Reply Brief — Wilder v. New York State Urban Development Corp.

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No. 88-1103 Supreme Court, U.S.

— — aD

s a oe FEB 8 1989

reme Court of the United TRS... F. SPANIOL, JR.

OcTOBER TERM, 1988 | wineries

—

STEPHEN F. WILDER, BRENDAN GILL, IMRE J. ROSENTHAL,

STEPHEN ROSENTHAL, ROBERT NEUWIRTH, LORI JEAN SAIGH.

and the WHITBY TENANTS’ ASSOCIATION,

Petitioners.

wi

LEE M. THOMAS, as Administrator of the United States Environmental

Protection Agency; UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY; REGION II of the UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY; NEW YORK STATE URBAN DEVELOP-

MENT CORPORATION; VINCENT TESE, as Chairman of the New York

State Urban Development Corporation; TIMES SQUARE REDEVELOP-

MENT CORPORATION; ROBERT M. HALL, as President of the Times

Square Redevelopment Corporation; NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT

OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION; HENRY G. WILLIAMS, as

Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental Con-

servation; DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF

THE CITY OF NEW YORK; HARVEY W. SCHULTZ, as Commissioner

of the Department of Environmental Protection of the City of New York:

MARIO M. CUOMO, as Governor of the State of New York; and

EDWARD I. KOCH, as Mayor of the City of New York,

Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

JOHN S. KiInzEy

LeBorur, LAMB, LEmBY & MACRAE

Of Counsel: 520 Madison Avenue

JAcoB FRIEDLANDER New York, New York 10022

JONATHAN E. POLONsky (212) 715-8000

STEPHEN OREL Counsel of Record

-and-

NorMAN DorsEN

RicHarD L. REVESZ

40 Washington Square South

New York, New York 10012

(212) 998-6100 r

Counsel for Petitioners N

ee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

eee GE BA 5 gg on once enc cewscccacusn ii

I. This Case Raises an Important Legal

Question of Broad Significance .......... 2

II. The Decision in This Case Conflicts With

Decisions in Other Federal Circuit Cases. . 6

III. The Decision Below is Inconsistent With

Decisions and Policies of This Court...... 7

IV. The Decision Below Will Hamper EPA’s

Enforcement of the Clean Air Act........ 9

Ce he ee ee ee 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

A. Cases

Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp.,

110 A.D.2d 304, 494 N.Y.S.2d 700 (lst Dep't

| a Pir seu Weta tnt. s))

Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67

N.Y.2d 400, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 494 N.E.2d 429

(EE oka ces csv aw os ee See eee eee

Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456

if 9; peer repr a een

Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) .

Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1988) ..

B. Statutes and Regulations

California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub.

Res. Code § 21002 (West 1986) ..............

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410 et seq.........

52 Fed. Reg. 45100-02 (1987) ..................

New York State Environmental Quality Review

Act, N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 et

seq. (McKinney 1984 and 1988 Supp.) ........

New York State Air Quality Implementation Plan

For Control of Carbon Monoxide and

Hvdrocarbons in New York City Metropolitan

I a ola ko wk ce a

C. Other Authorities

New York State Urban Development Corp.,

Findings with Respect to 42nd Street

Development Project, New York, New York

(err ery To et ae eee

City of New York, New York State Reasonable

Further Progress in 1984 Toward Attaininent of

Carbon Monoxide Standards (March 1986) ....

Page(s)

passim

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTosER TERM, 1988

No. 88-1103

STEPHEN F. WILDER, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

LEE M. THOMAS, as Administrator of the United States

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

All of respondents’ arguments for denial of certiorari rest on

the same premise—that the New York State Urban Develop-

ment Corporation (“UDC”) found that the 42nd Street Develop-

ment Project (the “Project”) would actually meet the federal

9 ppm standard for carbon monoxide. As discussed below, this

premise is flatly inconsistent with the UDC’s actual findings that

the Project would produce violations of this standard and with

the Second Circuit’s opinion according collateral estoppel ef-

fect to these findings. Thus, respondents provide no grounds

whatever for denying certiorari. Quite to the contrary, it is plain

that this case involves a continuing question of major importance

not only to private citizens seeking to enforce the provisions of

the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410 et seq., but also to the federal

Government, in its role as the Act’s primary enforcer.

