Petitioners Reply Brief — Kazmann v. Environmental Protection Agency
Supreme Court brief1989
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° | Siereme Sourt, U8,
S8-1693 Filey
| MAR 45.4989
' JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,
NO. ; CLERK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 1989
RAPHAEL G. KAZMANN, P. E.
PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.
RESPONDENT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
JACK N. ROGERS
MICHAEL R. CONNELLY
ROGERS & CONNELLY
604 St. Ferdinand
Baton Rouge, LA
70802-6187
(504) 344-4369
Counsel for
Petitioner
rene
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Petitioner, as a citizen
acting in his capacity as a ratepayer
and/or taxpayer of a municipality, has
standing under the provisions of 33 USC
1365 and/or 5 USC 702 et seq. to sue the
Environmental Protection Agency in order
to set aside orders of the EPA imposed
on said municipality.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opinions Below... ccscsvccecsscensiveene 1
JurisG@iction. «ss ss és6es4e esa eee 2
Constitutional Provisions
Involved... <sésssss040500 58a ee e
Statement of the CaSe€..... ccc ccccccces 5
Reasons for the Writ. ...cccssestssecus 11
Conclusion. 26k 0s<sssa ws aus oe cee eee 37
ApPeNGiX. wececeoccenucctetueens wee Ee 41
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Appalachian Power Company vs. Train
Joys a Se | a. i eS 32
Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations vs. Camp
(US S Ct 1970) 397 US 150,
eo ue mo 20 164, 90 S Ct 827...18,19
Atlantic City Municipal Utilities
Authority vs. Regional Administrator
(US Dist Ct D NJ 1985)
Set 2 Sa a a 18
Cre international, Inc., et al.
wea eeean tisr> CA 86) 5235 F 2d 1032...32
Hill vs. Tennessee Valley Authority
fewre Gm 6) S49 F 24 1064........ 18
International Federation of
Professional and Technical
Engineers vs. Williams
(1974 E D VA) 389 F Supp 287
Aff'd w/o opinion (CA 4 VA)
oe eck ce eee eerees 28
Loveladies Property Owners'
Association, Inc. vs. Raab
(US Dist Ct D NJ 1975)
Ce ES 18
Marathon Oil vs. Environmental
Protection Agency (1972 CA 9)
ee wee wenn nen 32
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers'
Association vs. State Farm
Mutual Insurance Co.
(US S Ct 1983) 463 US 29,
77 me Be 20 $43, 103 S Ct 2856:...32
National Association of Metal
Finishers vs. EPA (CA 3 1983)
(oi 2 Bis eer reer err eer 34
Public Citizen vs. Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation (1977) 184 App DC 133,
ae wr ee PO ge ee OR eS 30
Sierra Club vs. Hickel (1970 CA 9 Cal)
433 F 26 28 ALL’ a 405 US feta cas 30
U. S. CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES:
Article 3, Se@ctsaon 2 til seaweeds 3,19
Fourteenth Amendment.........-.---- 4
STATUTES:
5 uscS 702 (Administrative
PrOCeagure ACL) <i ccc save cvadas § 40 (240587
28,29, 30
S UBCS 704.6 seen c kaka ces bse dieeeaeee ee 34
S (GCS. 76S os beak bs te eS RR 36
S GCE TOG kk sce dc eh eas RRS ee Ee 35
2B. TECH 15GB a ec bas so cea toeacan 5, 40,217.48
D2 BCE 12S 2 ot elic w cae n dante eee ues 6,20 532
33° GRACE iG) vnc ccs 0 ct ek eee een eeeee ean a3
33 USCS 1365 Section (a) (2)..... 15,19, 24
27,29
Legislative History, Water
Pollution Control, P.L. 92-500
(p. 3738, 3744, 3747) ..cseees 16, 17
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORART
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
The petitioner, Raphael G. KFazmann,
P. E., prays that a Writ of Certiorari
be issued to review the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit entered in this proceeding
on December 16, 1988.
CITATION TO OPINIONS BELOW
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United States Environmental Protection
N y T and nen ~
igency, Through Its Administrator,
n 1 he 5 <7 D -x aot -~ + T ~ +
A. Thomas, and the City/Parish f Eas
Baton Rouge, and a Ruling on Motion t
Dismiss was rendered on May , 1988, ily!
as above.
By opinion rendered December 16,
1988, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower
' : - : eee a =|
Court’s decision in an unpublished
opinion in Case No. 88-3415.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 2, Clause 1.
WJ
~
Article
subjects of jurisdiction.
The judicial Power shall extend to
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the
and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their
Authority, --to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consul --to all Cases of admiralty and
oP)
=e
maritime Jurisdiction; --to
Controversies to which the Untied States
Shall be a Party; --to Controversies
between two or more States; --between a
ct
0)
ct
mM
\U
State and Citizens of another S
--between citizens of different States;
--between citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
2
—
AMENDMENT 14, Section 1. Citizens of
the United States.
All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of
the citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY:
Suit was originally filed by
Raphael G. Kazmann, P. E., individually
and on behalf ot all other individuals
Similarly situated against the United
States Environmental Protection Agency
through its Administrator, Lee A. Thomas,
and the City/Parish of East Baton Rouge.
