicles are given three separate options, compliance
with any one of which will satisfy FMVSS 208:
1) passive protection from frontal and angular
collisions;
2) passive protection from head-on collisions, sup-
° In the NHTSA’s July 1984 “final rule” on modifications to FMVSS
208, NHTSA included a “Summary of the Public Comments.” NHTSA
reprinted one commentator’s prediction that manufacturers would be
held liable for failing to install air bags. However, NHTSA made no
indication whether it agreed or disagreed with the statement. See 49 Fed.
Reg. 28,962, 28,972 (1984).
10a
plemented by seat belts and a belt warning system;
or
3) lap and shoulder belts, plus a belt warning
system.
49 CE.R. § 571.208, $4.2.2 (1987) (referring to $4.1.2.1,
S4.1.2.2, and $4.1.2.3); see also 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, $4.2.2
(Oct. 1976).
It is uncontroverted that the Blazer complied with the
third option (lap belts, shoulder belts, and a warning system)
and, for that reason, complied with FMVSS 208. Wood’s suit
alleges, in effect, that the Blazer was defectively designed
because it complied only with this third option, rather than
with the first or second option, which calls for one or another
form of passive restraint, e.g.. an air bag.
D. The District Court Opinion
The district court denied General Motors’s motion for
summary judgment based on federal preemption. General
Motors had argued that under theories of “express
preemption” or “implied preemption,” or both, the Safety
Act and FMVSS 208 preempted Wood’s Massachusetts
product liability claim. First, General Motors argued that
section 1392(d) expressly preempted the state claim because
it would, in the words of section 1392(d), “establish . . . [a]
safety standard” which was not identical to FMVSS 208. The
district court rejected this argument, reasoning that 1) the
language of section 1392(d) seemed to apply to state regula-
tions, and not to actions at law; 2) if Congress had meant to
preempt defective design actions, it would explicitly have
mentioned them in section 1392(d); 3) the savings clause,
section 1397(c), refuted any express congressional intent to
preempt product liability actions; and 4) the existence of a
presumption against preemption.
4
lla
Second, General Motors argued that a state action
based on a failure to install air bags would produce an
irreconcilable conflict with FMVSS 208 and would frustrate
the objectives of the Safety Act. The court rejected the
former argument, explaining that General Motors could
comply with both FMVSS 208 and the state standard simply
by installing air bags. The district court also used a broader
rationale purportedly based on the recent case of Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984): a product
liability action does not conflict with federal safety regula-
tions, the court thought, because even if a defendant
manufacturer has to pay a damages award in this case, it need
not alter its behavior in other instances. (Thus General
Motors could, if it wished, continue to sell vehicles without
passive restraints, taking its chances on future iawsuits
similar to this one.) The court held further that Wood’s claim
would not frustrate the objectives of the Safety Act nor of
FMVSS 208 because if it did have a regulatory effect, the
result would be safer cars. The district court also recognized
a “subsidiary purpose” of the Safety Act, namely,
“Congress’s intention that the safety standards be uniform
throughout the country.” It noted that the product liability
suit might create some “tension” with this subsidiary purpose
of the Safety Act, but held that under Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., this tension was acceptable. It explained,
Congress passed the Safety Act fully aware that
damage suits would be initiated against parties who
complied with the federal regulations. [Citations
omitted.] This Court therefore concludes, as the
Supreme Court did in Silkwood, that Congress
recognized and sanctioned this “tension” between
compliance with federal regulations and state com-
mon law claims. See Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1179
(citing and following Silkwood for similar reasons
in not finding preemption by the Federal Cigarette
12a
Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
41). 673 F. Supp. at 1117. The district court then
elaborated on its reasoning that both the majority
and dissenting opinions in Silkwood establish that
damages awards have very little regulatory effect.
E. Other Cases on the Same Issue
In addition to the present action, about two dozen other
suits have been recently filed claiming that an automobile
was defectively designed because it lacked passive restraints.
As yet, none of these cases has reached a federal appellate
court or state supreme court. Courts have found both for
and against preemption, with the majority ruling in favor of
preemption.’
Against this backdrop, we now turn to the question
certified to us.
Il. QUR CONCLUSIONS SUMMARIZED
In this interlocutory appeal, General Motors presses
the argument that Wood’s claim is both expressly and im-
pliedly preempted by FMVSS 208 and section 1392(d) of the
Safety Act. While we do not find an express preemption, we
agree that Wood’s claim is impliedly preempted.
Preemption is a matter of congressional intent. As a
unanimous Supreme Court recently said,
A pre-emption question requires an examination
of congressional intent. . . . Of course, Congress
explicitly may define the extent to which its enact-
; Finding preemption, e.g.: Baird v. General Motors Corp., 654 F.
Supp. 28 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761
(D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo.
1986).
Denying preemption, e.g.: Murohv v. Nissan Motor Corp., 650 F. Supp.
922 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
l3a
ments preempt state law. See, e.g.. Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1983). In the
absence of explicit statutory language, however,
Congress implicitly may indicate an intent to oc-
cupy a given field to the exclusion of state law.
Such a purpose properly may be inferred where the
pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes
supplementation by the States, where the federal
interest in the field is sufficiently dominant, or
where “the object sought to be obtained by the
federal law and the character of obligations im-
posed by it . . . reveal the same purpose.” Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp.. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Finally, even where Congress has entirely dis-
placed state regulation in a particular field, state
law is pre-empted when it actually conflicts with
federal law. Such a conflict will be found “‘when it
is impossible to comply with both state and federal
law, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the
State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941).’ ” California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite
Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1987), quoting
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248
(1984).
Schneiderwind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1150-51,
(1988) (citations modified).
We find the Safety Act facially ambiguous as to
Congress’s intent in the present situation. The difficulty
arises because section 1392(d) (the preemption clause) and
section 1397(c) (the savings clause) send conflicting mes-
Sages in these particular circumstances. For plaintiff Wood
l4a
to win on her design claim, it must be judicially determined
under state law that vehicles like hers are unsafe unless
equipped with air bags. That finding is tantamount to an-
nouncing a state safety standard (vehicles must have air
bags) that differs from the federal safety standard covering
the same aspect of performance (viz., the relevant federal
standard permits seat belts in lieu of air bags). 15 U.S.C. §
1392(d). Such a safety standard, if promulgated by state
statute or regulation, would be preempted by the clear com-
mands of section 1392(d). Is the same standard preempted
even though created by lawsuit? Section 1392(d) says noth-
ing about being limited to legislatively established state stand-
ards. However, section 1397(c) of the Safety Act provides
that compliance with a federal safety standard shall not be a
defense to common law liability. Arguably this “preserves”
a state or federal diversity court’s right to create such a
standard notwithstanding its conflict with the relevant
federal standard.®
Broadly speaking, two analyses are possible. The one
adopted by the court below — which has the virtue of
simplicity — is to harmonize sections 1392(d) (the preemp-
tion clause) and 1397(c) (the savings clause) by ascribing to
Congress an intent to preempt contradictory state safety
standards when promulgated by statute or regulation, but
not to preempt such standards when established in the
course of a lawsuit. Congress is said to welcome, for some
reason, the “tension” between the federal safety standards
8s we later discuss, this is not a case where compliance with the
federal standard is pleaded as a defense to plaintiff's tort claim. Rather
the argument is that because plaintiffs claim relates narrowly to design,
and because the alleged faulty design (no air bags) necessarily implies a
State standard requiring air bags, which standard flatly conflicts with a
relevant federal safety standard, the case raises an issue of preemption.
Preemption is a concept both narrower and different from an ordinary
defense. See Section IVD, infra.
1Sa
and any dissimilar state standards created by litigation —
even though Congress strictly forbade the states to create
dissimilar standards by statute or regulation.
The alternative analysis — which we prefer as being a
more plausible view of Congress’s intentions — begins with
an examination of the historical setting within which Con-
gress, in 1966, wrote the Safety Act. At that time, the only
kind of legal claim which could give rise to the present
dilemma — a cause of action based upon alleged automobile
design defects had yet to take its place in the arsenal of the
plaintiffs’ bar. We infer from this, as well as from the total
silence of the legislative record concerning the present
dilemma, that Congress simply did not anticipate the situa-
tion that now confronts us.? While Congress intended that
federal safety standards would not interfere with ongoing
state litigation as then understood, it did not foresee the
possibility of litigation that could, in practical effect, impose
a new and conflicting state safety standard on national
automobile manufacturers. Had Congress done so, we thittk,
the same logic that dictated the insertion of section 1392(d)
would inescapably have dictated that section 1392(d) extend
to this situation.
Nonetheless, given Congress’s failure to foresee this
problem, we are not persuaded that section 1392(d) can be
construed to manifest an express intention to preempt state
design lawsuits having the present effect. By the same token,
we do not construe the general language of section 1397(c)
as intended to preserve the narrow class of design lawsuits
that give rise to a conflicting state safety standard. We,
*Further diminishing foreseeability was the fact that the Safety Act
authorizes the promulgation of performance standards, rather than
design standards, so that, even if Congress had foreseen the existence of
defective design litigation, a direct conflict between a common law
design standard and a Safety Act performance standard — as exists here
— would be a rare event indeed. See Section IVC, infra.
l6a
therefore, reject General Motors’s argument that the Safety
Act works an express preemption, but we also reject Wood’s
contention that Congress meant by the savings clause to
express approval of the “tension” that would ensue if federal
safety standards and contradictory litigation-created state
design standards were to co-exist. Rather, we think Con-
gress simply overlooked the possibility of the present dilem-
ma, resulting in a statute that lacks clear and express
direction on the subject.
While we, therefore, do not find express preemption,
we are convinced that Congress’s purposes, as revealed in
the Safety Act and in the legislative history, plainly imply a
preemptive intent. The instant product liability claim alleg-
ing that the absence of an air bag rendered the vehicle’s
design faulty would, if upheld, clearly “stand as an obstacle”
to the regulatory scheme of the Safety Act. A state common
law action sustaining the theory that a vehicle was defective
because it lacked an air bag would, in effect, create a state
safety standard related to the same aspect of performance
of FMVSS 208 but not identical to FMVSS 208. Such an
action is, in our view, impliedly preempted because it would
effectively circumvent section 1392(d)’s prohibition of non-
identical state standards covering the same aspect of perfor-
mance as a federal safety standard. Allowing a common law
action holding manufacturers liable for failing to install air
bags in motor vehicles would be tantamount to establishing
a conflicting safety standard that necessarily encroaches
upon the goal of uniformity specifically set forth by Congress
in this area.1°
While our approach, as just stated, is clear, the argu-
ments pro and con involve countless details and byways. In
10 We, of course, do not imply that section 1392(d)’s prohibition
immunizes the manufacturer from liability for defective design of an air
bag.
:
a
z
4
i
;
17a
the following sections of this opinion, we explore these mat-
ters extensively.
Ill. PREEMPTION
A. What Congress Meant
The ianguage of the Safety Act sends conflicting signals
on the preemption of state actions for faulty design that
could establish a safety standard not identical to a federal
standard. The potential for ambiguity in special circumstan-
ces like the present is reflected in the preemption clause and
the savings clause. The preemption clause provides:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard
established under this subchapter is in effect, no
State or political subdivision of a State shall have
any authority either to establish, or to continue in
effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of
motor vehicle equipment any safety standard ap-
plicable to the same aspect of performance of such
vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical
to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section
shall be construed as preventing any State from
enforcing any safety standard which is identical to
a Federal safety standard. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prevent the Federal Govern-
ment or the government of any State or political
subdivision thereof from establishing a safety re-
quirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor
vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such
requirement imposes a higher standard of perfor-
mance than that required to comply with the other-
wise applicable Federal standard.
15 U.S.C. § 1392(d). The savings clause provides:
Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety
standard issued under this subchapter does not
18a
exempt any person from any liability under com-
mon law.
15 U.S.C. § 1397(c).
General Motors and Wood each use the provision
favorable to its or her viewpoint to construct arguments that
Congress expressly meant either to preempt or to preserve
the instant tort action. General Motors argues that as “no
State ... shall have any authority ...to establish . .. any safety
standard applicable to the same aspect of performance...
which is not identicai to the Federal standard,” id § 1392(d),
and as an air bag suit would create a state air bag standard
nonidentical to FMVSS 208, Congress expressly meant to
preempt this type of action. Wood argues that preempting
her theory of liability would effectively “exempt” General
Motors from liability, and that Congress has expressly for-
bidden such a result: “compliance with any Federal motor
vehicle safety standard ... does not exempt any person from
any liability under common law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c). The
district court accepted this latter reading of congressional
intent. It expressed the view that
Congress passed the Safety Act fully aware that
damage suits would be initiated against parties who
complied with the federal regulations. . . . This
Court therefore concludes, as the Supreme Court
did in Silkwood, that Congress recognized and
sanctioned this “tension” between compliance
with federal regulations and state common law
claims.
673 F. Supp. at 1117.
We agree with neither General Motors’s reading of
Congress’s express intent nor with that of Wood and the
district court. We instead reach a third conclusion: Cor-
gress in 1966 did not contemplate the likelihood that there
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19a
would be a state tort action that would effectively create a
state design standard conflicting with a federal safety stand-
ard. As it did not envisage this peculiar type of lawsuit, and
as no reason appears in the legislative history or comes to
mind as to why Congress would have meant to endorse a
state claim having the same effect as a forbidden state
regulation, we do not find that Congress meant to sanction
the “tension” between the FMVSS and state common law
existing in the current situation.!! This interpretation of the
Safety Act and of Congress’s intent is first suggested by the
very fact that the two provisions, read alone, yield such
different results. If Congress had considered the instant type
of tort claim in these facts, it would scarcely have left unex-
plained such a glaring ambiguity. Our reading is supported
by the state of tort law when the Safety Act was passed in
1966 and the legislative history of the Act.
