Opposition Brief — Navistar International Transportation Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

3n the Soupeeme Court ofthe Bnited

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

CORPORATION, PETITIONER

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

WILLIAM C. BRYSON

Acting Solicitor General

DONALD A. CARR

Acting Assistant Attorney General

KAREN L. EGBERT

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals, in upholding the

decision of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

finding petitioner liable for noncompliance penalties

under Section 120 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7420,

properly gave deference to EPA’s interpretation of the

federally enforceable Ohio state implementation plan.

2. Whether the court of appeals properly upheld the

exclusion of evidence of technological and economic in-

feasibility at the liability stage of the Section 120 non-

compliance proceeding.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Petroleum Institute v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176

(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1034 (1982) ...

Bethlehem Stee! Corp. v. EPA, 638 F.2d 994 (7th Cir.

a 0 ae ad So 5 hale bain a v8

Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987) ........—.......

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410

re eee a a nae ee ab eos ®

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) .....

City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462

ee ae ee Pe ete os gaa aio i

Clarke v. Securities industry Association, 479 U.S. 388

EE ee daa bale ae Haake hae hk eae 46

Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir.

ee ee ad ygth vanes dane eee a 6s

EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 108 S. Ct.

Ae ii iss anise 0 Kawa ake Mk0 s

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Build-

ing & Construction Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392

ef SSE Te ee ea a eo

Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482

a ee wale wide e bh ae a

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555

EE SOS Dit ES SIEES CR SGLT st a

Gardebring v. Jenkins, 108 S. Ct. 1306 (1988) ..........

a rr

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) ..........

(111)

IV

Cases — Continued: Page

Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839

a cc 2,

K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) ..... 8

Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987) ................. 8

Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Com-

pensation Programs, 108 S. Ct. 427 (1987) ........... 7

NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union,

a es er acc cake sb cpwaGeevancceessas 8

CAGE V, TE, Bee Shade BQUMIOD 5 once nec ccsacessss

Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) ........ 11

United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977) ......... 7

Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing

Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987) .......... Sd aie aes a 8

Statutes and regulation:

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§ 120(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. 7420(b)(4) ................. 3

§ 120(a)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. 7420(ay(2)(A)i) . 2.2... 6

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Ohio Admin. Code (1987):

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40 C.F.R.:

Pt. 50:

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Pt. 66, Subpt. F:

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Miscellaneous: Page

44 Fed. Reg. (1979):

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47 Fed. Reg. (1982):

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In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988-

No. 88-1321

NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

CORPORATION, PETITIONER

Vv.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-A14)

is reported at 858 F.2d 282. The initial decision of the ad-

ministrative law judge (Pet. App. E1-E19) and the final

order Of the Environmental Protection Agency chief

judicial officer (Pet. App. D1-D7) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. B1)

was entered on September 23, 1988. A petition for rehear-

ing was denied on November 10, 1988 (Pet. App. Cl). The

_petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on February 8,

1989. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 ef seq.,

establishes a joint federal and state program to control

and improve the nation’s air quality. Section 109, 42

U.S.C. 7409, requires the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) to promulgate national ambient air quality

standards, and Section 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(1), re-

quires each State to adopt and submit for EPA approval a

state implementation plan (SIP) to implement, maintain,

and enforce the federal air quality standards within its

borders. The SIP is to contain detailed regulations limiting

emissions from air pollution sources, including timetables

for compliance, and must be approved by EPA. 42 U.S.C.

7410(a)(1), (a)(2). Like original SIPs, revisions of SIPs

must be submitted to and approved by EPA. 42 U.S.C.

7410(a)(3). Once an initial SIP or a SIP revision is ap-

proved, it is promulgated as a federal rule, and the emis-

sions limitations are enforceable as federal law. 42 U.S.C.

7410(d).

The Clean Air Act provides several enforcement

mechanisms, including Sections 113 and 120, 42 U.S.C.

