Appendix — Thame v. United States

Supreme Court brief1988

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" Bilpreme Court, Us,

FILED

AUG 15 BB

F. SPANIOL, JR.

88-566)

CASE NO.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 1987 TERM

ALBERT JOHN THAME, JR.,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITIONER'S APPENDIX

TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Robert F. Simone, Esquire

1919 Walnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorney for Petitioner

S

i, os

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A

Judgment And Probation/Commitment

Ord Qld o & Get co CEE ede 6 SWCtW ee ESSEVEO 00 1

APPENDIX B

Notice Of Appeal To The United

States Court Of Appeals, Third

0 OS rr ae See ks lp eee eee a 4

APPENDIX C

Opinion Of The Court, United

States Court Of Appeals, Third

CRF OCIA cat 6 6 clainddws< cb dbp 6 0 FHA OE 6

APPENDIX D

Order, Supreme Court Of The

United States, Extension Of

Time To File Petition For

Writ Of eae ae ee ae eee 25

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL..... 27

JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DOCKET NUMBER 87-00261-1

DEFENDANT: THAME, ALBERT JOHN, JR.

COUNSEL

In the presence of the attorney

for the government Joan L. Markman,

AUSA, the defendant appeared in person

on 9/30/87, with counsel Robert F.

Simone, Esq.

PLEA

Not Guilty.

FINDING AND JUDGMENT

There being 4 finding/verdict

of guilty. Defendant has been convicted

as charged of the offense(s)- of

possession with intent to distribute

cocaine, a schedule II narcotic con-

trolled substance, in violation of

21 USC §841(a)(1).

SENTENCE OR PROBATION ORDER

The Court asked whether defendant

had anything to say why judgment should

why judgment should not be pronounced.

Because no sufficient cause to _ the

contrary was shown, or appeared to

the Court, the Court adjudged the

defendant guilty as charged and con-

victed and ordered that: The defendant

is hereby committed to the custody

of the Attorney General or his author-

ized representative for imprisonment

for a period of FIVE (5) years with

a FOUR (4) year term of supervised

release beginning upon release from

custody, on Count 1. A mandatory special

assessment of FIFTY ($50) DOLLARS

2.

ral

is imposed. Special conditions are

that the defendant receive a mental

health evaluation and based upon the

results, attend such treatment as deen-

ed necessary by the probation office.

A FIVE THOUSAND ($5,00) DOLLAR fine

is imposed, to be paid during the term

of supervised release in amounts to

be determined by the probation office.

It is requested that the Bureau of

Prisons consider defendant's request

for placement at the Federal Prison

Camp at Allenwood, PA and also consider

the government's opposition to place-

ment in a minimum security prison.

By: U.S. District Judge

s/ Edmund V. Ludwig, J.

Date 9/30/87

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO THE

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT

DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.

ALBERT JOHN THAME, JR.

CIRCUIT COURT DOCKET NUMBER

8 OCT '87

DISTRICT COURT DOCKET NUMBER

Cr. No. 87-00261-1

District Court Judge

Edmund V. Ludwig

he

Notice is hereby given that Albert

John Thame, Jr. appeals to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit from Judgment of Conviction

and Sentence. Entered in this action

September 30, 1987.

FILED: October 8, 1987.

s/ Robert F. Simone

Counsel for Appellant

Robert F. Simone, Esquire

1919 Walnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

(215) 563-7005

Joan Markman, Esquire

Counsel for Appellee

Assistant U.S. Attorney

3310 U.S. Courthouse

601 Market Street

Phildelphia, PA 19106

(215) 597-2556

5.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 87-1623

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ALBERT JOHN THAME. JR.

Appellant

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C.Criminal No.87-00261)

Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6)

May 3. 1988

Before: GIBBONS. Chief Judge.

and MANSMANN and COWEN,

Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: May 16, 1988)

WALTER S. BATTY. JR.