1. Common Law in 1966
In determining questions of preemption, a court “must
examine the [act’s] language against the background of its
legislative history and historical context.” California Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 691
(1987). Examining the historical context of the Safety Act’s
enactment in 1966, we find it unlikely that anyone in Con-
gress would have considered the possible preemption of
certain defective design actions because there was, up to
1966, hardly any experience at all with cases of that type.
Until the Eighth Circuit’s seminal decision in Larsen v.
General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (alioving
the jury to decide whether a vehicle with a rigid steering
linkage which caused severe injuries to the driver in a front-
end collision was defectively designed), persons injured in
'! We thus disagree with the district court’s assertion that Congress
was “fully aware” of this type of damages action. All the evidence seems
to us strongly to the contrary. See infra.
20a
automobile accidents seldom sued manufacturers on a
theory of design defect, and with the exception of one
decision involving a bus, see Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton
Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954), they did not prevail.
As one commentator noted in 1956, “[t]here is a dearth of
reported cases where negligence in design was urged by
plaintiff as a basis for liability.” Katz, Liability of Automobile
Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 Harv.
L. Rev. 863, 863 n.5 (1956). The commentator concluded
that “[i]t is indeed striking to observe how ineffective the law
has been to date in doing anything about effectuating im-
provements in design to alleviate the daily ‘blood bath of
automobile inspired tragedy.’ ” Jd. at 873 (citation omitted).
Courts were hardly more active in the ten years between
the writing of that comment and the passage of the Safety
Act. In 1967, an article co-authored by Ralph Nader decried
the failure of courts to promote automotive safety:
However, this trend [toward increased liability]
has not extended to automobile manufacturers’
liability for unsafe design of passenger cars. While
a number of suits involving unsafe design have
been settled, plaintiffs have had little luck on the
trial court level. On appeals, plaintiffs are batting
zero. The appellate courts have yet to reverse a
judgment for a manufacturer or affirm a judgment
for a plaintiff in a case involving a traffic accident
allegedly caused by the unsafe design of an
American passenger car.
Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process,
55 Calif. L. Rev. 645, 645-46 (1967). See also Recent Cases,
80 Harv. L. Rev. 688 (1967) (case comment on Evans v.
General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966)); Note,
Manufacturer’s Liability for an “Uncrashworthy” Automobile.
52 Cornell L.Q. 444 (1967). Seen in this context, it would
Suni cae Oe tp iano Daina dams sma Mae hal
P|
4
2la
not be surprising for the Congress which enacted the Safety
Act to have failed to perceive the possible conflict between
state defective design suits and the new federal motor vehicle
safety standards.
We do not mean to suggest that broadened design
liability, as reflected by Larsen v. General Motors Corp., was
entirely unforeseeable. At least since 1916 manufacturers
had been held liable for manufacturing defects which caused
accidents. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Furthermore, the Restatement of
Torts contained a general principle of liability for defective
design. See Restatement of Torts § 398 (1938).}2
However, despite the theoretical possibility of bringing
them, defective design actions against automobile manufac-
turers were an unpromising and for that reason, virtually
non-existent breed in 1966. First, it was not at all clear just
how the law relative to design would be applied. In an early
article advocating increased liability for defective design,
Professor Noel noted that
in the design cases, particularly those involving
widely-used products made by established
manufacturers, judges and juries have been under-
standably hesitant to impose liability. This hesita-
tion results partly from a reluctance to let a jury
pass on a product prepared by experts in the field,
2 The section provides that
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design
which makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufac-
tured is subject to liability to others whom he should expect
to use the chattel lawfully or to be in the vicinity of its
probable use for bodily harm caused by his failure to exercise
reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design.
Restatement of Torts § 398 (1934). See also Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 398 (1965).
22a
and partly from the realization that a judgment for
a particular plaintiff may open the door to many
additional claims and suits.
Noel, Manufacturer’s Negligence of Design or Directions for
Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816, 816 (1962). See also
Nader & Page, 55 Calif. L. Rev. at 653-54 (noting that
although-courts recognize “some sort of duty with respect to
design,” “a duty with respect to design which is defined in
terms so narrow as to eliminate virtually any possibility of
finding breach of duty differs little from a judicial determina-
tion that no duty exists.”). Indeed, as of 1966, no plaintiff
had yet prevailed on a claim that an automobile was defec-
tively designed. In the legal climate of 1966 one could not
tell to what degree, if any, design defect suits would ever have
an effect on automobile safety.
Furthermore, prior to the Larsen decision, plaintiffs had
an especially tough burden if they alleged not that the design
defect caused the accident but that a design defect made a
car less safe in an accident or in other situations of misuse —
types of defects which, as noted above, were a special con-
cern of the Safety Act. Under either the theory of “intended
use” or “patent danger,” see Note, 52 Cornell L.Q. at 447-49,
a plaintiff would likely lose because the automobile was not
intended to be misused or because plaintiff should have been
aware of the alleged defect and was thus solely at fault. See,
e.g., Amason v. Ford Motor Co.. 80 F.2d 265 (Sth Cir. 1935)
(alleged defective design was passenger door hinged at the
rear and a door handle which could catch a passenge®’s hand,
resulting in the death of plaintiff when he tried to open and
shut the door while the car was moving at high speed; sum-
mary judgment affirmed for defendant because decedent’s
actions were not “ordinary use” and decedent should have
known of the danger); Poore v. Edgar Brothers Cw, 33 Cal.
App.2d 6, 90 P.2d 808 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (alleged
Se
23a
defective design was the use of plain glass rather than safety
glass in automobile door; demurrer upheld for defendant
because “the glass in [automobile] windows is not intended
to withstand blows as part of its ordinary use”) ; Muncy v.
General Motors Corp., 357 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)
(alleged defective design was ignition key switch which al-
lowed key to be removed while car was running and in gear,
resulting in accidental injury to a pedestrian; plea of privilege
upheld for defendant because driver was “well aware” of the
design of the key switch and because driver failed to use the
car for its intended purpose).!3
In fact, the very year that Congress passed the Safety
Act, a federal appeals court ruled that a plaintiff had failed
to state a claim by alleging that a car was uncrashworthy. See
Evans v. General Motors Corp.. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied. 385 U.S. 836 (1966) (alleged design defect was the
use of an X-shaped frame which lacked protective side rails).
The court invoked the doctrines of intended use — “The
intended purpose of an automobile does not include its
participation in collisions” — and patent danger — “A
manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile
accident-proof or fool-proof; nor must he render the vehicle
‘more’ safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all.”
Id. at 824-25. The Evans court explained that requiring
manufacturers to design crashworthy cars might be a
desirable goal, but that “that would be a legislative function,
not an aspect of judicial interpretation of existing law.” Jd. at
824.
Congress may or may not have known of the Evans
decision when it passed the Safety Act, but Evans plainly
shows that in the historical context of 1966, persons then
'3 One decision did allow aclaim thata manufacturing defect rendered
a vehicle uncrashworthy. See Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th
Cir. 1959).
24a
concerned with automobile safety would likely have attached
little practical importance to claims of design defects alleged
to have rendered a car uncrashworthy.
Even if Congress foresaw defective design lawsuits, a
further reason Congress would not have anticipated the
current preemption problem is that, even among the body
of lawsuits claiming defective design, only a few would be
likely, as here, to establish what is in practical effect a new
safety standard. This is so because the Safety Act authorizes
promulgation of “performance” rather than design stand-
ards as such. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2). Although, as this case
shows there can be a direct clash between a standard for
performance and for design, see Section IVC, D, supra, it will
be rare that a design standard established in a lawsuit will
overlap and conflict with a performance standard estab-
lished under the Safety Act.
We conclude that it is unrealistic to ascribe to the
authors of the Safety Act, and to Congress generally, an
awareness that in the years ahead a new breed of state tort
actions would be developed from which design standards
might emerge that, on some rare occasion, might create a
direct conflict with a particular FMVSS. Thus when Con-
gress inserted the savings clause, it did not contemplate that
lawsuits would be brought with the potential to give rise to
the current dilemma.
2. The Legislative History
The legislative history of the Safety Act likewise indi-
cates that neither the preemption clause nor the savings
clause Specifically addressed the status of conflicting design
standards established through the mechanism of common
law suits for defective automobile design. Neither party has
directed us to a single legislative reference to actions for
design defects. Instead, the legislative history, like the
savings clause itself, employs more general terms such as
25a
“common law standards of care,” Senate Report, 1966 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2720, “rights of parties under
common law particularly those relating to warranty, con-
tract, and tort liability,” H. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 24 (1966), “common-law remedy,” 112 Cong. Rec.
19,663 (1966) (remarks of Representative Dingell), and
“common law on product liability,” 112 Cong. Rec. 14,230
(1966) (remarks of Senator Magnuson). These, as indicated
above, would not before 1966 have been based upon claims
of inadequate design.
The fullest discussion in the legislative history of the
Safety Act’s impact on state law leaves the exact same am-
biguity as the Act’s conflicting preemption and savings
clauses. The Senate Report has a brief section with the
promising title, “Effect on State Law”:
EFFECT ON STATE LAW
The centralized, mass production, high
volume character of the motor vehicle manufactur-
ing industry in the United States requires that
motor vehicle safety standards be not only strong
and adequately enforced, but that they be uniform
throughout the country. At the same time, the
committee believes that the States should be free
to adopt standards identical to the Federal stand-
ards, which apply only to the first sale of a new
vehicle, so that the States may play a significant
role in the vehicle safety field by applying and
enforcing standards over the life of the car. Ac-
cordingly, State standards are preempted only if
they differ from Federal standards applicable to
the particular aspect of the vehicle or item of
vehicle equipment (sec. 104).
26a
The States are also permitted to set more
stringent requirements for purposes of their own
procurement. Moreover, the Federal minimum
safety standards need not be interpreted as
restricting State common law standards of care.
Compliance with such standards would not neces-
sarily shield any person from product liability at
common law.
Senate Report, 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at
2720. On the one hand, “State standards are preempted only
if they differ from Federal standards.” On the other hand,
the Safety Act “need not be interpreted as restricting State
common law standards of care.” The dichotomy, we believe,
reflects a Congress that never had occasion to consider what
would occur if a state product liability action itself created
an overlapping automobile design standard so similar to
FMVSS as to raise the question of the former’s preemption
by the latter.!4 Instead Congress had in mind the then cus-
l47he statements of Senator Magnuson and Representative Dingell
cited in Wood’s brief are no more illuminating than the Senate Report.
Senator Magnuson’s statement that “compliance with Federal standards
would not necessarily shield any person from broad liability at common
law” is paired with the observation that “(t]he centralized, mass produc-
tion and high volume character of the manufacturing industry requires
that the safety standards be not only strong and adequately enforced but,
as I say, also uniform.” 112 Cong. Rec. at 14,230. Representative
Dingell stated that “we have preserved every single common-law remedy
that exists against a manufacturer for the benefit of a motor vehicle
purchaser. This means that all of the warranties and all of the other
devices of common law which are afforded to the purchaser, remain in
the buyer, and they can be exercised against the manufacturer.” Jd at
19,663. However, Representative Dingell’s remarks were made in op-
position to an amendment which would have provided criminal penalties
for manufacturers who violated the federal safety standards. He argued
that state tort suits would be an additional incentive for manufacturers
to comply with federal standards, and thus that criminal penalties were
not required. In this context, Representative Dingell’s remarks refer to
27a
tomary “State common law standards of care” pertaining to
the negligent operation or manufacture of vehicles, coupled,
no doubt, with warranty claims then customary, none of
which had the potential to create the present problem.
We accordingly divine no specific congressional intent
in section 1392(d) expressly to preempt an action of the
present type. Nor do we construe the savings clause (section
1397(c)) as reflecting any specific congressional concern to
preserve design actions such as the present which would, in
effect, create standards different from federal safety stand-
ards promulgated under the Safety Act.
B. Implied Preemption
Having found that Congress did not, in the language of
the Safety Act, make an explicit statement regarding
preemption of state claims that create, in effect, a state
design standard not identical to a federal standard, we turn
next to whether the Safety Act impliedly preempts the
present action. Cf. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107
S. Ct. 805, 812 (1987) (“Given that the Act itself does not
speak directly to the issue, the Court must be guided by the
goals and policies of the Act in determining whether it in fact
preempts [state law].”).!5 The kind of implied preemption
that would be applicable here is “where the state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.” Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline
State tort suits which enforce federal standards, and not to suits which
would create different standards..
| Wood argues that the savings clause, section 1397(c), precludes any
use of implied preemption analysis. We have already touched upon this
above, pointing out Congress’s unawareness in 1966, when the savings
clause was enacted, that lawsuits would give rise to what are, in effect,
state design standards. For this and other reasons discussed at length
| later in this opinion, we reject Wood’s argument that the savings clause
precludes implied preemption. See Section IVB, infra.
28a
Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145, 1151 (1988) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). See, e.g. Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v.
Connolly. 839 F.2d 837 (Ist Cir. 1988) (holding that the
Williams Act preempted the Massachusetts anti-takeover
statute; the state law stood as an obstacle to Congress's
preferred balance between management and shareholders);
Hernandez-Colon v. Secretary of Labor, 835 F.2d 958 (Ist
Cir. 1988) (holding that the Job Training Partnership Act
preempted a Puerto Rico law giving the Governor veto
power over the formation of intermunicipal bodies; the state
law stood as an obstacle to the federal law’s equilibrium
between state and local interests).
in a case decided after the district court had ruled on
General Motors’s motion for summary judgment, the
Supreme Court made clear that in implied preemption
analysis, one must look to interference with Congress's
chosen method as well as to the ultimate goal of the statute.