7413 and 7420. Section 113 authorizes EPA to initiate

judicial proceedings to sanction noncompliance with ap-

plicable SIP requirements by seeking injunctive relief and

civil penalties. Section 120, on the other hand, authorizes

EPA in an administrative proceeding to recoup from the

owner or Operator of a major stationary source the

economic value of its delaying compliance with applicable

SIP requirements. -

The Section 120 penalty is calculated on the basis of the

cost that a source avoids by delaying compliance. The

penalty begins accruing as of the issuance of a notice of

noncompliance. 42 U.S.C. 7420(d)(2). A noncomplying

source that receives a notice of noncompliance must either

(1) submit a petition for reconsideration, in which it can

contest the finding of liability, or (2) calculate the amount

of the penalty owed and the appropriate payment sched-

ule. 42 U.S.C. 7420(b)(4); 40 C.F.R. 66.13(a). If the non-

complying source files a petition for reconsideration on

the issue of liability, the EPA Administrator may, among

other things, provide an adjudicatory hearing to determine

whether the source is in violation of applicable SIP re-

quirements. 42 U.S.C. 7420(b)(5); 40 C.F.R. 66.41. Once

there is a decision that a source is liable for its non-

compliance, a second penalty phase commences for

calculation of the amount of the penalty owed. 40 C.F.R.

Pt. 66, Subpt. F. a.

2. In February 1979, EPA promulgated a combined

_ primary and secondary national ambient air quality stand-

ard for ozone. See 44 Fed. Reg. 8202; 40 C.F.R. 50.9.' To

attain the national standard for ozone, the State of Ohio

revised its SIP in 1981 to include regulations restricting the

emission of air pollutants that contribute to ozone forma-

tion. See Ohio Admin. Code § 3745-21-09 (1987). EPA

approved the SIP. Among its provisions, the Ohio SIP

limits the emission of volatile organic compounds (VOCs)

during the application of extreme performance (paint)

coatings to miscellaneous metal parts and products, in-

cluding automobiles and trucks, in excess of 3.5 pounds of

VOCs per gallon of coating, excluding water.? The Ohio

' Ozone, a byproduct of the photochemical oxidation of volatile

organic compounds (such as paint coatings), is a respiratory irritant

that is linked to various health disorders. 44 Fed. Reg. 8203-8204

(1979). See generally American Petroleum Institute v. Costle, 665

F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding EPA’s ozone standard), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982).

2 The Ohio Administrative Code states in pertinent part:

{[NJo owner or operator of a miscellaneous metal part or product

coating line may cause, allow or permit the discharge into the

4

SIP exempts from regulation “the application of a

refinishing coating to motor vehicles and trailers.” Ohio

Admin. Code § 3745-21-09(U)(2)(c) (1987). Section 110 of

the Clean Act required sources to comply with tke SIP

emission limitations by December 31, 1982. 42 U.S.C.

7410.

3. Petitioner owns and operates an assembly plant

near Springfield, Ohio, at which it applies paint and other

extreme performance coatings to newly manufactured and

assembled trucks. In September 1984, EPA notified peti-

tioner that emissions from ten of the coating lines at its

Springfield facility violated the VOC emission limits in the

Ohio SIP. Petitioner sought and was granted an adminis-

trative hearing on the issue of its liability for non-

compliance penalties under Section 120 of the Clean Air

Act. In response to a motion in limine by EPA, the admin-

istrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that claims of tech-

nological and economic infeasibility are irrelevant to the

question of petitioner’s liability for violation of the Ohio

SIP and therefore that evidence bearing only on that issue

was not admissible as evidence at the liability hearing. Pet.

App. F1-F8. The ALJ determined, however, that infeasi-

bility evidence could be retained in the record as an offer

of proof for the penalty calculation of the proceeding. /d.

at F7.

At the hearing petitioner contested its liability for non-

compliance penalties on the grounds that (1) two of its

painting lines were not “coating lines” within the definition

of the Ohio SIP; (2) four of its painting lines, on which

“touch-up” operations on newly assembled trucks are per-

ambient air of any volatile organic compounds from Such coating

line * * * [in excess of 3.5 pounds of volatile organic compounds

(minus water) per gallon as applied].

Ohio Admin. Code § 3745-21-09(U)(1)(a)(iil) (1987).

5

formed, are entitled to a refinishing exemption under the

Ohio SIP; and (3) four of its painting lines, on which both

metallic and nonmetallic parts are painted, are not

regulated by the Ohio SIP. After a hearing on the record,

the ALJ concluded that each of petitioner’s Springfield

coating lines is regulated by the Ohio SIP limiting VOC

emissions, that petitioner’s painting operations were in

violation of the SIP emission limitations, and that peti-

tioner was liable for Section 120 noncompliance penalties.

