Opposition Brief — Dura-Corp. v. Risi Stone Ltd.

Supreme Court brief1989

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Res ht No. 88-1450

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

DURA-CORP, a Pennsylvania

Business Corporation,

Petitioner

vs.

RISI STONE LTD., A Canadian

Corporation and ROTHBURY INVESTMENTS,

LTD., a Canadian Corporation,

Respondents

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Charles W. Kenrick, Esquire

Hunter A. McGeary, Jr., Esquire

DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE, P.C.

Two PPG Place, Suite 400

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222

(412) 281-7272

Attorneys for Respondents

Dated: March 31, 1989

; \ ms one jh Reta gli ai sak eae

iit , Ba has POON) Fav OS] eran se 5 pce pte eee Ra

ote Oe Ls ke ee PR LAE RP ear ORR SR LAY ‘, Hid

hein aa vet

RCO, Sarai

CLUE STUN! PO AMD CUMIN Bie ty eget rel rey

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

While Respondents contend that the

Petitioner has not properly preserved

for review several of the issues

presented in its Petition,

Respondents accept the statement of

the Questions Presented contained in

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Certiorari insofar as it lists

issues to be discussed and opposed by

- the within Brief.

Gulf

LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 28.1 LIST

Respondents accept the list of

parties as stated in Petitioner’s

Petition.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Case Law Page

Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.

501, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947) ...... 20

Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.

Mayacamas Corp., U.S.

108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d. 2 296

(1988) eeeseeeneeeeeeeseeeeeeee ee @ 11

Johnson v. Transportation Agency,

Santa Clara County, California,

U.S. _, 107 S.Ct. 1442,

1446 fn. 2, 94 L.Ed.2d 615

CREE id cede CE Pies 6 S040 4s 9

Kremens v. Bartley,

431 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 1709, 52

L.Ed.2d 184 (1977) eeeeoees#e#ee#se# 12

eam SE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont. )

Maria Victoria Naviera S.A. v.

Cementos Del Valle, 759 F.2d

1027, 1031 (2nd Cir. 1985) .... 23

McCreary Tire and Rubber Co. v.

CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3rd Cir.

TOFS) cvcsscccvecsccesccccccecs 18

Miree v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 433 °

U.S. 25, 53 L.Ed.2d 557, 97. be

S.Ct. 2490, 2496 (1977). peas 10

Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital Vv.

Mercury Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 ! —

S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765

(1983) w..ccccees Se eeb ee eee Ces es 21

PAS-EBS v. Group Health, Inc., 442

F. Supp. 937 (S.D. NY 1977) . 22

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin

Mfq. Co. 173 Gee S9a¢ BI

S.C. 1901, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270

BE ae 22

2

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417

U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. a 941

| 2 aia ida eis 18

Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos

Mexican National Oil Co., 767

F.2d 1140, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985) 16

Spring Hope Rockwool v. Industrial

Clean Air, Inc., 504 F. Supp.

1385, 1389 (E.D. NC 1981) ..... 23

Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.

204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d

i) lea ae aii wks 13

United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.

783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d

PR BEETED S066 eb eeccccccscccce 9

‘iene _— "

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont. )

Page

United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.

891, 45 L.Ed.2d 623, 95 S.Ct.

2585 (1975) *eese eeee#eetfees8s85s§ee#ee#eee#e#ee#ee#se#s?s@# 13

Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554 (3rd

Cail 1988) e*eeee#3se#see#e7#seee#8e#€#€8e#28e#e#ee#e 1l

Constitutional Provisions,

Statutes and Rules

United States Constitution, Article

VI, ee awe e*eeees 8

United States Constitution, .

Amendment XIV, Section l...... 8

Convention on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign

Arbitration Awards (9 U.S.C.

§201, et seq.), 9 U.S.C.A. §208 16

Federal Arbitration Act ( U.S.C. §l,

et seg.), 9 U.S.C.A. §3 ....... 16

Supreme Court Rule 17.1 ............ 14

iii

D. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW i

LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 28.1

LIST e*eeeees#ee#er#eeeers8sveer#see##ee#ee#e#ee?#8#8#e#e#e# i

GC. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........-. i

D. TABLE OF CONTENTS e*eeeeee#eeeee#e#e#@* iv

E. CITATIONS TO THE OPINIONS AND

JUDGMENTS DELIVERED IN THE

COURTS BELOW *eeeee#ee#esesee#ee#e#?#e#*¢ vi

F. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..... vi

G. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

TREATIES, AND STATUTES INVOLVED vi

H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........- . 1

g I e SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT e*eeete#eee#e#8?#e¢# 5

