Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Beeding v. Miller

| Suprame Court, us.

BR IT ZYS

pa i FILED

oe JAN 30 BS

No. JOSEPH F. SPANIOL. sk

CLERK

& é

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1988

€

CLOVIS BEEDING,

Petitioner,

No. 85-SC-4948 vs.

=

THOMAS K. MILLER,

Respondent.

€ PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

Bernard P. Reese, Jr.

REESE & REESE

¢ 979 North Main Street

Rockford, Illinois 61103

815/968-8851

Attorney for Petitioner,

Clovis Beeding.

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioner presents the following

questions:

i. Whether Illinois Revised Statutes

ch. 80, ¥4208 is unconstitutional in that

it deprives petitioner, the mobile home

park owner, of his property rights in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of

the Federal Constitution.

- Whether the Illinois Statute is

unconstitutional on its face as being

overly broad and vague.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented

Index to Appendix

Table of Authorities

Opinion Below

Jurisdictional Statement

Statutes and Reguiation

Statement of the Case

Argument For Granting the Writ

Conclusion

19

iii

INDEX TO APPENDIX

App. Page

Appendix A. Opinion of Appellate

Court of Illinois Second

District a ae ee ae ee oe ee er a ee 1

Appendix B. Order denying Petition

Sor Menmeering ..1s2+senneteeneees 50

Appendix C. Order and Opinion of

the trial court of the Seventeenth

Judicial Circuit, County of

Winnebago, State of Illinois... 51

Appendix D. Order of the Supreme

Court of Illinois in denying the

Petition for Leave to Appeal... 61

Appendix E. Order of the Supreme

Court of Illinois in denying a

Motion to withdraw its Order

denying the Petition for Leave

to Appeal and enter a proper

OrGer CROre@egm . «+ «+4 04 e© © 8 6 62

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iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Cider Barrel Mobile Home Court

v. Eader, 414 A.2d 1246

| CRP) a ee ee ee

Palm Beach Mobile Homes v.

Strong, 300 So.2d 881

(Pla. 1974) . «.« «© «© © © © «© « « 3,14

Herrington v. Sonoma County,

834 F.2d 1488, 1498 n.7 (1987) . 8

Lynch v. Household Finance

Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552

(2972) « © we we we se ewe wwe 8,9

Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d

93, 98 (8th Cir. 1942)

Morton Park District v. American

National Bank and Trust Co.,

I11.2d4 353, 362, 35 Iil.

Dec. 767, 771, 399 N.E.2d

1295, 1299 (1980) Pe a oe 8

Hall v. City of Santa Barbara,

813 F.2d 198 (1987),

corrected opinion republished,

833 F.2d 1270 (1988) .....- 11,12,13

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan

CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,

435-36 (1982) a ee es et ee ee 12

United States v. General Motors

Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378

Suen « ts ee ee Url Ue ee os 12

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont'd)

Cases Page

First English Evangelicai

Lutheran Church v. County

of Los Angeles, U.S. __,

107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d

260, 266 (3907) . »©= «© © «© «6 « 2 15

People ex rel. Fahner v.

Hedrich, 108 I11.App.3d

83, 63 I11.Dec. 782,

438 N.E.2d 924 (1982) cera fa dats 15

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.

330, 343 (1972) Me a ae ee Oe ee ee 16,17

Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S.

Bae (2088) «6 2s ts te we ee Hh oh 18

Keyishian v. Board of Regents,

385 U.S. 589 (1967) a tae ee 18

pi a

org fey

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1988

CLOVIS BEEDING,

Petitioner,

No. 85-SC-4948 vs.

THOMAS K. MILLER,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Appellate Court of

Illinois, Second District, is contained

herein as Appendix A and the citation

thereof is 167 I11.App.3d 128, 117 Ill.

Dec. 707, 520 N.E.2d 1058 (1988).

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

To: The Honorable Justices

of the Supreme Court

of the United States

The Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District, rendered its judgment on

March 1, 1988. A timely Petition for

Rehearing was denied on April 7, 1988.

A timely Petition for Leave to Appeal

to the Supreme Court of Illinois was

denied on October 6, 1988, with a motion

for review thereof pursuant to the provi-

sions of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 317

Genied on November 2, 1988, and this

Petition is timely filed within ninety

(90) days thereof.

The validity of Illinois Revised

Statutes ch. 80, Y¥208 is called into

question on the ground that it is

repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of

the United States Constitution.

It is also contended the Illinois

decision is in conflict with the decisions

in Maryland and Florida, Cider Barrel

Mobile Home Court v. Eader, 414 A.2d 1246

(Md. 1980) and Palm Beach Mobile Homes v.

Strong, 300 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1974).

This petition is filed under the pro-

visions of 28 U.S.C. §1257(3) and §2101(c)

and appropriate rules of this Court.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Involved herein is Illinois Revised

Statutes (Ill. Rev. Stat.) ch. 80, Y¥208

(1985) which states:

Every lease of a mobile home or

lot in a mobile park shall con-

tain an option which automati-

cally renews the lease; unless:

(a) the tenant shall notify the

owners 30 days prior to the

expiration of the lease that he

does not intend to renew the

lease; or (b) the park owner

shall notify the tenant 30 days

prior to the expiration of the

lease that the lease will not be

renewed and specify in writing

the reasons, such as violations

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wad POE SONA PAAR tex, ieee

of park rules, health and safety

codes or irregular or nonpayment

of rent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Clovis Beeding, has owned

and operated Maple Leaf Mobile Home Park

in Loves Park, Illinois since 1963. Ill.

Rev. Stat. ch. 80, 4¥%208 became effective

as of January 1, 1980. Respondent, Thomas

Miller, entered into a one year written

lease with petitioner on July 29, 1981,

for the placement of his mobile home

within Beeding's mobile home park. The

lease was renewed for subsequent one year

periods.

On June 8, 1985, Beeding served Miller

with notice that his lease of the mobile

home park lot would not be renewed at the

end of the lease term which expired July

29, 1985.

Miller refused to vacate the premises

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he >: 4 EAD a he

at the expiration of the lease term and

Beeding commenced a Forcible Entry and

Detainer action. Miller resisted on

grounds that Beeding did not have adequate

legal reasons for nonrenewing the lease.

At trial, petitioner first raised the

issue that the Illinois statute in

question was repugnant to the Fourteenth

Amendment of the Federal Constitution in

that it deprived petitioner of fundamental

property rights in violation of the Due

Process Clause.

After a hearing, the trial court

entered a written order that Ill. Rev.

Stat. ch. 80, 4208 was constitutional and

that Miller's lease could not be nonre-

newed except on adequate reasons which

Beeding had failed to prove. (App. p. 51).

This case presents to this Court a

question of first impression, and brings

to light an area of conflict among various

state court decisions.

ARGUMENT FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Illinois courts have ruled that

respondent Miller is not required to

vacate petitioner Beeding's property at

the conclusion of Miller's written lease,

even though Miller received a timely writ-

ten notice from Beeding that Miller's

lease would not be renewed upon its

expiration, and that Miller was to vacate

Beeding's property on the termination of

the existing lease.

The Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District, rejected Beeding's argu-

ment and held that a fundamental property

right was not involved, and petitioner had

not been deprived of his property without

due process. The court declined "plain-

tiff's invitation to apply a strict scru-

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Yat aaa ey oa null

tiny analysis," and ruled that under the

"police power of the state" the statute in

question was enacted for the protection of

the “lives, health, morals and generai

welfare" of the citizens of Illinois, and

that "the legislature is vested with a

large amount of discretion to determine

not only what the interests of public

welfare require but also what measures are

necessary to secure those interests."

