Opposition Brief — Harden v. Bert

—— S—

y

. Supreme Court, us |

| FILED

NO. 88-1201 cee Wf 1998

JOSEPH F. = |

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

DARREL G. HARDEN,

Petitioner,

vs.

C.W. BERT, D.M. EGLE, J.E. FRANCIS,

M.C. JISCHKE, T.J. LOVE, W.R.

UPTHEGROVE, Individually, and THE

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSTIY

OF OKLAHOMA, a subdivision of the

State of Oklahoma,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MICHAEL W. HINKLE - OBA #4227

MILLS, WHITTEN, MILLS, MILLS

& HINKLE

Suite 500, One Leadership Sq.

Oklahama City, OK 73102

SUSAN SEAMANS - OBA #8041

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

P.O. Box 20901

Oklahoma City, Oklahana 73190

PAGE DOBSON - OBA #2387

HOLLOWAY, DOBSON, HUDSON &

BACHMAN

Suite 900, One Leadership Sq.

Oklahana City, OK 73102

ATTORNEYS OF RECORD FOR

FEBRUARY, 1989 RESPONDENTS

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF

CONTENTS....-...e- a

TABLE OF

AUTHORITIES... cc cccccccccccececs

STATEMENT OF THE

ARGUMENT.......eee- eer cccccccccccs

PROPOSITION I:

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LAWS

OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA......

PROPOSITION II:

IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE

DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE FOR

THIS COURT TO ADDRESS WHETHER

ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS A CONSTI-

TUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT...... 14

PROPOSITION III:

PETITIONER FAILS TO ASSERT

FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT

THIS COURT'S CONSIDERATION

REGARDING PETITIONER'S

ALLEGED DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL

DUE PROCESS... cc cccccccccccccee 17

ii

PROPOSITION IV:

PETITIONER FAILS TO ASSERT

FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT

THIS COURT'S CONSIDERATION

REGARDING ALLEGED DISCRIM-

INATION....22c0- ee eoueeteceeseeens 19

PROPOSITION V:

THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECIDED

THE ISSUE OF ELEVENTH

AMENDMENT IMMUNITY IN

ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE

DECISIONS OF COURTS OF

APPEALS IN OTHER CIRCUITS....... 22

PROPOSITION VI:

BECAUSE THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S

APPLICATION OF FED. R. CIV.

P. RULE 12 (b) (6) AND DENIAL

OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DO NOT

INVOLVE DECIDING A FEDERAL

QUESTION AND BECAUSE THE COURT

HAS NOT DEPARTED OR SANCTIONED

THE DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED

AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL

PROCEEDINGS, THIS COURT'S

POWER OF SUPERVISION IS NOT

PUM Roce cbaeeeeseceeececes

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin

Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283

6. >) ree pee bee eet ede ecese 16

Clulow v. Oklahoma, 800 F.2d

1291, 1301 (10th Cir. 1983)......... 13

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

673 (1974). ccc cc eee cccenccccccces 24

Farmers State Bank of Ada

v. Keen, 66 Okl. 62, 167

Oe a 2 ED OY 2 eee 8

Gay Activists Alliance v. Board

of Regents, 638 P.2d 116,

BAe COEMs BEER Sc cccccccccccsccces 24

Gomez _v. Toledo, 446 U.S.

635, 640 (1980)...... eee ee eeeenee 15

Great American Federal Savings &

Loan Assoc. v. Novotny, 442

U.S. 366 (1979).......... coccccces 21

In Re: Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207,

1209 (Okla. 1976)... cccccccceee 13

iv

Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co.,

689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir.

St Perrper rye ty Prete PTC eT eT Tee 18

Knudson v. Weeks, 394 F.Supp.

963, 974 (W.D. Gila. 19735)... cece 13

Liberty National Bank of

Weatherford v. Lewis, 172 Okl.

103, 44 P.2d 127

fe Se ee ee ee ee eee 4

Muller v. United States Steel

Corp.,509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir.

