Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Stich v. Jensen

OF THE

UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

RODNEY F. STICH

Petitioner

vs.

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

NINTH CIRCUIT

Respondent

Petition Writ of Certiorari

Suspension of Due Process

and Other Constitutional Rights

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Rodney F. Stich

Post Office Box 5

Alamo, Nevada 89510

Telephone: (415) 820-7250

Appellant in pro se

No. 89-

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

RODNEY F. STICH

Petitioner

vs.

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

NINTH CIRCUIT

Respondent

Petition Writ of Certiorari

Suspension of Due Process

and Other Constitutional Rights

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Rodney F. Stich

Post Office Box 5

Alamo, Nevada 89510

Telephone: (415) 820-7250

Appellant in pro se

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

1. May federal judges render injunctive orders

suspending the constitutional and statutory protections

while the party adversely affected by the injunction is

suffering great and irreparable harm?

2. May federal judges reverse the Courts' definition

of frivolous, and then use that tactic to suspend

constitutional due process to a party suffering great

and irreparable harm from a multitude of repeated

civil and constitutionai violations?

3. May federal judges deny relief to a party

suffering terminal destruction of his life's assets, his

liberties, his freedoms, his quality of life, his privacy,

by summary judgment dismissal of Civil Right Act

complaint stating shocking numbers of civil and

constitutional violations of constitutional magnitude?

4. Are constitutional rights--due process, equal

protection, right to unabridged interstate travel, the

Privileges and Immunities Clauses, property rights,

violated by forcing a party to relitigate the exercise

of personal jurisdiction in a 22 year old divorce

judgment, after changing residence to the State of

California?

5. Are constitutionally protected rights violated by

voiding 22 years of adjudicated and acquired personal

and property rights, by a later jurisdiction of

residence refusing to accept the exercise of personal

jurisdiction by a 1966 divorce court on the basis of

residence?

6. Are civil and constitutional protections under the

Civil Rights Act and other federally protected rights

suspended when a domestic relations label! is

fraudulently placed upon a non-domestic relations

cause of action?

7. Does a judicial racketeering enterprise exists in

the Ninth Circuit courts?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented .............. i

te We ee 6 eee eee ij

Table Of Authorities ............... iii

[nn Pe ss sale wis ue ei l

Jurisdiction Statement ............... ]

Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions Involved ................. ]

Federal Questions Are

PURSE 6 ob 0.6'0'e 0 So's beeen 3

Statement of the Case ............... >)

Reasons For Granting Writ ...... 1

WD 65k ae ea ee ed ee ae ee 24

I. The Complaint Stated A Record

Number Of Civil and

Constitutional Violations,

Invoking Mandatory Federal Court

Jurisdiction, and Barring

NN, “81d 6:6 258 Cte ad aoe a 24

Il. The Ninth Circuit Abdicated Its

Trust and Responsibilities As A

Federal Appeals Court ........... 25

—

oo)

—

Petitioner Is Suffering Great and

Irreparable Harm Of Constitutionally

Protected Persona! and Property

Rights, and Is Entitled To Long

E,W be ee ea ss 32

IV. The Behind-the-Scene Major

National Scandal Giving Rise

To the Judicial Attacks and

Suspension of Law and

Constitution

The Supreme Court Justices Have

A Responsibility To Grant A

Hearing, Temporaty Injunctive

Relief, and To Vacate All Adverse

Federal Court Decisions Arising

Out of the Litany Of

onstitutional Violation

TABLE

)F AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL COURT CASES Pages

Aoucs v. S.H. Kress & Co

52.3 | eee eee es 17

Anders v. California

Bie a Bel” 5 err 13

Coe v. Coe

Bee te See IO) ov oe sb tka 6

Conle y_v. Gibson

See Ais ES 6.e sO as Oe OE Oe ee 15

Csibi v. Fustos

670 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 190862)... .4 60 wos 28

Crandall v. Nevada

Fe A lses e ED. 4 oo 4 ae eke ek ee 10

Dennis v. Sparks

B49 UB. 2S UIBGO) sci wt eee eae es 15

Estin v. Estin

Bae Wi et ION) keh ee eke 6

Gardener v. Toilet Goods Assn

Ser Seles TG CAG ae ee a eer as 15

Haines v. Kerner

O00 Ui. Ote (iWia) 6 0 oo eee ee 8 8 se 13

Kent v. Dulles

ee Sets BAG CG G8) ah er ek 10

Matter of McLinn

444 Fea Goo (9th Cir, 1964) 2.4.64 0a 25

Miofsky v. Superior Court of California

Ua FitG Gase oun Cir. TORS) . «st ss 0s 25

Monroe v. Pape

365 U.S. 167

. *

Shapiro v. Thompson

394 U.S.

Sherrer v.

334 U.

Stich v.

685 F.

Tovar v. Billmeyer

609 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1980) ........

eee

Sherrer

D>. 043 (1948) ..... ee ee

_NTSB

2d 446 (9th Cir. 1981) ........

. United States.,

paee eee ae Gar, 2970) «2. 2 ee ee

United States v. Guest

ee

Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt

© 8 4

Commerce Clause

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Privileges and Immunities Clause,

Art. IV, Section

U.S.C.

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1961

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OPINIONS BELOW

The United States Court of Appeals rendered a final

order on May 2, 1989, denying petitioner's timely re-

quested petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc.

(Appendix "A.") Earlier, on March 14, 1989, the Court of

Appeal rendered an order affirming the district court's

dismissal. (Appendix "B"). On July 30, 1986 the district

court rendered an injunctive order barring petitioner

access to any court for any cause of action, including

those yet to occur. (Appendix "C") On September 16, 1986

the district court granted summary judgment to the defen

dants. (Appendix "D.")

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This petition for writ of certiorari is filed pursuant to

Rules 17.1 (a) (c) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the

United States.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Constitutional and statutory provisions that are a

part of petitioner's complaint in the district court's July

30, 1986 injunctive order and September 16, 1986 summary

judgment, includes:

a. Fourteenth Amendment due process, equal protection,

property rights, and privileges and immunities clause.

b. Privileges and Immunities clause of Article IV, § 2

c. Full Faith and Credit, Article IV, § 1, and as statutori-

ly enacted in Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

d. Constitutional right to unabridged interstate travel.

e. Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and Title 28

f. Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.

g. Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 and 1962.

h. First Amendment right to petition government for

redress of grievances.

i. Fifth Amendment right to due process, equal protec-

tion, property rights,

j. Right and responsibility to report criminal acts af-

fecting the nation's air safety, and causing a series of air

tragedies.

k. Whistleblower case and statutory law, relating to

petitioner's reporting of government misconduct and

felonies relating to a series of fatal air tragedies.

THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL

Fundamental constitutional rights are violated, includ-

action prohibited by Supreme Court decisions, stripping

petitioner of all defenses, and then barring him access to

the courts after he discovered the judicial racketeering

enterprise. This suspension of important federal question

rights sought to obstruct petitioner's exposure of the

scandal, and obstruct defenses against a sham California

action. The scheme sought to block petitioner's exposure

activities that threatened to expose federal judges and

justices in the Ninth Circuit.

Statement Of the Case

Petitioner filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court,

under authority of federal law and Constitution,’ alleging

multiple violations of rights and protections under the

laws and Constitution of the United States, and of the

State of California.

The complaint stated that the violations arose from

orders rendered by California judges, acting under color of

State law, causing great and irreparable harm, in a cause

of action that had been (a) held impermissible by decisions

1 Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986; Title 28

U.S.C. $§ 1343, 2201, 2202; Title 18 U.S.C. $§ 196i,

1962; directly under the Constitution, and as a Bivens

claim.

on

of the U.S. Supreme Court and their progeny for the past

half century;? (b) in which the state judges lacked person-

al and subject matter jurisdiction;* (c) in which over two

dozen clear and settled state statutory laws and rules of

court were violated;* (d) in which federal law and consti-

tutional rights were trampled.”

2 Refusing to recognize prior divorce judgments of

persons changing residence to California, by refusing

to recognize exercise personal and property rights

adjudicated and acquired in prior divorce judgments

and jurisdictions, when the court jurisdiction was

exercised upon residence, without also requiring deter-

mination of the subjective mental thought processes of

domicile. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe

v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,

354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541

(1948); Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107 (3rd Cir. 1967).

3 California Family Law Act is strictly limited to

three causes of action, and does not provide jurisdic-

tion to attack prior divorce judgments, and specifically

bars such attacks. Rules of Court 1201(c), 1211, 1212,

1215(b), 1222, 1229, 1281, 1282.

* Mandatory divorce judgment recognition: Code

of Civil Procedure §§ 1699(b), 1713.3, 1908, 1913,

1915; Civil Code §§ 4554, 5004, 5164; Statute of limi-

tations: Code of Civil Procedure 318, 338, 343; Civil

Code §§ 880.020, 880.250; conclusive presumption that

prior court acted in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction

when under collateral attack: Evidence Code § 666;

and many others.

> Right to obtain a divorce; right to exercise

personal jurisdiction upon the same residence basis as

available to millions of others; Privileges and Immuni-

ties Clauses; right to unabridged interstate travel; due

6

The cause of action attacked and voided personal and

property rights adjudicated in a 1966 divorce judgment;

established in four subsequent judgments;° and acquired

during 22 years of divorced status as a divorced person,

which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment due

process, equal protection, and property right clauses.

The cause of action argued, and California judges held,

that these 22 years of protected rights were void, on the

basis that California judges would not recognize the exer-

process; equal protection; protection of property rights

from seizure of properties without due process and

equal protection.

© Initial 1966 divorce judgment following a bilat-

eral consent divorce proceeding, rendered by jurisdic-

tion of residence for five months, State of Chihuahua,

Mexico, No. 189723, authenticated by U.S. Consul;

Registration and confirmation of the 1966 divorce

judgment in the Superior Court, Contra Costa County,

action number 251773, under C.C.P. § 1699(b) and C.C.

§ 5164; registration of the Contra Costa divorce judg-

ment confirmation in the Superior Court, Solano Coun-

ty, State of California, action 91929; judicial entry of

the Contra Costa county confirmed judgment into the

Nevada courts, Second Judicial District of Nevada,

County of Washoe, case number 85-5391 and into

foreign judgment registry, number 31; registration of

the 1966 divorce judgment in the District Court of

Oklahoma County, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Case

number FD-86-5870; registration of the Contra Costa

confirmed judgment in the Civil Courts of Dallas Coun-

ty, Dallas, Texas, in Volume Two, Page 78, Foreign

Judgment Register.

: ne ee Cn a Re eo a —— = os i

cise of personal jurisdiction by courts foreign to Califor-

nia, and residents of such foreign jurisdictions. On that

constitutionally preposterous holding, the California

judges refused to recognize the exercise of personal juris-

diction of the 1966 court, and refused to recognize the

validity of petitioner's five month's residence in the 1966

court's jurisdiction.

The California judges held that unless the 1966 court

exercised jurisdiction over residents of the foreign court

jurisdiction on the basis of the subjective mental thought

processes of domicile, all personal and property rights

adjudicated in that divorce, all rights established in subse-

quent judgments, and property rights acquired during the

following two decades as a divorced person, were void.

Using this constitutionally preposterous argument as a

base, the California judges embarked on a six year scheme

that destroyed literally every right and protection under

the laws and Constitution of the State of California and of

the United States. The prior divorce judgment was recog-

nized by the federal government, through the Social Secu-

rity Administration, on the basis of the former wife's

declaration of divorced status, and the several divorce

judgments establishing that fact.

The California judges then proceeded to remarry peti-

tioner to the Texas resident, who declared herself di-

vorced from petitioner for the past two decades, and who

repeatedly gave constructive notice of that fact in numer-

ous real estate transaction. The California judges held

that they had the authority to relitigate, twenty years

later, the exercise of personal jurisdiction when petition-

er changed his residence years later to the Solano County,

State of California jurisdiction; and simultaneously deny

that party the right to rely upon the residence basis for

exercising jurisdiction (as exercised by millions of other

citizens) and substitute for residence in the relitigation,

the subjective mental thought processes of domicile,

insuring that a Kangaroo Court environment could "sup-

port" the refusal to recognize the 22 year old divorce

judgment, and two decades of adjudicated and constitu-

tionally protected property rights.

In this manner, the California judges could render an

order seizing protected personal and property rights of

virtually any citizen, and especially one who threatens to

expose a major government and judicial scandal.

That holding barred highly mobile persons, or those who

must change residence due to economic circumstances,

the right to obtain a divorce, or the prior divorce judgment

is subject to voiding by a California judge if the party

exercise constitutional travel rights and changes resi-

dence to California, possible decades later.

