Opposition Brief — Davis v. Himmelfarb
Supreme Court brief1989
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
| Sweceme Court, U.S.
j FILED
| APR 19 189
No. 88-1554 41S soccer F. SPANIOL, J
4 CLERK
INTHE (&
SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1989
VINCENT E. DAVIS,
Petitioner,
VS.
HENRY HIMMELFARB; CHARLES T. HAYS;
RICHARD A. EDWARDS; GOLDEN ARROW
GAS ENERGY CORPORATION; JIM KITCHENS;
RONALD G. MILLER; RUTAN & TUCKER;
ROBERT PIKE; EMPIRE EQUITIES;
RONALD GARRETT,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
DAN L. LONGO
MURCHISON & CUMMING
680 Wilshire Place, #200
Los Angeles, California 90005
(213) 382-7321
Counsel of Record for Respondent
HENRY HIMMELFARB
.
bas
—*
ph AS
:
.
ies
*
3 - : Me J
, a e Me ol Rp <¢
yy 8 Soe RP he) Lae Fy
. * x. ‘ees ase OC
we
ters!
t
ad f.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
= Is a secured note, the terms of
which were negotiated by all parties to the
transaction a security as defined by
section 3(a) of the Securities & Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 USC §78 (c)(a)?
° aye. . . } + 4% . ’ >
2. Does a Federal District Court have
+ . : . = iden . ~~ 7 ~ v.97} -
retion to dismis: state laims, whether
lllary or pendent, after the resolution
f the federal clain
‘ ’
» » L2 | la
‘ 1 ‘ rer A.
. 7 Y "
' ,
" "Y : .
ATEMEN
r , » , . m
‘ , r \ , , A
» | >
LAL
‘
»—
Ss
“4; tN
1 —
VV
x
fl oe
Ll =
ea .
oS
bas
~
‘eo >
| NJ
i“
a!
4 .
“or
pl of
a. Wai
~
; Y
/) e
)
>
0)
‘> ‘
>
—
4
.
‘
>
4
—
,
rade
United ports Fishers v. Buffo }
t i ‘
} = ‘ Ke »+} ‘i >» ,7 2 )
T c ~ 7 ‘7 ys
nited tate V. Lma, 66 F.2d ]
> fF r°s 2 4
» ~ » © *F s ; . . . . > > . . - . . “
Waste Systems, nce. V. Ciean Landa,
. . +o Cor + ‘ ‘
Air ana Water rporation, ¢ F.2d
Zeller V. Bogue Electric Manufacturing
7 ;
co + Aan AIA T c on2 O4 : ‘+
ert. denied 414 Soe F . 94 BeCe<
y ,38 L.Ed.2d 146 (197 . =) 6 6 8 . 19
- > +
A 4 .
No. 88-1554
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1988
VINCENT E. DAVIS,
Petitioner,
V.
HENRY HIMMELFARB; CHARLES T. HAYS;
RICHARD A. EDWARDS; GOLDEN ARROW GAS
ENERGY CORPORATION; JIM KITCHENS;
RONALD G. MILLER; RUTAN & TUCKER;
ROBERT PIKE; EMPIRE EQUITIES;
RONALD GARRETT,
Respondents.
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 858
F.2d 515 ("Danner, et al., v. Himmelfarb,
et al. and related cross-actions", Pet.
App. A 22-59 +/
1 "pet. App." refers to Petitioner’s
Appendix.
The memorandum opinion f the United
tates District Court for the Central
District of California (Pet. App. A1-19)
has not been ff illy reported
JURISDICTION
ne juagment f the Court of Appeals
“ entered on eptember 28, 1988.
Petitioner’s petition for rehearing was
denied on December 15 1988 (Pet.
App.