Pet. App. E1-E19. Petitioner appealed the ALJ’s decision

to the EPA Administrator. EPA’s chief judicial officer, on

behalf of the Administrator, affirmed the ALJ’s decision.

Id. at D1-D7.

4. Petitioner then sought review in the court of ap-

peals. The court affirmed EPA’s decision and its inter-

pretation of the federally enforceable Ohio SIP. Pet. App.

Al-Al4. In upholding EPA’s interpretation of the Ohio

SIP, the court concluded that EPA’s interpretation of the

Ohio SIP is entitled to “considerable deference.” Jd. at

A7.3 The court also concluded that the interpretation is

consistent with the terms of the regulations. /d. at

A7-Al12. In addition, the court considered petitioner’s

claim that it would be deprived of due process if it were

not permitted to introduce evidence of technological and

economic infeasibility as a defense to liability. The court

held that petitioner’s due process concerns “are satisfied by

allowing infeasibility arguments at the penalty stage” (id.

at Al3) and therefore upheld the ALJ’s decision to exclude

evidence of technological and economic infeasibility at the

liability hearing.

> The court relied in part on the fact that testimony from the prin-

cipal draftsman of the Ohio SIP supported EPA’s interpretation of

the SIP provision. Pet. App. A10.

6

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does

not conflict with any decision of this Court or of any other

court of appeals. Review by this Court therefore is not

warranted. :

1. Petitioner first argues that, although the Ohio SIP

is approved and enforced by EPA, it was improper for the

court to give any deference to EPA’s interpretation of the

SIP since EPA did not write the regulations. Pet. 6-8. Peti-

tioner’s simplistic argument reflects a lack of understand-

ing of the relationship between the States and EPA under

the Clean Air Act.

The States submit their SIPs to EPA to meet their

obligation under the Clean Air Act to control air pollution

within their borders. A SIP thus represents the judgment

of a State regarding how to meet its obligations under the

Clean Air Act, what pollutant emission reductions are ap-

propriate, and from what sources those reductions should

come. EPA, however, “is the ultimate supervisor” for the

administration and implementation of the Act. Duquesne

Light Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1983). A

SIP has no effect as a matter of federal law unless it is ap-

proved and promulgated by EPA. Once EPA approves a

SIP, its provisions are enforceable as federal law and can

be enforced through a variety of mechanisms, including

Section 120. See 42 U.S.C. 7410(d); 42 U.S.C.

7420(a)(2)(A)(i). Thus, Congress placed the ultimate

responsibility for enforcement of the Clean Air Act on

EPA. Since the Ohio SIP was approved by EPA in com-

pliance with the Clean Air Act and is enforceable by EPA,

the agency is fully entitled to interpret its provisions con-

sistent with the overall goals of the Act. Accordingly,

although EPA did not itself write the Ohio SIP, EPA was

required to and did review and approve it before it became

7

effective, and all of the other reasons underlying the usual

“deference to administrative views * * * bottomed on

respect for agency expertise” fully support deference to

EPA’s interpretation in this case. Ford Motor Credit Co.

v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 n.9 (1980); see also

Gardebring v. Jenkins, 108 S. Ct. 1306, 1314 (1988);

United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872-873 (1977)

(deferring to Navy’s construction of Department of

Defense regulation); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16

(1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S.

410, 413-414 (1945).

Petitioner next argues, much more broadly, that this

Court’s decisions permit a court to defer to an agency’s in-

tepretation of a statute or regulation “on/y in situations

where ‘the agency is required to apply [legal] standards to

a particular set of facts’ ” and not when any broader ques-

tion of law is raised. Pet. 8-9 (emphasis added) (quoting

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987)). That

contention, apart from being of no aid to petitioner since

this case involves the application of legal standards to a

particular set of facts, is demonstrably wrong.

Unlike the Cardoza-Fonseca case on which petitioner

relies almost exclusively, this case involves interpretation

of regulations, not statutes. It is in that context that this

Court has applied the most generous measure of

deference, holding —in cases that certainly involved pure

questions of law—that, “[iJn construing administrative

regulations, ‘the ultimate criterion is the administrative in-

terpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it

is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’ ”

United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. at 872 (quoting

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414

(1945)); see also Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of

Workers’ Compensation Programs, 108 S. Ct. 427, 440

(1987); Gardebring v. Jenkins, 108 S. Ct. at 1314.