This argument violated the constitutional right (a) to

obtain a divorce while a five-month resident of the juris-

diction foreign to California; (b) violated the rignt to

unabridged interstate travel;’ (c) the privileges and im-

” Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867); Shapiro

v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Referring to Com-

merce Clause; the Privileges and Immunities Clause of

Art. IV, section 2; the Privileges and Immunities

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. "the right to

travel interstate is a ‘fundamental’ right which, for

present purposes, should be regarded as having its

source in [the fifth amendment due process clause]."

Kent v. Dulles (1958) 357 U.S. 116, "The right to

travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen

cannot be deprived with the due process of law under

the Fifth Amendment ... Freedom of movement across

frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as

well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like

travel within the country [is] basic in our scheme of

values."; United States v. Guest (1966) 383 U.S. 745,

"The constitutional right to travel from one State to

another [occupies] a position fundamental to the con-

cept of our Federal Union. See also, Oregon v. Mitch-

ell 400 US 112, 27 L Ed 2d 272, 91 S Ct 260 (1970);

Slaughter House Cases 16 Wall 36, 21 L Ed 394 (1872);

Edwards v. California, 314 US 160, 86 L Ed 119, 62 S

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disaster whistleblower.

State Judge Violation of State Rights

The attack upon the 22 years old personal and property

rights, relying for support on the cause of action specifi-

cally barred by the federal and state constitutions, vio-

lated (a) statute of limitations under state and federal

law; (b) statutory requirement to recognize the 1966

divorce judgment, its confirmation as a California judg-

ment, and the entry of the California-confirmed judgment

in the courts of Nevada, Oklahoma, and Texas; (c) statu-

tory requirement for conclusive presumption that the 1966

court acted in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction when

under collateral attack (Evidence Code § 666); (d) Cali-

fornia constitution relating to property rights, due pro-

cess and equal protection.

Absence of Personal/Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under the California Family Law Act, an attack upon a

prior divorce judgment is (a) specifically barred by clear

and settled law; (b) does not meet the legal criteria of a

domestic relations action and there is no huetadiotas

under the California Family Law Act.

Violated Protected Property Rights

All of petitioner's properties were acquired years after

the 1964 abandonment of the Colorado marital residence

by petitioner's former wife and acquired after the 1966

divorce judgment in which the court held there were no

community properties. Under California law, and federal

law, the properties were not community, and never had

been, as shown by the titles. California judges lack juris-

diction over separate properties even if, for argument, the

cause of action was a Family Law Act matter.

State Judicial Due Process Gridlock

Every relevant procedural due process remedy in Cali-

fornia law and Constitution was suspended. California

judges and justices courts reversed the Supreme Court's

definition of frivolous,® using that as a judicial scam to

wrongfully dismissal the appeals and petitions, protect the

civil and constitutional violators, and impose harsh finan-

cial sanctions upon the party seeking relief.

° Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-522 (1972);

Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 ("An appeal

[or complaint] is not frivolous if "any of the legal

points [are] arguable on their merits ...").

13

Great and Irreparable Harm

The preposterous civil and constitutional violations

inflicted great and irreparable harm upon petitioner.

Petitioner's income was halted since 1983. His home, his

business, and his assets, were seized. His constitutionally

protected liberty, privacy, quality of life, property rights,

were destroyed. His business was eveniually lost. Peti-

tioner was converted from a multi-millionaire, using his

assets in a public-spirited endeavor to expose and correct

a major, ongoing, air safety/air disaster scandal that had

expanded into a government and federal judiciary scandal.

All of these constitutional outrages and injuries sought

support in the cause of action that this Supreme Court

held impermissible for the last 50 years, and that violated

dozens of clear and settled California statutory laws,

federal statutory and case laws, and fundamental consti-

tutional rights.

Federal Due Process Gridlock

These massive violations of rights and protections under

the laws and Constitution of the United States were al-

leged in petitioner's federal complaint (86-210). Federal

rules of civil procedure (FRCivP 12) and related case law?

requires that the allegations stated in the complaint must

be accepted as true to oppose dismissal or summary judg-

ment, and that if federal causes of action of constitutional

magnitude are raised, dismissal is barred.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for entry of

summary judgment only where the pleadings and available

evidence (depositions, answers to interrogatories, admis-

sions on file, and affidavits, if any) show that there is "no

genuine issue as to any material fact" and that the moving

party is therefore "entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law."

Petitioner's complaint raised numerous triable issues:

(a) Were orders were rendered without personal and with-

out subject matter jurisdiction; (b) were orders rendered

after all trial court proceedings had been halted by the

perfecting of notice of appeals; (c) were orders rendered

® Dennis v. Sparks 449 U.S. 24 (1980) ("a section

1983 complaint should not be dismissed unless it ap-

pears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

which would entitle him to relief. ... For purposes of

testing sufficiency of the complaint, the allegations of

the complaint must be taken as true."); Gardener v.

Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S. 167, 172 (1967); Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-47.

after petitioner moved the action to federal court, where

it remains at this time in the appeal stage. (C.A. No. be

(d) was the cause of action barred by decisions of the U.S.

Supreme Court; were the Full Faith and Credit Clause and !

statutory embodiment, requiring recognition of the Cali-

fornia confirmed judgment, and its entry as a local judg-

ment in the courts of Nevada, Oklahoma, and Texas, vio-

lated; (e) was the cause of action was barred by numerous

California laws and Constitutional provisions; (f) were

numerous fundamental constitutional rights violated; (g)

was the former wife barred from attacking the prior di-

vorce judgment when she gave constructive notice to the

world that she was divorced for the past two decades,

invoking also the quasi estoppel rule; and numerous other

questions.

Summary judgment is permitted under FRCivP 56(c) only

if the evidence shows "that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law." There were triable issues,

and the multiple federal causes of action of constitutional

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which were committed, aided and abetted by the federal

licial due process gridlock

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District Judge Milton Schwartz reversed the legal rights

ind protections serving as the criteria for rendering in-

unctive orders. Instead of rendering the injunctive order

to protect petitioner against the great and irreparable

harm, the injunctive order was rendered to protect the

g the party suffer

Duplication of Constitutional Outrages in United

States Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals justices had a simple task when

petitioner filed the appeal of the district court's dismissal

a . . . .

nctive order. The standard for review for

summary judgment the appellate court must con

novo review, and determine whether the complaint stated

a cause of action.*? If the allegations state a federal

cause of action for which federal courts can provide re-

lief, then it must vacate the dismissal/summary judgment.

