Reply Brief — Wilder v. New York State Urban Development Corp.
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No. 88-1103 Supreme Court, U.S.
— — aD
s a oe FEB 8 1989
reme Court of the United TRS... F. SPANIOL, JR.
OcTOBER TERM, 1988 | wineries
—
STEPHEN F. WILDER, BRENDAN GILL, IMRE J. ROSENTHAL,
STEPHEN ROSENTHAL, ROBERT NEUWIRTH, LORI JEAN SAIGH.
and the WHITBY TENANTS’ ASSOCIATION,
Petitioners.
wi
LEE M. THOMAS, as Administrator of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency; UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY; REGION II of the UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY; NEW YORK STATE URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT CORPORATION; VINCENT TESE, as Chairman of the New York
State Urban Development Corporation; TIMES SQUARE REDEVELOP-
MENT CORPORATION; ROBERT M. HALL, as President of the Times
Square Redevelopment Corporation; NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION; HENRY G. WILLIAMS, as
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental Con-
servation; DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK; HARVEY W. SCHULTZ, as Commissioner
of the Department of Environmental Protection of the City of New York:
MARIO M. CUOMO, as Governor of the State of New York; and
EDWARD I. KOCH, as Mayor of the City of New York,
Respondents.
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
JOHN S. KiInzEy
LeBorur, LAMB, LEmBY & MACRAE
Of Counsel: 520 Madison Avenue
JAcoB FRIEDLANDER New York, New York 10022
JONATHAN E. POLONsky (212) 715-8000
STEPHEN OREL Counsel of Record
-and-
NorMAN DorsEN
RicHarD L. REVESZ
40 Washington Square South
New York, New York 10012
(212) 998-6100 r
Counsel for Petitioners N
ee
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
eee GE BA 5 gg on once enc cewscccacusn ii
I. This Case Raises an Important Legal
Question of Broad Significance .......... 2
II. The Decision in This Case Conflicts With
Decisions in Other Federal Circuit Cases. . 6
III. The Decision Below is Inconsistent With
Decisions and Policies of This Court...... 7
IV. The Decision Below Will Hamper EPA’s
Enforcement of the Clean Air Act........ 9
Ce he ee ee ee 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
A. Cases
Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp.,
110 A.D.2d 304, 494 N.Y.S.2d 700 (lst Dep't
| a Pir seu Weta tnt. s))
Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67
N.Y.2d 400, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 494 N.E.2d 429
(EE oka ces csv aw os ee See eee eee
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456
if 9; peer repr a een
Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) .
Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1988) ..
B. Statutes and Regulations
California Environmental Quality Act, Cal. Pub.
Res. Code § 21002 (West 1986) ..............
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410 et seq.........
52 Fed. Reg. 45100-02 (1987) ..................
New York State Environmental Quality Review
Act, N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 et
seq. (McKinney 1984 and 1988 Supp.) ........
New York State Air Quality Implementation Plan
For Control of Carbon Monoxide and
Hvdrocarbons in New York City Metropolitan
I a ola ko wk ce a
C. Other Authorities
New York State Urban Development Corp.,
Findings with Respect to 42nd Street
Development Project, New York, New York
(err ery To et ae eee
City of New York, New York State Reasonable
Further Progress in 1984 Toward Attaininent of
Carbon Monoxide Standards (March 1986) ....
Page(s)
passim
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTosER TERM, 1988
No. 88-1103
STEPHEN F. WILDER, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
LEE M. THOMAS, as Administrator of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
All of respondents’ arguments for denial of certiorari rest on
the same premise—that the New York State Urban Develop-
ment Corporation (“UDC”) found that the 42nd Street Develop-
ment Project (the “Project”) would actually meet the federal
9 ppm standard for carbon monoxide. As discussed below, this
premise is flatly inconsistent with the UDC’s actual findings that
the Project would produce violations of this standard and with
the Second Circuit’s opinion according collateral estoppel ef-
fect to these findings. Thus, respondents provide no grounds
whatever for denying certiorari. Quite to the contrary, it is plain
that this case involves a continuing question of major importance
not only to private citizens seeking to enforce the provisions of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410 et seq., but also to the federal
Government, in its role as the Act’s primary enforcer.