Assistant United States Attorney

Chief of Appeals

JOAN MARKMAN

Assistant United States Attorney

Room 3310 U.S. Courthouse

601 Market Street

Philadelphia. PA 19106

Attorneys for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

GIBBONS, Chief Judge:

Albert John Thame, Jr. appeals from the judgment

of sentence imposed following his conviction for

ion of cocaine with intent to distribute. 21

U.S.C. 8 841(a) (1982). He contends that the district

court should have suppressed the cocaine that was

seized from his luggage. He also contends that the

district court erred in allowing the government to

present certain evidence and make certain arguments.

We will affirm.

Thame was a passenger on an Amtrak train from

Fort Lauderdale, Florida to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The train left Florida on May 21, 1987 and arrived in

Philadelphia on May 22, 1987. Thame did not use his

own name, but rather travelled under a reservation

made in the name “B. Kelly.” An Amtrak investigator in

Washington, D.C. reviewed the manifest while the

train was underway amd discovered that the

reservation was made on the day of travel, that no

telephone number was given, that a sleeping

accommodation was reserved for the northbound trip

but not for the return, and that the ticket was paid for

in cash. His suspicions aroused, the investigator

inquired of personnel at the Fort Lauderdale station

whether anyone remembered the passenger. He

learned that the passenger had appeared nervous. and

had repeatedly asked when the train would leave and

whether he could keep his luggage with him. A

different Amtrak investigator. Faith Doonan. boarded

the train in Washington, and Drug Enforcement

agents in Philadelphia were informed of the

passenger's description.

The district court conducted a suppression

hearing on Thame's motion. What happened when the

train arrived in Philadelphia was seriously disputed at

the suppression hearing, The version told by Thame

conflicts in important respects with the version told by

the law enforcement witnesses. The district court.

however, credited the testimony of the law enforcement

witnesses and found the facts to be as set forth in their

testimony. The following factual account is based on

that credited testimony.

Philadelphia Police Officer Michael McCue.

assigned to the Drug Enforcement Agency, followed

Thame up from the platform to the lobby of 30th Street

Station while DEA Special Agent John McCarty

followed still further behind with Amtrak Investigator

Doonan. In the lobby, McCue walked alongside Thame.

identified himself, and asked if he could speak with

Thame. Thame said that he did not mind. As they

continued walking, McCue asked Thame if he had just

gotten off the train from Florida. and Thame said that

he had. McCue then asked Thame his name, and

Thame replied “Albert Thame.” McCue then asked if he

could see his train ticket. At this point, the two stopped

walking as Thame reached into his pocket and

produced his train ticket, bearing the name “B. Kelly.”

Thame, in response to a question from McCue.

explained that he was using the ticket of a friend who

had to fly back. McCue then asked for identification.

8.

ile

and Thame produced a driver's license and old police

identification in his correct name. Agent McCarty then

joined McCue and Thame and identified himself.

McCue handed the ticket and the identification to

McCarty, who looked it over and handed it back to

Thame. McCarty then explained that they were

working with the Narcotics Interdiction Unit, seeking

cooperation from passengers from source cities such

as Miami and Fort Lauderdale, and asked if Thame

would mind if McCue and McCarty looked in the

luggage Thame was carrying. Thame declined, stating

that he had “sensitive material” in his bag. McCarty

replied that that was fine, that he had an absolute right

to refuse, but asked whether it would be okay if they

conducted the search in a more private place. Thame

again declined. McCarty then asked whether Thame

would object to a sniff search of the air around the bag

by a dog, as this would be less intrusive. Thame agreed.

McCarty then asked if Thame would mind

accompanying them to the Amtrak police office.

explaining that this would be more private and out of

the way. Thame carried his own bag to the office. The

entire conversation took about two minutes, and the

walk to the Amtrak police office took less than a

minute. At the office, a sniff search took place, and the

‘dog indicated that there were drugs in Thame’s bag.

