Opposition Brief — Dura-Corp. v. Risi Stone Ltd.
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Res ht No. 88-1450
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1988
DURA-CORP, a Pennsylvania
Business Corporation,
Petitioner
vs.
RISI STONE LTD., A Canadian
Corporation and ROTHBURY INVESTMENTS,
LTD., a Canadian Corporation,
Respondents
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Charles W. Kenrick, Esquire
Hunter A. McGeary, Jr., Esquire
DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE, P.C.
Two PPG Place, Suite 400
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222
(412) 281-7272
Attorneys for Respondents
Dated: March 31, 1989
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
While Respondents contend that the
Petitioner has not properly preserved
for review several of the issues
presented in its Petition,
Respondents accept the statement of
the Questions Presented contained in
Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of
Certiorari insofar as it lists
issues to be discussed and opposed by
- the within Brief.
Gulf
LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 28.1 LIST
Respondents accept the list of
parties as stated in Petitioner’s
Petition.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Case Law Page
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947) ...... 20
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp., U.S.
108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d. 2 296
(1988) eeeseeeneeeeeeeseeeeeeee ee @ 11
Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, California,
U.S. _, 107 S.Ct. 1442,
1446 fn. 2, 94 L.Ed.2d 615
CREE id cede CE Pies 6 S040 4s 9
Kremens v. Bartley,
431 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 1709, 52
L.Ed.2d 184 (1977) eeeeoees#e#ee#se# 12
eam SE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont. )
Maria Victoria Naviera S.A. v.
Cementos Del Valle, 759 F.2d
1027, 1031 (2nd Cir. 1985) .... 23
McCreary Tire and Rubber Co. v.
CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3rd Cir.
TOFS) cvcsscccvecsccesccccccecs 18
Miree v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 433 °
U.S. 25, 53 L.Ed.2d 557, 97. be
S.Ct. 2490, 2496 (1977). peas 10
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital Vv.
Mercury Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 ! —
S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765
(1983) w..ccccees Se eeb ee eee Ces es 21
PAS-EBS v. Group Health, Inc., 442
F. Supp. 937 (S.D. NY 1977) . 22
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin
Mfq. Co. 173 Gee S9a¢ BI
S.C. 1901, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270
BE ae 22
2
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. a 941
| 2 aia ida eis 18
Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos
Mexican National Oil Co., 767
F.2d 1140, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985) 16
Spring Hope Rockwool v. Industrial
Clean Air, Inc., 504 F. Supp.
1385, 1389 (E.D. NC 1981) ..... 23
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d
i) lea ae aii wks 13
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.
783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d
PR BEETED S066 eb eeccccccscccce 9
‘iene _— "
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont. )
Page
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891, 45 L.Ed.2d 623, 95 S.Ct.
2585 (1975) *eese eeee#eetfees8s85s§ee#ee#eee#e#ee#ee#se#s?s@# 13
Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554 (3rd
Cail 1988) e*eeee#3se#see#e7#seee#8e#€#€8e#28e#e#ee#e 1l
Constitutional Provisions,
Statutes and Rules
United States Constitution, Article
VI, ee awe e*eeees 8
United States Constitution, .
Amendment XIV, Section l...... 8
Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitration Awards (9 U.S.C.
