Appendix — Thame v. United States
Supreme Court brief1988
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" Bilpreme Court, Us,
FILED
AUG 15 BB
F. SPANIOL, JR.
88-566)
CASE NO.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER 1987 TERM
ALBERT JOHN THAME, JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITIONER'S APPENDIX
TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Robert F. Simone, Esquire
1919 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Attorney for Petitioner
S
i, os
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
APPENDIX A
Judgment And Probation/Commitment
Ord Qld o & Get co CEE ede 6 SWCtW ee ESSEVEO 00 1
APPENDIX B
Notice Of Appeal To The United
States Court Of Appeals, Third
0 OS rr ae See ks lp eee eee a 4
APPENDIX C
Opinion Of The Court, United
States Court Of Appeals, Third
CRF OCIA cat 6 6 clainddws< cb dbp 6 0 FHA OE 6
APPENDIX D
Order, Supreme Court Of The
United States, Extension Of
Time To File Petition For
Writ Of eae ae ee ae eee 25
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL..... 27
JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DOCKET NUMBER 87-00261-1
DEFENDANT: THAME, ALBERT JOHN, JR.
COUNSEL
In the presence of the attorney
for the government Joan L. Markman,
AUSA, the defendant appeared in person
on 9/30/87, with counsel Robert F.
Simone, Esq.
PLEA
Not Guilty.
FINDING AND JUDGMENT
There being 4 finding/verdict
of guilty. Defendant has been convicted
as charged of the offense(s)- of
possession with intent to distribute
cocaine, a schedule II narcotic con-
trolled substance, in violation of
21 USC §841(a)(1).
SENTENCE OR PROBATION ORDER
The Court asked whether defendant
had anything to say why judgment should
why judgment should not be pronounced.
Because no sufficient cause to _ the
contrary was shown, or appeared to
the Court, the Court adjudged the
defendant guilty as charged and con-
victed and ordered that: The defendant
is hereby committed to the custody
of the Attorney General or his author-
ized representative for imprisonment
for a period of FIVE (5) years with
a FOUR (4) year term of supervised
release beginning upon release from
custody, on Count 1. A mandatory special
assessment of FIFTY ($50) DOLLARS
2.
ral
is imposed. Special conditions are
that the defendant receive a mental
health evaluation and based upon the
results, attend such treatment as deen-
ed necessary by the probation office.
A FIVE THOUSAND ($5,00) DOLLAR fine
is imposed, to be paid during the term
of supervised release in amounts to
be determined by the probation office.
It is requested that the Bureau of
Prisons consider defendant's request
for placement at the Federal Prison
Camp at Allenwood, PA and also consider
the government's opposition to place-
ment in a minimum security prison.
By: U.S. District Judge
s/ Edmund V. Ludwig, J.
Date 9/30/87
NOTICE OF APPEAL
TO THE
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT
DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs.
ALBERT JOHN THAME, JR.
CIRCUIT COURT DOCKET NUMBER
8 OCT '87
DISTRICT COURT DOCKET NUMBER
Cr. No. 87-00261-1
District Court Judge
Edmund V. Ludwig
he
Notice is hereby given that Albert
John Thame, Jr. appeals to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit from Judgment of Conviction
and Sentence. Entered in this action
September 30, 1987.
FILED: October 8, 1987.
s/ Robert F. Simone
Counsel for Appellant
Robert F. Simone, Esquire
1919 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 563-7005
Joan Markman, Esquire
Counsel for Appellee
Assistant U.S. Attorney
3310 U.S. Courthouse
601 Market Street
Phildelphia, PA 19106
(215) 597-2556
5.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 87-1623
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALBERT JOHN THAME. JR.
Appellant
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C.Criminal No.87-00261)
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)
May 3. 1988
Before: GIBBONS. Chief Judge.
and MANSMANN and COWEN,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: May 16, 1988)
WALTER S. BATTY. JR.
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief of Appeals
JOAN MARKMAN
Assistant United States Attorney
Room 3310 U.S. Courthouse
601 Market Street
Philadelphia. PA 19106
Attorneys for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
GIBBONS, Chief Judge:
Albert John Thame, Jr. appeals from the judgment
of sentence imposed following his conviction for
ion of cocaine with intent to distribute. 21
U.S.C. 8 841(a) (1982). He contends that the district
court should have suppressed the cocaine that was
seized from his luggage. He also contends that the
district court erred in allowing the government to
present certain evidence and make certain arguments.