The sniff search was repeated in another room. A

warrant was then obtained, the bag was opened. and

cocaine was found. The district court refused to

suppress the cocaine.

At trial before a jury, Thame denied knowledge of

the cocaine. He testified that he had planned to drive

back to Philadelphia but the plans fell through, that he

called one airline regarding one particular route and

was told that only first class seats were available, and

that he decided to take the train and split the cost of a

sleeping compartment with “B. Kelly.” The thrust of

the defense was that Kelly had the opportunity to place

the cocaine in Thame's bag without Thame's

knowledge. Thame was convicted of possession of

cocaine with intent to distribute.

II

Thame contends that his consent to the sniff test

was the product of an unlawful detention. and

therefore invalid. However, “law enforcement officers

do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely

approaching an individual on the street or in another

public place, by asking him to answer some questions

[or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing

to listen ....” Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 497

(1983) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).

Moreover, “the fact that the officer identifies himself as

a police officer, without more. (does not] convert the

encounter into a seizure requiring some level of

objective justification.” Id.; see also United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551-57 (1980) (opinion

announcing the judgment). A majority of the Court has

agreed that a contact in which officers “simply ask [if a

defendant] would step aside and talk with them, [is]

clearly the sort of consensual encounter that implicates

no Fourth Amendment interest.” Florida v. Rodriguez.

469 U.S. 1. 5-6 (1984) (per curiam). Although we have

our doubts whether a reasonable person who is greeted

by federal agents and asked for identification feels free

to simply ignore the agents, we are not free to

substitute our judgment on this question for the

Supreme Court's. See United States v. Notorianni, 729

F.2d 520, 522 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Maybe this is a wrong

guess about what the average person feels in this

situation ... "); United States v. Cordell,’723 F.2d

1283, 1286. cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1029 (1984)

(Swygert, J.. concurring) (“I believe that as a factual

psychological matter people who are stopped for

10.

questioning of this kind by police officers. . .

do not feel ‘free to leave’. . .”); see also Note, The Drug

Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable

Intrusions or Suspicionless Seizures?, 12 Nova L. Rev.

273, 284 (1987) (lower courts recognize “the

artificiality of the test”).

In Royer, a plurality of the Court rejected the

contention that the particular encounter at issue was

consensual, stating:

Asking for and examining Royer's ticket and his

driver's license were no doubt permissible in

themselves, but when the officers identified

themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer that he

was suspected of transporting narcotics, and

asked him te accompany them to the police room.

while retaining his ticket and driver's license and

without indicating in any way that he was free to

depart, Royer was effectively seized for the

purposes of the Fourth Amendment. These

circumstance surely amount to a show of official

authority such that a reasonable person would

have believed that he was not [ree to leave. |

460 U.S. at 501-02 (plurality opinion).

Turning to the facts of this case, it is clear that it

was permissible to ask Thame for his ticket and for

identification. Moreover, the officers did not restrain

him, block his path, or otherwise control his

movement by retaining his papers. Cf. Cordell, 723

F.2d at 1285 (majority) and at 1287 (Swygert. J..

concurring). Unlike the defendants in Mendenhall,

Royer, and Rodriguez, Thame did not consent to a

search after he moved to another area in response to

the officers’ request, but rather was only asked to move

to the Amtrak police office after he consented to the

sniff test. Thus Thames can only prevail on this

argument if the permissible conversation in the lobby

11.

of 30th Street Station ripened into an unlawful

detention at some point prior to his consent to the sniff

test.

Thames argues that he was seized “at the point he

refused to consent to the search.” Brief at 30. He relies

on a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit which held that when “two agents explained

that they suspected [the defendant] of transporting

drugs and asked permission to search his luggage. the

consensual questioning had ripened into an

investigative stop.” United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d

304, 311 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1082

(1986). The important factor could not have been that

the agents asked permission to search, for such a rule

would mean that there is no such thing as a purely

consensual search. Instead, the important factor was

that “Borys knew that the agents had positively

identified him as a suspect.” Id. As the Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained.