§201, et seq.), 9 U.S.C.A. §208 16
Federal Arbitration Act ( U.S.C. §l,
et seg.), 9 U.S.C.A. §3 ....... 16
Supreme Court Rule 17.1 ............ 14
iii
D. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
A. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW i
LIST OF PARTIES AND RULE 28.1
LIST e*eeeees#ee#er#eeeers8sveer#see##ee#ee#e#ee?#8#8#e#e#e# i
GC. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........-. i
D. TABLE OF CONTENTS e*eeeeee#eeeee#e#e#@* iv
E. CITATIONS TO THE OPINIONS AND
JUDGMENTS DELIVERED IN THE
COURTS BELOW *eeeee#ee#esesee#ee#e#?#e#*¢ vi
F. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..... vi
G. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
TREATIES, AND STATUTES INVOLVED vi
H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........- . 1
g I e SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT e*eeete#eee#e#8?#e¢# 5
J. ARGUMENT eoeeetensveentreneskseeneteenreeeee 8
(1) THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED
TO PROPERLY RAISE BELOW AND
PRESERVE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
NOW ASSERTED IN PETITIONER’S
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 8
(a) Petitioner did not
raise the ints below
that the District Court’s
Order granting a stay
nding arbitration was
unconstitutional, or
that the District Court’s
finding of a Canadian
forum for arbitration was
unconstitutional ........ 8
iv
'
K.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)
(2) THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE
ESTOPPED FROM RAISING ARGUMENTS
CONTRARY TO THE POSITION IT
ADVANCED IN THE COURT BELOW IN
ORDER TO NOW SEEK REVIEW BY THE
SUPREME COURT ....ccceecccccees
(3) THE ORDERS BELOW STAYING
PROCEEDINGS PENDING ARBITRATION
AND DIRECTING ARBITRATION TO
TAKE PLACE IN ONTARIO, CANADA
WERE A PROPER APPLICATION OF
THE CONVENTION ON THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS AND
THEREFORE ARE NOT A PROPER
SUBJECT OF REVIEW IN THIS COURT
(a) The Supervisory
powers of this Court
should not be invoked
because the lower courts
properly stayed the
proceedings and directed
the parties to
arbitration pursuant to
the Convention on the
Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards .........
(b) Petitioner fails to
present any conflict
between the lower court
orders in the instant
case and relevant
decisions of this Court
or between the Circuit
Courts of Appeals on the
forum non conveniens
Tn CeCe eeeeebeeeenecece
CONCLUSION ..ccccccccccccccccce
10
14
14
19
24
OPINIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS
Respondents accept the citation to
the opinions of the lower Courts as
stated in the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Respondents accept the Statement of
Jurisdiction contained in the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATIES
AND STATUTES INVOLVED
Respondents accept the Verbatim
Reproduction of Constitutional
Provisions, Treaties and Statutes
Involved in the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
vi
= er
H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 16, 1983, Thomas R. Eddy,
Kenneth R. Dehus and Angelo Risi entered
into the agreement attached to Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint in the District Court
(345a, 311a-330a).1 Mr. Risi supplied the
typed portion of the Licensing Agreement
on behalf of Risi Stone, Ltd., as proposed
language for the Licensing Agreement
between the parties (345a-346a). Thomas
R. Eddy, an attorney, reviewed the
proposed Licensing Agreement prior to its
execution by the parties and made hand-
written revisions and additions thereto
(346a). Attorney Eddy did not make any
revisions to the Licensing Agreement
pertaining to Paragraph 28 thereof which
states:
28. Arbitration
1 References are to the appendix to the
appeals in The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Any dispute, difference or
question arising between Risi
and Licensee concerning the
interpretation, construction,
meaning or effect of this
Agreement or any part thereof
shall be referred a single
arbitrator if Risi and Licensee
agree upon such arbitrator or
failing such Agreement to a
board of three (3) arbitrators,
one (1) to be appointed by Risi;
one (1) to be appointed by
Licensee; and one (1) to be
appointed by the two (2)
arbitrators so named by Risi and
Licensee. The provisions of the
Arbitrations Act of the Province
of Ontario shall be applicable.
(324-325a,- 345a-347a).
Plaintiff, Dura-Corp, Petitioner
herein, initiated a Declaratory Judgment
action in the Federal District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania as
Licensee pursyant to the above-referenced
Agreement (303a-336a). Defendants then
filed a motion inter alia for a stay of
the declaratory judgment action pending
arbitration of the dispute between the
parties. In support of Defendants’
motion, Defendants filed the affidavit of
=. Lb eee ey bas
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Angelo Risi (345a-347a). Prior to the
entry of the District Court Order granting
Defendants’ Motion for Stay, no affidavits
were filed on behalf of Plaintiff, Dura-
Corp in support of its contention that the
instant case should not be referred to
arbitration or opposing the location of
the arbitration. Only after Plaintiff,
Dura-Corp, Petitioner herein, had appealed
the District Court’s Order to the Third
Circuit of Appeals, did Petitioner file
affidavits with the District Court
purportedly opposing the location of the
arbitration.