1975, cert. denied, 423 U.S.

BAe CAPO) ecb bh ee dnseewe bese bsensce 18

O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.

BS PPO KP PTT TT) CT rerrTreTe 25

Payne v. Travenol Laboratories,

Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 898

(5th Cir.), cert. denied,

439 U.S. 835 (1978)............... 26

Sade v. Northern Natural Gas Co.,

483 F.2d 230, 235 (10th Cir.

1973) cccccccccccccccccccccccccces 13

Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp.,

637 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.

Gem CRUE Ac cca snecbecssedrsscsesve 19

Vv

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. School

Board of Dade County, 666 F.2d

505 (llth Cir. 1982, cert.

denied, 549 U.S. 834, U.S.

BSE C1IGSS pa cccccccescecsesece 22,23,24

United Fidelity Life Insurance

Company v. Law Firm of Best,

Sharp, Thomas & Glass, 624

F.26 1465 (10th Cir. 1960)......2.- 10

U.S. v. American Friends Service l

Committee, 419 U.S. 7 (1974)...... 25

Weinberger v. Romero-Arcello,

BOGDOS Gels Wee CRRER pc eccescccesse 25

Wills v. Black & West Architects,

344 P.2d 581, 584 (Okla.

Re 0h 60466 606466 64% hE OOS 4S OR SRDE 13

STATUTES

42 UiS.G. Seetian 19Gb. escskese §

14

15

42 Y¥.8.C. Seetiem 19BG.ccccsccee 5

42 U.S.C. Section 1985 (3)...... 5

14

19

20

21

42 U.8.C. Seetiaom 1986... cceccseces 5

RITE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner filed a civil rights

case in the District Court for the

Western District of Oklahoma on February

28, 1986. Respondents filed their

Motion to Dismiss on March 21, 1986, and

the District Court granted the Motion,

in part, on May 5, 1986.

Petitioner requested leave to file

his First Amended Complaint on May 14,

1986, which was denied as moot, because

on August 5, 1986, Petitioner requested

leave to file his Second Amended Com-

plaint which was granted. The Second

Amended Complaint was twelve (12) pages

long, and the allegations set out there-

in are summarized below.

Petitioner claimed that he was not

promoted in 1973, and that the reason

given him for his lack of promotion was

deceitful. He also complained that stu-

ale

ia iacnieaiieaseene eile

dents for which he was an advisor were

the subject of discriminatory discour-

agement. He did not claim that race,

religion, sex, age or national origin

was the animating force behind this

alleged discriminatory discouragement.

Petitioner also claimed that his

work load was high, and that the sub-

jects that he was asked to teach were

unpopular. He conceded that these

problems were remedied, at least in

part, as a result of his complaining to

the university president. He also

complained that he received poor evalua-

tions in his teaching and research.

In successive paragraphs of Peti-

tioner’s Complaint, he discusses his

grade dispute which was "worked out to

the satisfaction of the Plaintiff." He

asserted that he was deprived of re-

search facilities which, according to

ofn

him, were normally and customarily

provided to engineering professors.

Petitioner asserted that in 1963,

his pay increases began dropping below

other staff members. He claimed that he

was the lowest paid faculty member in

the College of Engineering. Petitioner

complained that no action was taken with

regard to a requested sabbatical leave.

Petitioner alleged in another para-

graph of his Complaint that methods em-

ployed by some of the Respondents in

connection with the investigation into a

sexual harassment complaint were in

violation of the rules set forth in the

faculty handbook. He claimed that he

suffered embarrassment as a result.

Professor Harden complained that

the procedures employed in regard to the

promotion consideration in 1973 were

improper. Then, he complained that his

9

—————a~

methods and approach were not appreciat-

ed by his colleagues.

Petitioner complained that the Re-

spondents conspired to "constructively

Gischarge him from his tenured position

at the University of Oklahoma."

