Opposition Brief — Estate of Cornett v. Estate of Sikes
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ae
ERK
Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
() FEB 13 1989
No. 88-1312
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR
In The om oe
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1988
e
ESTATE OF ARCHIBALD CORNETT, ET AL,
Petitioners,
vs.
ESTATE OF M. D. SIKES, ET AL,
Respondents.
>
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI BY TEXACO OIL COMPANY
*
MICHAEL A. HATCHELL
P. O. Box 629
Tyler, Texas 75710
(214) 597-3301
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO,, (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
No. 88-1312
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1988
y%
—
ESTATE OF ARCHIBALD CORNETT, ET AL,
Petitioners,
VS.
ESTATE OF M. D. SIKES, ET AL,
Respondents.
*
CERTIFICATE
y%
4
The undersigned, counsel of record for respondent,
Texaco Oil Company, certifies that the following listed
parties have an interest in the outcome of this case. These
representations are made in order that judges of this
court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal
pursuant to Rule 21.1(b), Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
1. Estate of Archibald Cornett.
2. Estate of Sally Williams Cornett.
3. Jenny Cornett-German.
ii
4. Lillian German-Benjamin.
5. Carrie Armstrong.
6. Huey German.
7. Jesse E. German.
8. Annie M. Jones.
9. Shirley J. German.
10. Michael German.
11. Joe German.
12. Tommie German.
13. Jennie L. Johnson.
14. Bobbie J. Banks.
15. Roy J. German.
16. Le Otis Thomas.
17. Sandra Felder.
18. Clarissa Hudson.
19. Kelly Jackson, Sr.
20. Beulah M. Curtis.
21. Gwendolyn Pipkin.
22. Kimberly Pipkin.
23. Donna Pipkin.
24. Eva Jean Pipkin.
25. Sallie McMillons.
26. Raymond Pipkin.
27. Judy Pipkin.
28. Steve Pipkin.
29. Eva Pipkin.
30. Hilda Pipkin.
31. Mandy O’Gilvie Williams.
32. Thomas Pipkin.
33. Melvina Tucker.
34. Ruth Pipkin Yadell.
35. Jim Payton.
36. Julie Payton Duncan.
37. Betty Payton.
38. Bailey Payton.
39. Mary Nell Payton.
40. Alton Cornett.
41. Willie Cornett.
42. Vernon Cornett.
43. Bernice Washington.
|
ili
44. Lee A. Cornett.
45. Robert Cornett.
46. Leona Portley.
47. Leola Cornett Bars.
48. John A. Cornett.
49. Bernice Jones.
50. Archie Cornett.
51. Sallie Mae Cornett.
52. Gates Cornett.
53. Jewel Cornett.
54. Marvis McMillons.
55. Vernice Thomas.
56. Bogus Cornett.
57. Velma Cornett Grasple.
58. Ruby Cornett Hall.
59. Charles Daughtery.
60. Ollie Tucker Hollins.
61. Newt Tucker.
62. Blanchard Tucker.
63. Linda Cornett.
64. Levada Cornett.
65. Robert Louis Cornett.
66. David Earl Cornett.
67. Audrey Cornett Hines.
68. Ada Cornett.
69. Laura Mae Allen.
70. Perry O’Gilvie.
71. Estate of M. D. Sikes.
72. Claude (HC) Foshee.
73. Ann Lewis Rives.
74. Louis Werner Saw Mill Co., its successors and
assigns.
75. County of Panola, Texas.
76. “Texaco Oil Company”, the name under which
the present respondent was sued.!
1 The actual owner of the properties in question is Texaco
Producing, Inc. That corporation is a subsidiary of Texaco, Inc.