| Petitioner Dura-Corp’s Statement of
the case in this Court makes numerous
allegations not of record either in the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals or in the
District Court. Petitioner, as it did
before the Third Circuit, alludes to
allegations contained in its Amended
Complaint and Petitioner’s own briefs
filed in the District Court. These
assertions do not constitute facts of
record which should be considered by this
Court. Because the declaratory judgment
action below was disposed of on
Defendants’ Motion for Stay, the citations
to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and
Briefs are improper. The alleged "facts"
cited by Petitioner are in dispute;
however, because of the disposition of
this case on motion, Defendants were not
required to answer the Complaint or refute
the naked allegations contained in the
briefs which were not verified by
affidavit. Therefore, the only key facts
relevant to the current Petition for Writ
Certiorari include the arbitration clause
(quoted herein and attached to Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint) and the affidavit of
Angelo Risi which was timely filed prior
to the District Court’s ruling on the
arbitration issue.
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner’s attempt to obtain review
by this Court is flawed on both procedural
and substantive grounds. First, Dura-Corp
waited until the filing of its Petition in
this Court to first raise Constitutional
arguments, and accordingly has not
properly preserved those points for this
Court’s review. Second, despite citing
two Constitutional provisions in the
initial portion of its Petition as
required by Supreme Court rules,
Petitioner never explains in the argument
section of the Petition how and why the
District Court and Third Circuit decisions
violate the cited Constitutional
provisions.
Third, review of the Petition should
be denied based upon principles of
estoppel. Briefly stated, Petitioner now
seeks to advance an argument as the basis
for obtaining review that it vehemently
5
opposed in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. More
specifically, in the Court of appeals,
Respondents, Risi Stone, Ltd. and Rothbury
Investments, Ltd., argued that Dura-Corp’s
appeal of the District Court’s Stay Order
was barred by the reasoning of the recent
Third Circuit decision in Zosky v. Boyer, -
856 F.2d 554 (3rd Cir. 1988) and
Petitioner Dura-Corp opposed this same
argument. In an amazing and complete
reversal of position, Petitioner now
asserts that Zosky controls and that the
District Court’s order was not appealable
as it is an interlocutory order. Simply
stated, Petitioner attempts to take a
further appeal to this Court in order to
argue that the very Order that it
originally appealed from is not an
appealable order after all.
Fourth, Dura-Corp’s Petition fails on
substantive grounds as well. The District
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Court’s Order granted a stay of
proceedings and directed that arbitration
take place in Ontario, Canada pursuant to
the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(hereinafter referred to as "The
Convention"). A stay of the action under
the Convention is entirely appropriate as
the Convention is incorporated with
relevant sections of the Federal
Arbitration Act providing for a stay of
proceedings upon application of a party to
an agreement. Moreover, to effectuate the
intent of the Convention a Federal Court
must compel arbitration outside of its own
district when it enforces an agreement of
the parties to arbitrate a controversy
outside the United States. Therefore, the
District Court’s stay of proceedings and
direction that arbitration take place in
Ontario, Canada is not only permitted
under the Convention, but encouraged under
established precedent of this Court
supporting the national policy favoring
arbitration of disputes of this type.
J. ARGUMENT
(1) THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO
PROPERLY RAISE BELOW AND PRESERVE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES NOW
ASSERTED IN PETITIONER’S PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
(a) Petitioner did not
raise the points below that
the District Court’s Order
granting a stay of
proceedings pending
arbitration was
unconstitutional, or, that
the District Court’s finding
of a Canadian forum for
arbitration was
unconstitutional.
Dura-Corp cites the Supremacy Clause
of Article VI of the Constitution as well
as Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and
Immunities Clauses in its Petition for
Writ of Certiorari. U.S. Const., Art. VI,
e2,.2:3:-3.8: Const., Amend. XIV, sec.1.