See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).
Quellette dealt with the implied preemption of common law
water pollution suits by the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The
Court explained,
In determining whether Vermont nuisance law
“stands as an obstacle” to the full implementation
of the CWA, it is not enough to say that the ultimate
goal of both federal and state law is to eliminate
water pollution. A state law also is preempted if it
interferes with the methods by which the federal
statute was designed to reach this goal.
Id. at 813 (citing Michigan Canners & Freezers Association v.
Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 477
(1984)).
We believe that this “stand as an obstacle” type of
preemption preempts Wood’s design defect claim based on
the absence of an air bag. Even though the goal of Wood's
29a
design defect action might be the same as that of the Safety
Act — that is, to increase automobile safety — Wood’s
theory of recovery is preempted by FMVSS 208 and the
Safety Act because it interferes with the method by which
Congress intended to meet this goal.
Our analysis, set out below, has three steps. (1) Astate
regulation requiring passive restraints would be expressly
preempted by section 1392(d) of the Safety Act. (2) Wood’s
state law tort action would have an effect similar to such a
prohibited state regulation. (3) As Wood’s design defect
claim, if successful, would have the same effect as an imper-
mussible state regulation, it is preempted because it stands as
an obstacle to Congress’s chosen method for achieving auto
Safety.
1. A State Air Bag Regulation
Would Be Preempted
There is no question but that a nonconforming air bag
or other passive restraint regulation issued by the Mas-
sachusetts legislature or state or local agency would be ex-
pressly preempted by section 1392(d) of the Safety Act. The
State regulation might provide, for example, that “all vehicles
registered in this State must be equipped with passive
restraints.” The federal standard, as applicable to multipur-
pose vehicles like the Blazer, has three optional modes of
compliance, any one of which would be acceptable: vehicles
must be equipped with seat belts and shoulder harnesses,
with passive restraints, or with some combination of lap belts
and passive restraints. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, $4.1.2. Com-
paring the federal standard and hypothetical state regula-
tion, the state regulation is “applicable to the same aspect of
performance” as the federal standard, but is “not identical”
to the federal standard. Whereas the federal standard al-
lows seat belts and shoulder harnesses alone, the hypotheti-
cal state regulation requires passive restraints. Thus. the
30a
state standard is expressly preempted by section 1392(d),
which provides that “no State or political subdivision of a
State shall have any authority either to establish, or to con-
tinue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of
motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to
the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of
equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.”
In the hypothetical regulation presented, which is
directly applicable to the present case, application of section
1392(d)’s preemption of standards “applicable tw the : sme
aspect of performance” as a federal standard is neither
difficult nor controversial. However, in order to show the
high degree of conflict between such a state standard and
FMVSS 208, we elaborate on just why a state air bag regula-
tion is preempted by section 1392(d) and FMVSS 208.
The key issue in deciding whether a state regulation is
preempted by section 1392(d) is defining the “aspect of
performance” addressed by the applicable FMVSS. The
question is difficult and important: depending on how
broadly one defines the “aspect of performance,” the federal
regulation will have either a broad or narrow scope of
preemption. Fortunately, in Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416
F.2d 319 (Ist Cir. 1969), this court already has outlined the
procedure for deciding the “aspect of performance” of a
FMVSS.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, the question was whether
a New Hampshire regulation prohibiting the sale of cars
equipped with a supplementary light for night driving (the
“Super Lite”) was preempted by FMVSS 108, which regu-
lated “lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment.”
FMVSS 108 had no provisions directly addressed to the
Super Lite. Nonetheless, Chrysler claimed that the New
Hampshire regulation was preempted by FMVSS 108 and
section 1392(d). Chrysler argued that the “purpose and
3la
scope” section of FMVSS 108 established the “aspect of
performance” for purposes of preemption under section
1392(d). FMVSS 108, section 1, provided:
Purpose and scope. This standard specifies require-
ments for lamps, reflective devices, and associated
equipment, for signalling and to enable safe opera-
tion in darkness and other conditions of reduced
visibility.
416 F.2d at 322. Relying on this section, Chrysler argued that
the “aspect of performance” addressed by FMVSS 108 was
“safe operation in darkness,” and that a state regulation
covering the Super Lite was preempted because it too re-
lated to safe operation in darkness. We rejected this argu-
ment.
While “the purpose and scope” section of a federal
standard may well be the starting point in defining
“aspect of performance,” the inquiry cannot end
there. In our view, resort must be had to the
specific requirements and categories of the stand-
ard....
Id. at 325. As FMVSS 108 had no specific requirements
addressed to items like the Super Lite, we held that the New
Hampshire regulation was not preempted.
In this case, the state air bag regulation is not preempted
solely because it falls within the broad purpose and scope
provisions of the federal standard.!6 Rather, the air bag
16 FMVSS 208 has separate “scope” and “purpose” sections:
Sl. Scope. This standard specifies performance requirements
for the protection of vehicle occupants in crashes.
S.2. Purpose. The purpose of this standard is to reduce the
number of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity of
injuries, by specifying vehicle crashworthiness requirements
in terms of forces and accelerations measured on anthropo-
regulation is preempted because it is addressed to “the same
aspect of performance," no matter how narrowly one defines
that term, as the federal regulation. First, by including pas-
sive restraints as an option for complying with FMVSS 208,
NHTSA has left no doubt that passive restraints are within
the “aspect of performance” addressed by the federal stand-
ard. Furthermore, the history of FMVSS 208 shows ir-
refutably that passive restraints are within the “aspect of
performance” covered by the standard. All of the regulatory
changes, lawsuits, and congressional actions have focused on
the same question as that presented by Wood’s lawsuit: are
seat belts adequate to protect occupants in crashes, or are
passive restraint required? See pages 8-11, supra. In these
circumstances, we have no doubt that a hypothetical state air
bag regulation would be addressed to the same “aspect of
performance” as FMVSS 208, and would thus be expressly
preempted by section 1392(d) of the Safety Act.
2. Wood’s Tort Action Would Have An
Effect Similar To A State Regulation
If Wood prevailed in her defective design claim, the
effect would be similar to state promulgation of the
hypothetical state air bag regulation discussed above. The
Supreme Court has recognized the regulatory effect of
damages awards.
{R]egulation can be as effectively exerted through
an award of damages as through some form of
preventive relief. The obligation to pay compen-
sation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent
method of governing conduct and controlling
policy.
morphic dummies in test crashes, and by specifying equip-
ment requirements for active and passive restraint systems.
49 C.F.R. § 571.208.
33a
San Diego Building Trades Council v.Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
247 (1959). In Palmer v. Liggett Group. Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (Ist
Cir. 1987), this court recently held that a state tort suit was
preempted because it had a regulatory effect. Palmer in-
volved the preemptive scope of the Federal Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act as applied to a state tort suit based
on a theory of inadequate warning. Like the Safety Act, the
Labeling Act forbade states from imposing different labeling
requirements, but did not expressly mention state tort suits.
We thus accepted plaintiff's argument that the tort suit was
not expressly preempted. Nonetheless, we ruled that the suit
was impliedly preempted because it had a similar effect to
direct state regulation. We explained that if this suit were
not preempted, it would “arrogate[] to a single jury the
regulatory power explicitly denied to all fifty states’ legisla-
tive bodies.” Jd. at 628.17
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has similar-
ly acknowledged that the purpose of automobile design
defect suits is to set state design standards, and that such suits
have much the same effect as legislative standards. In Smith
v. Anens, 375 Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d 954 (1978), the
Supreme Judicial Court considered whether it would follow
Evans v. General Motors Corp. (not allowing suits based on
uncrashworthiness) or Larsen v. General Motors Corp.
(seminal case allowing suits based on uncrashworthiness, see
supra). The court decided to follow Larsen, explaining as
follows:
The major argument against the imposition of
liability for negligent design which results in en-
\7 We are well aware, as Wood vigorously asserts, that Palmer is
distinguishable from the present case. Unlike the Safety Act, the Label-
ing Act was designed to protect the tobacco industry as well as to increase
safety. In addition, the Labeling Act had no savings clause. However,
with respect to the regulatory effect of a state tort suit, Palmer is directly
applicable.
34a
hanced injury is that the Legislature, rather than
the judiciary, should determine design standards.
See Evans v. General Motors Corp. . .. However,
as noted in Larsen, “{t]he common law is not
sterile or rigid and serves the best interests of
society by adapting standards of conduct and
responsibility that fairly meet the emerging and
developing needs of our time. The common law
standard of a duty to use reasonable care in light
of all the circumstances can at least serve the needs
of our society until the legislature imposes higher
standards.”
Smith v. Ariens, 375 Mass. at 624-25, 377 N.E.2d at 957
(citing Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d at 506).
Wood argues that her suit will have no regulatory effect
because General Motors has the choice of paying the
damages award without modifying the design of its vehicles.
This argument might have some force in certain cases, if, for
example, the claimed design defect was highly particular to
the vehicle involved, or the accident was in some way un-
usual. With respect to a claim that a vehicle is defective
because it lacks air bags, however, it seems obvious that a
damages award will have a pronounced effect on the
manufacturer’s future conduct. The same theory of recovery
could be pursued by every front seat occupant injured in a
multipurpose vehicle. It is well known that injuries to front
seat occupants are frequent; well over 20 lawsuits have been
filed on the theory of absence of air bags in the last two years.
See section ILE supra. In these circumstances, General
Motors’s choice to avoid modification of its design “seems
akin to the free choice of coming up for air after being
underwater.” Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627.
We also disagree with the district court’s statement that
in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 464 U.S. 238 (1983), the
35a
Supreme Court “found that the impact of such [tort] awards
should be considered narrowly.”!8 673 F. Supp. at 1117.
Silkwood, in fact, affirms that tort awards have regulatory
effect. The issue in Silkwood was the preemptive scope of
federal nuclear safety regulations on state tort law. Nuclear
safety was a difficult area because Congress had enacted two
potentially conflicting sets of laws. On the one hand, the
Supreme Court had recently decided that federal safety
regulations occupied the field of nuclear safety, precluding
any direct state regulation. 464 U.S. at 240-41. On the other
hand, Congress had enacted the Price-Anderson Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (1982), which limited the aggregate liability of
nuclear facilities resulting from accidents. The very exist-
ence of the Price-Anderson Act implied that Congress in-
tended that nuclear facilities be liable for damages caused
by nuclear accidents.
The specific issue in Silkwood was whether a plaintiff
could receive punitive damages; her right to compensatory
'8 This court has already indicated our disagreement with this inter-
pretation of Silkwood. The district court's reading of Silkwood was
adopted at least in part from the district court’s opinion in Palmer (the
Cigarette labeling case). The Palmer district court had argued that
Silkwood discredited the Garmon reasoning that tort suits have a
regulatory effect. In reversing the Palmer district court, we rejected this
argument:
The district court evidently believed that Garmon’s reason-
ing had been discredited by the Supreme Court's decision in
Silkwood — even though nothing in Silkwood even remotely
suggests that Garmon has been qualified or overruled, and
even though the Court in Silkwood stated that federal law will
“preempt the recovery of damages based on state law” when-
ever “imposition of a state standard in a damages action
would frustrate, the objectives of the federal law.”
Palmer, 825 F.2d at 628 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
at 256).
36a
damages was unquestioned. The defendant argued that as
punitive damages are imposed solely to change conduct,
these types of damages were impliedly preempted. In a 5-4
decision, the Court found that punitive damages awards
were not preempted.
The Court’s reasoning, however, affirmed that compen-
satory damages awards have a regulatory effect. It agreed
with the defendant that “there is a tension between the
conclusion that safety regulation is the exclusive concern of
the federal law and the conclusion that a State may
nevertheless award damages based on its own law of
liability.” 464 U.S. at 256. The “tension” was that “the award
of damages based on state law is regulatory in the sense that
a nuclear plant will be threatened with damages liability if it
does not conform to state standards.” Silkwood does not
support the proposition that damages awards lack regulatory
effect.19
19 The district court also relied upon a partial sentence in a footnote
in a dissent joined by four members of the Court - “[t]here is no element
of regulation when compensatory damages are awarded.” Silkwood, 464
U.S. at 276 n.3 (Powell, J.). Aside from the general problem with
drawing principles of law from dissents, the district court quoted the
statement out of context. Justice Powell, in dissent, was attempting to
highlight the differences between compensatory damages (which all
Justices agreed to be permissible) and punitive damages. In making this
argument, he wrote,
The distinction in this case between the two types of damages
is of major importance. There is no element of regulation
when compensatory damages are awarded, especially when
liability is imposed without fault as authorized by state law.
Id. This statement does not apply to all suits for compensatory
damages, but to those areas of law, like nuclear power, where the
defendant may be found liable without any finding of fault. See generally
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (the general principle of abnormally
dangerous activities). In contrast, automobiles are not “abnormally
dangerous,” and General Motors in this case can only be found liable if
37a
We recognize that in Silkwood, after thoroughly ex-
amining the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act, the
Court held that Congress intended that there be a “tension”
between the Price-Anderson Act and the exclusive federal
control of nuclear safety. As the Court explained, since
Congress decided to tolerate this tension, “[w]e can do no
less.” Wood insists that the present case is just iike Silkwood
— Congress intended there to be a tension between the
Savings clause (section 1397(c)) and the preemption
provision of the Safety Act, and it is the courts’ duty to abide
by this congressional @ecision favoring tension. We find no
parallel, however, between the circumstances here and in
Silkwood. Wood is unable to suggest any convincing reason
why Congress would want to encourage states to impose an
inconsistent safety standard of this nature by lawsuits but not
by regulations. We shall discuss this further below.