I. THIS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT LEGAL QUESTION
OF BROAD SIGNIFICANCE.
Respondents argue that the Second Circuit’s decision does not
establish any general proposition on whether claims brought in
federal court under the Clean Air Act are estopped by state court
litigation under a state environmental quality review act like the
New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. Envtl.
Conserv. Law §§ 8-0101 et seq. (McKinney 1984 and 1988 Supp.),
(“SEQRA”). They maintain that no question of general ap-
plicability is presented because the “UDC’s utilization of the
federal 9 ppm standard for carbon monoxide in this particular
case rendered the difference between the two statutory standards
of no practical significance.” Resp. Br. at 27-28.
Respondents’ argument is wholly without merit. It is true, of
course, that the carbon monoxide national ambient air quality
standard (“NAAQS”) of 9 ppm played a role in the state pro-
ceedings, but it was very different from the role contemplated
by the Clean Air Act. SEQRA requires that “adverse environmen-
tal effects” be minimized “consistent with social, economic, and
other essential considerations.” N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law
§ 8-0109(1)(McKinney 1984) (A-75). Pursuant to SEQRA, the
UDC defined “adverse environmental effects” as carbon monox-
ide concentrations in excess of the 9 ppm standard and then found
that the proposed mitigation measures sufficiently minimized such
excess concentrations in light of the multitude of non-
environmental concerns that are cognizable under Section
8-0109(1)! This approach stands in sharp contrast to the require-
ment of the Clean Air Act, expressed in the New York State Air
' The Second Circuit is correct that the UDC in the SEQRA process “looked
to the NAAQS as ‘the standard’ that must be attained.” Wilder v. Thomas, 854
F.2d 605, 619 (2d Cir. 1988) (A-24). But under Section 8-0109(1), the UDC was
not required to find, and did not find, that the Project would actually meet
this standard.
Quality Implementation Plan (the “SIP”), that mitigation
measures “provide for attainment” of the 9 ppm standard. SIP
§ 3.6(A) (A-82). Under the Clean Air Act, the 9 ppm standard
must be met regardless of competing considerations; any excess
concentrations lead directly to a violation of the statutory
requirement.
Thus, this case cleanly poses the question whether a state court
finding, under a state environmental quality review statute like
SEQRA, that the amount of pollution in excess of the federal
ambient standards has been minimized can have collateral estop-
pel effect in a citizen suit under the Clean Air Act, where the
relevant question is whether such excess pollution has been totally
eliminated.
There can be no doubt that the question is of great national
significance. Most large urban metropolitan areas, including New
York, Los Angeles, and Houston, are in violation of the NAAQS
for carbon monoxide and ozone. See 52 Fed. Reg. 45100-02 (1987).
In many states, as in New York, the respective state environmental
quality review statutes do not require the actual elimination of
adverse effects. The California Environmental Quality Act pro-
vides, for example, that “in the event specific economic, social,
or other conditions make infeasible . .. project elements or .. .
mitigation measures, individual projects may be approved in spite
of one or more siginficant effects thereof.” Cal. Pub. Res. Code
§ 21002 (West 1986). Thus, the approach of the court below, if
left undisturbed, will produce a significant delay in the attain-
ment of the NAAQS, vitiating the central concern of the Clean
Air Act. See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266 (1976).
Respondents seek to reduce the significance of the question by
asserting that “[b]ecause the Second Circuit’s holding applies only
when state agencies apply the NAAQS in their own environmental
review, the decision presents no threat to consistent enforcement
of the CAA.” Resp. Br. at 31. But because the NAAQS are designed
“to protect public health” and “to protect the public welfare from
any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the
? Contrary to respondents’ claims, Resp. Br. at 26-27, petitioners do not assert
that all Clean Air Act claims are estopped under the Second Circuit’s ruling.
presence of . . . air pollutant(s],” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b), and SEQRA
requires the minimization of “adverse environmental effects,” it
will be rare that state agencies reviewing air quality impacts
would identify “adverse environmental effects” without reference
to the NAAQS.
