Opposition Brief — World Color Press, Inc. v. Dole

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OCTOBER TERM, 1988

WORLD COLOR PRESS, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

ANN MCLAUGHLIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND GRAPHIC

COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 554

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

GEORGE R. SALEM

Solicitor of Labor

ALLEN H. FELDMAN

Associate Solicitor

MARY-HELEN MAUTNER

Counsel for Appellate Litigation i

JEFFREY A. HENNEMUTH

Altorney

Depariment of Labor

Washington, D.C. 20210

QUESTION PRESENTED

In this case, the Occupational Safety and Health Review

Commission overruled its earlier decision allowing the

Secretary of Labor, in citation enforcement proceedings

under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, to use

non-federal experts to conduct discovery inspections of

the cited employer’s workplace, subject to a comprehen-

sive administrative protective order that guards against

improper disclosure of employer trade secrets. The ques-

tion presented is whether the Commission’s action was

properly set aside by the court below for failure to provide

an adequate explanation for overruling that prior

decision.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SII oS 0 vo th S04 Caw OS coe esas aes ease eee oa

aR Ci Pa. s tea eWha bere hr CReCa tii oat banat e

ee et Wt ae eae ak da tka Aen RE CCR EER OME S

Ea Ua wet h 6 te ky a ks KRU NOs CAT ORS eee kee eae

PEP Py ee EEE COOLER Ty eer

DM Uis chakae cheneaeeade ee bee aake CEE Cee Et L ecu

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Can Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1147, [1979]

ee es os we ccpkcwausas

American Can Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1947, [1979]

Fe. GROG. Cae DT BOO on nc cw pescscsccucess ,

Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc Smelter v. EPA, 658 F.2d

I ew a al oe anak une né das 6 San

Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948)... 0.00...

Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S.

SR EEN ay pp oer ag! ba. 9g re ape ae

Emerson Elec. Co., Upland Indus. Div., 7 O.S.H. Cas.

(BNA) 1454, [1979] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 23,640 .....

Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340

SUE cutd dessa scdeecskod cekeauketedcarten secede

Fred’s Frozen Foods, Inc., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1271,

tog, pee 2 Re eo & F e

Hercules, Inc. v. NLRB, 833 F.2d 426 (2d Cir 1987).....

Aaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)

1486, [1979] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 23,662 ...........

Kama Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1056, [1979] O.S.H.

i ee sa waudee es

Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) .........

Maxwell Wirebound Box Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1995,

[ideas ©.3.88. Dec. GOCH F 26758 oi. cc vce eens

Metal Container Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1202,

toe Cie Re ee ee |

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979)... 22...

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Se. a Se EG ED 6 dco ob eo kk ccs bb cunees

(III)

IV

Cases — Continued: Page

National Mfg. Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1435, [1980]

obs @ Rew LPS rrr rrr 7

Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. OSHRC,

671 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 905

ST Jc ses calcu ceeeahenuKd hha Weed SORE ewe eke y

Owens-Illinois, Inc., 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2162, [1978]

ok § os Le Sera ner 3, 6

Raiston Purina Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1201, [1979]

Ce es ee I fs bocce a nccuakvceawae de 7

Reynolds Metals Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1496, [1980]

att RR eb op Pp ! : Se rere 7

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) ...... 10

United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165

SE dca aa kare oe ka ae on ea ome ee 12

United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.

PCN tn uie 1c uh daca beak chat eRe hae ae 7

Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,

SP ee EE ecko ce lee hcun bak ewan anes 11

World Color Press, Inc., 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1084,

[1977-1978] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ¢ 22,358 .......... 4

Statutes, regulations and rule:

Administrative Procedure Act, § U.S.C. 551 ef seq.:

rr Le tae Oly cee ae kup ake ees es 7)

Pee EE ok cee bac vasveschs be akucde 9

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.

651 ef seq.:

§ Sadi). 29 U.S.C. GS44aMl) .............. - 2

e Jk A ot Bee Peers y

§ 10(c), 29 U.S.C. 659%(c) ..... epee re non’ y

§ 11(cM2), 29 U.S.C. 660(cy2) ........... 1]

Bee pik tl eee are )

§ 12(i), 29 U.S.C. 661i)... ... es 11

Bie. 2p ty |) ee AP 11

eee. 2 RY eee” Se 5,9, 10, 11

Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1905 2

29 C.F.R.:

Section 2200.2(b) ......... y

Section 2200. 11(f) ..... ve 8, 10

cara r

ete ee ee eee ee eee ee

-

V

Regulations and rule — Continued:

ie SR occ cg a a nak oe Oo Ba dene e A

Ractind SE SEED occ ccvascasctasswssesaeun¥.

Riis SN. os ud eae ss hae Rea bbe eae aeen

en AG a Re Se | een reraretr re. rate pw are eee

Miscellaneous:

116 Cong. Rec. 38,708 (1970) ........--- 6. eee ee eee

51 Fed. Reg. (1986):

ST | EAR ere ee eters eee errr

pp. 32,009-32,010 . 22... e eee c cece ccc e er erenes

Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982) ..........-..