(App. pp. 24-25).

In the case at bar, 4208 granted

Miller the right to occupy and use

Beeding's property for an unlimited dura-

tion. Petitioner contends that this

taking was not a reasonable exercise of

the police power. The test for reason-

ableness under the taking doctrine appears

to be less deferential to the government's

decision-making authority than in the test

for reasonableness under substantive due

process. Herrington v. Sonoma County, 834

F.2d 1488, 1498 n.7 (1987).

There is no question that the right to

use, possess, enjoy, and dispose of pro-

perty is a fundamental right ingrained in

the Federai Constitution. Lynch Vv.

Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552

(1972); Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d

93, 98 (8th Cir. 1942); Morton Park

District v. American National Bank and

trust Co., 78 111.24 353, 362, 35 fil.

Dec. 767, 771, 399 N.E.2d 1295, 1299

(1980).

The right to enjoy property with-

out unlawful deprivation, no less

than the right to speak or the

right to travel, is in truth a

"personal" right, whether the

"property" in question be a wel-

fare check, a home, or a savings

account. In fact, a fundamental

interdependence exists between

the personal right to liberty and

the personal right in property.

Lynch at 552.

The police power may restrict those

fundamental rights only when the need for

the restriction is clearly established.

Culp at 98.

The Illinois Appellate Court premised

its holding on the ground that “mobile

home park tenants" must be "protected"

from incurring expenses of moving when "an

unscrupulous landlord cites unreasonable,

arbitrary, or non-existent reasons for not

renewing a lease." This protection the

court considered to be a “legitimate

governmental interest in that it insures

the continued availability of quality

housing for persons of low to moderate

means." (App. pp. 28-29). (Emphasis

added. )

The court concluded that such limita-

tion of the landlord's rights and

10

requiring “proof of cause" are "rationally

related to achieving that goal." (App. p.

29).

The record, however, is absolutely

Gevoid of any evidence in support of the

court's conclusion that the "police power

of the state" is justified, authorizing a

"taking" of Beeding's property. The evi-

dence does not establish Beeding as an

"unscrupulous landlord," or Miller as one

of "low to moderate means," much less that

all mobile home owners and tenants fall

into these categories.

Mobile home park operators have thus

been arbitrarily placed in a category

somewhat analogous to that of the U.S.

citizen of Japanese descent during World

War II when his property was taken without

due process.

Even if the assertions of the Illinois

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11

court were substantiated by evidence as

being correct, the creation of such a

category for mobile home park owners with

the state prescribed remedy is untenable.

A fundamental property right of Beeding is

involved which under our constitution can-

not be so indiscriminately obliterated as

it is here found the Illinois legislature

has decreed.

The serious consequences of so con-

struing a similar statute, are discussed

in Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 813 F.2d

198 (1987), corrected opinion republished

in Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d

1270 (1988). The Santa Barbara statute

paralleled the statute at bar, and

required a mobile home park owner to pro-

vide a lease of unlimited duration to the

tenant. The lease was terminable at the

will of the tenant but only by the park

12

owner for cause. Hall brought an action

under 42 U.S.C. §1983 claiming the ordi-

nance effected a taking of his property

and he was entitled to compensation. The

court ruled in favor of Hall, stating the

fact that the tenants could be removed for

"cause" did not defeat Hall's claim and

cited the following language from Loretto

v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458

U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982):

Property rights in a physical

thing have been described as the

rights to possess, use and

Gispose of it. United States v.

General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.

373, 378 [65 S.Ct. 357, 359, 89

L.Ed. 311] (1945). To the extent

that the government permanently

occupies physical property, it

effectively destroys each of

these rights. First, the owner

has no right to possess’ the

occupied space himself, and has

no power to exclude the occupier

from possession and use of the

space. The power to exclude has

traditionally been considered one

of the most treasured strands in

an owner's bundle of property

rights. (Citations omitted).

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13

Second, the permanent physical

occupation of property forever

denies the owner any power to

control the use of the property;

he not only cannot exclude others

but can make no nonpossessory use

of the property. Although depri-

vation of the right to use and

obtain a profit from propert;, is

not, in every case, independently

sufficient to establish a taking,

(citation omitted) it is clearly

relevant. Finally, even though

the owner may retain the bare

legal right to dispose of the

occupied space by transfer or

sale, the permanent occupation of

that space by a stranger will

ordinarily empty the right of any

value, since the purchaser will

also be unable to make any use of

the property.

Hall at 204.

Other courts have recognized the

potential due process problen. In Cider

Barrel Mobile Home Court v. Eader, 414

A.2d 1246 (Md. 1980), an ordinance imposed

on a mobile home park owner contained cer-

tain restrictions. In deciding that the

restrictions did not constitute a taking,

the court noted in its opinion, however,

#

14

that the act in question did not prevent a

park owner from refusing to renew an

expired lease. Id at 1252.

Again, in Palm Beach Mobile Homes v.

Strong, 300 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1974), the

court dealt with the enactment of a

Florida statute preventing a mobile home

park owner from evicting a tenant except

for certain emumerated reasons. The court

found the statute constitutional, but in

doing so found that the mobile home park

owner could in fact nonrenew a lease after

a period of at least twelve (12) months,

but recognized that ". . . the perpetual

occupancy rights on another's property

cannot, consistent with the constitution,

be granted by law. ..." Id at 888.

Whatever supposed justification may be

used as a predicate for the lower court

holding, there is no question that the end

15

result is that petitioner's property has

been taken. The principle of a taking is

recognized in First English Evangelical

Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,

U.S. _, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d

250, 265 (1987), in which this Court sta-

ted:

While the typical taking occurs

when the government acts to con-

demn property in the exercise of

its power of eminent domain, the

entire doctrine of inverse con-

Gemnation is predicated on the

proposition that a taking may

occur without such formal pro-

ceedings.

The Illinois Appellate Court supports

its ruling on People ex rel. Fahner v.

Hedrich, 108 I11.App.3d 83, 63 I11.Dec.

782, 438 N.E.2d 924 (1982), claiming that

it expressed a similar reasoning in pro-

tecting a mobile home tenant from the

"expenses and other tribulations encoun-

tered in moving a mobile home," in

16

upholding 44206 and 209. The correlation

is inapposite but, in any event, not

controlling.

Assuming arguendo that special inter-

ests and circumstances surrounding a

mobile home park require legislative

attention, the fundamental rights of the

mobile home park owner must still be kept

in balance. A state may not choose the

way of greater interference, but must

achieve its purpose in a less restrictive

manner as this court stated in Dunn v.

Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972):

In pursuing that important inter-

est, the State cannot choose

means that unnecesssarily burden

or restrict constitutionally pro-

tected activity. Statutes affec-

ting constitutional rights must

be drawn with "precision" (cita-

tions omitted) and must be

"tailored" to serve their legiti-

mate objectives. (Citations

omitted). And if there are

other, reasonable ways to achieve

those goals with a lesser burden

on constitutionally protected

17

activity, a State may not choose

the way of greater interference.

If it acts at all, it must choose

"less dramatic means." (Citation

omitted).

q¥208 is a dramatic failure in that respon-

sibility.

