Petitioners Reply Brief — Kazmann v. Environmental Protection Agency

Supreme Court brief1989

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° | Siereme Sourt, U8,

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| MAR 45.4989

' JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

NO. ; CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1989

RAPHAEL G. KAZMANN, P. E.

PETITIONER

VERSUS

THE UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

JACK N. ROGERS

MICHAEL R. CONNELLY

ROGERS & CONNELLY

604 St. Ferdinand

Baton Rouge, LA

70802-6187

(504) 344-4369

Counsel for

Petitioner

rene

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Petitioner, as a citizen

acting in his capacity as a ratepayer

and/or taxpayer of a municipality, has

standing under the provisions of 33 USC

1365 and/or 5 USC 702 et seq. to sue the

Environmental Protection Agency in order

to set aside orders of the EPA imposed

on said municipality.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions Below... ccscsvccecsscensiveene 1

JurisG@iction. «ss ss és6es4e esa eee 2

Constitutional Provisions

Involved... <sésssss040500 58a ee e

Statement of the CaSe€..... ccc ccccccces 5

Reasons for the Writ. ...cccssestssecus 11

Conclusion. 26k 0s<sssa ws aus oe cee eee 37

ApPeNGiX. wececeoccenucctetueens wee Ee 41

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Appalachian Power Company vs. Train

Joys a Se | a. i eS 32

Association of Data Processing

Service Organizations vs. Camp

(US S Ct 1970) 397 US 150,

eo ue mo 20 164, 90 S Ct 827...18,19

Atlantic City Municipal Utilities

Authority vs. Regional Administrator

(US Dist Ct D NJ 1985)

Set 2 Sa a a 18

Cre international, Inc., et al.

wea eeean tisr> CA 86) 5235 F 2d 1032...32

Hill vs. Tennessee Valley Authority

fewre Gm 6) S49 F 24 1064........ 18

International Federation of

Professional and Technical

Engineers vs. Williams

(1974 E D VA) 389 F Supp 287

Aff'd w/o opinion (CA 4 VA)

oe eck ce eee eerees 28

Loveladies Property Owners'

Association, Inc. vs. Raab

(US Dist Ct D NJ 1975)

Ce ES 18

Marathon Oil vs. Environmental

Protection Agency (1972 CA 9)

ee wee wenn nen 32

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers'

Association vs. State Farm

Mutual Insurance Co.

(US S Ct 1983) 463 US 29,

77 me Be 20 $43, 103 S Ct 2856:...32

National Association of Metal

Finishers vs. EPA (CA 3 1983)

(oi 2 Bis eer reer err eer 34

Public Citizen vs. Lockheed Aircraft

Corporation (1977) 184 App DC 133,

ae wr ee PO ge ee OR eS 30

Sierra Club vs. Hickel (1970 CA 9 Cal)

433 F 26 28 ALL’ a 405 US feta cas 30

U. S. CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES:

Article 3, Se@ctsaon 2 til seaweeds 3,19

Fourteenth Amendment.........-.---- 4

STATUTES:

5 uscS 702 (Administrative

PrOCeagure ACL) <i ccc save cvadas § 40 (240587

28,29, 30

S UBCS 704.6 seen c kaka ces bse dieeeaeee ee 34

S (GCS. 76S os beak bs te eS RR 36

S GCE TOG kk sce dc eh eas RRS ee Ee 35

2B. TECH 15GB a ec bas so cea toeacan 5, 40,217.48

D2 BCE 12S 2 ot elic w cae n dante eee ues 6,20 532

33° GRACE iG) vnc ccs 0 ct ek eee een eeeee ean a3

33 USCS 1365 Section (a) (2)..... 15,19, 24

27,29

Legislative History, Water

Pollution Control, P.L. 92-500

(p. 3738, 3744, 3747) ..cseees 16, 17

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORART

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

The petitioner, Raphael G. KFazmann,

P. E., prays that a Writ of Certiorari

be issued to review the decision of the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit entered in this proceeding

on December 16, 1988.

CITATION TO OPINIONS BELOW

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United States Environmental Protection

N y T and nen ~

igency, Through Its Administrator,

n 1 he 5 <7 D -x aot -~ + T ~ +

A. Thomas, and the City/Parish f Eas

Baton Rouge, and a Ruling on Motion t

Dismiss was rendered on May , 1988, ily!

as above.

By opinion rendered December 16,

1988, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower

' : - : eee a =|

Court’s decision in an unpublished

opinion in Case No. 88-3415.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 2, Clause 1.

WJ

~

Article

subjects of jurisdiction.

The judicial Power shall extend to

Cases, in Law and Equity, arising

under this Constitution, the Laws of the

and Treaties made, or

which shall be made, under their

Authority, --to all Cases affecting

Ambassadors, other public Ministers and

Consul --to all Cases of admiralty and

oP)

=e

maritime Jurisdiction; --to

Controversies to which the Untied States

Shall be a Party; --to Controversies

between two or more States; --between a

ct

0)

ct

mM

\U

State and Citizens of another S

--between citizens of different States;

--between citizens of the same State

claiming Lands under Grants of different

States, and between a State, or the

Citizens thereof, and foreign States,

Citizens or Subjects.

2

—

AMENDMENT 14, Section 1. Citizens of

the United States.

All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of

the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of

the citizens of the United States; nor

shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

SUMMARY:

Suit was originally filed by

Raphael G. Kazmann, P. E., individually

and on behalf ot all other individuals

Similarly situated against the United

States Environmental Protection Agency

through its Administrator, Lee A. Thomas,

and the City/Parish of East Baton Rouge.