Obviously, petitioner's complaints stated many federal

causes of action of great constitutional significance.

Judge Schwartz held that petitioner's complaint stating

11 "Summary judgment is granted as a matter of

law. Therefore, the Appellate Court must review the

facts anew, in favor of the non-moving party. Ashton

v. Cory, 780 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1986)." On review, the

appellate court must review grant of judgment on the

pleadings de novo, taking all material allegations of

the non-moving party as true and construing them in

the light most favorable to that party. Judgment on

the pleadings will not be granted unless "the allega-

tions of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that

plaintiff does not have a claim." 5 C. Wright & A.

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357, at 604

(1969)." (Sinaloa Lake Owners Association v. City of

Simi Valley, 89 C.D.O.S. 238, No. 86-6425 (9th Cir.

Jan. 6, 1989).

19

numerous federal causes of action--which on May 9, 1986

he stated to be very serious--were suddenly called frivo-

lous several weeks later. A frivolous holding is subject to

de novo review on appeal.

On appeal, the law requires that this court accept the

complaint and supporting affidavits as true. Gardener v.

Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S. 167, 172 (1967). An action,

"especially under the Civil Rights Act, should not be dis-

missed at the pleadings stage unless it appears to a cer-

tainty that plaintiffs are entitled to no relief under any

state of the facts, which could be proved in support of

their claims." Escalera v. N.Y. Housing Auth., 425 F.2d

853, 857 (2nd Cir. 1970). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-7 ) 1957); Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287,

1290 (9th Cir. 1977); Mark v. Gross, 521 F.2d 1376, 1378

(9th Cir. 1975); York v. Gross, 521 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th

12 For the purpose of determining whether a

complaint is "frivolous," the court presumes that the

plaintiff's allegations are true. Franklin, 745 F.2d at

1228. In addition, courts must construe allegations in

pro se complaints liberally. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of

State Prison Commrs, 766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir.

1985)."

Cir. 1975); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 196-

3).

The appellate court review of summary judgment mo-

tions is de novo. Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423

(9th Cir. 1985). Summary judgment is appropriate only if

there are no genuine issues of material fact and the mov-

ing party is entitled to judgment based upon the absence of

federal causes of action. Culver v. Boat Transit, Inc., 782

F.2d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986). Culver v. Boat Transit,

Inc., 782

F.2d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986).

Reasons For Granting the Writ

1. Supreme Court's supervisory responsibilities (Su-

preme Court Rule 17) over the lower federal courts. The

Ninth Circuit judges and justices have embarked upon a

pattern of total suspension of the laws and Constitution of

the United States to protect the scheme to silence peti-

tioner's threatening exposure activities. The obstruction

of justice by dismissal of the earlier actions against the

FAA and NTSB,?° the judicial due process gridlock and

13 Stich v. United States, et al., 554 F.2d 1070

(9th Cir.) (table), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920

(1977)(addressed hard-core air safety misconduct,

21

misuse of the federal courts against petitioner, are tenta-

cles of the judicial racketeering enterprise in the Ninth

Circuit courts.

2. Supreme Court's responsibilities under Title 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343, Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986, and other re-

sponsibilities as justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, and

under criminal laws requiring reporting of criminal acts,

especially those subverting the laws and constitution of

the United States.

3. Supreme Court rule 26. The issues raised in the peti-

tion "aid in the Court's appellate jurisdiction, that there

violations of federal air safety laws, threats against

government inspectors not to report safety violations

and misconduct); Stich v. National Transportation

Safety Board, 685 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.)(table), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 861 (1982))(addressed repeated crimi-

nal falsification of official airline accident reports,

omitting highly sensitive air safety misconduct, making

possible repeated crashes from the same sequestered

problems); Amicus curiae brief filed on July 17, 1975,

in the Paris DC-10 multi-district litigation, Flanagan

v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation and United States

of America, Civil Action 74-808-PH, MDL 172, Central

District California.)(addressing the long standing FAA

misconduct, of which the coverup of the DC-10 cargo

door problem was one of repeated instances of tragedy

related misconduct); U.S. v. Department of Justice,

District of Columbia, Nos. 86-2523, 87-2214, and other

actions filed by claimant seeking to expose and cor-

rect the powerful and covert air disaster misconduct.

22

are present exceptional circumstances warranting the

exercise of the Court's discretionary powers, and that

adequate relief cannot be had in any other form or from

any other court."

4. The judicial anarchy of the Ninth Circuit, acting in

concert, undermining the laws and Constitution of the

United States, destroying the one party exercising re-

sponsibilities in the nation's worsening air disaster prob-

lems, and sacrificing the lives that will continue to be lost

by the obstruction of justice.

5. Grave national interests of major importance are

implicated, including (a) selective suspension of the laws

and constitution of the United States to silence expostire

of a major government and judicial scandal; (b) sacrificing

of lives in the underlying air disaster scandal which the

judicial misconduct seeks to cover up by blocking petition-

er's exposure and corrective actions.

Exceptional circumstances include:

1. Judicial racketeering activities within the Ninth Cir-

cuit courts that far exceeds the Greylord Cook County

judicial scandal, or the alleged wrongful acts of accused

federal district Judge Robert Aquilar. Their malfeasance,

23

misfeasance, obstruction of justice, racketeering activi-

ties, massive civil and constitutional violations, are cor-

ruptly suspending the laws and Constitution of the United

States. The intent of these outrageous acts is to destroy

petitioner's protected rights, barring him from exposing

the correcting the misconduct, barring him from defending

against the judicial scheme, and barring him from exposing

the scheme openly perpetrated against him. These out-

rages knowingly sacrifice lives in fraud-related air trage-

dies, and are sufficient reasons for the Justices of the U.S.

Supreme Court to exercise their responsibilities, after the

past 15 years of refusing to accept it.