In a further effort to obscure the important questions presented
in the Petition, respondents provide a thoroughly misleading ac-
count of the record. They claim that because the Project would
cause “no violation of the 9 ppm standard, the UDC and the
City could approve the Project, as planned, without further
mitigation (beyond that already incorporated into the Project)
and without any conflict between the UDC’s SEQRA and SIP
responsibilities.” Resp. Br. at 28, n. 11. Similarly, they protest that
“with [transportation-related] mitigation measures, the completed
Project would cause no violations of the 9 ppm NAAQS for car-
bon monoxide.” Jd. at 9 (emphasis added).
But respondents do not mention the UDC’s finding, on which
the Second Circuit relied, that the 9 ppm standard would be ex-
ceeded during the Project’s construction. See Wilder v. Thomas,
854 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1988) (A-8); N-Y. State Urban Develop-
ment Corp., Findings with Respect to 42nd Street Development
Project, New York, New York at 30 (Oct. 4, 1984) (A-110); Peti-
tion at 7. It is undisputed that the Project will lead to violations
of the federal 9 ppm standard at least during construction.
Thus, the Petition squarely presents the question whether a
state finding that the amount of pollution in excess of the federal
ambient standards has been minimized, rather than eliminated,
can have collateral estoppel effect in a citizen suit under the Clean
Air Act.
Given the UDC’s finding that the Project will violate the 9
ppm standard during construction, it is legally irrelevant to the
Court’s consideration of the issues raised by the Petition whether
the Project will also violate the standard after completion.
However, respondents’ gross mischaracterizations of the record
merit a brief answer. First, the Second Circuit directly relied on
the UDC’s finding that the 9 ppm standard would be violated
after completion and explicitly gave collateral estoppel effect to
a
this finding. See Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d at 611 (A-8).° Se-
cond, the UDC made its findings on October 4, 1984; the UDC’s
determination was affirmed by the New York Supreme Court and
the Appellate Division in 1985. See Jackson v. New York State
Urban Development Corp., 110 A.D.2d 304, 494 N.Y.S.2d 700
(Ist Dep't 1985). Yet respondents’ claim that no violation will occur
after the Project’s completion is based exclusively on the affidavit
of a UDC official, prepared in connection with the federal court
litigation on February 6, 1986— more than one year after the
UDC’s findings. See Resp. Br. at 8.* In any event, given the un-
disputed finding of violation during the construction period, the
question about the collateral estoppel effect, in a citizen suit under
the Clean Air Act, of findings made pursuant to SEQRA is prop-
erly presented to the Court regardless of whether the Project will
cause subsequent violations as well.‘
> Respondents’ inflammatory statement that the City’s Department of En-
vironmental Protection did not find a violation of the 9 ppm standard after
the Project’s completion is also incorrect. See Resp. Br. at Ll, n. 6. The City’s
1984 “reasonable further progress” report, prepared by the Department, clearly
identified such a violation. See City of New York, New York State Reasonable
Further Progress in 1984 Toward Attainment of Carbon Monoxide Standards,
at 36-37 (March 1986).
* While the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the UDC’s finding on May
8, 1986, it did not rely on this affidavit. See Jackson v. New York State Urban
Development Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 494 N.E.2d 429 (1986).
Indeed, under established principles of administrative law, it could not have
relied on the document because it was not part of the administrative record.
Not surprisingly, given the weakness of their claim, respondents rely on various
irrelevant materials but never set forth the UDC’s actual findings.
* In fact, under established collateral estoppel law, the relevant question is not
what findings were actually made, but instead, what findings were necessary
to the decision. See Petition at 13. The Second Circuit itself noted, and
respondents do not dispute, that a finding of actual compliance with the SIP
was not necessary to the UDC’s determination under SEQRA. See Wilder v.