8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

CO, ieeecan Dene Seek eee eee were core

’

Page

ty 6 (OO

ee er AS

§Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-778

WorRLD COLOR PREsS, INC., PETITIONER

Vv.

ANN MCLAUGHLIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND GRAPHIC

COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 554

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-A12)

is reported at 843 F.2d 1490. The decision of the Occupa-

tional Safety and Health Review Commission, dated

September 3, 1986 (Pet. App. Al2-A25), is reported at 12

O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2143 and [1986-1987] O.S.H. Dec.

(CCH) § 27,697.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

April 15, 1988. A petition for rehearing was denied on

June 23, 1988 (Pet. App. A26-A28). The petition for a

writ of certiorari was filed on September 21, 1988. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

(1)

ys

STATEMENT

1. Petitioner’s Salem-Gravure Division operates a

printing facility in Salem, Illinois. In May 1983, the Secre-

tary of Labor (the Secretary) issued a citation charging

Salem-Gravure with a serious violation of the “general du-

ty” clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of

1970 (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1).' The citation al-

leged that employees in the bindery department were ex-

posed to the hazard of “undue repetitive motion trauma”

when required to feed the binding machines using repeated

hand and wrist movements. Petitioner contested the cita-

tion and the matter was docketed with the Occupational

Safety and Health Review Commission (the Commission)

for adjudication. Pet. App. A4.

During pre-hearing discovery, the Secretary sought to

have a private consultant inspect the machinery and work

procedures in the employer’s bindery. The consultant, an

ergonomics expert and mechanical engineer, needed to

observe the workplace firsthand in order to evaluate the

feasibility of abating the cited hazard. Petitioner opposed

the discovery request on the ground that a non-federal ex-

pert posed a significantly greater risk of trade secret dis-

closure than a tederal employee, who is subject to,criminal

sanctions under the Trade Secrets Act.? The Secretary then

moved the Commission’s administrative law judge (ALJ)

The “general duty” clause of the OSH Act requires an employer to

turnish employees “employment and a place of employment * * * free

trom recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death

or serious physical harm to [its] employees * * *.” 29 U.S.C.

654(a)(1).

> The Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1905, prescribes fines and/or

unprisonment and removal trom office for federal emplovees who,

without legal authorization, divulge trade secrets and other conti-

denual information obtained by them in the course of their duties.

for an order compelling discovery. Pet. App. A4-AS,

Al4-A15; App., infra, la.?

After a hearing, the ALJ found that legitimate trade

secrets existed in the bindery department, and ordered that

the inspection be carried out subject to a protective order

including the precautionary measures required by the

Commission in Owens-Illinois, Inc., 6O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)

2162, [1978] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 23,218 (Pet. App. AS;

App. infra, 3a, 11a). Chief among the measures the ALJ

required were (1) a non-disclosure agreement between the

Secretary and the consultant that makes the employer a

third-party beneficiary of the agreement with the right to

recover damages in the event of a breach; and (2) a require-

ment that the expert surrender all notes and photographs

from the inspection to the Secretary’s counsel (Pet. App.

A5, AlS-A16; App., infra, 4a, lla).4 The ALJ found no

Statutory basis for a categorical exclusion of outside experts

and held that the Secretary’s need for the consultant’s serv-

ices outweighed the employer’s “speculative” fear of trade

secret disclosure (App., infra, 9a-10a).° Petitioner sought

3 Petitioner’s appendix omits the decision of the administrative law

judge concerning the Secretary’s discovery request. We have therefore

reproduced that decision in an appendix to this brief.

+ The other precautions required by the ALJ under the ees

Illinois decision included: (1) affording the employer an opportunity to

examine the expert’s resume for any past or present affiliation with the

employer’s competitors; (2) requiring the expert to sign and comply with

a written non-disclosure oath; and (3) framing the protective order in

broad enough terms to include within its coverage the Secretary and her

representatives, and to indicate that sanctions for a violation of the

order apply to anyone acting on the Secretary’s behalf (App. infra, 4a).

See Owens-Illinois, Inc., 6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 2165, 2167-2168,

[1978] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 23,218, at 28,071, 28,072-28,073.

* The ALJ also rejected petitioner’s argument that the Secretary is

barred by collateral estoppel trom relitigating the issue of whether an

4

and the Commission granted interlocutory review of this

ruling (Pet. App. AS, Al6).

2. The Commission vacated the ALJ’s order and

remanded with directions to stay the proceedings to enable

the Secretary to apply to a federal district court for a

search warrant or “other appropriate order” authorizing

the inspection of the Salem-Gravure bindery and contain-

ing non-disclosure provisions applicable to the outside ex-

pert (Pet. App. A23-A25). In the Commission’s view, its

authority to enforce protective orders was insufficient to

deter violations of those orders by outside experts, and the

contractual remedies available to an aggrieved trade secret

owner under an Owens-/ilinois protective order were in-

adequate as compared with the “swift and sure” contempt

sanctions that a court could impose (id. at A21-A23). The

Commission accordingly overruled the Owens-Illinois

decision to the extent that the decision upheld the use of

administrative protective orders in this context (id. at

A21-A22).* However, to “strike a balance” between the

competing interests of the Secretary and the employer, the

Commission provided that the Secretary could use an out-

side expert if a search warrant or similar order of a federal

district court authorized the entry with appropriate pre-

cautions (id. at A23).

outside expert can be used to conduct a discovery inspection of its

premises by virtue of an earlier ruling in World Color Press, Inc., 6

O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1084, [1977-1978] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 22,358,

affirming an ALJ's order limiting the Secretary to using federal

employees in conducting discovery in a facility operated by another of

petitioner's divisions (App., infra, 6a-8a).

