Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Acosta v. Sullivan
Supreme Court brief1989
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1988
BETSY ACOSTA,
Petitioner,
VS.
DR. LOUIS SULLIVAN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
RAFAEL CARRERAS-VALLE
Attorney for Petitioner
P.O. Box 20399
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico 00928
(809) 767-5665
QUESTIONS PRESINTID
1. Does the Federal Court of Appeals
err when they violate the due process of
law to the petitioner denying her oppor-
tunity to review decision she is entitled
to in the same manner as other Social
Security disability cases?
2. Does the Court below err by
holding that the Secretary's denial of
petitioner's Social Security Disability
Benefits is supported by substantial
evidence?
p74
)
he parties to the proceeding be
were the petitioner, Betsy Acosta, and
respondent, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Dr. Louis Sullivan, represented
by Honorable William C. Bryson, Acting
Solicitor General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. 20530. Pursuant to the
Social Security Act, he is responsible
for the determination of disability under
Title II disability programs, including
the promulgation of standards, determina-
tion of whether a claimant is disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security
Act, as amended.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED ...
LIST OF PARTIES ..ccce
OPINION BELOW ........;
JURISDICTION .wcccccece
es2aiuarm INVOLVED 2.00.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
e*eeeeeese#8?#88f¢ 8 @
#eeeegeeessese
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...
I.(a) Considering only that
the standard of review for sub-
jective allegation of pain in
light of Section 3(a)(
1) of the
Social Security Disability
Benefits—Reform Act of
Public Law No. 98-460,
1984,
dated
October 9, 1984, 98 STAT 1794 ...
II. Does the Court below err
by holding that the Secretary's
denial of petitioner's
Social
Security Disability Benefits is
supported by substantial evidence..
CONCLUSION eeeeeenee*eeseeeseeesee#eensese@*entseeee#eeee
APPENDICES .cccccccves
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SG I
PAGES
10
12
19
1(a)=-35(a)
20
rental ni Betcis Sonica tonsiner osiamriiasctmanig ay saint lining ince ea ee CIS ee Re ek
ee ea SS a ee eae
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGES
Bowen v City of New York, et al,
476 U.S. 467, 478, 106 S.Ct.
20ae, 20eo, 90 L.EA. 2a. 426,
C SORRY ww aa a ss ieee nwo enwes ees eK 12
Calero~Toledo v Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
668-6692, W5, (1974) eeeeeee eee ee @ 12
Caulder v Bowen, 791 F.2d. 1460,
1462,(C.A.11th., 1986) eeeeeeeseeee 10
Consolidated Edison Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 36 U.8.- 107, 229,
59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed.
T2326, CIGOR) cco 6665 66S a VES OO ee ed 13
Mason v Bowen, 791 F.2d. 1460,
1462,(C.A.11, 1986) eeeeveeeveev eee e8e 10
Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S.319,
332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed. 2d.
18, (1976) @eeeeeoe@ee@*ee*es#e?2e#2ctcest5@eeee#2ee#3$ees#s#e# 11
MNorgan v United States, 289 U.S.
468, (1936) *eeeeee#*s#seseeee#se#sesee#*1?ee#ees#288es#e#se?#e#*# 11
Richardson v Perales, 402 U.S.
399,401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427,
fA Lu. Wes 26s GAR CISTY) wes dscees 13
Sherill v Secretary of H.H.S.,
757 F.2d.803, (C.A.6, 1985) eccccces 17
Webb v Weinberger, 371 F.Supp.793,
Piste Ind., 1974) eeeeeeseeeeee800 17
iv
Jessmnereenseappwin-opemes momen essere eset ls SSNS SSESSS Suess ol nS
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
PAGES
Amendment V .eccccccccccccccceces 11-12,19
Amendment XIV *eoseeee@e#*e¢escee#2e¢€e#ertceeese be
STATUTES
28 U.S.C.A. Sections 1254(1) .... re)
ZIGVM GS) cass 5
42 U.S.C.A. Sections 405(g)...... 4-6, 13
402(e)(4)... 5
423(d)(1)(A).. 6
423(d)(5)(A).. 10
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 79(a) eenseeteeeeeseeeeeeeeene7ece K
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule 40 eeeeeoeeseeeseeeeseseeseeeeenseeeee 2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED)
PAGES
REGULATIONS
Section of the Secretary's Regu-
lations, (20 CFR,404.(1988)
404 .335(¢)}( 1) «cs 15
404.969 e*evtpjseeee#e 15
404.971 @*eeee*#*ee#e#es 16
404.1578(a)(b)... 18
Appendix I, Subpart P, of 20 C.F.R.
i 404., et seq. eeeeseeees*ee#etee#e#es 2
MISCELLANEOUS
Social Security Disability Bene-
fits Reform Act of 1984, Pubdlic
Law No. 98-460, 98 STAT. 1794
(1984), Section 3(a)(1) ......2... 10
S. Rep. No. 466, 98th. Cong.,
2d Sess. 24 eeeeee0neoe@ee@e#peeeeeeseeee 10
vi
NO. 88-
IN THE
SUPREMI COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
BETSY ACOSTA,
Petitioner,
V.