Professor Harden continued in his

Complaint to assert that the State of

Oklahoma, though normally immune from

actions in federal court, is neverthe-

less liable in this case because the

University purchased insurance.

Petitioner sought several millions

of dollars in damages in addition to

injunctive relief.

Respondents filed multiple Motions

to Dismiss on September 19, 1986. The

trial court entered an order on February

aa, 1987, granting the Defendants'

multiple Motions to Dismiss. On Septem-

ber 6, 1988, the United States Court of

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Appeals for the Tenth Circuit filed an

order affirming the judgment of the

District Court on the following bases:

i. That immunity under the Elev-

enth Amendment was not waived to the

extent of liability insurance procured

by the University;

de That facts necessary to sup-

port the award of injunctive relief had

not been plead;

3 That claims under 42 U.S.C.

Sections 1983, 1985, and 1986, if any,

were barred by the statute of limita-

tions; and

4. That Petitioner's allegations

that the Defendants conspired to deprive

him of due process and equal protection

failed to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted.

On October 20, 1988, the Court of

Appeals entered an order denying Appel-

lant's Petition for Re-Hearing en banc.

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The issues involved in this case do

not rise to the level warranting issu-

ance of a Writ of Certiorari. First,

the central issue in this case is wheth-

er Petitioner's action is barred by the

statute of limitations. The Tenth

Circuit, applying state laws, rendered a

decision consistent with the laws of the

State of Oklahoma.

The Court of Appeals decision did

not conflict with decisions of other

federal courts of appeals on the same

matters. Nor did the Circuit's decision

involve important questions of federal

law. The Tenth Circuit did not decide a

federal question in a way in conflict

with applicable decisions of the Supreme

Court.

.

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of

ARGUMENT

PROPOSITION I

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LAWS OF

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.

Petitioner first urges this Court

to issue a Writ of Certiorari because

the Court of Appeals' decision finding

that this action is barred by the stat-

ute of limitations is contrary to the

laws of the State of Oklahoma. Without

question, state law regarding the stat-

ute of limitations is to be applied. It

is also agreed that the two year statute

of limitations is proper. However,

Petitioner suggests that the Statute

should have been tolled.

According to Petitioner, there

exists a fiduciary relationship or a

relationship of trust between the par-

ties which excuses the Petitioner from

exercising due diligence in discovering

a,

the existence of his cause of action.

The Oklahoma cases on which Petitioner

relies for this proposition are clearly

distinguishable.

First, according to Farmers State

Bank of Ada v. Keen, 66 Okl. 62, 167 P.

207 (Okla. 1917), in cases where a

relationship of trust or a fiduciary

relationship between the parties exists,

there is an exception to the general

rule that the limitations period in

cases of fraud begins when the fraud is

committed or when the defrauded person

with ordinary diligence might have

discovered it. The court in Farmers

announced that the principal in a trans-

action that is a matter of public record

has a right to rely upon the fidelity or

truthfulness of his agent and his duty

to disclose the true state of fact. In

such a situation, ordinary diligence

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es . od seit

does not require the principal to search

public records to discern the trust

relationship has been abused. Thus, the

principal in such a situation should not

be charged with constructive discovery

of the fraud even though facts which

would have revealed the fraud are mat-

ters of the public record. The rule is

set forth in dicta and was unrelated to

the facts in Farmers.

In Liberty National Bank of

Weatherford v. Lewis, 172 Okl. 103, 44

P.2d 127 (Okla. 1935), a bank acted as

the plaintiff's agent for the collection

of sums owed on a note owned by the

plaintiff. Though the bank received

final payment on the note, payment was

not credited to plaintiff's account.

Also, in response to repeated inquiries,

plaintiff was told that payment was not

received, thereby causing plaintiff/

aan

owner to postpone filing an action

against the bank for recovery of the

amount collected. The Court held that

since there existed between the parties

a fiduciary relationship, the owner was

not charged with constructive knowledge

of the fraud with regard to the running

of the statute of limitations.

