Petition for Writ of Certiorari — New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey

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Supreme Court, U.S,

88-1868 ¢ FILED

No. MAY 18 1965

+} — Sosa. SPANIOL, JR,

‘ CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Cut of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

FRAGRANCE MATERIALS ASSOCIATION OF

THE UNITED STATES, et al.,

‘. Petitioners,

WILLIAM VAN NOTE, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

DANIEL R. THOMPSON

Counsel of Record

LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL R.

THOMPSON

1620 “I” Street, N.W.

Suite 925

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 293-5800

JOHN P. MCKENNA

DANIEL F. SHEA

McKENNA, SHEA & CRISMAN

1200 Nineteenth Street, N.W.

Suite 602

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 293-7010

Attorneys for Petitioners

WILSON - Epes PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

We erwramienic

QUESTION PRESENTED

Do the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

and the workplace container !abeling provisions of

OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard expressly pre-

empt the provisions of the New Jersey “Worker and

Community Right to Know Act” that require employers

to label containers in the workplace?

(i)

'

il

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The following is a complete list of all parties in the

proceedings below :

a. Plaintiffs:

Fragrance Materials Association of the United

States, Inc.;

Flavor & Extract Manufacturers’ Association of the

United States, Inc. ;

Bush Boake Allen, Inc.;

Dragoco, Inc. ;

Firmenich, Inc.;

International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.;

Isogenics, Inc.;

H. Kohnstamm & Co., Inc.;

Mane USA, Ine. (formerly V. Mane Fills, Inc.) ;

Noville Essential Oil Company, Inc.;

Polarome Manufacturing Corp. ;

Roure, Ine. (formerly Roure Bertrand Dupont,

Ine.) ;

Takasago International Corp. (USA) ;

Ungerer & Co.;

Universal Fragrance Corporation.

Union Camp Corporation is the parent corporation of

petitioner Bush Boake Allen, Inc.; Universal Foods Cor-

poration is the parent corporation of petitioners H.

Kohnstamm & Co., Ine. and Universal Fragrance Cor-

poration; F. Hoffman LaRoche & Co. is the parent cor-

poration of Roure, Inc.; and Takasago (Japan) is the

parent corporation of Takasago International Corpora-

tion (USA).

b. Defendants:

William Van Note;

J. Richard Goldstein;

Robert E. Hughey.

C.

Intervenor-Defendants:

Joseph H. Rodriguez;

New Jersey State Industrial Union Council, AFL-

CIO;

Citizen Action of New Jersey;

Philadelphia Area Project on Occupation Safety &

Health;

New Jersey Environmental Lobby;

New Jersey State Firemen’s Mutual Benevolent

Association;

International Association of Firefighters, New Jer-

sey AFL-CIO;

Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO;

District Three, International Union of Electronic,

Electrical, Technical, Salaried and Machine

Workers, AFL-CIO;

International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union,

AFL-CIO;

Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union,

AFL-CIO, Central and South Jersey Joint Board;

United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-

CIO;

Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, AFL-

CIO, Locals 8-149, 8-760, and 8-5570;

United Auto Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Local 502;

Chemical Workers Association, Inc.;

Independent Oil Workers Union;

Trenton Education Association;

Aluminum, Brick & Glass Workers International

Union, AFL-CIO, Local 514-G;

Pennsylvania Federation Brotherhood of Mainte-

nance of Way Employees, AFL-CIO;

Coalition Against Toxics;

League of Conservation Voters (New Jersey ) ;

Clean Water Action (Washington, D.C. and New

Jersey) ;

Student Public Interest Research Group of New

Jersey ;

iv

Environmental Action ‘Washington, D.C.) ;

League of Women Voters of New Jersey;

Sierra Club (New Jersey) ;

American Lung Association of New Jersey;

New Jersey Tenants Organization;

New Jersey Association of County Health Officers;

New Jersey Health Officers Association.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW Scidestaaka se barebenseneseniesinsevecieeusckaenee

I oa conscheciciaesintctnnwswokareremneuecnssabivcnnarrls

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,

AND REGULATIONS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Dial heteel pan Monabianes

1.

2.

3.

4.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act ..........

The Hazard Communication Standard................

The New Jersey Worker and Community Right

iy en CN 2 scudeanbonorasanioeuasesitineninaii

Proceedings Below ..........................-..------ ice ates

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...................

I. The Third Circuit’s “Purpose” Test Conflicts

II.

with Prior Decisions of this Court and Would

Permit the States to Nullify the Preemptive

Effect of the Hazard Communication Standard..

The Third Circuit’s Decisions Undermine the

Role of OSHA in the Statutory Preemption

STEER CRI OBE. NLD TAO IA LILA DRI

Sa ener cite is cates thereat ia com senacenihaucemsasceasisnidcs

Page

14

21

25

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES a Page

Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504

(198 1 ) .....nnensninssisesnisssileccaiieeeianaliatn nanan enn naar Che Anan: 17

Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Brock,

S62 F.2d GS (Bee Si re cceacccseees eases cacenaceces 4

Chevron, U.S.A., Ine. v. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).............. 22

Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,

108 S.Ct. S166 CURR coi ee ee 1

City of New York v. Federal Communications

Comm'n, 108 S.Ct. 1687 (2068) ............................ 22

Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,

478 U.S. SBS (Reece ccccce meee reaeeteeeceene eee 22

Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. New York,

855 F.2d 48 (2E Ci Be cicccecceccetceceaeteetetoeee 21

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co.,

240 U.S. 361 (RRR ei ace eee: 1

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481

(1987) ......<.:csccascncaeseeeaeeesielan iene mania aes 16, 17, 24

Manufacturers Ass’n of Tri-County v. Knepper,

801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108

S.Ct. 66 (1967): ctieuseeebedeeeneene ae 18-20

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471

U.S. 724 (1966) acc ee, 14

New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 868

F.2d 621 (30 (ae, Bee ee passim

New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774

F.2d 587 (3d Cink, Tees ee passim

New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600

F. Supp. 606 (Bide Rae eine passim

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources

Conservation & Development Comm’n, 161 U.S.