DR. LOUIS SULLIVAN,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST CIRCUIT
The petitioner, Betsy Acosta, respect-
fully prays to this Court that a writ of
certiorari be issued to review the order
of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit catered in this case on
August 29, 1988. Petition for Rehearing
was denied on October 25, 1988. Motion
for Reconsideration for rehearing en banc
was denied on December 16, 1988.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Order of the Court of Appeals,
not for publication, Civil Action Number
88-1057, is reprinted in the Appendix
hereto, p. 1(a), 9 pages, infra.
The Order of the Petition for
Rehearing pursuant to Rule 40, Rules of
Appellate Procedure, is reprinted in the
Appendix hereto, p.10(a), 2 pages, infra.
The Order of the Motion for Reconsi-
deration for rehearing en banc, is
reprinted in the Appendix hereto, p.12(a),
1 page, infra.
On October 7, 1987 the United States
District Court of the District of Puerto
Rico rendered an Order affirming the
Secretary's decision denying petitioner
her Widow Disability Insurance Benefits.
Civil Action No. 87-0498(J.A.F.), is
reprinted in the Appendix hereto, p.13(a)-
14, 2 pages, infra.
Judgment entered same date, is reprinted
in the Appendix hereto, p. 15(a), 1 page,
infra. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
79(a).
On October 8, 1986 the Administrative
Law Judge before whom a hearing was held
on October 3, 1986, rendered a notice of
decision-denial. He found that Mrs. Acosta
impairments do not meet or equal an impair-
ment listed in Appendix I, Subpart P,
Regulations No. 4, Secretary's Regula-
tions. It is reprinted in the Appendix
hereto, p. 16(a)-22, 7 pages, infra.
The Administrative Law Judge's denial
decision became the final decision of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services,
when the Appeals Council on February 24,
1987 sustained the denial decision of the
Administrative Law Judge. It is reprinted
in the Appendix hereto, p. 23(a)-25,
3 pages, infra.
JURISDICTION
Invoking federal jurisdiction under
42 U.S.C.A. Section 405(g), as amended,
the petitioner brought this appeal in
the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico. On October 7,
1987 the Court denied the appeal.
(p. 13(a)-14, infra).
The petitioner appealed before the
United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit and on August 29, 1988 the
Court entered judgment affirming the
decision of the District Court. (p.9(a),
infra).
On October %5, 1988 petition for
rehearing was denied. (p.10(a)-11, infra).
On December 15, 1988 petitioner
filed a Notice of Appeal before this Court.
It is reprinted in the Appendix hereto,
p. 26(a)-27, 2 pages, infra.
On January 24, 1989, Honorable
William J. Brennan,Jr., Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States
ordered that the time for filling this
petition for writ of pietiodns be
extended to and including March 24, 1989.
(A-589), p. 28(a), infra.
The petitioner is including excerpt
from 42 U.S.C.A. Section 402(e)(4) for
consideration by this Court. It is re-
printed in 29(a)-30, 2 pages, infra.
This Court's jurisdiction is invoked
under 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1254(1), 2101(c)
and 42 U.S.C.A. Section 405(¢g).
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
REGULATIONS PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Constitutional, Statutory and
Regulations provisions which are relevant
to decision of this case are Amendments V,
which provides in part:
"No person shall..... Be deprived
of life, liberty or property, without due
POCHES OF 2M. ic ci sede ceewescscecece™
and Amendment XIV Section provides in
part:
",eee. Nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of
EDO LOWE cece crores se essicsecanves”
Judicial review of cases arising
under Title II of the Social Security Act,
aS amended, is provided for in Section
205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. Section
405(g), in pertinent part provides:
"(g) «2.6. The judgment of the Court
shall be final except that it shall be
subject to review in the same manner as a
judgment in other civil actions........"
Section 223(d)(1)(A) of the Social
Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
Section 423(d)(1)(A) provides in part:
(d)(1) The term "disability" means-
(A) Inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months; or ..cccoeee”™
Congress authorizes the promulgation
of regulations to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, who in turn delegates
the authority to the Social Security
Administration. The S.S.A. promulgates
regulations as part IV and published in
the Federal Register under 20 C.I.R.
Section 404, Subpart P, et. seq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This petitioner seeks to review the
order of the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirming the judgment of
the District Comet.”
On October 3, 1986 a hearing was held
before an Administrative Law Judge.
Dr. Victor M. Diaz-Bonet, Ophthalmologist,
testified as a medical advisor for the
Administrative Law Judge. He stated that
1/ The U.S. District Judge failed to
mention any law, Secretary's Regulations,
nor any jurisprudence. An error of law.
the petitioner did not suffer from any
impairment which met or equalled in
severity a listed impairment. That
petitioner is unable to work with small
things.
The Administrative Law Judge found
that petitioner met the age requirement
and was the surviving widow of the wage
earner who died fully insured on MNarch 17,
197G. The A.L.J. further sustained the
testimony from the medical advisor without
mention specifically the Section of the
Secretary's Regulations involved in the
case.
On August 26, 1986 Petitioner submitted
a medical report from Dr. Jose Luis Martinez,
Cardiologist, petitioner's treating physi-
Cian, who diagnosed:
1. Ventriculae arrythmia
2. Hyperlipidemia,
3. Probable coronary artery
disease
4. Visual defictis.
The Administrative Law Judge found
the report not pertinent for there is no
evidence of allegations other than visual
to be considered on or before October 1983.