“Statements which intimate that an investigation has

focussed on a specific individual easily could induce a

reasonabie person to believe that failure to cooperate

would only lead to formal:detention.” United States v.

Berry, 670 F.2d 583. 597 (Lith Cir. 1982) (in banc)

(cited in Borys, 766 F.2d at 311); see also United

States v. Palen, 793 F.2d 853. 857 (7th Cir. 1986).

In this case, however, McCue testified that

McCarty explained to Thame that they were trying “to

elicit cooperation from passengers coming from source

cities.” not that they had positively identified Thame as

a suspect. Indeed, Thame testified at the suppression

hearing that McCarty told him that it was a routine

check and that others were also being checked. Thus

Borys is of no help to Thame.

Thame also notes that there were three law

enforcement officials within his sight: McCarty and

McCue were speaking to him and Doonan was in the

12. .

background. While the number of officers involved is

certainly a relevant factor in deciding whether an

individual has been detained, see Mendenhall, 446

U.S. at 554, we do not believe that it is determinative.

The district court's conclusion that Thame

consented to the sniff test “idjuring a period in which

he was not under custodial restraint” is in accordance

with the law and supported by the record. For this

reason, there is no need to consider whether the

officers had reasonable suspicion to subject Thame toa

limited investigatory detention. Cf. Reid v. Georgia.

448 U.S. 438 (1980).

There is no other basis on which the voluntariness

of Thame’s consent to the sniff test can reasonably be

“Voluntariness is a question of fact to be

determined from all the circumstances.” Schneckloth

vu. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973). Thame is a

former Philadelphia police officer. He was told that he

had an absolute right to refuse a search and did, in

fact, refuse. His consent to the sniff test was given in

the public area of the train station, after his refusal for

a full search was honored, and at a time when he had

possession of his ticket. his identification, and his

luggage. The district court's finding that Thame's

consent to the sniff test was “freely given” is amply

supported by the record.

“Thame does not dispute that after the sniff test

there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant

to search his luggage. We hold, therefore. that the

district court did not err in refusing to suppress the

cocaine which it contained. ;

Ul

Thame also contends that the prosecutor inflamed

the jury by stating in closing argument that Thame

“wanted to. . . distribute [the cocaine] on the streets of

Philadelphia or in Wildwood, New Jersey.” Trial

13.

counsel for Thame immediately objected. Stating

“There's no evidence of that at all, Your Honor.” The

court sustained the objection. and later clearly

instructed the jury that its recollection of the evidence

controlled over any statement by counsel and not to

“consider any personal opinions of the attorneys, but

only their logical arguments based on the evidence.” If

a more specific curative instruction were thought

necessary, counsel should have requested one phpfore

the jury retired. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30.

IV

Thame also makes a number of arguments for the

first time on appeal. Since these points were not

properly raised in the district court. Thame can secure

relief only if the alleged errors are within the plain error

doctrine of Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 (b). Rule 52 (b) provides:

Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights

may be noticed although they were not brought to

the attention of the court.

Rule 52 (b) is not to be used freely. Instead. tt

authorizes the Courts of Appeals to correct only

particularly egregious errors. those errors that

seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings. In other words.

the plain-error exception to the contem-

poraneous-objection rule is to be used sparingly.

solely in those circumstances in which a

miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.

United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15(1985) fanternal

quotations and citations omitted).

In Young, the Court of Appeals relied on the plain

error doctrine to reverse a conviction, but did not

explicitly consider the prejudicial impact of the error in

light of the facts of the particular case. 736 F.2d 565.

14.

