Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Arko v. United States Department of the Air Force

Supreme Court brief1988

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88-5 50. MAY 9 1988

POSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,

In the Supreme Court of the United States

1988-89 Term

Robert John Arko,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Ve

The United States Department of the Air

Force; The School of Education, Univer-

sity of Colorados The School of Law,

University of Colorado; The American sar:

Associations; The Association of American

Law Schools; The Law School Admission

Councils; and, The Law School Admission

Services, Inc.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the.

Tenth Circuit

Robert John Arko, Pro Se

404 Animas Street

Trinidad, Colorado 81082-3233

Telephone: 719-846-3672

Khe bobo Loker

cH

penne penny

1M LEE NRL EE A

et

Questions Presented by this Appeal

1. Should the American Bar Association.

(ABA) and the Association of American Law

Schools (AALS) be required to respond to

the original complaint and subsequent fil-

ings (a) in the district court? (b) in the

court of appeals? or, (c) in this court?

861103, I 18-19 Iy and 870727, 1 77 1.

2. Does a request that an individual

student leave an educational program sup-

ported by state and federal funds require

due process protections guaranteed by

Amendment Five of the Constitution of the

United States of America? 880223, I 3-4 1;

860902, I 5-9 Is 870527, 163-64 I, quest-

ion 4; and 17870917, I 92-93 I.

4 Unless otherwise noted, citations

are to the Joint Appendix Prepared by the

Appellant. Each reference is to the Docu-

ment Number in the Table of Contents and

the bracketed I X I Page Number in the

Joint Appendix. The title of each document

is provided in the Joint Appendix Table of

Contents, but not in the notes to this

Petition.

2

3. Does the applicant for admission

to a college educational program have a

right to due process of law when he is

denied admission without specific cause?

860902, I 5-6 I, number 8; 870626, I 76 I,

870806, I 89-90 I; and 17870917, I 92-93 I.

4, Is it desirable and/or equitable

to have a unitary legal education system

closely associated with a unified legal

profession that combine to screen entry

into law related training and employment

opportunities? 860902, I 6-8 I, numbers

9 and 103 and 870806, I 84-86 I.

5. When public information is inadequ-

ate to support or reject a position, is it

acceptable to limit a request for relief to

a demand for due process and publication of

the information derived from that process?

860902, I 8-9 I, numbers 11,12,13, and 143

861105, I 23 I, number 4; 870409, I 41-43 I,

numbers 9, 10, 11, and 12; 870806, I 81 I;

and 17870917, I 92-93 I.

2

6. Are private parties closely asso-

Ciated with state agents imune from com-

pliance with the due process provisions

of our Constitution? 861103, I 19-21 I;

and 17870917, I 92-93 I. ;

7- Is it necessary for a pro se lit-

igant to assert that his rizhts to life,

liberty, property, and the pursuit of

happiness (adequate food, clothing, shelter,

and education) have been restricted to make

a private claim under our anti-trust laws?

861103, I 21-22 I; 870727, I 77-79 I; and

870806, I 87-90 I.

8. Is an individual's right to choose

a particular military service and type of

arms guaranteed by the First and Second*

Amendments to our Constitution? 861118,

I 23-24 I; 870527, I 63-64 I, number 4;

and 17870917, I 92 I.

2 On one or more occasions the appel-

lant has referred to Amendment Three when

he should have referred to Amendment Two.

870527, I 63-64 I, number 4,

| |

4

9. Is the appellant's request for due

process “unprecedented” or the reassertion

of a dormant rule of common law evidenced

in the biography of Paul of Tarsus? 861118,

I 24 I; 870727, I 79 Is and 17870917, I 92-

93 I.

10. Is it possible to seperate a claim

for due process in civil cases from the

problem of minority rights and equal pro-

tection of the laws for identifiable ethnic

groups? 861118, I 25-27 I; and 17870917.

I 92-94 I.

11. Should the precedent set in Board

of Curators of the University of Missouri

ve Horowitz, 98 S.Ct. 948 (1978), be limited

to cases involving dismissals from medical

schools for lack of cleanliness? 861118,

I 27-30 I.

12. Is it within the discretionary

powers of a district judge or a court of

appeals to define adequate relief? 880223,

I i-5 I; 860902, I 8-9 I, numbers 11, 12,

13, and especially 14; and 861118, I 30-31 I.

5

13. Does the individual citizen have

a right to a yearly physical examination,

and non-military physical counseling and

training to prepare his/her mind and body

for military service after age 187 (a) In

grade school? (b) In junior high school?

(c) In high school? (d) In college? (e)

In a private or parochial school? 861209,

I 31-32 I.

14. May the individual claim protec-

tion “under the eagle's wing" when in con-

troversy with a state or its agents?

861209, I 32-37 I.

15. Have the governments of the var-

ious states and/or the federal government

assumed the right to direct the upbringing

of minor children? 861227, I 37-40 I.

164. Given their close association with

law schools receiving state and federal

support, have the Law School Admission

Council (LSAC) and the Law School Admission

Services, Inc. (LSAS) become state agents?

861217, I 40-41 I.

lil

6

17. Letters presented in evidence in

870409, I 44-48 I, clearly indicate that

any or all aspects of the appellant's

character may be called into question.

Given the fact that the defendants have

failed to provide adequate reasons for

their past actions, is this evidence

irrelevant? 870417, I 48-49 I, note 1.

18. Is it acceptable within the

jurisdiction of this court for a private

citizen with little or no legal training

to ordain and establish himself as court

clerk, prosecutor, judge and jury? 870424,

I 50-52 I; and 870512, I 52-59 I.

19. Can the appellant, or one of his

immediate relatives, be held accountable

for irregularities in the probate of his

grandparents' estate in Colorado courts

more than forty years ago? 870527, 1 59-62 I.

20. Is it acceptable within the juris-

diction of this court for an individual to

be indirectly associated with the crime of

forgery while he is denied due process of

law? 870512, I 57 I, number 14; and

870527, I 62 I.

21. Does the final paragraph of Article

One, Section Eight of our Constitution give

the Congress the authority to restrict

enumerated civil liberties, like due process,

with statutes of limitation? 870527, I 62-

63 Is and 17870917, I 90-91 I.

22. liust exorbitant monetary damages

be at issue in constitutional cases?

870626, I 64 I; and I 70-71 I.

23. Which guide for action takes

precedence: (a) state statute, (b) federal

statute, (c) amendments to the Constitution,

or (d) articles of the Constitution? 870626,

I 65-68 I.