During the hearing Petitioner testi-
fied that she felt very nervous, headaches
migraines and difficulty with her eye
Sight.
On Nay 3, 1985 Petitioner submitted
an ophthalmologist report from Dr. Bernardo
de Paz Reyes and his dhannvese:
"High hyperopic astigmatism right
eye ampliopia.
Left eye subnormal vision esotropia-
phoria alteranating migraine episodes
ocular".
On August 5, 1929 Petitioner was
born. Her husband died on March 17, 1976.
Petitioner was receiving mother's insurance
benefits in November 1976.
REASONS FOR GRANTING
THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI
I.(a) Considering only that the
standard of review for
subjective allegation of
pain in light of Section 3(a)
(1) of the Social Security
Disability Benefits Reform Act
of 1984, Public Law No. 98-460
dated October 9, 1984,
98 STAT. 1794.
"Congress in 1984 established a new
and temporary standard for evaluation of
subjective evidence of pain 42 U.S.C.A.
Section 423(d)(5)(A). This Circuit has
held that Congress intended the new standard
to apply to all cases then pending either
before the Secretary or the Courts. This
Court examined the relative legislation
history and determined the effect of this
change in the law......." (Quoting W. Rep.
No. 466, 98th.Cong., 2d. Sess. 24).
Mason v Bowen, 791 F.2d. 1460, 1462,(11th.
Cir., 1986); Caulder v Bowen, 791 F.2d.
872, 879, (11th. Cir., 1986).
10
This Court should consider whether
the Federal Court of Appeals err when they
violate the due process of law to the
petitioner denying her opportunity to
review decision when she is entitled to
in the same manner as other Social Secu-
rity disability cases. This case is a
Widow Disability Insurance Benefits that
should have been considered in the same
manner as any other disability cases.
Petitioner is entitled to the due
process requirements for a full and fair
review and the equal protection of law as
a right protected by the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States.
Morgan v United States, 289 U.S. 468(1936).
"It is well settled that Disability
Insurance Benefits are subject to proce-
dural due process protections."
Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332,
96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed. 2d. 18 (1976).
17
"Puerto Rico is subject to the Due
Process Clause of either the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment."
Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 668-669, N.5, (1974).
In this case Respondent applied
improper legal standards.
The Court below misapplied medical
vocational guidelines in determining that
petitioner, who is suffering from poor
vision, migraines, heart disease, was not
disabled.
Bowen v City of New York, et al, 476 U.S.
467, 478, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 2025, 90 L.Ed.
426, (1986).
II Does the Court below err by
holding that the Secretary's
denial of petitioner's Social
Security Disability Benefits
is supported by substantial
evidence.
12
The First Circuit in its denial
decision considered the case "De Novo"
and not in accordance with the Court's
standantd of review as to whether there
exists substantial evidence in the record
to support the Secretary's Findings.
(See 42 U.S.C.A. Section 405(g)). They
failed to consider that the U.S. District
Court failed to comment in its sketchy
decision. Under this standard, the
question is whether the record contains
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion".
Richardson v Perales, 402 U.S. 399, 401,
91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427; 28 L.Ed. 2d. 842,
(1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206,
216, 83 L.Ed. 126, (1938).
13
The Circuit Court cited that the
earlier period to be considered is
November 1983 according to 42 U.S.C.A.
Section 402(e).
The ruling in the present case direc-
tly conflicts with Section 402(e)(1)(B)(1),
in pertinent part provide:
"(4) The period referred to in
paragraph (1)(8)(i) in the case of anv
widow....... is the period beginning with
whichever of the following is the latest:
Pe eeadeneeene} or
(B) eoeeeeeees or
Pe? sntceedcest BF
and ending with the month before the month
in which she attains age 60, or, if earlier,
with the close of the eighty-fourth months
following the month with which such period
began." (Supp. 1988). (It is reprinted in
the Appendix hereto, p. 29(a)-30, 2 pages,
infra).
Petitioner attained age 50 on August
5, 1979 (date of entitlement to widow's
benefits), eight-four months following the
month with which such period began will be
in August 1986 and not October or November
1983, as stated by the Secretary
14
and the Court. The medical evidence
submitted by the petitioner should be
considered by the Secretary and the Courts
below. (Please see Section 404.335(c)(1)
of the Secretary's Regulations, 20 C.F.R.
Section 404.335(c)(1), (1988).
The Secretary as well as the Circuit
Court's denial of petitioner's Widow
Disability Benefits which was based on
finding that petitioner had not severe
impairment was not supported by substan-
tial evidence, in view of lack of any
explanation for review physician's
"not severe” conclusion.
The Appeals Council failed to consi-
der Section 404.969 of the Secretary's
Regulations, 20 C.F.R. Section 404.969,
(1988), in pertinent part provide:
",.ee.- Anytime within 60 days after
the date of the hearing decision or
dismissal, the Appeals Council itself may
decide to review the action was taken..."
15
On November 26, 1986 Petitioner
filed a Request for Review of Hearing
Decision/Order before the Appeals Council.
It was not wats February 24, 1987
(Ninety (90) days had elapsed), the
Appeals Council sustained the denial-
decision of the Administrative Law Judge.
| At the same token, Section 404.971
of the Secretary's Regulations, (20 C.F.R.