ARGUMENT

Be The Complaint Stated A Record Number

Of Civil And Constitutional Violations of

Constitutional Magnitude, Invoking

Mandatory Federal Court Jurisdiction,

and Barring Dismissal

A record number of civil and constitutional violations of

constitutional magnitude were stated in petitioner's com-

plaint filed in the district court. (86-210) The complaint

stated with sufficient specificity to meet federal plead-

ings requirements m

The mandatory responsibility of federal courts was ar-

24

ticulated in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (federal

courts have "the "unflagging obligation" of the federal

courts to exercise the jurisdiction given to them.); Tovar

v. Bilimeyer, 609 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1980) ("It is no an-

swer that the State has a law which if enforced would give

relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state

remedy ...." This obligation is particularly weighty when

those seeking a hearing in federal court are asserting, as

the appellants are here, their right to relief under 42

U.S.C. § 1983."; Miofsky v. Superior Court of the State of

California, 703 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983) ("... we must bear

in mind the fundamental principle that federal courts have

an "unflagging obligation" to exercise their jurisdiction.

Il. The Ninth Circuit Abdicated Its Trust

and Responsibilities As A Federal Ap-

peals Court

The Ninth Circuit articulated its responsibilities in Mat-

ter of McLinn, 744 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1984), and made ref-

erence to its own abdication of responsibilities if they did

not give de novo review of the district courts' decisions:

To fulfill our role within the federal court structure,

we should review all legal issues, whether of state or

federal law, under the independent de novo standard.

. Indeed, this respect is inherent in the adversary

system, which assigns to the appellant the duty to es-

25

neem ae

tablish the errors in the trial court's decision.

Summary judgments must be reviewed de novo, to deter-

mine whether the complaint stated any federal cause of

action. Petitioner's complaint stated a shocking number

of major violations of federal question rights, for which

federal courts had mandatory jurisdiction responsibilities.

It is obvious that the Ninth Circuit pattern of solid judicial

due process gridlock extended into the Court of Appeals,

duplicating the repeated denial of due process and equal

protection, and repeated protection of those committing

the federal violations.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district

court's summary judgment, omitting reference to the ma-

jor causes of action, omitting reference to the major civil

and constitutional violations raised in petitioner's com-

plaints. The Court of Appeals affirmance protected viola-

tions committed by the district court, including the bla-

tantly unconstitutional injunctive order.

The Ninth Circuit approved the injunctive order that

suspended the laws and Constitution of the United States,

and which was then used to sentence petitioner to prison

for seeking relief in federally guaranteed due process

26

right to federal court relief, for those yet to perish in air

tragedies made possible by the misconduct, and seeking

relief from the continuing barrage of civil and constitu-

tional violations.

The Ninth Circuit approved the gross, and crass, viola-

tions of civil and constitutional violations committed by

the state and federal judges, and the San Francisco law

firm of Friedman, Sloan and Ross, who acted as a "front" in

the air tragedy riddled racketeering enterprise. Every

action by the district and appellate courts were to protect

the Friedman law firm and their grotesque violations of

civil and constitutional rights.

Sequestering the Violations

The Ninth Circuit addressed none of the multitude of

civil and constitutional violations, which they are requir-

ed to review de novo. The Ninth Circuit approved, and

covered up for, the massive violations committed in their

prens by the state and federal courts. And in the process,

they continued sacrificing the lives that would be lost in

selected air tragedies, just as they did when they wrong-

fully affirmed the corrupt dismissal of the 1974 and 1980

actions against the FAA and NTSB.

27

Misstating the Facts and Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmance decision totally misstated

the cause of action in the California courts, protecting

one of the most outrageous judicial racketeering enter-

prises yet exposed in U.S. judicial history. The Ninth Cir-

cuit affirmance decision deliberately and fraudulently

circumvented the issues, misstated the facts, abdicated

their responsibilities, and used the same sordid ploys used

by the civil and constitutional violators in the state ac-

tion. In their affirmance decision, the Ninth Circuit open-

ly misstated the facts:

Rodney Stich appeals pro se the district court's grant

of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a

civil rights action arising out of a divorce action

brought in California Superior Court by Stich's wife.

The judgment must be affirmed. The district court did

not have jurisdiction to hear a core domestic relations

case in which "a federal court is asked to grant a di-

vorce or annulment, determine support payments, or

award custody of a child." Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d

134, 137 (9th Cir. 1982).

Judgment Affirmed.

In typical Ninth Circuit fashion, Csibi states the very

opposite, making clear that the abstention is narrowly

construed, and making it clear that it would not apply

where a federal court must decide which one of five di-

28

Leena iaeneaanameiaaaasiaarieattr

$$$ ———

vorce judgments, from different jurisdictions, are to be

recognized under the Federal Supremacy Clause rights.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is federal

court responsibility to halt attacks upon divorce judg-

ments rendered by courts in other jurisdictions. As it now

remains, petitioner's personal and property rights are

legally recognized as accruing from a 1966 divorce judz-

ment in judgments confirmed as a California judgment iin

the Superior Court, Contra Costa County (251773), en-

tered in the courts of Nevada, Oklahoma, and Texas. But

now there is another action, seeking to enter an entirely

different judgment, totally changing the rights and pro-

tections established in the five earlier judgments.

Obviously--even to Ninth Circuit judges and justices--

this serious contradiction can only be addressed by federal

courts, who are paid, and entrusted with the responsibili-

ties, to provide such relief.

The Ninth Circuit fraudulently classified the California

action as a divorce action even though (a) they knew five

divorce judgments legally established petitioner's di-

vorced status for the past 22 years, barring the possibility

of a domestic relations divorce action 22 years after the

29

fact; (b) that the cause of action (retroactive refusal to

recognize exercise of personal jurisdiction on residence)

was blatantly illegal and unconstitutional under federal

law; (c) that under California law the attack upon a prior

divorce judgment was barred; (d) that under the California

Family Law Act, the attack upon any prior divorce judg-

ment is not considered a domestic relations action, and is

specifically barred under the Act; (e) that the attack upon

the 1966 judgment was without personal and without sub-

ject matter jurisdiction under California law; (f) that the

state judges were violating dozens of California statutes,

rules of Court, doctrines of law, California Constitutional

provisions, California Supreme Court decisions.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision knowingly

protected and failed to address the multiple violations of

federally protected rights, including (a) Right of non-

California residents to obtain a divorce in their residence

of jurisdiction, without interference by a California judge,

years later, violating a multitude of rights and protections

under state and federal law; (b) the right to unabridged

interstate travel; (c) intrusion into the sovereignty of

jurisdictions foreign to California, and taking protected

30

Se

rights of residents of such foreign jurisdictions; (d) and

many other rights stated herein.

The Ninth Circuit wrongfully implies that placing a do-

mestic relations label on a cause of action suspends gil due

process and eaual protection under the laws and Constitu-

tion of the United States.