24. Is it within the discretionary

powers of a district judge to waive rest-

rictions like statutes of limitation when

a pro se litigant is the weaker party?

870626, I 68-69 I.

25. When the weaker party would not

otherwise be heard, should the chief judge

8

insure that he/she receive judicial notice

and representation? 870626, I 69-70 I.

26. Does a citizen have the right to

use the First Amendment as a sword to ob-

tain education for the practice of law; and

as a Shield to actively participate in the

production of dramatic presentations that

offer a balanced view of his participation

in government service? 870626, I 71-76 I. 3

3 This question has broader applica-

tion to treatment of Supreme Court cases by

the legal media. Compare Duncan v. Louisiana,

391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491

(1968) in Morris, Arval A. The Constitution

and American Education: Second Edition.

(Saint Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Com-

pany; 1980.) pp. 51-53; with treatment of

this case in Lockhart, William 8.3; Yale Kam-

isar; Jesse H. Choper; and Steven k. Shif-

frin. Constitutional Rights .and Liberties:

Cases-Comments-Questions; Sixth Edition.

(Saint Paul, hhinnesota: West Publishing Com-

pany; 1986.) (Hereinafter cited as: Lockhart,

Constitutional Rights.) pp. 100, 104, 107-

111, and 697. in each treatment the distor-

tion is. so bad it is not possible to deter-

mine what Duncan did to merit the attention

of the state of Louisiana.

A variation on this theme appears in

Lowy, Joan. “Local: Justice's talk may have

violated ethics". Rocky Mountain News. (Den-

ver, Colorado: Denver Publishing Companys

9

27. Can actual or implied liberties

guaranteed by the Constitution as amended

be restricted by state statutes “borrowed"

to fill in gaps in federal law? 870227,

I 79 Is: and 870806, 1 86 I.

28. Should each school have its own

constitution, including a system of checks

and balances on the educational process?

870806, I 81-83 I.

29. If no trial is held and relief is

not granted in a civil action, do state

legislative acts like statutes of limitation

amount to bills of attainder when they are

used to limit access to relief requesting

due process? 870527, I 62 I; 870727, I 80-

81 1; 870806, I 87 1; and 17870917, I 91 l.

30. Does a litigant have an obligation

to bring new material to the court's atten-

tion, even during the appeal process, if

the evidence may be related to the issues

before the court? 880223, I 5 I.

10

of Appeals Jor the Tenth Circuit

All parties listed in the caption of

the original complaint and in uocuments

submitted to the Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit are listed in the caption of

this case in this court.

It was determined in the United States

District Court for the District of Colorado

that the proper party defendant should be

a branch of the military or a federal

agency. 870227, I 10 1. In the court of

appeals and in this court "The United States

Department of the Air Force" has been addres-

sed as the proper party defendant.

The ABA and the AALS did not respond

in the district court or the court of

appeals. They may have no interest in the

outcome of this appeal. Question 1, page 1,

above.

It is rignt and proper, however, that

the appellant move this court to request

their presence and meaningful response.

11

For fear of citing one or more cases that

may be “inapvosite", 861217, I 38 I.

reference is made to no specific case to

support this rosition.

Since the 14th Century it has been

customary for the judicial district of the

plaintiff to bc the forum for any complaint.

Since the American Revolution, however, it

has become a cherished right of defendants

to skirt legal action by claiming residence

in another judicial district. These rules

of law should be retained in tact.

The ABA and the AALS no doubt claim

residence.in another judicial district. lt

is the contention of the appellant that the

residence of a member of these associations

“ The appellant relies on a layman's

cursory reading of one or more cases in

Cound, John J.3 Jack H. Friedenthal; and

Arthur R. Miller. Civil Frocedure: Cases

and Materials; Second Edition. (Saint Faul,

Minnesota: West Puolishing Companys 1974.)

Hereinafter cited as: Cound, Civil Procedure.

The court may request the appellant's

comments on any questions it may have

regarding material presented in this peti-

tion, in the joint appendix, or in any

cited authority.

12

is the residence of the association. That

a complaint should be filed by the plain-

tiff with the national office of one of

these associations is appropriate when a

clearly recognized representative is not

identified in the judicial district of the

plaintiff.

In any case, no defending party should

be permitted to exercise contempt of court

by failing to appear when it is properly

served with the original complaint. He

should be required to resvond by claiming

that his residence is outside the jurisdic-

tion of the originating court. Ideally, the

case will be transferred to the jurisdic-

tion of the Judicial Panel on Multi-vist-

rict Litigation for assignment to the proper

forum. United States Code, Title 28, Section

1407. Jurisdictional rules would eventually

develop and become firm.

Table of

supreme

Court

Rule

Rule Description

21.1(a)

21.1(b)

21.1(c)

21.21(c)

21.1(d)

21.1(e)

21.1(f)

21.1(g)

2i.1(h)

21.1(i)

21.1(j)

Questions Presented by this

Appeal eoeeeeeeeeeeeeeseee

Parties to the Proceedings

in the Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit eee.

Table of ContentS ceccoccce

Table of Authorities esecere

Orders and Judgments of the

District Court and the

Court of AppealS ceveceece

Jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court SGC eeeereessecosececse

Constitutional Frovisions .

Statement of the CaSe ceeee

Index to Federal Questions

in the Joint: Appendix

Prepared by the Appellant

Basis of federal

Jurisdiction in the

District Court and the

Court of AppealS eeseeoes

Amplified Reasons for

Allowing this Writ eevese

ConcluSion cececosecececes

13

21

22

24

29

14

Table of Authorities

Page

Description Number

Cases

Board of Curators of the University

of Missouri v. Horowitz, 98 S.Ct.