3. The Air Bag Suit Is Impliedly Preempted
We think it plain that Wood’s action, if successful, would
stand as an obstacle to Congress’s chosen method of increas-
ing automobile safety. See Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. at 813. While
“courts should not lightly infer preemption,” Wood’s
product liability action must bow to the supremacy of federal
law because it disturbs the Safety Act’s allocation of
authority between the federal government and the states. Jd.
at 811.
Congress, in enacting the Safety Act, set up a clear
division of authority between the states and the federal
government. If the federal government has not issued a
safety standard on a certain aspect of performance, the
states are allowed to set their own standards in these areas.
the jury finds that the Blazer was defective because it lacked air bags. If
indeed Massachusetts law did place accident liability on automobile
manutacturers regardless of whether the vehicle was defectively designed,
then compensatory damages would have less of a regulatory effect.
38a
However, Congress decided that once the federal govern-
ment had promulgated a standard, the states’ usual role in
setting safety standards was subordinated in the interest of
national uniformity. When a federal standard is in effect, the
states are prohibited from establishing a nonidentical stand-
ard, see 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) ; and their role is then limited to
enforcing the federal standard, id. and to issuing higher,
standards for vehicles procured for their own use. Jd. The
states are also free to consult with federal authorities. Jd. at
§ 1392(f). aie
This division of authority between state and federal
government was part of Congress’s chosen method for im-
plementing the Safety Act. Congress believed that for the
federal standards to be effective, they had to be uniform
throughout the country. See 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d); Senate
Report, 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2720
(“The centralized, mass production, high volume character
of the motor vehicle manufacturing industry in the United
States requires that motor vehicle safety standards be not
only strong and adequately enforced, but that they be
uniform throughout the country.”).
Congress thus inte.ded that all of the FMVSS, includ-
ing FMVSS 208, be uniform national standards. A state
regulation requiring passive restraints would be expressly
preempted because it would destroy the uniformity of the
federal standard, and exceed the Safety Act’s prescribed role
for state regulation. By the same token, a defective design
action which, if successful, effectively would require the
installation of passive restraints, would likewise destroy the
national uniformity of the federal standard and exceed the
state’s authority. Thus, although Wood’s air bag suit is not
expressly preempted by the Safety Act, it is impliedly
preempted because it presents an “actual conflict” with the
Safety Act — specifically because it “stands as an obstacle”
39a
to Congress’s determination that safety is best served by
having uniform national standards.
Wood’s response, as aiready indicated, is that Congress
manifested its intent via the savings clause to allow Wood's
air bag suit notwithstanding its direct impact on the unifor-
mity of federal standards, and notwithstanding Congress’s
refusal to allow the states to mandate air bags through direct
regulation. As preemption is always a question of congres-
sional intent, we would, of course, find no preemption if we
were Satisfied that Congress did, in fact, intend to allow the
courts to accomplish what a state was otherwise prohibited
from doing. We are not, however, so convinced.
The Supreme Court in Silkwood did not lay down some
kind of general rule that “tension” between federal regula-
tion and clashing state product liability law is generally
favored. Silkwood merely held, on its own facts, that such
tension was there envisaged by Congress. In Silkwoud, the
Court had the entire Price-Anderson Act as evidence that
Congress intended that nuclear facilities would be subject to
common law liability. The availability of state actions for
compensatory damages was, indeed, uncontested. The only
issue was the availability of punitive damages, and the Court
observed that “punitive damages have long been a part of
traditional state tort law.” In contrast, the only evidence here
of a possible congressional intent to sanction the handful of
design defect actions that might create standards which clash
directly with federal standards is section 1397(c), a general
savings clause which applies to the universe of state tort
actions. As earlier explained, automobile design defect ac-
tions, particularly ones based on a theory of uncrashworthi-
ness, were not in 1966 an established “part of traditional tort
law,” and the legislative history gives no evidence that Con-
gress anticipated the present dilemma. For this and other
reasons discussed below, the language in the savings clause
40a
retusing to exempt persons from liability under common law
because of compliance with a safety standard does not reflect
Congress’s intention to avoid preemption of those few and
unique design actions that would have the effect of creating
a state safety standard in direct conflict with an existing
FMVSS.
In Silkwood, moreover, regulations implementing the
Price-Anderson Act specifically mentioned punitive
damages, indicating that the federal agency believed that
punitive damages were allowed Jd. at 255. In this case,
there is no comparable signal from NHTSA indicating that
state product liability actions should be allowed to establish
state safety standards that conflict directly with relevant
federal standards.
Less obvious, but even more important, the preemption
claimed by the defendant in Silkwood was more akin to the
“occupy the field variety” than the “actual conflict” type
(which applies in this case). In Silkwood, the theory of
liability did not focus on any specific portion of the nuclear
facility’s design nor on any particular procedure of the defen-
dant. Accordingly, the suit had little potential for estab-
lishing a state safety standard; the opinion never discusses a
single federal safety standard that was potentially threatened
by a judicially created state standard. The court was careful
to state that if a common law suit did present an actual
conflict with federal law, the suit would be preempted.
We do not suggest that there could never be an
instance in which the federal law would pre-empt
the recovery of damages based on state law. But
insofar as damages for radiation injuries are con-
cerned, pre-emption should not be judged on the
basis that the Federal Government has so com-
pletely preoccupied the field of safety that state
remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an
4la
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and
state standards or whether the imposition of a state
standard in a damage action would frustrate the
objectives of federal law. We perceive no such
conflict or frustration in the circumstances of this
case. ;
Id. at 256. We believe the Court would be much less willing
to find that Congress created a “tension” between federal
law and state common law when the state law, as here,
evidences an actual conflict. Where Wood’s action creates
an actual conflict, Silkwood offers little support for Wood’s
contention that Congress intended state product liability
Suits to impose standards that would disrupt the uniformity
of federal safety standards.
We conclude that the air bag claim, being in direct
conflict with federal safety standards, is impliedly preempted
by the Safety Act, and that the savings clause does not
evidence a contrary congressional intention.
IV. OTHER ARGUMENTS
A. The FMVSS are Not Merely Minimum
Standards
Wood argues that because the Safety Act defines the
FMVSS as minimum standards, they cannot preempt more
stringent state standards.” This argument has no merit.
Although the standards are “minimum” in the sense that a
manufacturer may make a vehicle safer than required by
20 The definitional section of the Safety Act includes the following
provision:
“Motor vehicle safety standards” means a minimum standard
for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment
performance, which is practicable, which meets the need for
motor vehicle safety and provides objective criteria
15 U.S.C § 1391(2).
42a
federal law, the standards are not “minimum” in relation to
state law. Section 1392(d) provides that states are forbidden
from establishing standards not “identical” to a federal
standard. Thus section 1392 preempts state standards which
are either more or less stringent than the federal standard.
B. The Savings Clause Does Not Foreclose
Implied Preemption
Wood argues that two recent Supreme Court cases
establish the following “principle”: when a statute contains
a savings clause, “it is not within the province” of a court to
engage in implied preemption analysis. Applying this prin-
ciple, Wood argues that “Congress has expressly stated its
intention” to preserve the state air bag claim, and that we
should thus not look at implied preemption.
We disagree both with Wood’s “principle” and with the
proposed application of the principle to this case. With
regard to the latter point, the Safety Act, even on its face,
does not express an unambiguous intent to preserve a state
suit that conflicts with a federal safety standard. As noted in
Section ITIA, above, the Safety Act contains both a savings
clause which would preserve the claim and a preemption
provision that would preclude the claim. Neither provision
can be read in isolation, and thus we have no choice but to
look beyond the face of the statute to find Congress’s intent
with respect to preemption of the air bag claim. Thus even
if Wood’s principle were correct, it would not apply in the
present case.
Moreover, Wood’s proposed principle is not supported
by the Supreme Court cases on preemption. Wood mainly
relies on California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987), which addressed the preemp-
tive scope of the pregnancy discrimination provisions of the
Civil Rights Act. Wood in particular focuses on Justice
43a
Marshall’s statement?! that because the Civil Rights Act has
two savings clauses, “there is no need to infer congressional
intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions
of the [act].” Jd. at690. Wood fails to mention, however, that
one of the savings clauses in the Civil Rights Act provides, in
effect, that implied preemption analysis must be applied to
state laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (preempting state laws
that are “inconsistent with any purposes of this Act, or any
provision thereof’). Accordingly, Justice Marshall stated
that part of his inquiry was whether the state law was “incon-
sistent with the purposes of the statute.” Thus Wood’s
proposed principle — which applies in situations where a
savings clause arguably forecloses the use of implied
preemption analysis — has absolutely nothing to do with
Guerra — a Situation where the “savings clause” mandates
implied preemption analysis. In fact, it is ironic that Wood
cites Justice Marshall’s opinion to argue against implied
preemption — both Justice Scalia, concurring separately,
and Professor Tribe have criticized Justice Marshall’s
opinion for ranging too far afield in its implied preemption
analysis. See id. at 697 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Laws 6-26, at 482-
83 n.8 (2d ed. 1988).
The other case cited by Wood, California Coastal Com-
mission v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987), also fails
to support the principle that a savings clause prevents a court
from applying implied preemption analysis. Granite Rock
involved a facial challenge to a system of state mining permits
on the basis of preemption by several federal laws. One of
these laws, the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”),
had a broadly worded savings clause, and the Court relied on
this clause to hold that the CZMA did not preempt the state
2IThis quotation is taken from Part III-A of Guerra, which was joined
only by a plurality of the Court. Jd at 686.
44a
law in question. Jd. at 1430. However, as Granite Rock
involved a facial challenge to the state law, the Court only
held that the CZMA did not “occupy the field”; the Court
also stated that state law might be preempted if there was an
actual conflict with the CZMA. The Court wrote that the
CZMA did not preempt state law “except in cases of actual
conflict,” and that “the CZMA does not automatically
preempt all state regulation.” Jd. at 1430-31 (emphasis
added).
If there is a general principle with respect to the applica-
tion of implied preemption analysis to statutes with general
savings clauses, it may be closer to that advocated by amicus
curiae Product Liability Advisory Council: “general savings
clauses may not be read literally to permit common law
actions that contradict and subvert a statutory scheme.”
There are Supreme Court cases that support this view. In
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.
(Abilene). 204 U.S. 426 (1907), the question was whether a
shipper’s common law suit to recover an unreasonably high
shipping charge was preempted because the railroad had
filed its rate schedule with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission ("ICC"). The shipper, arguing against preemption,
relied on a savings clause in the “act to regulate com-
merce.” The clause provided
Nothing in this act contained shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute, but the provisions of this act
are in addition to such remedies.
Id. at 446. In spite of this clause, the Court proceeded to
engage in-implied preemption analysis: a
[A]s it is conceded that the act to regulate com-
merce did not in so many words abrogate such
[common law] right, it follows that the contention
that the right was taken away by the act to regulate
45a
commerce rests upon the proposition that such
result was accomplished by implication.
Id. at 436. The Court went on to hold that the shipper’s
common law suit was “wholly inconsistent” with the ad-
ministrative scheme of the Commerce Act, and that the
shipper could not proceed with its suit.
In the recent Supreme Court decision addressing the
preemptive scope of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), the
Court again used implied preemption analysis despite the
presence of a broad savings clause. The issue in Ouellette
was whether interstate nuisance suits (Le., suits brought by a
oom, in one state against a polluter in another state) were
preempted by the CWA. The CWA contains two broad
savings clauses, including the following provision:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which
any person (or class of persons) may have under
any statute or common law to seek enforcement of
any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief ....
33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). Despite this provision, the Court held
that the CWA did “not speak directly to the issue” of
preempting interstate nuisance suits, because the provision
started with the words “nothing in this section” (which was
the only section dealing with private causes of action) rather
than the words “nothing in this law.” 107 S. Ct. at 812. The
Court then proceeded to apply implied preemption analysis,
and found that interstate nuisance suits were preempted
unless they employed the law of the source state. Otherwise,
the Court explained, the common law action would disturb
the balance between source states and affected states, and
would interfere with the CWA’s policy of having predictable
standards. Jd. at 814.
46a
Although the Court in Ouellette found some ambiguity
in the CWA’s savings clause, the decision shows a general
reluctance by the Court to follow a savings clause if state law
will actually conflict with a federal regulatory scheme. The
Court explained that “we do not believe that Congress in-
tended to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a
general saving clause.” Jd. at 812. The Court also implied
that in certain statutes the savings clause might be a
boilerplate provision that Congress did not mean to apply in
cases of actual conflict. The Court wrote:
The fact that the language of [the saving clause] is
repeated in haec verba in the citizen suit provisions
of a vast array of environmental legislation . . .
indicates that it does not reflect any considered
judgment about what other remedies were pre-
viously available or continue to be available under
any particular statute.
Id. at 812 n.14 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois. 451 U.S. 304,
329 n.22 (1981)).
Abilene and Ouellette belie the supposed principle that
a general savings clause precludes a court from looking into
implied preemption. On the other hand, we do not adopt
the opposite conclusion — that implied preemption always
applies.. Rather, in each case the question requires a close
reading of the statute and a thorough examination of con-
gressional intent. In this case, the ambiguity created by
section 1392(d) in combination with the savings clause, com-
bined with the paucity of design defect suits at the time the
Safety Act was passed, leads us to conclude that Congress
Ww ave intended to preempt any state standard like this
(ev ough established through the medium of a design
la rather than by a state regulation) that, in the parlance
of implied preemption analysis, “actually conflict[s]” with
the Safety Act.