Plaintiffs sought relief under the
provisions of 28 USC 1346 and 5 USC
Section 702, et seq., to prohibit the
Environmental Protection Agency and the
City/Parish Government of East Baton
Rouge from entering into a consent decree
which would order the expenditure of more
than Two Hundred Forty Million Dollars by
the City/Parish Government to construct
secondary sewage treatment for East Baton
Rouge Parish. Plaintiffs contend that
such secondary sewage treatment is
—e—oO—C—O
unnecessary and would not fulfill the
requirements of the Clean Water Act (now
the Water Quality Act of 1987) and that,
prior to a consent decree being entered
into or an order being issued by the EPA,
there should have been public hearings
held by the EPA at which evidence could
be presented showing that the
construction was unnecessary.
Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that the
EPA, by failing to hold such public
hearings, violated the Administrative
Procedure Act when it is read in
conjunction with the provisions of 33 USC
1251, et seq. (The Clean Water Act).
Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
the issues of standing and jurisdiction
had been previously adjudicated ina
prior suit filed by plaintiffs under the
provisions of the Clean Water Act. The
matter was considered on defendants'
Motion to Dismiss before the Honorable
John V. Parker, Chief Judge of the Middle
District of Louisiana, and judgment was
rendered dismissing plaintiffs' complaint
on May 10, 1988.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS:
This case involves a suit by
taxpayers and citizens of East Baton
Rouge Parish seeking injunctive relief
against the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (hereinafter referred
to as the EPA) and the City of Baton
Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge
(hereinafter referred to as the
City/Parish).
In November 1982, the City/Parish
and the EPA entered into a Consent
Decree. Paragraph 4 of the Decree sets
forth its objectives and reads as
follows:
"All plans, studies,
monitoring, remedial, and
maintenance programs described
in this Consent Decree or
resulting from the acitivities
reguired by this Decree shall
have as their objective causing
the Central Treatment Plant
owned and operated by Baton
Rouge, to come into and remain
in compliance with National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Permit Number
LA00 36421."
It has deen the contention of the
EPA that the City/Parish had failed to
comply with the requirements of the
Consent Decree, therefore the EPA was
threatening to fine the City/Parish and
seeking a new Consent Decree. The
City/Parish at several times requested
administrative hearings in order to nave
a variance considered, but such hearings
had been denied by the EPA. As a result
citizens and taxpayers of East Baton
Rouge Parish and the City of Baton Rouge,
represented by Raphael G. Kazmann, P. E.,
olaintiff herein, filed suit in U. S.
District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana seeking an injunction to
prohibit the EPA and the City/Parish from
proceeding with a new Consent Decree
until such time as hearings had been
held. At the hearing on their request
for injunctive relief, plaintiffs
intended to offer evidence in support of
the following facts:
1. The City/Parish was, in fact, in
substantial compliance with the Clean
Water Act;
2. The EPA had failed to follow
proper administrative procedures in this
matter;
3. If proper administrative
procedures were followed, it would be
Seen that the EPA reguirements of the
City/Parish did not further the goals of
the Act and are not cost effective and
that they impose an economic hardship on
the Baton Rouge community, without need.
In response to this citizens' suit,
the City and the Parish initially joined
with Raphael Kazmann and adopted the
pleadings filed by him as their own. The
EPA, on the other hand, responded by
filing a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Just three days
prior to the Court's hearing on the EPA's
Motion to Dismiss, the City and Parish
decided to change their position and
adopted the EPA's Motion to Dismiss.
Ultimately, the District Court
ruled that plaintiff was without standing
to assert rights on behalf of the City
and Parish which they had chosen not to
assert on their own behalf. Other than
appeal from that decision, plaintiff
sought relief under the provisions of 28
USC 1346 and 5 USC Section 702 et seq. in
a new suit filed in U. S. District Court.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was granted
in that matter on May 5, 1988, on the
basis that the issues of standing and
jurisdiction had been previously
adjudicated in the prior suit. That
decision was timely appealed to the
10
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, which rendered a decision on
December 16, 1988, affirming the actions
of the Lower Court and dismissing
plaintiff's appeal.
REASONS FOR GRANTING WRITS
Plaintiff is one of a group of
citizens and taxpayers in an economically
depressed community which has-been
ordered by the EPA to spend over Two
Hundred Forty Million Dollars on
secondary sewerage treatment which the
EPA claims is necessary to bring the
Parish of East Baton Rouge into
compliance with the Clean Water Act. The
plaintiff, on the other hand, has
accumulated a substantial body of
Sclentific evidence which indicates that
the order issued by the EPA for secondary
treatment is counter-productive and that
it will not meet the goals of the Clean
1l
Water Act, either in cleaning up our
nation's waterways and/or doing it ina
cost-effective manner. Plaintiff has,
from the beginning, sought only the
opportunity to present this evidence at a
public hearing to be held by the EPA
which he believes is necessary before the
order can be issued to the City/Parish
requiring the expenditure of funds on
secondary treatment.
Unfortunately for plaintiff, he has
been thwarted in his attempts to get a
public hearing on this matter by the
Court's ruling that he lacks standing to
force the EPA, through the Federal
Courts, to have such a public hearing.
In its opinion in the case Raphael G.