I. THIS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT LEGAL QUESTION

OF BROAD SIGNIFICANCE.

Respondents argue that the Second Circuit’s decision does not

establish any general proposition on whether claims brought in

federal court under the Clean Air Act are estopped by state court

litigation under a state environmental quality review act like the

New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. Envtl.

Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 et seq. (McKinney 1984 and 1988 Supp.),

(“SEQRA”). They maintain that no question of general ap-

plicability is presented because the “UDC’s utilization of the

federal 9 ppm standard for carbon monoxide in this particular

case rendered the difference between the two statutory standards

of no practical significance.” Resp. Br. at 27-28.

Respondents’ argument is wholly without merit. It is true, of

course, that the carbon monoxide national ambient air quality

standard (“NAAQS”) of 9 ppm played a role in the state pro-

ceedings, but it was very different from the role contemplated

by the Clean Air Act. SEQRA requires that “adverse environmen-

tal effects” be minimized “consistent with social, economic, and

other essential considerations.” N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law

§ 8-0109(1)(McKinney 1984) (A-75). Pursuant to SEQRA, the

UDC defined “adverse environmental effects” as carbon monox-

ide concentrations in excess of the 9 ppm standard and then found

that the proposed mitigation measures sufficiently minimized such

excess concentrations in light of the multitude of non-

environmental concerns that are cognizable under Section

8-0109(1)! This approach stands in sharp contrast to the require-

ment of the Clean Air Act, expressed in the New York State Air

' The Second Circuit is correct that the UDC in the SEQRA process “looked

to the NAAQS as ‘the standard’ that must be attained.” Wilder v. Thomas, 854

F.2d 605, 619 (2d Cir. 1988) (A-24). But under Section 8-0109(1), the UDC was

not required to find, and did not find, that the Project would actually meet

this standard.

Quality Implementation Plan (the “SIP”), that mitigation

measures “provide for attainment” of the 9 ppm standard. SIP

§ 3.6(A) (A-82). Under the Clean Air Act, the 9 ppm standard

must be met regardless of competing considerations; any excess

concentrations lead directly to a violation of the statutory

requirement.

Thus, this case cleanly poses the question whether a state court

finding, under a state environmental quality review statute like

SEQRA, that the amount of pollution in excess of the federal

ambient standards has been minimized can have collateral estop-

pel effect in a citizen suit under the Clean Air Act, where the

relevant question is whether such excess pollution has been totally

eliminated.

There can be no doubt that the question is of great national

significance. Most large urban metropolitan areas, including New

York, Los Angeles, and Houston, are in violation of the NAAQS

for carbon monoxide and ozone. See 52 Fed. Reg. 45100-02 (1987).

In many states, as in New York, the respective state environmental

quality review statutes do not require the actual elimination of

adverse effects. The California Environmental Quality Act pro-

vides, for example, that “in the event specific economic, social,

or other conditions make infeasible . .. project elements or .. .

mitigation measures, individual projects may be approved in spite

of one or more siginficant effects thereof.” Cal. Pub. Res. Code

§ 21002 (West 1986). Thus, the approach of the court below, if

left undisturbed, will produce a significant delay in the attain-

ment of the NAAQS, vitiating the central concern of the Clean

Air Act. See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266 (1976).

Respondents seek to reduce the significance of the question by

asserting that “[b]ecause the Second Circuit’s holding applies only

when state agencies apply the NAAQS in their own environmental

review, the decision presents no threat to consistent enforcement

of the CAA.” Resp. Br. at 31. But because the NAAQS are designed

“to protect public health” and “to protect the public welfare from

any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the

? Contrary to respondents’ claims, Resp. Br. at 26-27, petitioners do not assert

that all Clean Air Act claims are estopped under the Second Circuit’s ruling.

presence of . . . air pollutant(s],” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b), and SEQRA

requires the minimization of “adverse environmental effects,” it

will be rare that state agencies reviewing air quality impacts

would identify “adverse environmental effects” without reference

to the NAAQS.