47a
C. Performance Standards v. Design Standards
Plaintiff argues that a state product liability action can
never conflict with a FMVSS because product liability
actions establish design standards, while under the Safety
Act, NHTSA may only promulgate performance standards.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (“ ‘Motor vehicle safety standards’
means a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance,
or motor vehicle equipment performance ...”). A perfor-
mance standard establishes a test for a certain aspect of a
vehicle’s performance, without mandating how the vehicle
should be designed to comply with the test. As explained by
the Senate Report
The Secretary would thus be concerned with the
measurable performance of a braking system, but
not its design details. Such standards will be
analogous to a building code which specifies the
minimum loadcarrying characteristics of the struc-
tural members of a building wall, but leaves the
builder free to choose his own materials and
designs.
Senate Report, 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
at 2714.22 In contrast, a design standard mandates how a
vehicle or item of vehicle equipment should be designed, and
does not dictate how the product should perform in response
to certain tests. We agree with Wood that the usual common
law action for design defect, like the present one claiming
that the Blazer was defectively designed because it lacked air
bags, creates a design standard rather than a performance
standard.
22Congress preferred performance standards, rather than design
standards, because “performance standards are .. . not intended or likely
to stifle innovation in automotive design.” Jd.
48a
Merely stating the difference between design and per-
formance standards, however, does not lead to the con-
clusion that a state design standard will never conflict with a
federal performance standard. First, although design and
performance standards are analytically distinct, in practice
the line is not so clear. For example, a performance standard
requiring that a vehicle’s driver should be able to see in
the dark is not very different from a design standard requir-
ing that a vehicle have lights. Similarly, although FMVSS
208 is a performance standard dealing with the protection of
occupants from the second collision, it specifies that vehicles
must either have seat belts meeting certain criteria or have
other safety equipment (passive restraints) that will protect
occupants from the second collision.?3 By requiring seat belts
Or passive restraints, FMVSS 208 has elements of a design
standard.
Second, although the Safety Act provides that NHTSA
should develop performance standards, the Safety Act’s
preemption provision is not limited to any one type of stand-
ard. Section 1392(d) provides that “any safety standard
applicable to the same aspect of performance” as a federal
standard is preempted. The above discussed hypothetical
state regulation — requiring all vehicles registered in the
state to be equipped with air bags — is a design standard.
Yet, as we discussed above, such a state standard is unques-
tionably related to the same aspect of performance as
FMVSS 208, and is thus expressly preempted by section
1392(d). Similarly, if a state product liability action would
establish a design standard related to the “same aspect of
performance,” as that term is defined narrowly in Chrysler v. -
Rhodes as a federal standard but not identical to the federal
standard, then it is impliedly preempted by the Safety Act.
3In FMVSS 208, a vehicle’s ability to protect occupants from the
second collision is stated “in terms of forces and accelerations measured
on anthropomorphic dummies in test crashes.” 49 C.F.R. § 571.208.
49a
D. Preemption v. Raising FMVSS as a Defense
to a Design Defect Claim
Wood claims that “General Motors’ preemption argu-
ment has been specifically addressed and rejected in other
Circuits.” The cases cited by Wood fail to support this asser-
tion. Not a single appellate decision addresses the question
of the implied preemption of a state law cause of action ‘hat
would effectively create a state standard not identical to a
federal standard, in violation of section 1392(d).
Instead, the cited cases hold that compliance with a
federal safety standard does not serve as a defense on the
merits of a defective design claim. See. e.g.. Shipp v. General
Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (Sth Cir. 1985); Sours v. General
Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir. 1983); Dawson
v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 957-58 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied. 450 U.S. 959 (1981). In each of these cases, the
defendant manufacturer argued that the vehicle could not
have been defectively designed because it complied with
applicable FMVSS. This argument is summarily rejected,
usually in a single paragraph. See Shipp, 750 F.2d at 421 (“Of
course, compliance with such minimum safety standards
does not exempt or immunize a manufacturer from common
law strict liability”); Sours. 717 F.2d at 1517 (“[T]he very
federal safety statute upon which General Motors relies
makes it abundantly clear that compliance with the regula-
tions promulgated thereunder does not immunize a
manufacturer from common law liability.”); Dawson, 630
F.2d at 958 (“Compliance with the safety standards promul-
gated pursuant to the National Traffic Motor Vehicle Safety
Act, however, does not relieve Chrysler of liability in this
action.”). We have no quarrel with our sister circuits’ hold-
ings that compliance with a FMVSS is not a defense on the
merits to a claim of design defect.
50a
The issue in this case — implied preemption of a state
product liability suit that would stand as an obstacle to the
uniformity of federal standards — is distinct from a defense
on the merits. To be sure, the defendant manufacturer
would be happy to win on any theory. However, the road to
a successful defense based on preemption is entirely dif-
ferent, and is more unlikely to be found, than that to a
defense on the merits. The latter is much broader — the
manufacturer just claims compliance with a standard, and
argues that compliance proves that the car could not have
been defectively designed. To prove preemption, on the
other hand, the manufacturer must show 1) that the theory
of recovery advanced by the product liability suit is directed
at the same “aspect of performance,” as that term is narrowly
defined in Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (Ist Cir.
1969), as the federal safety standard, and 2) that the theory
of recovery is of sufficiently general applicability that a suc-
cessful tort suit would be equivalent to a state regulation.
We cannot say whether implied preemption would have
been a viable defense in any of the cited cases where FMVSS
were invoked as a defense on the merits. However, we do
not think it coincidental that defendants first raised, and
courts have first accepted, the preemption argument in the
unusual context of an air bag suit. Air bags suits are peculiar-
ly well suited to implied preemption. First, as discussed in
Section IVC above, the applicable federal regulation has
moved beyond a pure performance standard toward a design
standard. Product liability actions based on a theory of
defective design have a much greater potential to conflict
with a design-type standard because such an action will allege
that some specific aspect of the vehicle’s design was defec-
tive. Defective design actions will not ordinarily allege that a
vehicle should be manufactured to meet some hypothetical
performance standard. Second, air bag suits are of the
broadest general applicability — potentially affecting every
Sla
vehicle on the road —and thus are most similar to a state
regulation.
However, regardless of the applicability of implied
preemption to the defense on the merits cases cited by
plaintiff, these cases are not controlling as the issue of im-
plied preemption was never argued or addressed. =
E. Agency Capture
In contrast to our reading of the conflicting preemption
and savings clauses, plaintiff argues that the two provisions
embody Congress’s well thought out intent that the Safety
Act would create a dual system of regulating automobile
safety, where both state courts and a federal agency would
be free to extend the standards of care of the safe design of
automobiles. We find this argument utterly lacking in his-
toric or statutory support. However, we address it fully
because the policy implications of the argument have un-
doubted appeal, and may have influenced the district court.
Congress, plaintiff argues, believed that two institutions
— both state courts and a federal agency — were required
because the federal agency would be subject to “capture” by
the automotive industry. “Agency capture,” as explained by
legal scholars, is the undesirable scenario where the regu-
lated industry gains influence over the regulators, and the
regulators end up serving the interests of the industry, rather
than the general public. See generally Wiley, A Capture
Theory of Antitrust Federalism. 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 724-26
(1986); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administra-
tive Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1684-87, 1713-15 (1975).
This theory was applied to the Safety Act’s savings clause in
a 1967 article co-authored by Ralph Nader: ,
While there is much to be said for consistency and
uniformity, achieving these ends by making the
agency the sole and ultimate arbiter of design
\
52a —
standards ignores the political aspect of design
decisions. When the standard-setting function is
centered exclusively in a single agency, that agency
becomes the sole target for outside pressures.
There is only one battle to be won. The consider-
able power of the automobile industry, brought to
bear on the agency, will inevitably affect the stand-
ard-setting process. Therefore, a decentralization
of the decision-making function allows the creation
of countervailing pressures which can support or
prod the agency. This is perhaps what Congress
intended to be the thrust of section [1397(c)].
Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process,
55 Calif. L. Rev. 645, 676 (1967). Several explanations are
advanced for the considerable influence which industries can
exert on their regulators, including the following which, ar-
guably, could apply to NHTSA and the automotive industry.
The division of responsibility between the regu-
lated firms, which retain primary control over their
own affairs, and the administrator, whose power is
essentially negative and who is dependent on in-
dustry cooperation in order to achieve his objec-
tives, places the administrator in an inherently
weak position. The administrator will, nonethe-
less, be held responsible if the industry suffers
serious economic dislocation. For both of these
reasons he may pursue conservative policies.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1685. The district court, in fact, seemed
influenced by the “agency capture” argument — at the hear-
ing on the motion for summary judgment, the court stated
If the [Safety Act] reads the way you [General
Motors] say it is, this statute, which is supposed to
be a safety statute, is an incredible piece of self-in-
53a
terest legislation on the part of the auto industry,
isn’t it?
Although plaintiffs “agency capture” argument may
have force in the field of public policy, it lacks persuasive
force in this case. Our task is to divine the legislative intent
behind the preemption and savings clauses, and neither the
text nor legislative history of the Safety Act indicate that
Congress was concerned with the “capture” of federal
regulators by the automobile industry. As noted above, the
legislative history of the Safety Act fails to even mention suits
for unsafe designs, no less the plaintiff's sophisticated dual
system of safety regulation based on state court defective
design suits and federal motor vehicle safety standards.
When Congress did mention another source of design
regulation — state government — it explicitly provided that
these institutions would only have a consultative role in areas
covered by federal standards. We find no indication that
Congress intended the dual regulatory scheme which now
seems so reasonable to plaintiff.
Furthermore, if Congress intended the savings clause to
create this dual system of regulation, plaintiff fails to explain
why Congress forbade state agencies from setting standards
nonidentical to the federal standards. Although state agen-
cies are also subject to “agency capture,” the automobile
industry would certainly have more difficulty capturing 50
states than one federal agency. And as state tort law was
ineffective in setting design standards prior to 1966, state
agencies were the only other source of regulation when the
Safety Act was passed in 1966. Thus if Congress really feared
agency capture, and wanted a dual system of safety regula-
tion, it would not have preempted state regulation.
54a
V.
We thus answer the question certified on interlocutory
appeal that federal law does preempt the Massachusetts
product liability claim in question against General Motors
based on its installing seat belts rather than air bags in the
motor vehicle in which plaintiff was injured.
Remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
herewith.
Dissent follows.
SELYA, Circuit Judge (dissenting). My brethren today
espouse a vision of preemption that I find needlessly wide
and a conception of the common law that seemingly misper-
ceives tort as a regulatory system. What is more, this
espousal occurs in an arena fraught with political drama
— automobile safety regulation — where we should be espe-
cially reluctant to insulate administrative decisions from the
prophylaxis of the civil jury, thereby placing common law
protections beyond the reach of the motoring public. I am
not so naive as to question that Congress may, if it chooses,
shield its legislative product from unwanted state-law infr-
ingement. Short of that, however, the regulatory schematas
of administrative agencies should be no less subject to the
full panoply of democratic institutions than are the overt acts
of other governmental instrumentalities.
While jury verdicts have an admittedly anecdotal
quality, they are a core ingredient of our representative
democracy, signifying the considered judgment of citizens
forced to confront and define the scope of law in action.
Because I can discern neither a clear expression that this tort
action has been preempted nor any sufficient reason to imply
so drastic a result, I would answer the certified question in
the negative and affirm the decision below.
55a
I
We have been asked, in effect, to police the border
between two subsections of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, specifically 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d)
(preempting state automobile safety standards) and 15
U.S.C. § 1397(c) (preserving common law remedies).24 With
respect, the majority does not so much police the border as
displace it, claiming more territory for federal exclusivity
than the statute warrants.
My colleagues and I are not entirely at odds. I agree
with them that “[p]reemption is a matter of congressional
intent,” ante at 15, and that the statute sub judice is “facially
ambiguous”. Jd. at 16.4 I depart from their analysis, how-
ever, when they purport to resolve that ambiguity with a
sojourn through the unknown and the unknowable. I sub-
scribe instead to the Court’s teaching that “[t]he essence of
our federal system is that within the realm of authority left
open to them under the Constitution, the States must be
equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens
choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or
4The pertinent statutory text has been set out in the majority
opinion, ante at 20-21; it would be pleomastic to repeat it here.
ra does strike me as curious, however, that having found such
ambiguity, the majority expends little effort in trying to reconcile the
perceived conflict. See ante at 20-23. Instead, they presume that tort
liability in this case would have the same effect as a state safety standard,
and then argue that Congress “did not envisage this peculiar type of
lawsuit...” Jd. at 22. This breathtakingly broad approach seems to me to
skip the requisite step of analyzing the statute’s language. Moreover, it
dresses Congress in an oversized set of blinders; logically extended, the
majority’s methodology would freeze “saved” common law actions in the
form they existed, or could be envisioned, at the time an act was passed.
I refuse to believe that Congress need “envisage” every twist and turn of
evolving common law jurisprud ence in order to shelter tort liability
from preemption.
56a
unnecessary anyone else — including the federal judiciary
— deems state involvement to be.” Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth.. 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985). I am
unwilling to find preemption in a case as charged with am-
biguity as this one. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,
746 (1981); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947). Rather, I believe, as did the court below that Mas-
sachusetts remains free to impose its common law concepts
of tort liability in this area.