948 (1978) @eeeveeseeeseeeeeeeeeee ser 4

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 S.Ct. 1444,

20 L.Ed.2da 491 (1968) @e@eeseeeeeeweeeve¢e8 8

Constitutional Provisions

Article One, Section Eight

Commerce ClauSe seccccseccvece 23-24, 29

Congressional Powers Clause .eesee 7y 29

Militia Training Clause .e.eeee 23-24, 29

Weights and Measures Clause e. 23-24, 29

Article One, Section Nine eesessee 24, 29

Article One, BOCCLON TEN ccoecccecece 9

Article Three, Section One seceveoes 23

Article Three, SSOCtiONn -TWO seccees 17 « 22

Amendment One ecvecsecccscceveseseses 3, 8

Amendment Two eeenevoeoveeaeoeeeeeeeoeeee8 @ 3

Amendment TNFES cecoseceseesevsevecee i

Dee DEW op o,ccesees 1, 25 32 4% 6-7

Amendment Fourteen wccccccccccccoccce 4

15

Page

Description Number

Statutes

United States Code, ‘'itle 28

Section 44 eevee ereeereeeseseeseeeees 23

Section B85 eeceeseeeeeeeseeeseeeeees 23

Section 1254 (1) cscccccecceccccces 17

Section 1291 eoeeeeereeeeeeaeeeeseees 23

Section t33% eeoerereeeeseseeeeseseeee 23

Section 1407 eeoecereeeeeereeeeeeeseee 12

United States Code, ‘itle 42

Section 1983 Ceoveeeeereeeeereeeeoeen 25

Textbooks

Cound, John J.3 Jack H. Friedenthalys

and Arthur R. Miller. Civil

Procedure: Cases and Materials;

Second Edition. (Saint Paul,

Wiinnesotat West Publishing Company}

1974.) eesneeeveseeoeeseseeeesesne 11, 25-26

Lockhart, William B.; Yale Kamisar;

Jesse H. Chopers and Steven H.

Shiffrin. Constitutional Rights and

Liberties: Cases-Comments-Quest-

ions; Sixth Edition. (Saint Paul,

Minnesota: West Puolishing Com-

pany 3 1986.) eoeeseeeseeseoseseeeee 8, 25

Morris, Arval A. The Constitution

and American Education: Second

Edition. (Saint Paul, Minnesotas

West Publishing Companys 1980.) ees. 8

Books

Steinbeck, John. East of Eden. (New

York: The Viking Press; 1952.) eeos 28

16

Page

Description Number

NewSpaper Articles

Lowy, Joan. “Vocals Justice's talk

may have violated ethics". Rocky

Mountain News. (Venver, Colorado:

Denver Puolishing Company; May 2,

1987.) Pp. 6 and 4O, eeoeoeeeevoeveeese 8

Dramatic Fresentations

Full Mie tal Jacket eeeceveeoveeeeeeeee 19

Orders and Judgements of the District

Court and the Court of Appeals

Finesilver, Sherman G.3 Chief Judge. Order

and Judgment. (Denver, Colorado: United

States District Court for the District

of Colorado; February 24 and 27, 1987.)

870227, I 9-13 I.

- Order. (Denver, Colorado: United

States District Court for the District

re Colorado; May 11, 1987.) 870511, I 14-

16 I.

. Minute Order. (Denver, Colorado:

United States District Court for the

District of Colorado; Way 21, 1987.)

870521, I 17 I.

Brimmer, Clarence A.;3 Chief Judge; and

Moore and Tacha, Circuit Judges. Order

and Judgement. (Denver, Colorado: United

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth

ert ig February 23, 1988.) 880223,

I 1-4 I.

17

Jurisdiction of the Suvreme Court

Statutory jurisdiction for this

court to review the Fer Curiam Order and

Judgment by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued

February 23, 1988 is Section 1254 (1),

Title 28, United States Code.

Constitutional jurisdiction for this

review lies in Article Three, Section Two,

of our Constitution. 17870917, I 91-92 I.

As noted at pages 22 through 24, the juris-

dictional statements in the District Court

and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit should have had a far broader base

in the Articles of our Constitution. To

rely on federal statute and Article Three

is insufficient in this case.

Constitutional Provisions

Constitutional provisions and federal

statutes are quoted in this Petition and in

the Joint Appendix Prepared by the Appellant,

17870917, I 90-94 I, when they are relevant

to the argument presented.

18

Statement of the Case

The Clerk of the District Court for

the District of Colorado accepted the Com-

plaint filed September 2, 1986. 860902,

I 5-9 I. Motions and briefs were filed by

the plaintiff and one or more of the de-

fendants. 861103 through 870105, I 18-41 I,

The district court found that the plaintiff's

claims were barred by various statutes of

limitation. From March through May 1987 new

evidence came to the attention of the plain-

tiff While refusing to grant a new trial,

the District Court did grant leave to

appeal to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit. 870227, 870511, and

870521, I 9-17 Is and 870409 through 870512,

I 41-59 I.

A number of motions and briefs were

filed by the appellant as well as one or

more of the appellees. 870527 through

870806, I 59-90 I. The Court of Appeals

found that the District Court may not raise

affirmative defenses sua sponte when a

S

19

complaint is filed pro se, but not in forma

pauperis. ‘'he opinion of the appellate

court further found, however, that the

plaintiff's complaint failed to state a

federal cause of action. It also rejected

the "new" evidence presented by the appel-

lant. The judgment of the district court

was affirmed. 880223, I 1-5 lI.

The following facts are also “material

to the consideration of the questions pre-

sented". To date the ABA and the AALS have

not given recognition to the questions at

issue in this case. (Q. 1) One of the pri-

mary reasons for bringing this case to this

court is that the information requested in

the courts below is not generally available

near the residence of the appellant - or he

has not been thorough in his search for it.

(Q. 5)

Since comvosing the plaintiff's brief

dated 861209, I 31-32 I, the appellant has

viewed Full Metal Jacket, a Stanley Kubrick

film. While viewing this film the personal

20

experience of the appellant during basic

military training served to under score

the very important questions raised in

this dramatic presentation.w One or more

broadcasts by Howard Cossell, an ABC radio

sportscaster, on the proper relationship

between education and sport also came to

mind. In order to perform successfully in

combat on the battlefield the individual

soldier must have proper mental and physical

conditioning from an early age regardless of

the character of the school he attends. It

must follow that funding for this condition-

ing and training must be apportioned on a

per capita basis regardless of the type of

school the student chooses to attend. While

the Department of Lefense should have the

authority to set goals and objectives that

each student must meet, each student should

have the right to choose any school approved

for this training and conditioning. (Q. 13)

A consistent theme in the record is

that the appellant has born full

21

responsibility for each error in judgment

that he has made. Une or more of the appel-

lees, on the other hand, have ignored their

own neglizencee They have permitted one cit-

izen to make accusations which they must

have believed.(Q. 17) They have sanctioned

vigilante law for a period of at least seven

years. (Q. 18) They have constructed the

laws of the state of Colorado to permit a

will to be called into question more than

forty years after recognition in probate

court. (Q- 19) And, they have permitted

criminal accusation without benefit of

trial by jury. (Q. 20) Most damaging of all

is that they have denied the appellant the

right to adequately prepare for his own.

defense. (Q. 3 and Q. 7) This continuing

disregard of their own inadequate performance

must be looked on with disfavor by this court.