United Fidelity Life Insurance

Company v. Law Firm of Best, Sharp,

Thomas & Glass, 624 F.2d 145 (10th Cir.

1980) involved an attorney malpractice

action in which attorneys plead the

statute of limitations as a defense.

The Court of Appeals held that a fiduci-

ary relationship between the attorneys

and their clients existed and that the

attorneys had a duty to keep their

clients apprised of the course of liti-

gation. Thus, the trial court was

correct in holding that there was will-

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ful concealment by the attorneys which

tolled the running of the statute of

limitations where the attorneys failed

to inform their clients that a judgment

was entered against them until three

months after its entry. Plaintiffs

brought their action more than two years

after the judgment was entered, but less

than two years after they were informed

of its entry.

In the cases cited by Petitioner,

tolling of the statute was proper where

the defendants were in a fiduciary

position and concealed facts which

prevented the plaintiffs from knowing

| they had a cause of action. In this

case, Professor Harden offers no

authority for his contention that the

university occupies the position of

fiduciary. Moreover, the Court of

| Appeals considered Petitioner's

atte

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arguments and found that in this case,

"there waS no concealment as to the

existence of the cause of action."

Upon examination of the record, the

Court found that when the University

denied his promotion in 1973, Mr. Harden

was aware of all the necessary facts

which constituted his claims for depri-

vation of due process and conspiracy,

and that reasonable inquiry would have

led to the discovery of the claim.

It was not necessary for the Court

of Appeals to state that no fiduciary

‘relationship between Professor Harden

and the University existed as Peti-

tioner suggests. It is apparent that

the Court of Appeals considered Peti-

tioner's arguments and rejected them

because they were inapplicable to the

facts in this case. Instead, the Court

of Appeals rendered a decision con-

al ta

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sistent with the laws of the State of

Oklahoma. That is, that the limitations

period is not tolled unless the Plain-

tiff could show "concealment of facts

which would prevent him from knowing

that he had a cause of action." Clulow

v. Oklahoma, 800 F.2d 1291, 1301 (10th

Cir. 1983). Moreover, failure to exer-

cise due diligence in discovering the

claims will prevent the limitations

period from being tolled where a reason-

able inquiry would have led to the

discovery of the claim. Sade v. North-

ern Natural Gas Co., 483 F.2d 230, 235

(10th Cir. 1973); Knudson v. Weeks, 394

F.Supp. 963, 974 (W.D. Okla. 1975); In

Re: Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Okla.

1976); Wills v. Black & West Architects,

344 P.2d 581, 584 (Okla. 1959).

= =

PROPOSITION II

IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE

DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE FOR

THIS COURT TO ADDRESS WHETHER

ACADEMIC FREEDOM Is A

CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED

RIGHT.

Petitioner next contends that the

Tenth Circuit disregarded his allega-

tions of the violation of his right to

academic freedom, and asserts’ that

Certiorari should be granted to clarify

the issue of whether academic freedom is

a constitutionally protected right for

purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and

1985 (3).

The Tenth Circuit ruled that Re-

spondents were absolutely immune in

their individual capacities from suit

for conspiracy seeking money damages and

that allegations necessary for a per-

sonal capacity suit under Sections 1983

and 1985 were absent.

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According to Gomez v. Toledo, 446

U.S. 635, 640 (1980), the Plaintiff must

allege that some person deprived him of

a federal right and that the person

acted under color of state law. Deter-

mining that Petitioner's Complaint

lacked indications that the Respondents

acted in their individual capacities

under color of state law, it was not

necessary that the Court determine

whether Petitioner set forth facts

showing the deprivation of a federal

right. However, the Court determined

that Professor Harden's claims regarding

poor working conditions, professional

criticism and denial of raises, privi-

leges and promotions did not rise to the

level of fundamentally protected liberty

or property rights.