190 (1963)... ccccccsselcen eee enemies 17

Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 687 (1971) ................. 17

Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 5682 (1933).......................... 1

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).. 15

United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 764

F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985) ....... Serre RSE SOOS a eee 4

United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrass,

819 F.2d L268 CBG Ce Bae i vccc cries sasctesencvcceeei ss 4

United Steelworkers of An. ‘rica v. Pendergrass,

855 F.2d 108 (Gq Cam, Ry cee 4

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Page

ST I Tos vc nc cdacsumtaessnwscsaoienthynebiaasaaacinnvieens 2

STATUTES

Federal

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543....... Nets ee 18

Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-

Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11001 et seq...................... 18

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

IL UE Ee Oe OM COED aire sinsnecnnsenssnssnsrseennniews 15, 17-18

Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ 651 et seq.

§ 2(b) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 651 (b) (3)...................... 3

nos scinhicanabuissaienanasuabadanicbe 3

eR Be ee Tye) ines 3

2 SR Gtk See Ed |) rn passim

BL LARA eT | yg 0) cee 4, 15, 22

OT we. ORR oe Ey tC: | ee 4

OR ee 8 Re Dy 6 t ) er 4

Railway Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 434 ............... ASeae 18

State

New Jersey Worker and Community Right to

Know Act, Tit. 34, § 5A-1 et seq.

a sce ici wcnksbiamakerishachpilenke 9

he ARNE ee 10

LS aR Rime Ree ee 8, 9, 12

8 EEG ee OTE ee ae EEE TE RCE 9

AO Ee ae ee ee 10

EN ee cc ag tl a Lett ae 10

a cuca elwavettuaden 10, 11

§ 14(a), 34:5A-14(a)............... ecaieats cunccas cata passim

Oe I MOON iio nn sch cencexcctassanaeashabans passim

Pennsylvania Worker and Community Right To

Know Act, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7301 et seq......... 19-20

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

REGULATIONS Page

ee A SF, Oe ee 21

Bre ai Ae I OU oc cesnaa ca varacnsancnsvassvacessyaseasceessane 21

ek EE passim

MISCELLANEOUS

Federal Register:

GE BU, Te, SE CGD aca en a since scnescasss 24

OU re Us Be CE vn csivns cesses 5, 24

48 Fed. Reg. 58280 (1988) .................................. passim

BS Om. Beem, SIGGE CEOS) qn... cc cccecccnne cnc csnncc.ss 4

H. Rep. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)... 15

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No.

FRAGRANCE MATERIALS ASSOCIATION OF

THE UNITED STATES, et al.,

. Petitioners,

WILLIAM VAN NOTE, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioners respectfully request that a writ of certiorari

issue to review the judgment of the United States Court

of Appeals entered in this case on 28 February 1989.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the court of appeals are reported as

New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 868 F.2d

621 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Hughey II’), and New Jersey

Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.

1985) (“Hughey I’).! They are reprinted beginning at

pages 1 and 85 of the separately printed Appendix filed

1Certiorari exposes the entire case to review, including the

decision of the court in Hughey I. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt

Industries Operating Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178 (1988); Rogers v.

Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 586-88 (1933); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v.

Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916).

i , |

2

in No. 88-1845 by the New Jersey Chamber of Commerce

petitioners. The district court’s original opinion is re-

ported as New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey,

600 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J. 1985) (25a). The district

court’s opinions on remand from Hughey I (112a, 121a)

are not reported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

28 February 1989 (la). A timely Petition for Rehear-

ing and Suggestion for Rehearing In Bane was denied

on 7 April 1989 (155a). By orders of 1 and 9 May 1989,

the court of appeals stayed the issuance of its mandate

(158a).

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C. $1254(1). The district court’s jurisdiction was

invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,

AND REGULATIONS

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the

United States, Article 6, clause 2, provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United

States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof:

and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, un-

der the Authority of the United States, shall be the

supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every

State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-

stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-

withstanding.

Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act

of 1970, 29 U.S.C. $667, the Hazard Communication

Standard promulgated by the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration in November 1983, 29 C.F.R.

* Petitioners herein adopt that Appendix and hereafter will pro-

vide parallel citations to it in parentheses, e.g., “(la)”.

D al

§ 1910.1200, and the New Jersey Worker and Commu-

nity Right to Know Act, N.J.S.A. 34:5A-1 et seq., are

reproduced beginning at pages 168, 466, and 173 of the

Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners are trade associations of flavor and fra-

grance manufacturers, and certain individual members

thereof, who brought suit in the United States District

Court in New Jersey to enjoin enforcement of the New

Jersey Worker and Community Right to Know Act by

the respondent state officials. The action was consolidated

with one instituted by the New Jersey Chamber of Com-

meree and others. Petitioners charged that certain pro-

visions of the New Jersey Act are preempted -by the

Occupational Safety and Health Act and the federal

Hazard Communication Standard.

1. The Occupational Safety and Health Act

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (hereafter

“OSH Act’) directs the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (hereafter OSHA”) to promulgate man-

datory national occupational safety and health standards

applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce.

See 29 U.S.C. $$ 651(b) (3), 655. Until OSHA has prom-

ulgated a standard, the states are not preempted from

regulating. Jd. §667(a) (168a). Once such a standard

has been promulgated, however, the states are precluded

from enacting standards “relating to” the matters cov-

ered by the federal standard without first obtaining

OSHA’s specific consent :

Any State which, at any time, desires to assume re-

sponsibility for development and enforcement therein

of occupational safety and health standards relating

to any occupational safety or health issue with re-

spect to which a federal standard has been promul-

gated under Section 655 of this title shall submit

A

a state plan for the development of such standards

and their enforcement.