* The Commission emphasized that collateral estoppel (see note 5,

supra) played no part in its decision. (Pet. App. A22 n.7). Tae Com-

mission Observed that a prior decision rendered erroneous by an in-

tervening change in the law cannot form the basis for applying col-

lateral estoppel, in a subsequent action, against a party to that earlier

case (bid.).

Upon remand to the ALJ, the Secretary declined to seek

judicial authorization for the discovery request and, thus

lacking the necessary expert testimony, elected not to pro-

ceed to a hearing on the citation (Pet. App. A6). As a

result, the ALJ granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss the

case (ibid.). The Secretary then sought appellate review of

this final Commission decision (ibid.).

- 3. The court of appeals reversed the Commission’s rul-

ing on the discovery issue as arbitrary and capricious, and

vacated its dismissal of the citation enforcement case (Pet.

App. A4, All-A12). The court held that the Commission

had failed to supply a reasoned explanation for departing

from Owens-Illinois and had improperly relied, without

supporting evidence, on a presumed inability to impose

meaningful sanctions against private consultants and a

belief that confidentiality agreements are ineffective (id. at

A10-A11).’ The court further observed that the Commis-

sion’s decision “interposes courts to perform a duty Con-

gress expressly empowered the Secretary and the Commis-

sion to perform, namely ‘issu{ing] such orders as may be

appropriate to protect the contidentiality of trade

secrets’ ” (id. at A9-A10 n.3, citing 29 U.S.C. 664). The

court concluded that Congress did not envision a Commis-

sion with such limited powers as to require “repeated

federal [court] interventions” at the discovery stage of ad-

ministrative proceedings (id. at Al2).

’ As a threshold matter, the court of appeals agreed with the Com-

mission that because Owens-I//linois had changed the governing law,

the Secretary was not precluded by the earlier World Color Press deci-

sion from seeking to use an outside consultant in discovery pro-

ceedings in this case (Pet. App. A8-A9).

6

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does

not conflict with any decision of this Court or any other

court of appeals. Accordingly, further review is not war-

ranted.

1. The court of appeals correctly rejected the Commis-

sion’s attempt to overturn its earlier decision allowing

discovery inspections by non-federal experts. In Owens-

Illinois, the Commission thoroughly evaluated the com-

peting interests of employers in their trade secrets and of

the Secretary in achieving swift and effective abatement of

workplace hazards, and it took into account its unsatis-

factory experience under prior Commission rulings that

barred the use of outside experts in workplace inspections

(6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 2165-2167, [1978] O.S.H. Dec.

(CCH) § 23,218, at 28,071-28,072). In holding that

employer trade secrets could be protected most ap-

propriately in discovery entries by non-federal experts

through administrative protective orders, the Commission

struck a balance that would “avoid imposing * * * ex-

cessive constraints on the Secretary’s prosecution of cases

While at the same time adequately protecting employers’

legitimate interests in preserving the confidentiality of

their trade secrets” (6 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 2166, [!978]

O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) € 23,218, at 28,071). The Commis-

sion’s Owens-Illinois decision thus overruled past deci-

sions (including one involving another division of World

Color Press, see note 5, supra), that generally limited the

Secretary to using federal employees in conducting dis-

covery inspections where trade secrets could be found.

During the eight years following Owens-I/linois, protec-

tive orders of the kind outlined in that decision were used,

with apparent success, in nearly a dozen citation enforce-

ment cases where Outside experts conducted workplace

-

discovery on the Secretary’s behalf.* And in similar con-

texts, at least three circuits have found such measures, par-

ticularly the use of confidentiality agreements, to be an

adequate safeguard for trade secrets disclosed to private

consultants and other persons not employed by the federal

government. Hercules, Inc. v. NLRB, 833 F.2d 426, 429

(2d Cir. 1987); United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d

728, 743 (3d Cir. 1985); Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc

Smelter v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1981).

In choosing to abandon this settled approach to the

issue in the present case, the Commission was obliged to

supply “a reasoned analysis * * * beyond that which may

be required” if the issue were being confronted in the first

instance. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). Here, the

Commission’s rejection of administrative protective

measures in the trade secret context was neither well-rea-

soned nor supported by legal theory or empirical evi-

§ See Maxwell Wirebound Box Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1995,

[1980] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 4 24,758; Reynolds Metals Co., 8 O.S.H.

Cas. (BNA) 1496, [1980] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) € 24,607; National Mfe.

Co., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1435, [1980] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) € 24,519;

American Can Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1947, [1979] O.S.H. Dee.