Subsidiaries of Texaco, Inc., and Texaco Producing, Inc., are
shown in Appendix B.
iv
SUBJECT INDEX
Page
ee 2 PEPPPTETITETE TT Trier re ee re ii
I Te TE a a ke cnn deennceseaneneeses 1
Summary of Argument ...........cscccccessccccees 2
PHONOQUC oo cece ccc csccccscccsecccceesnscenssnss wie ®
Reasons Why The Writ Should Be Denied ......... 4
1. The governing statute of limitations is bor-
oe LE Perery Pe reer r Tree re 5
2. This action accrued when petitioners knew, or
had reason to know, of the injury for which
CRY GUAR oss ce cs nasins ccventdaneechansacbeses 7
3. Petitioners’ action fully accrued prior to 1974 8
4. The summary judgment record renders ineffec-
tive any claim that the Texas statute was “tol-
es eco uc eck esa cseciedusencepacnvecbe sas 11
Com Gi PGE oo oa ic oie s caveenennanad seat 12
PII, 6 onde scence senrsccceuacieacsonseaes App. 1
ee ee nated
Vv
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 477
US. BEEZ, OF LOE Be. COU oso cc dacsvcccceas 12
Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983) ....12
Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 468 U.S. 42, 47,
Oe Re a Pe I oo. ps dcdhoie ce acs 2,5
Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 477
CB. SEZ, Be cece ee Re biks wktck de tedie dances 12
Cross v. Lucius, 713 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1983)......... 11
Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.
1986), rev’d 107 S.Ct. 2246, 482 U.S. 64, 96
Re GUNES Ck iain cbc dhs be Cub hae van robbaeet’s 11
Longoria v. City of Bay City, Texas, 779 F.2d 1136,
RE ee le Sanka ges ce when akesasdne 6, 7
Peter Henderson Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur,
Texas, 806 F.2d 1273 (Sth Cir. 1987) ................ 6
Reed v. United Transportation Union, 109 S.Ct.
GRE Er Rite Me GUE 5 oe Fi ad nhecsnkeddeve ts 5
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States,
ee rrr ree rr err err rT er rrr 4
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, Sections
16.003-16.004 ......... Sp Pe eh OR Tah pyre Fae 7
ae PE Peer CL ree re EAT eee ate 4, 5, 6, 11
Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 471 U.S. 261, 266,
TD Kg ele Se GED shen ccc caaneivarsarers 5, 6
No. 88-1312
+.
_
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1988
,%
-_
ESTATE OF ARCHIBALD CORNETT, ET AL,
Petitioners,
vs.
ESTATE OF M. D. SIKES, ET AL,
Respondents.
,™
2
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI BY TEXACO OIL COMPANY
,™
_
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES:
Texaco Oil Company, a defendant in the trial court,
responds, as follows, to a petition for writ of certiorari in
a civil rights case that was disposed of by summary
judgment by reason of bar by the appropriate statute of
limitations:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The unreported opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit contains a statement of the
proceedings and disposition below. It is correct.
The seven-page “Statement Of The Case” in the peti-
tion (Petition 3-9) contains no references to the record.
See Rule 34.1(g), Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
States. By and large, that statement depends upon the
“allegations” in petitioner’s complaint. It does not deal
with or respond to the “facts” in the summary judgment
record upon which the case was decided by both courts
below.
The forthcoming argument is predicated specifically
upon “facts” in the summary judgment record, predomi-
nantly “admissions” by petitioners in the trial court.’
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In support of the judgments below, Texaco will
argue:
1. Under the rule of Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S.Ct. 2924,
468 U.S. 42, 47, 82 L.Ed.2d 36, 43 (1984), we look to the
common law of Texas for the applicable statute of
limitations.
2. Since the civil rights acts redress injuries in the
nature of “torts”, the most appropriate Texas statute of
limitations is its two-year statute for bringing personal
injury suits, although the summary judgment record
would satisfy the Texas four-year statute as well.
1 “R” references are to the official record filed in the court
of appeals. Rule 34.1(g), Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
3. The appropriate accrual date is the time when
petitioners had knowledge of the injury sought to be
redressed in this suit.
4. The summary judgment establishes conclusively
the following:
(a) Petitioners hired an attorney in 1959 to reclaim
the property for them. They were thus aware of their lack
of title at that time.
(b) Petitioners’ attorney confessed, in written repre-
sentations, that the heirs’ claim to title was rooted in
fraud practiced upon them by reason of their race. Thus,
they were aware at this time, also, of the civil rights
nature of their injury.