Id. § 667(b) (169a).

Recognizing that state laws that “relate to” matters

covered by a federal standard could impair the effective-

ness of the standard, Congress further provided that

states could regulate under the authority of a “state plan”’

only if OSHA is satisfied that the state requirements will

be “at least as effective’ as the OSHA standard, will

“not unduly burden interstate commerce,” and are “re-

quired by compelling local conditions.” Jd. § 667(¢) (2)

(169a). OSHA may reject a proposed plan only after

notice and opportunity for a hearing, and its decision is

subject to review in the courts of appeals. /d. § 667(d)

and (g) (170a, 172a).

2. The Hazard Communication Standard

In November 1983, OSHA promulgated its “Hazard

Communication” Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200; 48

Fed. Reg. 53280." The standard originally applied only

to employers in the manufacturing sector such as peti-

tioners, but was extended to all employers in 1987. See

52 Fed. Reg. 31852 (503a).

* Hereafter, the standard will be cited only to the appropriate

subsection. The original standard is reproduced in full in the

Appendix beginning at page 466, and the preamble beginning at

page 217. The validity of the standard was upheld, with modifica-

tions, in United Steelworkers of America v. Auchter, 764 F.2d 728

(3d Cir. 1985). Subsequently, in United Steelworkers of America

v. Pendergrass, 819 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987), the court directed

OSHA to extend the standard to employers beyond the manufactur-

ing sector. For further litigation regarding the scope of the

standard, see United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrass, 855

F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1988), Associated Builders and Contractors,

Inc. v. Brock, 862 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1988). Certiorari petitions were

filed by various parties in the last two cited cases. See Nos. &88-

1070, 88-1075, 88-1385, 88-1434. On May 15, the Court granted the

government’s petition in No. 88-1434, and denied the petitions in

Nos. 88-1070 and 88-1385.

-

a

The standard is perhaps OSHA’s most ambitious un-

dertaking. Rather than dealing with the hazards of a

single chemical or specific group of chemicals, as OSHA

standards normally do, it deals comprehensively with

all chemicals in the workplace. OSHA considered the

matter for more than 6 years, and conducted an exten-

sive two-year rulemaking with hearings throughout the

country.

One of the principal motivating forces behind the

hazard communication standard was OSHA’s concern

about the “proliferation” of state and local labeling and

right to know laws and the consequent “potential for

contradictory and cumulatively burdensome requirements

..” 47 Fed. Reg. 12092, 12108 (March 1982). When

OSHA proposed the standard in March 1982, only nine

states and one locality had such laws, but OSHA ex-

pressed its concern that others—including New Jersey—

were considering them. Jd. at 12095. A comprehensive

federal standard, said OSHA, “would eliminate this con-

flict, decrease the cumulative burden of compliance, and

ensure basic protection for all employees.” Jd.

These concerns remained paramount in November 1983

when OSHA promulgated the final standard. It noted

that the number of states and localities with such laws

had increased since the standard had been proposed, as

had the number considering such legislation, and that

such laws “cover different lists of substances, have dif-

ferent reporting requirements, serve different purposes,

have different labeling and material safety data sheet

requirements, and have different educational and train-

ing requirements.” 48 Fed. Reg. at 53284 (235-236a).

OSHA stated forcefully its intention to preempt such

laws and reduce their regulatory burden, id. at 53284

(236-237a), 533822 (399a), 53329 (426-427a), and 53334

(444-445a), and emphasized its determination “to scru-

tinize carefully any state law or regulation submitted”

as part of a state plan in order to insure “that any ad-

es

6

ditional requirements contemplated by the state do not

conflict with or adversely affect the effectiveness of

OSHA’s standard,” id. at 53322-323 (399-400a). Sce

also id. at 53334 (445a).

Accordingly, the standard starts out:

This occupational safety and health standard is in-

tended to address comprehensively the issue of eval-

uating and communicating chemical hazards to em-

ployees in the manufacturing sector, and to preempt

any state law pertaining to this subject. Any state

which desires to assume responsibility in this area

may only do so under the provisions of § 18 of the

Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. 651

et seq.) which deals with state jurisdiction and state

plans.

Subsection (a) (2) (467a).

The standard proceeds to designate lists comprising

more than 2300 chemicals that employers must treat as

“hazardous.” Subsection (d) (476-478a). See also 48

Fed. Reg. at 53299 (298a). Employers also must evalu-

ate, by means of tests, literature searches, and review of

other available data, all other chemicals present at their

facilities to determine whether they present any physical

or health hazards. /d.

Information regarding these hazardous chemicals and

their specific hazards must be communicated to employ-

ees by an integrated program of container labeling, Ma-

terial Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs), and employee train-

ing pursuant to subsections (f), (gi), and th) of the

standard (479-486a). Because OSHA decided that the

container label should serve as an “alert mechanism,” 48

Fed. Reg. at 53327 (416a), “an immediate warning of

hazards in the workplace,” id. at 53301 (306a), and not

as the repository of technical information, the standard

mandates simply that labels contain warnings of the

specific hazards posed by a substance (e.g., “hazardous

7

to lungs if inhaled’’) and the “identity” of the contents.

See Subsection (f)(4) (480a). And because the only

purpose of the “identity” on the label is to refer one to

the correct MSDS, OSHA decided that the “identity”

may be any designation that the individual employer

wishes to use, including common names or code numbers

familiar to its employees, so long as the same identity is

used on the corresponding MSDS for the substance or

mixture. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 53301 (306a), 53303

(317a).

The MSDS is the “primary vehicle for transmitting

detailed hazard information.” Jd. at 53305 (327a). In

addition to the identifier which corresponds to that used

on the label and thereby “links” the two for the employ-

ees, the MSDS must include the proper chemical name

of the substance, its physical and chemical characteris-

tics, and both its physical and health hazards. Subsection

(g) (2) (i)-(iv) (481-482a). The MSDS also must state

the signs and symptoms of exposure, primary routes of

entry, permissible exposure limit, precautions for safe

handling and use, protective equipment, and emergency

and first-aid procedures, and must be readily available to

employees. Subsection (g)(2)(iv)-(x) and (8) (482-

484a).