Plaintiffs sought relief under the

provisions of 28 USC 1346 and 5 USC

Section 702, et seq., to prohibit the

Environmental Protection Agency and the

City/Parish Government of East Baton

Rouge from entering into a consent decree

which would order the expenditure of more

than Two Hundred Forty Million Dollars by

the City/Parish Government to construct

secondary sewage treatment for East Baton

Rouge Parish. Plaintiffs contend that

such secondary sewage treatment is

—e—oO—C—O

unnecessary and would not fulfill the

requirements of the Clean Water Act (now

the Water Quality Act of 1987) and that,

prior to a consent decree being entered

into or an order being issued by the EPA,

there should have been public hearings

held by the EPA at which evidence could

be presented showing that the

construction was unnecessary.

Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that the

EPA, by failing to hold such public

hearings, violated the Administrative

Procedure Act when it is read in

conjunction with the provisions of 33 USC

1251, et seq. (The Clean Water Act).

Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint on the grounds that

the issues of standing and jurisdiction

had been previously adjudicated ina

prior suit filed by plaintiffs under the

provisions of the Clean Water Act. The

matter was considered on defendants'

Motion to Dismiss before the Honorable

John V. Parker, Chief Judge of the Middle

District of Louisiana, and judgment was

rendered dismissing plaintiffs' complaint

on May 10, 1988.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS:

This case involves a suit by

taxpayers and citizens of East Baton

Rouge Parish seeking injunctive relief

against the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (hereinafter referred

to as the EPA) and the City of Baton

Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge

(hereinafter referred to as the

City/Parish).

In November 1982, the City/Parish

and the EPA entered into a Consent

Decree. Paragraph 4 of the Decree sets

forth its objectives and reads as

follows:

"All plans, studies,

monitoring, remedial, and

maintenance programs described

in this Consent Decree or

resulting from the acitivities

reguired by this Decree shall

have as their objective causing

the Central Treatment Plant

owned and operated by Baton

Rouge, to come into and remain

in compliance with National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System (NPDES) Permit Number

LA00 36421."

It has deen the contention of the

EPA that the City/Parish had failed to

comply with the requirements of the

Consent Decree, therefore the EPA was

threatening to fine the City/Parish and

seeking a new Consent Decree. The

City/Parish at several times requested

administrative hearings in order to nave

a variance considered, but such hearings

had been denied by the EPA. As a result

citizens and taxpayers of East Baton

Rouge Parish and the City of Baton Rouge,

represented by Raphael G. Kazmann, P. E.,

olaintiff herein, filed suit in U. S.

District Court for the Middle District of

Louisiana seeking an injunction to

prohibit the EPA and the City/Parish from

proceeding with a new Consent Decree

until such time as hearings had been

held. At the hearing on their request

for injunctive relief, plaintiffs

intended to offer evidence in support of

the following facts:

1. The City/Parish was, in fact, in

substantial compliance with the Clean

Water Act;

2. The EPA had failed to follow

proper administrative procedures in this

matter;

3. If proper administrative

procedures were followed, it would be

Seen that the EPA reguirements of the

City/Parish did not further the goals of

the Act and are not cost effective and

that they impose an economic hardship on

the Baton Rouge community, without need.

In response to this citizens' suit,

the City and the Parish initially joined

with Raphael Kazmann and adopted the

pleadings filed by him as their own. The

EPA, on the other hand, responded by

filing a Motion to Dismiss the complaint

for failure to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted. Just three days

prior to the Court's hearing on the EPA's

Motion to Dismiss, the City and Parish

decided to change their position and

adopted the EPA's Motion to Dismiss.

Ultimately, the District Court

ruled that plaintiff was without standing

to assert rights on behalf of the City

and Parish which they had chosen not to

assert on their own behalf. Other than

appeal from that decision, plaintiff

sought relief under the provisions of 28

USC 1346 and 5 USC Section 702 et seq. in

a new suit filed in U. S. District Court.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was granted

in that matter on May 5, 1988, on the

basis that the issues of standing and

jurisdiction had been previously

adjudicated in the prior suit. That

decision was timely appealed to the

10

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth

Circuit, which rendered a decision on

December 16, 1988, affirming the actions

of the Lower Court and dismissing

plaintiff's appeal.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRITS

Plaintiff is one of a group of

citizens and taxpayers in an economically

depressed community which has-been

ordered by the EPA to spend over Two

Hundred Forty Million Dollars on

secondary sewerage treatment which the

EPA claims is necessary to bring the

Parish of East Baton Rouge into

compliance with the Clean Water Act. The

plaintiff, on the other hand, has

accumulated a substantial body of

Sclentific evidence which indicates that

the order issued by the EPA for secondary

treatment is counter-productive and that

it will not meet the goals of the Clean

1l

Water Act, either in cleaning up our

nation's waterways and/or doing it ina

cost-effective manner. Plaintiff has,

from the beginning, sought only the

opportunity to present this evidence at a

public hearing to be held by the EPA

which he believes is necessary before the

order can be issued to the City/Parish

requiring the expenditure of funds on

secondary treatment.

Unfortunately for plaintiff, he has

been thwarted in his attempts to get a

public hearing on this matter by the

Court's ruling that he lacks standing to

force the EPA, through the Federal

Courts, to have such a public hearing.

In its opinion in the case Raphael G.