The Illinois court in referring to and

upholding the constitutional status of

q¥208 states that a lease cannot be nonre-

newed without a cause. q¥208 does not

state with specificity any standardized

formula for determining the adequacy of

such reasons.

A noncriminal statute is unconstitu-

tionally vague under the «iue process

clause, where its language does not convey

sufficiently definite warning as to the

proscribed conduct when measured by common

understanding and practices, or stated

otherwise, where its language is such that

men of common intelligence must neces-

. «

18

sarily guess at its meaning; but such a

statute is not unconstitutionally vague

where it is set out in terms that the

ordinary person exercising ordinary common

sense can sufficiently understand and

comply with. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S.

223 (1951); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,

385 U.S. 589 (1967).

The trial court in the instant case

held that the reasons extended by the

landlord for nonrenewal of the lease were

not adequate and consequently the lease

had to be automatically renewed for a like

term and would be renewed infinitim on a

like term unless there were adequate

reasons advanced and proven by the land-

lord for nonrenewing the lease. Both the

statute and the court, however, leave to

the arbitrary interpretation of a court or

jury the "fact issue" of what constitutes

19

a "sufficient cause" enabling a mobile

home park owner to nonrenew a lease. The

statute is drawn in such a vague and over-

broad fashion that on its face, it is

unconstitutional. Indeed, petitioner is

not given any previous notice or warning

that the use of his land as a mobile home

park was conditioned upon ¥%208 as now

interpreted.

CONCLUSION

We would respectfully request that

this court grant this Petition for

Certiorari and permit full and adequate

briefing on the subject.

It is a matter of national interest

and concern and an issue that is not going

to go away. The ruling of the Illinois

courts in this case adversely affect-the

property rights of every mobile home park

owner and put them arbitrarily in the

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20

category of being “unscrupulous,” thereby

imposing on the state a mandate that it

"protect" the tenant against these vil-

lians who own mobile home parks, not-

withstanding the age old and constitution-

ally protected right of contract and

fundamental property rights.

Respectfully submitted,

Bernard P. Reese, Jr.

REESE & REESE

979 North Main Street

Rockford, Illinois 61103

815/968-8851

Attorney for Petitioner

APPENDIX A

No. 2-87-0899

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

CLOVIS BEEDING, Appeal from

Circuit Court

for Winnebago

County,

Illinois

Plaintiff and

Counterdefendant-—Appellant

and Cross-Appellee,

Vv.

No. 85 SC 4948

THOMAS K. MILLER,

Hon. Paul A.

Logli, Judge

Presiding.

Defendant and

Counterplaintiff-Appellee

and Cross-Appellant.

me me ee ee eee ee eee ee ee

JUSTICE INGLIS delivered the opinion

of the court:

This action was brought by the owner

of a mobile home park to evict the owner

of a mobile home from property leased in

that park. Defendant filed a counterclaim

against plaintiff and third-party com-

plaint against plaintiff's wife. The

trial court held in favor of defendant on

plaintiff's complaint and in favor of

plaintiff and third-party defendant on

defendant's counterclaim. Plaintiff

appeals challenging the trial court's

interpretation of section 8 of the Mobile

Home Landlord and Tenant Rights Act (Act)

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par. 208),

the constitutionality of that section as

interpreted, and the court's finding on

the facts presented. Defendant cross-

appeals challenging the sufficiency of the

evidentiary hearing held by the trial

court on defendant's counterclaim. We

affirm.

Plaintiff, Clovis Beeding, is the

owner and operator of the Maple Leaf

Mobile Home Park located in Loves Park,

Illinois. Defendant, Thomas Miller, is

the owner of a mobile home located on lot

38 of the mobile home park. Defendant

leases that site from plaintiff pursuant

LS a A

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—_ A se ne see

’ . to a written lease executed between the

parties on July 29, 1981. The lease term

is for one year and is renewed automati-

) cally unless either party provides the

other with adequate notice of their intent

not to renew. On June 8, 1985, defendant

’ received notice from plaintiff that his

lease of the mobile home lot would not be

renewed at the end of the term. Pursuant

- to section 8 of the Act, a landlord's

notice of intent not to renew must state

the reasons for nonrenewal, such as non-

payment of rent, violation of the law, or

violation of the park rules. (Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par. 208.) Plain-

tiff's reasons for nonrenewal were stated

as follows:

ae Continual violation of

park rules. Specifically, para-

graph 9, in that the yards have

Pi Bip oe Es tg IT RE NE UN i RONG PL LSS RTT NEL

not been kept neat and clean.

2. In violation of para-

graph 12 of the park rules and

regulations, disposal of garbage

has created a health hazard which

situation endangers the other

tenants in the park."

Defendant was provided with a copy of the

park rules and regulations at the time he

Signed the lease. Paragraph 9 of the park

rules and regulations provides, inter

alia, that the tenant keep his lot neat

and lawn clean and mowed. Paragraph 12

regulates the disposal of trash and gar-

bage, specifically describing the type of

garbage containers required, pickup times,

and further prohibiting storage of the

containers in front of the mobile home.

Despite receiving the notice of nonre-

newal, defendant did not vacate the premi-

ses at the expiration of the lease term

ending July 29, 1985. Instead, defendant

attempted to continue making monthly rent

icing, Payments attempted after July

29, 1985, were refused.

On August 20, 1985, plaintiff filed

this action seeking possession of lot 38.

This is plaintiff's third judicial attempt

to regain possession of lot 38. Plain-

tiff's first attempt was dismissed for

failure to comply with notice time provi-

sions. Plaintiff's second attempt ended

in a decision for defendant because plain-

tiff failed to show that defendant had

notice of the park rules and regulations.

In the instant action, defendant filed his

answer denying the allegations in the

notice of nonrenewal and raising affir-

mative defenses. Defendant also filed a

counterclaim against plaintiff and third-

Mle)

party complaint against plaintiff's wife,

Dorothy Beeding, alleging numerous viola-

tions of statutes and local ordinances and

seeking injunctive and compensatory

relief. Defendant later filed an amend-

ment to his counterclaim and third-party

complaint adding a second count and

alleging that the Beedings were engaged in

deceptive practices in violation of the

Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business

Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch.

122 1/2, par. 261 et seqg.). Count II also

sought injunctive and compensatory relief.

The trial court held a hearing at

which time plaintiff introduced evidence

on the reasons for nonrenewal of the lease

and defendant presented rebuttal evidence

and evidence on the counterclain. Essen-

tially, the trial consisted of both sides

calling neighbors to the witness stand to

’ . testify regarding the condition of defen-

dant's lot. These witnesses gave con-

flicting accounts regarding the upkeep of

’ defendant's lot, particularly with respect

to the length of the grass and weeds

around defendant's mobile home. With

» regard to defendant's disposal of garbage,

one witness did testify vaguely on that

point, but did not state what she found

ie objectionable to it. She did state that

defendant occasionally left empty oil cans

in his front yard; however, this was not

corroborated. A second witness objected

te defendant storing his garbage con-

tainers on his back porch as opposed to in

a storage shed. Other witnesses testified

that there was nothing objectionable about

the manner in which defendant disposed of

his garbage.

The court also heard from an inspector

of the Illinois Department of Health who

stated that none of the violations alleged

in defendant's counterclaim existeu on the

occasions he inspected the mobile home

park for license elegibility. Also, an

investigator for the Loves Park Planning

and Zoning Department testified that he

was currently investigating allegations of

nonconforming uses in the mobile home park.