In a further effort to obscure the important questions presented

in the Petition, respondents provide a thoroughly misleading ac-

count of the record. They claim that because the Project would

cause “no violation of the 9 ppm standard, the UDC and the

City could approve the Project, as planned, without further

mitigation (beyond that already incorporated into the Project)

and without any conflict between the UDC’s SEQRA and SIP

responsibilities.” Resp. Br. at 28, n. 11. Similarly, they protest that

“with [transportation-related] mitigation measures, the completed

Project would cause no violations of the 9 ppm NAAQS for car-

bon monoxide.” Jd. at 9 (emphasis added).

But respondents do not mention the UDC’s finding, on which

the Second Circuit relied, that the 9 ppm standard would be ex-

ceeded during the Project’s construction. See Wilder v. Thomas,

854 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1988) (A-8); N-Y. State Urban Develop-

ment Corp., Findings with Respect to 42nd Street Development

Project, New York, New York at 30 (Oct. 4, 1984) (A-110); Peti-

tion at 7. It is undisputed that the Project will lead to violations

of the federal 9 ppm standard at least during construction.

Thus, the Petition squarely presents the question whether a

state finding that the amount of pollution in excess of the federal

ambient standards has been minimized, rather than eliminated,

can have collateral estoppel effect in a citizen suit under the Clean

Air Act.

Given the UDC’s finding that the Project will violate the 9

ppm standard during construction, it is legally irrelevant to the

Court’s consideration of the issues raised by the Petition whether

the Project will also violate the standard after completion.

However, respondents’ gross mischaracterizations of the record

merit a brief answer. First, the Second Circuit directly relied on

the UDC’s finding that the 9 ppm standard would be violated

after completion and explicitly gave collateral estoppel effect to

a

this finding. See Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d at 611 (A-8).° Se-

cond, the UDC made its findings on October 4, 1984; the UDC’s

determination was affirmed by the New York Supreme Court and

the Appellate Division in 1985. See Jackson v. New York State

Urban Development Corp., 110 A.D.2d 304, 494 N.Y.S.2d 700

(Ist Dep't 1985). Yet respondents’ claim that no violation will occur

after the Project’s completion is based exclusively on the affidavit

of a UDC official, prepared in connection with the federal court

litigation on February 6, 1986— more than one year after the

UDC’s findings. See Resp. Br. at 8.* In any event, given the un-

disputed finding of violation during the construction period, the

question about the collateral estoppel effect, in a citizen suit under

the Clean Air Act, of findings made pursuant to SEQRA is prop-

erly presented to the Court regardless of whether the Project will

cause subsequent violations as well.‘

> Respondents’ inflammatory statement that the City’s Department of En-

vironmental Protection did not find a violation of the 9 ppm standard after

the Project’s completion is also incorrect. See Resp. Br. at Ll, n. 6. The City’s

1984 “reasonable further progress” report, prepared by the Department, clearly

identified such a violation. See City of New York, New York State Reasonable

Further Progress in 1984 Toward Attainment of Carbon Monoxide Standards,

at 36-37 (March 1986).

* While the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the UDC’s finding on May

8, 1986, it did not rely on this affidavit. See Jackson v. New York State Urban

Development Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 494 N.E.2d 429 (1986).

Indeed, under established principles of administrative law, it could not have

relied on the document because it was not part of the administrative record.

Not surprisingly, given the weakness of their claim, respondents rely on various

irrelevant materials but never set forth the UDC’s actual findings.

* In fact, under established collateral estoppel law, the relevant question is not

what findings were actually made, but instead, what findings were necessary

to the decision. See Petition at 13. The Second Circuit itself noted, and

respondents do not dispute, that a finding of actual compliance with the SIP

was not necessary to the UDC’s determination under SEQRA. See Wilder v.