Finally, the standard mandates an employee training

program that must include instruction in the detection

of hazardous chemicals, the specific hazards of the chem-

icals with which the employees work, protective measures,

and an explanation of the labeling system and the MSDS.

Subsection (h) (485-486a). Training in the manufactur-

ing sector was completed by May 1986 when compliance

with all provisions of the standard was mandated. Sub-

section (j) (49la). Thus, all manufacturing sector em-

plovees have been working under the OSHA system for

the past 3 years.

The standard also requires employers to label “down-

stream” shipments, 7.e., shipments from the plant, and to

occas aati iia

8

include with such shipments the corresponding MSDSs.

Subsections (f)(1) and (g) (6) (479-480a, 484a). The

labeling requirements are the same as the in-plant re-

quirements with the addition of the name and address

of the manufacturer. The downstream provisions of the

federal standard are not involved in the instant case

because the New Jersey Act does not require downstream

labeling.

3. The New Jersey Worker

and Community Right to Know Act

Almost simultaneously with the OSHA standard, New

Jersey enacted its “Worker and Community Right to

Know Act.” N.J.S.A. § 384:5A-1, et seg. (1738a). The

Act applies only to workplace operations and deals, as che

district court found in its original opinion, “with pre-

cisely the same subjects in the workplace as are regulated

by the OSHA Standard.” 600 F. Supp. at 618 (52a).

The Act directs the State Department of Health to

compile a list of all “workplace hazardous substances”

that constitute “a threat to the health or safety of an

employee,” including any substance on an “environmental

hazardous substance list’? to be compiled by the Depart-

ment of Environmental Protection. See §5(a) (188a).

There are approximately 2150 chemicals on the “work-

place” list, 161 of which are taken from the “environ-

mental” list.

The workplace container labeling requirements are the

central feature of the Act and the only provisions directly

at issue here. They appear in § 14 of the New Jersey Act

(191-193a) and apply, as does the federal standard, to all

containers in the workplace. There are two phases to

the labeling. First, subsection (a) of $14 requires that

“every container ... [of] a hazardous substance shall

bear a label indicating the chemical name and [CAS]

9

”

.

number‘ of the habardous substance. “Hazardous

substance” is defined in § 3(m) as any substance on the

“workplace” hazardous substance list (178a). This label-

ing originally was required to be completed within 6

months of the effective date of the Act.

Subsection (b) provides that 24 months after the effec-

tive date of the Act, “every” container in the workplace

must bear “a label indicating the chemical name and

[CAS] number of the substance in the container,” and, if

there is a mixture in the container, the chemical names

and CAS numbers “of the five most predominant sub-

stances in the mixture. ” This second-stage labeling

has been referred to at times as “universal”’ labeling be-

cause it covers substances that the State has not deter-

mined to be hazardous.

A flavor or fragrance plant typically has between

50,000 and 70,000 containers, not including samples, that

range in size from 4 ounces to 55 gallons (133a). Com-

mon or trade names, not chemical names or CAS num-

bers, are routinely used by fragrance and flavor com-

panies in the plants and on their OSHA labels (id.). The

difference may be illustrated by an example cited by the

lower court. A substance now labeled by plaintiffs under

the OSHA standard merely as ‘“‘Galaxoide” would have to

be labeled under the New Jersey system as: “1, 3, 4, 6,

7, 9—hexahydro—4, 6, 6, 7, 8, 8—hexamethyl cyclopenta

gamma 2 benzopyrene,” together with the CAS number

(id.).

Section 7 of the New Jersey Act (185a) requires em-

ployers to complete a “workplace survey” on which they

must report any “hazardous” substances present at their

facilities, §5(¢c) (184a), and an “environmental survey”

on which thev must report information about “environ-

4+“CAS” its an acronym for “Chemical Abstracts Survey,” a

scientific reference manual that assigns numbers to chemical

substances.

10

mental” hazardous substances at their facilities, § 4

(182a). After receiving a completed ‘‘workplace” sur-

vey, the Department of Health must transmit to the em-

ployer a “hazardous substance fact sheet for each haz-

ardous substance present in the employer’s workplace.”’

$8(a) (186a). The fact sheets, which are prepared by

the Department for each substance on the state’s work-

place list, $ 5(d) (184a), are the functional equivalents

of MSDSs and must be made available to employees, § 12

(189a). In another parallel to the OSHA standard, § 13

of the Act (189a) requires a comprehensive education

and training program for employees.

New Jersey has not obtained OSHA approval of any

of the state’s workplace requirements as part of a state

plan.

4. Proceedings Below

The district court held that the New Jersey Act was

preempted in its entirety in the manufacturing sector

because its essential provisions ‘related to” the matters

covered by the federal standard. 600 F. Supp. 621-22

(57-60a). The court noted, inter alia, that the major

provisions of the New Jersey Act deal with “hazard

communication in the workplace, the identification of

hazardous substances, labeling, and workplace training

and educational programs, the precise issues covered by

the Standard....” Jd. at 618 (5la).

On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part, re-

versed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Without discussing either the statutory “relating to” lan-

guage, the state plan procedure, or OSHA’s statements

regarding the preemption of state right to know laws,

the court stated that the ‘preemptive effect of the OSHA

Act and the Hazard Communication Standard is narrow,”

774 F.2d at 598 (106a), and used a “purpose” test to

determine whether the New Jersey provisions were pre-

11

empted. The “purpose” in question, however, was not

that of Congress, but rather that of the state. A provi-

sion of the New Jersey Act would be preempted, held

the court, only if the “primary purpose” of the provision

were the protection of workers. /d. at 595 (100a).