Defendant rested following the presen-

tation of his evidence, and counsel for

the parties were given an opportunity to

make summations. On September 16, 1986,

the trial court rendered an oral ruling

finding that (1) the statutory provision

allowing a mobile home park owner to ter-

minate a lease with notice and a statement

of reasons requires proof of cause; (2)

the statutory provision requiring proof of

cause to terminate a mobile home lot lease

2 -_ ane (RN SAE EEE Sy OT ne oe _—_ Big ” mv he Lt cceaailt*)

is constitutional; and (3) plaintiff was

not entitled to possession of the lot

since he failed to show cause for ter-

mination of the lease. The trial court

further determined that the evidence pre-

sented at trial was not sufficient to sup-

port the relief sought in either counts I

or II of defendant's counterclaim. The

trial court's oral decision indicated that

a written order would follow.

Prior to the entry of a written order,

plaintiff and defendant filed their

respective appeals from the court's oral

decision. The parties stipulated that the

transcript of the trial court's oral deci-

sion was true and accurate and, if

necessary, should stand in lieu of a writ-

ten order. We subsequently entered an

order aliowing plaintiff "to supplement

the record with a copy of the report of

—=-

proceedings at the hearing on September

16, 1986, before the trial judge, con-

taining the judgment order of the trial

court and a stipulation of the parties

that said report of proceedings is

accurate." Our order did not state that

the transcript of the oral decision could

stand in lieu of a written order. (See E.

J. De Paoli Co. v. Novus, Inc. (1987), 156

I1l1.App.3d 796, (appellate court's juris-

diction cannot be conferred by agreement

of the parties).) This case was origi-

nally set on our September 1987 docket.

On July 28, 1987, we dismissed both

appeals in an order pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 23 (107 I11.2d R. 23) after

questioning our jurisdiction in the

absence of a written order as required by

the triai judge. Beeding v. Miller (2d

Dist. 1987), No. 2-86-0963.

On July 31, 1987, plaintiff filed his

motion with the trial court for entry of a

written order. On August 6, 1987, a writ-

ten order was entered in accordance with

the trial court's prior oral decision.

Plaintiff and defendant then filed their

respective notices of appeal and cross-

appeal from the written order. The par-

ties have resubmitted their original

briefs at our invitation.

PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL

Plaintiff first contends that the

trial court's interpretation of section 8

of the Act requiring the landlord to show

proof of cause for nonrenewal of the lease

was error. Plaintiff argues that the sec-

tion 8 language requiring a landlord to

state the reasons for nonrenewal is

“surplusage" and "does not mandate proof

of those stated reasons to be successful

in obtaining possession of tenant's leased

premises." We disagree.

Section 8 of the Act provides:

"Every lease of a mobile home

or lot in a mobile park shall

contain an option which automati-

cally renews the lease; unless:

(a) the tenant shall notify the

owners 30 days prior to the

expiration of the lease that he

does not intend to renew the

lease; or (b) the park owner

shall notify the tenant 30 days

prior to the expiration of the

lease that the lease will not be

renewed and specify in writing

the reasons, such as violations

of park rules, health and safety

codes or irregular or non-payment

13

of rent." (Emphasis added.) Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par.

208.

It is well established that the

court's function in construing statutes is

to ascertain and give effect to the intent

of the legislature. (Harris v. Manor

Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 I111.2d 350,

362.) In ascertaining the intent of the

legislature, the court should examine the

entire statute noting the subject it

addresses and the legislature's apparent

objective in enacting it. (111 I11.2d at

362; Hetterman v. Weingart (1983), 120

I1ll.App.3d 683, 690.) Each provision or

word in a statute should be given a reaso-

nable meaning and the statute should not

be presumed to contain surplusage within

its provisions. Bloese v. Board of Educa-

tion (1985), 138 Ill.App.3d 460, 464.

a —- — . TS en ey Fae © BE OE ii

Py

QU ...€©¢:-—- az

14

Construing section 8 in light of the

other provisions of the Act indicates that

the legislature did not intend that mere

recitation of the reasons for nonrenewal

should be sufficient for termination of

a lease. In several provisions of the

Act, the statutory grounds for termination

of a mobile home lot lease are expressly

limited. For example, the "reasons"

listed in section 8 for nonrenewal of a

lease include (a) violation of park rules;

(b) violation of health and safety codes;

or (c) irregular or nonpayment of rent.

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par. 208.)

Section 15 similarly limits the grounds

for eviction to (a) nonpayment of rent;

(b) failure to comply with park rules; and

(c) failure to comply with local and State

laws regulating mobile homes. (Ill. Rev.

15

Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par. 215.) Section 17

provides that each lease contain a notice

which states in pertinent part:

"You may continue to reside

in the park as long as_ you pay

your rent and abide by the rules

and regulations of the park. You

may only be evicted for non-

payment of rent, violation of

laws, or for violation of the

rules and regulations of the park

and the terms of the _ lease."

(Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par. 217.)

Finally, section 16 specifies improper

grounds for eviction, such as, (a) repri-

sals for a tenant's effort to secure or

enforce any rights under the lease or

laws; (by reprisals for a tenant's good

faith complaint to governmental authority

aA ADEA Ry, 9

16

of the landlord's attempted violation of

laws; or (c) reprisals for a tenant's par-

ticipation in a homeowner's association or

its activities. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985,

ch. 60, pear. 217.) Construing these sec-

tions together, it is apparent that the

legislature intended to limit the bases

for which a mobile home park owner can

regain possession of a lot occupied by a

mobile home.

Our supreme court has previously

recognized the peculiar nature of mobile

homes given their mobility and potential

use as long-term dwellings. (Rezler v.

Village of Riverside (1963), 28 I11.2d

142, 148.) Noting the necessity for spe-

cial treatment of trailer parks, the court

validated an ordinance requiring that

trailers: permanently attached to the

ground or with their wheels removed comply

:

17

with applicable zoning and building codes.

(38 I11.2d at 148.) The court noted that

removal of wheels was not required for

occupancy and it was not "unreasonable to

view their removal as signifying a use of

the trailer that is more than transient or

temporary." (Emphasis added. ) (28 I11.2d

at 150.) In Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc.

v. Strong (Fla. 1974), 300 So.2d 881, the

supreme court of Florida has similarly

recognized the peculiar nature of mobile

homes. That court stated:

"Mobile homes come to rest in

established parks, the wheels are

generally removed, they are an-

chored to the ground, because of

forces of the wind, connections

with electricity, water and

sewerage are made, awnings are

frequently attached, and to a

i

large degree they lose _ their

mobility except, unless, and

until the wheels are restored,

disruption of electrical, water

and sewer connections is had and

a certain amount of dismantling

and crating is had, all at a

substantial expense of the owner

of the mobile home who had bought

such home with the expectation of

being able to remain in the park

for a not unreasonable time so

long as he abides by all the

reasonable regulations estab-

lished by the park owner. The

removal from one park to another

becomes more than a mere hitching

to a truck or tractor and pulling

it away. To a large degree,

mobile homes are occupied by

19

people in the lower income

brackets who cannot spend several

hundred dollars at the mere whim

of a lessor park." (300 So.2d at

886.)

Our own legislature has also recognized

that the regulation of mobile homes and

mobile home parks may contribute to the

quality of housing for moderate and low

income citizens. See Ill. Rev. Stat.

1985, ch. 111 1/2, par. 711.