J. ARGUMENT eoeeetensveentreneskseeneteenreeeee 8

(1) THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED

TO PROPERLY RAISE BELOW AND

PRESERVE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

NOW ASSERTED IN PETITIONER’S

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 8

(a) Petitioner did not

raise the ints below

that the District Court’s

Order granting a stay

nding arbitration was

unconstitutional, or

that the District Court’s

finding of a Canadian

forum for arbitration was

unconstitutional ........ 8

iv

'

K.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)

(2) THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE

ESTOPPED FROM RAISING ARGUMENTS

CONTRARY TO THE POSITION IT

ADVANCED IN THE COURT BELOW IN

ORDER TO NOW SEEK REVIEW BY THE

SUPREME COURT ....ccceecccccees

(3) THE ORDERS BELOW STAYING

PROCEEDINGS PENDING ARBITRATION

AND DIRECTING ARBITRATION TO

TAKE PLACE IN ONTARIO, CANADA

WERE A PROPER APPLICATION OF

THE CONVENTION ON THE

RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF

FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS AND

THEREFORE ARE NOT A PROPER

SUBJECT OF REVIEW IN THIS COURT

(a) The Supervisory

powers of this Court

should not be invoked

because the lower courts

properly stayed the

proceedings and directed

the parties to

arbitration pursuant to

the Convention on the

Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign

Arbitral Awards .........

(b) Petitioner fails to

present any conflict

between the lower court

orders in the instant

case and relevant

decisions of this Court

or between the Circuit

Courts of Appeals on the

forum non conveniens

Tn CeCe eeeeebeeeenecece

CONCLUSION ..ccccccccccccccccce

10

14

14

19

24

OPINIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS

Respondents accept the citation to

the opinions of the lower Courts as

stated in the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Respondents accept the Statement of

Jurisdiction contained in the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATIES

AND STATUTES INVOLVED

Respondents accept the Verbatim

Reproduction of Constitutional

Provisions, Treaties and Statutes

Involved in the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari.

vi

= er

H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 16, 1983, Thomas R. Eddy,

Kenneth R. Dehus and Angelo Risi entered

into the agreement attached to Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint in the District Court

(345a, 311a-330a).1 Mr. Risi supplied the

typed portion of the Licensing Agreement

on behalf of Risi Stone, Ltd., as proposed

language for the Licensing Agreement

between the parties (345a-346a). Thomas

R. Eddy, an attorney, reviewed the

proposed Licensing Agreement prior to its

execution by the parties and made hand-

written revisions and additions thereto

(346a). Attorney Eddy did not make any

revisions to the Licensing Agreement

pertaining to Paragraph 28 thereof which

states:

28. Arbitration

1 References are to the appendix to the

appeals in The United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Any dispute, difference or

question arising between Risi

and Licensee concerning the

interpretation, construction,

meaning or effect of this

Agreement or any part thereof

shall be referred a single

arbitrator if Risi and Licensee

agree upon such arbitrator or

failing such Agreement to a

board of three (3) arbitrators,

one (1) to be appointed by Risi;

one (1) to be appointed by

Licensee; and one (1) to be

appointed by the two (2)

arbitrators so named by Risi and

Licensee. The provisions of the

Arbitrations Act of the Province

of Ontario shall be applicable.

(324-325a,- 345a-347a).

Plaintiff, Dura-Corp, Petitioner

herein, initiated a Declaratory Judgment

action in the Federal District Court for

the Western District of Pennsylvania as

Licensee pursyant to the above-referenced

Agreement (303a-336a). Defendants then

filed a motion inter alia for a stay of

the declaratory judgment action pending

arbitration of the dispute between the

parties. In support of Defendants’

motion, Defendants filed the affidavit of

=. Lb eee ey bas

ae the ae

Angelo Risi (345a-347a). Prior to the

entry of the District Court Order granting

Defendants’ Motion for Stay, no affidavits

were filed on behalf of Plaintiff, Dura-

Corp in support of its contention that the

instant case should not be referred to

arbitration or opposing the location of

the arbitration. Only after Plaintiff,

Dura-Corp, Petitioner herein, had appealed

the District Court’s Order to the Third

Circuit of Appeals, did Petitioner file

affidavits with the District Court

purportedly opposing the location of the

arbitration.