We will affirm.
Thame was a passenger on an Amtrak train from
Fort Lauderdale, Florida to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
The train left Florida on May 21, 1987 and arrived in
Philadelphia on May 22, 1987. Thame did not use his
own name, but rather travelled under a reservation
made in the name “B. Kelly.” An Amtrak investigator in
Washington, D.C. reviewed the manifest while the
train was underway amd discovered that the
reservation was made on the day of travel, that no
telephone number was given, that a sleeping
accommodation was reserved for the northbound trip
but not for the return, and that the ticket was paid for
in cash. His suspicions aroused, the investigator
inquired of personnel at the Fort Lauderdale station
whether anyone remembered the passenger. He
learned that the passenger had appeared nervous. and
had repeatedly asked when the train would leave and
whether he could keep his luggage with him. A
different Amtrak investigator. Faith Doonan. boarded
the train in Washington, and Drug Enforcement
agents in Philadelphia were informed of the
passenger's description.
The district court conducted a suppression
hearing on Thame's motion. What happened when the
train arrived in Philadelphia was seriously disputed at
the suppression hearing, The version told by Thame
conflicts in important respects with the version told by
the law enforcement witnesses. The district court.
however, credited the testimony of the law enforcement
witnesses and found the facts to be as set forth in their
testimony. The following factual account is based on
that credited testimony.
Philadelphia Police Officer Michael McCue.
assigned to the Drug Enforcement Agency, followed
Thame up from the platform to the lobby of 30th Street
Station while DEA Special Agent John McCarty
followed still further behind with Amtrak Investigator
Doonan. In the lobby, McCue walked alongside Thame.
identified himself, and asked if he could speak with
Thame. Thame said that he did not mind. As they
continued walking, McCue asked Thame if he had just
gotten off the train from Florida. and Thame said that
he had. McCue then asked Thame his name, and
Thame replied “Albert Thame.” McCue then asked if he
could see his train ticket. At this point, the two stopped
walking as Thame reached into his pocket and
produced his train ticket, bearing the name “B. Kelly.”
Thame, in response to a question from McCue.
explained that he was using the ticket of a friend who
had to fly back. McCue then asked for identification.
8.
ile
and Thame produced a driver's license and old police
identification in his correct name. Agent McCarty then
joined McCue and Thame and identified himself.
McCue handed the ticket and the identification to
McCarty, who looked it over and handed it back to
Thame. McCarty then explained that they were
working with the Narcotics Interdiction Unit, seeking
cooperation from passengers from source cities such
as Miami and Fort Lauderdale, and asked if Thame
would mind if McCue and McCarty looked in the
luggage Thame was carrying. Thame declined, stating
that he had “sensitive material” in his bag. McCarty
replied that that was fine, that he had an absolute right
to refuse, but asked whether it would be okay if they
conducted the search in a more private place. Thame
again declined. McCarty then asked whether Thame
would object to a sniff search of the air around the bag
by a dog, as this would be less intrusive. Thame agreed.
McCarty then asked if Thame would mind
accompanying them to the Amtrak police office.
explaining that this would be more private and out of
the way. Thame carried his own bag to the office. The
entire conversation took about two minutes, and the
walk to the Amtrak police office took less than a
minute. At the office, a sniff search took place, and the
‘dog indicated that there were drugs in Thame’s bag.
The sniff search was repeated in another room. A
warrant was then obtained, the bag was opened. and
cocaine was found. The district court refused to
suppress the cocaine.
At trial before a jury, Thame denied knowledge of
the cocaine. He testified that he had planned to drive
back to Philadelphia but the plans fell through, that he
called one airline regarding one particular route and
was told that only first class seats were available, and
that he decided to take the train and split the cost of a
sleeping compartment with “B. Kelly.” The thrust of
the defense was that Kelly had the opportunity to place
the cocaine in Thame's bag without Thame's
knowledge. Thame was convicted of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute.
II
Thame contends that his consent to the sniff test
was the product of an unlawful detention. and
therefore invalid. However, “law enforcement officers
do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another
public place, by asking him to answer some questions
[or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing
to listen ....” Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 497
(1983) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
Moreover, “the fact that the officer identifies himself as
a police officer, without more. (does not] convert the
encounter into a seizure requiring some level of
objective justification.” Id.; see also United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551-57 (1980) (opinion
announcing the judgment). A majority of the Court has
agreed that a contact in which officers “simply ask [if a
defendant] would step aside and talk with them, [is]
clearly the sort of consensual encounter that implicates
no Fourth Amendment interest.” Florida v. Rodriguez.