Because of the peculiar nature of

mobile homes, limiting the bases for ter-

mination of a mobile home lot lease is

necessary for the tenant's protection. We

have previously held that the purpose of

sections 6 and 9 of the Act is to protect

tenants from landlords who would take

unfair advantage of a tenant by raising

rental fees and adding charges after the

rr ial

ee

tenant had incurred the expense of affix-

ing the dwelling onto the rented premises.

(People ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich (1982),

108 I11.App.3d 83, 95.) This purpose of

protecting tenants from unscrupulous land-

lords is similarly reflected by section 8

and other sections of the Act which limit

the bases for which a landlord may elect

to terminate a lease by nonrenewal or

eviction. This protection would not be

extended were the Act to be construed to

allow a landlord to merely recite the

stated grounds for termination without

proving that those grounds exist. Under

such a construction, a tenant would be

subject to the extreme hardships and

expense of relocating the mobile home

solely at the whim of the landlord. Were

this intended by the legislature, the

language requiring a landlord to state his

21

reasons for nonrenewal would be meaning-

less. As noted by one commentator,

requiring a landlord to show cause for

terminating a tenancy recognizes the

"incredible hardship wrought upon mobile

home tenants whose tenancies are subject

to the whims of park owners," and provides

meaning to the other rights and obliga-

tions in the Act. (Thompson, Mobile Home

and Lot Leases, Representing Residential

Tenants Chapter 18, §18.16 (Ill. Inst.

Cont. Legal Educ. 1983).) Similarly, we

believe that the trial court correctly

interpreted section 8 of the Act to

require that a mobile home park owner show

cause for the nonrenewal of the lot

lease.

Plaintiff next contends that the trial

court's interpretation of section 8 ren-

ders that provision unconstitutional.

22

Plaintiff first challenges the constitu-

tionality of section 8 on the basis that

it deprives him of his liberty and pro-

perty rights without due process of law.

We disagree.

The starting point for any due process

analysis is the selection of the proper

test to be applied to the challenged sta-

tute. (Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp.

(1986), 111 I111.2d 350, 367-68; Rackow v.

Human Rights Comm'n (1987), 152 I11.App.3d

1046, 1058.) Statutes affecting a fun-

damental constitutional right, such as the

expression of ideas, participation in the

political process, travel among the

States, and privacy with regard to the

most intimate and personal aspects of

one's life, should be subjected to strict

scrutiny.. (Harris, 111 I111.2d at 368;

People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68

I11.2d 88, 97; Rackow, 152 I11.App.3d at

1058.) Such statutes are presumptively

invalid and will be validated only if a

compelling State interest for their enact-

ment can be shown. (Village of Oak Lawn

v. Marcowitz (1981), 86 I11.2d 406, 416.)

Where a statute under consideration does

not affect a fundamental right, the

appropriate level of scrutiny is’ the

rational basis test. (Harris, 111 I11.2d

at 368; Seckow, 152 I11.App.3d at 1058.)

Under the rational basis test, the statute

is presumed valid and will be upheld if it

bears a rational relation to a legitimate

legislative purpose and is neither arbi-

trary nor discriminatory. (111 I11.2d at

368.) The party challenging the statute

has the burden of proving that it is irra-

tional. 111 I11.2d at 368.

In the instant action, plaintiff cites

24

Culp v. United States (8th Cir. 1942), 131

F.2d 93, for the proposition that "[{t])he

right to the enjoyment of liberty and the

right to use property are fundamental.

rights." Plaintiff argues that "[{s]Jince

fundamental rights are involved, an

infringement thereof must promote a com-

pelling State interest." Plaintiff con-

cludes that no compelling State interest

exists for the enactment of section 8.

We decline plaintiff's invitation to

apply a strict scrutiny analysis to sec-

tion 8. Pursuant to its police power, a

State may enact a statute for the protec-

tion of the lives, health, morals, and

general welfare of its citizenry. (See

Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47

I33.28 323, 326; City of Decatur vv.

Chasteen -(1960), 19 I11.2d 204, 210.) Our

supreme court has recognized that while

"(tjhe privilege of every citizen to use

his property according to his own will is

both a liberty and a property right, ***

these rights are always subordinate to the

interests of the public welfare." (Empha-

sis added. ) (Chasteen, 19 I11.2d at 211.)

Simply because a law may operate to impose

burdens or restrictions on property is not

determinative of its validity. 19 I11.2d

at 210-11; see also Penn Central Trans-

portation Co. v. City of New York (1978),

438 U.S. 104, 125, 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 649, 98

S.Ct. 2646, 2659.

The legislature is vested with a iarge

amount of discretion to determine not only

what the interests of public welfare

require, but also what measures are

necessary to secure those interests.

(Chicago National League Ball Club _ v.

Thompson (1985), 108 I111.2d 357, 364;

Rackow, 152 I11.App.3d at 1059.) To be a

valid exercise of the police power, the

enactment of the legislature must bear a

reasonable relation to the public interest

sought to be protected, and the means

adopted must be reasonable to accomplish

that objective. {(Sherman-Reynolds, Inc.,

47 I11.2d at 327; Village of Carpenters-

ville v. Fiala (1981), 98 I11.App.3d 1005,

1008. ) A party challenging a law enacted

under the State's police power must prove

by clear and affirmative evidence that the

law constitutes arbitrary, capricious, and

unreasonable legislative action; that

there is no permissible interpretation

which justifies its adoption; or that it

will not promote the safety and general

welfare of the public. Chasteen, 19 Ill.

2d at 210.

This court recently addressed the

27

constitutionality of a statute similariy

restricting the use of private property.

(See Rackow v. Human Rights Comm'n (1987),

152 I11.App.3d 1046.) In Rackow, the

court considered legislation implemented

to prevent discriminatory renting prac-

tices against people with children under

the age of 14. (152 I1l1.App.3d at 1059.)

The court noted that the purpose of that

statute was to protect the family interest

and promote equal treatment in society.

(152 I11.App.3d at 1059.) The court con-

cluded that while the plaintiffs raised a

legitimate interest in the right to use

their property as they saw fit, they were

unable to demonstrate that their personal

property rights outweighed the public need

of assuring fair and equal housing oppor-

tunities and avoiding discrimination on

the basis of family status. 152 I11.App.

28

3d at 1060.

In the instant action, the statutory

language of section 8 as well as other

sections of the Act limiting the bases for

which a tenant's lease can be terminated

reveals the legislature's desire to pro-

tect tenants from enduring the expenses

and other tribulations encountered in

moving a mobile home. We have previously

noted a similar purpose in sections 6 and

9 of the Act and have held that to be a

legitimate State interest. (People ex

rel. Fahner v. Hedrich (1982), 108 Ill.

App.3d 83, 95.) Here, section 8 protects

mobile home park tenants from incurring

the expenses of moving encountered when an

unscrupulous landlord cites unreasonable,

arbitrary, or nonexistent reasons for not

renewing a lease. (See Ill. Rev. Stat.

1985, ch. 80, par. 208.) We find this

Pe Lom ME cy

* Soe Sigs My eins eee Srapee

29

protection to be a legitimate governmental

interest in that it ensures the continued

availability of quality housing for per-

sons of low to moderate means. (See Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111 1/2, par. 711.)