Kazmann, P. E., Individually and On
Behalf of All Other Individuals Similarly
——
Situated vs. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, through its
Administrator, Lee A. Thomas, and the
City/Parish of East Baton Rouge, Number
87-210-A, the District Court stated the
following:
"Plaintiff may be entirely
correct in his claim that EPA
is mandating superfluous
treatment standards and that
the local governing bodies are
entitled to an administrative
hearing before they can be
required to provide that
treatment. But the local
elected officials whose duty it
is to make the decision to
demand or not to demand such a
hearing, have apparently
decided to forego it. That is
their decision to make."
It is piaintiff's contention that
it is, in fact, not entirely the decision
of the local governing body to make. It
is plaintiff and the other taxpayers and
rate-payers of the City of Baton Rouge
and the Parish of East Baton Rouge who
will bear the burden of paying for the
secondary sewerage treatment ordered by
the EPA and of paying any fines imposed
by the EPA on local governments for
failure to comply with EPA requirements.
It is also the citizens, taxpayers and
rate-payers who will bear the burden of
any economic dislocation resulting from
the expenditure of these funds and also
the loss of any other municipal services
which could have been provided by funds
which are diverted to fulfill the
requirements of the EPA.
he
THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE
WHAT CONSTITUTES STANDING
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT
In the first action filed by
plaintiff in this matter, Civil Action
No. 87-0210, entitled "Raphael Kazmann,
P. E., et al. vs. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,"
plaintiff was originally joined in the
Suit by the government of the City of
Baton Rouge and the Parish of East Baton
Rouge, which clearly gave them standing
to litigate the issues which they
oresented. However, shortly before the
14
hearing on defendant EPA's Motion to
Dismiss, the City/Parish switched sides
and joined with the EPA in asking that
plaintitf's Motion be dismissed. As a
result, the District Court found that
there was no standing on behalf of
plaintiff and, therefore, that the Court
had no jurisdiction to hear the
complaint. In that original complaint,
however, plaintiff had relied exclusively
on jurisdiction under the provisions of
33 USC 1365, which is the citizens' suit
provision of the Clean Water Act. The
EPA had argued to the Court that the
legislative history of the Clean Water
Act indicated that the intent was to
limit citizens' suits under 33 USC 1365
to citizens who had suffered some injury
personal to them. Plaintiff argued that
this was not the case and, in fact, cited
portions of the legislative history to
Support his claim:
15
"An essential element in any
control program involving the
nation's waters is public
participation. The public must
have a genuine opportunity to
Speak on the issue of
protection of its waters. The
Committee has therefore
established requirements to
orovide opportunity for public
hearings by the Federal
government, or if State
participation is approved by
the Administrator, the State,
and other provisions to make
available to the public all
relevant information
surrounding a discharge source
placed on it. This includes
the deposit of any permit, and
the conditions thereto, ina
place of ready public access.
The scrutiny of the public and
the exercise of authority under
this section is extremely
important in insuring
expeditious implementation of
the authority and a high level
of performance by all levels of
government and discharge
sources." (Emphasis added)
Legislative History, Water
Pollution Control, P. L. 92-
500 (p. 3738).
"Section 505 -- Citizen Suits:
Anyone may initiate a civil
suit against any person who is
alleged to be in violation of
an effluent limitation or a
Federal or State abatement
order, or against the
administrator for failure to
perform a non-discretionary
16
Guty." Legislative History,
water Pollution Control, P. L.
92-500 (p. 3744).
"As pointed out, the Committee
bill would provide in the
citizen suit provision that
actions will lie against the
administrator for failure (to)
exercise his duties under the
Act, including his enforcement
duties..." Legislative History,
Water Pollution Control, P. L.
92-500 (p. 3747).
"In addition to violations of
Section 301l(a) citizens are
granted authority to bring
enforcement actions for
violations of schedules or
timetables of compliance and
effluent limitations under
Section 301, standards of
performance under Section 306,
prohibitions or effluent
Standards under Section 307,
provisions of certification
under Section 401, and any
under Section 402. (Emphasis
added) Legislative History,
Water Pollution Control, P. L.
92-500 (p. 3744).
Plaintiff contended that the
reading of the Legislative History showed
that the citizens' suit provisions of the
Act were much broader than the
interpretation offered by the counsel for
17
the EPA. In Loveladies Property Owners
Association, Inc. vs. Raab, (U. S. Dist
Ct D New Jersey 1975) 430 F Supp 276, the
Court found that a property owners
association had standing under the
provisions of 33 USC 1365 since they
alleged “injury-in-fact." Included in
the alleged injuries were aesthetic and
recreational benefits as well as an
economic interest. Raphael Kazmann has
made specific allegations in his
complaint of his and other taxpayers'
economic interests. See also Association
of Data Processing Service Organizations
vs. Camp (U. S. Sup Ct 1970) 397 US 150,
25 L Ed 2d 184, 90 S Ct 827 and Atlantic
City Municipal Utilities Authority vs.
Regional Administrator (U. S. Dist Ct D
New Jersey 1985) 616 F Supp 722.
It is also important to notice
that, in the case of Hill vs. Tennessee
Valley Authority (1977 C A 6) 549 F 2d
1064, the Court granted standing to
18
environmentalists to protect the
interests of the "snail darter" under
provisions of 16 USC 1540, the citizen
Suit provisions of the Endangered Species
Act. The language of Section (g)l(c) of
that provision is almost identical in
content to Section (a)2 of 33 USC 1365.