The Ninth Circuit courts have repeatedly, on at least 15

different occasions, violated petitioner's due process and

equal protection rights. They did this in the 1974 action

against the FAA, the 1975 Paris DC-10 action, the 1980

action against the NTSB, which made federal judges ac-

cessory before the fact, at the fact, and after the fact.

Summary judgment appellate review is de novo. If the

record, which must be viewed in the light most favorable

to petitioner, shows issues of material fact, or federal

causes of action, the summary judgment must be vacated.

There is no possibility that the district court, and the

appellate court, could have failed to recognize the multi-

tude of issues and federal causes of action. They both lied.

These absurd constitutional violations were not judicial

ignorance. They all knew what they were doing, and they

were engaging in a judicial racketeering enterprise to

silence exposure of the world's worst air disaster and

superimposed government and judicial scandal.

Ill. Petitioner Is Suffering Great and Irrep-

arable Harm From A Pattern Of Ninth

Circuit Due Process Gridlock, Invoking

Supreme Court responsibilities

Solely on the cause of action that had been held uncon-

stitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court for the past 50

years, with superimposed massive violations of state and

federal laws and Constitution, petitioner has suffered

great and irreparable harm, including: (a) halting peti-

tioner's sole source of income for the past six years; (b)

destroyed his credit worthiness, which will continue for

the remainder of petitioner's life; (c) seized his proper-

ties, converting him from a multi-millionaire, devoting his

assets to the public's air safety welfare, into a state of

poverty; (d) caused the loss of petitioner's retirement

home; (e) caused the loss of petitioner's business; (f)

caused stress-induced open heart surgery; (g) grossly

invaded petitioner's privacy; (h) destroyed his quality of

life; (i) sentenced petitioner to prison.

In addition, the constitutional outrages and due process

gridlock blocking relief, and blocking petitioner's correc-

tion of the sequestered air disaster misconduct, continues

to result in horror and deaths in air tragedies made possi-

ble or caused by the misconduct, the coverup, and the

judicial attacks upon petitioner. Every federal court that

had an opportunity to provide a federal court forum and

relief, and blocked those remedies, violated their trust

and the laws and Constitution of the United States, know-

ingly sacrificing little children and others who paid the

price for coverup in air tragedies arising from the miscon-

duct petitioner seeks to correct.

IV. The Behind-the-Scene Major National

Scandal Giving Rise To the Judicial At-

tacks and Suspension of Law and Consti-

tution

The reasons behind the solid California and federal judi-

cial due process gridlock: Petitioner uncovered a major,

ongoing, air safety/air disaster scandal, initially while

petitioner was a government air safety investigator as-

signed to, among others, powerful United Airlines. These

discoveries were made while petitioner had the govern-

ment responsibility for making such determinations, and

while United Airlines was experiencing thirty years of

major fraud-related air tragedies.

33

Petitioner's official federal air safety responsibilities

at the most crash-plagued airline in the United States

were blocked by the FAA legal and management staffs, the

National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Bu-

reau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the

federal courts--as this Court already knows. The details of

these crimes were brought to federal court attention, and

that of the U.S. Supreme Court, in numerous federal ac-

tions.14 The Department of Justice obstructed every at-

14 Stich v. United States, et al., 554 F.2d 1070

(9th Cir.) (table), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920

(1977)(addressed hard-core air safety misconduct,

violations of federal air safety laws, threats against

government inspectors not to report safety violations

and misconduct); Stich v. National Transportation

Safety Board, 685 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.)(table), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 861 (1982))(addressed repeated crimi-

nal falsification of official airline accident reports,

omitting highly sensitive air safety misconduct, making

possible repeated crashes from the same sequestered

problems); Amicus curiae brief filed on July 17, 1975,

in the Paris DC-10 multi-district litigation, Flanagan

v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation and United States

of America, Civil Action 74-808-PH, MDL 172, Central

District California.)(addressing the long standing FAA

misconduct, of which the coverup of the DC-10 cargo

door problem was one of repeated instances of tragedy

related misconduct); U.S. v. Department of Justice,

District of Columbia, Nos. 86-2523, 87-2214, and other

actions filed by claimant seeking to expose and cor-

rect the powerful and covert air disaster misconduct.

34

tempt to expose the air disaster misconduct and petition-

er's attempts to correct the crash-causing misconduct.

This blockage actions followed petitioner's formal com-

plaints to the Department of Justice, commencing in 1965;

the 1974 action against the FAA; the 1975 amicus curiae

brief in the Paris DC-10 crash litigation in the Central

District of California; the 1980 action against the NTSB;

and the 1987 criminal prosecution (E.D. Cal. CR 87-124)

for filing federal actions exposing the misconduct and the

obstruction of justice by the Justice Department and fed-

eral judges.

V. The Supreme Court Justices Have A Long

Overdue Responsibility To Grant A

Hearing, Temporary Injunctive Relief,

and To Vacate All Adverse Federal Court

Decisions Arising Out of the Litany Of

Constitutional Violations

The Supreme Court has a supervisory responsibility

over the district and appellate courts. The allegations

brought by petition strongly infers a literal judicial insur-

rection or racketeering enterprise in the Ninth Circuit

courts.

Under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,

1585, 1986, the justices of the Supreme Court have at

35

least the same responsibilities as the average citizen, if

not much greater, to prevent or aid in the prevention of

violations rights and privileges under the laws and consti-

tution of the United States. Since the judicial attacks

upon petitioner are closely related to some of the na-

tion's--and the world's--most brutal air tragedies, it is an

insult to those yet to die, for this court not to exercise its

responsibilities! The fallout from the judicial insurrection

in the Ninth Circuit includes subversion of our form of

government, subversion of the laws and Constitution of

the United States. This too, invokes Supreme Court re-

sponsibilities.

This Court has been informed of the air safety/air disas-

ter scandal in earlier actions, and in at least a dozen appli-

cations to the Court. It is aware of the scheme to silence

petitioner's exposure of the air disaster and superimposed

judicial scandal. It is aware of the prison sentence to si-

lence petitioner's exposure activities. This court is aware

of the corrupt and unconstitutional seizure and destruc-

tion of petitioner's estates. This court is aware of the

shocking judicial outrages, perversion of the rights and

protections under the laws and constitution of the United

States. In every instance the Supreme Court has pro-

tected the violators, while abdicating its responsibilities.