We further find that limiting the bases

for nonrenewal of a lot lease and requir-

ing proof of cause are rationally related

to achieving that goal. (See Palm Beach

Mobile Homes v. Strong (Fla. 1974), 300

So.2d 881, 885 (restricting grounds for

evicting mobile home lot tenant constitu-

tes a reasonable and necessary regulation

of the right to use property in view of

the peculiar nature of mobile homes). )

Therefore, we hold that section 8 does not

violate plaintiff's right to due process

under either the State or Federal Con-

stitutions.

Plaintiff next challenges the consti-

30

tutionality of section 8 on the basis that

it violates his right to equal protection

under the law. We disagree.

The first test in assessing an equal

protection claim is to determine if the

statute in question operates to the disad-

vantage of a suspect class or infringes

upon a fundamental right. (Illinois

Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter

(1980), 82 I11.2d 116, 119; People ex rel.

Fahner v. Hedrich (1982), 108 I11.App.3d

83, 94.) If the statute in question

creates a suspect classification, such as

race, alienage, or national origin; or, if

the statute infringes upon a fundamental

right, then the statute must promote a

compelling State interest. (82 I11.2d at

119-20.) If a suspect classification or

fundamental right is not found, the sta-

tute must simply bear a rational relation

31

to a legitimate governmental interest. 82

I1l1.2d at 120.

In the instant action, plaintiff does

not argue that mobile home park owners are

members of a suspect class. Pliaintiff

argues instead that the right to use,

possess, enjoy, and dispose of a pro-

perty is a fundamental right which is

infringed upon through section 8 of the

Act by treating unequally a certain class

of property owners whose land is leased by

mobile home tenants. However, as stated

above and recognized by both the United

States and Illinois Supreme Courts, a pro-

perty owner's right to use his property as

he chooses is subordinate to the State's

right to regulate that use for the protec-

tion of the general welfare. (Penn

Central Transportation Co. v. City of New

York (1978), 438 U.S. 104, 125, 57 L.Ed.2d

haves ee

rn Ne “= ~ ited 9 bl stig 4 ‘ —

Coe Se eae EMER oat Pa sy ANS a Mae ele

32

631, 649, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659; City of

Decatur v. Chasteen (1960), 19 I11.2d 204,

2423.) Thus, the privilege of an indivi-

dual to use his property freely is subject

always to a legitimate exercise of police

power under which new burdens and restric-

tions may be imposed when the public wel-

fare demands. (Village of Carpentersville

v. Fiala (1981), 98 I11.App.3d 1005,

1008. ) Because the statute here involves

neither a suspect classification nor a

fundamental right, the rational basis test

is applicable. (See 98 I11.App.3d at

1008.) Under traditional equal protection

standards, the legislative classification

must be based on some real and substantial

difference between persons and bear a

rational relation to the purposes of the

statute. 98 I11.App.3d at 1008; see also

Illinois Housing Development Authority, 82

* 2 | ‘ y . *

Le ST ee ae ee: 56 ae Poe ee ee > oe

33

I1l1.2d at 121.

In Fiala, this court upheld an ordi-

nance which distinguished between single-

family and multiple-unit dwellings in

limiting the number of dogs in each resi-

dence. (98 I11.App.3d at 1006.) The

court noted that, with regard to keeping

dogs, there were real and substantial

differences between between single-family

and multiple-unit dwellings such as space,

density and proximity to others, noise

levels, and structural considerations.

(98 I1l1.App.3d at 1009.) The court held

that limiting multiple-unit dwellings to

less than two dogs per residence was a

valid classsification rationally related

to the object of the ordinance, namely,

promoting the general welfare and comfort

of the building's residents. (98 I11.App.

3d at 1009.)} Similarly, in Hedrich, we

34

held that a distinction between tradi-

tional landlords and mobile home park

owners was a valid legislative classifica-

tion rationally related to the purpose of

protecting tenants of mobile home parks

from encountering additional charges after

the tenant had already expended funds by

affixing his dwelling to the leased premi-

ses. 108 I11.App.3d at 95.

In the instant case, the purpose of

section 8 is to protect mobile home ten-

tants from experiencing the extraordinary

expenses of relocating a mobile home by

limiting the reasons for which a lot lease

can be terminated. We have already con-

cluded that this is a legitimate State

interest. Because mobile home park

tenants encouter greater burdens in

establishing and maintaining their resi-

dencs than do traditional tenants, we

35

further hold that the classification

involved here is rationally related to

furthering the State's interest in pro-

tecting mobile home park tenants. There-

fore, we hold that section 8 of the Act

does not violate plaintiff's right to

equal protection under the law.

Plaintiff next challenges the consti-

tutionality of section 8 on the basis that

it is special legislation in violation of

article IV, section 13, of the Illinois

Constitution. We disagree.

Article IV, section 13, of the

Illinois Constitution prohibits the legis-

lature from passing any special or local

law when a general law can be made appli-

cable. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13.)

Whether a general law can be made appli-

cable is a matter of judicial deter-

mination. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,

36

§13.) Special legislation confers a

general privilege or benefit on a person

or group of persons to the exclusion of

others similarly situated and discrimina-

tes in favor of a select group without a

reasonable basis. (Harris . Manor

Healthcare Corp. (1986), i11 I11.2d 350,

370; Chicago National League Ball Club v.

Thompson (1985), 108 I11.2d 357, 367.) The

standards used in determining whether a

law violates this special legislation pro-

vision of the Illinois Constitution are

the same as those used in determining

whether a law violates equal protection.

(111 I11.2d at 370; 108 I11.2d at 368;

Illinecis Housing Development Authority v.

Van Meter (1980), 82 I11.2d 116, 124.)

When a classification does not affect a

fundamental right or discriminate against

a suspect class, the legislation must only

sive Mints Bae

37

bear a rational relation to a legitimate

governmental interest. 108 I11.2d at 368.

Because of the special treatment

surrounding the establishment and con-

tinued occupation of a mobile home

GQwelling (see Rezler v. Village of River-

Side (1963), 28 Il11.2d 142, 148; Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1985, ch. ie Fe F par. (coer

separate classification and regulation of

mobile home parks is rationally related to

the legitimate governmental interest of

protecting tenants renting lots in those

parks. Therefore, we hold that section 8

does not violate the special legislation

provision of the Illinois Constitution.

Plaintiff next challenges the consti-

tutionality of section 8 on the basis that

it acts as a substantial impairment of

plaintiff's property and contract rights.

Essentially, plaintiff argues that the

5 SS tre ti Seni i SON SBE Sag a

38

statute's requirement of automatic renewal

imposes a new contractual condition on

plaintiff. We disagree.

Our supreme court has held that the

right to contract is qualified by the

State's legitimate exercise of police

power. (Memorial Gardens Association,

Inc. v. Smith (1959), 16 I11.2d 116, 128,

appeal dismissed (1959), 361 U.S. 31, 4 L.

Ed.2d 98, 80 S.Ct. 121.) The State may

pass legislation which affects the right

to contract as long as the legislation is

reasonably necessary to secure the health,

safety, morals, or general welfare of the

community. (16 I11.2d at 128; see also

City of Evanston v. Create, Inc. (1981),

85 I11.2d 101, 114.) In examining whether

a contract has been unconstitutionally

impaired, the court must determine whether

(1) the statute has operated as a substan-

39

tial impairment; (2) the State had a

significant and legitimate public purpose

behind the statute; and (3) the adjustment

of rights and responsibilities of con-

tracting parties is based upon reasonable

conditions and is of a character appro-

priate to the public purpose of the regu-

lation. Royal Liquor Mart, Inc. v. City

of Rockford (1985), 133 I11.App.3d 868,

877.