| Petitioner Dura-Corp’s Statement of

the case in this Court makes numerous

allegations not of record either in the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals or in the

District Court. Petitioner, as it did

before the Third Circuit, alludes to

allegations contained in its Amended

Complaint and Petitioner’s own briefs

filed in the District Court. These

assertions do not constitute facts of

record which should be considered by this

Court. Because the declaratory judgment

action below was disposed of on

Defendants’ Motion for Stay, the citations

to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and

Briefs are improper. The alleged "facts"

cited by Petitioner are in dispute;

however, because of the disposition of

this case on motion, Defendants were not

required to answer the Complaint or refute

the naked allegations contained in the

briefs which were not verified by

affidavit. Therefore, the only key facts

relevant to the current Petition for Writ

Certiorari include the arbitration clause

(quoted herein and attached to Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint) and the affidavit of

Angelo Risi which was timely filed prior

to the District Court’s ruling on the

arbitration issue.

I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioner’s attempt to obtain review

by this Court is flawed on both procedural

and substantive grounds. First, Dura-Corp

waited until the filing of its Petition in

this Court to first raise Constitutional

arguments, and accordingly has not

properly preserved those points for this

Court’s review. Second, despite citing

two Constitutional provisions in the

initial portion of its Petition as

required by Supreme Court rules,

Petitioner never explains in the argument

section of the Petition how and why the

District Court and Third Circuit decisions

violate the cited Constitutional

provisions.

Third, review of the Petition should

be denied based upon principles of

estoppel. Briefly stated, Petitioner now

seeks to advance an argument as the basis

for obtaining review that it vehemently

5

opposed in the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit. More

specifically, in the Court of appeals,

Respondents, Risi Stone, Ltd. and Rothbury

Investments, Ltd., argued that Dura-Corp’s

appeal of the District Court’s Stay Order

was barred by the reasoning of the recent

Third Circuit decision in Zosky v. Boyer, -

856 F.2d 554 (3rd Cir. 1988) and

Petitioner Dura-Corp opposed this same

argument. In an amazing and complete

reversal of position, Petitioner now

asserts that Zosky controls and that the

District Court’s order was not appealable

as it is an interlocutory order. Simply

stated, Petitioner attempts to take a

further appeal to this Court in order to

argue that the very Order that it

originally appealed from is not an

appealable order after all.

Fourth, Dura-Corp’s Petition fails on

substantive grounds as well. The District

6

=

AY

BAL 2 3 ch he Ie f

Se

igi =e

Fp sexioo ELIS, -

=

_,

er a

a“

oY taglts

| Te re SNR i eres eenper aee -

4 ; ; — ae ah = te : Lee Orwe Z

a : ;

€ 3 7

~) -

Pe: ;

: ‘ 5 -2- =

ed ee a

aa

:

. > 5 = “4

a :

| =

ae me go nt ee

SoD hae eee

Court’s Order granted a stay of

proceedings and directed that arbitration

take place in Ontario, Canada pursuant to

the Convention on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards

(hereinafter referred to as "The

Convention"). A stay of the action under

the Convention is entirely appropriate as

the Convention is incorporated with

relevant sections of the Federal

Arbitration Act providing for a stay of

proceedings upon application of a party to

an agreement. Moreover, to effectuate the

intent of the Convention a Federal Court

must compel arbitration outside of its own

district when it enforces an agreement of

the parties to arbitrate a controversy

outside the United States. Therefore, the

District Court’s stay of proceedings and

direction that arbitration take place in

Ontario, Canada is not only permitted

under the Convention, but encouraged under

established precedent of this Court

supporting the national policy favoring

arbitration of disputes of this type.

J. ARGUMENT

(1) THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO

PROPERLY RAISE BELOW AND PRESERVE

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES NOW

ASSERTED IN PETITIONER’S PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

(a) Petitioner did not

raise the points below that

the District Court’s Order

granting a stay of

proceedings pending

arbitration was

unconstitutional, or, that

the District Court’s finding

of a Canadian forum for

arbitration was

unconstitutional.

Dura-Corp cites the Supremacy Clause

of Article VI of the Constitution as well

as Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and

Immunities Clauses in its Petition for

Writ of Certiorari. U.S. Const., Art. VI,

e2,.2:3:-3.8: Const., Amend. XIV, sec.1.