Kazmann, P. E., Individually and On

Behalf of All Other Individuals Similarly

——

Situated vs. United States Environmental

Protection Agency, through its

Administrator, Lee A. Thomas, and the

City/Parish of East Baton Rouge, Number

87-210-A, the District Court stated the

following:

"Plaintiff may be entirely

correct in his claim that EPA

is mandating superfluous

treatment standards and that

the local governing bodies are

entitled to an administrative

hearing before they can be

required to provide that

treatment. But the local

elected officials whose duty it

is to make the decision to

demand or not to demand such a

hearing, have apparently

decided to forego it. That is

their decision to make."

It is piaintiff's contention that

it is, in fact, not entirely the decision

of the local governing body to make. It

is plaintiff and the other taxpayers and

rate-payers of the City of Baton Rouge

and the Parish of East Baton Rouge who

will bear the burden of paying for the

secondary sewerage treatment ordered by

the EPA and of paying any fines imposed

by the EPA on local governments for

failure to comply with EPA requirements.

It is also the citizens, taxpayers and

rate-payers who will bear the burden of

any economic dislocation resulting from

the expenditure of these funds and also

the loss of any other municipal services

which could have been provided by funds

which are diverted to fulfill the

requirements of the EPA.

he

THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE

WHAT CONSTITUTES STANDING

UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF

THE CLEAN WATER ACT

In the first action filed by

plaintiff in this matter, Civil Action

No. 87-0210, entitled "Raphael Kazmann,

P. E., et al. vs. United States

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,"

plaintiff was originally joined in the

Suit by the government of the City of

Baton Rouge and the Parish of East Baton

Rouge, which clearly gave them standing

to litigate the issues which they

oresented. However, shortly before the

14

hearing on defendant EPA's Motion to

Dismiss, the City/Parish switched sides

and joined with the EPA in asking that

plaintitf's Motion be dismissed. As a

result, the District Court found that

there was no standing on behalf of

plaintiff and, therefore, that the Court

had no jurisdiction to hear the

complaint. In that original complaint,

however, plaintiff had relied exclusively

on jurisdiction under the provisions of

33 USC 1365, which is the citizens' suit

provision of the Clean Water Act. The

EPA had argued to the Court that the

legislative history of the Clean Water

Act indicated that the intent was to

limit citizens' suits under 33 USC 1365

to citizens who had suffered some injury

personal to them. Plaintiff argued that

this was not the case and, in fact, cited

portions of the legislative history to

Support his claim:

15

"An essential element in any

control program involving the

nation's waters is public

participation. The public must

have a genuine opportunity to

Speak on the issue of

protection of its waters. The

Committee has therefore

established requirements to

orovide opportunity for public

hearings by the Federal

government, or if State

participation is approved by

the Administrator, the State,

and other provisions to make

available to the public all

relevant information

surrounding a discharge source

placed on it. This includes

the deposit of any permit, and

the conditions thereto, ina

place of ready public access.

The scrutiny of the public and

the exercise of authority under

this section is extremely

important in insuring

expeditious implementation of

the authority and a high level

of performance by all levels of

government and discharge

sources." (Emphasis added)

Legislative History, Water

Pollution Control, P. L. 92-

500 (p. 3738).

"Section 505 -- Citizen Suits:

Anyone may initiate a civil

suit against any person who is

alleged to be in violation of

an effluent limitation or a

Federal or State abatement

order, or against the

administrator for failure to

perform a non-discretionary

16

Guty." Legislative History,

water Pollution Control, P. L.

92-500 (p. 3744).

"As pointed out, the Committee

bill would provide in the

citizen suit provision that

actions will lie against the

administrator for failure (to)

exercise his duties under the

Act, including his enforcement

duties..." Legislative History,

Water Pollution Control, P. L.

92-500 (p. 3747).

"In addition to violations of

Section 301l(a) citizens are

granted authority to bring

enforcement actions for

violations of schedules or

timetables of compliance and

effluent limitations under

Section 301, standards of

performance under Section 306,

prohibitions or effluent

Standards under Section 307,

provisions of certification

under Section 401, and any

under Section 402. (Emphasis

added) Legislative History,

Water Pollution Control, P. L.

92-500 (p. 3744).

Plaintiff contended that the

reading of the Legislative History showed

that the citizens' suit provisions of the

Act were much broader than the

interpretation offered by the counsel for

17

the EPA. In Loveladies Property Owners

Association, Inc. vs. Raab, (U. S. Dist

Ct D New Jersey 1975) 430 F Supp 276, the

Court found that a property owners

association had standing under the

provisions of 33 USC 1365 since they

alleged “injury-in-fact." Included in

the alleged injuries were aesthetic and

recreational benefits as well as an

economic interest. Raphael Kazmann has

made specific allegations in his

complaint of his and other taxpayers'

economic interests. See also Association

of Data Processing Service Organizations

vs. Camp (U. S. Sup Ct 1970) 397 US 150,

25 L Ed 2d 184, 90 S Ct 827 and Atlantic

City Municipal Utilities Authority vs.

Regional Administrator (U. S. Dist Ct D

New Jersey 1985) 616 F Supp 722.

It is also important to notice

that, in the case of Hill vs. Tennessee

Valley Authority (1977 C A 6) 549 F 2d

1064, the Court granted standing to

18

environmentalists to protect the

interests of the "snail darter" under

provisions of 16 USC 1540, the citizen

Suit provisions of the Endangered Species

Act. The language of Section (g)l(c) of

that provision is almost identical in

content to Section (a)2 of 33 USC 1365.

Plaintif€ contends that his claim

for standing in this matter clearly falls

within the applicable tests provided in

Association of Data Processing Service

Organizations, Inc. vs. William B. Camp,

Supra. There, the Court ruled that the

question of standing to sue in the

Federal Courts is to be considered in the

Framework of Article 3 of the U. S.

