Amicus Curiae Brief — Richardson v. United Steelworkers of America

JOS

in the Supreme Court of the United States

Octosgr TERM, 1989

ALTHEUS RICHARDSON, ET AL., PETITIONERS

V.

UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

DAVID L. SHAPIRO

Deputy Solicitor General

Amy L. WAX

Assistant to the Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

re re ‘(i Sale

@) DEC 22 1588

SEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

CLERK

—

;

|

a

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a state law claim alleging a breach of the

duty owed by a union to the employees it represents as their

exclusive bargaining agent is completely preempted by

federal law.

2. Whether that claim is removable from state court to

federal district court.

3. Whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the

denial of intervention to certain fellow employees of the

Original plaintiffs.

(I)

ee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ST er !

Lk G kes eb esac eae’ 5

ali 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514 (9th

NE 4

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202

Eg en y

Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v.

Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971) ............. 6

Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass’n of

Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968) ............ 11

Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes & Checkers, 50\

oe )

Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, No. 88-124 (Dec.

eee won capeaaseseseesss 9, 12

Carter, In re, 618 F.2d 1093 (Sth Cir. 1980) .... 12

Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) .... 10

DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151

A a a 2,3

Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) ..... s

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vaca-

io eee, Gee Gu. 8 C983) ............... 11

Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 48\ U.S. 851

ee isa wc nner sesesees 3, 4,9

Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, 530 N.E.2d 468

Ce ce cw ewcecceeecass 9-10

Lewis v. Local Union No. 100 of the Laborers’ Int'l

Union, 750 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1984) ........ 9, 12

Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, 108 S. Ct.

etc abecasancscscceccce 9

eT

IV

Cases — Continued: Page

Merchant v. American S.S. Co., 129 L.R.R.M. 2737

OO GA. FED 6s occ cdncsdceecekeusect oa 10

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58

Le PE ee rE re ree Poe re ere 12

Storey v. Local 327, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 759

fF ek Ce ee re 9, 12

United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 770 P.2d 794 (Idaho

1989), petition for cert. pending, No. 89-322 .. 7

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) .......... 3, 4, 5, 6

Statutes:

Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, § 301, 29

if 2 oi | Sane eeubevasueoelentseoeienae 4, 10

National Labor Relations Act, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C.

ROUEN ocp awk odds on eucsneus casual ok 3,7

yr BUR E ode) . | ren er mper rer Hea! 5, i2

We ORG. BONE oo vn cccscnsccuseachenseueue 3

ee ae EE nckee ns bowkeey bee eeneeetes 2

BS UR. BOD 54.06 6ccsexnsnnsose ince a Se

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In the Supreme Court of the Qnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

No. 88-2009

ALTHEUS RICHARDSON, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is submitted in response to the Court’s invita-

tion to the Solicitor General to express the views of the

United States.

STATEMENT

1. Petitioners are 55 former employees of Phelps Dodge

Refinery in El Paso, Texas. They were permanently replaced

by their employer during the course of an economic strike.

They filed suit in state court against the respondent Union,

alleging (Pet. App. 2-3):

Between July 1, 1983, and April 5, 1985, Defendant

acted as bargaining agent for Plaintiffs in connection

with their employment by the Phelps Dodge Refinery

in El Paso, Texas. As the bargaining agent for Plain-

tiffs, Defendant had a duty to advise them of measures

which their employer could, and in reasonable prob-

ability would, take, should members of the bar-

(1)

CO

2

gaining unit (including Plaintiffs and others) either vote

to reject their employer’s final offer or vote to go out

on strike. Among the employer’s rights in this dispute

was the right to put into effect its final offer after

bargaining to impasse, and to hire permanent replace-

ments in the event of a strike. Defendant, without legal

justification or excuse, failed to advise plaintiffs that

their employer had these rights. Thereafter, the em-

ployer exercised these rights, and all Plaintiffs were per-

manently replaced by the employer. Had Plaintiffs

known that their employer had the rights which it in

fact had, they would have either persuaded the other

members of the bargaining unit to vote in favor of the

employer’s final offer, and if that had failed, then

Plaintiffs would have accepted the final offer

individually.

The Union removed the case to the United States District

Court for the Western District of Texas pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 1441.' Asserting that petitioners’ action was based

on the allegation of a breach of the federal duty of fair

representation, the Union then moved to dismiss the claim

as time barred under the six-month limitations period ap-

plicable to such claims under De/Costello v. Int'l Bhd. of

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). Pet. App. 3-4.