While listing these provisions, Petitioner

never discusses them in its argument and

never explains how or why those

Constitutional provisions as applied to

the facts of this case justify review by

this Court. Moreover, no Constitutional

argument was properly raised and preserved

by Petitioner below in either the District

Court or the Court of Appeals.

This Court has held on several

occasions that arguments not addressed in

the District Court or the Court of Appeals

will not be reviewed absent exceptional

circumstances. United States v. Lovasco,

431 U.S. 783, 52 L.Ed.2d 752, 97 S.Ct.

2044, 2048 fn. 7 (1977); Johnson v.

Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,

California, U.8. 7-24072--S.Ct. 1442,

1446 fn. 2., 94 L.Ed.2d 615 (1987)

(Constitutional issue not considered when

not raised below). No exceptional

circumstances exist here. Therefore,

Petitioner may not rely upon the

Constitutional provisions cited as an

9

‘ ,

afterthought to its unsuccessful non-

constitutional arguments advanced in the

Court of Appeals. As this Court stated in

Miree v. DeKalb County, Georgia:

{[tjhe fact that this asserted

basis of liability is so

obviously an afterthought may be

some indication of its merit,

but since it was neither

pleaded, argued, nor briefed

either in the District Court or

in the Court of Appeals, we will

not consider it.

Miree, 433 U.S. 25, 53 L.Ed.2d 557, 97

S.Ct. 2490, 2496 (1977). Similarly, in

the case at bar, Petitioner may not now

attempt to formulate a Constitutional

argument for the first time to obtain

review in this Court.

—

(2) THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE ESTOPPED

FROM RAISING ARGUMENTS CONTRARY

TO THE POSITION IT ADVANCED IN

THE COURT BELOW IN ORDER TO NOW

SEEK REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT.

Petitioner Dura-Corp devotes a large

portion of its Petition for Writ of

Certiorari to the issue of the

10

2s

'

es d j

@

¢ \

'

:

i

|

.

'

‘

acres hp ’

“! - 7 ree ¥ Ass” a, ee 7 ’ 1

. * oe a 4¢q oe la . a hae) ore he ms Pg a ee a O mnaes ptt pa .

“s aoe, At que Balbo a R [= a oe Le ee N

appealability of the District Court’s

Order subsequent to the Third Circuit

decision of Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554

(3rd Cir. 1988). Unlike the

Constitutional provisions discussed above

which were raised for the first time in

this Court, the apppealability of the

District Court Order was raised on appeal

before the Third Circuit. However, it was

Appellees, Respondents herein, Risi Stone,

Ltd. and Rothbury Investments, Ltd., that

raised the issue and argued that the Zosky

case, supra, and this Court’s ruling in

Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas

Corp., U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99

L.Ed.2d 296 (1988), rendered the District

Court’s stay Order a non-appealable

interlocutory order.

In a complete reversal of position,

Petitioner, Dura-Corp, which prosecuted

the appeal despite the Zosky opinion and

opposed Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss the

11

appeal or jurisdiction grounds, now

asserts that its initial appeal was

improper. Petitioner now seeks Supreme

Court review apparently to obtain a ruling

that its appeal was improperly taken in

the first place from a non-appealable

interlocutory order of the District Court.

Petitioner’s assertion of this

argument demonstrates the frivolous nature

of the instant Petition for Writ of

Certiorari. By making this argument,

Petitioner seeks an order that is moot and

would not change the result reached by the

lower Courts or the rights and liabilities

of the parties under existing lower Court

Orders. Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119,

136 97 S.Ct. 1709, 1718-19, 52 L.Ed.2d 184

(1977) Currently, the District Court’s

order staying proceedings and directing

the parties to arbitration, as affirmed,

requires that the parties arbitrate their

dispute. If Petitioner ultimately secured

12

an order from this Court holding that the

initial Order of the District Court to

arbitrate was not properly appeslable,

Petitioner would still be required to

proceed to arbitration under the same

District Court order. Thus, the review

sought by Petitioner does not present a

justifiable "case or controversy" and no

useful purpose can be served by presenting

the appealability argument to this Court.

Kremens, supra.

Moreover, in the circumstances,

Petitioner’s opposition to dismissal of

the appeal pursuant to the Zos case

below constitutes a waiver of that issue.

See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.

204, 208-211, 68 L.Ed.2d 38, 101 S.Ct.

1642, 1645-47 (1981); United Stated v.

Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 898, 95 S.Ct. 2585,

2589, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975). Accordingly,

Petitioner Dura-Corp should be estopped

from asserting a contrary position before

13

tt he L

ee el Pew 6 4

this Court in a frivolous attempt to

obtain further review of the appealability

issue.

(3) THE ORDERS BELOW STAYING

PROCEEDINGS PENDING ARBITRATION

AND DIRECTING ARBITRATION TO TAKE

PLACE IN ONTARIO, CANADA WERE A

PROPER APPLICATION OF THE

CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND

ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL

AWARDS AND THEREFORE ARE NOT A

PROPER SUBJECT OF REVIEW IN THIS

COURT.

Rule 17.1 of the Rules of the Supreme

Court of the United States makes it clear

that review by writ of certiorari is

discretionary and that such a writ will

only be issued when special and important

reasons are presented by the Petitioner.

In the current case, Dura-Corp’s. Petition

clearly fails to satisfy any of the

criteria for review outlined in Supreme

Court Rule 17.1.

(a) The supervisory powers

of this Court should not be

invoked because the lower

Courts properly stayed the

proceedings and directed the

14

4

parties to arbitration

pursuant to the Convention

on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign

Arbitral Awards.

Petitioner urges this Court to

exercise its supervisory powers claiming

that the Stay Order entered below is

inconsistent with the Convention. Indeed,

Petitioner states "the issue in the case

at bar is whether an order granting a

defensive §3 motion to stay proceedings is

inconsistent with §208 of the Convention."

(See Petition, p. 26, fn. 4). Such an

argument demonstrates a complete

misunderstanding of the scope and

application of the Convention, the terms

of which are cited by Petitioner in its

Petition. Moreover, this position taken

in the Petition is not supported by

applicable precedent, including that cited

and relied upon by Petitioner.

Petitioner Dura-Corp attempts to

argue that because the Convention does not

15

contain a provision for stay of

arbitration, such an order is inconsistent

with the Convention. This argument

clearly ignores §208 of the Convention

cited by Petitioner. Section 208

provides:

Chapter 1 [The Federal

Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A §1 et

seq.] applies to actions and

proceedings brought under this

Chapter [The Convention, 9

U.S.C.A. §201 et seq.] to the

extent that Chapter is not in

conflict with this Chapter [The

Convention, 9 U.S.C.A. §201 et

seq.] or the Convention as

ratified by the United States.

9 U.S.C.A. §208. Therefore, the stay

provision of the Federal Arbitration Act,

9 U.S.C.A. §3, is incorporated into the

Convention. This concept has been

recognized and discussed by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit in Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos

Mexicanos Mexican National Oil Company:

Thus §201 provides that the

Convention ‘shall be enforced by

United States courts.’ In

substance, the Convention

16

EEE EE OO OOOO

replicates the Federal

Arbitration Act. Indeed, §208

of the enabling legislation for

the Convention incorporates all

of the Convention into Chapter 1

of Title 9. But while the

Convention requires Courts of

the United States to enforce

arbitration clauses along lines

similar to those specified in

the arbitration act, its reach

is broader than the Arbitration

Act. Both the Arbitration Act

and the Convention provide that

if a dispute in a pending

lawsuit is subject to

arbitration, the District ‘shall

on application of one of the

parties stay the trial of the

action until such arbitration

has been had.’ ... Section 206

of the enabling legislation for

the Convention also authorizes

District courts to order parties

to proceed with the Convention

arbitration even outside the

United States.

Sedco, Inc. v.._Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican

National Oil Company, 767 F.2d 1140, 1146

(5th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). Thus,

the grant of a defensive motion for stay

under the Convention as incorporated into

the Federal Arbitration Act is appropriate

and entirely consistent with the express

language and intent of the Convention.

17

This view is also in accord with the

strong public policy in favor of

international arbitration. See Scherk v.

Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct.

2449, 41 L.Ed.2d. 270 (1974).

Even the precedent cited by

Petitioner does not support its position.

Petitioner cites McCreary Tire and Rubber

Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3rd Cir. 1974)

in support of its argument that a stay

order is inconsistent with the Convention.

(See Petition, p.27). Petitioner’s

quotation of that opinion is out of

context, citing only from a portion of the

opinion dealing with foreign attachment.

The portion of the McCreary opinion

dealing with international arbitration,

however, supports the entry of a stay

pending arbitration in the case at bar.

Specifically, the Third Circuit Court

Appeals in McCreary held that the District

18

Court committed error by failing to grant

a stay under the Convention.