The time for exercising this court's jurisdiction and

responsibilities is long over due.

XI. CONCLUSION

The multipie violations of important civil and constitu-

tional rights with national implications, stated in petition-

er's complaint, bars any summary judgment for the defen-

dants. The district court judge aided and abetted some of

the most vicious civil and constitutional rights yet stated

in any published decision, abdicating the responsibilities

for which the judge was paid and is entrusted to uphold.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal justices--each and ev-

ery one of them--aided and abetted these outrageous con-

stitutional violations.

Unconscionable violations of rights and privileges under

the laws and constitution of the United States are being

blatantly violated by the Ninth Circuit judges and justices,

in a racketeering enterprise that requires the emergency

intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court. The racketeering

enterprise has included judges and justices protecting

each other, and with each subsequent corrupt act, ex-

37

panded the nature of the conspiracy.

Petitioner has been devastated by the judicial racket-

eering enterprise, trying to protect the lives of those lit-

tle children and others who are sacrificed by the crude

thugs in federal judicial garb, wherein judge and justices

protect each other, overwhelming innocent persons that

perish as a result of their infamous acts.

A hearing is long overdue. Injunctive relief is long over-

due. And petitioner appears before the Supreme Court,

with a vested interest in protecting the constitutional

outrages. Incredible!

Dated: June 17, 1989.

RODNEY F. STICH

Petitioner in prose

38

VERIFICATION

I, Rodney F. Stich, declare:

I am the petitioner in the foregoing petition for writ of

certiorari. The contents are true to the best of my knowl-

edge.

Executed This 17th day of June 1989, in the town of Ala-

mo, State of California. I declare under penalty of perjury

that the foregoing is true and correct.

Rodney F. Stich

39

INITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Filed

May 2, 1989

Rodney F. Stich, et al., No. 89-2698

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. CV-S-86-210-MLS

vs.

William Jensen, Judge, Superior

Court of the County of Solano,

State of California; State of

California; Larry Gibbs; Jeffrey

Ross: Friedman, Sloan & Ross;

Emma W. Stich; Neil Crawford,

Clerk, Solano County,

Defendants-Appellees.

/

Before: Merrill, Wright, and Beezer, Circuit Judges.

The panel as constituted in the above case has voted to

deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the sugges-

tion for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for en

banc rehearing, and no judge of the court has requested a

vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Fed. R. App.

P, 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied, and the suggestion

for a rehearing en banc is rejected.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Filed May 2, 1989

Rodney F. Stich, et al., No. 89-2698

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. CV-S-86-210-MLS

VS.

William Jensen, Judge, Superior

Court of the County of Solano,

State of California; State of

California; Larry Gibbs; Jeffrey

Ross; Friedman, Sloan & Ross;

Emma W. Stich; Neil Crawford,

Clerk, Solano County,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Edward J. Schwartz, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 22, 1989

Filed: March 14, 1989

Before: Merrill, Wright, and Beezer, Circuit Judges.

Rodney Stich appeals pro se the district court's grant of

Summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a civil

rights action arising out of a divorce action brought in

California Superior Court by Stich's wife.

The judgment must be affirmed. The district court did

not have jurisdiction to hear a core domestic relations

case in which "a federal court is asked to grant a divorce

or annulment, determine support payments, or award cus-

+

tody of a child." Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir.

1982).

In the United States District Court

For the Eastern Distsrict of California

Rodney F. Stich

Plaintiff,

v. Civil No. S-86-0210 MLS

Judge William Jensen; Superior

Court of the County of Solano,

State of California; Larry Gibbs;

Jeffrey Ross; Friedman, Sloan and

Ross, P.C.; Emma W. Stich; Neil

Crawford, Clerk, Solano County,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This matter came on regularly for hearing on July 25,

1986, on the motions of defendants for injunctive relief.

The court having considered the arguments and the memo-

randa of points and authorities, the declarations sub-

mitted in support thereof and the files of this and the re-

lated cases, and the files in those cases involving plaintiff

Rodney F. Stich which the court has judicially noticed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff, Rodney F.

Stich, is barred from filing any action or actions in any

United States District Court, or in any state court, until

his current state court action, Solano County Superior

Court No. 83472, becomes final and he has exhausted all

his state court appellate remedies, against defendants

Emma W. Stich, Friedman, Sloan & Ross, P.C., or any at-

torneys or employees of Friedman, Sloan & Ross., Law-

rence A. Gibbs, Jeffrey S. Ross, the judges of the Superior

Court of the County of Solano, State of California, which

in any way relates to issues raised in Stich v. Stich, No.

CIVS-84-0048 RAR, In re the Marriage of Stich, Superior

Court of the State of California in and for the County of

Solano, No. 83472, and Stich v. California Court of Ap-

peal, United States District Court, Northern District of

California, Action No. C-85-3600-MHP, or in the instant

case; after the judgment in that state court action has

become final and all appellate processes have been ex-

hausted, this bar to further actions shall still apply to any

and all claims precluded by the doctrines of res judicata

and/or collateral estoppel.

DATED: July 30, 1986.

Milton L. Schwartz

United States District Judge

Nh

In the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of California

Filed Sep 16, 1986.

Rodney F. Stich,

Plaintiff, CIV. No. S-86-210-MLS

Vv.

Judge William Jensen, et al.,

Defendants.

Rodney F. Stich,

Plaintiff, CIV No. S-85-1073 MLS

Vv.

Judge Richard M. Harris,

Superior Court of the County

of Solano,

Defendants.

Rodney F. Stich,

Plaintiff, CIV No. S-86-0004-MLS

Vv.

The Honorable Judge

Rau! A. Ramariz, et al.

Defendants.

SS

Plaintiff has filed four (4) separate actions under provi-

sions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro se. The four cases were all

determined to be related cases pursuant to an earlier or-

der of the Court, under provisions of Local rule 123(b).

The defendant in CIV-S-86-004-MLS filed a motion for

dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) and/or 12(b)(6). The defendants in each of the

three remaining cases filed motions for Summary Judg-

ment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(b)

and Local Rule 260(a). The defendant's motions were all

heard on July 25, 1986, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 3 before

the Honorable Milton L. Schwartz, Judge.