' Section 1441 (28 U.S.C.) provides in pertinent part:

(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original

jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Con-

stitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable

without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any

other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties

in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen

of the State in which such action is brought.

As the Union has not sought to base removal on diversity of citizen-

ship, only federal question removal is at issue. See Pet. App. 11.

3

Petitioners, in turn, moved to remand the case to the state

court on the ground that their action was a claim for

negligent breach by the Union of a Texas common-law tort

duty and that the state statute of limitations applied. The

court then granted the Union leave to amend its removal

petition to allege federal jurisdiction based on Section 9(a)

of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.

159(a), and 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1337. Pet. App. 4.

The district court denied petitioners’ motion to remand,

applied the six-month federal limitations period, dismissed

the claim as time-barred, and denied the motions to int-

ervene of 14 similarly situated employees. Pet. App. 4-5.

2. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s

judgment. Pet. App. 1-19. In determining whether peti-

. toners’ action arose under state or federal law, the court

noted that the original petition had described the “duty

which the Union allegedly breached” as one belonging to

the Union by virtue of its role “/a/s the bargaining agent

for Plaintiffs (emphasis added).” /d. at 6. It “is well

established,” the court stated (id. at 7), that “a union’s con-

duct vis-a-vis the bargaining unit members when the union

is representing them” is governed by a “duty of fair represen-

tation” grounded in federal labor law. Citing Vaca v. Sipes,

386 U.S. 171 (1967), the court held that the federal duty

of fair representation preempts state substantive law and

that, while state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enter-

tain suits alleging a breach of that duty, federal substan-

tive law applies in determining whether the duty was

breached. Pet. App. 8-9. The court further noted that peti-

tioners “did not allege any breach of a state tort duty that

exists independently of the NLRA-established collective

bargaining relationship, which is the central concern of the

NLRA.” 7d. at 10.?

2? The court observed that, like /ni? Bhd of Elec’ Workers \

Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987), this case did not present the question

4

Turning to the removal issue, the court stated that “federal

preemption is generally a defensive issue that does not

authorize removal of a case to federal court.” Pet. App.

13. However, the court further observed that in Avco Corp.

v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 390 U.S.

557 (1968), the Supreme Court held that state law claims

alleging breach of a collective bargaining agreement were

removable to federal court because they “were so wholly

preempted” by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Rela-

tions Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185. Pet. App. 13-14. The

court concluded (id. at 16):

{W]here the NLRA federal law duty of fair represen-

tation, actionable in federal court, preempts a state law

claim, the suit asserting such a claim arises under Sec-

tion 1337 and may be removed to federal court just

as the suit asserting state law claims preempted by sec-

tion 301 of the NLRA may be removed under Avco

and its progeny. Avco recognized removal based on

Section 301’s complete, displacing preemption of state

law because of congressional intent that federal (and

state) courts create and administer a comprehensive

body of federal law for the court enforcement of col-

lective bargaining agreements. Under Vaca, the NLRA

duty of fair representation, for the enforcement of

which a federal (and state) court action is authorized,

completely preempts state law because of the congres-

whether “the Union was subject to ‘an independent state-law duty of

care . . . arising simply from the relationship of a union to its

members.’ ” Pet. App. 10 (quoting 481 U.S. at 864 n.5). Petitioners

did not allege a duty arising from the membership relationship — indeed

the original petition did not even allege “that plaintiffs are or were

members of the Union.” Pet. App. 10. Rather, petitioners based their

action on the allegation of “a duty arising from the collective bargain-

ing agent’s relationship under the NLRA with the bargaining unit

members, who may or may not be union members.” /bid.

sional intent that federal law, developed to further the

goals of the NLRA, entirely govern the duties which

an NLRA collective bargaining representative owes, by

virtue of its position as such, to the workers it

represents in that capacity.

Citing De/Costello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, supra, the

court agreed that petitioners’ duty of fair representation suit,

“which [was] filed approximately two years after their claims

arose, [was] * * * time-barred” under the applicable six-

month limitations period. Pet. App. 10-11. The court fur-

ther held that the district court did not err in denying in-

tervention to the employees who sought to join the action.

Id. at 17-18.