Constitution, and plaintiff specifically

refers to Section 2, Clause 1 of Article

3. Further, the Court required of

plaintiffs that they show that there was

an injury in fact to them and that the

interests sought to be protected by a

19

plaintiff is arguably within the zone of

interests protected or regulated by a

U.S. Statute or Constitutional guarantee.

Plaintiff contends that the economic

well-being of his community and himself,

as well as the issue regarding the

promotion of and meeting of the goals of

the-Clean Water Act all fall within the

categories cited above.

The economic consequences have

already been cited in this petition, but

the question in regard to meeting the

goals of the Clean Water Act needs to be

discussed further. Specifically,

plaintiff refers to the legislative goals

and intent of the Clean Water Act which

are stated in 33 USC 1251, which reads,

in pertinent part:

"(a) The objective of this Act

is to restore and maintain the

chemical, physical, and

biological integrity of the

Nation's waters. In order to

achieve this objective, it is

hereby declared that:

Consistent with the provisions

Of this Act ==

20

(1) It is the national

goal that the discharge of

pollutants into the

navigable waters be

eliminated by 1985;

(2) It is the national

goal that, wherever

attainable, an interim

goal of water quality

which provides for the

protection and propagation

of fish, shellfish and

wildlife and provides for

recreation in wildlife and

on the water be achieved

py July l, 1983;

(3) It is the national

policy that the discharge

of toxic pollutants in

toxic amounts be

prohibited;

(4) It is the national

policy that Federal

Financial assistance be

provided to construct

publicly owned waste

treatment works;

(5) It is the national

policy that area wide

waste treatment management

planning processes be

developed and implemented

to assure adequate control

of sources of pollutants

in each State; and

(6) It is the national

policy that a major

research and development

effort be made to develop

21

technology necessary to

eliminate the discharge of

pollutants into the

navigable waters, waters

of the contiguous zone,

and the oceans.

(b) It is the policy of the

Congress to recognize, preserve

and protect the primary

responsibilities and rights of

States and to prevent, reduce

and eliminate pollution, to

plan the development and use

(including restoration,

reservation and enhancement) of

land and water resources, and

to consult with the

administrator in the exercise

of authority under this Act.

It is the policy of Congress

that the States manage the

construction grant program

under the Act and implement the

permit programs under Sections

402 and 404 of this Act (33 USC

1342, 1344). It is further the

policy of the Congress to

Support and aid research

relating to the prevention,

reduction and elimination of

pollution, and to provide

Federal technical services and

financial aid to State and

interstate agencies and

municipalities in connection

with the prevention, reduction

and elimination of pollution."

In the section of the Act dealing

with “Grants for Construction of

Treatment Works" which is directly

22

applicable to the situation in East Baton

Rouge Parish, the Congress elaborated

further on its purposes. The pertinent

parts of 33 USCS 1281 read as follows:

"(a) It is the purpose of

this title to require and to

assist the development and

implementation of waste

treatment management plans and

practices which will achieve

the goals of this Act.

(b) Waste treatment management

plans and practices shall

provide for the application of

the pest practicable waste

treatment technology before any

discharge into receiving

waters, including reclaiming

and recycling of water, and

confined disposal of pollutants

so they will not migrate to

cause water or other

environmental pollution and

shall provide for consideration

of advanced waste treatment

techniques.

(c) To the extent practicable,

waste treatment management

Shall be on an areawide basis

and provide control or

treatment of all point and

nonpoint sources of pollution,

including in place or

accumulated pollution sources."

(emphasis added)

23

In order to meet the intent and

goals of Congress, the Administrator of

the Environmental Protection Agency

(hereinafter referred to as the

"Administrator") is empowered to take

certain actions and to compel others,

including municipalities and private

industries, to take certain actions.

Among other things, the Administrator is

entitled to set effluent limitations and

compel municipalities to comply with

them. However, the power of the EPA is

not unlimited.

Plaintiff therefore contends that

the citizens' suit provisions of the

Clean Water Act, 33 USC 1365, allow a

citizen to bring a suit against the

Administrator for failure to perform a

non-discretionary duty even when the

allegations of the citizen are to the

effect that the Administrator is failing

to meet the goals of the Act by ordering

unnecessary expenditures on a non-cost-

24

EE

effective basis. Plaintiff further

contends that failure to provide standing

to citizens in such circumstances,

particularly when standing has been

denied by a political ploy such as that

used by the City/Parish of Baton Rouge in

Switching sides shortly before the

hearing on this matter, amounts to a

violation of equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S.

Constitution. Specifically, in this

case, the violation consisted of the City

acting under color of State law, lulling

the plaintiff into a false sense of

security by joining with them in

litigation and then abandoning them

Shortly before a hearing was to be held,

but too late for plaintiff to take any

other action, thereby leaving its

citizens in an untenable position of

facing a standing question which

heretofore would not have existed.

25

ee

THE SECOND SUIT FILED BY

PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED STANDING

UNDER DIFFERENT LEGAL GROUNDS

Plaintiff contends that the

District Court and the Court of Appeals

erred manifestly in their decision tnat

olaintiff had not asserted a new cause of

action by making its second complaint

under the provisions of the

Administrative Procedures Act, 5 USC

Section 702, et seq., and that the issue

of standing had already been decided in

previous litigation.

Plaintiff asserts that, although

the same parties were involved and the

Same substantive issues regarding the

actions of the EPA were alleged in the

second litigation, the grounds for

standing and jurisdiction of the Court

were entirely different and, therefore,

raised new issues and a new cause of

action which should have been decided by

2€

the District Court on the basis of the

merits of the new complaint and not on

the previously decided case involving

only one section of the Clean Water Act.