Plaintif€ contends that his claim
for standing in this matter clearly falls
within the applicable tests provided in
Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. vs. William B. Camp,
Supra. There, the Court ruled that the
question of standing to sue in the
Federal Courts is to be considered in the
Framework of Article 3 of the U. S.
Constitution, and plaintiff specifically
refers to Section 2, Clause 1 of Article
3. Further, the Court required of
plaintiffs that they show that there was
an injury in fact to them and that the
interests sought to be protected by a
19
plaintiff is arguably within the zone of
interests protected or regulated by a
U.S. Statute or Constitutional guarantee.
Plaintiff contends that the economic
well-being of his community and himself,
as well as the issue regarding the
promotion of and meeting of the goals of
the-Clean Water Act all fall within the
categories cited above.
The economic consequences have
already been cited in this petition, but
the question in regard to meeting the
goals of the Clean Water Act needs to be
discussed further. Specifically,
plaintiff refers to the legislative goals
and intent of the Clean Water Act which
are stated in 33 USC 1251, which reads,
in pertinent part:
"(a) The objective of this Act
is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the
Nation's waters. In order to
achieve this objective, it is
hereby declared that:
Consistent with the provisions
Of this Act ==
20
(1) It is the national
goal that the discharge of
pollutants into the
navigable waters be
eliminated by 1985;
(2) It is the national
goal that, wherever
attainable, an interim
goal of water quality
which provides for the
protection and propagation
of fish, shellfish and
wildlife and provides for
recreation in wildlife and
on the water be achieved
py July l, 1983;
(3) It is the national
policy that the discharge
of toxic pollutants in
toxic amounts be
prohibited;
(4) It is the national
policy that Federal
Financial assistance be
provided to construct
publicly owned waste
treatment works;
(5) It is the national
policy that area wide
waste treatment management
planning processes be
developed and implemented
to assure adequate control
of sources of pollutants
in each State; and
(6) It is the national
policy that a major
research and development
effort be made to develop
21
technology necessary to
eliminate the discharge of
pollutants into the
navigable waters, waters
of the contiguous zone,
and the oceans.
(b) It is the policy of the
Congress to recognize, preserve
and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of
States and to prevent, reduce
and eliminate pollution, to
plan the development and use
(including restoration,
reservation and enhancement) of
land and water resources, and
to consult with the
administrator in the exercise
of authority under this Act.
It is the policy of Congress
that the States manage the
construction grant program
under the Act and implement the
permit programs under Sections
402 and 404 of this Act (33 USC
1342, 1344). It is further the
policy of the Congress to
Support and aid research
relating to the prevention,
reduction and elimination of
pollution, and to provide
Federal technical services and
financial aid to State and
interstate agencies and
municipalities in connection
with the prevention, reduction
and elimination of pollution."
In the section of the Act dealing
with “Grants for Construction of
Treatment Works" which is directly
22
applicable to the situation in East Baton
Rouge Parish, the Congress elaborated
further on its purposes. The pertinent
parts of 33 USCS 1281 read as follows:
"(a) It is the purpose of
this title to require and to
assist the development and
implementation of waste
treatment management plans and
practices which will achieve
the goals of this Act.
(b) Waste treatment management
plans and practices shall
provide for the application of
the pest practicable waste
treatment technology before any
discharge into receiving
waters, including reclaiming
and recycling of water, and
confined disposal of pollutants
so they will not migrate to
cause water or other
environmental pollution and
shall provide for consideration
of advanced waste treatment
techniques.
(c) To the extent practicable,
waste treatment management
Shall be on an areawide basis
and provide control or
treatment of all point and
nonpoint sources of pollution,
including in place or
accumulated pollution sources."
(emphasis added)
23
In order to meet the intent and
goals of Congress, the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency
(hereinafter referred to as the
"Administrator") is empowered to take
certain actions and to compel others,
including municipalities and private
industries, to take certain actions.
Among other things, the Administrator is
entitled to set effluent limitations and
compel municipalities to comply with
them. However, the power of the EPA is
not unlimited.
Plaintiff therefore contends that
the citizens' suit provisions of the
Clean Water Act, 33 USC 1365, allow a
citizen to bring a suit against the
Administrator for failure to perform a
non-discretionary duty even when the
allegations of the citizen are to the
effect that the Administrator is failing
to meet the goals of the Act by ordering
unnecessary expenditures on a non-cost-
24
EE
effective basis. Plaintiff further
contends that failure to provide standing
to citizens in such circumstances,
particularly when standing has been
denied by a political ploy such as that
used by the City/Parish of Baton Rouge in
Switching sides shortly before the
hearing on this matter, amounts to a
violation of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S.
Constitution. Specifically, in this
case, the violation consisted of the City
acting under color of State law, lulling
the plaintiff into a false sense of
security by joining with them in
litigation and then abandoning them
Shortly before a hearing was to be held,
but too late for plaintiff to take any
other action, thereby leaving its
citizens in an untenable position of
facing a standing question which
heretofore would not have existed.
25
ee
THE SECOND SUIT FILED BY
PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED STANDING
UNDER DIFFERENT LEGAL GROUNDS
Plaintiff contends that the
District Court and the Court of Appeals
erred manifestly in their decision tnat
olaintiff had not asserted a new cause of
action by making its second complaint
under the provisions of the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 USC
Section 702, et seq., and that the issue
of standing had already been decided in
previous litigation.