Thomas, 854 F.2d at 618 (A-24). Thus, under no circumstances can the UDC’s

findings be entitled to collateral estoppel effect in a proceeding under the Clean

Air Act.

EE

——ceceeeae iia iain |

ll. THE DECISION IN THIS CASE CONFLICTS WITH

DECISIONS IN OTHER FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS.

The Petition establishes a conflict between the Second and

Seventh Circuits, which allow economic and social considera-

tions to be taken into account in enforcement proceedings under

the Clean Air Act, and the Third and Sixth Circuits, which do

not. See Petition at 17-21. Respondents do not contest that the

Seventh Circuit is in conflict with the Third and Sixth Circuits.

They maintain, however, that this case is not appropriate to

resolve the conflict because the “UDC and the City of New York

did not seek merely to minimize air quality impacts; nor did they

balance social and economic considerations against the value of

clean air.” Resp. Br. at 32-33. According to respondents, such an

inquiry was not necessary because the Project will not produce

violations of the 9 ppm standard. Jd. at 33. Thus, this argument

also rests on respondents’ baseless assertion, flatly contradicted

on the face of the UDC’s findings and of the Second Circuit's

decision, that the Project will cause no violation of the 9 ppm

standard. See supra at 4-5.

Moreover, there can be no doubt that, contrary to respondents’

contention, the UDC did balance economic and social considera-

tions against the value of clean air, and found that such con-

siderations excused the violations of the 9 ppm standard that it

had identified. The UDC expressly found that

(1) consistent with the social, economic and other essen-

tial considerations, from among the reasonable alter-

natives thereto, the action to be approved is one which

minimizes or avoids adverse environmental effects to

the maximum extent practicable, including the effects

disclosed in the Final Environmental Impact State-

ment; and

(2) consistent with the social, economic and other

essential considerations, to the maximum extent prac-

ticable, adverse environmental effects revealed in the

environmental impact statement process will be

minimized or avoided by incorporating as conditions

to the decision those mitigating measures which were

identified as practicable.

N.Y. State Urban Development Corp., Findings with Respect to

42nd Street Development Project, New York, New York at 43-44

(Oct. 4, 1984) (A-111) (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, the Sec-

ond Circuit determined that the UDC had “consider[ed] ‘social,

economic and other factors,” Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d at 610

(A-8), and that such an inquiry was required by SEQRA, see id.

at 618 (A-24).

In giving collateral estoppel effect to these findings, see id. at

611 (A-9), the Second Circuit held that the legal issues for the |

SEQRA and Clean Air Act proceedings were identical. Jd. at

617-620 (A-21 to A-24). But the legal issues can be identical only

if in enforcement proceedings under the Clean Air Act, as under

SEQRA, social and economic considerations are cognizable, and

can excuse compliance with the requirements of the SIP.* Thus,

the Second Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit, is at odds with the

Third and Sixth Circuits, and this case provides an appropriate

vehicle to resolve the conflict.

Ill. THE DECISION BELOW IS INCONSISTENT WITH

DECISIONS AND POLICIES OF THIS COURT.

Respondents maintain that the decision below will not en-

courage litigants to bypass state court remedies. In support of

this argument, they seek to limit the scope of the Second Cir-

cuit’s decision to cases in which the environmental impact state-

ment does not reveal violations of the NAAQS. According to

respondents, “the opinion suggests that when a state EIS prepared

pursuant to SEQRA reveals a violation of the NAAQS, litigants

will have available both SEQRA and CAA actions.” Resp. Br. at

* Respondents further maintain that the question of “whether economic or

technological considerations are cognizable in CAA enforcement proceedings

.. was simply not ... briefed or argued by any party.” Resp. Br. at 34. This

claim, like most of the other factual assertions in respondents’ brief, is com-

pletely false. Petitioners argued to the Second Circuit that while SEQRA per-

mits a balancing of social and economic considerations, the Clean Air Act does

not, particularly in light of Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).