The enactment of Pub. L. 91-368,

providing a federal remedy for

the enforcement of the

Convention, including removal

jurisdiction without regard to

diversity or amount in

controversy, demonstrates the

firm commitment of the Congress

to the elimination of vestiges

of judicial reluctance to

enforce arbitration agreements,

- at least in the international

commercial context. It was

error to deny the motion for

stay in disregard of the

Convention.

McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1037 (citations

omitted). Thus, the trial Court Order

staying proceedings pending arbitration is

consistent with the Convention and clearly

not a departure from the accepted and

usual course of judicial proceedings so as

to justify the exercise of this Court’s

power of supervision.

(b) Petitioner fails to

present any conflict between

the lower Court orders in

this case and relevant

decisions of this Court or

19

between The Circuit Courts

of Appeals on the -forum non

conveniens issue.

Petitioner’s citation of this Court’s

decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330

U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947) is not

relevant to or in conflict with the

applicable caselaw concerning arbitration.

Moreover, while Petitioner makes passing

reference to a conflict between the lower

courts’ rulings pursuant to the Convention

and some New York cases, said conflict is

not discussed or readily apparent from a

review of the argument section of Dura-

Corp’s petition. Therefore, there is no

conflict justifying review in this Court.

This Court’s decision in Gulf Oil

Corp. v. Gilbert, supra, pre-dates

enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act

and the Convention on the Recognition and

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitrél Awards.

While the decision discusses the doctrine

of forum non conveniens, it clearly has no

20

application to the parties’ choice of a

site for arbitration and is clearly

distinguishable from the case at bar.

Therefore, Gulf Oil clearly does not

support Petitioner’s assertions that the

District Court was "Constitutionally

obliged to weigh the jurisdictional

contacts of the parties in order to

determine the appropriate forum for

arbitration." Petition, pg. 3l.

The decision below staying

proceedings pending arbitration and

directing that arbitration take place in

Ontario, Canada clearly is in accord with

later decisions of this Court establishing

a liberal federal policy favoring

arbitration agreements. See Scherk v.

Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct.

2449, 41 L.Ed.2d. 270 (1974); Moses H.

Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Corp.,

460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941 (1983).

Moreover, the District Court’s

21

oa

4

Se a HN Se ea

determination that arbitration should be

conducted according to an agreement is a

preliminary one that must be made on the

facts as presented by the movant, in this

case pursuant to the affidavit of

Mr. Angelo Risi for Risi Stone, Ltd. and

Rothbury Investments, Ltd. PAS-EBS v.

Group Health, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 937, 940

(S.D. NY 1977), citing, Prima Paint Corp.

v. Flood Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,

403-404, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 1806, 18 L.Ed.2d

1270 (1967).

Finally, Petitioner presents no

conflict among the United Stated Circuit

Courts of Appeal which would justify

review in this Court. Petitioner cites

several District Court opinions, but fails

to highlight any split among the Circuit

Courts which is ripe for review on the

forum non conveniens issue.

The courts which have considered the

doctrine of forum non conveniens in the

22

i, ees

\

i

~~

.

fj ,

or. ‘

-

=

7

*

aT ta

= .

“=

~

7

a vs

eae |

a

°

i

r

.- s “ot

o . =

context of a site for arbitration have

found that the doctrine is either not

applicable to arbitration, or, only

applicable to where to the Federal Court

action to compel arbitration should be

prosecuted. See Spring Hope Rockwool v.

Industrial Clean Air, Inc., 504 F.Supp.

1385, 1389 (E.D. NC 1981) (application of

the forum non conveniens doctrine not

authorized under the Arbitration Act);

Maria Victoria Naviera S.A. v. Cementos

Del Valle, 759 F.2d. 1027, 1031 (2nd Cir.

1985) (federal court forum for petition to

compel arbitration subject to doctrine but

distinguished from location of the

arbitration itself). In the circumstances,

Petitioner has failed to present a

conflict sufficient to support review in

this Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

AFekhea

23

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

Respondents, Risi Stone, Ltd. and Rothbury

Investments, Ltd., respectfully request

that Dura-Corp’s Petition for Writ of

Certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE, P.C.

LM gyyf

Charles W Kénrick,’Esq.

Hunter A. McGeary, Jr., Esq.

Two PPG Place, Suite 400

Pittsburgh, PA 15222-5402

By

Attorneys for Respondents

24

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.