(c) In response to interrogatories, petitioners con-
ceded that, no later than 1974, they knew they were being |
victimized by purported conduct of government officials
of Panola County which, if true, ostensibly had peti-
tioners’ race as its motivation and thus was facially ille-
gal. If this conduct had any deterrent effect that
prevented the filing of this suit, that effect ceased, accord-
ing to petitioners’ own discovery admissions, no later
than December 31, 1973.
(d) Ergo, as early as January 1, 1974, the heirs had
knowledge of a title defect, knowledge of racial discrimi-
nation against them, and an unfettered right to bring the
present suit. Their delay of more than ten years con-
clusively invokes the bar of the appropriate Texas statute
of limitations.
PROLOGUE
Texaco is one of several respondents. So far as Texaco
can determine, it has been joined in this suit because it
has a minor, essentially dormant leasehold interest in real
property that would be affected if the district court had
granted full relief prayed for by petitioners. (See R. 142.)
Texaco can locate only a single, generic reference in the
petition to the cause of action against any non-govern-
mental parties.?
Petitioners have not cited any summary judgment
evidence, and Texaco is aware of no evidence, that it
participated in any of the conduct by which petitioners
claim deprivation of personal, property, or civil rights.
REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED
Judgment has been rendered by reason of bar by the
statute of limitations applicable to the federal statutes
under which the action was brought - 42 U.S.C.,
§§ 1981-1983, §§ 1985-1986, and § 1988. (R. 203, et seq.)
Elements that determine proper application of the statute
of limitations are: (i) the appropriate statute, (ii) the
accrual date, and (iii) facts which commenced the statute.
We discuss each of those as follows:
2 “Petitioners specifically alleged race, interracial associa-
tion and previous condition of servitude to be at the core of
this civil action and as the affirmative links to all unconstitu-
tional actions and inactions intentionally directed at Peti-
tioners . . . relative to private citizens’ actions as far as
individual, non-governmental Respondents and their prede-
cessors in title, interest or office are concerned.” (Petition 4-5.)
> F
The governing statute of limitations is bor-
rowed from Texas law.
The civil rights acts under which petitioners sue
“***do not contain a specific statute of limita-
tions * * *.” Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 471 U.S. 261,
266, 85 L.Ed.2d 254, 260 (1985). The applicable statute of
limitations, thus, is determined by the “ * * * three-step
process ***” mandated by 42 U.S.C., § 1988, for the
purpose of “ * * * borrow(ing) an appropriate rule ***”
from a pertinent corpus of statutory law. Burnett v. Grat-
tan, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 468 U.S. 42, 48, 82 L.Ed.2d 36, 43
(1984). That process is described thus in Burnett, supra:
“*** First, courts are to look to the laws of the
United States ‘so far as such laws are suitable to
carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into
effect.’ Ibid. If no suitable federal rule exists, the
courts undertake the second step by considering
application of state ‘common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes’ of the
forum State. Ibid. A third step asserts the predomi-
nance of the federal interest: Courts are to apply state
law only if it is not ‘inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and laws of United States.’***” (468 U.S.
47-48, 82 L.Ed.2d 43.)
This court has recognized that, as a general rule,
Congress intends, when federal statutes are silent on the
issue of limitations, the appropriate “ ** * statutes of
limitations are to be borrowed from state law. ** *” Reed
v. United Transportation Union, 109 S.Ct. 621, 57 U.S.L.W.
4088 (1989). This is true of actions under the civil rights
acts. Burnett v. Grattan, supra.
The case of Wilson v. Garcia, supra, holds that civil
rights actions, like the present, “ *** are best charac-
terized as personal injury actions * * * ”. (471 U.S. 280, 85
L.Ed.2d 269.) The reason why was stated thus:
“The atrocities that concerned Congress in 1871
plainly sounded in tort. Relying on the premise we
have found tort analogies compelling in establishing
the elements of a cause of action under § 1983
. and in identifying the immunities available to
defendants ***. *** As we have noted, however,
the § 1983 remedy encompasses a broad range of
potential tort analogies, from injuries to property to
infringements of individual liberty.” °
“Among the potential analogies, Congress
unquestionably would have considered the remedies
established in the Civil Rights Act to be more analo-
gous to tort claims for personal injury than, for
example, to claims for damages to property or breach
of contract.***” (471 U.S. 277, 85 L.Ed.2d 267.)