469 U.S. 1. 5-6 (1984) (per curiam). Although we have
our doubts whether a reasonable person who is greeted
by federal agents and asked for identification feels free
to simply ignore the agents, we are not free to
substitute our judgment on this question for the
Supreme Court's. See United States v. Notorianni, 729
F.2d 520, 522 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Maybe this is a wrong
guess about what the average person feels in this
situation ... "); United States v. Cordell,’723 F.2d
1283, 1286. cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1029 (1984)
(Swygert, J.. concurring) (“I believe that as a factual
psychological matter people who are stopped for
10.
questioning of this kind by police officers. . .
do not feel ‘free to leave’. . .”); see also Note, The Drug
Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable
Intrusions or Suspicionless Seizures?, 12 Nova L. Rev.
273, 284 (1987) (lower courts recognize “the
artificiality of the test”).
In Royer, a plurality of the Court rejected the
contention that the particular encounter at issue was
consensual, stating:
Asking for and examining Royer's ticket and his
driver's license were no doubt permissible in
themselves, but when the officers identified
themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer that he
was suspected of transporting narcotics, and
asked him te accompany them to the police room.
while retaining his ticket and driver's license and
without indicating in any way that he was free to
depart, Royer was effectively seized for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. These
circumstance surely amount to a show of official
authority such that a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not [ree to leave. |
460 U.S. at 501-02 (plurality opinion).
Turning to the facts of this case, it is clear that it
was permissible to ask Thame for his ticket and for
identification. Moreover, the officers did not restrain
him, block his path, or otherwise control his
movement by retaining his papers. Cf. Cordell, 723
F.2d at 1285 (majority) and at 1287 (Swygert. J..
concurring). Unlike the defendants in Mendenhall,
Royer, and Rodriguez, Thame did not consent to a
search after he moved to another area in response to
the officers’ request, but rather was only asked to move
to the Amtrak police office after he consented to the
sniff test. Thus Thames can only prevail on this
argument if the permissible conversation in the lobby
11.
of 30th Street Station ripened into an unlawful
detention at some point prior to his consent to the sniff
test.
Thames argues that he was seized “at the point he
refused to consent to the search.” Brief at 30. He relies
on a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit which held that when “two agents explained
that they suspected [the defendant] of transporting
drugs and asked permission to search his luggage. the
consensual questioning had ripened into an
investigative stop.” United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d
304, 311 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1082
(1986). The important factor could not have been that
the agents asked permission to search, for such a rule
would mean that there is no such thing as a purely
consensual search. Instead, the important factor was
that “Borys knew that the agents had positively
identified him as a suspect.” Id. As the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained.
“Statements which intimate that an investigation has
focussed on a specific individual easily could induce a
reasonabie person to believe that failure to cooperate
would only lead to formal:detention.” United States v.
Berry, 670 F.2d 583. 597 (Lith Cir. 1982) (in banc)
(cited in Borys, 766 F.2d at 311); see also United
States v. Palen, 793 F.2d 853. 857 (7th Cir. 1986).
In this case, however, McCue testified that
McCarty explained to Thame that they were trying “to
elicit cooperation from passengers coming from source
cities.” not that they had positively identified Thame as
a suspect. Indeed, Thame testified at the suppression
hearing that McCarty told him that it was a routine
check and that others were also being checked. Thus
Borys is of no help to Thame.
Thame also notes that there were three law
enforcement officials within his sight: McCarty and
McCue were speaking to him and Doonan was in the
12. .
background. While the number of officers involved is
certainly a relevant factor in deciding whether an
individual has been detained, see Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 554, we do not believe that it is determinative.
The district court's conclusion that Thame
consented to the sniff test “idjuring a period in which
he was not under custodial restraint” is in accordance
with the law and supported by the record. For this
reason, there is no need to consider whether the
officers had reasonable suspicion to subject Thame toa
limited investigatory detention. Cf. Reid v. Georgia.