Section 404.971,(1988), in pertinent part
provide:
"The Appeals Council will dismiss
your request for review if you did not
file your request within the stated period
of time and the time for filing has not
been extended."2/
The Appeals Council's actions on
petition's review violated her right to
due process as well as applicable federal
regulations.
2/ The stated period of time is sixty,
(60) days.
16
Since the Appeals Council did not
address the onset of petitioner disabi-
lity in its order of February 24, 1987,
this Court should remands this matter to
the Appeals Council for the limited pur-
pose of deciding the issue raised by the
petitioner's appeal.
"It is not function of medical
advisor in Social Security Disability
cases to make decision as to existence
of claimed disability but rather to teach
or explain complex medical data to
layman examiner."
Webb v Weinberger, 371 F.Supp. 793,
(D.C., Be@s, W74).
The medical advisor failed to
explain the complex medical data to the
Administrative Law Judge.
"Testimony of a medical advisor is
entitled to less weight than the reports
of any other physician who examined the
Claimant for a period of time."
Sherill v Secretary of H.H.S., 757 F.2d.
803, (C.A.6, 1985).
17
Sections 404.1578(a) and (b) of
the Secretary's Regulations, (20 C.F.R.
404.1578(a) and (b),(1988), in pertinent
part provides:
How we determine disability for
WidOW. ccccece
"(a) we will find that you are
disabled and pay you widow's benefits as
a widow. eeesve if-
(1) your impairment(s) has specific
clinical findings that are the
same as those for any impairment
in the Listings of Impairments
in Appendix I or any medically
equivalent to those for any
impairment shown there;
(2) your impairment(s) meets the
duration requirement."' (Emphasis
added).
The Secretary and the Courts below
failed to consider then properly.
18
CORCLYS | OF
Petitioner respectfully prays to
this Court that she is entitled to the
equal protection of law as expressed by
the Fifth Amendment , pursuant to the
Social Security Disability Benefits
Reform Act.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
4 9 Wa)
HAP Erm whl
7 T
RAFAEL CARRERAS-VALLE, ESQ.
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
P., O. BOX 20399
RIO PIEDRAS, P.R. 00928
PHONE (809) 767-5665
March , 1989
19
NO. 88-
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
BETSY ACOSTA,
Petitioner,
Vs.
DR. LOUIS SULLIVAN,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
' THE FIRST CIRCUIT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Rafael Carreras-Valle,Esquire, a
member of the Bar of this Court, hereby
certify that on this th. day of March,
1989, three copies of the petition for
writ of certiorari in the above-entitled
case was mailed, first class postage
prepaid to:
Hon. William C. Bryson
Acting Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Kad bree (eh
AD fae ARRERAS-VALLE, ESQ.
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
March , 1989
20
» 2° DBD FF & ES
Order of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit
dated August 29, 1988 @eeeeeeee#eee#e#e
Petition for Rehearing denied
Gated OClLCOGP Zo, THES se ececnsenes
Order of Court the Motion for
reconsideration or for rehearing
en banc is denied dated,
December
16, 1988 @#eeoeeoeoeee*ee#e#e?8eee#ee?#e#e#*e
Opinion and Order of the
District Court dated ,
October ¥¢ 1987 @eeoeeeee##e$#8cee#eee#e#e#e#e#e#@
Judgment entered on
October tT 1987 @eeeseeoeee*ee#ee#*e#e#€e@¢@e?2ee?2ee8eeeee
Notice of
Decision-—-Denial dated,
October 8, 1986 .ccccccccccccccecs
Appeals Council's decision
dated February 24, 1987,
sustaining the A.L.J.'s denial
decision
Notice of
eeeeeeeeeeteeseesmeneeeeeeeeee @
Appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, dated,
December 15, 1988 .ccccccccccvecces
Order Extending Time to Tile
Petition for Writ of Certiorari
dated January 24, 1989 ..cccceeces
Excerpt from 42 U.S.C.A. Section
402(e) (4)
PAGES
1(a)-9
10(a)-11
12(a)
13(€a)-14
15(a)
16(a)=25
26(a)-30
31(a)-32
33(a)-34
35(a)-36
(NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 88-1057
BETSY ACOSTA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
(Hon. José A. Fuste, U.S. District Judge)
Before
Campbell, Chief Judge,
Coffin and Selya, Circuit Judges..,
Rafael Carreras-Valle on brief for
Appellant. Donna J. Fuchsluger, Office of
the General Counsel, Social Security Division,
Department of Health and IIuman Services,
Daniel F. Lopez Romo, United States Attorney,
Donald A. Gonya, Chief Counsel for Social
Security, Randolph W. Gaines, Deputy Chief
Counsel for Social Security Litigation, and
A. George Lowe, Chief, Disability Litigation
Branch, on brief for appellee.
AUGUST 29, 1988
1(a), 9 pages
Der Curiam. Claimant applied for widow's
benefits based on visual problems. The Secre-
tary denied benefits, and claimant sought
judicial review. ,
Claimant's main arguments seem to be that
the Secretary incorrectly computed her last
date of eligibility and placed too much or
improper reliance on the medical advisor's
testimony. We deal with these points.