Applying this purpose test, the court held that the

provision that employers complete ‘workplace’ surveys

was expressly preempted, together with the requirement

that employers furnish to employees copies of the “fact

sheets” compiled by the Department of Health for sub-

stances on the “workplace hazardous substance list.” Id.

at 594-95 (99-100a).°

Because the Hughey I court never specifically discussed

the express preemption of ‘universal’ labeling,® the pre-

cise scope of its holding with respect to express preemp-

tion of New Jersey’s workplace labeling requirements was

not definitively resolved until Hughey IJ. Read together,

the decisions hold that:

1. The labeling requirements of subsection (a) of § 14

are not preempted as applied to the 161 substances on

the state’s “workplace hazardous substance list” that are

also on the state’s “environmental hazardous substance

list,” * but are preempted as applied to the remaining

5 The court did not address the employee training requirements

of § 13 of the Act, presumably because the state had conceded that

they were preempted. The court also held that employers could be

required to complete the state’s “environmental” surveys. /d.

® One of the issues in Hughey I] was whether the decision in

Hughey I had ruled upon the express preemption of “universal”

labeling. Despite considerable misgivings about the point, the

court held that the panel had resolved the issue on the first appeal.

See Hughey II, 868 F.2d at 626-27 (13-16a).

7™The court in Hughey I referred to “environmental hazard

labeling” as though it were a separate category of labeling under

the New Jersey Act. See 774 F.2d at 596, 598 (101-102a, 107a).

In fact, the Act contains no provision dealing with “environ-

mental hazard labeling.” As noted above, substances on the

12

substances on the “workplace’’ list because the “primary

purpose” of the labeling is communication to “workers.”

See 774 F.2d at 595-96 (101-102a).

2. The “universal” labeling mandated by subsection

(b) of section 14 is not preempted because its primary

purpose is to communicate information to firemen, police-

men, and the public at large. See 868 F.2d at 627 (15-

16a).*

3. Moreover, even though labeling substances on the

“workplace” list is preempted, such substances must be

labeled under subsection (b) because the “primary pur-

pose” of that subsection is communication to firefighters.

emergency personnel, and members of the public. See

868 F.2d at 627-28 (16-17a). In other words, labeling

of the identical substances is preempted under subsection

(a) because it deals with substances on the “workplace”

list, but not under subsection (b) when called by another

name.

The Hughey II panel adhered to the “purpose” test

adopted in Hughey I, and held that the prior panel’s

resolution of the express preemption issues was binding.

868 F.2d at 625-28 (11-18a). The panel also affirmed

the district court’s determination, on remand, that the

New Jersey labeling provisions were not “impliedly” pre-

empted. See 868 F.2d at 628-31 (18-23a). Rehearing

in bane was denied (155a!, but imposition of the state’s

labeling requirements was stayed by the court pending

application for a writ of certiorari (158a).

state’s “environmental” list must be labeled only because § 5(a)

of the Act specifically directs that they be included as a subset

on the list of “workplace” hazards. In other words, the legislature

determined that any substance that could be hazardous to the

environment would, when concentrated in a workplace container,

be hazardous to the employees working with it.

* See note 6 supra.

13

By making the “relating to” test mandated by Con-

gress turn upon a state’s “purpose,” the court of ap-

peals virtually eliminated the preemptive effect of the

hazard standard and sustained intact the New Jersey

workplace labeling requirements. Under the court’s rul-

ing, it will no longer be sufficient to label containers in

accordance with the federal standard. Employers will

have to add to the OSHA labels information that OSHA

expressly decided should not be required—the proper

chemical names and CAS numbers of the contents, in-

cluding (pursuant to New Jersey’s “universal” labeling

provision) the chemical! names and CAS numbers of even

non-hazardous substances. The simplicity and cohesive-

ness of the OSHA system will go by the boards merely

because the state claims that its labeling of workplace

containers is directed not at workers, but at an audience

that is not even present in the workplace.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The matter of immediate concern here is the preemp-

tive effect of the OSH Act and the Hazard Communica-

tion Standard upon New Jersey’s workplace labeling re-

quirements. The case has far broader implications, how-

ever, for the integrity and continued vitality of uniform

regulation of workplace hazard communication. By mak-

ing preemption turn upon how the state or local govern-

ment elects to characterize the “purpose” of its law

rather than the intent of Congress and the substantive

content of the law in question, the Third Circuit has

given the states a virtual primer on how to circumvent

the preemptive effect of this and other OSHA standards.

Under the court’s purpose approach, state hazard com-

munication laws would be upheld routinely and employers

would be subjected to numerous and diverse state re-

quirements, each having the potential for interfering

with the effectiveness of the federal program and increas-

ing the regulatory burdens upon domestic industries.

i4

The Third Circuit also has effectively ousted OSHA

from its statutorily prescribed role of passing upon state

and local legislation that may impinge upon the federal

program. Under the OSH Act, Congress directed that

OSHA would cecide whether state programs should be

allowed once a federal standard has been promulgated.

Under the court’s decision, however, a state need not be

concerned about OSHA scrutiny. All the state need do is

ascribe to its program some purpose other than “worker’

protection and the threat of preemption disappears. In

much the same vein, OSHA’s pronouncements regarding

the preemption of state and local laws have been swept

aside without discussion, much less deference.

This Court has been sensitive to the need for Congress

to specify the preemptive effects of its statutes in order

to avoid the ambiguity that otherwise attaches and the

need for a difficult search for an elusive Congressional

intent to “‘oceupy the field” or the existence of a “con-

flict.” Here, Congress has done so, but its intentions

‘

have now been subordinated to those of state legislatures

across the country.