Plaintiff contends that in the case

presently before this Court, the grounds

for jurisdiction are based on 28 USCS

1346, 33 U.S.C. Section 1365(A)(2) by

implication and 5 USCS 702. 5 USCS 702

provides for judicial review under the

Administrative Procedure Act and was not

—_

argued in Kazmann I. 5 USCS 702 sta

eT

o))

the following:

"A person suffering legal wrong

because of agency action, or

adversely affected or aggrieved

Dy agency action withing the

meaning of a relevant statute,

1s entitled to judicial review

thereof. An action in a court

of the United States seeking

relief other than money damages

and stating a claim that an

agency or an officer or

employee thereof acted or

failed to act in an official

official capacity or under

color of legal authority shall

not be dismissed nor relief

therein be denied on the ground

that 1t is against the United

States or that the United

ae

States is an indispensable

party. The United States may

be named as a defendant in any

Such action, and a judgment or

decree may be entered against

the United States: PROVIDED,

That any mandatory or

injunctive decree shall specify

the Federal officer or officers

(py name or by title), and

their successors in office,

personally responsible for

compliance. Nothing herein (1)

affects other limitations on

judicial review or the power or

duty of the court to dismiss

any action or deny relief on

any other appropriate legal or

equitable ground; or (2)

confers authority to grant

relief if any other statute

that grants consent to suit

expressly or implicitly forbids

the relief which is sought."

5 uScS 702 is not in and of itself

a mechanism to establish jurisdiction in

the District Court wnich would not

}

otherwise be in its competence.

ED VA) 389 F Supp 287, Aff'd without

opinion (CA 4 VA) 510 F 2d 966. However,

when coupled with a valid jurisdictional

)

statute such as 28 USCS 1346 and/or 33

HK

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Rouge Parish who will be required to bear

the financial burden of paying for the

new sewage treatment plants and

associated construction as required by

the EPA and the Clean Water Act, and, as

of a recent tax election, they are no

user fee but

ry

longer just paying a sewe

increased sales taxes to support tne

construction requirements imposed by the

EPA.

Surely it is the Federal District

Court's duty to ensure that the EPA is

complying with the goals and policies of

the legislation when a complaint is filed

asking for judicial review of an

rn

rn

administrative procedure. The plainti

ct

and the general citizenry would benefi

from the Court's intervention in

reviewing legislation that creates an

onerous and unnecessary financial burden

on the taxpayers.

Further, the EPA has violated the

legislative goals and the intent of the

31

Clean Water Act as stated oy 33 USCS

1251. In Appalachian Power Company vs.

Train, (1976 CA 4) 545 F 2d 1351, the

Court held that:

"Nevertheless, EPA is under a

statutory duty to determine

whether, in fact, its

regulations for 1983 will

'result in reasonable further

progress toward the national

goal of eliminating the

discharge of all pollutants..'"

It is also within the jurisdiction

of the Federal Courts to review agency

action to determine if it is correct both

from the substantive and procedural

standpoints. See CPC International,

Inc., @t al. vs: Train, 1975; CA 8), 515

F 2d 1032 and Marathon Oil vs.

Environmental Protection Agency, (1972;

CA 9) 564 F 2d 1253.

In inquiring into the substance of

the EPA action, the inquiry is limited

but can be made by the Federal Courts.

In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers'

Association of the United States, Inc.

vs. State Farm Mutual Insurance, Co., (US

Sup Ct 1983), 463 US 29, 77 L Ed 2d 443,

103 S Ct 2856, the Court stated:

"...The scope of review under

the ‘arbitrary and capricious'

standard is narrow and a court

is not to substitute its

judgment for that of the

agency. Nevertheless, the

agency must examine the

relevant data and arbitrate a

satisfactory explanation for

its action including a

‘rational connection between

the facts found and the choice

made.' Burlington Truck Lines,

Inc. vs. United States, 371 US

156, 168, 9L Ed 2d 207, 83 S Ct

239 (1962). In reviewing that

explanation, we must ‘consider

whether the decision was based

on a consideration of the

relevant factors and whether

there has been a clear error of

judgment.' Bowman

Transportation, Inc. vs.

Arkansas-Best Freight System,

Inc., Supra at 285, 42 L Ed 2d

447, 95 S Ct 438; Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park vs.

Volpe, supra, at 416, 28 L Ed

2a 136, 91 S Ct 814. Normally

an agency rule would be

arbitrary and capricious if the

agency has relied on factors

which Congress has not intended

it to consider, entirely failed

to consider an important aspect

of the problem, offered an

explanation for its decision

33

that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or

is so implausible that it could

not be escrived to a difference

in view or the product of

agency expertise. The

reviewing Court should not

attempt itself to make up for

such deficiencies; we may not

Supply a reasoned basis for the

agency's action that the agency

itself has not given. SEC vs

Cheney Corp., 332 US 194, 196,

91 L Ed 1995, 67 S Ct 1575

(1947). "We will, however,

uphold a decision of less than

ideal clarity if the agency's

path may reasonably be

discussed.' Bowman

Transportation, Inc. vs

Arkansas-Best Freight System,

Inc., Supra at 286, 42 L Ed 2d

447, 95 S Ct 438. See also

Camp vs. Pitts, 411 US 138,

142-143, 362 Ed 106, 93 S Ct

£24k (i973),.°

See also National Association of

Metal Finishers vs. EPA, (CA 3 1983) 719

PF 2d 624.