Plaintiff asserts that, although
the same parties were involved and the
Same substantive issues regarding the
actions of the EPA were alleged in the
second litigation, the grounds for
standing and jurisdiction of the Court
were entirely different and, therefore,
raised new issues and a new cause of
action which should have been decided by
2€
the District Court on the basis of the
merits of the new complaint and not on
the previously decided case involving
only one section of the Clean Water Act.
Plaintiff contends that in the case
presently before this Court, the grounds
for jurisdiction are based on 28 USCS
1346, 33 U.S.C. Section 1365(A)(2) by
implication and 5 USCS 702. 5 USCS 702
provides for judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act and was not
—_
argued in Kazmann I. 5 USCS 702 sta
eT
o))
the following:
"A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved
Dy agency action withing the
meaning of a relevant statute,
1s entitled to judicial review
thereof. An action in a court
of the United States seeking
relief other than money damages
and stating a claim that an
agency or an officer or
employee thereof acted or
failed to act in an official
official capacity or under
color of legal authority shall
not be dismissed nor relief
therein be denied on the ground
that 1t is against the United
States or that the United
ae
States is an indispensable
party. The United States may
be named as a defendant in any
Such action, and a judgment or
decree may be entered against
the United States: PROVIDED,
That any mandatory or
injunctive decree shall specify
the Federal officer or officers
(py name or by title), and
their successors in office,
personally responsible for
compliance. Nothing herein (1)
affects other limitations on
judicial review or the power or
duty of the court to dismiss
any action or deny relief on
any other appropriate legal or
equitable ground; or (2)
confers authority to grant
relief if any other statute
that grants consent to suit
expressly or implicitly forbids
the relief which is sought."
5 uScS 702 is not in and of itself
a mechanism to establish jurisdiction in
the District Court wnich would not
}
otherwise be in its competence.
ED VA) 389 F Supp 287, Aff'd without
opinion (CA 4 VA) 510 F 2d 966. However,
when coupled with a valid jurisdictional
)
statute such as 28 USCS 1346 and/or 33
HK
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Rouge Parish who will be required to bear
the financial burden of paying for the
new sewage treatment plants and
associated construction as required by
the EPA and the Clean Water Act, and, as
of a recent tax election, they are no
user fee but
ry
longer just paying a sewe
increased sales taxes to support tne
construction requirements imposed by the
EPA.
Surely it is the Federal District
Court's duty to ensure that the EPA is
complying with the goals and policies of
the legislation when a complaint is filed
asking for judicial review of an
rn
rn
administrative procedure. The plainti
ct
and the general citizenry would benefi
from the Court's intervention in
reviewing legislation that creates an
onerous and unnecessary financial burden
on the taxpayers.
Further, the EPA has violated the
legislative goals and the intent of the
31
Clean Water Act as stated oy 33 USCS
1251. In Appalachian Power Company vs.
Train, (1976 CA 4) 545 F 2d 1351, the
Court held that:
"Nevertheless, EPA is under a
statutory duty to determine
whether, in fact, its
regulations for 1983 will
'result in reasonable further
progress toward the national
goal of eliminating the
discharge of all pollutants..'"
It is also within the jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts to review agency
action to determine if it is correct both
from the substantive and procedural
standpoints. See CPC International,
Inc., @t al. vs: Train, 1975; CA 8), 515
F 2d 1032 and Marathon Oil vs.
Environmental Protection Agency, (1972;
CA 9) 564 F 2d 1253.
In inquiring into the substance of
the EPA action, the inquiry is limited
but can be made by the Federal Courts.
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers'
Association of the United States, Inc.
vs. State Farm Mutual Insurance, Co., (US
Sup Ct 1983), 463 US 29, 77 L Ed 2d 443,
103 S Ct 2856, the Court stated:
"...The scope of review under
the ‘arbitrary and capricious'
standard is narrow and a court
is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the
agency. Nevertheless, the
agency must examine the
relevant data and arbitrate a
satisfactory explanation for
its action including a
‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice
made.' Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. vs. United States, 371 US
156, 168, 9L Ed 2d 207, 83 S Ct
239 (1962). In reviewing that
explanation, we must ‘consider
whether the decision was based
on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of
judgment.' Bowman
Transportation, Inc. vs.
Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc., Supra at 285, 42 L Ed 2d
447, 95 S Ct 438; Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park vs.
Volpe, supra, at 416, 28 L Ed
2a 136, 91 S Ct 814. Normally
an agency rule would be
arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors
which Congress has not intended
it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect
of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision
33
that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or
is so implausible that it could
not be escrived to a difference
in view or the product of
agency expertise. The
reviewing Court should not
attempt itself to make up for
such deficiencies; we may not
Supply a reasoned basis for the
agency's action that the agency
itself has not given. SEC vs
Cheney Corp., 332 US 194, 196,
91 L Ed 1995, 67 S Ct 1575
(1947). "We will, however,
uphold a decision of less than
ideal clarity if the agency's
path may reasonably be
discussed.' Bowman
Transportation, Inc. vs
Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc., Supra at 286, 42 L Ed 2d
447, 95 S Ct 438. See also
Camp vs. Pitts, 411 US 138,
142-143, 362 Ed 106, 93 S Ct
£24k (i973),.°
See also National Association of
Metal Finishers vs. EPA, (CA 3 1983) 719
PF 2d 624.