(CCH) 4 24,066; Aaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas.

(BNA) 1486, [1979] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) §¢ 23,662; Emerson Elec. Co.,

Upland Indus. Div., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1454, [1979] O.S.H. Dec.

(CCH) § 23,640; Fred’s Frozen Foods, Inc., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)

1271, [1979] O.S.H. Dee. (CCH) § 23,461; Metal Container Corp., 7

O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1202, [1979] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) § 23,384;

Ralston Purina Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1201, [1979] O.S.H. Dec.

(CCH) § 23,383; American Can Co., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1147,

[1979] O.S.H. Dee. (CCH) § 23,385; Kama Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas.

(BNA) 1086, {1979} O.S.H. Dee. (CCH) § 23,296. Although peti-

tioner rejects our reliance on this history as “naive[ ]” (Pet. 19), there

have been no allegations in these cases that any Commission protec-

tive Order was ever violated by the Secretary's expert.

8

dence.’ Indeed, as the court of appeals pointed out, “the

Commission c[ould not] point to a single case where [the

Owens-Illinois protective order] was insufficient,” nor did

it provide “evidence * * * to disprove the efficacy of

similar confidentiality agreements applied by federal

courts” (Pet. App. All).'° The Commission instead ig-

nored its past success with Owens-Illinois protective orders

and based its policy reversal on unsubstantiated fears of

unauthorized disclosure and on a supposed need for penal

sanctions as a deterrent. “[T]his conjecture,” the D.C. Cir-

cuit properly concluded, “cannot substitute for a reasoned

explanation” (/bid.).

* Petitioner erroneously contends (Pet. 11, 31-32) that the Commis-

sion’s new rules of procedure “codif[y]” its ruling in this case, permit-

ting it to abandon the Owens-/ilinois precedent without further ex-

planation. First, under the new rules, an ALJ is empowered, but not

required, to prohibit disclosure of information to “persons against

whom the Commission could not enforce [a protective] order,” and

also to stay proceedings to allow a party “an opportunity to seek an

order of a court or search warrant with protective conditions” (29

C.F.R. 2200.11(f/)). By contrast, the Commission's decision in this

case Would require such action in every instance where an employer

demonstrates that trade secrets might be uncovered. Furthermore, the

rulemaking record provides no support for such a requirement. Faced

with strong objections to a warrant requirement on grounds that a

tederal district court would lack jurisdiction to issue such a warrant

and that such a requirement would lead to disruption and delay in en-

torcement proceedings, the Commission left the matter for “adjudica-

use resolution.” and thus simply deferred its obligation to address

those objections ($1 Fed. Reg. 32.002, 32,009-32,010 (1936)).

* We also note that the Commission's new rules of procedure (see

preceding note) authorize the ALJ to require written confidentiality

agreements that provide tor liquidated damages (29 C.F.R. 2200.11¢f)

'. Thus, the Commission's rejection of such agreements as an effec-

e Means Of protecting trade secrets information in this case is diffi-

cult to square with the Commussion’s own regulations.

9

2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 15-25) that the Secretary

should be required to obtain a search warrant from a

federal district court in order to conduct discovery inspec-

tions with outside consultants. This contention erroneous-

ly assumes that the district courts have authority to issue

such a warrant, but consideration of that matter by this

Court is not appropriate because the decision below did

not definitively address it. In rejecting the inadequately ex-

plained departure from Owens-Illinois, the court of ap-

peals merely noted its doubts that the district courts

“possess[ed] authority to issue discovery orders while a

citation enforcement proceeding is pending.” Pet. App.

A9 n.3.

We note, in any event, that the court of appeals’ skepti-

cism regarding the warrant requirement is well founded.

Section 15 of the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. 664) plainly em-

powers the Commission to “issue such orders as may be

appropriate to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets.”

Indeed, the Act established the Commission as a “neutral

arbiter” with functions similar in nature to a district court.

See Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474

U.S. 3, 6-7 (1985); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int’]

Union v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643, 652 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 905 (1982); 116 Cong. Rec. 38,708 (1970)

(remarks of Rep. Steiger). It accordingly possesses a wide

array Of quasi-judicial powers and generally follows the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the conduct of its pro-

ceedings. See 29 U.S.C. 659, 661; 29 C.F.R. 2200.2(b),

2200.52(a)(1). As in the case of other formal adjudications

under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Commission

here has broad authority to direct the hearing process. See

29 U.S.C. 659(c) (incorporating by reference 5 U.S.C.

554(c)(2), 556(c)). This authority, recognized in the Com-

mission’s own rules, enables it to authorize and compel the

use Of pre-hearing discovery methods in citation enforce-

10

ment proceedings, and includes the power to issue protec-

tive orders to safeguard trade secrets based on a showing

of good cause by the owner of the information and a fair

balancing of the “competing needs and interests of parties

affected by discovery” (29 C.F.R. 2200.11(f), 2200.52(d);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,

467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).!!