Further, the Court is entitled to

review the actions of the EPA ona

Substantive and procedureal basis under

the provision of the Administrative

Procedure Act. 5 USCS 704 states the

following:

34

704. Actions reviewable

Agency action made reviewable

by statute and final agency

action for which there is no

other adequate remedy ina

court are subject to judicial

review. A preliminary,

procedural, or intermediate

agency action or ruling not

directly reviewable is subject

to review on the review of the

final agency action. Except as

otherwise expressly required by

statute, agency action

otherwise final is final for

the purposes of this section

whether or not there has been

presented or determined an

application for a declaratory

order, for any form of

reconsideration, or, unless the

agency otherwise requires by

rule and provides that the

action meanwhile is

inoperative, for an appeal to

Superior agency authority.

5 USCS 706 establishes the scope of

the review available to the court. It

states:

706. Scope of review

To the extent necessary to

decision and when presented,

the reviewing court shall

decide all relevant questions

of law, interpret ©

constitutional and statutory

provisions, and determine the

meaning or applicability of the

terms of an agency action. The

reviewing court shall--

35

(1) compel agency action

unlawfully withheld or

unreasonably delayed; and

(2) hold unlawful and set

aside agency action, findings,

and conclusions found to be:

(A) arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law;

(B) contrary to

constitutional right, power,

privilege, or immunity;

(C) in excess of

statutory jurisdiction,

authority, or limitations, or

short of statutory right;

(D) without observance

of procedure required by law;

(E) unsupported by

substantial evidence in a case

subject to sections 556 and 557

of this title [5 USCS 556 and

557] or otherwise reviewed on

the record of an agency hearing

provided by statute; or

(F) unwarranted py the

facts to the extent that the

facts are subject to trial de

novo by the reviewing court.

It is also possible, under the

provisions of the Administrative

Procedure Act,

the action of the agency or, in this

for the Court to suspend

the effectiveness of the consent

decree, while a full review is held.

USCS 705 provides:

36

705. Relief pending review

When an agency finds that

justice so requires, it may

postpone the effective date of

action taken by it, pending

judicial review. On such

conditions as may be required

and to the extent necessary to

prevent irreparable injury, the

reviewing court, including the

court to which a case may be

taken on appeal from or on

application for certiorari or

other writ to a reviewing

court, may issue all necessary

and appropriate process to

postpone the effective date of

an agency action or to preserve

Status or rights pending

conclusion of the review

proceedings.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff, as a citizen and

taxpayer of East Baton Rouge Parish,

which has been subjected to EPA orders

whicn will cost the City/Parish some two

hundred forty million dollars to execute,

seeks nothing further than the

opportunity to present his case, ina

28

public hearing, to the Environmental

Protection Agency or to a hearing before

a Federal District Court. At such a

nearing, he believes that he can present

evidence which strongly supports his

contention that the massive expenditures

ordered by the EPA are unnecessary and

that the goals of the Clean Water Act can

be better accomplished by other means.

Certainly the government-of the

City/Parish would be the ideal party to

assert these claims, but, for whatever

reason, it has failed to do so.

Therefore, the petitioner, as a taxpayer

and ratepayer and representative of other

taxpayers and ratepayers of the

City/Parish feels that he should be

entitled to do so since he is one of

those who will ultimately bear the burden

-of paying the cost of the EPA ordered

constructicn and also is one of those who

has a vested interest in seeing that the

goals of the Clean Water Act are

38

fulrilled.

The plaintirt feels that he

lis entitled to do so under the

provisions,

cited above, of the Clean

Water Act and the Administrative

Procedure Act and that the Lower Court's

decision regarding the questions of

standing and jurisdiction should be

reversed.

Therefore, for the reasons

Shown in this petition, the Court is

urged to grant the Writ prayed for.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

ROGERS & CONNELLY

JACK N. ROGERS

MICHAEL R. CONNELLY

604 St. Ferdinand Street

Baton Rouge, LA 70802-6187

Telephone: (504) 344-4369

Attorneys for Petitioner

ar iar nace ors ames

MICHAEL R. CONNELLY

39

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that three copies

of the foregoing Petition for Certiorari

have been served on each party by mailing

same, postage prepaid, to each of the

following: Tara Avery Hingle, Assistant

United States Attorney, 352 Florida

Street, Second Floor, Baton Rouge, LA

70801; Randall J. Cashio, Assistant

Parish Attorney, 301 St. Ferdinand

Street, Baton Rouge, LA 70802; Angus E.

Crane, Attorney, Appellate Section, Land

& Natural Resources Division, P. O. Box

23795, Washington, D. C. 20026; and

William C. Bryson, Acting Solicitor

General, c/o Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530, on this [1

day of April 1989.

ee R (pee En

MICHAEL R. CONNELLY

40

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NO. 88-3415

Summary Calendar

RAPHAEL G. KAZMANN, P. E., Individually

and on behalf of all other individuals

similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant

VErsus

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, ETC., ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the

United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

(CA-87-1016-A)

(December 16, 1988)

Before POLITZ, KING, and SMITH,

Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The

publication of opinions that have no

precedential value and merely decide

particular cases on the basis of

well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and

burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that Rule, the court has

determined that this opinion should not

be published.

41

This lawsuit is Raphael G.

Kazmann's second attempt to prevent the

Environmental Protection Agency from

requiring that the authorities of the

City of Baton Rouge, Louisiana and of

East Baton Rouge Parish comply with the

provisions of the Clean Water Act, as it

relates to secondary sewerage treatment.

The first suit was dismissed for lack of

standing and jurisdiction on September

17, 1987, Kazmann v. United States

Environmental Protection Agency, 669 F

Supp 144 (M.D.La. 1987), and no appeal

was taken.