In the instant action, plaintiff sta-

tes that the subject of impairment is the

provision prohibiting a landlord from

simply choosing not to renew a lease at

its expiration. The contract in question

here is the lease. The lease, executed

subsequent to the statute in question,

provides on its face that renewal will be

automatic subject to either party giving

adequate notice. Defendant argues that

40

since the statute was in effect prior to

execution of the lease and its provisions

were incorporated in the lease, it does

not constitute a substantial impairment of

the contract. However, regardless of

whether section 8 impairs the contract, we

have already concluded that the State's

purpose behind section 8--protecting ten-

ants from the arbitrary termination of

their tenancies--is legitimate, and the

conditions imposed by section 8 are reaso-

nable. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion,

section 8 does not create a life tenancy

for mobile home lot lessees. It merely

requires landlords to establish cause for

terminating the tenancy. Plaintiff con-

tinues to have the beneficial use of his

property and may regain possession of it

if he shows cause for termination. There-

fore, we hold that section 8 of the Act is

41

not an unconstitutional impairment of

contract between mobile home park owners

and lot lessees.

Plaintiff's final contention is that

the trial court's finding that plaintiff

was not entitled to possession of the

leased premises was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. We disagree.

In close cases, where findings of fact

must necessarily be determined from the

credibility of the witnesses, a reviewing

court will defer to findings of the trial

court unless they are against the manifest

weight of the evidence. (Chicago Invest-

ment Corp. v. Dolins (1985), 107 I11.2d

120, 124.) For a finding or judgment to

be against the manifest weight of the evi-

dence an opposite conclusion must be

clearly evident. (In re Estate of Elson

(1983), 120 I11.App.3d 649, 655.) The

42

trial judge, as the trier of fact, is ina

superior position to hear and weigh evi-

Gence and determine the credibility and

Gemeanor of witnesses. 120 I11.App.3d at

655.

. Our review of the record indicates

that plaintiff's contentions are without

merit. The reasons for nonrenewal stated

in plaintiff's notice provided that plain-

tiff was in continual violation of rules 9

and 12 of the park rules and regulations.

Specifically, the notice advised defendant

that his lease would not be renewed

because his lot was not kept neat and

clean and because his disposal of garbage

created a health hazard endangering other

tenants in the park. Plaintiff states

that these violations were supported by

evidence that (1) a truck tire used as a

children's sand box was also used by cats

FER ES SE eS A I EE Oe Hy TS

43

as a litter box; (2) weeds grew around the

mobile home; (3) a child's toys were in

the yard; (4) debris was scattered around

the yard; and (5) the lot was "unkept."

Plaintiff's evidence consisted of pic-

tures of the property and testimony of

neighbors. Despite plaintiff's evidence,

other witnesses testified that defendant's

lot was well-kempt, mowed regularly, and

Gevoid of weeds. Furthermore, no evidence

was introduced establishing a violation of

rule 12 regarding defendant's disposal of

garbage. In fact, witnesses testified

that there was nothing wrong with the

manner in which defendant disposed of his

garbage.

Prior to the conclusion of the

hearing, the following colloquy took pla-

"THE COURT: I find that most

of the hearing so far has been

EN PS ae te NI ae eee

44

really a tempest in a teapot.

MR. REESE [plaintiff's

counsel]: I understand.

THE COURT: I have not seen

anything here. In fact, the

requirement of the statute is

cause. I see nothing even remo-

tely approaching cause."

Given the contrary views expressed at the

hearing and the absence of evidence on

rule 12, we do not find the court's con-

clusions to be against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of

the trial court holding that section 8 of

the Act requires proof of cause, that sec-

tion 8 of the Act is constitutional, and

that plaintiff did not meet his burden of

proof.

DEFENDANT'S CROSS-APPEAL

On cross-appeal, defendant contends

that the trial court erred in finding the

evidence presented on his counterclaim

insufficient to grant relief. Count I of

defendant's counterclaim sought injunctive

and compensatory relief for plaintiff's

failure to comply with certain statutes

and ordinances regulating mobile home

parks. Count II was brought under the

Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business

Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch.

121 1/2, par. 261 et seg.). Defendant

states that the trial court "abruptly and

prematurely" terminated the evidentiary

hearing wherein defendant ine presenting

evidence on his counterclaim and thereby

erred when it rendered its decision

against defendant on the counterclaim.

This is simply not supported by the

i,

46

= record.

At the point in the record where

defendant claims the hearing was “termin-

eo... ated," the court merely advised plain-

tiff's attorney that it saw no cause in

E

) what was presented by plaintiff up to that

e point. The court then allowed the hearing

to proceed, during which time plaintiff's

counsel cross-examined defendant's wife

x regarding the allegations in defendant's

counterclaim. Defendant's counsel was

then given an opportunity to conduct a

a

& redirect examination and was further

allowed to call defendant as an additional

witness. Defendant's counsel's examina-

& tion of defendant concerning the upkeep of

his own lot was interrupted by the trial

court with a suggestion that it was dupli-

. cative. Counsel then rested subject to

the admission of exhibits. Thus, coun-

- eras

47

sel's statement that the trial court ter-

minated the hearing on the counterclaim is

not supported by the record.

Moreover, it cannot be said that the

trial court's decision on the evidence

presented was against the manifest weight

of the evidence. Of the two witnesses

testifying in relation to plaintiff's

violation of laws regarding the operation

of the park, one testified that violations

were not found during license eligibility

inspections, and the other testified that

an investigation for violations was merely

underway. We can find nothing in the

testimony or evidence presented which com-

pels a conclusion clearly opposite of that

rendered by the trial court.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of

the trial court holding that the evidence

presented on defendant's counterclaim was

* a fos + ae oy - ‘ is x * 4 A q

beset cba ATT ae Ph Ay Sa Ata tat AES SREP TNR in SIR ot PS MH, Be ee

48

insufficient to suport the relief sought.

We further hold that each party pay

his own costs and fees.

Affirmed.

LINDBERG, P.J., and NASH, J., concur.

oer =

pr. ‘g

wy, ris

Amt: tied fiat

49

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

State of Iilinois)

Appellate Court, ) SS.

Second District, )

I, LOREN J. STROTZ, Clerk of the Appellate

Court, in and for said Second Judicial

District of the State of Illinois, and the

keeper of the Records and Seal thereof, do

hereby certify that the foregoing is a

true, full and complete copy of the deci-

sion of the said Appellate Court in the

above entitled cause of record in my said

office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have set my

hand and affixed the seal of the said

Appellate Court, in Elgin, in said

State, this list day of MARCHE, A.D.

1988.

/s/ Loren J. trotz

Clerk Appellate Court, Second District

q, APPENDIX B

STATE OF ILLINOIS

APPELLATE COURT SECOND DISTRICT

ELGIN

60120

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

312/695-3740

Appeal from the Circuit Court of County of

r nnebago

¢ Wi bag

Trial Court Number: 85SC4948

THE COURT HAS THIS DAY, 04/07/88, ENTERED

THE FOLLOWING ORDER IN THE CASE OF:

P| Gen. No.: 2-87-0899

Beeding, Clovis v. Miller, Thomas kK.

Petition for Rehearing by Appellant/

Cross-Appellee is denied.