8

Even in the construction of statutes, it is—contrary to

petitioner’s contention — this Court’s longstanding and fre-

quent practice to defer to agency constructions, even when

a pure question of law is involved. See, e.g., K mart Corp.

v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (1988); EEOC v.

Commercial Office Products Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666, 1671

(1988); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast

Building & Construction Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392,

1397 (1988); Honig v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592, 605 n.8 (1988);

NLRB vy. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 108

S. Ct. 413, 421 (1987); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,

____ n.8 (1987) (slip op. 18 n.8); Fall River Dyeing &

Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, __ (1987) (slip op.

14); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 378-379 (1987); City

of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 468

(1987); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment &

Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 427 (1987); Clarke v.

Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388, 403-404

(1987); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837,

842-845 (1984) (and cases cited therein). As the above cita-

tions indicate, that has been this Court’s practice after the

Cardoza-Fonseca decision as well as before.

_ Cardoza-Fonseca itself does not stand for a contrary

rule. The opinion of the Court does, to be sure, contain

statements that can be taken out of context to stand for

the proposition that deference to agency interpretations of

Statutes is the exception and de novo construction of am-

biguous statutes the rule. Four Justices have already

observed, however, that that language should not be so

applied, United Food Workers, 108 S. Ct. at 426 (Scalia,

J., concurring), and this Court’s subsequent cases appear

to bear that observation out. In any event, Cardoza-

Fonseca involved only “[t]he narrow legal question

whether the two [differently worded] standards [set out in

two statutory sections] are the same,” 480 U.S. at 448,

9

and its language suggesting the inappropriateness of

deference to the agency interpretation must be read in light

of the narrowness of the question facing the Court.

Moreover, in Cardoza-Fonseca the Court regarded the

agency interpretation at issue as contrary to clear congres-

sional intent and believed that the agency had given the

Statute inconsistent interpretations over time — factors that

would justify a rejection of the agency interpretation

whether the Court applied deference or not. Here, by con-

trast, EPA was not called on to determine whether two

differently worded provisions mean the same thing, but

rather whether petitioner’s coating plants were or were not

covered by the terms of the Ohio SIP. The court of ap-

peals determined that EPA’s conclusion that petitioner’s

coating lines are regulated, whether or not they have

ovens, was consistent with the goals of the Clean Air Act

(Pet. App. A9);* that the refinishing exemption had been

consistently interpreted by EPA over time (id. at All);

and that EPA’s interpretation of the SIP with respect to

coverage of miscellaneous metal parts or product coating

lines “is consistent with the plain language of the SIP”

(ibid.).

Petitioner’s further contention that EPA’s interpreta-

tion of the Ohio SIP is not even reasonable (Pet. 10-11) is

also wrong. As the court of appeals held, EPA’s inter-

pretation of the Ohio SIP “is in keeping with the goal of

the Clean Air Act to reduce emission of organic com-

pounds from operations such as those employed by

Navistar” (Pet. App. Al1-Al2). Petitioner has never

disputed that each of the coating lines at issue emits VOCs

in excess of the Ohio SIP limitat. »ns. One of the funda-

+ In fact, the State of Ohio subsequently revised its SIP to make it

clearer that coating lines emitting VOCs, whether or not they have

ovens, are regulated under the SIP. Pet. App. Al0 n.1.

10

mental purposes of the Clean Air Act and the federally ap-

proved Ohio SIP is to provide for the attainment and

maintenance of the National Ambient Air Quality Stand-

ards and to require emission reductions of organic com-

pounds from major sources in areas that have not attained

those standards.’ Indeed, in rejecting petitioner’s argu-

ment that its coating lines without ovens were not

regulated, the court noted that “(t]he two painting lines at

issue emitted 315 tons of compounds in 1985, nearly 200

tons above the allowable level. It would be an anomalous

result to interpret the regulations©as to exclude coating

lines without ovens when they contribute so greatly to the

undesired pollutants in the air that are to be reduced by the

regulations.” Pet. App. Al0. Since EPA’s construction of

the Ohio SIP is reasonable and is consistent with the intent

of the SIP and the goals of the Clean Air Act, the court of

~ appeals properly determined not to substitute its judgment

for that of the agency.