A60-6] The jurisdiction o
bh
the Court is
invoked by Petitioner unde? 28 Uswst
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By perceiving a departure from f
anchored securities precedent by the Court
of Appeal, where no departure exists,
Petitioner challenges a well thought out
and reasoned opinion of the court. Until
now, a party could not be held liable under
federal securities law in relation to the
issuance of a note which bears none of the
long established characteristics of a
security. The issue posed by Petitioner’s
application is whether these longstanding
principles of securities law should be
abrogated by holding a note a security by
proving only the document itself. The
facts of this case do not demonstrate a
further refining of securities law in the
area of the issuance of notes and the
petition should be denied. Further, this
Court has repeatedly recognized a federal
court’s wide latitude to decide ancillary
Or pending questions of state law. The
state law claims were properly dismissed
Tr é 1t I I TNe T€ lé ra 44
I action ind for tl reason the
lild be 1enl1ied
+ rt ¢ ™m <¢ + . - } .+ rT } or —
i be w presented by Petitioner ls
eT 4 ‘ an’ Y ¢ , Ly - F > ‘ ¢ i ¢ ta) ng
+>
Statement of Facts
t yreat lenaths
facts of this case from
ummarize the i ts f
inception. The summarization includes
number of extraneous facts and the
rt’s attention is respectfully directed
which form the basis for the
ng procedural] motions and
before the Court of
for |! pe Davis declined
f fer } he later declined the
t t exchange his pesos Lor. @
f the profit from the Mexican
Em r¢ wa pursulng Davis
negotiated t recelve from
promi: r note n the principal
, , payable in United States
with yuarterly interest to be
in annual rate of prime plus one
witt nterest payments to commence
184 in exchange for his pesos.
sted that the note be secured by
en deed of trust Empire agreed
ed Davis 2 lien on property in
avis did not realize that this
Subordinate to the liens of the
plaintiff: in this action (the
ida I and an OkKlahoma
The Proceedings Below
ae. . ¥ ~ > > « ’ . ¥ ’
‘ ‘ 4 4 . + } . 4 q
+ rhs ' : r\Y r\< » + et +
4 \ ‘ i
wat + ’ + . ~+ .
4 ‘ » + ~+ + ‘ » 1 , , ’
c J } A
> _ _ - > - . ~ >
‘ “A : : 1¢ ‘ :
> . >) r - + --f m y ~ +
“ . i . :
- r . , : ¢ y + » 7
. . " - - + _>? ‘ ’ y : _¥ .
A ;y : , iv A 2 A
7 : > ™”
‘ ‘ ; T¢ ‘ ] ‘ aw ?
‘ 4 + +
raud ; we ; evera | Liaw
+ . /
r ‘ ‘ ‘ ¥ _
‘ ¥ " oY rats + » mmo + ay?
: \ 2 2 : i A i 2 |
- > . ~ + +, t¢ » ‘ + + , 7 . ~ +
y A ,
at=h. smoOr 14 ; , y -_ . ~ -
* oY kK > "hie . | D “ < - >= «xs
, i A . 2 i
’ “~¢ , 4 : : pul. ¥ i¢ ’ ¥ ‘ < on
+ . . . ~ > "4 , ¥
> > + + A TL) +
; tiff had !
Ma ) > ‘ ’ l¢ ,+
‘ > ‘ 7 . vy + . > ‘ mmar ,
lomen? ba ‘ that a . wa
that 1 matte! f iv the note issued
+ + RF , + ; P 1? ty . } + + at +heo
federa eh ee 110 } i1ld be
Addit na J, Himmelfart isked
aa ‘ + } 7 ’ j Her ieont + ite
Himmelfarb’s motion for summary judgment in
its entirety and held
"The court concludes’ that
the application of the risk
capital test as to the undisputed
acts of this case preclude a
finding that the transaction at
issue 1S ae security." (Pet.
>
9p. ALS
In reaching this conclusion, the court
made the following finding; (1) Davis’ note
was a privately negotiated transaction
secured by real property uncontradicted
testimony indicated that Davis rejected
other forms of structuring the deal, (2)
the defendant’s right to substitute
collateral rendered the importance of
collateralization of the loan insignificant
for the purposes of characterizing the
transaction, (3) the Obligation at issue
appeared to be a garden variety privately
negotiated loan. Davis had unambiguously
disclaimed any interest in Empire’s Mexico
investment and affirmed that Empire’s
obligation to Davis had no relationship to
Empire’s success or failure in that ven-
ture. (4) Davis looked to the collateral
to secure repayment, not to Empire’s
entrepreneurial efforts. (5) Davis did not
view repayment of his note as dependent on
the success of any venture of Empire and
(6) the circumstances surrounding Davis’
deal with Empire belied any and all analogy
to a public offering. Davis conducted
extensive negotiations and participated
actively in determining the structure of
the transaction. Moreover, it was Davis
who demanded that the note be secured by a
lien on real property. Additional
uncontroverted testimony suggested that the
10
payment schedule on the note was set up to
accommodate Davis’ personal tax
Finally, the court held that there was
no reason to retain jurisdiction over the
state causes of action and dismissed then.