1. Eligibility date. Claimant applied
for benefits in February 1986 claiming disa-
bility since April 30, 1985. Benefits were |
initially denied on the ground that under
the statute and regulations claimant's
condition had to be disabling on or before
March 17, 1983 in order to be eligible for
benefits. Claimant thereafter amended her
onset date to March 17, 1983. On further
administrative review, the administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) and the Appeals Council determined
that the correct date before which disability
1(a), page 2
had to be established was October or
November 1983, seven years after October
1975, the last month in which claimant was
entitled to mother's benefits. Claimant
argues that the correct date should be
August 1986, by which time, claimant says,
she had disc problems, coronary artery
disease, ventricular arrhythmia, and depres-
Sion in addition to her visual loss, ailments
which the Secretary did not consider.
Claimant's brief, however, contains no
comprenhensible argument explaining why
August 1986 should be the correct date.
The relevant regulation for calculating
the eligibility date is 20 C.F.R. S 404.335
(c)(1) which provides in material part as
follows:
You may be entitled to benefits
as the widow or widower of a
person who was fully insured when
he or she died. You are entitled
to these benefits if --
1(a), page 3
(c) You are... at least 50 years
Old and have a disability as
defined in S 404.1577 and --
(1) The disability started no
later than 7 years after the
insured died or 7 years after
you were last entitled to mother's
or father's benefits......."
Claimant's husband died March 17, 1976.
Seven years from then is March 17, 1983. A
form in the record (A=-58) gives November
1976 as the last month of entitlement to
mother's benefits. Seven years from then
is November 1983. Claimant does not explain
and we do not see how, claimant arrives at
an August 1986 date. On the present record,
we see no basis to question the Secretary's
1983 date, and as the only medical report
concerning the coronary and other problems
is dated August 27, 1986, the Secretary did
not err in limiting the disability conside-
ration to claimant's visual problems.
2. Reliance on medical advisor. The
medical evidence consisted basically of
reports from claimant's treating physicians,
1(a), page 4
Dr. Gorbea who first saw claimant in 1959,
and Dr. De Pax who first saw her in
March 1983. In 1959, right eye vision was
20/300, but the left eye, without correction
was 20/30 and 20/20 with correction.
Despite her vision problems, claimant appar-
ently was able to function fairly well,
for in 1977, shortly after her husband died,
she began working, first typing and then
later, when her sight worsened, filing and
as a receptionist. She continued working
until 1982 when the company went bankrupt.
Also, she held a driver's license from at
least February 1980 to February 1984. In
April 1985 when Dr. DePaz examined her,
right eye vision had deteriorated to 20/400
and the left eye was 20/60. Dr. De Paz
wrote “her condition disables her to do
work attieteneiy because of no Stereopis
and poor fixation causing double vision
when working in the near range." A year
1(a), page 5
later, in May 1986, claimant was reexa-
mined by both Dr. gorbea and Dr. De Paz.
Her right eye was 20/400 according to
Dr. Gorbea. Visual acuity in the left eye
with corrective lenses for distance viewing
was 20/25 according to Dr. Gorbea and 20/40
according to Dr. De Paz. Corrected left
eye near vision was 20/25 (Dr. Gorbea) or
20/40 (Dr. De Paz).
The medical advisor (MA), after viewing
the reports, explained as foliows. Claimant
had a refraction defect and, as a consequence
had probably been cross-eyed since birth.
Due to that condition, her right eye had not
developed properly and its vision was very
poor. Her left eye vision was subnormal --
20/50 he said -- which did not meet the
listings. As for how the vision problen
affected claimant functionally, the liA stated
the following: "I suspect by the manner in
which she managed _ movement looking for
her purse that (her vision) should be enough
1(a), page 6
in order that she could engage in routine
things, and it isn't sufficient if she
had to work with extremely small things,
which demand a lot of concentration." He
felt that from a visual point of view,
Claimant could hold an eight hour a day
job, five days per week, as long as the
work did not entail extreme concentration
on close work.
As we explained in Rodriguez v.
Secretary, 647 F.2d. 218, 220 (1st.Cir. 1981)
to be entitled to widow's benefits, the
widow must have either a listed impairment
or one medically equivalent to a listing.
The relevant listing in this case is
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1,
S 2.02 which, in order to establish disabi-
lity, requires the "(r)emaining vision in
the better eye after best correction (to be)
20/200 or less." The Secretary concluded
Claimant's visual impairment did not meet
1(a), page 7
or equal any listing and hence denied
benefits.
Claimant complains that the ALJ did
not specify by number the listing he was
considering and, counsel argues, the
medical adivisor went beyond his proper
realm (which claimant would limit to |
explaining medical terms) when the TIA said
Claimant did not meet the listings.
A simple reading of the listings makes
obvious which listing is relevant, and
Claimant has not pointed to any listing
she claims to meet. Nor did the MA exceed
his proper role when, after examining the
treating doctors' reports, the NA explained,
in essence, that under said reports, no
listing was met. Rodriguez v Secretary,
647 F.2d. 218, 223-24 (1st.Cir.1981).
We find no error and conclude that the
1(a), page 8
Secretary's decision is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a
whole. All of claimant's remaining
arguments have been considered, but do
not merit discussion.
Affirmed.
1(a), page 9
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 88-1057
BETTY ACOSTA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before
Campbell, Chief Judge,
Coffin and Selya, Circuit Judges.
ORDER OF COURT
Entered October 25, 1988
The petition for rehearing is denied.
We read the last three lines of 42 U.S.C.A.
