Opposition Brief — Davis v. Himmelfarb

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| Sweceme Court, U.S.

j FILED

| APR 19 189

No. 88-1554 41S soccer F. SPANIOL, J

4 CLERK

INTHE (&

SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

VINCENT E. DAVIS,

Petitioner,

VS.

HENRY HIMMELFARB; CHARLES T. HAYS;

RICHARD A. EDWARDS; GOLDEN ARROW

GAS ENERGY CORPORATION; JIM KITCHENS;

RONALD G. MILLER; RUTAN & TUCKER;

ROBERT PIKE; EMPIRE EQUITIES;

RONALD GARRETT,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

DAN L. LONGO

MURCHISON & CUMMING

680 Wilshire Place, #200

Los Angeles, California 90005

(213) 382-7321

Counsel of Record for Respondent

HENRY HIMMELFARB

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

= Is a secured note, the terms of

which were negotiated by all parties to the

transaction a security as defined by

section 3(a) of the Securities & Exchange

Act of 1934, 15 USC §78 (c)(a)?

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2. Does a Federal District Court have

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retion to dismis: state laims, whether

lllary or pendent, after the resolution

f the federal clain

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Waste Systems, nce. V. Ciean Landa,

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No. 88-1554

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1988

VINCENT E. DAVIS,

Petitioner,

V.

HENRY HIMMELFARB; CHARLES T. HAYS;

RICHARD A. EDWARDS; GOLDEN ARROW GAS

ENERGY CORPORATION; JIM KITCHENS;

RONALD G. MILLER; RUTAN & TUCKER;

ROBERT PIKE; EMPIRE EQUITIES;

RONALD GARRETT,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 858

F.2d 515 ("Danner, et al., v. Himmelfarb,

et al. and related cross-actions", Pet.

App. A 22-59 +/

1 "pet. App." refers to Petitioner’s

Appendix.

The memorandum opinion f the United

tates District Court for the Central

District of California (Pet. App. A1-19)

has not been ff illy reported

JURISDICTION

ne juagment f the Court of Appeals

“ entered on eptember 28, 1988.

Petitioner’s petition for rehearing was

denied on December 15 1988 (Pet.

App.

A60-6] The jurisdiction o

bh

the Court is

invoked by Petitioner unde? 28 Uswst

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

By perceiving a departure from f

anchored securities precedent by the Court

of Appeal, where no departure exists,

Petitioner challenges a well thought out

and reasoned opinion of the court. Until

now, a party could not be held liable under

federal securities law in relation to the

issuance of a note which bears none of the

long established characteristics of a

security. The issue posed by Petitioner’s

application is whether these longstanding

principles of securities law should be

abrogated by holding a note a security by

proving only the document itself. The

facts of this case do not demonstrate a

further refining of securities law in the

area of the issuance of notes and the

petition should be denied. Further, this

Court has repeatedly recognized a federal

court’s wide latitude to decide ancillary

Or pending questions of state law. The

state law claims were properly dismissed

Tr é 1t I I TNe T€ lé ra 44

I action ind for tl reason the

lild be 1enl1ied

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i be w presented by Petitioner ls

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Statement of Facts

t yreat lenaths

facts of this case from

ummarize the i ts f

inception. The summarization includes

number of extraneous facts and the

rt’s attention is respectfully directed

which form the basis for the

ng procedural] motions and

before the Court of

for |! pe Davis declined

f fer } he later declined the

t t exchange his pesos Lor. @

f the profit from the Mexican

Em r¢ wa pursulng Davis

negotiated t recelve from

promi: r note n the principal

, , payable in United States

with yuarterly interest to be

in annual rate of prime plus one

witt nterest payments to commence

184 in exchange for his pesos.

sted that the note be secured by

en deed of trust Empire agreed

ed Davis 2 lien on property in

avis did not realize that this

Subordinate to the liens of the

plaintiff: in this action (the

ida I and an OkKlahoma

The Proceedings Below

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lomen? ba ‘ that a . wa

that 1 matte! f iv the note issued

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federa eh ee 110 } i1ld be

Addit na J, Himmelfart isked

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Himmelfarb’s motion for summary judgment in

its entirety and held

"The court concludes’ that

the application of the risk

capital test as to the undisputed

acts of this case preclude a

finding that the transaction at

issue 1S ae security." (Pet.

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9p. ALS

In reaching this conclusion, the court

made the following finding; (1) Davis’ note

was a privately negotiated transaction

secured by real property uncontradicted

testimony indicated that Davis rejected

other forms of structuring the deal, (2)

the defendant’s right to substitute

collateral rendered the importance of

collateralization of the loan insignificant

for the purposes of characterizing the

transaction, (3) the Obligation at issue

appeared to be a garden variety privately

negotiated loan. Davis had unambiguously

disclaimed any interest in Empire’s Mexico

investment and affirmed that Empire’s

obligation to Davis had no relationship to

Empire’s success or failure in that ven-

ture. (4) Davis looked to the collateral

to secure repayment, not to Empire’s

entrepreneurial efforts. (5) Davis did not

view repayment of his note as dependent on

the success of any venture of Empire and

(6) the circumstances surrounding Davis’

deal with Empire belied any and all analogy

to a public offering. Davis conducted

extensive negotiations and participated

actively in determining the structure of

the transaction. Moreover, it was Davis

who demanded that the note be secured by a

lien on real property. Additional

uncontroverted testimony suggested that the

10

payment schedule on the note was set up to

accommodate Davis’ personal tax

Finally, the court held that there was

no reason to retain jurisdiction over the

state causes of action and dismissed then.

While noting that the procedural posture of

this action rendered the question of the

court’s subject matter jurisdiction over

the remaining claims somewhat complex, the

court found that the assertion of

jurisdiction was discretionary and after

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ancing considerations of judicial

economy and fairness to the parties,

lieclined to retain the state claims.