While noting that the procedural posture of
this action rendered the question of the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction over
the remaining claims somewhat complex, the
court found that the assertion of
jurisdiction was discretionary and after
vor
()
>
ancing considerations of judicial
economy and fairness to the parties,
lieclined to retain the state claims.
Petitioner appealed the entry of
Summary judgment in favor of respondents to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. On that appeal, (Danner, et
>
Capitai appreciation or a
f the earnings from a
venture formed with the
j capital. (Citations)
lid not ‘lend’ Empire
except to the extent that
e of an asset in exchange
romissory note represents
lers loan to the buyer of
I r tne purchase price.
a"
, ++
7 > ’
7 > ’ one r |
r ‘ f Hey TI
+ > a ‘4
. > } ’ 7 ’ , y ‘ ‘ ,
rye anal yr +
7 ‘ > + * +
+ ‘ - P
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
The Peculiar Facts Of This Case Do Mot
Warrant Reexamination Of Federal Securities
Law And This Writ Should Be Denied.
S.Ct.2297, 85 L.Ed.2d 692 (1985) to the
question of whether a note should be deemed
a security based solely on its title and
characteristics. In Landreth, this Court
rejected the sale of business doctrine in
relation to the determination of whether
stock should be treated as a "security"
and held that the particular
characteristics o f stock made it
Susceptible to a plain meaning approach in
determining whether or not that stock was a
"Security." In persuasive dicta, this
-Ourt pointed out several reasons why stock
was distinguishable from most, if not alli,
of the ether categories listed in the Acts
definition of security.
First, traditional stock
"represents to many people both
trained and untrained in business
matters the paradigm of a
security." ... Second, as we
made clear in Forman, "stock" is
relatively easy to identify
because it lends itself to
consistent definition. (Id. at
6 9 3 )
On the other hand, the court pointed
out that a "note" should be viewed as a
relatively broad term that encompasses
instruments with widely varying
characteristics, depending upon whether
issued in a consumer context, as commercial
paper, or in some other investment context.
(Landreth Timber Company Vv. Landreth,
Supra, at pp. 693-694) Clearly, as the
facts of this case highlight, a note is not
a category of instruments in the Acts
definition that might be shown by proving
L 7
only the document ltself. Moreover,
while holding that "stock" was particularly
fal
4
T
ct
ry
le to being proved by its
fnharacteristics, the court noted that it
was still important that the context of the
transaction sought to be placed within the
ope of the securities laws be examined
wnen deciding whether’ some financial
instrument Lis 4 "security". (Landreth
Timber Company v. Landreth, Supra, at 687)
fhus, the court’s approach in Landreth did
not require the Court of Appeals to ignore
tne economic realities in the context of
l€ underlying transaction in declining to
abel Empire’s note to Davis as a security.
-ircuit Courts have used different methods
of analysis’ for determining whether an
instrument ls a "security", the great
mayority of CaseS examine the context of
~r
L
i ,
>
<? ,
bay
»«
C c
=
Me }
oe
. f
qd 4
= ,
+
5 : :
\ a~ >
= 4
‘
f
. >
J mm.
».~
rv) A ,
- Ly
—
t '
Q
+> < baw
\
a. ~
L. .) '@),
-
. ,
ee ' a
<?
<?t
">
. >
4)
i ‘
Q
aa
—
+
>
x
X
b~«
4 ‘
a
=
- « ond
e 7
. rw
4
4 .