S 402(e)(4), particularly the words "if
earlier,”
to direct that the period before
which disability must be established will
end with the earlier of the following two
dates: 1) the month before the month in
10(a), 2 pages
which claimant attains age 60 or 2) 84 months
after the date arrived at from applying S
402(e)(4)(A), (B),-or (C).
Claimant's entitlement to mother's ben-
efits ended, according to the record, in
November 1976. Eighty-four months from then
was November 1983. As November 1983 is a
date earlier than the month before the month
in which claimant turned 60, November 1983
is therefore the date by which disability
had to be established.
By the Court:
(s): Francis P. Scigliano
Clerk.
(cc: Messers. Carreras-Valle and
Fuchsluger) (U.S. Attorney,
U.S. Dept. of Justice and
Romano)
10(a), page 2
UNITED STATES. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 88-1057
BETSY ACOSTA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vs.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before
Campbell, Chief Judge,
Coffin, Bowenes, Breyer, Torruella
and Selya, Circuit Judges.
ORDER OF COURT
Entered December 16, 1988
The motion for reconsideration or for
rehearing en banc is denied.
By the Court:
(s.t) FRANCIS P. SCIGLIANO
Clerk.
(cc: Mr. Carreras-Valle and
Ms. Fuchsluger)
12(a)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
BETSY ACOSTA, Widow, *
JOSE JAINE VALLES, WE *
*
Plaintiff, * Civil No.
*
v. 6 87-0498( JAF)
*
*
*
*
*
SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action brought under section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 405(g), to review
a final determination by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services ("Secretary")
denying plaintiff a period of disability
and disability insurance benefits.
After careful consideration of all the
evidence in this case, as well as the
Secretary's findings and the arguments
raised by both parties, this court holds
that the Secretary's decision is supported
13(a), 2 pages
by substantial evidence in the record as
a whole. Richardson v Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971).
By virtue of this determination, and
in light of the Social Security Act and t
the applicable case law and regulations,
the Secretary's decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, puerto Rico, this 7th. day
of October, 1987.
(s.) JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
(s.t.) JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
U.S. District Judge
13(a), page 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
BETSY ACOSTA, Widow .
JOSE JAIME VALLES,WE *
*
Plaintiff, * Civil No.
*
= * 87~-0498(JAP)
SECRETARY OF HEALTH ‘
AND HUMAN SERVICES *
Defendant. ;
JUDGMENT
Under the terms of an Opinion and
Order entered by this court today, and in
light of the Social Security Act and
applicable law and regulations, judgment
is hereby entered affirming the decision
by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 7th. day
of October, 1987.
(s.) JOSE ANTONIO FUSTL
(s.t.) JOSE ANTONIO FUSTE
U.S. District Judge
15(a)
DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Social Security Administration
Office of Hearings and Appeals
DECISION
IN THE CASE OF CLAIM FOR:
Betsy Acosta de Widow's Insurance
Vailes AKA Benefits (Disability)
Elisa Isabel Acosta
(Claimant)
Jose J. Valles 581-09-7745
(Wage Earner) (Social Security No.
This case is before the Administrative Law
Judge on a request for hearing. The Admin-
istrative Law Judge has carefully considered
all the documents identified in the record
as exhibits, the testimony at the hearing
and the arguments presented.
ISSUES
The general issue before the Administrative
Law Judge is whether the claimant is entitled
to widow's insurance benefits (disability)
16(a), 10 pages
under sections 202(e) and 223 of the Social
Security Act, as amended. The Social Sec-
urity Act provides that a widow shall not
be determined to be under a disability un-
less her physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of a level of severity which
under regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary is deemed to be sufficient to preclude
an individual from engaging in any gainful
activity.
The specific issues are whether the claim-
ant has attained age 50, whether she is un-
married and whether she is under a "disa-
bility" as defined in the Act; and if on,
when such "disability" commenced and the
duration thereof.
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND EVALUATION
OF THE EVIDENCE
Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary has es-
tablished Social Security Administration
Regulations No. 4. Section 404.1577 of the
16(a), page 2
i
regulations provides that for an individual
to be entitled to a widow's benefits as a
disabled widow, she must have a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12
months. The impairments must be of a level
of severity to prevent a person from doing
any gainful activity. Age, education, and
work experience are not considered in deter-
mining whether a widow is under a disability.
Section 404.1578 provides that a widow who
is not doing substantial gainful activity,
will be found disabled if--
(1) The impairment(s) has specific
clinical findings that are the
same as those for any impairment
in the Listing of Impairments in ,
Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regula-
tions No. 4 or are medically equiv-
alent to those for any impairment
shown there;
16(a), page 3
(2) The impairment(s) meet(s)
the duration requirement.
In addition, section 404.335 provides, in
effect, that the disability must have started
not later than 7 years after the insured
died or 7 years after the claimant was last
entitled to "survivor's benefits, whichever
is later.
In applying the definition of disability
outlined above, the Administrative Law Judge
concludes that the claimant does not have
an impairment which is listed in Appendix
1 and that she does not have an impairment
or combination of impairments which is med-
ically equivalent to a listed impairment.
Accordingly, it must be found that the
claimant is not disabled within the mean-
ing of the Social Security Act.
The record shows that claimant was married
to the wage earner for over ten years. He
16{a), page 4
died on March 17, 1976, while fully insured.