DISCUSSION

Petitioners’ principal contention is that the court of ap-

peals erred in holding that their state law claim —a claim

based on breach of a duty owed by the Union as their ex-

clusive bargaining agent—is completely preempted by a

federal cause of action. Pet. 5-10. Petitioners also contend

that the case was improperly removed to federal district

court. However, petitioners concede (Pet. 9) that, if the state

claim is completely preempted, removal is proper. Peti-

tioners’ contentions raise no issue warranting review by this

Court.’

1. In Vacav. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177, the Court held that

federal law governs a cause of action for breach of the

} Petitioners’ final contention (Pet. 11) —that the district court erred

in denying intervention because “extraordinary circumstances” were

present that justified permissive intervention — presents a factual issue

that does not merit this Court's aitention. In any event, as the court

of appeals noted (Pet. App. 18 n.9), if intervention were granted, the

claims of the intervenors would have been dismissed along with those

of the original plaintiffs.

6

duty of fair representation because the “duty is grounded

in federal statutes.” Accordingly, the Court reversed a judg-

ment of the state court finding that the union had violated

state law in refusing to take to arbitration an employee’s

claim of wrongful discharge found by a state court jury to

be meritorious. The Court held that, under federal law, the

employee must “prove[ ] arbitrary or bad-faith conduct on

the part of the Union in processing his grievance,” not mere-

ly that the grievance had merit. The Court stated (386 U.S.

at 192-193):

{I]f a union’s decision that a particular grievance lacks

sufficient merit to justify arbitration would constitute

a breach of the duty of fair representation because a

judge or jury later found the grievance meritorious, the

union’s incentive to settle such grievances short of ar-

bitration would be seriously reduced. Tir: dampening

effect on the entire grievance procedur. of this reduc-

tion of the union’s freedom to settle claims in good faith

would surely be substantial. [*]

Here, petitioners allege a violation of a duty that is

established by federal labor law: the obligation of the union

as exclusive representative of employees in a bargaining unit

fairly to represent all the employees in that unit. Petitioners

have identified no independent source in state law of a duty

owed by a union in its role as exclusive bargaining represen-

tative under the NLRA to the employees in their role as

* As the Court further explained in Amalgamated Ass’n of Street

Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 292 (1971), “[p]re-emption * * *

is designed to shield the system from conflicting regulation of conduct.”

Therefore, causes of action that “define[ } differently what sorts of * * *

union conduct may permissibly be proscribed” do not survive preemp-

tion simply because they can be .yled as state law claims in contract

or tort rather than as claims of violations of federal standards govern-

ing labor relations.

7

members of the bargaining unit, nor could they do so.° In-

deed, it is only because the union is empowered under Sec-

tion 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(a), to act as the ex-

Clusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit

that the union owes a corresponding duty to represent each

member of the unit fairly.

Petitioners argue (Pet. 5-6) that preemption is unwar-

ranted here because to preclude a state cause of action when

a union gives “careless” advice in the course of represen-

ting employees would “place labor unions beyond the reach

{of the] accountability for their actions” that lawyers have

in giving advice to clients, and would “effectively exempt[ ]

5 In United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 770 P.2d 794, 796 (idaho 1989),

petition for cert. pending, No. 89-322, the court held that where a union

“did actively undertake” a duty to conduct safety inspections of the

workplace, that duty is governed by standards imposed under state tort

law, and the union could be held liable for workplace injuries alleged-

ly caused by its negligent inspections. Jd. at 796-797.

The Idaho Supreme Court stated that it was not necessary to “look{ ]

at the Collective Bargaining Agreement to determine whether it imposes

some new duty upon the union — rather it is conceded the union under-

took to inspect.” 770 P.2d at 796. And, contrary to the implicatior: in

the respondent’s brief in opposition in this case (Br. in Opp. 2 n.1),

the court nowhere stated in Rawson that the statutory duty of fair

representation was the source of the union’s duty to conduct safety in-

spections; rather, the court found that the union had voluntarily “under-

taken” this duty. The court thus held that the plaintiffs had claimed

a breach of a state duty of care that was independent of the bargaining

representative/bargaining unit relationship as well as of the collective

bargaining agreement, and that the issue before the court was “solely

whether that inspection was negligently performed under traditional

Idaho tort law.” 770 P.2d at 796. The correctness of that finding is

immaterial to the disposition of the instant case, where the court found

that the character of the duty at issue was wholly dependent on the

relationships established under federal labur law and that no indepen-

dent state duty had been asserted. We therefore agree with respondent

(Br. in Opp. 2 n.1) that Rawson does not create a conflict with the deci-

sion below.