Thomas, 854 F.2d at 618 (A-24). Thus, under no circumstances can the UDC’s
findings be entitled to collateral estoppel effect in a proceeding under the Clean
Air Act.
EE
——ceceeeae iia iain |
ll. THE DECISION IN THIS CASE CONFLICTS WITH
DECISIONS IN OTHER FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS.
The Petition establishes a conflict between the Second and
Seventh Circuits, which allow economic and social considera-
tions to be taken into account in enforcement proceedings under
the Clean Air Act, and the Third and Sixth Circuits, which do
not. See Petition at 17-21. Respondents do not contest that the
Seventh Circuit is in conflict with the Third and Sixth Circuits.
They maintain, however, that this case is not appropriate to
resolve the conflict because the “UDC and the City of New York
did not seek merely to minimize air quality impacts; nor did they
balance social and economic considerations against the value of
clean air.” Resp. Br. at 32-33. According to respondents, such an
inquiry was not necessary because the Project will not produce
violations of the 9 ppm standard. Jd. at 33. Thus, this argument
also rests on respondents’ baseless assertion, flatly contradicted
on the face of the UDC’s findings and of the Second Circuit's
decision, that the Project will cause no violation of the 9 ppm
standard. See supra at 4-5.
Moreover, there can be no doubt that, contrary to respondents’
contention, the UDC did balance economic and social considera-
tions against the value of clean air, and found that such con-
siderations excused the violations of the 9 ppm standard that it
had identified. The UDC expressly found that
(1) consistent with the social, economic and other essen-
tial considerations, from among the reasonable alter-
natives thereto, the action to be approved is one which
minimizes or avoids adverse environmental effects to
the maximum extent practicable, including the effects
disclosed in the Final Environmental Impact State-
ment; and
(2) consistent with the social, economic and other
essential considerations, to the maximum extent prac-
ticable, adverse environmental effects revealed in the
environmental impact statement process will be
minimized or avoided by incorporating as conditions
to the decision those mitigating measures which were
identified as practicable.
N.Y. State Urban Development Corp., Findings with Respect to
42nd Street Development Project, New York, New York at 43-44
(Oct. 4, 1984) (A-111) (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, the Sec-
ond Circuit determined that the UDC had “consider[ed] ‘social,
economic and other factors,” Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d at 610
(A-8), and that such an inquiry was required by SEQRA, see id.
at 618 (A-24).
In giving collateral estoppel effect to these findings, see id. at
611 (A-9), the Second Circuit held that the legal issues for the |
SEQRA and Clean Air Act proceedings were identical. Jd. at
617-620 (A-21 to A-24). But the legal issues can be identical only
if in enforcement proceedings under the Clean Air Act, as under
SEQRA, social and economic considerations are cognizable, and
can excuse compliance with the requirements of the SIP.* Thus,
the Second Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit, is at odds with the
Third and Sixth Circuits, and this case provides an appropriate
vehicle to resolve the conflict.
Ill. THE DECISION BELOW IS INCONSISTENT WITH
DECISIONS AND POLICIES OF THIS COURT.
Respondents maintain that the decision below will not en-
courage litigants to bypass state court remedies. In support of
this argument, they seek to limit the scope of the Second Cir-
cuit’s decision to cases in which the environmental impact state-
ment does not reveal violations of the NAAQS. According to
respondents, “the opinion suggests that when a state EIS prepared
pursuant to SEQRA reveals a violation of the NAAQS, litigants
will have available both SEQRA and CAA actions.” Resp. Br. at
* Respondents further maintain that the question of “whether economic or
technological considerations are cognizable in CAA enforcement proceedings
.. was simply not ... briefed or argued by any party.” Resp. Br. at 34. This
claim, like most of the other factual assertions in respondents’ brief, is com-
pletely false. Petitioners argued to the Second Circuit that while SEQRA per-
mits a balancing of social and economic considerations, the Clean Air Act does
not, particularly in light of Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 15, Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1988).