By refusing to enforce any discovery request involving

outside experts and possible trade secrets, and relying in-

stead on district courts to authorize and control that seg-

ment of its proceedings, the Commission abdicated a key

portion of its adjudicatory function to the courts, which

have hitherto played no role in pre-hearing discovery

under the OSH Act. As the court of appeals correctly

noted (Pet. App. A9 n.3), neither the Commission nor

petitioner has cited any statutory or decisional support for

their assumption that district courts may exercise such

authority and control.'? The OSH Act itself supplies no

'! Contrary to petitioner’s assertions (Pet. 13-14, 15-19), Congress

did not guarantee employer trade secrets automatic and complete im-

munity from disclosure in Commission adjudications. “As with most

evidentiary and discovery privileges recognized by law, ‘there is no ab-

solute privilege for trade secrets and similar confidential informa-

tion.’ ” Federul Open Mkt. Comm. vy. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362

(1979) (quoting 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-

cedure § 2043, at 300 (1970)). Although Section 15 of the OSH Act

affirms the need to prevent unauthorized disclosures of trade secret in-

formation obtained by the Secretary and her representatives, and it in-

corporates for that purpose the criminal sanctions available under the

Trade Secrets Act (see note 2, supra), neither that provision nor the

Trade Secrets Act prohibits the Commission from requiring employers

to allow discovery of trade secrets by private individuals. See 29

U.S.C. 664.

'? Petitioner cites several district court decisions (Pet. 22-23, 24-25)

regarding administrative inspection warrants and protective orders for

trade secrets. Those cases are inapposite, however, because none of

~

support for such a proposition: with only carefully cir-

cumscribed exceptions,'? the Act envisions that questions

related to the enforcement of the Secretary’s citations will

be adjudicated solely before the Commission, with subse-

quent review available in the courts of appeals. Congress’s

failure to specify a judicial role in pre-hearing discovery,

and its granting of broad adjudicatory powers to the Com-

mission (including explicit authority to “issue such orders

as may be appropriate to protect the confidentiality of

trade secrets” (29 U.S.C. 664)), certainly imply—as the

court below recognized (Pet. App. at A10 n.3)—that “Con-

gress did not contemplate that the Commission would

delegate these duties to the federal judiciary.” See Whitney

Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S.

411, 422 (1965) (where there is “a specific statutory scheme

for obtaining review * * * the statutory mode of review

[must] be adhered to notwithstanding the absence of an ex-

press statutory command of exclusiveness”).

3. Finally, although petitioner contends (Pet. 32-33)

that collateral estoppel barred the Secretary from even

seeking to conduct discovery with an outside expert, we

note that the court of appeals, the Commission, and the

them involved pre-hearing discovery in an ongding Commission pro-

ceeding; they instead arose in the context of pre-enforcement in-

vestigations and other circumstances where the Commission has no

statutory jurisdiction. Unlike this Court’s decision in Marshall v.

Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the Commission's new search

Warrant requirement for discovery inspections was not prompted vy

constitutional concerns; the Commission in fact assumed that “prob-

able cause” would always exist in such cases (Pet. App. A24).

'* The OSH Act expressly creates jurisdiction in the district courts

to enforce subpoenas issued by the Commission during citation en-

forcement proceedings (29 U.S.C. 661(i)); to restrain and remedy em-

ployer retaliation against employee “whistleblowers” (29 U.S.C.

660(c(2)); and to restrain preliminarily any conditions that create an

immediate danger of death or serious physical harm (29 U.S.C. 662).

12

ALJ all rejected that assertion, and that even the peti-

tioner does not raise the issue as an independent ground

for review. The decision in World Color Press (see note 5,

supra), on which petitioner relies, was overruled by the

Commission in Owens-Illinois. Collateral estoppel, as this

Court has long recognized, is available only where the “ap-

plicable legal rules remain unchanged.” Comunissioner v.

Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1948). See also United

States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 169, 170

(1984); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155

(1979); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(2)

(1982). The court of appeals was therefore correct in re-

viewing the propriety of the Commission’s decision in this

case.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES FRIED

Solicitor General

GEORGE R. SALEM

Solicitor of Labor

ALLEN H. FELDMAN

Associate Solicitor

MIAKY-HELEN MAUTNER

Counsel for Appellate Litigation

JEFFREY A. HENNEMUTH

Attorney

Department of Labor

JANUARY 1989

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND

HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

Docket Number 83-509

SECRETARY OF LABOR, COMPLAINANT

Vv.

SALEM GRAVURE DIVISION, WORLD COLOR

PRESS, INC., RESPONDENT

(Mar. 5, 1984]

ORDER

Procedural background

1. World Color Press has moved for a protective order

guarding against the disclosure of certain trade secrets and

commercial information under Commission Rule 11, 29

C.F.R. § 2200.11. -

2. The Secretary of Labor requested entry of his repre-

sentatives at the Salem Gravure plant at Salem, Illinois,

“for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, testing, survey-

ing, photographing or sampling Respondent’s bindery de-

partment” for determining abatement measures available

to reduce employee exposure to repetitive motion trauma.

The employer objected, and the Secretary of Labor filed a

document that was construed as a motion to compel.