2. Petitioner contends that evidence of economic and

technological infeasibility of compliance was improperly

excluded from the liability hearing and that the decision of

the court of appeals upholding the exclusion creates a con-

flict among the circuits. Pet. 12-15. That claim is fun-

damentally inconsistent with the Clean Air Act, its

legislative history, and judicial precedent. The court of ap-

peals correctly concluded that, “[g]iven Congress’ intent to

obtain compliance or require that facilities be shut down,

regardless of feasibility, and given that due process con-

5 Petitioner’s facility is located in such a nonattainment area. The

Ohio SIP was adopted pursuant to Part D of the Clean Air Act, Sec-

tions 171-178, 42 U.S.C. 7501-7508. Congress enacted Part D in 1977

for the purpose of imposing particularly stringent air pollution re-

quirements on areas of the country that did not meet the national

standards by 1979. 47 Fed. Reg. 28,097, 28,098 (1982).

11

cerns are satisfied by allowing infeasibility arguments at

the penalty stage,” it should “affirm the ALJ’s decision to

exclude evidence of technological and economic in-

feasibility at the liability hearing.” Pet. App. Al3. The

court rightly observed: “As the evidence was retained in

the record for purposes of the penalty hearing, any due

process requirements were met.” Jbid.

The Clean Air Act is a “technology-forcing” statute, re-

quiring States to formulate pollution control strategies

that “force regulated sources to develop pollution control

devices that might at the time appear to be economically or

technologically infeasible.” Union Electric Co. v. EPA,

427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976). Thus, a source must meet SIP

standards or face penalties for continuing operations

“regardless of whether available technology enables [it] to

meet the standards.” Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 698

F.2d at 463.

Nonetheless, noncomplying sources have several oppor-

tunities to raise claims of infeasibility. They may present

their claims before the state agency formulating the SIP or

SIP revision, in a request for a variance or an exemption

from a SIP or a SIP revision, or before state courts. Such

claims also may be relevant to fashioning a compliance

order under Section 113. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427

U.S. at 268. Since petitioner has the opportunity to raise

its infeasibility claims at the penalty calculation stage of

the Section 120 proceeding (Pet. App. A13), no due proc-

ess considerations are implicated.

Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s claim (Pet.-12), the

exclusion of infeasibility evidence at the liability stage

creates no conflict among the circuits. In neither of the

two cases that petitioner cites did the court hold that

claims of infeasibility may create a defense to Section 120

liability. One case, Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v.

EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975), involved a challenge to

12 |

, EPA’ Ss approval of two state implementation plans. The

\ court approved EPA’s refusal to consider the tech-

nological feasibility and economic impact of the two

plans, but it stated that infeasibility “may be of

significance” in Section 113 enforcement proceedings. /d.

at 844. While noting that it was not deciding the extent to

which such factors should be considered, the court stated |

that technological and economic considerations may be

worthy of consideration “in terms of compliance schedules

as well as the imposition of penalties.” Jd. at 845. Thus,

the court was addressing the role of infeasibility only in

the context of remedy, not liability.

In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 638 F.2d 994 (7th

Cir. 1980), the court of appeals considered a request to

review EPA’s disapproval of a delayed compliance order

under Section 113. Without further discussion, the court

merely stated that a source “may raise its infeasibility

defense in the course of enforcement proceedings.” 638

F.2d at 1005. The court did not, however, hold that such

claims constitute a defense to liability; rather it merely

stated that such claims may be considered at some time

during the proceeding.

Permitting infeasibility claims to be raised as a defense

to Section 120 liability would substantially interfere with

the congressional purpose of prompt attainment of na-

tional air quality standards and the compliance-forcing

purpose of Section 120. No court of appeals has ever held

that such claims can be raised at the liability stage of an

enforcement proceeding. Petitioner’s contention therefore

does not merit review.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM C. BRYSON

Acting Solicitor General

DONALD A. CARR

Acting Assistant Attorney General

KAREN L. EGBERT

Attorney

APRIL 1989

US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1989—241-699/00184