8

Labor Unions from any of the legal consequences normal-

ly associated with negligence in all of the States.” Id. at 8-9.

But the purpose of preemption is precisely to preclude the

State from impairing the ability of the bargaining agent

properly to perform its function by imposing a higher stand-

ard of care on a union representative than that imposed

under the federal labor law that defines the union’s duty.

As the court below explained in summarizing Vaca, “this

uniform federal standaré jof fair representation] struck the

proper balance between the union’s need for discretion when

acting as the representative of all the bargaining unit

members and the individual’s right to be treated fairly.” Pet.

App. 8. And, as the court of appeals also noted (id. at 10),

petitioners do not claim that the union breached any state

duty of care independent of the relationship of bargaining

representative to employees (such as a state law duty that

might arise between any organization and its members).°®

6 The court of appeals acknowledged (Pet. App. 10) that there are

exceptions to the general preemption rule, such as where an independ-

ent state law duty of care regulates activity “ ‘deeply rooted in local

feeling’ ” or of “ ‘peripheral concern of the NLRA,’ ” citing, inter alia,

Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977). In Farmer, the Court held

that a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is actionable

under state tort law even though the conduct at issue grew out of al-

leged discrimination in union administration of a hiring hall, because

the state had a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from such

“outrageous” conduct and could do so without “resolution of the ‘merits’

of the underlying labor dispute” (id. at 304). However, the Court cau-

tioned that “[{uJnion discrimination in employment opportunities can-

not itself form the underlying ‘outrageous’ conduct on which the state-

court tort action is based. * * * [I]t is essential that the state tort be

either unrelated to employment discrimination,” — which is a matter

regulated by federal labor law—“or a function of the particularly

abusive manner in which the discrimination is accomplished or threat-

ened rather than a function of the actual or threatened discrimination

itself” (id. at 305). Moreover, in Farmer, the duty to refrain from in-

flicting emotional distress did not depend on the character of the

9

Petitioners further contend (Pet. 6-7) that preemption is

not appropriate here because a state cause of action would

not disrupt labor management relations or require analysis

or interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Im-

plicit in this contention is the assumption that the preemp-

tive effect of the federal duty of fair representation is limited

to matters arising under-a collective agreement. But that

assumption is incorrect. It is settled that a union may breach

its duty of fair representation in ways unrelated to ad-

ministration of a collective bargaining agreement,’ and there

is no valid reason why the duty fairly to represent employees

as delimited by federal law should be any less exclusive in

such a case than in a case arising in connection with a col-

lective agreement. The question in both instances involves

the “proper balance between the union’s need for discre-

tion * * * and the individual’s right to be treated fairly.”

Pet. App. 8. Moreover, insofar as petitioners rely on the

decisions of this Court® and the courts of appeals® holding

relationship between the employees and the union as their exclusive

bargaining representative, and thus was not wholly a creature of the

federal labor law that creates and governs this relationship.

7 See, e.g., Lewis v. Local Union No. 100 of the Laborers’ Int'l

Union, 750 F.2d 1368, 1376 (7th Cir. 1984); Storey v. Local 327, Int’l

Bhd. of Teamsters, 759 F.2d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 1985); Beriault v. Local

40, Super Cargoes & Checkers, 501 F.2d 258, 264-266 (9th Cir. 1974).

See also Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, No. 88-124, (Dec. 5, 1989),

slip op. 11-15.

* See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Int'l Bhd.

of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987); cf. Lingle v. Norge

Division of Magic Chef, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).

* The three court of appeals cases cited by petitioners (Pet. 7) all in-

volve situations where the court, relying on Lingle, supra, held that

an independent state cause of action was not preempted simply because

the conduct might also have created a breach of the collective agree-

ment. Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1988)

(handicap discrimination under state fair employment law); Krasinski

\ il:

ets | 10

that federal law preempts. state if Ww. claims that’ require

analysis or interpretation of, a collective bargaining

agreement — but not those where resolution of the state claim

is independent of the contract— that reliance is misplaced.

As respondents point out in their brief in opposition (at 12

n.12), “{t}he controlling question here is not the preemp-

tive, scope of § 301 [of the LMRA], as in Allis-Chalmers

and Hechler, but rather the preemptive reach of the duty

of fair representation, which exists independent of § 301.”