Index to Federal ‘Juestions in the Joint

Appendix Frepared by the Appellant

The Joint Appendix Prepared by the

Appellant and this Petition are cross indexed.

22

The Fetition refers to the Joint Appendix

by using the six or eight digit document

number and bracketed I X I page number

that make up each reference in the Petition.

The “Table of Contents" in the Joint Appen-

dix correlates "Vocument Numbers", "Docu-

ment Titles", and leading “Fage Numbers".

Basis of Federal Jurisdiction in the Dist-

rict Court and the Court of Appeals

The basis of federal jurisdiction in

this case in the court of first instance

was summarized in 870626, pp. 1-2:

eee the plaintiff claimed that the

District Court for the District of Colorado

had original jurisdiction in this case. be-

cause the plaintiff resides in the court's

jurisdiction and one of the defendants is

an agency of the government of the United

States. The Department of the Air Force is

an agency of the government of the United

States, a party to this controversy, and

under Article Three, Section Two of the

Constitution... subject to the jurisdiction

of the Supreme Court. The School of Educ-

ation and the School of Law in the Univer-

sity of Colorado at. Boulder are agents of

the State of Colorado and subject to the

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under

the same article. The United States Dist-

rict Court for the District of Colorado

and the United States Court of Appeals for

the Tenth Circuit are both inferior courts

to the Supreine Court of the United States

and thereby have jurisdiction in this case

23

under Article Three, Section One of the

Constitution.

Section 1331 of the United States Code,

Title 28, zives the district court original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising

under the Constitution. Title 28, Section

1291 of the ... Code gives the courts of

appeal jurisdiction of appeals from all

final decisions of tne district courts....

Section 85 zives jurisdiction over the

State of Colorado to the District Court

for tne District of Colorado. Apreals from

decisions of this court fall under juris-

diction of the United States Court of

Appeals for tne Tenth Circuit pursuant to

Title 28, Section 41 of the United States

Code.

This comment is deficient in that it fails

to note that the ABA and the AALS are both

subject to federal jurisdiction under the

Commerce Clause and the Weights and Measures

Clause of Article One, Section Eight of our

Constitution. 17870917, I 90 Ile The follow-

ing vortion of Article One, Section Eight

Should also have been included in this pas-

sage

The Congress shall have Power To .e.

provide for organizing, arming, and discip-

lining the Militia, ... reserving to the

States respectively, the Appointment of the

Officers, and the Authority of: training the

Militia according to the discipline prer

scribed by Congress. eee

Each of the defendant-appellees traffics in

24

interstate commerce, is responsible for

establishing and operating a system of

weizhts and measures, and/or may assist in

"training the Militia” thereby establishing

a nobility based on intelligence in viola-

tion of Article Une, Section Nine of our

Constitution.

Amplified Reasons for Allowing this Writ

The District Court and the Court of

Apveals decided very important questions

of federal law by ignoring the real issues

and basing their decisions on narrow legal

points. These problems of federal law have

not been, but should be, settled by this

court.

A brief comment is required on the

ruling oy the United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit. 880303, I 3 I. it

reads:

Plaintiff's complaints against the

defendants ... failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. ee.

The appellant's various claims for relief

may be found in the Joint Appendix at

25

860902, I 8-9 1, numbers 11, 12, 13, and

14%, and 870409, 1 41-43 I, numbers 9, 10,

11, and 12.

In at least six other cases this court

has ruled on the measure of damages under

42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 870626, I 70 I.

The sources available to the Supreme Court,

as well as to the attornies for the appel-

lees, should give the full text of each of

these ooinions. 3

There are three types of remedy:

declarative, specific, and compensatory.

Declarative relief consists in a court's

defining the rights and duties of the par-

ties in a particular legal context. This

type of relief is not common and is often

limited by statute, but in many cases it is

6

invaluable.

y Lockhart, Constitutional Rightsys

Op cit.; p. 1143, footnote i.

6 The following comment is a summary

of Cound, Civil Procedure, “Section C. A

Note on Remedies", opcit.es pp. 18-21.

26

Specific relief is an order directing

conduct. The defendant may be ordered to

return a jewel he has taken from the plain-

tiff, or stop operating a pig farm ina

residential neighborhood. Specific relief

will be granted only when damages would be

completely inadequate.

Compensatory relief requires that the

defendant pay a sum certain in money to

the plaintiff. The measure for determining

the loss sustained when the object in quest-

ion is 100 shares of General Motors stock,

your leg, your reputation, or your peace

of mind is different in each case.

In the first prayer for relief, 860902,

I 8-9 I, item 11 requests compensatory

relief. Item 12 requests specific relief.

Item 13 requests a combination of declara-

tive and specific relief. Item 14 gives

this court the opportunity to fashion

relief of its choice.

In the second prayer for relief,

870409, I 41-43 I, the appellant requests

27

a combination of both declarative and

specific relief in items 9 through 12.

Item 13 is now moot.

The six cases cited at 870626, I 70 I,

of the Joint Appendix define the measure

of compensatory damages in similar cases.

The court should be mindful that we still

live in a free market economy. The plain-

tiff-appellant continues to believe that

once due process has been achieved and the

facts are aired, the free market will make

appropriate benefits available.

This court may mold relief to fit its

final decision. The appellant, however,

continues to be restricted in the demands

that he can make by both moral and ethical

constraints not applicable to most liti-

gants. The original complaint, 860902,

I 5-9 I, was framed in its first editions

without reference to actual military ser-

vice and veteran status. Had one of these

early versions been accepted by the Dist-

rict Court the appellant would have been

28

in a stronger position to request addi-

tional relief that any court could grant.

Given veteran status, however, the

appellant is obligated to frame relief

that is generally applicable to every

citizen and has little to no personal

benefit attached. In East of Eden John

Steinbeck is one step from claiming that

a veteran has no preference at bar, or in

society generally, based on prior military

service. He,in fact,assumes duties and

obligations other citizens never know.

The appellant favors this perspective. ?

The individual citizen is obligated,

however, to preserve, protect and defend

our Constitution whenever it is within his

Capacity to act. It makes no difference —

what the status of the individual is when

One or more civil liberties are abused.

The individual citizen must act within the

law when his experiences indicate that one

? Steinbeck, John. East of Eden. (New

York: The Viking Press; 1952.)

29

or more civil liberties are threatened.

The Court of Appeals also found that

the appellant's allegations fail to state

a federal cause of action. 880303, I 4-5 I.