While listing these provisions, Petitioner
never discusses them in its argument and
never explains how or why those
Constitutional provisions as applied to
the facts of this case justify review by
this Court. Moreover, no Constitutional
argument was properly raised and preserved
by Petitioner below in either the District
Court or the Court of Appeals.
This Court has held on several
occasions that arguments not addressed in
the District Court or the Court of Appeals
will not be reviewed absent exceptional
circumstances. United States v. Lovasco,
431 U.S. 783, 52 L.Ed.2d 752, 97 S.Ct.
2044, 2048 fn. 7 (1977); Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,
California, U.8. 7-24072--S.Ct. 1442,
1446 fn. 2., 94 L.Ed.2d 615 (1987)
(Constitutional issue not considered when
not raised below). No exceptional
circumstances exist here. Therefore,
Petitioner may not rely upon the
Constitutional provisions cited as an
9
‘ ,
afterthought to its unsuccessful non-
constitutional arguments advanced in the
Court of Appeals. As this Court stated in
Miree v. DeKalb County, Georgia:
{[tjhe fact that this asserted
basis of liability is so
obviously an afterthought may be
some indication of its merit,
but since it was neither
pleaded, argued, nor briefed
either in the District Court or
in the Court of Appeals, we will
not consider it.
Miree, 433 U.S. 25, 53 L.Ed.2d 557, 97
S.Ct. 2490, 2496 (1977). Similarly, in
the case at bar, Petitioner may not now
attempt to formulate a Constitutional
argument for the first time to obtain
review in this Court.
—
(2) THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE ESTOPPED
FROM RAISING ARGUMENTS CONTRARY
TO THE POSITION IT ADVANCED IN
THE COURT BELOW IN ORDER TO NOW
SEEK REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT.
Petitioner Dura-Corp devotes a large
portion of its Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the issue of the
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appealability of the District Court’s
Order subsequent to the Third Circuit
decision of Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554
(3rd Cir. 1988). Unlike the
Constitutional provisions discussed above
which were raised for the first time in
this Court, the apppealability of the
District Court Order was raised on appeal
before the Third Circuit. However, it was
Appellees, Respondents herein, Risi Stone,
Ltd. and Rothbury Investments, Ltd., that
raised the issue and argued that the Zosky
case, supra, and this Court’s ruling in
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas
Corp., U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99
L.Ed.2d 296 (1988), rendered the District
Court’s stay Order a non-appealable
interlocutory order.
In a complete reversal of position,
Petitioner, Dura-Corp, which prosecuted
the appeal despite the Zosky opinion and
opposed Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss the
11
appeal or jurisdiction grounds, now
asserts that its initial appeal was
improper. Petitioner now seeks Supreme
Court review apparently to obtain a ruling
that its appeal was improperly taken in
the first place from a non-appealable
interlocutory order of the District Court.
Petitioner’s assertion of this
argument demonstrates the frivolous nature
of the instant Petition for Writ of
Certiorari. By making this argument,
Petitioner seeks an order that is moot and
would not change the result reached by the
lower Courts or the rights and liabilities
of the parties under existing lower Court
Orders. Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119,
136 97 S.Ct. 1709, 1718-19, 52 L.Ed.2d 184
(1977) Currently, the District Court’s
order staying proceedings and directing
the parties to arbitration, as affirmed,
requires that the parties arbitrate their
dispute. If Petitioner ultimately secured
12
an order from this Court holding that the
initial Order of the District Court to
arbitrate was not properly appeslable,
Petitioner would still be required to
proceed to arbitration under the same
District Court order. Thus, the review
sought by Petitioner does not present a
justifiable "case or controversy" and no
useful purpose can be served by presenting
the appealability argument to this Court.
Kremens, supra.
Moreover, in the circumstances,
Petitioner’s opposition to dismissal of
the appeal pursuant to the Zos case
below constitutes a waiver of that issue.
See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 208-211, 68 L.Ed.2d 38, 101 S.Ct.