448 U.S. 438 (1980).
There is no other basis on which the voluntariness
of Thame’s consent to the sniff test can reasonably be
“Voluntariness is a question of fact to be
determined from all the circumstances.” Schneckloth
vu. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973). Thame is a
former Philadelphia police officer. He was told that he
had an absolute right to refuse a search and did, in
fact, refuse. His consent to the sniff test was given in
the public area of the train station, after his refusal for
a full search was honored, and at a time when he had
possession of his ticket. his identification, and his
luggage. The district court's finding that Thame's
consent to the sniff test was “freely given” is amply
supported by the record.
“Thame does not dispute that after the sniff test
there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
to search his luggage. We hold, therefore. that the
district court did not err in refusing to suppress the
cocaine which it contained. ;
Ul
Thame also contends that the prosecutor inflamed
the jury by stating in closing argument that Thame
“wanted to. . . distribute [the cocaine] on the streets of
Philadelphia or in Wildwood, New Jersey.” Trial
13.
counsel for Thame immediately objected. Stating
“There's no evidence of that at all, Your Honor.” The
court sustained the objection. and later clearly
instructed the jury that its recollection of the evidence
controlled over any statement by counsel and not to
“consider any personal opinions of the attorneys, but
only their logical arguments based on the evidence.” If
a more specific curative instruction were thought
necessary, counsel should have requested one phpfore
the jury retired. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30.
IV
Thame also makes a number of arguments for the
first time on appeal. Since these points were not
properly raised in the district court. Thame can secure
relief only if the alleged errors are within the plain error
doctrine of Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 (b). Rule 52 (b) provides:
Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to
the attention of the court.
Rule 52 (b) is not to be used freely. Instead. tt
authorizes the Courts of Appeals to correct only
particularly egregious errors. those errors that
seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. In other words.
the plain-error exception to the contem-
poraneous-objection rule is to be used sparingly.
solely in those circumstances in which a
miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15(1985) fanternal
quotations and citations omitted).
In Young, the Court of Appeals relied on the plain
error doctrine to reverse a conviction, but did not
explicitly consider the prejudicial impact of the error in
light of the facts of the particular case. 736 F.2d 565.
14.
570 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The Supreme Court
reversed, criticizing the Court of Appeals for not
viewing the error in context. 470 U.S. at 14-20. In
particular, the Court stated:
A per se approach to plain error is flawed. An error,
of course, must be more than obvious or readily
apparent in order to trigger appellate review under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 (b). [TJhe
plain error doctrine ... requirjes] an appellate
court to find that the claimed error not only
seriously affected “substantial rights.” but that it
had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's
deliberations.
470 U.S. at 16 n.14.
Justice Blackmun has recently noted that Young,
by isolating the prejudice inquiry “without giving it
any substantive definition,” has created confusion in
the proper application of the plain error doctrine.
United States v. Robinson, 56 U.S.L.W. 4174, 4177
(Feb. 23, 1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring and
dissenting). He argued that the Court “should either
continue on the path that it started down in Young and
formulate a test for plain error that articulates the
prejudice standard to be applied, or, in the alternative,
it should make clear, by reasserting the plain-trror
doctrine’s lack of rigid definition, that its language in
Young is not to be interpreted as a test.” Id. (footnote
omitted). He noted that “[t/his latter course may be
more true to the doctrine’s purpose of allowing courts
to single out the rare case in which allowing a
conviction to stand would severely undermine the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (citations and internal quotation
omitted).
This court has not interpreted Young as
establishing a rigid test for plain. error. Instead, we
15.
have continued to look on a case-by-case basis to such
factors as the obviousness of the error, the significance
of the interest protected by the rule that was violated.
the seriousness of the error in the particular case, and
the reputation of judicial proceedings if the error
stands uncorrected -- all with an eye toward avoiding
manifest injustice. See. e.g.. Bennis v. Gable. 823
F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987); Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73. 76-77 (1986):
Government of the Virgin Isiands v. Joseph, 765 F.2d
394, 398 (3d Cir. 1985) (“the error must be egregious
or otherwise constitute a manifest miscarriage of
justice”) (quoting United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d
757, 761 (3d Cir. 1983)); United States v. Graham.
758 F.2d 879. 883 (3d Cir.) cert. denied 474 U.S. 901
(1985). We have not applied the doctrine rigidly. For
example, the Supreme Court has suggested that “|blv
its terms,.recourse may be had to [Rule 52 (b)] only on
appeal from a trial infected with error so ‘plain’ that the
trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in
countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely
assistance in detecting it.” United States v. Frady. 456
U.S. 152, 163 (1982): see also United States v. Castro.