Petitioner appealed the entry of

Summary judgment in favor of respondents to

the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit. On that appeal, (Danner, et

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Capitai appreciation or a

f the earnings from a

venture formed with the

j capital. (Citations)

lid not ‘lend’ Empire

except to the extent that

e of an asset in exchange

romissory note represents

lers loan to the buyer of

I r tne purchase price.

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REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The Peculiar Facts Of This Case Do Mot

Warrant Reexamination Of Federal Securities

Law And This Writ Should Be Denied.

S.Ct.2297, 85 L.Ed.2d 692 (1985) to the

question of whether a note should be deemed

a security based solely on its title and

characteristics. In Landreth, this Court

rejected the sale of business doctrine in

relation to the determination of whether

stock should be treated as a "security"

and held that the particular

characteristics o f stock made it

Susceptible to a plain meaning approach in

determining whether or not that stock was a

"Security." In persuasive dicta, this

-Ourt pointed out several reasons why stock

was distinguishable from most, if not alli,

of the ether categories listed in the Acts

definition of security.

First, traditional stock

"represents to many people both

trained and untrained in business

matters the paradigm of a

security." ... Second, as we

made clear in Forman, "stock" is

relatively easy to identify

because it lends itself to

consistent definition. (Id. at

6 9 3 )

On the other hand, the court pointed

out that a "note" should be viewed as a

relatively broad term that encompasses

instruments with widely varying

characteristics, depending upon whether

issued in a consumer context, as commercial

paper, or in some other investment context.

(Landreth Timber Company Vv. Landreth,

Supra, at pp. 693-694) Clearly, as the

facts of this case highlight, a note is not

a category of instruments in the Acts

definition that might be shown by proving

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only the document ltself. Moreover,

while holding that "stock" was particularly

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le to being proved by its

fnharacteristics, the court noted that it

was still important that the context of the

transaction sought to be placed within the

ope of the securities laws be examined

wnen deciding whether’ some financial

instrument Lis 4 "security". (Landreth

Timber Company v. Landreth, Supra, at 687)

fhus, the court’s approach in Landreth did

not require the Court of Appeals to ignore

tne economic realities in the context of

l€ underlying transaction in declining to

abel Empire’s note to Davis as a security.

-ircuit Courts have used different methods

of analysis’ for determining whether an

instrument ls a "security", the great

mayority of CaseS examine the context of

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1 of trust Petitioner did

his mone in Empire or

Mexican venture. He did

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r rt ; Share of the

uSiness venture formed

} capital. Oo! did

re money, except to the

ile I il in

missory note represents

the buyer of a portion

price. Whether this

mined under the Ninth

-ai" tess or if it is

the sontext f the

tne result is the same

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NOW! r j , reason

1 reexamine the holding

Whether The State Claims Are Ancillary

Or Pendent, The Decision To Exercise

Jurisdiction Remains a Discretionary

Function.

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hesitate to exercise

jurisdiction over state claims,

even though bound to apply state

law to them..." iG, at 726 (fn.

and citation omitted).

The District Courts have applied the

analysis developed in Gibbs, a pendent

jurisdiction case, to suits like the

present case that raise questions about the

retention of ancillary jurisdiction after

dismissal of the federal claims. See,

e.g., Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686

F.2d 449, 458 (7th Cir. 1982), Cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 880; Waste Systems, Inc.

v. Clean Land, Air and Water Corporation,

683 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1982), United States

v. Zima, 766 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir., 1985).

Moreover, the Federal Appeals Courts

in general have indicated a= strong

na

preference for the dismissal of pendent or

ancillary claims whenever the District

Court disposes of the federal claim or

claims prior to trial. Indeed, in cases

involving complex or novel issues of state

law, the appellate courts have held that it

is an abuse of discretion to retain

jurisdiction after the federal issue is

disposed of at trial or even on appeal.

See, e.g., Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine

Insurance Company, 597 F.2d 798, 811 (2d

Cir. 1979); Hodge v. Mountain State

Telephone & Telegraph Company, 555 F.2d 254

(9th Cir. 1977); American National Bank &

Trust Co. v. Bailey, 750 F.2d 577, 581 (7th

Cir. 1984).

It is therefore clear that whether

these claims are viewed as pendent or

ancillary makes no difference to _ the

determination of whether or not the court

= -

should have retained jurisdiction over the

state claims. As the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the decision

to exercise jurisdiction is always

discretionary. The trial court properly

examined the relevant factors and

determined that, on balance, it should

exercise its discretion and decline to

retain the state claims. (Pet. App. A58-

59) Petitioner has shown no good reason

why this court should reexamine _ the

decision of the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit nor has petitioner showed a

gross deviation from the guidelines

enunciated by this court in United Mine

Workers v. Gibbs. For these reasons, the

Petition for Writ should be denied.

ee

CONCLUSION

No matter how many different

under which this transaction 1S exar

ined,

the fact remains that in the particular

circumstances and sontext of

transaction, the note in question was

security. Nothing in the particular

of this case warrants uprooting

decision. Moreover, following the dec

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facts

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1sSion

of this Court in United Mine Workers Vv.

Gibbs, the lower courts have uniformly

that the qadecision whether to

jurisdiction over pendent or anc

claims is a matter left tc the

qadiscretion of the tria court.

nothing in the peculiar facts of th

warrant uprooting this time honored

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retain

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sound

regqoing reasons, the

on + - - “Krad!

f Certiorari should be

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pect f inpmitted,

Z i

A o y,

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L. Longo

son & Cummilr

ire Place #200

(

Angeles, CA 3S

Henry Himmelfarb

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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