The point of reasoned beginning in interpreting a law is
the language of the statute itself. United States v. James, 479
U. S. 597, 604 (1986). In construing statutes, our role is to
give effect to them as written and as a whole, not to enforce
one section at the expense of another. We must “assume
that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used." American Tobacco Co. v. Pat-
terson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982). That canon of construction
has particular pertinency here, where both the preemption
and savings clauses use the word “any.” The Supreme Court
has recently placed special emphasis on that term, remark-
ing that “[i]t is difficult to imagine broader language.” James,
479 U.S. at 604 (footnote omitted). Applying its analysis to
statutory language dealing with liability, the Court con-
tinued: “Congress’ choice of the language ‘any damage’
and ‘liability of any kind’ further undercuts a narrow con-
struction.” Jd. at 605. (emphasis supplied by the Court).
A savings clause exists as a specific exception to a
general preemption clause it is designed to save a specific
subset of legal expressions that would otherwise be
preempted.”6 Thus, while we are generally obligated to give a
26 One cannot sensibly reverse these roles and read the savings clause
as general and the preemption clause as specific. The savings clause,
after all, contains the general predicate, “[c]ompliance with and Federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this chapter....” 15 U.S.C. §
1397(c) (emphasis supplied). Section 1392(d) contains a second general
S7a
broad construction to the word “any” as used in the preemption
clause, we are specifically obligated to give great breadth to
its use in the savings clause.
Even if these canons of construction do not, in and of
themselves, suggest the proper resolution of the facial am-
biguity in the statute — and I believe they do — they at least
inform one’s reading of the legislative history. The majority
concludes that “Congress in 1966 did not contemplate the
likelihood that there would be a state tort action that would
effectively create a state design standard conflicting with a
federal safety standard.” Ante at 23. In arriving at this point,
my confreres first examine the “historical context of the
Safety Act’s enactment in 1966....” Jd. at 24. That approach
reverses the proper analytic sequence in two ways. For one
thing, the legislative history comprises the statements which
Congress itself deemed most relevant to statutory under-
standing. Both legal and historical research techniques sug-
gest that the most relevant materials be analyzed first.27 See
e.g. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). It is only if a
reviewing court needs enlightenment that “outside” histori-
cal sources must be plumbed to illuminate the language of
the legislative materials.
The second deviation from the proper norm is more
subtle. My brethren radically alter the inquiry’s focus by
defining the peek into the past in the narrowest conceivable
predicate, safety standards “in effect” preempting a State from “estab-
lish[ing], or ... continuing in effect” non-identical safety standards “ap-
plicable to the same aspect of performance” as the federal standard. The
savings Clause depends for its meaning on the factual predicates of
federal safety standards in effect, complied with, and covering the
relevant aspect of performance.
27The order of reference in California Federal Savincs & Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra. 479 U.S. 272, 284 (1987), relied on by the majority, ante at 24,
seems to me no accident. A court “must examine the [act’s] language
against the background of its legislative history and historical context”.
Id.
58a
terms (e.g., the historical question deals with “possible
preemption of certain defective design actions... up to 1966,”
ante at 24), unabashedly presuming Congress to have been
nescient in the face of the dynamic evolution of tort law.
Given the level of generality in both the statutory language
and the legislative history — a level of generality which
appears conceded, see ante at 31 — I think that the better
approach is to ask what one means by the general language
in the context of legal history circa 1966. That approach
grounds the interpretative query in what Congress said,
rather than in the “precarious business” of attempting to
draw inferences from congressional silence, Symons v.
Chrysler Loan Guarantee Board, 670 F.2d 238, 242 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); see also Capitol Technical Services, Inc. v. FAA,
791 F.2d 964, 971 &n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same); cf D.
Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies 15-24, 47-48 (1970) (discussing
fallacies of fictional question, semantical question, and nega-
tive proof).
Try as I might, I can fathom no implicit exception for
design defects in the general statements contained in the
legislative history.
To the exact contrary, an unbiased glimpse of tort law
circa 1966 indicates to me that design defect litigation, al-
though then a relatively recent phenomenon, was not so new
as to catch the Congress unawares. Let me illustrate briefly.
By 1966, the judiciary had amassed a great deal of experience
with design defects in respect to a host of products. When
one looks to the intellectual world of tort at that time and
seeks to ascertain what was meant by generic references to
products liability, the sensible approach is to assume that
broad language derives its meaning from the commensurate-
ly broad universe of legal practice which informs it. When
my colleagues focus on the date of what they term the
“seminal decision” in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
59a
F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), ante at 24, they imply that the
liability it imposed for negligent automotive design sprang
full-blown from the collective brows of the Eighth Circuit at
that moment. But Larsen did not emerge ex nihilo; the
Larsen court simply took what seemed the next logical step
in the evolution of tort law. See, e.g., 391 F.2d at 504
(automotive industry not “being singled out for any special
adverse treatment; liability for design defects predicated
upon established “general negligence principles”).
Fairly read, the Larsen rationale derived from cases,
annotations, legislative materials, and scholarly commentary
which, by and large, were available in 1966. Moreover, the
decision itself took note of the heavy criticism trailing in the
wake of Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 836 (1966), a pre-Safety Act case
holding that an automobile manufacturer could not be held
liable for negligence in design. Larsen. 391 F.2d at 505 n.9.
Even if we accept arguendo the majority’s isthmian frame of
reference, there is a great deal of evidence that when the
general words “common law liability” or “products liability”
were used in 1966, they could easily have embraced what the
Evans dissent characterized as a “broad national issue”-
automobile design defects. Evans, 359 F.2d at 828 (Kiley, J.,
dissenting). Significantly, Judge Kiley drew attention to the
extensive literature then available concerning automobile
“safety design and production,” id., and noted that the law
was clearly pointing “to[ward] greater responsibility of
manufacturers in designing ... products....” Jd. at 826.
Indeed, Larsen itself addressed the reiationship be-
tween NHTSA standards and common law liability with
some particularity. Discussing the savings clause, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1397(c), in the context of a design defect action, the court
invoked the general language of common law liability:
60a
It is apparent that the National Traffic Safety Act
is intended to be supplementary of and in addition
to the common Iaw of negligence and product
liability. The common law is not sterile or rigid and
serves the best interests of society by adapting
standards of conduct and responsibility that fairly
meet the emerging and developing needs of our
time. The common law standard of a duty to use
reasonable care in light of all the circumstances can
at least serve the needs of our society until the
legislature imposes higher standards or the courts
expand the doctrine of strict liability for tort. The
Act is a salutary step in this direction and not an
exemption from common law liability.
Larsen, 391 F.2d at 506. While I do not regard the Larsen
court’s discussion of the interplay among products liability,
tort, and regulation as dispositive, such expressions, nearly
contemporaneous with passage of the Safety Act, are ex-
tremely suggestive. At a distance of some twenty years, I fail
to see how we can construe the ordinary language of a statute
enacted in 1966 better than a court not twenty months
distant.
Given that courts both before and closely after the
passage of the Safety Act addressed the question of
automobile design defects in general terms, I believe we
ought to give the legislative history’s general language the
overall meaning that contemporary courts gave it. This is
especially so since Congress could hardly have been blind
and deaf to the transformation that tort law had undergone
in the preceding decades. Congress made no specific excep-
tion for products liability for design defects, and we deserve
the proper performance of our role by carving such an
exception against the grain of history. At the very least, the
usage of the times suggests sufficient ambiguity in legislative
Ky
w
61a
history and historical context to require us to resolve the
amphiboly based on the canons of statutory interpretation
earlier discussed. See supra at 71-72 & n.26. While I am not
an historian, I believe that the mood in 1966 was both dif-
ferent and more fluid than my colleagues portray when they
selectively scrutinize the history of design defect actions \
generally28 and then proceed to conflate that history with
developments in the automotive industry.
The history of tort law over the period in question has
been the subject of much scholarly attention in recent years.
The sum of the relevant scholarship makes me less sanguine
than my brethren that Congress, in 1966, was ignorant of the
impact of design defect actions. The general consensus
seems clear: “Since 1960, our modern civil liability regime
has experienced a conceptual revolution that is among the
most dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal
system.” Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Criti-
cal History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort
28No useful purpose would be served by overturning every stone upon
which the majority’s view of the mid-1960s rests. It suffices to say that
even the sturdiest of my colleagues’ supporting authorities yield inter-
pretations radically at variance with the ones proffered in the opinion.
See. e.g.. Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers For Unsafe Design
of Passenger Cars, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 863 n.5 (1956) (noting that,
although “[t]here is a deadth of reported cases where negligence in
design was urged by plaintiff as a basis for liability,... the successful
instances appear io be recent...;” the portion which I have underlined
plainly suggests a nascent trend which the panel majority inexplicably
discounts); Nader and Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process,
55 Cal. L. Rev. 645,645 nn. 3,4 (1967) (recognizing that design defect
actions in the automotive industry were, by 1966, at least occasionally
settled and not infrequently successful at the trial level); id. at 669-70
(concluding that inclusion of standards in the Safety Act will spur design
defect actions, inasmuch as “[t]he reluctance of the courts to recognize
these safety values should vanish, now that they are embodied in statute
and regulation”); id. at 674 (concluding that prospective design liability :
“played some role” in passage of the 1966 Safety Act).
———E
62a
Law, 15 J. Leg. Stud. 461, 461 (1985); G. White, Tort Law in
America: An Intellectual History 168-73, 197-208 (1980)
(similar). In Professor Priest’s view, product defect claims,
based on the theory that an enterprise should internalize the
costs of_accidents resulting from failings in its wares, were
fully “synthesized” and generally accepted by 1965. Priest,
op. cit. supra, at 505-18. And by then, although the definition
of defective design was not firmly established, the commen-
tators had begun to urge, and some courts had begun to
adopt, expansive definitions. Id. at 521-23; see also Noel,
_ Recent Trends in Manufacturer's Negligence as to Design,
Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw.L.J. 43, 47-48 51-60 (1965);
Noel, Manufacturer’s Negligence of Design or Directions for
Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816 (1962). The evolving
scholarship itself acted as a stimulus for rapid doctrinal
change in the area of products liability. See White, op. cit.
supra., at 168. The Safety Act was passed in the midst of just
such turbulent change. Had Congress wanted to separate
the spheres of common law and federal regulation complete-
ly, it knew how to do so. It chose instead repeatedly to use
the general language of tort, fashioning no such clear
dichotomy as my colleagues now divine. The statutory
framework, the language of the Act, the historical antece-
dents which pertain, and the tenor of the legal times coalesce
to convince me that Congress, when enacting this law, did
not intend to restrict the evolution of tort, much less to
restrict it by way of preemption.
i
Notwithstanding that the savings clause deserves fuller
effect, it can still be preempted if the cause of action which
plaintiffs endeavor to assert “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.” Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145,
63a
1151 (1988); see also San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959); Palmer v. Liggett Group.
Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (ist Cir. 1987). Yet, mindful that the
savings clause must, for the reasons stated in Part I hereof,
preserve the widest possible range of causes of action not in
conflict with the safety standard, I believe the plaintiff's
complaint passes muster.
Let me start this segment of the analysis by noting my
frank disagreement with the majority when it professes to
see no difference between direct regulation and the indirect
regulatory effect of tort law vis-a-vis this case. See ante at
40-51. While Lhave no wish to indulge — let alone sponsor
— an arid jurisprudential debate, I think there is a meaning-
ful distinction. Direct regulation comprises a set of com-
mands which all must obey, and thereby overrides both
economic and noneconomic considerations. Tort law regu-
lates not by obligation, but by suasion; though it lacks the
power to command behavioral modifications, it affects the
economics of production and consumption, thereby acquir-
ing considerable persuasive impact. The spectre of potential
tort liability forces a firm to choose how best to respond to
liability costs and, depending upon market conditions, how
to allocate those costs among consumers and shareholders.
Put another way, compliance with a course of action man-
dated by actual regulation is a given; compliance with a
course of action suggested by the spectre of tort liability, or
not, is a choice constrained by economic factors.
In that sense, tort operates to change the background
costs of the manufacturer’s design decisions. And, the resul-
tant choice — say, to install airbags or forgo them is not a
pure one — for one choice, for all background costs, not just
tort liability, influence design decisions. So viewed, every
election which a manufacturer makes among the options
64a
available under the safety standard is governed by a
variegated economic mix.
Because a manufacturer’s choice is in this sense never
a “free” choice, the analogy which the majority draws to the
colorful rhetoric of Palmer seems badly skewed.2? Palmer
was a Cigarette warning case where, absent preemption,
defendant would have been faced with a Hobson’s choice: it
could avoid future liability only by adding a new warning
label, one not within the prescription of 15 U.S.C. § 1333.
This case does not pose that sort of dilemma for General
Motors. Here, defendant can avoid liability by choosing an
option which NHTSA (and even Congress, see Pacific Legal
Foundation v. Dept of Transportation, 593 F.2d 1338, 1342 n.
29 (D.C. Cir.) (Congress did not exercise its option to veto
gradual introduction of passive restraints, including airbags)
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979)), has approved. Unlike
cigarette warnings — where the labels required would have
“contravene[d] the Act’s policy of uniform labelings,” 825
F.2d at 627 — the statute here in play provides only for
“minimum” safety standards. See 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2). I
fully agree that any state holding that covered the same
aspect of performance as the safety standard in question and
that would have the effect of requiring something other than
a permitted statutory option would — and should — be
preempted as non-identical. But that is some other case —
not this one. As the majority concedes, “the standards are
‘minimum’ in the sense that a manufacturer may make a
vehicle safer than required by federal law....” Ante at 52. The
instant case is thus at a sizable remove from Palmer. Ab-
solutely no conflict exists between federal law and state tort
law when the latter allows for the imposition of damages; the
2°The exact statement bears repeating. My colleagues argue that, if
plaintiffs could pursue this suit, “General Motors’ choice to avoid
modification of its design seems akin to ‘the free choice of coming up for
<*- ~fter being underwater.’ Palmar, 825 F.2d at 627.” Ante at 43.