776 F.2d 1118, 1129 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied. 475
U.S. 1029 (1986). Nevertheless. in a case where the
trial judge could not be faulted for failing to anticipate
a truly unexpected Supreme Court decision. we stated
that if the jury instruction “allowed conviction for
conduct outside the proscription of the mail fraud
statute, such instruction would constitute ... plain
error.” United States v. Piccolo. 835 F.2d 517. 519
(1987); cf. United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338.
1349 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1111
(1985) (“To be plain, an error must be conspicuous. at
16.
least in hindsight.”)' With these considerations in
mind, we turn to the errors alleged by Thame.
Thame claims that his post-arrest silence was used
against him. Although Agent McCarty did mention in
his testimony that he advised Thame of his Miranda
rights after the second sniff test, there was no
testimony concerning Thame’s response (or lack of
one) and the matter was not pursued either through
further testimony or in argument. If there was any
error, it certainly did not undermine the fairness of the
trial.
Thame also contends that it was improper for the
prosecutor to argue to the jury that his refusal to
consent to the full search is evidence that he knew that
the bag contained cocaine. In the closing statement,
the prosecutor argued:
Now, you might say that the defendant was
attempting to be cooperative. and in fact Agent
McCarty and Officer McCue testified that he was
cooperative, he answered their questions.
But ladies and gentlemen, let me suggest to
you that the defendant was attempting to be
cooperative for a very specific reason. If he were
cooperative, I think he was hoping against hope
that Officer McCue and Agent McCarty would just
go away. In fact, the defendant produced a police
1.D. card absolutely unsolicited.
l. As another example. in Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Brathwaite. 782 F.2d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 1986), we granted relief
from multiple sentences despite the defendant's failure to raise the
issue either at trial or on appeal, reasoning that “to afford one
coconspirator relief from muitiple sentences without extending the
same relief to another coconspirator who received identical
sentences would be at best unseemly and at worst a miscarriage of
justice.” (citations and internal quotation omitted).
1F a
Why would he produce a police 1.D. card? He
could show that card to Agent McCarty and Officer
McCue and say, hey, I'm one of you guys. I'm clean.
There's no reason to ask me any further questions.
And it's true that after he refused consent, he
refused to cooperate with Agent McCarty by
opening his suitcase because he knew what he had
in his suitcase, he did consent to having the dog
sniff the bag. And when Agent McCarty opened the
bag, it was easy to understand why. That cocaine
wasn't just thrown in the suitcase in any old way.
That cocaine was very. very. very. carefully
packaged. It was packaged in a substance that
contained talcum powder and pepper. If you open
the bag you can smell it for yourselves. Mr. Thame
was hoping against hope even knowing that he
had cocaine in his suitcase. that somehow the
narcotics dog could be fooled. And as we know.
that hope did not pan out and the narcotics dog
was not fooled. |
The thrust of the argument was that Thame’s consent
to the sniff test was perfectly consistent with
knowledge of the cocaine since it was packed in a way
to attempt to avoid detection by smell. Thame concedes
that this aspect of the argument was proper. Mixed in
with this proper argument, however. was the
challenged argument that the refusal to consent to the
full search is evidence of guilt. In rebuttal. moreover.
the prosecutor did not make the concededly-proper
argument. Instead, she made the challenged argument
the last point of her presentation: :
Finally. the defendant testified that he didn't
want tne Government to search his bag and that’s
quite obvious, he didn't want the Government to
search his bag whether the story happened as
Agent McCarty and Officer McCue testified and --
or whether it happened as the defendant testified.
And I suggest to you that there's a very good reason
why he didn't want agents searching his bag and
that is because this was in the bag. Again, almost a
quarter of a million dollars worth of cocaine.
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the
Supreme Court held that a prosecutor may not argue to
a jury that a defendant's exercise of the fifth
amendment right to remain silent is evidence of guilt.
It reasoned that allowing such comment would be a
“penalty . . . for exercising a constitutional privilege.”
380 U.S. at 614. This court has not confined the Griffin
rationale to the fifth amendment. In United States ex
rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973), the defendant consulted
an attorney the day after the alleged crime. and the
state prosecutor argued that this action was
inconsistent with innocence. This court reversed the
listrict court's denial of a petition for a writ of habeas
~orpus. We held. relying on Griffin, that a prosecutor
may not argue that a defendant's exercise of the sixth
amendment right to counsel is evidence of guilt since
such an argument penalizes the exercise of a
constitutional right. We saw “little. if any. valid
distinction between the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel” which was
relevant. 476 F.2d at 615; see also United States v.