Kazmann filed the instant action

shortly after dismissal of the first

suit. The present pleadings are

essentially the same except for the

substitution of statutory references to

the Administrative Procedure Act in

place of the earlier references to the

Clean Water Act. Finding that the prior

42

Eee |

judgment constituted a direct estoppel,

the district court dismissed the present

Suit. Kazmann appeals.

For the reasons stated in the

dismissal of the first suit, and those

set forth by the district court in its

Ruling on Motion to Dismiss the present

Suit entered on May 5, 1988, we AFFIRM.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MINUTE ENTRY:

SEPTEMBER 8, 1987

PARKER, C. J.

RAPHAEL G. KAZMANN, P.E.,

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL

OTHER INDIVIDUALS SIMILARLY SITUATED

VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-210-A

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, THROUGH ITS ADMINISTRATOR,

LEE A. THOMAS, AND

THE CITY PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE

s- 2°22 22

In this proceeding, a frustrated

citizen seeks to ultimately halt what he

considers to be unnecessary sewerage

treatment for discharge of sewage into

the Mississippi River and thus terminate

what he considers will then become an

unnecessary sewer user fee or tax. He

further seeks to represent a class of

taxpayers and persons who operate

businesses in East Baton Rouge Parish,

Louisiana, and who pay the sewer user

fee imposed by the local government.

44

Made defendants are the Administrator of

the Environmental Protection Agency and

the "City-Parish of East Baton Rouge. "1

The EPA has moved to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.

The City of Baton Rouge and the

Parish of East Baton Rouge hold permits

from the EPA for the discharge of sewage

into the river. Acting under the

authority of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act, 33 U.S.C. Section 1251 et

seq. ("The Clean Water ‘“Act"), the EPA

has ordered the City and the Parish to

utilize what is known as secondary

treatment for all sewage which is

IThere is no such entity as the

"City-Parish of East Baton Rouge." In

1949, the Plan of Government for the

Parish of East Baton Rouge and the City

Of Baton Rouge became effective. That

Plan consolidated some functions of

local government but the City and the

Parish continue as separate units of

local government. See Plan of

Government Sections 1.02, 1.03.

45

discharged into the River. Plaintiff

claims that he and other taxpayers will

bear the cost of providing such

treatment facilities and that the EPA

requirements will "impose and onerous

and unnecessary financial burden" upon

the local folks. More specifically,

plaintiff alleges that use of secondary

treatment "will have no appreciable

effect on the water quality of the

Mississippi River." Plaintiff further

claims that under the Clean Water Act,

the City and the Parish are entitled to

an administrative hearing at which he

and the local governmental bodies may

demonstrate that the EPA requirements

are unnecessary and unwarranted.

Finally, he seeks injunctive reiief

pending the holding of such an

administrative hearing.

Federal district courts are courts

of limited jurisdiction, hence that is

46

always the first inquiry. The only

basis for federal jurisdiction alleged

in this complaint are 28 U.S.C. Section

134, The Tucker Act, and 33 U.S.C.

Section 1365, the "citizen suit"

provisions of the Clean Water Act.

Since this action makes no money

demand against the United States, it is

Obvious that the Tucker Act does not

provide a jurisdictional basis for it.

The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Section

1365 provides:

Except as provided in

subsection (b) of this

section, any citizen may

commence a civil action on his

own behalf--2

2 The legislative history of the Clean

Water Act clearly indicates that the

Congress did not intend to authorize

class actions. Instead, only suits by

any citizen or citizens acting on their

own behalf are authorized. 1972 U.S.

Code Cong. & Admin. News, 3746. See

City of Evansville, Ind. v. Kentucky

Liquid Recycling Co., 604 F. 2d 1008

(7th Cir. 1979)

47

(1) against any person

(including (i) the United

States, and (ii) any other

governmental instrumentality

or agency to the extent

permitted by the eleventh

amendment to the Constitution)

who is alleged to be in

violation of (A) an effluent

standard or limitation under

this chapter or (B) an order

issued by the Administrator of

a State with respect to such a

standard or limitation, or

(2) against the

Administrator where there is

alleged a failure of the

Administrator to perform any

act or duty under this chapter

which is not discretionary

with the Administrator.

The district courts shall have

jurisdiction, without regard

to the amount in controversy

or the citizenship of the

parties, to enforce such an

effluent standard or

limitation, or such an order,

or to order the Administrator

to perform such act or duty,

as the case may be, and to

apply any appropriate civil

penalties under section

1319(d) of this title.

Since no allegation is made in this

complaint that any defendant is in

violation of an effluent standard or

limitation or of an order with respect

thereto, it is clear that plaintiff's

48

jurisdictional basis must be subsection

(2). Plaintiff argues that the

administrator has a non-discretionary

duty to afford an administrative hearing

to the City and the Parish.

The EPA argues that plaintiff lacks

standing to bring this action and hence

that the court lacks jurisdiction to

hear it. Plaintiff essentially relies

upon his claim of economic injury due to

burdensome and unnecessary increases in

taxes or user rates.

One's status as a taxpayer does not

confer standing to invoke the judicial

power of the United States except in the

most narrow of circumstances, none of

which are present here. See, e.g.,

United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.

166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678

(1974). More importantly, however, the

tax or utility rate which plaintiff here

seeks to use to acquire taxpayer status,

49

is not one levied or imposed by the EPA.

As the complaint clearly shows, the

sewer user fee is a local tax levied by

the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of

East Baton Rouge. The EPA has no power

to impose such a tax or to repeal it.