65a
economic calculus changes, to be sure — but the change does
little more than counsel that the wiser course for the
manufacturer may be to alter or expand its selection among
the choices legitimately available to it.
Perhaps the root cause of my fellow panelists’ objection
to allowing a suit like this one to go forward is the concern
that different juries in different locales may choose different-
ly among the statutory options, see ante at 12-14, thus “re-
quiring” a manufacturer to implement all three of the
permissible safety systems. This, it is intimated, would
frustrate NHTSA’s apparent purpose of providing manufac-
turers a choice. But that objection is something of a heuris-
tic. In the first place, NHTSA’s method must be in service
to the aim of the statute. In the second place, the contention
that variation in verdicts would destroy uniformity holds very
little water. And finally, the effect of requiring any particular
option may be such as to allow a manufacturer to absorb or
pass along liability costs from suits based on lack of the
remaining options. Let me amplify on these three lines of
response.
1. Aim of the Statute. In line with the enabling legisla-
tion itself, NHTSA’s decision to allow manufacturers to
exercise an option must be designed to save lives and reduce
injuries. The regulation itself tells the tale:
The purpose of this standard is to reduce the num-
ber of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity
of injuries ... by specifying equipment requirements
for active and passive restraint systems.
49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1976). One searches in vain for any-
thing in the statute or the standard intimating that the
provision of choice to the manufacturer is an “objective of
federal law.” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
256 (1984). If no such objective can be discerned, then a
fortiori, the statute cannot be frustrated by allowing state tort
66a
laws to operate. Given that the option is simply in service to
the statutory and regulatory objective actually stated, that is,
safety, I can perceive no irreconcilable conflict which would
stem from court decisions in cases like this one. Damage
suits will tend to encourage safety, not countervail it. Ad-
judications adverse to manufacturers would likely have the
effect of implementing the safety standard in toto.
Texas & Pacific Ry Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204
U.S. 426 (1907), is not to the contrary. Abilene arose out of
a scenario wherein the Interstate Commerce Commission
had been empowered to set “reasonable” freight rates and
railroads were required to charge accordingly. Id. at 437-38.
To allow juries to find other rates “reasonable” would have
resulted in the “absolute destruction of the act.” Jd. at 440.
But in the case at bar, unlike in Abilene, the suggested tort
action is not “wholly inconsistent with the administrative
power.” Jd. at 441. AsI have pointed out, all three options
contained in FMVSS 208 are statutorily and administratively
legitimate and, as the majority concedes, ante at 52, could be
utilized coactively by defendant if it chose to do so.
I am also unpersuaded that International Paper v. Ouel-
lette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), compels the majority’s result.
Ouellette is dependent upon the wording of the idiosyncratic
savings clause there at ssue and presents, at bottom, a
question of which state-law actions survive in the face of
federal regulation — not a question of whether any state-law
actions survive at all. Not only did the Ouellette Court act to
preserve certain state-law claims, but it also decreed Ver-
mont law preempted solely because its application would
“allow respondents to circumvent the NPDES permit sys-
tem, thereby upsetting the balance of public and private
interests so carefully addressed by the [Clean Water] Act.”
Id. at 494. In this case, General Motors cannot so facilely
escape the administrative scheme; all of its choices stem
67a
from acceptable options.The interest balance —
public/private — remains unaffected. Under the Clean
Water Act, after all, a state was given the right to exceed
federal standards for pollution sources within its jurisdiction.
Id. at 489-90. Under the Safety Act, the states lack even that
power; the sovereignty of each state, the implicit concern of
the Ouellette Court, id. at 495, remains uncompromised by
validating the tort law of Massachusetts.
2. Uniformity. I find my colleagues’ fear that main-
tenance of this action will destroy uniformity, see, e.g., ante
at 31-32, 46-50, to be unfounded. They point to nothing in
the voluminous record which so much as suggests that instal-
lation of any one or more of the proffered options makes
installation of any of the others impossible. Unless a
manufacturer wilfully attempted to engineer different
modes of compliance for each jurisdiction, an act which
would be tantamount to economic self-immolation, nothing
about the “centralized, mass production, high volume char-
acter” of the industry....,” ante at 47 (citation omitted), would
be compromised. A manufacturer would never be in the
position of having to implement contradictory safety fea-
tures, nor could it ever be faced with one state’s safety
“maximum” and another’s conflicting “minimum.” In no
meaningful sense would uniformity be threatened; in the
worst-case scenario — “worst” from the manufacturer’s
viewpoint — self-interest would require either concurrent
implementation of the FMVSS 208 options or payment of
whatever damage awards (if any) might accrue. Such a result
does not create an irreconcilable conflict between the
federal regulatory scheme and state common law. See Wood
v. General Motors Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108, 1114-16 (D.
Mass. 1987) (explaining why potential for damage award
under state law is not incompatible with FMVSS 208; citing
relevant authority).
68a
3. Cost Considerations. In the last analysis, the
likelihood that all three options could ever be required, in
the sense that tort law ever “requires” anything to be done,
seems remote. The synergy inherent in, for example, adding
airbags to an automobile that already has manual belts with
warning systems, would likely be enormous. Under such
circumstances, neglect to furnish the incremental protection
of the additional (third) option might well yield such small
liability losses that manufacturers could logically rate the
game as eminently worth the candle. This assertion, to be
sure, has a speculative quality. But that, perhaps, is the point:
it is no less problematic than the chain of conjectural inferen-
ces put together by my colleagues to the effect that a contrary
decision (1) will open the door to statelaw claims, which (2)
will be realized in this and countless other actions, (3) yield-
ing damage rewards so large as to force car manufacturers
to alter their behavior.°°
It
There is perhaps, one other observation which should
be made. The majority apparently agrees that “compliance
with a federal safety standard does not serve as a defense on
the merits of a defective design claim.” Ante at 61 (emphasis
in original). Yet the abundant caselaw supporting that
proposition cannot be reconciled with this court’s opinion
today. If compliance is not a defense on the merits, then
almost by definition, a successful common law action for
inadequate design could force manufacturers to go beyond
With respect, my brethren’s approach involves other large chunks
of surmise as well, assuming, for instance, that a decision in regard to a
1976 Blazer will be applicable to every car of every make of every year,
and that “passive restraints” within the meaning of plaintiffs’ claim in
this case will necessarily involve airbags rather than the less expensive
belt system.
69a
the safety standards in place under any imaginable federal
law. The effect, therefore, would be the same as requiring a
non-identical standard covering the same aspect of perfor-
mance. It would be a strange “savings clause” indeed which
could salvage an action on the merits in this fashion but be
impuissant to step preemption, when the effect on unifor-
mity of regulation and manufacture would be precisely the
same in either case. Cf. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d
950, 953 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that compliance with
NHTSA safety standards does not relieve an automobile
manufacturer of liability and noting “the troubling public
policy dilemma ... that under existing federal law individual
juries in the various states are permitted, in effect, to estab-
lish national automobile safety standards”), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981).
IV
I need go no further. I recognize the closeness of the
question and the imprecisions of the statutory scheme. I
understand ful’ -vell that the balance of policy considerations
may have altered since the Safety Act of 1966 was passed.
And it can, I suppose, be hypothesized that automobile
safety is not today the pressing concern it was in 1966 (al-
though that is not a theorem to which I can willingly sub-
scribe). But the crux of the matter is not whether the
majority’s vision may best serve an era in which the regulated
are free both to choose safety options which exempt them
from the imposed wisdom of juries under the common law
and to safeguard their profit margins wherever Congress’s
speech is less than explicit. What counts, I suggest, is that
Congress did not originally, and has yet to, superimpose that
entrepreneurial vision on the Safety Act. Nor do I under-
stand the safety standard promulgated by NHTSA to have
done so. Because of those parallel truths, I would affirm the
70a
district court and aliow this suit to proceed. The plaintiff's
cause of action in tort, held by the trial judge to state a viable
claim under the common law of Massachusetts, 673 F. Supp.
at 1120, is not preempted.*!
I respectfully dissent.
3! The question of whether or not the plaintiffs complaint, preemp-
tion aside, adequately limns a state-law claim upon which relief can be
granted is not presently before us, and in dissenting, I take no view of
that question.
7Tla
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
PATRICIA M. WOOD,
FRANCIS X. WOOD, and
)
)
ELIZABETH WOOD, )
Plaintiffs, )
) CIVIL ACTION
) NO. 84-1566-Y
v. | )
GENERAL MOTORS )
CORPORATION, )
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
ON THE MOTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT TO DIS-
MISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
YOUNG, D.J. May 8, 1987
The plaintiffs Francis and Elizabeth Wood and their
daughter Patricia initiated this diversity action after Patricia
Wood suffered severe injuries as a result of an accident in an
automobile manufactured by the defendant General Motors
Corporation (“General Motors”).
I.
For the purposes of addressing the present motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment, the facts are straight-for-
ward and essentially undisputed. On May 19, 1981, Patricia
Wood was on her way home from school, riding as a pas-
senger in a 1976 General Motors Blazer. Wood was seated,
72a
apparently unbelted, in the front seat. The vehicle, while
travelling in excess of thirty miles per hour, collided head on
into a roadside tree. Wood suffered a broken neck and was
rendered quadriplegic. On May 18, 1984, she and her parents
commenced this action.
The Woods’ products liability action alleges that
General Motors’ automobile was, when manufactured and
released from the factory, in a defective condition and un-
reasonably dangerous to the user. The Woods’ theory is that
General Motors’ failure to install a passive restraint system,
specifically the failure to equip the automobile with air bags
or automatic seatbelts, rendered the car defective and this
defect caused the Woods to suffer their injuries. The Woods
claim that their injuries are due to General Motors’
negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchan-
tability, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 2-314(2)(c), and conduct
in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, §§ 2 and 9.
Moreover, Francis and Elizabeth Wood both claim injuries
based upon a loss of consortium theory. 1
General Motors has filed a motion for summary judg-
ment on the negligence, breach of warranty, and chapter 93A
claims and a motion to dismiss the loss of consortium claim.
General Motors contends that its summary judgment motion
should be granted because the Woods’ claims are preempted
by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
(“Safety Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1420 (1982 & Supp. 1987)
and the regulations promulgated thereunder. General
Motors also contends that the tort law of Massachusetts
This Court has previously dismissed their claim for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress. For an excellent, nation-wide synthesis
of the evolving law in this area, see S . Plotkin, The Evolution of Tort
Liability for Psychic Injuries: A Prepesal to Protect Relational Interests
(1986) (unpublished thesis on file at the University of Virginia School
of Law).
73a
recognizes neither the claim that the lack of passive restraint
systems can render a motor vehicle unreasonably dangerous
nor, in the circumstances of this case, the claim for loss of
consortium. There is considerable thoughtful support for
General Motors’ position on the preemption issue,* no
specific Massachusetts guidance on the issue whether breach
of warranty can be premised on the absence of passive
restraints, and scant and contradictory lower court prece-
dent concerning the recognition of a claim for loss of consor-
tium in these circumstances. ~ Even so, after careful
Wuttelet v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. CV-85-054-GF, slip op. (D.
Mont. April 27, 1987)(order of court); Doty v. McMahon, No. 85-3591,
slip op. (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1987); Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., No. 84-1049,
slip op. (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 1987) (adopting Magistrate’s ruling that
decided issue on Connecticut state tort law grounds); Baird v. General
Motors Corp., No. 84-2874A, slip op. (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 1986); Cox v.
Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor
Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota,
Inc., No. 470771, slip op. (Minn. D. Ct. March 12, 1987). But see Murphy
v. Nissan Motor Corp., No. 84-4556, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1987)
(claim for defectively designed product on theory that seatbelts were
ineffective when used in a reclining position where there are no addi-
tional safety features such as airbags); see also Note, Air Bag Litigation:
Plaintiffs, Start Your Engines, 13 Pepperdine L. Rev. 1063, 1074 (1986)
(reasoning in a conclusory manner that compliance with the
Administrator’s safety standards does not exempt a manufacturer from
state tort law liability for failing to install an air bag system).
3Compare Prince-Jackson v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center, No.
72769 (Mass. Superior Ct. April 8, 1985)(Young, J.)(opinion recogniz-
ing a parent’ s right at common law to sue for loss of consortium arising
out of injuries to a minor child) with Schebel v. General Motors Corp.,
No. 85-1574 (Mass. Superior Ct. June 25, 1986)( Murphy , J .)(order
granting summary judgment against such a claim). See Rogers v. Baker
Industries, No. 86-0395-MA, slip op. (D. Mass. August 20, 1986)(con-
cluding, without reference to the decisions of the Massachusetts Supe-
rior Court, that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, when it
comes to address the issue, will not recognize such a claim).
74a
reflection this Court concludes that General Motors’ motion
ought be denied and the case ought stand for trial.
Il.