1642, 1645-47 (1981); United Stated v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 898, 95 S.Ct. 2585,
2589, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975). Accordingly,
Petitioner Dura-Corp should be estopped
from asserting a contrary position before
13
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this Court in a frivolous attempt to
obtain further review of the appealability
issue.
(3) THE ORDERS BELOW STAYING
PROCEEDINGS PENDING ARBITRATION
AND DIRECTING ARBITRATION TO TAKE
PLACE IN ONTARIO, CANADA WERE A
PROPER APPLICATION OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS AND THEREFORE ARE NOT A
PROPER SUBJECT OF REVIEW IN THIS
COURT.
Rule 17.1 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States makes it clear
that review by writ of certiorari is
discretionary and that such a writ will
only be issued when special and important
reasons are presented by the Petitioner.
In the current case, Dura-Corp’s. Petition
clearly fails to satisfy any of the
criteria for review outlined in Supreme
Court Rule 17.1.
(a) The supervisory powers
of this Court should not be
invoked because the lower
Courts properly stayed the
proceedings and directed the
14
4
parties to arbitration
pursuant to the Convention
on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.
Petitioner urges this Court to
exercise its supervisory powers claiming
that the Stay Order entered below is
inconsistent with the Convention. Indeed,
Petitioner states "the issue in the case
at bar is whether an order granting a
defensive §3 motion to stay proceedings is
inconsistent with §208 of the Convention."
(See Petition, p. 26, fn. 4). Such an
argument demonstrates a complete
misunderstanding of the scope and
application of the Convention, the terms
of which are cited by Petitioner in its
Petition. Moreover, this position taken
in the Petition is not supported by
applicable precedent, including that cited
and relied upon by Petitioner.
Petitioner Dura-Corp attempts to
argue that because the Convention does not
15
contain a provision for stay of
arbitration, such an order is inconsistent
with the Convention. This argument
clearly ignores §208 of the Convention
cited by Petitioner. Section 208
provides:
Chapter 1 [The Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A §1 et
seq.] applies to actions and
proceedings brought under this
Chapter [The Convention, 9
U.S.C.A. §201 et seq.] to the
extent that Chapter is not in
conflict with this Chapter [The
Convention, 9 U.S.C.A. §201 et
seq.] or the Convention as
ratified by the United States.
9 U.S.C.A. §208. Therefore, the stay
provision of the Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C.A. §3, is incorporated into the
Convention. This concept has been
recognized and discussed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos
Mexicanos Mexican National Oil Company:
Thus §201 provides that the
Convention ‘shall be enforced by
United States courts.’ In
substance, the Convention
16
EEE EE OO OOOO
replicates the Federal
Arbitration Act. Indeed, §208
of the enabling legislation for
the Convention incorporates all
of the Convention into Chapter 1
of Title 9. But while the
Convention requires Courts of
the United States to enforce
arbitration clauses along lines
similar to those specified in
the arbitration act, its reach
is broader than the Arbitration
Act. Both the Arbitration Act
and the Convention provide that
if a dispute in a pending
lawsuit is subject to
arbitration, the District ‘shall
on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration
has been had.’ ... Section 206
of the enabling legislation for
the Convention also authorizes
District courts to order parties
to proceed with the Convention
arbitration even outside the
United States.
Sedco, Inc. v.._Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican
National Oil Company, 767 F.2d 1140, 1146
(5th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). Thus,
the grant of a defensive motion for stay
under the Convention as incorporated into
the Federal Arbitration Act is appropriate
and entirely consistent with the express
language and intent of the Convention.
17
This view is also in accord with the
strong public policy in favor of
international arbitration. See Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct.
2449, 41 L.Ed.2d. 270 (1974).
Even the precedent cited by
Petitioner does not support its position.
Petitioner cites McCreary Tire and Rubber
Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3rd Cir. 1974)
in support of its argument that a stay
order is inconsistent with the Convention.
(See Petition, p.27). Petitioner’s
quotation of that opinion is out of
context, citing only from a portion of the
opinion dealing with foreign attachment.
The portion of the McCreary opinion
dealing with international arbitration,
however, supports the entry of a stay
pending arbitration in the case at bar.