See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 15, Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1988).

41. Once again, respondents’ argument relies wholly on the false

proposition that the record reveals no violation of the 9 ppm stan-

dard. See supra at 4-5, 6.

Respondents also maintain that there is no incentive for a

bypass of state remedies because, even if petitioners’ claims under

the Clean Air Act were allowed, petitioners would be entitled

only to a record review of the UDC’s findings and would not

be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.’ The record in this case

belies respondents’ claim. Petitioners sought to challenge not only

the adequacy of the mitigation measures that were approved by

the UDC, but also subsequent efforts by the City of New York

to assure the implementation of such mitigation. See Petition at

16. Respondents do not argue, as indeed they cannot, that the

failure to carry out mitigation measures is not enforceable under

the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act. Yet, it is clear

that the only way in which allegations of such failures can be

tested is by means of an evidentiary hearing in the district court

as there is no administrative record for the court to review nor

any administrative agency empowered to make such a record.°

Thus, at the very least, the effect of the Second Circuit’s deci-

sion is that a challenge in state court to the adequacy of mitiga-

tion measures, will estop litigants from challenging in federal

court the wholly separate question of whether such mitigation

measures are being properly implemented. This reason alone pro-

vides a strong incentive to bypass state court remedies.

’ Even if there were no right to an evidentiary hearing in federal court, ligitants

would choose to bypass state court remedies because the Clean Air Act man-

dates actual compliance with SIP requirements, while SEQRA does not. See

supra at 2-3.

* Finally, respondents do not meet petitioners’ arguments that an administrative

determination affirmed by a state court is not entitled to collateral estoppel

effect if there was no opportunity, in the administrative proceedings, to rebut

evidence presented to the agency. See Petition at 15-16. Respondents’ argument

that the availability of such an opportunity is irrelevant to the collateral estop-

pel question, See Resp. Br. at 36-37, is an attempt to rewrite Kremer v. Chemical

Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), to suit respondents’ litigation needs.

IV. THE DECISION BELOW WILL HAMPER EPA'S

ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT.

The decision below will hamper EPA in its role as the Clean

Air Act’s primary enforcer. Clean Air Act contemplates a dual

mechanism for enforcement. Section 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413, sets

forth the procedures for federal enforcement by EPA of any SIP

requirement. In turn, section 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604, provides

private enforcement by means of citizen suits of certain SIP re-

quirements. For both types of actions, the definition of an ac-

tionable “violation” is identical, since it is provided by the SIP

itself. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) with 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1),

(f)(3).

While the Petition in this case arises out of a citizen suit, the

Second Circuit’s decision interprets the Clean Air Act in a man-

ner that will also affect the federal enforcement provision. As

indicated above, a necessary predicate to the Second Circuit’s

ruling was its determination that the SIP requirement that mitiga-

tion measures “provide for attainment of the [9 ppm standard],”

SIP § 3.6 (A-82), is not violated if pollution concentrations in

excess of 9 ppm are minimized consistent with social and

economic considerations. See supra at 2, n5. Thus, under the deci-

sion below, EPA will not be able to insist on actual compliance

by indirect sources with the requirements of the SIP.° This effect

on federal enforcement of the Clean Air Act greatly magnifies

the extent to which the Second Circuit’s decision will delay at-

tainment of the NAAQS. See supra at 3.

* Of course, if the Court has doubts about the impact of the decision below

on EPA, it can invite the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views

of the United States.

10

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for those presented in the Peti-

tion, the Court should issue a writ of certiorari to review the judg-

ment of the Court of Appeals.

Of Counsel:

JACOB FRIEDLANDER

JONATHAN E. POLONSKY

STEPHEN OREL

Dated: February 7, 1989

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN S. KINZEy

LEBoeur, Lams, LEIBy

& MacRArE

520 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10022

(212) 715-8000

Counsel of Record

=

NorMAN DorSEN

RicHARD L. REVEsz

40 Washington Square South

New York, New York 10012

(212) 998-6100

Counsel for Petitioners

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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