570 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The Supreme Court

reversed, criticizing the Court of Appeals for not

viewing the error in context. 470 U.S. at 14-20. In

particular, the Court stated:

A per se approach to plain error is flawed. An error,

of course, must be more than obvious or readily

apparent in order to trigger appellate review under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 (b). [TJhe

plain error doctrine ... requirjes] an appellate

court to find that the claimed error not only

seriously affected “substantial rights.” but that it

had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's

deliberations.

470 U.S. at 16 n.14.

Justice Blackmun has recently noted that Young,

by isolating the prejudice inquiry “without giving it

any substantive definition,” has created confusion in

the proper application of the plain error doctrine.

United States v. Robinson, 56 U.S.L.W. 4174, 4177

(Feb. 23, 1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring and

dissenting). He argued that the Court “should either

continue on the path that it started down in Young and

formulate a test for plain error that articulates the

prejudice standard to be applied, or, in the alternative,

it should make clear, by reasserting the plain-trror

doctrine’s lack of rigid definition, that its language in

Young is not to be interpreted as a test.” Id. (footnote

omitted). He noted that “[t/his latter course may be

more true to the doctrine’s purpose of allowing courts

to single out the rare case in which allowing a

conviction to stand would severely undermine the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Id. (citations and internal quotation

omitted).

This court has not interpreted Young as

establishing a rigid test for plain. error. Instead, we

15.

have continued to look on a case-by-case basis to such

factors as the obviousness of the error, the significance

of the interest protected by the rule that was violated.

the seriousness of the error in the particular case, and

the reputation of judicial proceedings if the error

stands uncorrected -- all with an eye toward avoiding

manifest injustice. See. e.g.. Bennis v. Gable. 823

F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987); Government of the Virgin

Islands v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73. 76-77 (1986):

Government of the Virgin Isiands v. Joseph, 765 F.2d

394, 398 (3d Cir. 1985) (“the error must be egregious

or otherwise constitute a manifest miscarriage of

justice”) (quoting United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d

757, 761 (3d Cir. 1983)); United States v. Graham.

758 F.2d 879. 883 (3d Cir.) cert. denied 474 U.S. 901

(1985). We have not applied the doctrine rigidly. For

example, the Supreme Court has suggested that “|blv

its terms,.recourse may be had to [Rule 52 (b)] only on

appeal from a trial infected with error so ‘plain’ that the

trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in

countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely

assistance in detecting it.” United States v. Frady. 456

U.S. 152, 163 (1982): see also United States v. Castro.

776 F.2d 1118, 1129 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied. 475

U.S. 1029 (1986). Nevertheless. in a case where the

trial judge could not be faulted for failing to anticipate

a truly unexpected Supreme Court decision. we stated

that if the jury instruction “allowed conviction for

conduct outside the proscription of the mail fraud

statute, such instruction would constitute ... plain

error.” United States v. Piccolo. 835 F.2d 517. 519

(1987); cf. United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338.

1349 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1111

(1985) (“To be plain, an error must be conspicuous. at

16.

least in hindsight.”)' With these considerations in

mind, we turn to the errors alleged by Thame.

Thame claims that his post-arrest silence was used

against him. Although Agent McCarty did mention in

his testimony that he advised Thame of his Miranda

rights after the second sniff test, there was no

testimony concerning Thame’s response (or lack of

one) and the matter was not pursued either through

further testimony or in argument. If there was any

error, it certainly did not undermine the fairness of the

trial.

Thame also contends that it was improper for the

prosecutor to argue to the jury that his refusal to

consent to the full search is evidence that he knew that

the bag contained cocaine. In the closing statement,

the prosecutor argued:

Now, you might say that the defendant was

attempting to be cooperative. and in fact Agent

McCarty and Officer McCue testified that he was

cooperative, he answered their questions.

But ladies and gentlemen, let me suggest to

you that the defendant was attempting to be

cooperative for a very specific reason. If he were

cooperative, I think he was hoping against hope

that Officer McCue and Agent McCarty would just

go away. In fact, the defendant produced a police

1.D. card absolutely unsolicited.

l. As another example. in Government of the Virgin Islands v.