As noted on pages 23 and 24 of this Peti-

tion, the appellees are subject to federal

regulation under various portions of

Article One, Sections Eight and Nine of

our Constitution. 17870917, I 90 I.

Conclusion

Following military service the veteran

is responsible for safeguarding the reputa-

tion of his fallen brothers in arms. He is

obligated to assist his former adversary in

meeting basic needs. He consequently has a

duty to achieve these goals and objectives

through legal education for the practice of

law, through active participation in the

diplomatic service of his country, and by

analysing historical events and making a

true and correct record of them.

While the events at issue in this case

were taking place these responsibilities,

30

obligations and duties were not recognized.

As time passed they were only dimly

perceived. Unly now as this case comes to

court does the appellant realize the great

debt he owes these men.

Few of them understood the cause for

which they sacrificed their lives on the

rim of Asia. Even now we have difficulty

defining the right to process as one of the

central issues in that conflict. But, in

the land of their birth this gift of pro-

cess is at risk. To demand process in this

court for students, for the unborn, and

for others who may require it is to espouse

their cause.

This case is about elementary liber-

ties we have held dear for more than two

hundred years. This court should sugzest to

the Congress a rule of discipline for men-

tal and physical training prior to military

service. It should provide for the reasser-

tion of the right to due process in civil

matters for students as well as for others.

31

It should also mandate congressional

regulation of lezal education in this soc-

iety. The right to equal protection of the

laws should be more clearly defined.

The rights, duties, obligations and

responsibilities of litigants, advocates,

and judges in any legal proceeding should

be clearly defined. Jurists should be

admonished to avoid setting themselves

apart as a nobility based on intellect.

lt should ve established that the

individual's primary relationship is with

his family, community, county, and state

in that order. When all else fails, however,

he should be aware that he m2y always rely

on the federal system when each of these

other relationships have failed him.

For the foregoing reasons the plain-

tiff-appellant humbly requests that this

Supreme Court of the United States grant

this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit this 25th day of July, 1988.

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Robert J Arko, Plaintiff-Appel-

lant, Fro Se

404 Animas Street

Trinidad, Colorado 81082-3233

Telephone: 719-846-3672

FO Re OAT N

Docket Entries

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Joint Appendix Prepared by the Appellant

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Table of Contents

Document Document Page

: Number Title Number

Table of Contents i

Docket Entries

880223 Order and Judgment: United

States Court of Appeals -

Tenth Circuit eevvecsceosece 1

860902 Comvlaint cocccsceccsecece 5

870227 Judgment and Order: United

States District Court -

District of Colorado eeee 9

870511 Order: United States Dist-

rict Court - District of

Colorado ecoeseoeveeeeeeeesne 14

870521 liinute Order Entered by

Chief Judge Sherman G.

Finesilver eeceensceeeeseees 1-7

Joint Appendix Prepared by the Appellant

861103 Motion of Law. School

Admission Council and Law

School Admission Services,

Inc. to Dismiss the

Complaint eeeeeeveevnesevce 18

861105 Motion to DisSmiSS ceeeecooes 23

a 861118 Memorandum Opposing

j Motions by Three Defend-

ants to Dismiss the Com-

plaints Against Them eeee 23

- 861209 iwemorandum Supvorting a

4 Motion Requesting Certi-

fication of Jurisdiction 31

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Document Document Page

Number Title Humber

861217 Reply Memorandum of De-

fendants Law School Ad-

mission Council and Law

School Admission Serv-

ices, Inc. to Flaintiff's

Memorandum in Opposition

to Notion to Dismiss eee. ae

870105 Reply Memorandum by Plain-

tiff in Response to Reply

Memorandum by Defendants

LSAU and LSAS Dated

12-10-86 eeoeeevoeee eee eee 44

870409 Motion Requesting a New

Trial or Grant of Leave

to Appeal to the Court of

Appeals eecveeseenseeseeeen 44

870417 Deféndant's Response to

Plaintiff's Motion Re-

questing a New Trial or

Grant of Leave to Appeal

to the Court of Appeals . 48

870424 Moticn Requesting Relief

from Final Judgment and

Permission to Submit New

EVIGENCE accccccceccceces 49

870512 Motion Requesting Fermis-

sion to Submit Additional

New Evidence ceecsccccveves 52

870527 United States Court of

Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit: Pro Se Docketing

Statement ceccovcsecccvsioce 59

870626 Brief of the Appellant oe. 64

Document

Document

Title

870727 3rief for Defendants-

Appellees Law School Ad-

mission Council and Law

School Admission Serv-

ices, InCe ceovcccsesccecece

870806 Reply Brief of the Appel-

lant eeeeveeeeeeeseoeeeeses

17870917 The Constitution of the

United States of America

Table of Authorities eevee

CaSe€S ceoccccccesscesecvese

Constitutional Provisions

StatuteS ceeovocevesscscveece

Court RuleS ececcessvvcece

Congressional ActS eervess

BOOKS ececcoeseorsevesccssece

DocumentS esceccsesvccseses

Law ScChoolS esrsecoecevece

Dramatic Presentations .e.

Private Letters in

Evidence @eeseeaecevoesvsesese#eevee01ee@

Newspaper ArticleS eevee

Certificate of Mailing ...

iii

Page

Number

76

Docket Entries

880223 Order and Judgment: United States

Court of Appeals - Tenth Circuit

IP. 11 After examining the briefs and

appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not

materially assist the determination of this

appeal. See Fed. R. Apo. P. 34(a)s 10th Cir.

R. 34.1.8. The Cause is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his

complaint and the denial of his subsequent

Rule 60(b) motion. Plaintiff alleges Ip. 2I

that numerous state and federal actors de-

prived him of due process of law by deny-

ing him educational opportunities in the

Air Force Reserve ''raining Program, the

University of Colorado, and the University

of Colorado Law School. Plaintiff also

alleges that some of the defendants discri-

minated against him.

The United States Air Force Reserve

Officer Training Program moved to dismiss

2

on several grounds. The Law School Admise

sion Council and the Law School Admission

Services moved to dismiss for lack of per-

sonal jurisdiction. The University of Colo-

rado, the Colorado University Law School,

and the Senv ibaa’ tex Association did not

answer the complaint or move to dismiss.

The court dismissed plaintiff's com-

plaint in its entirety as barred by the

applicable statute of limitations. No de-

fendant, however, had raised the statute of

limitations as a defense. Statute of limit-

ations is an affirmative defense. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(c). This court has noted that

“Iglenerally, it is the duty of the defend-

ant to plead affirmative defenses, and the

court cannot raise such defenses sua sponte.”

Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F. 2d 1471, 1476 (10th

Cir. 1987). This court has made an exception

to this rule for in forma pauperis com-

plaints. Id. Plaintiff here, however, is

proceeding pro se, but not in forma pauperis.

Thus, the district court could not sua sponte

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dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on the

affirmative defense of statute of lLimitat-

ions.

Plaintiff's complaints against the de-

fendants, however, fail to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Plain-

tiff's complaint against the Air Force Re-

serve Officer Training Program Ip. 3I is

that a professor of air military science at

the University of Colorado asked plaintiff

to withdraw from the training program.

Similarly, plaintiff's complaint against the

Universit; of Colorado is that in 1969, he

“was asked to withdraw from the Student

Teaching Program offered by the School of

Education at the University of Colorado...

ITIhe plaintiff did so without comment."

The plaintiff complains that these requests

were not accompanied by due process protect-

ions. However, a “request” that pliintiff

leave these programs, without more, did not

require due process protections. lloreover,

because plaintiff also states that he later

4

completed the teacher certification program,

his prayer for relief as to the University

of Colorado, with the possible exception of

the request for one dollar in damages, is

now moote

Plaintiff's counts against the Univer-

sity of Colorado Law School include the com-

plaint that unfavorable decisions of the

admissions committee cannot be appealed ex-

cept by reapplying. Plaintiff argues that

due process requires a hearing before an in-

partial third party. Plaintiff further al-

leges that the Law School's admission pro-

cess is the same one used by other’ law

schools, and that this process is used by the

ABA, the Association of American Law Schools,

the Law School Admission Council, and the

Law School Admission Services to deprive

"Vietnam veterans with low grade point aver-

ages and low Law School Admission test

scores" admission to law school. Plaintiff

contends that defendants' actions deprived

him of Equal Protection of the laws and

5

violated the spirit of the antitrust laws. |

Yhese allegations do not state Ip. 4la

federal cause of action. We accordingly af-

firm the district court's dismissal of

plaintiff's comolaint on other grounds.

In his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b), plaintiff sought to raise new alleg-

ations that "plaintiff's experiences as a

student and law school applicant may be re-

lated to long-standing rancor over dispos-

ition of his grandparents’ estate." The

district court properly denied this motion.

The judgment of February 26, 1987, and

the order of lay 11, 1987, of the United

States District Court for the District of

Colorado are Affirmed.

The mandate shall issue forthwith. ***

860902 Complaint Ip. 2I ***

8. Durinz Seotember 1965 the plaintiff

entered the University of Colorado as a pre-

law student. While the University of Colo-

rado is the only state supported institution

in Colorado offering a law degree, it does

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not offer specific courses for pre-law

students. Durinz September 1965 pre-law

students were instructed that no specific

course of study was required for law school

admission. Since graduation from the Univer-

sity of Colorado in June 1969the plaintiff

has taken the Law School Admission Test and

made application for admission to the Uni-

versity of Colorado School of Law more than

once. Each request for admission has been

denied. The only method for appealing an un-

favorable decision of the admissions committee

is to reapply for admission. Applicants denied

admission have no recourse to a hearing before

an impartial third party. Without recourse to

a hearing in one of the courts inferior to the

Supreme Court, the right to due process

Zuaranteed by amendment five is abridged.

IP. 31 9. The plaintiff further alleges

that the law school admission process employ-

ed by the University of Colorado School of

Law is similar to the procedure used by

other law schools that belong to the

7

Association of American Law Schools. This

process is constructed to screen applicants.

Unly desired classes of students are permitted

to enter schools holding membership in the

association. The American Bar Association

uses the Association of American Law Schools,

the Law School Admission Council, and the

Law School Admission Services to restrict

entry into the legal profession to certain

classes of people. The plaintiff alleges

that Viet Nam veterans with low grade point

averazes and low Law School Admission Test

scores have been denied admission to law

schools holding memoership in the Associa-

tion of American Law Schools in dispropor-

tion to their number in the general popula-°"

tion of law school applicants each year

Since 1965.

10. Non-competitive professional assoc-

iations are permitted by the Sherman and

Clayton Anti-trust Acts. While these assoc-

iations are permitted by the letter of the

law, they violate the spirit of it.

In this case the right of professional

associations to avoid competition violates

the rights of both the plaintiff and those

unsuccessful law school applicants unwilling

to speak for themselves. ***

11. The plaintiff requests that the

court award him one freshly minted dollar

bill in the currency of the United States.

12. The plaintiff demands that the

defendants be required to develop an adequate

appeal procedure for situations similar to

those described in paragraphs (6) through

(10). This procedure will include, but not

be limited to, (a) a written statement of

reasons for summary dismissals, (b) a right

to a hearing »efore an impartial third party,

and, (c) the right of appeal to one or more

of the courts inferior to the Supreme Court.

tH

13. The plaintiff asks that the

Association of American Law Schools be

required to study admission patterns at its

member schools IandI be required to publish

as

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its findings *** if the charge made in

paragraph (9) proves to be true.

14. The Court may grant other relief

it deems appropriate. ***

870227 Judgment and Orders United States

District Court - District of Colorado Ip. iI

Plaintiff's pro se Complaint alleges

numerous causes of action against the above-

named defendants. First, he claims a Pro-

fessor at the University of Colorado asked

him to withdraw from the Air Force Reserve

Officer Training Program in November, 1966.

He withdrew, without being given an oppor-

tunity for a hearing. Plaintiff also asserts

he w2s asked to withdraw from the Student

Teaching Program at the School of Education

at the University of Colorado during the

spring of 1969. Again, he withdrew, without

opportunity for a hearing. Lastly, he claims

he has been denied admission to the University

of Colorado School of Law more than one time.

He contends his denial of admission occured

without due process. Additionally, he claims

10

Viet Nam veterans with low grade point

averages and low Law School Admission Test

scores have been denied admission to law

schools more readily than other applicants

since 1965. He also contends defendant pro-

fessional associations are operating in

violation of the Sherman Act and the Clay-

ton Act. Ip. 2I

Only the United States Air Force Reserve

Officer Training Program, the Law School Ad-

mission Council (LSAC), and the Law School

Admission Services (LSAS) have appeared to

date. Each has filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint on numerous grounds. We find the

plaintiff's claims are barred by the applic-

able statutes of limitation.