The specified period-referred to in Sec-
tion 202(e) of the Social Security Act ex-
tends to October, 1983, seven years after she
stopped receiving mother's benefits. The
claimant has no prior work experience and
alleges disability since April, 1985 changed
to October, 1983, due to visual medical com-
plaints. Claimant was born on August 5,
1929, and is presently fifty-seven years of
age. Claimant stopped working in 1982 when
the business she worked for went bankrupt.
In order to qualify for benefits as disabled
widow under the Social Security Act, she
must establish that she is at least fifty
years of age but not sixty; that she is the
widow of a wage earner who died fully in-
sured, and, that she has physical or mental
impairments which, under the regulations
16(a), page 5
promulgated by the Secretary, are deemed to
be of such severity as to preclude her from
engaging in any gainful activity.
The claimant's impairments must be manifest
within a specified period which is seven
years from the month of the insured wage
earner's death, or from the month she stopped
receiving mother's benefits.
The test of disability for a widow was de-
liberately designed to be more strict than
the definition of disability which applies
to an insured worker. Section 223{d)(2) of
the Act specifically provides that a widow:
"shall not be determined to be under
a disability unless her physical or
mental impairment or impairments
are of a level of severity which
under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary is deemed to be suffi-
cient to preclude an individual from
engaging in any gainful activity."
Thus, a widow with an impairment or impair-
ments which are not listed in the Appendix
16(a), page 6
—— a
. ‘
1 to the Secretary's Regulations, or which
are not medically the equivalent in severity
to a listed impairment, cannot be found dis-
abled. A determination of "disability", and
a claim for Widow's Insurance Benefits based
thereon, unlike wage earner's cases, is made
without regard to non-medical factors such
as age, education, and prior vocational ex-
perience--the fact that a widow has never
worked or would be unable to hold productive
employment is not a matter of consideration.
In other words, the severity of the widow's
impairment must be evaluated on the basis
of medical consideration alone; impairments
which do not meet or equal the level of se-
verity in the Listing of Impairments may not
serve as a basis for a finding of "disabil-
ity" . 7
At the hearing on August 27, 1986 report
16(a), page 7
Peer eee eee ee ee a
(Exhibit 26) from Dr. J.L. Martinez was con-
sidered not pertinent for there is no evidence
whatsoever of any allegation other than vis-
ual to be considered on or before October,
1983. Disability must be found to have oc-
curred on or before that date.
Regarding the visual condition the medical
evidence reveals there is hyperopia, astig-
matism, estrabismus and amblyopia with best
correction of 20/50, 20/60 in the best eye
(Exhibits 24, 17, 16, 15, 14). This does
not meet or equal the Listings as per the
impartial medical advisor and reported find-
ings. Claimant, thus, cannot be considered
entitled to Disabled Widow's Insurance Ben-
efits because of a visual impairment.
FINDINGS
After careful consideration of the entire
record, the Administrative Law Judge makes
16(a), page 8
the following specific findings:
1. The claimant was born on August 5, 1929.
2. The claimant is the widow of the wage
earner, who died fully insured on March
17, 1976, and the claimant is not married.
3. The period during which the claimant
must establish that she is under a
disability extends through November,
1983.
4. The medical findings shown in the med-
ae
ical evidence of record establish the
existence of hyperopia, astigmatism,
amblyopia OD.
5. The medical evidence of record does
not establish that the claimant's
impairment(s) has specific clinical
findings that are the same as those
for any impairment in the Listing of
Impairments in Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1
Ww
25)
-
16(a), page 9
6. The medical evidence of record does not
establish that the claimant has any im-
pairment or combination of impairments
which is medically equivalent to an im-
pairment listed in Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1526).
7. The claimant was not under a "disabil-
ity, as defined in the Social Security
Act, at any time through the date of
this decision (20 CFR 404.1578).
DECISION
It is the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge that the claimant is not entitled to
widow's insurance benefits (disability) un-
der sections 202(e) and 223, respectively,
of the Social Security Act.
(s) RAMON E. QUINONES
(s.t.) | RAMON E. QUINONEZ
Administrative Law
Judge
October 8, 1986
Date
16(a), page 10
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SOCIAL SECURITY
AND HUMAN SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
February 24, 1987
Refer to: Office of Hearings
and Appeals
SGC PO Box 3200
581-009-7745 Arlington VA 22203
ACTION OF APPEALS COUNCIL ON REQUEST FOR REVIEW
Ms. Betsy Acosta
Genova A 4-4 Ext. Villa Caparra
Guaynabo, PR 00657
Dear Ms. Acosta:
The request for review of the Administrative
Law Judge's Decision in your case has been
considered.
Social Security Administration regulations
provides that the Appeals Council will grant
a request for review where: (1) there ap-
pears to be an abuse of discretion by the
Administrative Law Judge; (2) there is an
error of law; (3) the Administrative Law
Judge's action, findings, or conclusions
26(a), 5 pages
are not supported by substantial evidence;
or (4) there is a broad policy or procedural
issue which may affect the general public
interest. (These provisions are contained
in 20 CFR 404.970 for Social Security claims
under Title II of the Social Security ore
and in 20 CFR 416.1470 for supplemental se-
curity income claims under Title XVI of the
Act.)