Brathwaite. 782 F.2d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 1986), we granted relief

from multiple sentences despite the defendant's failure to raise the

issue either at trial or on appeal, reasoning that “to afford one

coconspirator relief from muitiple sentences without extending the

same relief to another coconspirator who received identical

sentences would be at best unseemly and at worst a miscarriage of

justice.” (citations and internal quotation omitted).

1F a

Why would he produce a police 1.D. card? He

could show that card to Agent McCarty and Officer

McCue and say, hey, I'm one of you guys. I'm clean.

There's no reason to ask me any further questions.

And it's true that after he refused consent, he

refused to cooperate with Agent McCarty by

opening his suitcase because he knew what he had

in his suitcase, he did consent to having the dog

sniff the bag. And when Agent McCarty opened the

bag, it was easy to understand why. That cocaine

wasn't just thrown in the suitcase in any old way.

That cocaine was very. very. very. carefully

packaged. It was packaged in a substance that

contained talcum powder and pepper. If you open

the bag you can smell it for yourselves. Mr. Thame

was hoping against hope even knowing that he

had cocaine in his suitcase. that somehow the

narcotics dog could be fooled. And as we know.

that hope did not pan out and the narcotics dog

was not fooled. |

The thrust of the argument was that Thame’s consent

to the sniff test was perfectly consistent with

knowledge of the cocaine since it was packed in a way

to attempt to avoid detection by smell. Thame concedes

that this aspect of the argument was proper. Mixed in

with this proper argument, however. was the

challenged argument that the refusal to consent to the

full search is evidence of guilt. In rebuttal. moreover.

the prosecutor did not make the concededly-proper

argument. Instead, she made the challenged argument

the last point of her presentation: :

Finally. the defendant testified that he didn't

want tne Government to search his bag and that’s

quite obvious, he didn't want the Government to

search his bag whether the story happened as

Agent McCarty and Officer McCue testified and --

or whether it happened as the defendant testified.

And I suggest to you that there's a very good reason

why he didn't want agents searching his bag and

that is because this was in the bag. Again, almost a

quarter of a million dollars worth of cocaine.

In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the

Supreme Court held that a prosecutor may not argue to

a jury that a defendant's exercise of the fifth

amendment right to remain silent is evidence of guilt.

It reasoned that allowing such comment would be a

“penalty . . . for exercising a constitutional privilege.”

380 U.S. at 614. This court has not confined the Griffin

rationale to the fifth amendment. In United States ex

rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613 (3d Cir.), cert.

denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973), the defendant consulted

an attorney the day after the alleged crime. and the

state prosecutor argued that this action was

inconsistent with innocence. This court reversed the

listrict court's denial of a petition for a writ of habeas

~orpus. We held. relying on Griffin, that a prosecutor

may not argue that a defendant's exercise of the sixth

amendment right to counsel is evidence of guilt since

such an argument penalizes the exercise of a

constitutional right. We saw “little. if any. valid

distinction between the privilege against

self-incrimination and the right to counsel” which was

relevant. 476 F.2d at 615; see also United States v.

McDonald, 620 F.2d 559 (Sth Cir. 1980).

We also see little, if any. valid distinction between

the privilege against self-incrimination and the

privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures

which is relevant to the propriety of the prosecutor's

argument.’ Neither did the Court of Appeals for the

2. There may be relevant differences. between the fourth and

fifth amendment protections regarding the propriety of

19.

Ninth Circuit, which simply cited Griffin in holding

that @ prosecutor's comment on a defendant's refusal

to consent to a search was misconduct. United States

v. Taxe; 540 F.2d 961. 969 (9th Cir. 1976). cert.

denied 429 U.S. 1040 (1977). Thus. in our view, it was

error for the prosecutor to argue that Thame’'s reliance

on his fourth amendment rights constituted evidence

of his guilt. Certainly the argument cannot be justified

as an invited reply since the prosecutor raised the

argument first. Cf. United States v. Robinson. 56

U.S.L.W. 4174 (Feb. 23, 1988).