Plaintiff's claim against the United

States Air Force keserve Ufficer Training

1 is barred by the statute of

Program

The Reserve Officer Training Program

is not the proper party defendant. Plaintiff

should have breught his claim against a

branch of the military or a federal agency.

However, we assume for purposes of this

Order that a proper U.S. defendant has been

named.

11

limitations. Under 28 U.S.C. #2401(a), a

cause of action against the United States

or one of its agencies is time-barred if

not commenced "within six years after the

right of action first accrues." Flaintiff's

claim against the United States, contained

in Paragraph 6 of the Complaint, admittedly

accrued in 1966. He did not file his Com-_

plaint until September .2, 1986. He has made

no showing that the statute of limitations

was somehow tolled during the twenty years

between his departure from the Training

Program and commencement of the suit. Hor

does the Court know of any cognizable reason

for tolling the statute. Defendant United

States Air Force Reserve Officer Training

Program's Motion to Vismiss is Granted.”

Plaintiff's claims against the LSAC

and the LSAS are similarly barred. Ip. 31

2 Plaintiff appears to argue that the

due process violation at issue has somehow

been continuting to this date. However,

plaintiff has not brought a class action,

and cannot purport to assert the rights of

Others not before the Court.

12

His due process and equal protection claims

are apparently brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

#1983. As there is no tederal statute of

limitations for claims brought under 42

U.S.C. #1983, the Colorado statute of limit-

ations for actions under federal statutes

applies. Under Colo.Rev.Stat. #13-80-102

(z)(1986Cum.Supp.), such claims are barred

if they are not commenced within two years

after the cause of action accrues. Again,

we can conceive of no reason why the statute

of limitations on plaintiff's constitutional

claims was tolled during the period at issue.

As such, defendants LSAS and LSAC's Motion to

Dismiss those claims is Granted.

Plaintiff also asserts antitrust claims

against LSAS and LSAC. Section 4B of the

Clayton Act, at 15 U.S.C. #15b, provides a

3 Again, plaintiff appears to assert

some sort of continuing constitutional vio-

lation. However, we confine our analysis to

the violations asserted on behalf of the

plaintiff himself, between the years 1965

and 1969. See footnote 2, above.

res

oe

13

four year statute of limitations for pri-

vate antitrust actions. The limitations

period begins to run when the cause of act-

ion accrues. * The Ninth Circuit has held

#4B does not apply to equitable claims

under the Clayton Act, but a defense of

laches does apply and bars equitable claims

four years after accrual of the cause of

action. International Telephone & Telegraph

Coe ve General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 518

F.2d 913, 929 (9th Cir. 1975). We concur.

Because again, no sufficient reason exists

for tolling the statute, the Motion to Dis-

miss plaintiff's antitrust claim is Granted.

Accordingly, defendants' Motions to Dis-

miss are Granted. Accordingly, the remainder

of plaintiff's claims fail under the respect-

ive statutes of limitation, for the reasons

expressed above. Therefore, those claims

are dismissed, sua sponte.

A cause of action under the Sherman

Act does not accrue until damages are ascer-

tainable. However, in this case, any damages

to plaintiff were ascertainable upon his

denial of admission to law school.

14

The Clerk of the Court is Directed to enter

judgment for defendants and against plain-

tiff Robert John darko. Plaintiff's claims

are Bismissed, with prejudice. The Clerk of

the Court is Directed to enter judgment in

favor of the defendants and against the

plaintiff. Each party to bear its own costs.

Hee

870511 Order: United States District Court

- District of Colorado Ip. il

This matter comes before the Court on

Plaintiff's liotion Requesting a New Trial

or Grant of Leave to Appeal filed April 7,

1987. Plaintiff has since filed a motion

requesting leave to redesignate his request

as a Motion Requesting Relief from Final

Judgment and Permission to Suomit New Evi-

dence. Plaintiff's Request for Fermission to

File a Motion is Granted. The Clerk of the

Court is Directed to file plaintiff's tend-

ered Motion Requesting Relief.

Defendant's have responded to plaintiff's

initially tendered motion. The responses apply

15

as well to the newly filed motion. The

issues are therefore fully briefed and ripe

for resolution. Plaintiff's Motion Request-

ing Relief is hereby Denied.

It appears plaintiff's motion is now

asserted only under the provisions of Rule

60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. However, inasmuch as

the motion may still Ip. 21 be construed as

a Motion for New Trial, the motion is denied

as untimely and procedurally inappropriate,

This action was concluded prior to trial by

entry of judgment on motion to dismiss.

Even if a motion for new trial were approp-

riate, plaintiff's motion was filed more

than 10 days after entry of judgment, and

was therefore untimely. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(b).

Inasmuch as plaintiff's motion may be

construed as a motion to alter or amend

judgment, it was also untimely filed. Fur-

Suant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), a motion to

alter or amend must be filed within 10 days

after entry of the judgment. Additionally,

we find the motion lacks substantive merit.

16

In our ruling of February 27, 1987, we

found the statute of limitations had run on

plaintiff's various claims. The evidence

tendered with plaintiff's motion does not

affect that judgment. None of the evidence

submitted warrants a finding that the

applicable statutes of limitations were some-

how tolled. Plaintiff's claims are still time

barred.

Plaintiff's newly tendered motion was

filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.

This motion was timely filed, but lacks merit.

As stated above, our judgment of February 27,

1987 is not affected by the evidence submit-

ted to the Court. As such, plaintiff's motion

is denied.

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for

Grant of Leave to Appeal. In that motion,

plaintiff appears to request a stay of judg-

ment. Plaintiff has not shown sufficient

reason for stay of judgment pending appeal.

the lotion is denied. Plaintiff is hereoy

granted until May 18, 1987 to file a

17

properly framed Notice of Appeal. No fur-

ther extensions will be granted.

Accordinsly, it is Ordered that Plain-

tiff's Motions filed pursuant to Rules 59(a),

59(e) and 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. are Denied.

Further, plaintiff's Motion for Stay of

Judgment pending Appeal is Denied at this

time, ***

870521 Winute Order Entered by Chief Judge

Sherman G. Finesilver Ip. il

Plaintiff's Kequest to File a lotion

and Motion Requesting Permission to Submit

Additional New Evidence filed May 18, 1987

are Granted. The Court has reviewed the

tendered evidence. The newly submitted

evidence does not alter the views expressed

in our Orders of February 26, 1987 and May

11, 1987. Plaintiff has submitted a timely

Notice of Appeal. ***

18

JOINT APPENDIX FREPARED BY THE APPELLANT

861103 Motion of Law School Admission Council

and Law School Admission Services, Inc. to

Dismiss the Complaint

IP. 51 Il. Plaintiff Has Not Established

Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants LSAC

and LSAS.