Substantial federal authority has determined that a
two-year statute of limitations is neither inimical to the
purposes of, nor an inhibition upon, the rights secured by
the Civil Rights Acts. (42 U.S.C., § 1981, et seq.) As to
such federal court actions brought within the territorial
limits of Texas, it has been determined that Texas’ two-
year statute of limitations for bringing personal injury
suits is the “*** most appropriate ***” statute. See:
Peter Henderson Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, Texas, 806
F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1987); Longoria v. City of Bay City, Texas,
779 F.2d 1136, 1137 (5th Cir. 1986), both of which involved
a civil rights claim rooted in the deprivation of real
property rights, just as does our case.
Texaco does not understand petitioners to dispute
applicability of Texas’ two-year statute. It notes, par-
enthetically, however, that Texas has only two general
limitations periods — a two-year period and a four-year
period. See § § 16.003-16.004, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code.
(Appendix A.) Texaco will demonstrate in the following
argument that petitioners’ suit was barred under either
statute.
B
This action accrued when petitioners knew, or
had reason to know, of the injury for which
they sue.
Though a state statute may determine the applicable
limitations period, the accrual of the limitations period is
a question of federal law. Longoria v. City of Bay City,
Texas, 779 F.2d 1136, 1138 (5th Cir. 1986). That case aptly
states the test for determining the “accrual” date, to wit:
“*** The federal standard used to determine the
accrual of a section 1983 cause of action is that the
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or
has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of
the action. ***” (779 F.2d 1138, emphasis added.)
As with the previous element, Texaco does not
understand petitioners to contest this rule. We thus turn
to application of the preceding rules to the summary
judgment record:
3.
Petitioners’ action fully accrued prior to 1974.
The summary judgment record establishes con-
clusively that petitioners’ cause of action had accrued,
and the applicable limitations period had begun to run,
by January 1, 1974.3 This is ascertainable from answers to
requests for admissions and responses to interrogatories,
in which petitioners confessed the following facts:
(i) As early as 1959 “ ** * all the heirs of Archibald
Cornett *** ”, i.e., the present petitioners (R. 1214, 1237),
hired attorney William Conners of Houston, Texas,
“***to assert a claim of title to said land***”. (R.
1214.) Thus, at that time, petitioners knew conclusively
title was not vested in the Cornett estate.
(ii) An August 4, 1959, letter from Mr. Conners is
confessed to be “true” (R. 1238) in the following
particulars:
“My clients are all the heirs of Archibald Cornett,
and as such they assert a claim of title to said land,
including the mineral fee.”
3 In advancing that contention, Texaco gives petitioners
the benefit of every doubt and eschews the compelling argu-
ment that petitioners’ pleadings, themselves, establish accrual
as early as 1915.
For example, petitioners’ allegations that “ * * * the Cor-
netts [petitioners’ predecessors in title] were driven out of
Panola County, Texas by a legitimized terroristic force known
as the Ku Klux Klan***” (R. 208) is virtually a concession
that their predecessors in action had knowledge of the present
civil rights injury at least by the time of Archibald Cornett’s
death in 1915. (R. 206.)
9
“The record reflects a chain of title out of one
Sikes and the Werner Sawmill Company. Sikes’ claim
is founded upon a deed from ‘Aster’ Cornett, dated
October 1, 1902.”
+e te &
“The deeper I dig into the facts of this investiga-
tion the stronger my case appears. My clients being
colored, there appears certain disturbing elements of a
conspiracy to defraud.” (R. 1214, emphasis added.)
Those admitted facts establish conclusively not only
knowledge of a title claim, but that a basis for petitioners’
“injury” was a “*** conspiracy to defraud***” (R.
1214) rooted in their race — the same allegations made
here.