I. The Third Circuit’s “Purpose” Test Conflicts with

Prior Decisions of this Court and Would Permit the

States to Nullify the Preemptive Eifect of the Hazard

Communication Standard

The touchstone to preemption analysis is, of course, the

intent of Congress. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985). Here, Con-

gress has specified the preemptive effect of a standard

issued pursuant to the OSH Act. Once a standard has

been promulgated :

Any State which, at any time, desires to assume re-

sponsibility for development and enforcement therein

of occupational safety and health standards relating

to any occupational safety or health issue with re-

spect to which a federal standard has been promul-

15

gated under Section 655 of this title shall submit a

state plan for the development of such standards

and their enforcement.

29 U.S.C. §$ 667(b) (169a). As this Court has empha-

sized in another context, “{t]he breadth of |the statute’s |

preemptive reach is apparent from” the “relating to

language. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,

96 (1983) (ERISA). The courts “must give effect to

this plain language unless there is good reason to believe

age to have some more

that Congress intended the langu

restrictive meaning....” Jd. at 97.

No such reason exists here. To the contrary, the broad

. . . |

preemptive scope of the language is confirmed by the

nt} Va ton ba £ th va’ +3 el . TT1Q1N) R > TaAbate. that

entirety ol le preemption provision. LecOognNnIZINeE wnat

| standards would frequently dis-

Ll

‘

the issuance of federa

place state police power to a significant degree,” Con-

gress provided a safety valve whereby states can con-

tinue to regulate through the instrumentality of a “state

plan” if OSHA itself is first satisfied that the effective-

ness of its standard will not be undermined by the state

system. 29 U.S.C. §$ 667(¢) (2) (169a). Had Congress

intended OSHA standards to have only the narrow pre-

emptive reach found by the Third Circuit, there would

have been no need for such a carefully crafted procedure

for agency review of state regulations.

Under the statutory scheme established by Congress,

the states can seek to achieve legitimate state purposes

in ways that do not

federal standards, or they can follow the state plan route

and submit their programs for evaluation by OSHA, the

by Congress and best equipped to evaluate

the impact of state regulation upon the federal standard.

é *

“relate to” the matters addressed in

‘Congress rejected a more narrow preemption proposal that

would have allowed States lo impose standards more stringent than

those adopted by OSHA. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d

‘el 12 (1970

16

Now, by virtue of the gloss put upon the statute by the

Third Circuit, the states need do neither.

The “relation” of the New Jersey labeling to the OSHA

standard was never really challenged by the state. As

the Court noted in Hughey II, “|d|jefendants concede the

obvious areas of overlap between the state and federal

requirements... .” 868 F.2d at 626 (13a). The rela-

tion is, in any event, obvious. Both the OSHA and New

Jersey standards address precisely the same thing—

labeling of containers in the workplace—and do so for the

same reason—to communicate information about poten-

tial hazards. Indeed, as we show below, OSHA specific-

ally considered imposing the essential ingredients of the

New Jersey system (i.e., chemical name and universal

labeling) as part of the federal standard, but decided

that the system would be more effective without them.’°

The Third Circuit, however, read the statutory lan-

guage to require a “primary purpose” analysis. By fo-

cusing upon the purpose of the state rather than that of

Congress, the court issued an open invitation to semantic

evasion of the preemptive effect of OSHA standards. By

simply manipulating the ostensible “purpose” of their

legislation, the “States could do indirectly what they

could not do directly. . . .” International Paper Co. v.

Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495 (1987). As the district

judge so aptly concluded when the case was first before

him, the purpose test ‘“‘would permit ready nullification of

the Section 18 preemption provision.” 600 F. Supp. at

622 (59a).

109 The “implied preemption” evidentiary hearing that was held

on remand after Hughey I also demonstrated a relation as a matter

of fact. Thus, the witnesses for both sides agreed, and the district

court found (144-145a), that the New Jersey labeling would so

impact the OSHA standard as to necessitate special label design

and positioning programs and the revamping of the OSHA employee

training program to minimize interference with the effectiveness

of the federal standard.

17

The same kind of “purpose” analysis was emphatically

rejected in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.

504 (1981), a case that also involved a New Jersey law

and a comparable preemption provision in ERISA (29

U.S.C. § 1144 (a)) applicable to state laws that “relate

to” employee benefit plans. In ERISA, Congress specified

the object of the “relating to” language (i.e., employee

benefit plans), while in the OSH Act Congress left iden-

tification of the object to OSHA—.e., any issue addressed

in an OSHA standard. The preemption test itself is,

however, the same.

This Court held in Alessi that the New Jersey Act was

preempted, “whatever [its] purpose or purposes” and

even though it addressed “‘a matter quite different from

pension plans,” because it nonetheless “related to” the

matter covered by the federal statute. Jd. at 524. Rejec-

tion of the “purpose” test was necessary, said the Court,

to prevent the states “from avoiding through form the

substance of the preemption provision.” Jd. at 525. As

the Court earlier had noted in Perez v. Campbell, 402

U.S. 637, 652 (1971), an implied preemption case, a

‘“nurpose” test would permit states to avoid preemption:

. .. by simply publishing a legislative committee re-

port articulating some state interest or policy—other

than frustration of the federal objective—that would

be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law.

See also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, supra, 479

U.S. at 498-99, n.19 (“effect rather than purpose of a

state statute governs preemption analysis’).

When Corgress wishes to preempt according to “pur-

pose,” it knows how to do so. See Pacific Gas & Elec.

Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Develop-

ment Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (Atomie Energy

Act; states may regulate for “purposes other than” those

underlying the federal regulation). In the OSH Act,

however, Congress chose not “purpose” language, but

18

rather the broad “relating to” language also used in

ERISA (supra) and in other federal statutes.”

Significantly, OSHA itself has taken issue with the

Third Cireuit’s approach. When certiorari was sought in

Manufacturers Ass’n of Tri-County v. Knepper, No. 86-

1102, this Court, sua sponte, solicited the views of the

United States. In its amicus brief, the government agreed

that the Third Circuit had “erred” and that its purpose

analysis was “incorrect.” See Brief for the United States

as Amicus Curiae at 9, 13, 14. The proper inquiry, said

the government, was whether a state law “related to”

the matters addressed in the OSHA standard in either

“primary purpose or effect.” Jd. at 13 (emphasis in

original).