As the government points out in its

brief, the legislative history of the

Clean Air Act makes it plain that the

Congress defined "citizen" as the term

was used in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

U.S. 727, 32 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.8as26 636

(1972). See S.Conf. Rept. No. 1236, 92d

Congress 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972

Code Cong. & Admin. News, 3823. To

bring such an action, the citizen must

seek to vindicate his own rights, not

those of a third party. Here, plaintiff

seeks to assert rights which he claims

are due the local governing bodies,

implying that the local public officials

who should do so have somehow abdicated

50

their own duty to demand such an

administrative hearing, in court if

necessary. This amounts to a sort of

citizen-taxpayer derivative suit brought

to assert rights which the elected

leaders of the community have failed to

assert. Plaintiff has cited no

authority which authorizes the bringing

of such an action and this court has

found none.

Analysis of the wikaatian shows

Clearly that plaintiff lacks standing.

The Clean Air Act confers jurisdiction

upon this court to entertain citizens'

actions brought (1) against violators

and (2) for non-performance of

non-discretionary duties, against the

Administrator. No other jurisdiction is

conferred. Since there is no claim that

the city and the parish are violators,

this court is without subject matter

jurisdiction to hear any claim by this

51

plaintiff against those defendants.

When the city and the parish are removed

from the suit (as they would be), it

becomes clear that plaintiff is

attempting to assert the rights of

others. Neither the city nor the parish

has demanded the administrative hearing

which plaintiff seeks for them. Should

this court answer the only question

presented by the complaint-- Does the

Administrator have a non-discretionary

duty to grant an administrative hearing

to the city and the parish? -- then the

court would truly render an advisory

Opinion which is prohibited by Article

III of the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff may be entirely correct

in his claim that the EPA is mandating

superfluous treatment standards and that

the local governing bodies are entitled

to an administrative heavine before they

can be required to provide that

52

treatment. But the local elected

officials whose duty it is to make the

decision to demand or not to demand such

a hearing, have apparently decided to

forego it. That is their decision to

make. No authority has been presented

to this court for the proposition that a

citizen-taxpayer who disagrees with such

a decision may supercede the local

elected officials and exercise the

rights of the local government on their

behalf. Clearly, everyone recognizes

that citizen-taxpayers may be effected

in significant ways by decisions of

their elected officials, but

disagreement with their decisions must

be registered at the ballot box, not the

courthouse.

The court is convinced, after the

most careful study and consideration,

that plaintiff lacks standing to being

this action and that consequently this

WW

5

court has no jurisdiction to hear it.

The motion dismiss for failure to state

a claim is hereby GRANTED and this

action will be dismissed.

Uy

>

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAPHAEL G. KAZMANN, P.E., ET AL.

VERSUS CIVIL ACTION NO. 87-1016-A

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

ET AL.

RULINC ON MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the court on

EPA's motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, res

judicata and failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff has filed an opposition.

There is no need for oral argument.

The salient issue presented by the

motion to dismiss is whether this suit

is barred under res judicata principles.

This lawsuit is plaintiff's second

attempt to thwart EPA's actions in

forcing the City of Baton Rouge and the

Parish of East Baton Rouge to comply

55

with the provisions of the Clean Water

Act concerning secondary sewerage

treatment. Plaintiff's first attempt to

enjoin EPA's actions was made in Raphael

Kazmann, P.E. v. United States

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,

CA No. 87-210-A (of this court's

docket). That action was dismissed by

the court for lack of standing and

jurisdiction. See reported decision at

669 F.Supp. 144 (M.D.La. 1987). A

judgment of dismissal was entered on

September 17, 1987, which is now final

as plaintiff failed to appeal.

On November 20, 1987, plaintiff

instituted this action against the same

defendants asserting the same wrong

doing by epa.! In this case, however,

plaintiff has substituted the statutory

references to the Clean Water Act in his

complaint with references to the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

56

EE LLlLlLlLlLl ee

Section 702, et seq. Plaintiff argues

that by asserting the Administrative

Procedure Act in this lawsuit, he has

presented a new cause of action

precluding the application of res

judicata. The court cannot agree;

clearly the issue of standing was

litigated in the first action. Any

question as to the correctness of that

decision should have been raised by a

motion for post judgment relief or an

appeal.

Although a judgment of dismissal

predicated on standing is not an

'Tn his first suit, plaintiff sought to

enjoin EPA enforcing the provisions of

the Clean Water Act relating to

secondary treatment to and prohibit the

defendants from entering into a consent

decree until an administrative hearing

had been held by EPA. In this suit,

plaintiff essentially seeks to prohibit

the same conduct. Plaintiff erroneously

claims that a consent decree was entered

in late September of 1987. Clearly,

these allegations are incorrect as the

court has pending before it an

application for approval of a proposed

consent decree in CA No. 88-191-A.

57

adjudication on the merits, such a

judgment precludes further litigation on

those matters actually adjudged.

Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.

Compagnie des Bauzites, 465 U.S. 694,

102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104, n.9, 72 L.Ed. 492

(1982); Mann v. Sabella, No. 86-3336

(5th Cir. February 11, i988). See

Moore's Federal Practice, Paragraph

0.405[5]. Since the issues are

substantially identical, the prior

judgment constitutes a direct estoppel. ?

Consequently, plaintiff is precluded

from relitigating the same issues

herein.

—.

2In the prior suit, the court did not

limit plaintiff to the jurisdictional

allegations of his complaint. The

effect of the Administrative Procedure

Act was raised and argued therein,

although not expressly noted in the

court's written reasons.

58

Acccrdingly, defendant's motion to

dismiss is hereby GRANTED and this

action will be dismissed.

JOHN V. PARKER, CHIEF JUDGE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

a9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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