A contrary rule would undermine the rule of

Simmons v. United States. 390 U.S, 377 (1968).

Simmons mandates that a defendant's testimony at a

suppression hearing not be used against him at trial.

This protection would be largely illusory if the fact of

reliance on the fourth amendment (easily proven from

the court records without using defendant's testimony)

could be used against the defendant. Thus if the

district court had overruled a defense objection to the

argument, we would reverse.

Thame contends that the error is of constitutional

dimension. was not harmiess bevond a reasonable

doubt, and therefore must result in a reversal. If this

introducing evidence of the exercise of the right as opposed io

arguing for inferences of guilt from the exercise of the right

Evidence of the exercise of the right against self-incrimination wil!

be PPS pesto prejudicial since. by its terms.

} a consciousness of guilt. On the

of the right to refuse to consent

GERRI tiny Warelsnra thts cant Nach on thes one to an

* surrounding consent to a les»

_taurusive investigative method. In. addition. since privacy concerns

"not just fears of incrimination — can reasonably be expected to

motivate reliance on Fourth Amendment rights. evidence of the

‘of these rights may not be as prejudicial. I. tight of our

conclusion below that the argument was not plata error. we need

not decide whether the admission of the evidence itself was error a!

all, since it certainly was not plain error.

20.

were the applicable test, we would agree. However, the

test for harmiess error is not the same as the test for

plain error. Instead, “the plain error standard of Fed.

R. Crim. P. 52 (b) ... is more generous to the

government than the Rule 52 (a) standard” of harmiess

error. United States v. Jonnet, 762 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir.

1985). Both the harmless error doctrine and the plain

error doctrine are exceptions to the general rule that

properly preserved claims of error result in reversals

while claims of error that are not properly preserved do

not. The harmless error doctrine allows convictions to

stand despite properly preserved claims of

constitutional error in the exceptional circumstance

where the reviewing court can conclude that the error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v.

Caltfornta, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The plain error

doctrine allows convictions to be reversed even in the

absence of properly preserved claims of error where the

reviewing court can conclude that fundamental

fairness so requires.

The constitutional nature of the error certainly

makes it easier to conclude that fundamental fairness

requires reversal. Nevertheless, concluding that

anytime a constitutional claim is at issue the

Chapman standard applies to the plain error

determination collapses the plain error and harmiess

error doctrines into one and “threatens to render

meaningless the contemporaneous-objection

requirement in the context of constitutional error.”

United States v. Robinson, 56 U.S.L.W. 4174, 4177

(Feb. 23, 1988) (Blackmun, J.. concurring and

dissenting).

Although we do not believe that the error was

sufficiently minor to be harmless beyond a reasonabie

doubt, we also do not believe that it was sufficiently

major that a miscarriage of justice will result if the

conviction is not reversed. There is considerable other

21.

evidence of Thame's guilt. First, of course, Thame was

in fact carrying carefully packed cocaine with a street

value of $250,000. The possibility that someone gave

him an unexpected gift of that value ts rather remote.

His actions suggest that he knew that he was carrying

the cocaine. He flew to Florida under his own name.

but, aware of the security checks at airports. made the

return trip to Philadelphia by train under a different

name.