Even if it is assumed that Peti-

tioner asserted that some person de-

al@e

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prived him of his academic freedom, his

personal capacity suit under 1983 would

fail because, as the Tenth Circuit

determined, one of the essential allega-

tions would still be lacking from the

Complaint, i.e., indications that the

Defendants acted in their individual ca-

pacities under color of state law.

Thus, Petitioner asks this Court to

address a constitutional question that

is not essential to the disposition of

the case.

Deciding this question posed by the

Petitioner would be contrary to the

policy of the United States Supreme

Court to avoid unnecessary ajudication

of federal constitutional questions.

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin Castle,

Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982).

atte

PROPOSITION III

PETITIONER FAILS TO ASSERT

FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT THIS

COURT'S CONSIDERATION REGARDING

PETITIONER'S ALLEGED DENIAL OF

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

Petitioner contends that tenure is

a property right and that Respondents

deprived him of his constitutional right

when they allegedly “abrogated” his

tenure without due process. Assuming

tenure is a federally protected property

right, Petitioner has not stated facts

sufficient to show any infringement of

that right.

It is not alleged that Harden was

discharged from his position at the Uni-

versity. Nor was he constructively

discharged. Constructive discharge

occurs only when an employer

deliberately makes or allows the

employee's working conditions to become

so intolerable that the employee has no

oh Dus

choice but to quit. Moreover, the

employer's actions must be intended by

the employer as an effort to force the

employee to quit. Muller v. United

States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825

(1975), Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co.,

689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982).

Petitioner did not quit. In fact,

he is still employed by the University.

Thus, he has not been actually or con-

structively deprived of his tenure. If

there is no deprivation of a

constitutionally protected property or

liberty right, there can be no question

for this Court to consider regarding the

deprivation without due process of that

right. Thus, Petitioner fails to assert

facts which would warrant this Court's

consideration regarding his allegations

of Fourteenth Amendment violations.

atte

PROPOSITION IV

PETITIONER FAILS TO ASSERT

FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT THIS

COURT'S CONSIDERATION REGARDING

ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION.

The Court of Appeals found that the

Complaint was lacking in any allegations

that Professor Harden was the subject of

some invidious class based discrimina-

tion of a type envisioned by the framers

of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which

allegations would be necessary to es-

tablish a conspiracy under 1985. In

order to support an action under 1985

(3), “the plaintiff must be a member cf

a statutorily protected class, and the

actions taken by the defendant must

stem from plaintiff's membership in the

class. Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp.,

637 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981). rN

private feud is not within the intended

scope of the Act's coverage. Silkwood,

637 F.2d at 748.

ain

First, assuming that tenured teach-

ers comprise a class to be afforded

protection from invidious class. based

discrimination, Petitioner's Complaint

wholly failed to assert any facts which

could be construed as showing that the

actions were taken because he was a

member of the class of tenured teachers,

or that Respondents harbored a general

prejudice that transcended the private

disputes between the parties. Thus,

Professor Harden fails to state facts

sufficient to warrant this Court's

examination of the allegations regarding

class based discrimination.

The Court of Appeals did not state

or imply that dismissal of Professor

Harden's claims under 1985 (3) was

proper because his claims were for

deprivation of rights created by Title 7

as Professor Harden asserts. The opin-

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aman

ion clearly states that dismissal of

conspiracy claims under 1985 (3) is

proper because the Complaint was devoid

of allegations necessary to state a

cause of action under that federal stat-

ute. The Court merely includes an addi-

tional possibility for the propriety of

the dismissal. This extra precaution by

the Court of Appeals is clearly warrant-

ed, given the shotgun approach of alle-

gations set forth in Petitioner's Com-

plaint. Thus, since it is not essential

to the disposition of this case, this

Court should not address the Tenth

Circuit interpretation of Great Ameri-

can Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v.

Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979), as Peti-

tioner requests.

atte

PROPOSITION V

THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECIDED THE

ISSUE OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

IMMUNITY IN ACCORD WITH APPLI-

CABLE DECISIONS OF COURTS OF

APPEALS IN OTHER CIRCUITS.

Petitioner asserts that if the

Eleventh Circuit had heard his appeal,

the Respondents would have been denied

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Petition-

er bases his conclusion on one case,

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. School Board

of Dade County, 666 F.2d 505 (11th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 834

(1982).

In Travelers, a school board

claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from

suit by a performance bond surety on the

basis that the money to satisfy the

judgment might be derived from the State

by way of a bond issue for construction

of school buildings. The Eleventh

Circuit denied the school board Eleventh

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Amendment protection from suit on the

basis that the County Board of Educa-

tion, under Florida law, was not ordi-

narily considered a part of the State

for Eleventh Amendment purposes, and

where judgment against the board might

be satisfied with funds not in any way

derived from the State of Florida.

Travelers, 666 F.2d at 509.

Given the facts in Travelers, when

the Court states:

The Eleventh Amendment protec-

tion is available only if sat-

isfaction of judgment against

the state "agency" must under

all circumstances be paid out

of state funds,

it clearly refers to a judgment against

a governmental entity not considered to

be part of the state for Eleventh Amend-

ment purposes. In this case, it is

undisputed that the Respondents, the

Board of Regents, and six individuals in

their official capacities, are con-

«23=

sidered as an arm of the State. Article

XIII, Section 8 of the Oklahoma Consti-

tution, and Gay Activists Alliance v.

Board of Regents, 638 P.2d 116, 123

(Okla. 1981). Thus, Respondents in this

case are immune from liability in a suit

which seeks damages in federal court.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673

(1974). Tenth Circuit judgment on this

issue is in accord with judgments of

other federal courts of appeals, not-

withstanding Travelers.

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PROPOSITION VI

BECAUSE THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S

APPLICATION OF FED. R. CIV. P.

RULE 12 (b) (6) AND DENIAL OF

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DO NOT IN-

VOLVE DECIDING A FEDERAL QUES-

TION AND BECAUSE THE COURT HAS

NOT DEPARTED OR SANCTIONED THE

DEPARTURE FROM ACCEPTED AND

USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PRO-

CEEDINGS, THIS COURT'S POWER OF

SUPERVISION IS NOT NECESSARY.

The District Court and the Court of

Appeals both recognized that the Peti-

tioner alleged no facts from which it

could be inferred that he would suffer

irreparable harm absent the issuance of

an injunction or that there was not

adequate remedy at law. Both elements

are essential in order for an injunction

to be warranted in federal court.

Weinberger v. Romero-Arcello, 10456 U.S.

305 (1982), U.S. v. American Friends

Service Committee, 419 U.S. 7 (1974),

O'Shea _v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488

(1974). The Petitioner has pointed out

a2Se

a

no specific allegations in his Complaint

which would fulfill the requirements so

firmly set and recognized by the Court

of Appeals.

Moreover, Petitioner does not

specify what he wishes to be enjoined.

As the Court of Appeals instructed,

"obey the law" injunctions or injunc-

tions against discrimination in broad

terms are impermissible. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65 (f£); Payne v. Travenol Laborato-

ries, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 898 (5th

Cas. ), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835

(1978).

Ite

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Writ

of Certiorari should not issue in this

action.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL W. HINKLE - OBA #4227

MILLS, WHITTEN, MILLS,

MILLS & HINKLE

Suite 500, One Leadership Square

211 N. Robinson

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102

(405) 239-2500

SUSAN SEAMANS - OBA #8041

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

Health Sciences Center

P.O. Box 20901

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73190

PAGE DOBSON - OBA #2387

HOLLOWAY, DOBSON, HUDSON

& BACHMAN

Suite 900, One Leadership Square

211 N. Robinson

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102

(405) 235-8593

ATTORNEYS OF RECORD

FOR RESPONDENTS

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