Specifically, the Third Circuit Court
Appeals in McCreary held that the District
18
Court committed error by failing to grant
a stay under the Convention.
The enactment of Pub. L. 91-368,
providing a federal remedy for
the enforcement of the
Convention, including removal
jurisdiction without regard to
diversity or amount in
controversy, demonstrates the
firm commitment of the Congress
to the elimination of vestiges
of judicial reluctance to
enforce arbitration agreements,
- at least in the international
commercial context. It was
error to deny the motion for
stay in disregard of the
Convention.
McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1037 (citations
omitted). Thus, the trial Court Order
staying proceedings pending arbitration is
consistent with the Convention and clearly
not a departure from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings so as
to justify the exercise of this Court’s
power of supervision.
(b) Petitioner fails to
present any conflict between
the lower Court orders in
this case and relevant
decisions of this Court or
19
between The Circuit Courts
of Appeals on the -forum non
conveniens issue.
Petitioner’s citation of this Court’s
decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947) is not
relevant to or in conflict with the
applicable caselaw concerning arbitration.
Moreover, while Petitioner makes passing
reference to a conflict between the lower
courts’ rulings pursuant to the Convention
and some New York cases, said conflict is
not discussed or readily apparent from a
review of the argument section of Dura-
Corp’s petition. Therefore, there is no
conflict justifying review in this Court.
This Court’s decision in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, supra, pre-dates
enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act
and the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitrél Awards.
While the decision discusses the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, it clearly has no
20
application to the parties’ choice of a
site for arbitration and is clearly
distinguishable from the case at bar.
Therefore, Gulf Oil clearly does not
support Petitioner’s assertions that the
District Court was "Constitutionally
obliged to weigh the jurisdictional
contacts of the parties in order to
determine the appropriate forum for
arbitration." Petition, pg. 3l.
The decision below staying
proceedings pending arbitration and
directing that arbitration take place in
Ontario, Canada clearly is in accord with
later decisions of this Court establishing
a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements. See Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct.
2449, 41 L.Ed.2d. 270 (1974); Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941 (1983).
Moreover, the District Court’s
21
oa
4
Se a HN Se ea
determination that arbitration should be
conducted according to an agreement is a
preliminary one that must be made on the
facts as presented by the movant, in this
case pursuant to the affidavit of
Mr. Angelo Risi for Risi Stone, Ltd. and
Rothbury Investments, Ltd. PAS-EBS v.
Group Health, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 937, 940
(S.D. NY 1977), citing, Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
403-404, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 1806, 18 L.Ed.2d
1270 (1967).
Finally, Petitioner presents no
conflict among the United Stated Circuit
Courts of Appeal which would justify
review in this Court. Petitioner cites
several District Court opinions, but fails
to highlight any split among the Circuit
Courts which is ripe for review on the
forum non conveniens issue.
The courts which have considered the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in the
22
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context of a site for arbitration have
found that the doctrine is either not
applicable to arbitration, or, only
applicable to where to the Federal Court
action to compel arbitration should be
prosecuted. See Spring Hope Rockwool v.
Industrial Clean Air, Inc., 504 F.Supp.
1385, 1389 (E.D. NC 1981) (application of
the forum non conveniens doctrine not
authorized under the Arbitration Act);
Maria Victoria Naviera S.A. v. Cementos
Del Valle, 759 F.2d. 1027, 1031 (2nd Cir.
1985) (federal court forum for petition to
compel arbitration subject to doctrine but
distinguished from location of the
arbitration itself). In the circumstances,
Petitioner has failed to present a
conflict sufficient to support review in
this Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
AFekhea
23
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
Respondents, Risi Stone, Ltd. and Rothbury
Investments, Ltd., respectfully request
that Dura-Corp’s Petition for Writ of
Certiorari be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
DICKIE, MCCAMEY & CHILCOTE, P.C.
LM gyyf
Charles W Kénrick,’Esq.
Hunter A. McGeary, Jr., Esq.
Two PPG Place, Suite 400
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-5402
By
Attorneys for Respondents
24
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