(iii) Later, in October of 1961, the heirs conveyed a
1/4th interest in the disputed property, and also gave
power of attorney, to a Philander Neville, an Illinois
attorney, to help them establish “ * * * our rights to***”
(R. 1221) and to “ * * * reclaim the subject property. *** ”
(R. 1244.) The heirs admit that, at that time, they
“*** knew that a problem existed with respect to the
chain of title. ** * ” (R. 1245.) Petitioners also admittedly
knew at that time that someone other than a descendant
of Archibald Cornett was claiming to own the property.
(R. 1246.)
(iv) Prior to January of 1982, petitioners admittedly
knew of the deed from “Aster” Cornett to M. D. Sikes,
which is the instrument inimical to their claim of title. (R.
1239.)
(v) Lastly, the petitioners confessed that, before 1973,
their attempts to examine the title documents pertaining
to the original Cornett land grant were being met with
10
illegal conduct and threats of violence that had seeming
racial motivation, to wit:
“*** plaintiffs were physically barred up to and
including approximately 1973. Plaintiffs had to get
someone white to inquire for them. Prior to 1971, fam-
ily members on several occasions attempted to obtain
information from the Deed Records in Panola County
but were told either ‘none existed for Archibald Cor-
nett’ or they were told to ‘leave the premises and
warned not to return or they would be met with
bodily harm, Negroes could not investigate themselves in
the deed and tax records.”
“Subsequent to 1972, one family member, Ervin
Pipkins (deceased) and a friend went to Panola
County to research the records. They were told by the
clerk attending the counter that they could not view
the records. They were then instructed by another
courthouse official to leave the courthouse or they
would be met with physical harm and the high sher-
iff would get them.” (R. 1242-1244, emphasis added.)
In sum, petitioners’ admissions on the summary
judgment record conclusively visit them with knowledge,
no later than January 1, 1974, of the following:
(i) that another party was claiming the land they
believed legitimately should have passed to them,
(ii) that the adverse title claim, according to their
view, was false,
(iii) that the adverse title had been established or
concealed through a conspiracy to defraud promulgated
by reason of the heirs’ race, and
(iv) that facially illegal, discriminatory conduct,
rooted primarily in race, had been practiced upon them
11
by officials of Panola County in their attempt to research
the status of the original Cornett land grant.
Petitioners’ claim encompasses the following injuries:
(i) loss of title through fraud or other illegal activity
practiced because of the race of petitioners or their precle-
cessors and (ii) denial of the petitioners’ /heirs’ rights, as
equal citizens, to examine or otherwise have access to
history of the title. Yet, the summary judgment record
establishes conclusively that the Cornett heirs (the pre-
sent petitioners) were fully aware at least ten years before
filing the present action of each “injury” they claim to
have suffered by violation of 42 U.S.C., § 1981, et seq.
Compare: Cross v. Lucius, 713 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1983).
4.
The summary judgment record renders ineffec-
tive any claim that the Texas statute was
“tolled”.
Petitioners’ vague inference that the Texas limitation
statute was “tolled” by reason of their being barred from
the courthouse by Panola County officials is circuitous, if
not self-defeating. The conduct of the Panola County
officials is, in fact, the crux of petitioners’ substantive
claim. If the facts of a civil rights claimant’s cause of
action can successfully be alleged as a ground for “tol-
ling”, there is, then, no applicable statute of limitations;
the substantive complaint and grounds for tolling would
always merge.
To the extent that petitioners’ reliance upon Hohri v.
United States, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev’d 107 S.Ct.
2246, 482 U.S. 64, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987), obliquely- or
{
ap
12
inferentially, suggests fraudulent concealment of facts by
respondents (certainly respondents other than Texaco)
that prevented petitioners from learning of their claim, it
is sufficient to say that such a basis for tolling, under
Texas law, would be operative only until petitioners
acquired the requisite knowledge the fraudulent conceal-
ment purportedly denied them. See: Borderlon v. Peck, 661
S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983).