Even so, the Solicitor General recommended that the

Court “postpone” consideration of the issue. Jd. at 14.

The government expressed its hope (id. at 10, 15, 18)

that the Third Circuit would reconsider its position '* and

that the states would reconsider the wisdom of their

right to know laws in light of the expansion of the OSHA

standard to non-manufacturing industries in 1987 and

the enactment of Title III of the Superfund Amendments

and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (codified as the Emer-

gency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42

U.S.C. § 11001 et seg.).'* Unfortunately, that has not

11 See, e.g., Railway Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. $434 (“relating to

railroad safety”); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (“relating

to the control of [motor vehicle| emissions’’).

12 The Solicitor General perceived some _tension between the

Knepper and Hughey I decisions. See Amicus Brief at 15 n.13.

With the decision in Hughey II, it is clear that the tension was

illusory.

13J7t should be noted that this recent federal legislation has

nothing whatever to do with container labeling, either in-plant or

downstream. The Act does, however, require that firemen and

emergency personnel be provided with comprehensive information

about hazardous chemicals in forms other than labeling. E.g., id.

19

happened. Neither New Jersey nor the Third Circuit has

receded from its position, and review by this Court is

now appropriate.

The fundamental inadequacy of the “purpose” test is

strikingly illustrated by the anomolous results that it has

produced in the instant case. For example, as noted

earlier, the requirement that substances on the state’s

“workplace” hazardous substance list be labeled was

deemed preempted while the court simultaneously upheld

the application of the state’s “universal” labeling require-

ment to the very same substances. In other words, the

court preempted the labeling requirement under subsec-

tion (a) of $14 of the New Jersey Act and then rein-

stated it under subsection (b). The only difference is

that the labeling is called one thing in subsection (a) and

another in subsection (b).

The point is underscored by comparing the instant

case with Manufacturers Ass’n of Tri-County v. Knep-

per, 801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.

66 (1987), involving the Pennsylvania Worker and Com-

munity Right to Know Act, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7301

et seq. The workplace labeling provisions in the Pennsyl-

vania and New Jersey Acts are essentially the same.

The Pennsylvania statute also contains both a labeling

requirement for “hazardous” substances and a “univer-

sal” labeling provision applicable to “the top five sub-

stances by volume” in a container. See id. § 7306(a) (1)

& (4). And yet, Knepper affirmed the district court’s

holding that all of the workplace labeling was preempted

because communication to employees was the “chief”

purpose of the labeling, 801 F.2d at 140, while Hughey

at § 11021-22 (employers must provide “hazardous chemical inven-

tory forms” and allow “on-site inspection[s]’’).

14 Moreover, the “hazardous” substance labeling requirement in-

cludes, as does New Jersey’s, substances on the State’s “environ-

mental” hazards list. See id. § 7303(d).

20

refused to preempt the virtually identical labeling provi-

sions in the New Jersey Act.'’ A test that produces such

diametrically opposed results is, we submit, both obviously

and seriously flawed.

The issue here is whether a state’s ostensible “purpose”

should be the measure of federal preemption, not whether

the court of appeals’ reading of the purpose of the New

Jersey labeling is correct. Nonetheless, the court’s read-

ing of the New Jersey law illustrates the imprecision

and indeterminate nature of the “purpose” test. There

is not a word in either §14(a) or (b) about the public,

firemen, emergency personnel, or the environment; only

“employees” are mentioned, and they are mentioned re-

peatedly. E.g., “will enable an employee to readily make

a cross reference”; “will provide the employee with a

chemical name and |CAS] number”; “allow the employee

access to this information’; “shall be available to the

employee at close proximity to his specific job location”

(191-193a) (Emphasis added).’® Labeling workplace

containers is, moreover, by its very nature “primarily”

for the benefit of employees who are the only ones rou-

tinely exposed to the containers and their labels.

Indeed, if the New Jersey labeling can survive, it is

difficult to imagine a situation in which a state dissatis-

fied with the federal system would not be able to superim-

pose its own merely by representing that it is intended

for the protection of firemen, other emergency personnel,

and the public. Nor is there any reason why the same

kind of purpose analysis could not be used by states to

15 To compound the confusion, the court in Knepper held that the

state’s “downstream” labeling requirements were not preempted

even though the OSHA standard addressed the “downstream” issue

as well. See 801 F.2d at 139, 140 n.8. As noted above, the New

Jersey Act has no downstream component.

16 The court in Hughey II expressly acknowledged “the force” of

our arguments challenging Hughey I’s construction of the labeling

section of the New Jersey Act. See 868 F.2d at 627 (16a).

21

impose other workplace requirements in circumvention of

OSHA standards. The “firemen” and “emergency per-

sonnel” ploy used so effectively here could be applied with

equal and perhaps greater justification to almost any

workplace regulation. Note, for example, Environmental

Encapsulating Corp. v. New York, 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.

1988), where the court employed a purpose test to sus-

tain New York City’s mandatory training program for

asbestos workers in the face of a federal standard cov-

ering the identical matter.'

This is not to say that th» “nurpose” of a state law

or regulation are necessarily irrelevant. “Purpose” may

be a factor indicating that a state law “relates to” the

matters covered by the federal standard. Thus, if the

purpose is to any extent to inform workers, the law would

seem to “relate to” the issues covered by the hazard com-

munication standard. But mere attribution of a differ-

ent or additional purpose should not save a state law if,

in “effect,” it nonetheless “relates to” matters covered by

the standard, as the New Jersey labeling so clearly does.