-
ae
os
5 :
XY v
o~| a
roa ew
Y +
a
* e~
~ » . rus |
i ¢ A / Y 2 A
+ L —T ~ +
¥ ¢ ? -
, \
s r"¢ 7 rT) YF
. i b/ A
+ y -+ Al
1 of trust Petitioner did
his mone in Empire or
Mexican venture. He did
+ — y +ho conce of either
r rt ; Share of the
uSiness venture formed
} capital. Oo! did
re money, except to the
ile I il in
missory note represents
the buyer of a portion
price. Whether this
mined under the Ninth
-ai" tess or if it is
the sontext f the
tne result is the same
‘ 17 rT y -
NOW! r j , reason
1 reexamine the holding
Whether The State Claims Are Ancillary
Or Pendent, The Decision To Exercise
Jurisdiction Remains a Discretionary
Function.
‘ > 4 + a ’ -
T r ‘ ‘ ‘ T
>
YT ¢ M) WwW “a r
+ + ~ ~~, =. 6 al bk
+ ‘ ‘ . . y an »+ »- +
: 2
‘ T r €6¢ ‘ T ]
4 -, T-s TT re
? y ‘ + — ~ 7
¢ t¢ a. WW > - > + . *?
+ - { 4 2 } ~ +
> > > > > > +
‘ ‘
’ : ~ >) "
. ‘
A
J é ‘
‘ : ‘
‘ : —_
‘ ‘ , . =:
‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘
: : . ‘ }
‘ :
:
’ > : ‘ - } .
hesitate to exercise
jurisdiction over state claims,
even though bound to apply state
law to them..." iG, at 726 (fn.
and citation omitted).
The District Courts have applied the
analysis developed in Gibbs, a pendent
jurisdiction case, to suits like the
present case that raise questions about the
retention of ancillary jurisdiction after
dismissal of the federal claims. See,
e.g., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686
F.2d 449, 458 (7th Cir. 1982), Cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880; Waste Systems, Inc.
v. Clean Land, Air and Water Corporation,
683 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1982), United States
v. Zima, 766 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir., 1985).
Moreover, the Federal Appeals Courts
in general have indicated a= strong
na
preference for the dismissal of pendent or
ancillary claims whenever the District
Court disposes of the federal claim or
claims prior to trial. Indeed, in cases
involving complex or novel issues of state
law, the appellate courts have held that it
is an abuse of discretion to retain
jurisdiction after the federal issue is
disposed of at trial or even on appeal.
See, e.g., Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine
Insurance Company, 597 F.2d 798, 811 (2d
Cir. 1979); Hodge v. Mountain State
Telephone & Telegraph Company, 555 F.2d 254
(9th Cir. 1977); American National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Bailey, 750 F.2d 577, 581 (7th
Cir. 1984).
It is therefore clear that whether
these claims are viewed as pendent or
ancillary makes no difference to _ the
determination of whether or not the court
= -
should have retained jurisdiction over the
state claims. As the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the decision
to exercise jurisdiction is always
discretionary. The trial court properly
examined the relevant factors and
determined that, on balance, it should
exercise its discretion and decline to
retain the state claims. (Pet. App. A58-
59) Petitioner has shown no good reason
why this court should reexamine _ the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit nor has petitioner showed a
gross deviation from the guidelines
enunciated by this court in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs. For these reasons, the
Petition for Writ should be denied.
ee
CONCLUSION
No matter how many different
under which this transaction 1S exar
ined,
the fact remains that in the particular
circumstances and sontext of
transaction, the note in question was
security. Nothing in the particular
of this case warrants uprooting
decision. Moreover, following the dec
this
not a
facts
this
1sSion
of this Court in United Mine Workers Vv.
Gibbs, the lower courts have uniformly
that the qadecision whether to
jurisdiction over pendent or anc
claims is a matter left tc the
qadiscretion of the tria court.
nothing in the peculiar facts of th
warrant uprooting this time honored
lS
"11
4
held
retain
,
A
c
7
llary
sound
regqoing reasons, the
on + - - “Krad!
f Certiorari should be
+ P 1+ +
pect f inpmitted,
Z i
A o y,
/ y ,
L. Longo
son & Cummilr
ire Place #200
(
Angeles, CA 3S
Henry Himmelfarb
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.