The summary judgment record more than adequately
invokes that rule. The purported physical disbarment of
petitioners from the courthouse was conceded by them to
have terminated at least by January 1, 1974. (R. 1242.)4
The previous discussion (pp. 8-11) establishes requisite
knowledge of all other elements of petitioners’ claim
prior to January 1, 1974. This knowledge effectively
removed any ground for tolling at that time and activated
accrual of the appropriate statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
The facts upon which summary judgment was ren-
dered are found either in “admissions” by petitioners or
their own words answering interrogatories. The dictates
of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 477 U.S. 242,
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) and Celotex Corporation v. Catrett,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 477 U.S. 317, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), are not
implicated. This is not a battle of opposing affidavits or
conflicting answers, nor does it involve assessment of
credibility. The issue here involves the legal implications
4 “*** Plaintiffs were physically barred up to and includ-
ing approximately 1973.***” (R. 1242.)
13
of facts petitioners admit exist. The cases cited fully
condone summary judgment in that context.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Texaco Oil
Company, prays that the petition for writ of certiorari
herein be denied forthwith. Texaco additionally prays for
such other and further relief to which it may justly be
entitled at law or in equity.
Respectfully submitted,
MicHaAEL A. HATCHELL
Bar No. 09219000
P. O. Box 629
Tyler, Texas 75710
(214) 597-3301
App. i
APPENDIX A
Sec.
16.066. Action on Foreign Judgment.
16.067. Claim Incurred Prior to Arrival in this State.
16.068. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings.
16.069. Counterclaim or Cross Claim.
16.070. Contractual Limitations Period.
16.071. Notice Requirements. ;
16.072. Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday.
SUBCHAPTER A.
LIMITATIONS OF PERSONAL ACTIONS
§ 16.001. Effect of Disability
(a) For the purposes of this subchapter, a person is
under a legal disability if the person is:
(1) younger than 18 years of age, regardless of
whether the person is married; or
(2) of unsound mind. "
(b) Ifa person entitled to bring a personal action is
under a legal disability when the cause of action accrues,
the time of the disability is not included in a limitations
period.
(c) A person may not tack one legal disability to
another to extend a limitations period.
(d) A disability that arises after a limitations period
starts does not suspend the running of the period.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
Amended by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 1049, § 56, eff. Sept.
1, 1987.
Section 65 of the 1987 amendatory act provides:
alii
App. 2
“(a) A period of limitations that on August 31, 1987,
was tolled under Section 16.001 or 16.022, Civil Practice
and Remedies Code, because the person entitled to bring
the action was imprisoned, begins to run on the effective
date of this Act.
“(b) A period before the effective date of this Act
during which a person was under a legal disability
because of imprisonment is not affected by this Act.”
§ 16.002. One-Year Limitations Period
A person must bring suit for malicious prosecution,
libel slander, or breach of promise of marriage not later
than one year after the day the cause of action accrues.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
§ 16.003. Two-Year Limitations Period
(a) A person must bring suit for trespass for injury
to the estate or to the property of another, conversion of
personal property, taking or detaining the personal prop-
erty of another, personal injury, forcible entry and
detainer, and forcible detainer not later than two years
after the day the cause of action accrues.
(b) A person must bring suit not later than two
years after the day the cause of action accrues in an
action for injury resulting in death. The cause of action
accrues on the death of the injured person.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
App. 3
§ 16.004. Four-Year Limitations Period
(a) A person must bring suit on the following
actions not later than four years after the day the cause of
action accrues:
(1) specific performance of a contract for the con-
veyance of real property;
(2) penalty or damages on the penal clause of a
bond to convey real property; or
(3) debt.
(b) A person must bring suit on the bond of an
executor, administrator, or guardian not later than four
years after the day of the death, resignation, removal, or
discharge of the executor, administrator, or guardian.
(c) A person must bring suit against his partner for
a settlement of partnership accounts, and must bring an
action on an open or stated account, or on a mutual and
current account concerning the trade of merchandise
between merchants or their agents or factors, not later
than four years after the day that the cause of action
accrues. For purposes of this subsection, the cause of
action accrues on the day that the dealings in which the
parties were interested together cease.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985.
§ 16.005. Action for Closing Street or Road
(a) A person must bring suit for any relief from the
following acts not later than two years after the day the
cause of action accrues:
App. 4
(1) the passage by a governing body of an incor-
porated city or town of an ordinance closing and aban-
doning, or attempting to close and abandon, all or any
part of a public street or alley in the city or town, other
than a state highway; or
(2) the adoption by a commissioners court of an
order closing and abandoning, or attempting to close
and abandon, all or any part of a public road or thor-
oughfare in the county, other than a state highway.