Since Section 301 only encompasses suits to enforce collec-

tive bargaining agreements, the preemptive effect of that

provision on a state law claim naturally turns on the rela-

tion of the claim to the collective bargaining agreement. A

duty of fair representation claim, like the one asserted here,

may be unrelated to any right under a collective agreement;

there is thus no warrant for making the preemptive effect

of such a claim turn on whether it requires analysis or in-

terpretation of the agreement.

2. As the court of appeals acknowledged (Pet. App. 13),

a case is not removable to federal district court simply

because, as a matter of defense, it can be shown that it is

preempted by federal law. Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S.

386, 393 (1987). “[T]he plaintiff {is] the master of the claim;

he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance

on state law” (ibid.). But, as the Court further explained

in Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (citation and footnote

omitted): rr

;. There « does exist, however, an “independent corollary”

to the well- Rleaded complaint rule, * * * known as the

~ “complete preemption” doctrine. On occasion, the

v. United Parcel Service, 530 N.E.2d 468 (Ill. 1988) (malicious defama-

tion in the course of a discharge); Merchant v. American S.S. Co., 129

L.R.R.M. 2737 (6th Cir. 1988) ements discharge for bringing per-

sonal injury action).

11

Court has concluded that the preemptive force of a

Statute is so “extraordinary” that it “converts an or-

dinary state common-law complaint into one stating

a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded com-

plaint rule.” Once an area of state law has been com-

pletely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that

pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception,

a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.

Thus, in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S.

557 (1968), the Court held that a state court suit seeking

injunctive relief based on breach of a no-strike clause in

a collective bargaining agreement was removable to federal

district court because, under Section 301 of the LMRA,

federal substantive law controlled the action even though

the state court had concurrent jurisdiction to apply that law.

390 U.S. at 560. The Court considered it immaterial that

the Norris-LaGuardia Act would preclude the availability

of injunctive relief in federal court: “[T]he breadth or nar-

rowness of the relief which may be granted under federal

law in § 301 cases is a distinct question from whether the

court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject mat-

ter.” Id. at 561.

As the Court explained in Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construc-

tion Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1983):

The necessary ground of decision {in Avco] was that

the pre-emptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to

displace entirely any state cause of action “for viola-

tion of contracts between an employer and a labor

organization.” Any such suit is purely a creature of

federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law

would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301.

Aveo stands for the proposition that if a federal cause

of action completely pre-empts a state cause of action,

12

any complaint that comes within the scope of the

federal cause of action necessarily “arises under” federal

law.

The court of appeals correctly concluded that the Avco

complete preemption principle is applicable here. As shown

above, the only claim asserted in the complaint was that

the union breached a duty owed to the employees in its

capacity as their bargaining representative. But, as Vaca

establishes, that duty is solely a creature of federal law.

To be sure, “even an ‘obvious’ preemption defense does

not, in most cases, create removal jurisdiction;” there must

be a clearly manifested congressional intent to establish a

federal cause of action which could have been brought in

federal court in the first instance. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1986). But it is plain that,

as employees represented by a union, petitioners have a

federal cause of action against that union for breach of the

duty of fair representation —a cause of action that is within

original federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and

1337. See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, No. 88-124,

(Dec. 5, 1989), slip op. 14 (“We have always assumed that

independent federal jurisdiction exists over fair represen-

tation claims because the duty is implied from the grant of

exclusive representation status and the claims therefore ‘arise

under’ the NLRA”); see also Lewis v. Local Union No. 100

of the Laborers’ Int’l Union, 750 F.2d at 1375 n.7; Storey

v. Local 327, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 759 F.2d at 523; In

re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1104 (Sth Cir. 1980).

In sum, the court of appeals correctly concluded that peti-

tioners’ state law claim was wholly preempted by a federal

cause of action and that the case was therefore properly

removed to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. 1441(b).

Moreover, its decision is not in conflict with decisions of

this Court or those of any other court of appeals.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

DAVID L. SHAPIRO

Deputy Solicitor General

AMY L. WAx

Assistant to the Solicitor General

JERRY M. HUNTER

General Counsel

D. RANDALL FRYE

Associate General Counsel

ROBERT E. ALLEN

Associate General Counsel

NORTON J. COME

Deputy Associate General Counsel

LINDA SHER

Assistant General Counsel

National Labor Relations Board

DECEMBER 1989

® U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1989—262.203/00668