Thereafter the employer filed the aforementioned motion

for protective order.

(la)

2a

3. The employer has no objection to the entry of full-

time government employees, but seeks to bar the entry of |

any independent or private consultants. The Secretary

wishes to use as a representative a Dr. Armstrong, who is

an ergonomist and mechanical engineer (Tr. 162, 169),

and who is an independent consultant. It is represented

that the only ergonomist who is a full-time federal em- |

ployee who might be available is a Dr. Stevens, who is em-

ployed in Washington by OSHA itself (Tr. 169). Dr.

Stevens’ availability is questionable (Tr. 168).

4. The motion for protective order was accompanied

by the single affidavit of Mr. Paul McDaniels, the plant

manager at the Salem Gravure Division, who swore to the

truth of the facts stated in the supporting brief. The mo-

tion indicated that, if a fuller description of the alleged

trade secrets were desired, request was made for a closed

hearing. That request was granted. A closed hearing was

held in St. Louis, Missouri, on February 7, 1984.

5S. Incensidering what is a “trade secret”, World Color

Press relies upon the definition in the Restatement on

Torts (Ist Restatement) (Tr. 5). This is a commonly used

definition. See Words and Phrases, Trade Secret. It shall

be applied here. It is as follows:

A trade secret may consist of any formula, process,

patent, device or compilation of information which is

used in one’s business and which gives him an oppor-

tunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who

do not know or use it. Restatement, Torts, § 757,

comment b.

In addition to the requisite degree of secrecy and lack of

knowledge of other competitors, in proving a trade secret

it must be shown that material has been retained in secrecy

and not disclosed in the conduct of business without ade-

quate protection. Milgrim, Trade Secrets, § 7.07.

6.

3a

Trade Secrets

World Color Press has sustained its proof of trade

secrets in the bindery department regarding the foliowing:

a.

b.

m.

7.

Stream Feeders, which are unique in the way stock

is delivered to the binder (Exhibit SA, Tr. 36-38);

A mail bagging system, with

i. around table, and

ii. bagging chute (Exhibit 5B, Tr. 38-41, 111);

“Long book” rejector systems for binding equip-

ment (Exhibit 5C, Tr. 41-44);

“Micro-Sert” processor (Exhibit 5D, Tr. 44-47);

Sucker arm modifications (Exhibit SE, Tr. 47-50);

“One up-two up” drive system (Exhibit 5F, Tr.

50-53);

A modification of the Signode strapper (Exhibit

5G, Tr. 54-56);

Automated polyfilm imprinter (Exhibit 5H, Tr.

56-58);

In-line jogging system (Exhibit 51, Tr. 59-60);

Modified caliper system (Exhibit 5J, Tr. 61-64);

Magnetic imprinters (Exhibit 5K, Tr. 64-67);

Silicone sprayer and applicator (Exhibit 5L, Tr.

67-69);

Crewing or manning table (Exhibit 7, Tr. 70, 71,

73-74).

A major contention of the Secretary is that the

trade secrets were not adequately protected. There was

heavy reliance upon testimony to the effect that company

practice permitted the entry into the plant of persons in-

cluding members of the public, family members of em-

ployees, a labor union group, and sundry truck drivers.

The record supports this (Tr. 97-98, 113, 121, Exhibits C-2

and C-3). However, the record shows no close scrutiny of

the bindery department by the visitors (Tr. 100), nor ob-

4a

servation by persons having engineering expertise (Tr.

99-100). Nor is there any indication that trade secrets have

been revealed to any competitors. Also, the record shows a

consistent prohibition on the taking of photographs by

visitors within the plant and innovations constituting trade

secrets (Tr. 83, 100, 105-106, 130, 144, 150).

8. Official notice is taken of the fact that ergonomics

is the study of the interaction of persons within an engi-

neered environment. It is an emerging science, and pres-

ently almost all knowledge and theory that it entails can be

regarded as 4 derivative of more established disciplines.

Protective Order Issues

9. In opposing the barring of outside consultant, the

Secretary of Labor argues that this case is controlled by

Owens-Illinois, 1978 CCH OSHD § 23,218; 6 BNA OSHC

2162 (Rev. Com. 1978), and subsequent cases following its

teaching. These permit entry for discovery purposes on

behalf of the Secretary of Labor of an expert who is not a

full-time employee of the federal government subject to

the foliowing minimum conditions: (1) that the expert

swear in writing to keep any secrets made known to him;

(2) that the employer should have a chance to challenge the

selection of the expert on the ground that the expert is

closely aligned with a competitor of the employer; (3) that

there be included in the Secretary of Labor’s contract with

the expert a confidentiality provision as well as one ex-

pressly making the employer a third-party beneficiary of

that provision; and (4) that the protective order indicate

that any sanctions for a violation of its terms will apply to

_ anyone acting on behalf of the Secretary of Labor.