Moreover, Thame was a successful owner and

operator of establishments at the Jersey Shore with

considerable assets; there is scant reason for such a

person -- immediately before one of the biggest

weekends at the shore - to take a 24 hour train ride

back to Philadeiphia merely because the one airline he

checked had only first class seats available on one

particular route. There is even less reason for such a

person to split the cost of the sleeping compartment

with “B. Kelly” in order to save money. Moreover, the

heart of Thame’s defense -- that “B. Kelly” was on the

train and must have placed the cocaine in his bag --

was severely undermined by Thame's statement in the

train station that he was using a friend's ticket

because the friend had decided to fly. Lastly. Thame's

statement that he had “sensitive materials” in his bag

could quite reasonably be taken as a reference to the

cocaine, since he has never pointed to anything else

that was found in the bag that warranted this

— While Thames had no obligation to take

“{Liaw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth

pete ot by merely approaching an individual on the street or

in another public place. by asking him to answer some questions.

by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen. or by

offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary

answers to such questions.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491. 497

(plurality opinion) (citations omitted) iemphasis added). Thus

while the exercise of the constitutional right to refuse a seurch iz

protected. explanatory statements given in a non-custodial

situation are admissibie.

22.

iii alll

silence was not used against him in any prejudicial

manner. Neither the prosecution's comment on

Thame's assertion of fourth amendment rights nor the

introduction of evidence demonstrating that assertion

is plain error requiring a reversal. The judgment

appealed from will, therefore, be affirmed.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the Untied States Court of Appeuls

Jor the Third Circutt

23.

the stand and put on evidence, once he did so, the

holes in his story constitute evidence against him.

In addition, the error here can hardly be said to

have been obvious. Even in the briefs to this court,

neither party pointed to a single case holding that the

‘prosecutor's argument was improper, nor was the

‘argument so obviously improper that the reason for the

dearth of such caselaw is the very outrageousness of

the argument. We cannot conclude that the error was

sufficiently egregious to warrant invocation of the

plain error doctrine. Nor do we see how the public

reputation of judicial proceedings will be damaged if

the conviction is allowed to stand. In short, we see no

manifest injustice to justify reversal despite the

absence of a contemporaneous objection.

United States v. Branson, 756 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.

1985), which Thame asserts is dispositive, is readily

distinguishable. First, Branson involved prosecutorial

comment on the exercise of the right to remain silent:

comment the impropriety of which is both more

established and more prejudicial than the comment

involved here. In addition, the prejudice in Branson

was palpable: The jury specifically asked if they could

base their decision on Branson's silence and the

district judge replied that they could base their

decision on any evidence they thought relevant. 756

F.2d at 754; see also United States v. Puig, 810 F.2d

- 1085. 1088 n.9 (11th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing

Branson and concluding error was harmiess): United

States v. Ortiz, 776 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, 475 U.S. 1097 (1986) (same).

V

The suppression motion was properly denied. The

court's instruction adequately cured the prosecutor's

error in speculating about Thame’'s intention to

distribute cocaine on the street. Thame’s post-arrest

24.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. A88-49

Albert John Thame, Jr.,

Applicant

© United States

ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION of the appli-

cation of counsel for’ the appicant,

IT IS ORDERED that the time for

filing a petition for a writ of

certiorari in the above-entitled case,

be and the same hereby, extended to

and including August 14, 1988.

s/ Byron R. White

Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court of the United States

Dated this 20th day of July, 1988.

DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, Heidi Lindsay Hinst, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States

and am employed in Denver County, C0;

that my business address is 1461 Logan

St., Suite D-2, Denver, CO 80203; that

I am over the age of eighteen years

of age and am not a party engaged in

this action; that on Fe Z. » 1988,

I deposited at the US. Postal Service

General Mail Facility, 1595 Wynkoop

Denver, CO 80217, two envelopes, each

containing three copies of Petitioner's

Appendix ‘To Petition For Writ Of

Certiorari in Albert John Thame, Jr.,

vs. United States of America, bearing

the requisite postage, addressed to:

Mr. Charles Fried

Solicitor General

US Dept. of Justice

Washington, DC 20530

Sally Mrvos

US Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

601 Market St., Rm. 21400

Philadelphia, PA 19106

at which place there is delivery by

United States Mail. I declare under

gp of perjury that the foregoing

aes and correct. This Z "y

ae Oy; 1988:

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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