The Appeals Council has concluded that there
is no basis under the above regulations .for
granting your request for review. According-
ly, your reguest is denied and the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's decision stands as the
final decision of the Secretary in your
case.
The Appeals Council notes that the speci-
fied period for establishing that your con-
dition was disabling ended on October 31,
1983, 7 years after October 1976, the last
month in which you were entitled to mother's
26(a), page 2
benefits.
If you desire a court review of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's decision, you may com-
mence a civil action by filing a complaint
in the United States District Court for the
judicial district in which you reside within
sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of
this letter. It will be presumed that this
letter is received within five (5) days after
the date shown above unless a reasonable
showing to the contrary is made. The com-
plaint should name the Secretary of Health
and Human Services as the Defendant and
should include the Social Security number(s)
shown at the top of this notice. The right
to court review is provided for in Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amend-
ed (42 U.S.C.A. 405(g) for claims under Title
II and in Section 1631(c)(3) of the Act
26(a), page 3
EE aaa
(42 U.S.C.A. 1383(c)(3) for claims under
Title XVI.
If a civil action is commenced, the Secret-
ary must be served by sending a copy of the
Summons and complaint by registered or cer-
tified mail to the General Counsel of the
Department of Health and Human Services at
200 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington,
D.C. 20201. (See Rules 4(c)(2) and (d)(4)
and (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and Part 45, Section 4.1 of the Code
of Federal Regulations.) In addition, you
must serve the United States Attorney for
the district in which you file your complaint
and the Attorney General of the United States,
as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Sincerely yours,
(s) William Raffel
26(a), page 4
(s.t.) William Raffel
Member, Appeals Council
CC.
Rafael Carreras-Valle
ty
W
QO
DO, Bayamon, PR
HO, Bayamon, PR (ALJ Quinones)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
NO. 88-1057
BETSY ACOSTA
SSN: 581-09-7745
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vs.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Defendant-—Appellee
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPRENE COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Notice is hereby given that, BETSY ACOSTA,
the Plaintiff above named, hereby appeals
to the Supreme Court of the United States
from the final Order dismissing the Peti-
tion for Rehearing entered in action on
october 25, 1988.
This appeal is taken pursuan to
28 U.S.C.A. Section 2101{c).
31(a), 2 pages
At Rfo Piedras, Puerto Rico,
December 15, 1988.
(s) RAFAEL CARRERAS-VALLE
(s.t.) RAFAEL CARRERAS-VALLE, Esa.
Counsel for Plaintiff-
Appellant
P. O. Box 20399
Rio Piedras, P.R. 00928
PHONE (809) 767-5665
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I HEREBY CERTIFY tha ton this same date,
a copy of this Notice of Appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States was
mailed to: 7
Donna Fuchfluger, Esquire
Office of the General Counsel
Dept. of H.H.S.
Social Security Division
Room 639 Altmeyer Bldg.
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
(s) RAFAEL CARRERAS-VALLE
(s,t.)RAFAEL CARRERAS—-VALLE, isq.
Plaintiff-Appellant's Councel
December 15, 1988
31(a), page 2
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR. Area Code 202
Clerk of the Court 479-3011
January 24, 1989
Mr. Rafael Carreras-Valle
P.O. Box 20399
Rio Piedras, P.R. 00928
RE: Betsy Actosta v Secretary of Health
and Human Services A-589
Dear Mr. Carreras-Valle:
Your application for an extension of
time to file a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari in the above-entitled case has been
presented to Justice Brennan, who on Janu-
ary 24, 1989, signed an order extending your
time to and including March 24, 1989.
A copy of the Justice's order is en-
closed.
Very truly yours,
(s.t.) JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.
CLERK
33(a), 2 pages
By:
(s.) Francis J. Lorson
Francis J. Lorson
(s.t.) Chief Deputy Clerk
lg
CC: Solicitor General
Clerk, USCA 1st-Circuit
(No. 88-1057)
33(a), page 2
EXCERPT FROM 42 U.S.C.A. SECTION 402(e) (4)
(e) Widow's insurance benefits
(1) The widow (as defined in section
416(c) of this title) and every surviving
divorced wife (as defined in section 416(d)
of this title) of an individual who died a
fully insured individual, if such widow or
such surviving divorced wife--
(A) is not married,
(B)(i) has attained age 60 or (ii)
has attained age 50 but has not attained age
60 and is under a disability (as defined in
~*~ section 423(d) of this title) which began
before the end of the period specified in
paragraph (4),
(4) The period referred to in para-
graph (1)(B)(ii), in the case of any widow
or surviving divorced wife, is the period
35(a), 2 pages
ee EN ee NONE er a TO ne TN SE NSE LR aR en ee a EE ST
Re ae
beginning with whichever of the following is
the latest:
(A) the month in which occurred
the death of the fully insured individual
referred to in paragraph (1) on whose wages
and self-employment income her benefits are
or would be based or
(B) the last month for which she
was entitled to mother's insurance benefits
on the basis of the wages and self-employ-
ment income of such individual, or
(C) the month in which a previous
entitlement to widow's insurance benefits on
the basis of such wages and self-employment
income terminated because her disability had
ceased,
and ending with the month before the month in
which she attains age 60, or, if earlier, with
the close of the eighty-fourth month follor
2,
cand
|
QO
the month with which such period began.
35(a), page 2
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.