McDonald, 620 F.2d 559 (Sth Cir. 1980).
We also see little, if any. valid distinction between
the privilege against self-incrimination and the
privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures
which is relevant to the propriety of the prosecutor's
argument.’ Neither did the Court of Appeals for the
2. There may be relevant differences. between the fourth and
fifth amendment protections regarding the propriety of
19.
Ninth Circuit, which simply cited Griffin in holding
that @ prosecutor's comment on a defendant's refusal
to consent to a search was misconduct. United States
v. Taxe; 540 F.2d 961. 969 (9th Cir. 1976). cert.
denied 429 U.S. 1040 (1977). Thus. in our view, it was
error for the prosecutor to argue that Thame’'s reliance
on his fourth amendment rights constituted evidence
of his guilt. Certainly the argument cannot be justified
as an invited reply since the prosecutor raised the
argument first. Cf. United States v. Robinson. 56
U.S.L.W. 4174 (Feb. 23, 1988).
A contrary rule would undermine the rule of
Simmons v. United States. 390 U.S, 377 (1968).
Simmons mandates that a defendant's testimony at a
suppression hearing not be used against him at trial.
This protection would be largely illusory if the fact of
reliance on the fourth amendment (easily proven from
the court records without using defendant's testimony)
could be used against the defendant. Thus if the
district court had overruled a defense objection to the
argument, we would reverse.
Thame contends that the error is of constitutional
dimension. was not harmiess bevond a reasonable
doubt, and therefore must result in a reversal. If this
introducing evidence of the exercise of the right as opposed io
arguing for inferences of guilt from the exercise of the right
Evidence of the exercise of the right against self-incrimination wil!
be PPS pesto prejudicial since. by its terms.
} a consciousness of guilt. On the
of the right to refuse to consent
GERRI tiny Warelsnra thts cant Nach on thes one to an
* surrounding consent to a les»
_taurusive investigative method. In. addition. since privacy concerns
"not just fears of incrimination — can reasonably be expected to
motivate reliance on Fourth Amendment rights. evidence of the
‘of these rights may not be as prejudicial. I. tight of our
conclusion below that the argument was not plata error. we need
not decide whether the admission of the evidence itself was error a!
all, since it certainly was not plain error.
20.
were the applicable test, we would agree. However, the
test for harmiess error is not the same as the test for
plain error. Instead, “the plain error standard of Fed.
R. Crim. P. 52 (b) ... is more generous to the
government than the Rule 52 (a) standard” of harmiess
error. United States v. Jonnet, 762 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir.
1985). Both the harmless error doctrine and the plain
error doctrine are exceptions to the general rule that
properly preserved claims of error result in reversals
while claims of error that are not properly preserved do
not. The harmless error doctrine allows convictions to
stand despite properly preserved claims of
constitutional error in the exceptional circumstance
where the reviewing court can conclude that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v.
Caltfornta, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The plain error
doctrine allows convictions to be reversed even in the
absence of properly preserved claims of error where the
reviewing court can conclude that fundamental
fairness so requires.
The constitutional nature of the error certainly
makes it easier to conclude that fundamental fairness
requires reversal. Nevertheless, concluding that
anytime a constitutional claim is at issue the
Chapman standard applies to the plain error
determination collapses the plain error and harmiess
error doctrines into one and “threatens to render
meaningless the contemporaneous-objection
requirement in the context of constitutional error.”
United States v. Robinson, 56 U.S.L.W. 4174, 4177
(Feb. 23, 1988) (Blackmun, J.. concurring and
dissenting).
Although we do not believe that the error was
sufficiently minor to be harmless beyond a reasonabie
doubt, we also do not believe that it was sufficiently
major that a miscarriage of justice will result if the
conviction is not reversed. There is considerable other
21.
evidence of Thame's guilt. First, of course, Thame was
in fact carrying carefully packed cocaine with a street
value of $250,000. The possibility that someone gave
him an unexpected gift of that value ts rather remote.
His actions suggest that he knew that he was carrying
the cocaine. He flew to Florida under his own name.
but, aware of the security checks at airports. made the
return trip to Philadelphia by train under a different
name.