II. The Third Circuit’s Decisions Undermine the Role of

OSHA in the Statutory Preemption Scheme

The Third Circuit has dismantled, without discussion,

the carefully crafted scheme whereby Congress has des-

ignated OSHA' as the arbiter of which state laws

should survive the expansive “relating to” preemption.

The court has also swept aside, again without a word

of explanation, OSHA’s pronouncements that it intended

7 The court abandoned as unworkable the “primary” component

of the test, thereby converting it into an “any” other purpose test.

Id. at 57. The Third Circuit seems to have done the same in prac-

tice, as the panel in Hughey II appears to have recognized. See 868

F.2d at 627 (16a) (court noted that Hughey I panel ended its

inquiry upon finding a purpose other than furnishing information

to workers).

18 The powers of the Secretary of Labor under the Act have been

delegated to OSHA. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1901.7, 1902.1(a) (1988).

Zz

the federal hazard communication standard to preempt

state right to know laws, and more specifically, their in-

plant labeling requirements. The result is ‘“ ‘a serious

evisceration of a congressionally crafted scheme. . .’”

and the denial of the deference due to an agency’s rea-

sonable statutory interpretations. Commodity Futures

Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 840, 844-45

(1986); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-

fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).

Section 18 of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (168a),

creates a detailed administrative structure for states de-

siring to escape preemption and enforce a Jaw that “re-

lates to” an issue, such as in-plant container labeling,

addressed by an OSHA standard. Subsection (b) re-

quires a state to submit a ‘State plan” to OSHA, and

subsection (c) provides guidelines for the agency to fol-

low in determining whether to permit an otherwise pre-

empted law to be enforced, (169a). To survive, a state

law must be “at jeast as effective” as the related OSHA

standard, must “not unduly burden interstate commerce,”

and must be “required by compelling local conditions”

(id.). And cognizant of the centrality of its role in the

Congressional plan, OSHA expressed its intent “to scru-

tinize carefully any state law” submitted as part of a

state plan “to assure... that any additional require-

ments contemplated by the state do not conflict with or

adversely affect the effectiveness of [the] standard.” 48

Fed. Reg. at 53322-323 (399-400a)."

The district court relied heavily upon this “State plan”

construct, and New Jersey’s avoidance of it, in conclud-

19 Cf, City of New York v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 108

S.Ct. 1637, 1645 n.5 (1988) (“state and local authorities remain

free” to avoid express regulatory preemption by “petition|[ing] the

Commission for an individualized waiver that would permit them

to ‘impose additional or different requirements,’ which they may

seek to obtain by demonstrating that particular local conditions

create special problems that make the federal technical standards

inadequate’”’).

23

ing that the New Jersey Act was expressly preempted.

600 F. Supp. at 618 (52a). The court of appeals, how-

ever, simply ignored the Congressionally mandated pro-

cedure, thereby effectively excising it from the statute.

Rather than having OSHA pass upon the extent to which

a state law may adversely affect a federal standard or

unduly burden commerce, the courts will now do so us-

ing the wholly unsatisfactory and clumsy tools of court

process and “implied”? preemption analysis. The courts

will assume OSHA’s role as the guardians of the integ-

rity of the federal program, a role that neither suits

them nor was conferred upon them by Congress. OSHA

will be relegated to the status of a bystander.

The Third Circuit decisions are also devoid of the def-

erence due to OSHA’s statements concerning the preemp-

tion of state right to know laws and in-plant labeling.

The district court, on the other hand, relied upon OSHA’s

expressed intent “to address comprehensively the issue of

evaluating and communicating chemical hazards to em-

ployees in the manufacturing sector, and to preempt any

state law pertaining to this subject ....” 600 F. Supp.

at 617 (51a). As we pointed out in our discussion of the

standard, OSHA was specifically concerned about the

“proliferation” of conflicting state and local right to

know laws and the regulatory burden which they im-

posed, and emphasized the need to preempt such laws in

order to reduce this burden and insure nationwide uni-

formity. See supra at 5-6.

OSHA also made careful and pointed policy judgments

in regard to the very “chemical identity” and “universal”

labeling of in-plant containers required by the New Jer-

sey Act. During the lengthy rulemaking, OSHA eare-

fully considered and rejected proposals to require em-

ployers to use chemical names and CAS numbers on

workplace labels and to label all substances rather than

merely those that are hazardous.

OA

aie

Thus, when OSHA proposed a revised standard in

1982, it concluded that ‘chemical identity’ labeling should

not be imposed because it could inhibit the effectiveness

of hazard communication. See 47 Fed. Reg. at 12109-

110. OSHA again rejected chemical identity labeling

when it promulgated the final rule in 1983. See 48 Fed.

Reg. at 53301-302 (306-31lla), 53325-326 (415-416a).

“Universal” labeling was rejected in 1981 when OSHA

first proposed a standard, and again in 1983 when the

final standard was issued. See 46 Fed. Reg. 4412, 4427;

48 Fed. Reg. at 53292 (271a). It is highly unlikely, to

say the least, that OSHA would have engaged in such a

painstaking process had it thought that states would

nonetheless remain free to impose the rejected require-

ments. Cf. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, supra,

479 U.S. at 497 (“It would be extraordinary for Con-

gress, after devising an elaborate permit system that

sets clear standards, to tolerate common-law suits that

have the potential to undermine this regulatory struc-

ture.”’).

CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit’s decisions in this case are the lead-

ing ones in the field of OSHA preemption of state and

local workplace regulation. Because of their prominence,

they can only have a normative effect and greatly en-

courage the states to impinge even further upon OSHA’s

Congressionally conferred domain.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL R. THOMPSON

Counsel of Record

LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL R.

THOMPSON

1620 “I” Street, N.W.

Suite 925

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 2938-5800

JOHN P. MCKENNA

DANIEL F. SHEA

MCKENNA, SHEA & CRISMAN

1200 Nineteenth Street, N.W.

Suite 602

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 293-7010

Attorneys for Petitioners

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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