Further, the Court is entitled to
review the actions of the EPA ona
Substantive and procedureal basis under
the provision of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 5 USCS 704 states the
following:
34
704. Actions reviewable
Agency action made reviewable
by statute and final agency
action for which there is no
other adequate remedy ina
court are subject to judicial
review. A preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate
agency action or ruling not
directly reviewable is subject
to review on the review of the
final agency action. Except as
otherwise expressly required by
statute, agency action
otherwise final is final for
the purposes of this section
whether or not there has been
presented or determined an
application for a declaratory
order, for any form of
reconsideration, or, unless the
agency otherwise requires by
rule and provides that the
action meanwhile is
inoperative, for an appeal to
Superior agency authority.
5 USCS 706 establishes the scope of
the review available to the court. It
states:
706. Scope of review
To the extent necessary to
decision and when presented,
the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions
of law, interpret ©
constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the
terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall--
35
(1) compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be:
(A) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to
constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance
of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by
substantial evidence in a case
subject to sections 556 and 557
of this title [5 USCS 556 and
557] or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted py the
facts to the extent that the
facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
It is also possible, under the
provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act,
the action of the agency or, in this
for the Court to suspend
the effectiveness of the consent
decree, while a full review is held.
USCS 705 provides:
36
705. Relief pending review
When an agency finds that
justice so requires, it may
postpone the effective date of
action taken by it, pending
judicial review. On such
conditions as may be required
and to the extent necessary to
prevent irreparable injury, the
reviewing court, including the
court to which a case may be
taken on appeal from or on
application for certiorari or
other writ to a reviewing
court, may issue all necessary
and appropriate process to
postpone the effective date of
an agency action or to preserve
Status or rights pending
conclusion of the review
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff, as a citizen and
taxpayer of East Baton Rouge Parish,
which has been subjected to EPA orders
whicn will cost the City/Parish some two
hundred forty million dollars to execute,
seeks nothing further than the
opportunity to present his case, ina
28
public hearing, to the Environmental
Protection Agency or to a hearing before
a Federal District Court. At such a
nearing, he believes that he can present
evidence which strongly supports his
contention that the massive expenditures
ordered by the EPA are unnecessary and
that the goals of the Clean Water Act can
be better accomplished by other means.
Certainly the government-of the
City/Parish would be the ideal party to
assert these claims, but, for whatever
reason, it has failed to do so.
Therefore, the petitioner, as a taxpayer
and ratepayer and representative of other
taxpayers and ratepayers of the
City/Parish feels that he should be
entitled to do so since he is one of
those who will ultimately bear the burden
-of paying the cost of the EPA ordered
constructicn and also is one of those who
has a vested interest in seeing that the
goals of the Clean Water Act are
38
fulrilled.
The plaintirt feels that he
lis entitled to do so under the
provisions,
cited above, of the Clean
Water Act and the Administrative
Procedure Act and that the Lower Court's
decision regarding the questions of
standing and jurisdiction should be
reversed.
Therefore, for the reasons
Shown in this petition, the Court is
urged to grant the Writ prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
ROGERS & CONNELLY
JACK N. ROGERS
MICHAEL R. CONNELLY
604 St. Ferdinand Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70802-6187
Telephone: (504) 344-4369
Attorneys for Petitioner
ar iar nace ors ames
MICHAEL R. CONNELLY
39
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that three copies
of the foregoing Petition for Certiorari
have been served on each party by mailing
same, postage prepaid, to each of the
following: Tara Avery Hingle, Assistant
United States Attorney, 352 Florida
Street, Second Floor, Baton Rouge, LA
70801; Randall J. Cashio, Assistant
Parish Attorney, 301 St. Ferdinand
Street, Baton Rouge, LA 70802; Angus E.
Crane, Attorney, Appellate Section, Land
& Natural Resources Division, P. O. Box
23795, Washington, D. C. 20026; and
William C. Bryson, Acting Solicitor
General, c/o Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530, on this [1
day of April 1989.
ee R (pee En
MICHAEL R. CONNELLY
40
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO. 88-3415
Summary Calendar
RAPHAEL G. KAZMANN, P. E., Individually
and on behalf of all other individuals
similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant
VErsus
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees
Appeal from the
United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(CA-87-1016-A)
(December 16, 1988)
Before POLITZ, KING, and SMITH,
Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:
*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The
publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide
particular cases on the basis of
well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and
burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the court has
determined that this opinion should not
be published.
41
This lawsuit is Raphael G.
Kazmann's second attempt to prevent the
Environmental Protection Agency from
requiring that the authorities of the
City of Baton Rouge, Louisiana and of
East Baton Rouge Parish comply with the
provisions of the Clean Water Act, as it
relates to secondary sewerage treatment.
The first suit was dismissed for lack of
standing and jurisdiction on September
17, 1987, Kazmann v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 669 F
Supp 144 (M.D.La. 1987), and no appeal
was taken.