10. World Color Press argues that Owens-I/linois is

not controlling. Its first argument is that the Secretary of

Labor is precluded by the doctrines of collateral estoppel

Sa

and res judicata from re-litigating the question of whether

there may be entry by an expert who is not a full-time

federal employee into the Salem Gravure plant. It is

argued that the question was fully litigated in World Color

Press, Inc., Docket No. 76-2005 (ALJ dec., 7/6/77). The

administrative law judge (Judge Wienman) had held that

no good cause had been shown by the Secretary of Labor

for the use of an outside consultant and, therefore, the

Secretary was limited to the use of full-time federal em-

ployees in the conduct of a discovery inspection in order to

protect adequately the employer’s trade secrets. That case

involved a discovery inspection in which the Secretary

sought to use an outside (non-federal) acoustical engineer

concerning allegations of excessive noise at World Color

Press’ workplace in Effingham, Illinois. The purpose of

the inspection was to discover facts regarding the feasi-

bility of reducing allegedly excessive noise in the press

room.

11. Judge Wienman’s decision was reviewed by a

Review Commission which then consisted of two

members. The two members reached an impasse concern-

ing action, and agreed therefore to affirm the judge’s deci-

sion. But they assigned it the precedential value of an un-

reviewed judge’s decision. World Color Press, Inc., 6

BNA OSHC 1084 (Rev. Com. 1977). An unreviewed ad-

ministrative law judge’s decision is not considered prece-

dent binding upon the Review Commission itself because

it does not necessarily indicate approbation of the judge’s

action. See Leone Construction Co., 3 BNA OSHC 1979,

1975-76 CCH OSHD § 20,387 (Rev. Com. 1976). Thus,

for precedential purposes the weight io be accorded an un-

reviewed administrative law judge’s decision depends upon

the intrinsic merit of that decision. Nothing more.

12. The Secretary of Labor filed a petition for review

of the Commission action in the Seventh Circuit, and later

6a

moved to withdraw the petition for review stating only

that it had been “subsequently concluded that the case was

inappropriate for appellate review”. The motion was

granted.

Res Judicata and collateral estoppel arguments

not now re-litigate before the Commission precisely the

same issues that were decided against him in previous ac-

tion, Which for convenience shall be referred to as World

Color Press, |. This begs the question of precisely what

was litigated almost seven years ago. Also, the application

of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to

an exercise of adjudicative discretion is not squarely ad-

dressed. Determining the scope of a protective order in-

volves an exercise of much discretion by an administrative

law judge.

14. It is generally held that the doctrine of res judicata

or, Where applicable estoppel, does not apply to a decision

on a motion with the same strictness as to a judgment and

that an order made in a pending action on a motion in-

volving a question of practice or the discretion of the trial

court is not an adjudication barring a subsequent motion

on the same ground. 56 Am.Jur., Motions, rules, and

orders, § 30. See also American Surety Co. v. Baidwin, 53

S.Ct. 98, 102 (U.S. 1932).

15. It is unclear what options for experts were avail-

able to the Secretary in World Color Press, |. Here, the

Secretary's only option on the record is the possible use of

a Dr. Stevens, who is employed by OSHA itself. This nar-

row choice of experts within the government could plainly

atfect drastically the experi aid to the Secretary in con-

ducting his case.

13. World Color Press argues that the Secretary can-

7a

16. In asupplemental brief filed at the closed hearing,

World Color Press argues that the Supreme Court’s deci-

sion in U.S. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., __ U.S. ____ (Jan.

10, 1984), which was decided after the briefs were filed in

this case, supports its argument with respect to collateral

estoppel. Stauffer Chemical concerned two EPA inspec-

tions conducted two weeks apart. EPA tried to inspect a

Stauffer phosphorus plant in Tennessee under the Clean

Air Act using private contractors in addition to full-time

EPA employees. Stauffer refused entry to the private con-

tractors because the private contractors refused to sign a

non-disclosure agreement concerning trade secrets. There

.was a similar refusal of an attempted inspection under

similar circumstances of a Stauffer phosphate plant in

Wyoming. The Wyoming case was litigated as far as the

Tenth Circuit which held, among other things, that the

private contractors were not “authorized representatives”

under the enabling legislation, the Clean Air Act. The

Tennessee case was subsequently litigated in the Sixth Cir-

cuit which held that the United States was estopped from

re-litigating the “authorized representative” question be-

cause the United States had previously litigated the

Wyoming case in the Tenth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit deci-

sion was affirmed. In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist the

Court considered any factual differences between the two

cases, such as the difference in location of the plants and

the difference in the private contracting firms, to have no

legal significance in resolving the issues. While eschewing

an exception to the collateral estoppel rule concerning an

issue Of law in Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147 (1979), the

court noted that in Montana it was determined that the

issue Of law exception was inapplicable because of the

“close alignment of time and subject matter, between the

two court actions”. In this case there is no close alignment

of time. Almost seven years separate World Color Press,

8a

I, from World Color Press, 11. Collateral estoppel is

generally said to have three purposes: to “relieve parties of

the cost and vexation of multiple law suits, conserve

judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent deci-

sions, encourage reliance on adiudication”. (Concurring

Qpinion) (Sl. Op. 3). The time elapsing between the cases

Suggests a lack of vexatious litigation and no undue drain

upon the agency’s adjudicative resources. Concerning con-

sistency of decisions, collateral estoppel has been applied

in only a limited fashion to questions of law. It has been

recognized as manifestly unjust to apply one rule of law

forever as between the parties and to apply a different rule

to all other persons. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judg-

ment, 56 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 7 (1942) (article cited with ap-

proval in concurring opinion). The doctrine of collateral

estoppel is intended to provide litigants the benefit of prior

litigation. This is not the same as insuring litigants the

benefits of a prior ruling. (Concurring opinion) (Sl. Op.