(b) The cause of action accrues when the order or
ordinance is passed or adopted.
(c) If suit is not brought within the period provided
by this section, the person in possession of the real prop-
erty receives complete title to the
* * *
App. 5
APPENDIX B
TEXACO INC. SUBSIDIARIES AS OF JUNE 1988
Bay Drilling Corporation
Bridgeline Gas Distribution Company
El Capitan Mutual Water Company
Getty Capital Corporation
Harrison Capital Inc.
Harrison Corporation, The
Boca Del Mar Inc.
Texaco Boca Del Mar Inc.
Getty Oil Company
Getty Oil International (Caribbean) N.V.
Getty Timberlands Inc.
Neches Gas Distribution Company
Paragon Oil Company, Inc.
Riverway Gas Pipeline Company
Sabine Pipe Line Company
Seaboard Oil Company
Texaco Canada Inc.
Canadian Reserve Oil and Gas Ltd.
Great Eastern Oil Ltd.
McColl-Frontenac Oil Co. Ltd.
Oilship Limited
Texaco Canada Resources Ltd.
Cynthia Gas Gathering Company Limited
La Societe Acadienne de
Recherches Petrolleres Ltd.
380311 Alberta Limited
Texaco Canada Enterprises Ltd.
Texaco Canada Gas Enterprises Inc.
Texaco Canada Properties, Inc.
Tournemaine Realties Limited
Texaco Capital Inc.
Texaco Capital N.V.
Texaco Chemical Company
Federal Chemical Company
Seachem Pipeline Company
App. 6
Texaco Chemical International Sales Corporation
Texaco Chemical International Trader Inc.
Texaco Chemical Pipeline Company, Inc.
Texas Chemical Company
Texaco Development Corporation
Texaco Exploration Properties Inc.
Texaco Financial Services Inc.
Texaco Fourbear Inc.
Texaco Harvest Gas Pipeline Company Inc.
Texaco Harvest Pipeline Company Inc.
Texaco Mineral Company
Texaco Producing Inc.
Texaco Properties Inc.
Texaco Refining and Marketing Inc.
Texaco Overseas Holdings Inc.
Texaco Trading and Transporation Inc.
Texaco Syngas Inc.
Texaco Tamarac Inc.
Texaco Timberlands Inc.
TXL Oil Corporation, The
Whitney Supply Company:
TEXACO PRODUCING INC. SUBSIDIARIES
AS OF JUNE 1988
ACC Chemical Company
Chemplex Construction Corporation
Associated Oil Company
Basin Drilling Corp.
Getty Canadian Minerals, Limited
Getty Canadian Metals, Limited }
Getty Chemical Company
Chemplex Construction Corporation
Getty Energy Company
Getty Gas Gathering, Inc.
Getty Mining Company
CP Water Company
Getty Canadian Mining Company
Getty Mining International Inc.
Getty Minerals Company, Limited
App. 7
Getty Mines, Limited
Getty Mining Northwest, Limited
Getty Mining Pty. Ltd.
Hueiva Pyrites, Inc.
Seville Metals Corporation
Texaco Oil Development Company
Grande Properties, Inc.
Petrotomics Company
Getty Oil Exploration Company
Getty Scientific Development Company
Minnehoma Corporation
Minnehoma Develpment, Inc.
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.
Skelly Leasing Company
Vanply, Inc.
Vanply of Liberia, Inc.
Vancouver Plywood Co., Inc.
Snake River Gas Transmission Corp.
Texaco Alaska Inc.
Texaco Coalinga Energy Company
Texaco Cogeneration Company
Texaco Congeneration Gas Company
Texaco Gas Inc.
Texaco Gas Marketing, Inc.
Texaco Midway-Sunset Cogeneration Company
Texaco San Ardo Energy Company
Texaco Services Inc.
Texaco Sobel Cogeneration Company
Texaco Yoakum Energy Company
TPI Ventures Inc.
Wasco Gas Services, Inc.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.