Kazmann filed the instant action
shortly after dismissal of the first
suit. The present pleadings are
essentially the same except for the
substitution of statutory references to
the Administrative Procedure Act in
place of the earlier references to the
Clean Water Act. Finding that the prior
42
Eee |
judgment constituted a direct estoppel,
the district court dismissed the present
Suit. Kazmann appeals.
For the reasons stated in the
dismissal of the first suit, and those
set forth by the district court in its
Ruling on Motion to Dismiss the present
Suit entered on May 5, 1988, we AFFIRM.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MINUTE ENTRY:
SEPTEMBER 8, 1987
PARKER, C. J.
RAPHAEL G. KAZMANN, P.E.,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL
OTHER INDIVIDUALS SIMILARLY SITUATED
VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-210-A
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, THROUGH ITS ADMINISTRATOR,
LEE A. THOMAS, AND
THE CITY PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
s- 2°22 22
In this proceeding, a frustrated
citizen seeks to ultimately halt what he
considers to be unnecessary sewerage
treatment for discharge of sewage into
the Mississippi River and thus terminate
what he considers will then become an
unnecessary sewer user fee or tax. He
further seeks to represent a class of
taxpayers and persons who operate
businesses in East Baton Rouge Parish,
Louisiana, and who pay the sewer user
fee imposed by the local government.
44
Made defendants are the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency and
the "City-Parish of East Baton Rouge. "1
The EPA has moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
The City of Baton Rouge and the
Parish of East Baton Rouge hold permits
from the EPA for the discharge of sewage
into the river. Acting under the
authority of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. Section 1251 et
seq. ("The Clean Water ‘“Act"), the EPA
has ordered the City and the Parish to
utilize what is known as secondary
treatment for all sewage which is
IThere is no such entity as the
"City-Parish of East Baton Rouge." In
1949, the Plan of Government for the
Parish of East Baton Rouge and the City
Of Baton Rouge became effective. That
Plan consolidated some functions of
local government but the City and the
Parish continue as separate units of
local government. See Plan of
Government Sections 1.02, 1.03.
45
discharged into the River. Plaintiff
claims that he and other taxpayers will
bear the cost of providing such
treatment facilities and that the EPA
requirements will "impose and onerous
and unnecessary financial burden" upon
the local folks. More specifically,
plaintiff alleges that use of secondary
treatment "will have no appreciable
effect on the water quality of the
Mississippi River." Plaintiff further
claims that under the Clean Water Act,
the City and the Parish are entitled to
an administrative hearing at which he
and the local governmental bodies may
demonstrate that the EPA requirements
are unnecessary and unwarranted.
Finally, he seeks injunctive reiief
pending the holding of such an
administrative hearing.
Federal district courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction, hence that is
46
always the first inquiry. The only
basis for federal jurisdiction alleged
in this complaint are 28 U.S.C. Section
134, The Tucker Act, and 33 U.S.C.
Section 1365, the "citizen suit"
provisions of the Clean Water Act.
Since this action makes no money
demand against the United States, it is
Obvious that the Tucker Act does not
provide a jurisdictional basis for it.
The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Section
1365 provides:
Except as provided in
subsection (b) of this
section, any citizen may
commence a civil action on his
own behalf--2
2 The legislative history of the Clean
Water Act clearly indicates that the
Congress did not intend to authorize
class actions. Instead, only suits by
any citizen or citizens acting on their
own behalf are authorized. 1972 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News, 3746. See
City of Evansville, Ind. v. Kentucky
Liquid Recycling Co., 604 F. 2d 1008
(7th Cir. 1979)
47
(1) against any person
(including (i) the United
States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality
or agency to the extent
permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution)
who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent
standard or limitation under
this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator of
a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, or
(2) against the
Administrator where there is
alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any
act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary
with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have
jurisdiction, without regard
to the amount in controversy
or the citizenship of the
parties, to enforce such an
effluent standard or
limitation, or such an order,
or to order the Administrator
to perform such act or duty,
as the case may be, and to
apply any appropriate civil
penalties under section
1319(d) of this title.
Since no allegation is made in this
complaint that any defendant is in
violation of an effluent standard or
limitation or of an order with respect
thereto, it is clear that plaintiff's
48
jurisdictional basis must be subsection
(2). Plaintiff argues that the
administrator has a non-discretionary
duty to afford an administrative hearing
to the City and the Parish.
The EPA argues that plaintiff lacks
standing to bring this action and hence
that the court lacks jurisdiction to
hear it. Plaintiff essentially relies
upon his claim of economic injury due to
burdensome and unnecessary increases in
taxes or user rates.
One's status as a taxpayer does not
confer standing to invoke the judicial
power of the United States except in the
most narrow of circumstances, none of
which are present here. See, e.g.,
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678
(1974). More importantly, however, the
tax or utility rate which plaintiff here
seeks to use to acquire taxpayer status,
49
is not one levied or imposed by the EPA.
As the complaint clearly shows, the
sewer user fee is a local tax levied by
the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of
East Baton Rouge. The EPA has no power
to impose such a tax or to repeal it.