THE SAFETY ACT
Congress established the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 -1420 (1966), in
response to the “soaring rate of death and debilitation on the
Nation’s highways.” S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 2709, 2709
(hereinafter S. Rep. No. 1301). Section 1381, the Congres-
sional declaration of purpose, declares that the “purpose of
this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and
injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.” 15
U.S.C. § 1381 (1982). The legislation places the “primary
responsibility” for establishing safety standards on the
federal government. The role of the states in the motor
vehicle safety regulatory scheme is set forth in § 1392(d):
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard
established under this subchapter is in effect, no
State or political subdivision of a State shall have
any authority either to establish, or to continue in
effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of
motor vehicle equipment any safety standard ap-
plicable to the same aspect of performance of such
vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical
to the Federal standard. Nothing in this section
shall be construed as preventing any State from
enforcing any safety standard which is identical to
a Federal safety standard. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prevent the Federal Govern-
ment or the government of any State or politi-
cal subdivision thereof from establishing a safety
taceiaieaaa anima eae
75a
requirement applicable to motor vehicles or motor
vehicle equipment procured for its own use if such
requirement imposes a higher standard of perfor-
mance than that required to comply with the other-
wise applicable Federal standard.
Thus, states are not preempted from enforcing safety stand-
ards identical to federal standards. In essence, the states’
regulations should complement the federal regulatory
scheme. S. Rep. No. 505, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 3169, 3174. Not only do
states have the authority to establish identical regulations,
but also they may regulate on “aspects of performance” not
specifically established by the federal government. Chrysler
Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1969)(where federal
regulations did not deal with specific feature of safety lamp,
states may regulate area). It is only when a federal standard
deals with a specific “aspect of performance” of a vehicle or
item of equipment that nonidentical state regulations are
precluded. Jd. at 325. Finally, Congress explicitly intended
to retain state tort remedies. It enacted a “savings clause,”
§ 1397(c), which provides that “[c]ompliance with any
federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this sub-
chapter does not exempt any person from any liability under
common law.”
Congress implemented the motor vehicle safety stand-
ard plan by directing the Secretary of Transportation to
establish federal standards. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(a). The
Secretary delegated this authority to the Administrator of
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“Ad-
ministrator”).4 Pursuant to this authority, the Administrator
“This opinion uses the word “Administrator” generally to refer to the
Administrator himself and also to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, its predecessor, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Bureau, the Department of Transportation, and the Secretary of
Transportation.
76a
issued Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 ("Stand-
ard 208"), entitled “Occupant Crash Protection.”
Standard 208 “bears a complex and convoluted his-
tory.” Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 35 (1983). As
originally issued in 1967, Standard 208 required only the
installation of seatbelts. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415 (1967).
Due to the low levels of seatbelt usage, the Administrator
amended Standard 208 in 1970 to include passive restraint
requirements. 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (1969). The two forms
of passive restraints considered were “passive seat-belts”
and airbags. Passive or automatic seatbelts are fastened to
the interior of the door and deploy automatically when the
door is closed by attaching to the car floor. Airbags are
inflatable devices concealed in the dashboard and steering
column that inflate automatically when a sensor indicates
that the “deceleration forces from an accident have ex-
ceeded a preset minimum." State Farm , 463 U.S. at 35.
In 1972, Standard 208 was amended to require the gradual
phasing in of passive protection for all cars. For models
made before August 1975, manufacturers were permitted to
use mapual belts with a warning or an “ignition interlock”
system, which prevented a car from starting until the belts
were fastened. For models made after August 1975, the rule
did not “dictate any particular form of passive protection,
[but] ... established minimum criteria that cars would have to
meet.” Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transpor-
tation, 593 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S.
The ignition interlock system was prohibited by Congress in 1974 in
an amendment to the Safety Act that also provided that any future safety
standards other than seatbelts would have to be submitted to Congress
where they would be subject to legislative veto. 15 U.S.C. § 1410(b).
The legislative veto provision is apparently unconstitutional in light of
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
77a
830 (1979). In 1975, the imposition of the mandatory passive
restraint system was postponed until August, 1976. 40 Fed.
Reg. 16,217 (1975).
Then, in June, 1976, the Secretary of Transportation
suspended the passive restraint requirement and extended
the optional alternatives indefinitely.° The Secretary feared
public hostility against the new systems State Farm, 463
US. at 37 (citing Secretary Coleman’s Decision of Dec. 6,
1976). The Secretary’s successor disagreed and reimposed
the mandatory requirement four months later.42 Fed. Reg.
34,289 (1976). The new standard mandated the phasing in
of passive restraints between 1982 and 1984. The standard
was submitted to Congress in accordance with 15 U.S.C. §
1410(b), where no action was taken. S. Rep. No. 481, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation held four Cays of hear-
ings and issued a report endorsing the standard).
In 1981, the Administrator rescinded the passive
restraint requirements. The Supreme Court, in State Farm,
held that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious and
remanded the matter to the Administrator for further con-
sideration. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57. In response, the
Administrator reimposed the passive restraint requirement
with phasing-in to begin on September 1, 1986 and becoming
mandatory by September 1, 1989 unless states with popula-
tions aggregating two thirds of the nation’s total population
pass mandatory seatbelt use laws by April, 1989. 49 Fed. Reg.
28,962, 28,963 (1984). A recent challenge to the
Administrator’s decision was judged not ripe by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. State
General Motors, through the affidavit of Jeffrey L. Pearson, states
that the 1976 Blazer in question was assembled in August, 1976, making
the optional alternative regulations those applicable at the time of
manufacture.
78a
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dole, 802 ©.2d 474
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, New York v. Dole, 55 U.S.L.W.
3661 (U.S. March 31, 1987).
The options provided by Standard 208 in August, 1976
are nearly identical to those applicable today. Standard 208
provides that manufacturers may comply by utilizing one of
several options. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1985).’? For
automobiles manufactured during the relevant time period
for this litigation, a manufacturer may comply by providing
a complete passive protection system, a head-on protection
system, or a lap and shoulder protection system. Jd §
571.208-S4.1.2. Simplified, the first option requires full air
bag protection; the second option requires only frontal air
bag protection; and the third option requires protection of
the occupant by a lap and shoulder belt apparatus Jd.
General Motors chose to comply with Standard 208 by
implementing the third option. Wood contends that the
1976 Blazer was unreasonably dangerous and defective be-
cause it was not equipped with a passive restraint system,
either under option one, two, or some other comparable
design. General Motors argues that it complied with a
federal safety standard option that preempts any state
regulation on the same aspect of performance, and that a
judgment of liability in tort for failure to provide air bags
would, according to General Motors, effectively impose a
nonidentical safety standard in contravention of the inten-
tion of Congress as expressed in 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d).
7General Motors’ 1976 Blazer, a multipurpose passenger vehicle
manufactured between January 1, 1976 and August 14, 1977, having a
gross vehic’e weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less, is covered by 49
C.F.R. § 571.208 - S4.2.2. (1985). The regulations applicable to the 1976
Blazer have remained essentially unchanged although the requirements
for the first option, $4.1.2.1., have been amended with respect to com-
plete automatic protection systems. This minor change is irrelevant for
the purpose of preemption analysis.
79a
PREEMPTION
Federal law may preempt state law in several ways.
First, Congress may include express preemption language in
the statute. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977). Second, if express preemption language is absent,
Congress may nonetheless imply preemption by evidencing
an intent to “occupy a given field” thereby precluding any
state law within that field. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 248 (1984). Congress’ intent to occupy a field can
be determined by the pervasiveness of the federal scheme,
the dominance of the federal interest, or the objectives of the
federal law. Id.; Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. De
La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).8 Third, where Congress has not
entirely superceded state regulation in a specific area, “state
law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with
federal law.” Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248. Actual conflict arises
when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is
a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), or “where state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.” Silkwood, 464 U.S. at
248 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 [1941]). See
generally Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis, No. 86-
1575, slip op. at 3-6 (1st Cir. March 30, 1987).
5General Motors has indicated in its brief that this form of preemp-
tion is not relevant to the Safety Act. Given that Congress expressly
permitted identical regulation, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d), and that states may
regulate areas not specifically addressed by Congress, see Chrysler Corp.
v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1969), it is apparent that Congress did
not intend to occupy the entire field of motor vehicle safety.
80a
Before applying these principles, this Court notes that
federal regulations have the same preemptive effect as
federal statutes. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (Assuming
the regulatory agency did not exceed its authority, “[f]ederal
regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal
statutes.”).9 Also, when deciding whether Congress in-
tended to preempt state law, this Court must be mindful of
the presumption that “Congress did not intend to displace
state law,” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981),
and that it should not disturb unnecessarily the federal-state
balance. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171,
1173 (D. Mass. 1986) (citing Maryland v. Louisiana).
A. Express Preeinption
General Motors argues that § 1392(d) expressly
preempts “implicit regulation” based upon theories of com-
mon law liability such as that asserted in the instant case by
the Woods. The language of § 1392(d) does not compel
giving such a broad sweep to the concept of regulation by
means of safety standards. It states that “no States ... shall
have the authority ... to establish ... any safety standards
applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle
... not identical to the Federal standard.” Federal motor
vehicle safety standards are minimum standards for motor
vehicle performance. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2). The federal
standards are established by a regulatory agency, subject to
judicial review. Noncompliance with the federal safety
standards constitutes a violation punishable by civil penalties
In prescribing any standards under the Safety Act, the Administrator
must consider whether the proposed standard is reasonable, practicable,
appropriate, and whether it will contribute to carrying out the purposes
of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f). The Woods do not assert that the
Administrator exceeded his authority or that he in any way flouted the
statutory guidelines. Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (holding that
the Administrator acted capriciously and arbitrarily).
8la
and the imposition of injunctive relief. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392,
1394, 1398-99. Noncompliance with federal safety standards
prior to sale by a dealer also subjects the manufacturer to the
duty of repurchasing the vehicle or replacing the parts not in
compliance with appropriate equipment. 15 U.S.C. § 1400.
An award of common law damages does not invoke this
panopoly of sanctions and prohibitions. Rather, it is aimed
at compensating a victim injured by tortious conduct. The
manufacturer need not alter its future conduct but instead
may choose only to compensate the individual victim. This
is not the situation with a violation of the Safety Act. In the
case of noncompliance, the manufacturer must repurchase
the vehicle or, at its own expense, furnish conforming re-
placement parts. 10
Finally, the argument in favor of express preemption is
severely undercut by § 1397(c), the savings clause of the
Safety Act, which explicitly provides for the continuation of
common law liability: “Compliance with any Federal motor
vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not
exempt any person from any liability under common law.”
The statutory preemptive language of § 1392(d) does not
directly address state common law. Cf. Cippollone v. Liggett °
Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986)(failure of
preemptive language in federal Cigarette Labelling and Ad-
vertising Act to include a reference to state common law
claims militated against express preemption), cert. denied, 55
U.S.L.W. 3474 (Jan. 13, 1987); Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical
Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542-43 (D.C. Cir.)(same construction
10General Motors contends, nonetheless, that this Court should con-
clude that the Safety Act expressly preempts any putative award be-
cause it will have some regulatory impact on its conduct. This
argument is better conceptually understood as one calling for implied
preemption and is addressed therefore in that portion of this opinion.
See infra § B.2, pp. 18-26.
82a
applied to Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act preemption claim), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
Congress well knows how to expressly bar common law suits
when it so desires. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1144(a)(c)(1)(1985)(chap-
ter supercedes all state laws including “laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of
law”)(emphasis added). The failure of this express exclusion
combined with the existence of the savings clause and the
presumption against preemption leads this Court to con-
clude that there is no express preemption here. Baird v.
General Motors Corp., No. C84-2874A, slip op. (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 31, 1986).11
B. Implied Preemption
Implied preemption based upon a conflict analysis is a
two-part inquiry. Under the first prong, General Motors
apparently argues that if it complies fully with federal Stand-
ard 208 and is nevertheless subjected to a state damage
award because it did not pursue some other option favored
by a jury, an “irreconcilable conflict” is produced, making it
physically impossible to comply with both federal and state
standards. Under the second prong, General Motors argues
that the imposition of a state standard by way of a damages
award would frustrate the objectives of the federal law. The
Court addresses each argument in turn.
1. Impossibility
The inquiry under this prong is “whether there exists an
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state
1 Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mo. 1986) held
that § 1392(d) did, in fact, expressly preempt state tort law liability in
this area but the Vanover court made no reference to the savings clause
and its discussion of the “regulatory impact” of a common law claim is
better addressed as an implied preemption claim. See infra § B.2, pp.
18-26.
83a
regulatory schemes. The existence of a hypothetical or poten-
tial conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of a
statute.” Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659
(1982)(In applying general preemption principles to an-
titrust law, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] party may
successfully enjoin the enforcement of a state statute only if
the statute on its face irreconcilably conflicts with federal
antitrust policy”)(emphasis added). The type of physical
impossibility rising to the level of irreconcilable conflict is
often presented where dual compliance with federal and
state regulations cannot be legally achieved. In Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963), a
seminal case on conflict analysis, the Supreme Court gave an
example of physical impossibility: “[I]f, for example, the
federal orders forbade the picking and marketing of any
avocado testing more than 7% oil, while the California test
excluded from the State any avocado measuring less than 8%
oil content,” then physically impossible dual compliance
would be presented.
General Motors contends that the imposition of com-
mon law liability would have the practical effect of eliminat-
ing its federally guaranteed options in occupant crashworthy
restraint systems. Although such an imposition would not
appear to create an “irreconcilable conflict” whereby dual
compliance is “physically impossible,” General Motors
nonetheless argues that the imposition of such an award
would produce a conflict forbidden by the Supreme Court’s
holding in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. De La
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). The Supreme Court, in De La
Cuesta, specifically stated, however, that compliance with
one of several options provided under the federal regula-
tions and also with the state common law rule “may not be”
a physical impossibility. Jd. at 155. In De La Cuesta, the
Supreme Court did not find preemption under the Avocado
Growers impossibility test but rather under the second prong
|
84a
of the conflict analysis. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. at 67 (a state statute is pre-empted if it c
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