41. Once again, respondents’ argument relies wholly on the false
proposition that the record reveals no violation of the 9 ppm stan-
dard. See supra at 4-5, 6.
Respondents also maintain that there is no incentive for a
bypass of state remedies because, even if petitioners’ claims under
the Clean Air Act were allowed, petitioners would be entitled
only to a record review of the UDC’s findings and would not
be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.’ The record in this case
belies respondents’ claim. Petitioners sought to challenge not only
the adequacy of the mitigation measures that were approved by
the UDC, but also subsequent efforts by the City of New York
to assure the implementation of such mitigation. See Petition at
16. Respondents do not argue, as indeed they cannot, that the
failure to carry out mitigation measures is not enforceable under
the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act. Yet, it is clear
that the only way in which allegations of such failures can be
tested is by means of an evidentiary hearing in the district court
as there is no administrative record for the court to review nor
any administrative agency empowered to make such a record.°
Thus, at the very least, the effect of the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion is that a challenge in state court to the adequacy of mitiga-
tion measures, will estop litigants from challenging in federal
court the wholly separate question of whether such mitigation
measures are being properly implemented. This reason alone pro-
vides a strong incentive to bypass state court remedies.
’ Even if there were no right to an evidentiary hearing in federal court, ligitants
would choose to bypass state court remedies because the Clean Air Act man-
dates actual compliance with SIP requirements, while SEQRA does not. See
supra at 2-3.
* Finally, respondents do not meet petitioners’ arguments that an administrative
determination affirmed by a state court is not entitled to collateral estoppel
effect if there was no opportunity, in the administrative proceedings, to rebut
evidence presented to the agency. See Petition at 15-16. Respondents’ argument
that the availability of such an opportunity is irrelevant to the collateral estop-
pel question, See Resp. Br. at 36-37, is an attempt to rewrite Kremer v. Chemical
Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), to suit respondents’ litigation needs.
IV. THE DECISION BELOW WILL HAMPER EPA'S
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT.
The decision below will hamper EPA in its role as the Clean
Air Act’s primary enforcer. Clean Air Act contemplates a dual
mechanism for enforcement. Section 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413, sets
forth the procedures for federal enforcement by EPA of any SIP
requirement. In turn, section 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604, provides
private enforcement by means of citizen suits of certain SIP re-
quirements. For both types of actions, the definition of an ac-
tionable “violation” is identical, since it is provided by the SIP
itself. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) with 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1),
(f)(3).
While the Petition in this case arises out of a citizen suit, the
Second Circuit’s decision interprets the Clean Air Act in a man-
ner that will also affect the federal enforcement provision. As
indicated above, a necessary predicate to the Second Circuit’s
ruling was its determination that the SIP requirement that mitiga-
tion measures “provide for attainment of the [9 ppm standard],”
SIP § 3.6 (A-82), is not violated if pollution concentrations in
excess of 9 ppm are minimized consistent with social and
economic considerations. See supra at 2, n5. Thus, under the deci-
sion below, EPA will not be able to insist on actual compliance
by indirect sources with the requirements of the SIP.° This effect
on federal enforcement of the Clean Air Act greatly magnifies
the extent to which the Second Circuit’s decision will delay at-
tainment of the NAAQS. See supra at 3.
* Of course, if the Court has doubts about the impact of the decision below
on EPA, it can invite the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views
of the United States.
10
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for those presented in the Peti-
tion, the Court should issue a writ of certiorari to review the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals.
Of Counsel:
JACOB FRIEDLANDER
JONATHAN E. POLONSKY
STEPHEN OREL
Dated: February 7, 1989
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN S. KINZEy
LEBoeur, Lams, LEIBy
& MacRArE
520 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 715-8000
Counsel of Record
=
NorMAN DorSEN
RicHARD L. REVEsz
40 Washington Square South
New York, New York 10012
(212) 998-6100
Counsel for Petitioners
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