8). Here, World Color Press seeks to preserve the benefit

in a different case of a “good cause” ruling by Administra-

tive Law Judge Weinman almost seven years ago in a diff-

erent case involving different expertise, even though there

is some Overlap in the trade secrets involved.

Discretion in entry of protective order

17. Worid Color Press also argues that a proper exer-

cise of discretion in entry of a protective order in this case

is to limit inspection of the plant to federal employees.

Cases such as Triangle Ink and Color Co., Inc. v. Sherwin

Williams Co., 61 F.R.D. 634(N.D. Ill. 1974), are noted in

‘which disclosure of trade secret information was restricted

to the plaintiffs trial attorney, although the attorney

could consult an independent expert provided the parties

mutually agreed upon an independent expert. The cases

. 9a

are cited in support of the reasonableness of Respondent’s

proposed use of a federal employee expert. But World

Color Press still opposes categorically the disclosure of

trade secret information to an independent expert who is

not employed by the federal government. This is so even

though it has not been shown that Dr. Armstrong, the

Secretary’s outside expert, is aligned with any competitor

of World Color Press.

18 U.S.C. section 1905 and section 15 of OSHA

18. World Color Press argues that the OSHA statute

and 18 U.S.C. 1905 require protection of World Color

Press’ trade secrets by limiting inspection to full-time

federal employees. Section 1905 of Title 18 U.S.C. pro-

vides for criminal penalties for any federal employee who

divulges “to any extent not authorized by law” any infor-

mation coming to him in the course of his employment

concerning trade secrets of any person. The statute does

not provide that access to trade secrets will be given only

to federal employees. It only provides sanctions for the

disclosure of trade secrets in the possession of federal

employees. Owens-Illinois, Inc., supra at 2166. Section 15

of OSHA places no additional restrictions on the disclo-

sure of trade secrets. Rather, it adds two exceptions: (1)

disclosure to other offices or employees concerned with

carrying out the OSHA Act, and (2) disclosure when rele-

vant in any proceeding under the Act. Owens-I/linois,

Inc., supra at 2166. Compare Louisiana Chemical Asso-

ciation v. Bingham, 550 F.Supp. 1136, 1144 (W.D. La.

1982). This case falls plainly within the second exception

in Section 15.

19. World Color Press argues that under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure incorporated by reference in

Commission proceedings that, if it is established that con-

10a

fidential information is being sought, the burden is on the

party seeking discovery to establish that the information is

sufficiently relevant and necessary to his case to outweigh

the potential harm of disclosure. Reliance is placed upon

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil,

§ 2043, at pages 300-302. The reliance is well placed. The

treatise, however, in turn relies fully upon a statement by

the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence that reads

as follows:

The need for accommodation between protecting

trade secrets, on the one hand, and eliciting facts re-

quired for full and fair presentation of a case, on the

other hand, is apparent. Whether disclosure should

be required depends upon a weighing of the com-

peting interests involved against the background of

the total situation, including consideration of such

factors as the endangers of abuse, good faith, ade-

quacy of protective measures, and the availability of

other means of proof.

The competing considerations have been weighed and

the listed factors have been considered. There is no

asserted lack of good faith on the part of the Secretary or

his outside expert. The only danger of disclosure that has

been mentioned is a possible mental lapse by the expert at

some time in the future and this could result in a revelation

of a trade secret (Tr. 163). This seems somewhat specula-

tive. Moreover, a full and fair presentation of the Secre-

tary’s case may turn on his ability to use Dr. Armstrong.

Finally, as noted previously there is no indication that Dr.

Armstrong is allied with any competitor of World Color

- Press.

22% Ogee

eee ee

lla

ORDER

Accordingly, the employer is ORDERED to permit en-

try of the Secretary’s Outside expert at its Salem Gravure

plant within thirty (30) days from the date of this order

subject to the following conditions: (1) the protective

measures Outlined in Owens-//linois shall be used; (2) the

entry shall be limited to the area of the citation and not in-

clude the entire bindery department; and (3) any notes or

photographs taken in the course of the discovery inspec-

tion shall be surrendered to the Secretary’s counsel at the

completion of Dr. Armstrong’s participation in this case

and any such material shall remain in the possession of the

Secretary’s agents and thus subject to the strictures of 18

U.S.C. § 1905.

/s/ Paul A. Tenney

PAUL A. TENNEY

Judge, OSHRC

Dated: March 5, 1984

Washington, D.C.

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING Or FICE 1969- 241-699'00056

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Opposition Brief — World Color Press, Inc. v. Dole · 489 U.S. 1011 | Frix