The plaintiff failed to appear at the above-scheduled

hearings, informing the Court, in writing, of his intention

not to appear. Judge Raul A. Ramirez was represented at

the hearing by Gregory G. Hollows, Assistant United

States Attorney, Eastern District of California. The State

Court judicial defendants, state superior court and Solano

County Clerk were represented by Thomas H. Gordinier,

Chief Deputy County Counsel for Solano County. All non-

judicia/non-county defendants were represented by Caro-

lyn E. Moore, of Friedman, Sloan and Ross.

The Court, having considered the pleadings filed herein

and arguments of the parties, HEREBY ORDERS:

1. In Stich v. Ramirez, CIV-S-86-0004-MLS, the Court

grants defendant's motion for dismissal for the reasons

stated in defendant's memorandum in support of the mo-

tion. Dismissal is appropriate under both Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1°) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff failed to

file timely opposition to this motion, as required by Local

Rule 230(c). The dismissal of this action is with prejudice.

The Court also grants defendant's motion for attorney's

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 11. Attorney fees shall be awarded in the

amount of nine hundred eighty and No/190 ($980.00) dol-

lars, which the Court finds to be appropriate and fair. The

Court notes that timely opposition to the motion for attor-

ney fees was not filed by plaintiff.

The Court also imposes sanctions under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 11 because of the unnecessary and frivo-

lous requirement of the use of the Court's time and re-

sources in that this action was not well grounded in either

law or fact. For these reasons, a sanction of four hundred

and No/100 ($400.00) dollars, payable to the Clerk of the

Court, is also ordered.

2. In Stich v. Harris, CIV-S-1073-MLS, the Court grants

the motion for summary judgment as to ali defendants. The

plaintiff is collaterally estopped by the judgment entered

in Stich v. Stich, CIV-S-84-0048-RAR, from relitigating

the question of this Court's lack of jurisdiction based upon

a claim that there was no personal jurisdiction ever ob-

tained over him, and the litigation of the question of the

validity of his Mexican divorce icetee.

Plaintiff is also collaterally estopped from relitigating

the issue of judicial immunity from § 1983 suits for money

damages, and that collateral estoppel comes from the

judgment in Stich v. Court of Appeal, decided in the Dis-

trict Court for the Northern District of California by

Judge Patel, CIV-85-3600-MHP.

Even if the plaintiff were not collaterally estopped by

the decision in the two previous cases from relitigating

these issues, this Court would reach the same conclusion

on the jurisdictional and judicial immunity issues. The

Court also agrees that the doctrine of abstention is appro-

priate on claims for injunctive and declaratory relief un-

der this doctrine as enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401,

U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger abstention has in fact been

applied to domestic relations cases. Williams v. Williams,

532 F.2d 120 (9th Cir., 1976.)

The motion for summary judgment in favor of Defendant

Solano County Superior Court must be granted, as state

courts are agencies of the state and the 11th Amendment

bars suits for money damages against the state. O'Connor

v. Nevada 686 F.2d 749 (9th Cir., 1982). cert denied, 459

U.S. 1071 (1982).

3. In Stich v. Stich CIV-S-85-1549-MLS, the Court

grants the motion for summary judgment in favor of the

judicial defendants and State Superior Court for the same

reasons as set forth in paragraph 2 for case 85-1073-MLS,

above. Additionally, the Court, on its own motion, dis-

misses the complaint as to defendants, Friedman, Sloan

and Ross, P.C., Lawrence A. Gibbs, Jeffrey S. Ross, and

Emma Stich, under provisions of Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 4(j) for failure of timely service of process on

those defendants and failure of plaintiff to request relief

from failure to make timely service within the 120-day

period.

4. In Stich v. Jensen, CIV_S-86-0210-MLS, the Court

also grants the motion for summary judgment for the same

reasons as Stich v. Harris in paragraph 2, above. The Court

also grants summary judgment in favor of defendant Neil

Crawford, Solano County Clerk, for the additional reasons

stated in defendants' Memorandum submitted in support

of the motion. The motion for summary judgment on behalf

of the non-judicial/non-county defendants is granted on

the basis of res judicata; plaintiff is barred from relitigat-

ing issues resolved in Stich v..Superior Court, CIV-85-

3600-MPH by Judge Patel in the Northern District of Cali-

fornia.

Even if plaintiff were not barred from relitigating these

issues, and to the extent, as plaintiff claims, that the com-

plaint covers new events which could not have been cov-

ered in the case decided by Judge Patel, the Court reaches

the same conclusion Judge Patel reached concerning the

sufficiency of the conspiracy allegations.

Finally, the Court finds dicen fees and sanctions war-

ranted and grants non-judicial defendants' motion, sub-

ject to proof of appropriate amount.

5. The Court finds that injunctive relief is warranted by

the factors discussed in Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber

of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1523-1526 (9th Cir.

1983), cert denied 104 S.Ct. 1446 (1984), as set out in

separate order of the Court.

Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and injunctive

relief in Stich v. Jensen, and other cases, are denied.

6. The Court imposes sanctions in Stich v. Harris, Stich

v. Stich, and Stich v. Jensen under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 11 in effect to compensate the taxpayers for

having to pay for the expenses of processing these actions.

The actions of plaintiff were not well grounded in fact or

law, and were interposed in bad faith or for the purposes

of harassment. Accordingly, plaintiff is ordered to pay the

Clerk of the Court an additional One Thousand ($1000)

dollars for this violation of Rule 11, making his total obli-

gation for the four cases heard today, as far as the Court

sanctions are concerned, an aggregate One Thousand Four

Hundred ($1,400) dollars.

7. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's requests and

motions for temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction in Stich v. Jensen, et al., CIV. S-86-0210 MLS,

filed June 3, 1986, are denied.

It is so ordered.

~!

Dated: Sept. 15, 1986.

Milton L. Schwartz

Judge of the United States

District Court

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I declare that I am a resident of the County of Contra

Costa, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen

years, and not a party to the action described herein. My

address is 43 Diablo Creek Place, Danville, California

94526. On June 23, 1989 I served the attached petition for

hearing on the below parties in the above action, by plac-

ing a true copy in a sealed envelope with sufficient post-

age prepared, in the United States mail at Alamo, Califor-

nia, addressed as follows:

U.S. Court of Appeals

P.O. Box 547

San Francisco, CA 94101

Friedman, Sloan and Ross

1040 Aicoa Bldg, 1 Maritime Plaza

San Francisco, CA 94104

U.S. District Court

Federal Building

Sacramento, CA 95418

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is

true and correct, and that this declaration was executed

on June 23, 1989.

Stephanie A. Stadtler