As the government points out in its
brief, the legislative history of the
Clean Air Act makes it plain that the
Congress defined "citizen" as the term
was used in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 32 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.8as26 636
(1972). See S.Conf. Rept. No. 1236, 92d
Congress 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972
Code Cong. & Admin. News, 3823. To
bring such an action, the citizen must
seek to vindicate his own rights, not
those of a third party. Here, plaintiff
seeks to assert rights which he claims
are due the local governing bodies,
implying that the local public officials
who should do so have somehow abdicated
50
their own duty to demand such an
administrative hearing, in court if
necessary. This amounts to a sort of
citizen-taxpayer derivative suit brought
to assert rights which the elected
leaders of the community have failed to
assert. Plaintiff has cited no
authority which authorizes the bringing
of such an action and this court has
found none.
Analysis of the wikaatian shows
Clearly that plaintiff lacks standing.
The Clean Air Act confers jurisdiction
upon this court to entertain citizens'
actions brought (1) against violators
and (2) for non-performance of
non-discretionary duties, against the
Administrator. No other jurisdiction is
conferred. Since there is no claim that
the city and the parish are violators,
this court is without subject matter
jurisdiction to hear any claim by this
51
plaintiff against those defendants.
When the city and the parish are removed
from the suit (as they would be), it
becomes clear that plaintiff is
attempting to assert the rights of
others. Neither the city nor the parish
has demanded the administrative hearing
which plaintiff seeks for them. Should
this court answer the only question
presented by the complaint-- Does the
Administrator have a non-discretionary
duty to grant an administrative hearing
to the city and the parish? -- then the
court would truly render an advisory
Opinion which is prohibited by Article
III of the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff may be entirely correct
in his claim that the EPA is mandating
superfluous treatment standards and that
the local governing bodies are entitled
to an administrative heavine before they
can be required to provide that
52
treatment. But the local elected
officials whose duty it is to make the
decision to demand or not to demand such
a hearing, have apparently decided to
forego it. That is their decision to
make. No authority has been presented
to this court for the proposition that a
citizen-taxpayer who disagrees with such
a decision may supercede the local
elected officials and exercise the
rights of the local government on their
behalf. Clearly, everyone recognizes
that citizen-taxpayers may be effected
in significant ways by decisions of
their elected officials, but
disagreement with their decisions must
be registered at the ballot box, not the
courthouse.
The court is convinced, after the
most careful study and consideration,
that plaintiff lacks standing to being
this action and that consequently this
WW
5
court has no jurisdiction to hear it.
The motion dismiss for failure to state
a claim is hereby GRANTED and this
action will be dismissed.
Uy
>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RAPHAEL G. KAZMANN, P.E., ET AL.
VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1016-A
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
ET AL.
RULINC ON MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the court on
EPA's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, res
judicata and failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff has filed an opposition.
There is no need for oral argument.
The salient issue presented by the
motion to dismiss is whether this suit
is barred under res judicata principles.
This lawsuit is plaintiff's second
attempt to thwart EPA's actions in
forcing the City of Baton Rouge and the
Parish of East Baton Rouge to comply
55
with the provisions of the Clean Water
Act concerning secondary sewerage
treatment. Plaintiff's first attempt to
enjoin EPA's actions was made in Raphael
Kazmann, P.E. v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,
CA No. 87-210-A (of this court's
docket). That action was dismissed by
the court for lack of standing and
jurisdiction. See reported decision at
669 F.Supp. 144 (M.D.La. 1987). A
judgment of dismissal was entered on
September 17, 1987, which is now final
as plaintiff failed to appeal.
On November 20, 1987, plaintiff
instituted this action against the same
defendants asserting the same wrong
doing by epa.! In this case, however,
plaintiff has substituted the statutory
references to the Clean Water Act in his
complaint with references to the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
56
EE LLlLlLlLlLl ee
Section 702, et seq. Plaintiff argues
that by asserting the Administrative
Procedure Act in this lawsuit, he has
presented a new cause of action
precluding the application of res
judicata. The court cannot agree;
clearly the issue of standing was
litigated in the first action. Any
question as to the correctness of that
decision should have been raised by a
motion for post judgment relief or an
appeal.
Although a judgment of dismissal
predicated on standing is not an
'Tn his first suit, plaintiff sought to
enjoin EPA enforcing the provisions of
the Clean Water Act relating to
secondary treatment to and prohibit the
defendants from entering into a consent
decree until an administrative hearing
had been held by EPA. In this suit,
plaintiff essentially seeks to prohibit
the same conduct. Plaintiff erroneously
claims that a consent decree was entered
in late September of 1987. Clearly,
these allegations are incorrect as the
court has pending before it an
application for approval of a proposed
consent decree in CA No. 88-191-A.
57
adjudication on the merits, such a
judgment precludes further litigation on
those matters actually adjudged.
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauzites, 465 U.S. 694,
102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104, n.9, 72 L.Ed. 492
(1982); Mann v. Sabella, No. 86-3336
(5th Cir. February 11, i988). See
Moore's Federal Practice, Paragraph
0.405[5]. Since the issues are
substantially identical, the prior
judgment constitutes a direct estoppel. ?
Consequently, plaintiff is precluded
from relitigating the same issues
herein.
—.
2In the prior suit, the court did not
limit plaintiff to the jurisdictional
allegations of his complaint. The
effect of the Administrative Procedure
Act was raised and argued therein,
although not expressly noted in the
court's written reasons.
58
Acccrdingly, defendant's motion to
dismiss is hereby GRANTED and this
action will be dismissed.
JOHN V. PARKER, CHIEF JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
a9
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.