€ Inglis, Lindberg, Nash, JJJ.

LOREN J. STROTZ, Clerk

cc: Reese & Reese

; Bernard P. Reese, Jr.

¢ William E. Gottfred

e Downey, Yalden, Shriver & Yalden

Donald L. Shriver

M. Allyson Misevich

51

APPENDIX C

STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO

CLOVIS BEEDING,

Plaintiff and

Counterdefendant,

THOMAS K. MILLER,

Defendant and

)

)

)

)

)

vs. ) No. 85 SC 4948

)

)

)

)

Counterplaintiff. )

ORDER

The above entitled and numbered cause

came on regularly for trial before the

court sitting without a jury, with Bernard

P. Reese, Jr. appearing as counsel for

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, and Donald L.

Shriver appearing as counsel for Defendant

Counterplaintiff. The court having heard

the testimony and having examined the

proofs offered by the parties, and having

ARIE a SRO OE BE BEE oh ~ ee

52

heard the arguments of counsel, and this

cause having been submitted for decision,

the court, being fully advised herein, now

makes the following findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

That based on the authority of

People ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich, 108 Ill.

App.3d 83 (2d Dist., 1982), that Il]. Rev.

Stat. ch. 80, §208 is, in fact, constitu-

tional and is not unconstitutional on

either grounds argued by plaintiff;

2. That under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 80,

§208, that the landlord in a case such as

this must establish cause in order to not

renew a lease for a mobile home lot, that

good cause was not established by the

necessary burden of proof in this case;

. That plaintiff, landlord, is not

entitled to possession of the lease premi-

ses; and

4. That the evidence presented at

trial was not sufficient to support the

relief sought in defendant's counterclain,

Count I or Count II.

Based on the foregoing findings of

fact, the court makes the following

conclusions of law:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ae The Court orders that judgment be

awarded for defendant against plaintiff on

the original Complaint and that plain-

tiff's lease shall continue for the dura-

tion of the term and cannot be terminated

or nonrenewed except by good cause shown;

2. The Court further awards a judg-

ment for plaintiff against defendant on

defendant's Counterclaim; and

3. Each party to pay all costs and

fees.

a

54

DATED: 08/06/87

/s/ John C. Layng

JUDGE

Approved as to form:

/s/ Donald L. Shriver

Donald L. Shriver

Attorney for Defendant/

Counterplaintiff

Prepared and approved by:

/s/ William E. Gottfred

Bernard P. Reese, Jr.

Attorney for Plaintiff/

Counterdefendant

979 N. Main Street

Rockford, IL 61103

815/968-8851

SE AO AT EL. OC sy Oe ey

———————

55

l» STATE OF ILLINOIS

. IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO

+ CLOVIS BEEDING,

Plaintiff and

Counterdefendant,

vs.

THOMAS K. MILLER,

Defendant and

Counterplaintiff,

> vs. No. 85 SC 4948

THOMAS K. MILLER,

Third-Party

Plaintiff,

| vs.

| DOROTHY L. BEEDING,

me ee ee ee ee ee ee ee See ee ee See ee See ee ee See

: Third-Party

a) Defendant.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS at the Hearing

of the above-entitled cause before the

Honorable PAUL A. LOGLI, Judge of said

56

Court, on the i6th day of September, A.D.,

1986.

JOYCE M. OLSON, CSR

Official Court Reporter

THE COURT: This is on Case 85-SC-4948,

Beeding versus Miller, Beeding, B-e-e-d-i-

n-g, and Miller, obviously.

This is a proceeding wherein the Court

is dictating its decision in this case,

said decision to be transmitted to Counsel

for both parties.

The Court has heard the testimony of

the witnesses and the statements of

Counsel, and has reviewed the rather

extensive Exhibits in this case.

The Court makes the following finding:

that based on the authority of People ex

rel. Fahner, F-a-h-n-e-r, v. Hedrich, H-e-

d-r-i-c-h, which is 108 I11.App.3d 83

57

(Second District, 1982), that Section 208

is, in fact, constitutional erd is not

unconstitutional on either grounds argued

by Plaintiff Beeding.

Second, the Court further finds that

under Section 208 of Chapter 80 of the

Illinois Revised Statutes that the land-

lord in a case such as this must establish

cause in order to not renew a lease for a

mobile home lot, that good cause was not

established by the necessary burden of

proof in this case.

Third, that the Plaintiff landlord is

not entitled to possession of the lease

premises.

Fourth, that the evidence presented at

trial was not sufficient to support the

relief sought in Defendant's Counterclaim,

Count I or Count II.

Therefore, the Court orders that judg-

ge Sn oh AS OS

a

ey

ete +

ment be awarded for Defendant against

Plaintiff on the original Complaint and

that Plaintiff's lease shall continue for

the duration of the term and cannot be

terminated or nonrenewed except by good

cause shown.

Court further awards a judgment for

Plaintiff against Defendant on Defendant's

Counterclaim.

Each party to pay all costs and fees.

See Order.

(Which were all of the proceedings of

record heard in the above-entitlied matter

on this date. )

59

STATE OF ILLINOIS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

COUNTY OF WINNEBAGO

CERTIFICATE

I, Joyce M. Olsen, C.S.R., Official

Court Reporter, Seventeenth Judicial

Circuit, State of Illinois, do hereby cer-

tify that I reported in stenograph the

testimony given in the hearing of said

cause, and that the foregoing transcript

is a true and correct transcription of my

stenographic notes so taken as aforesaid,

and contains all the testimony given at

the hearing of the said cause.

I further certify that I am not con-

nected by blood or marriage to any of the

parties in this action, nor am Ia rela-

tive or employee or attorney or counsel of

any of the parties, nor am I a relative or

@

(@

60

employee of such attorney or counsel, or

financially interested in said action, or

interested directly or indirectly in the

matter in controversy.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set

my hand and seal this 23rd day of

September, A.D., 1986.

/s/ Joyce M. Olson

Official Court Reporter

17th Judicial Circuit

State of Illinois

61

APPENDIX D

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

67008 JULEANN HORNYAK, CLERK

SUPREME COURT BUILDING

SPRINGFIELD, ILL. 62706

(217) 782-2035

October 6, 1988

Mr. Bernard P. Reese, Jr.

Reese and Reese

979 N. Main Street

Rockford, IL 61103

No. 67008 - Clovis Beeding, petitioner, v.

Thomas K. Miller, respondent.

Leave to appeal, Appellate

Court, Appellate Court, Second

District.

The Supreme Court today DENIED the

petition for leave to appeal in the above

entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue

to the Appellate Court on October 28, 1988.

————

tt

62

APPENDIX E

STATE OF ILLLINOIS

SUPREME COURT CLERK

SUPREME COURT BUILDING

SPRINGFIELD 62706

FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE

Room 30-129

Richard J. Daley Center

Chicago 60602

(312) 793-1332

JULEANN HORNYAK

CLERK OF THE COURT

(217) 782-2035

November 2, 1988

Bernard P. Reese, Jr.

Reese and Reese

979 N. Main Street

Rockford, IL 61103

THE COURT HAS TODAY ENTERED THE FOLLOWING

ORDER IN THE CASE OF:

No. 67008 - Clovis Beeding, petitioner, v.

Thomas K. Miller, respondent.

The motion by petitioner to

withdraw this Court's order of

October 6, 1988, and issue a

corrected order is denied.

JH: bko

cc: Donald L. Shriver