Moreover, Thame was a successful owner and
operator of establishments at the Jersey Shore with
considerable assets; there is scant reason for such a
person -- immediately before one of the biggest
weekends at the shore - to take a 24 hour train ride
back to Philadeiphia merely because the one airline he
checked had only first class seats available on one
particular route. There is even less reason for such a
person to split the cost of the sleeping compartment
with “B. Kelly” in order to save money. Moreover, the
heart of Thame’s defense -- that “B. Kelly” was on the
train and must have placed the cocaine in his bag --
was severely undermined by Thame's statement in the
train station that he was using a friend's ticket
because the friend had decided to fly. Lastly. Thame's
statement that he had “sensitive materials” in his bag
could quite reasonably be taken as a reference to the
cocaine, since he has never pointed to anything else
that was found in the bag that warranted this
— While Thames had no obligation to take
“{Liaw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth
pete ot by merely approaching an individual on the street or
in another public place. by asking him to answer some questions.
by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen. or by
offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary
answers to such questions.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491. 497
(plurality opinion) (citations omitted) iemphasis added). Thus
while the exercise of the constitutional right to refuse a seurch iz
protected. explanatory statements given in a non-custodial
situation are admissibie.
22.
iii alll
silence was not used against him in any prejudicial
manner. Neither the prosecution's comment on
Thame's assertion of fourth amendment rights nor the
introduction of evidence demonstrating that assertion
is plain error requiring a reversal. The judgment
appealed from will, therefore, be affirmed.
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the Untied States Court of Appeuls
Jor the Third Circutt
23.
the stand and put on evidence, once he did so, the
holes in his story constitute evidence against him.
In addition, the error here can hardly be said to
have been obvious. Even in the briefs to this court,
neither party pointed to a single case holding that the
‘prosecutor's argument was improper, nor was the
‘argument so obviously improper that the reason for the
dearth of such caselaw is the very outrageousness of
the argument. We cannot conclude that the error was
sufficiently egregious to warrant invocation of the
plain error doctrine. Nor do we see how the public
reputation of judicial proceedings will be damaged if
the conviction is allowed to stand. In short, we see no
manifest injustice to justify reversal despite the
absence of a contemporaneous objection.
United States v. Branson, 756 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.
1985), which Thame asserts is dispositive, is readily
distinguishable. First, Branson involved prosecutorial
comment on the exercise of the right to remain silent:
comment the impropriety of which is both more
established and more prejudicial than the comment
involved here. In addition, the prejudice in Branson
was palpable: The jury specifically asked if they could
base their decision on Branson's silence and the
district judge replied that they could base their
decision on any evidence they thought relevant. 756
F.2d at 754; see also United States v. Puig, 810 F.2d
- 1085. 1088 n.9 (11th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing
Branson and concluding error was harmiess): United
States v. Ortiz, 776 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1097 (1986) (same).
V
The suppression motion was properly denied. The
court's instruction adequately cured the prosecutor's
error in speculating about Thame’'s intention to
distribute cocaine on the street. Thame’s post-arrest
24.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. A88-49
Albert John Thame, Jr.,
Applicant
© United States
ORDER
UPON CONSIDERATION of the appli-
cation of counsel for’ the appicant,
IT IS ORDERED that the time for
filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the above-entitled case,
be and the same hereby, extended to
and including August 14, 1988.
s/ Byron R. White
Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States
Dated this 20th day of July, 1988.
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL
I, Heidi Lindsay Hinst, declare:
That I am a citizen of the United States
and am employed in Denver County, C0;
that my business address is 1461 Logan
St., Suite D-2, Denver, CO 80203; that
I am over the age of eighteen years
of age and am not a party engaged in
this action; that on Fe Z. » 1988,
I deposited at the US. Postal Service
General Mail Facility, 1595 Wynkoop
Denver, CO 80217, two envelopes, each
containing three copies of Petitioner's
Appendix ‘To Petition For Writ Of
Certiorari in Albert John Thame, Jr.,
vs. United States of America, bearing
the requisite postage, addressed to:
Mr. Charles Fried
Solicitor General
US Dept. of Justice
Washington, DC 20530
Sally Mrvos
US Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
601 Market St., Rm. 21400
Philadelphia, PA 19106
at which place there is delivery by
United States Mail. I declare under
gp of perjury that the foregoing
aes and correct. This Z "y
ae Oy; 1988:
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.