The complaint fails to show that this

Court has personal jurisdiction over LSAC

or LSAS. Plaintiff does not rely upon any

federal statute authorizing extraterritorial

service of process upon nonresidents of Colo-

rado. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

4(e) and (f), state long-arm statutes may

be used to assert personal jurisdiction over

nonresident defendants.

The Colorado long-arm statute, C.R.S.

# 13-1-124(1)(a) and (b), would not suodjéct

defendants to personal jurisdiction unless

they had transacted Dusiness or committed

a tort within Colorado. Plaintiff does not

allege any injury from the administration of

the LSAT in Volorado, and this is the only

contact that could conceivably be attributed

to LSAS or LSAC for these purposes. Under

19

the prevailing constitutional "minimum

contacts" test for assertion of long-arm

jurisdiction, the fact of plaintiff's tak-

ing the LSAT cannot be used to establish

personal jurisdiction over nonresident

defendants for the purposes of determining

liability for other, unrelated acts compre-

hended by plaintiff's conspiracy Ip. 61

theory. *** It would offend “traditional

notions of fair play and substantial just-

ice" to force LSAC and LSAS to defend against

this action in Colorado simply because plain-

tiff was rejected by a Colorado law school.

*#* Thus, there is no personal jurisdiction

over LSAC and LSAS as a matter of law.

III. Plaintiff's Civil Rights Claim Is

Without Merit.

The complaint purports to state a claim

against all defendants under the Fifth Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution. The

Fifth Amendment restricts federal government

activities and does not apply to LSAC and

LSAS. If taken as asserting a Fourteenth

pave * 9

. "I a

20

Amendment claim against LSAC and LSAS, this

claim still must fail as a matter of law.

The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause

only applies to actions that can fairly be

attributed to the statess; a suit cannot be

maintained under 42 U.S.C. # 1983 against

wholly private entities, such as LSAC and

LSAS. *** Wor can plaintiff avail himself

of 42 U.S.C. # 1985, which has consistently

been held to protect only victims of invi-

dious race- or class-based discrimination.

*#* Ip. 7I Vietnam veterans with low grades

and LSAT scores are not such a protected

Class. *** No sction by LSAC and LSAS could

have infringed plaintiff's rights to sub-

Stantive or procedural due process under

either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.

Count nine of plaintiff's complaint

may be interpreted as a claim for denial of

the equal protection of the laws. Plaintiff

allezes that Vietnam veterans with low

grades and low uSAT scores have been discrim-

inated against in the area of law school

21

admissions. Since plaintiff is suing in his

individual capacity, he must establish that

he has suffered injury himself as a member

of a protected class, and he is not entitled

to assert the constitutional rights of third

parties, whether Vietnam veterans or others,

in this action. *** The complaint fails to

show any such injury at the hands of LSAC

and LSAS. And, as noted adove, the actions

of LSAC and LSAS are not the actions of the

federal government or any state government

to which equal protection guarantees apply.

Plaintiff's civil rights claim should there-

fore be dismissed as against LSAC and LSAS

as a matter of law. Ip. 8I

IV. Pleintiff's Antitrust Claim Is

Without Merit.

The complaint does not allege a single

fact to support the allegation of a conspir-

acy in violation of the Sherman and Clayton

Acts. Plaintiff's "business or property"

were not injured as required by Clayton Act

#4, 15 U.S.C. # 15. Plaintiff was not

22

necessarily entitled to be admitted to law

school, and thus no cognizable property in-

terest was harmed by his rejection. ***

The complaint does not allege that plaintiff

is threatened dy LSAC and LSAS with future

harm to any interest which may be protected

by a private suit for equitable relief under

Clayton Act # 16, 15 U.S.C. # 26. *** The

complaint thus fails to allege that LSAC

and LSAS have harmed any interest that plain-

tiff has which is protected by the federal

antitrust laws.

Past injuries cannot be redressed under

the federal antitrust laws unless they were

proximately caused by the defendant's con-

duct. **#* On a fair reading of the complaint,

it is evident that whatever injuries plain-

tiff alleges were not directly or Ip. 9l

even remotely c2used by LSAC and LSAS. Plain-

tiff's antitrust claim against LSAC and LSAS

Should therefore be dismissed as a matter

of law.

23

861105 Motion to Dismiss

“## TP, 22 4. The complaint fails to

state a cluvim upon which relief can be

granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R.

Civ. P. Assuming all of the allegations

made against the named federal defendant are

true, for purposes of this motion only, the

allegations still fail to state a claim

against the federal defendant upon which

relief can be granted. Assuming that plain-

tiff was in the RuUTC program at the Univer-

sity of Colorado in November, 1966, and

“wes asked to withdraw" from the ROTC pro-

cram, and "did so without comments" those

allegations fail to state a cause of action

or claim for damages upon which relief can

be granted.

861118 Memorandum Opposing Motions by Three

Defendants to Dismiss the Complaints

Against Them

IP. 31 *** Federal Law 42 U.S.C. # 1983

authorizes law suits in federal court when a

State agent has deprived the plaintiff of

his constitutional rights. The First

al le

24

Amendment gives the people the right to peti-

tion the government for a redress of griev-

ances. Consequently, this court has juris-

diction in this case.

The plaintiff could have claimed tnat

his First Amendment rizht to Freedom of

Speech was also violated by this defendant.

In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community

School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733,

21 LeEd.2d 731, (1969), the Supreme Court

ruled that wearing an item of clothing is an

expression of speech guaranteed by the First

Amendment. It follows that denying an indiv-

idual the same right is also a violation of

that amendment. ***

IP. 71 Re®rring to the Bidle again, it

is relevant to cite the case of Paul of

Tarsus, “Acts of the Apostles", chapter 22,

verses 22-29. After claiming Roman citizen-

Ship by birth, Paul was granted a Ip. 8I

Statement of charges, a hearing at the

district court and appeal to Rome. The charge

against him was *** bad teaching. ***

25

IP. 8I *** At no point in the complaint

did the plaintiff invoke the Fourteenth

Amendment. While the plaintiff does not

reject any of the benefits to be derived

from the guarantees this amendment makes, he

chooses to base his arguments on firmer

ground.

In its long history the Fourteenth

Amendment has become the I-25 of Constitution-

al Law. A Supreme court composed of ccontempor-

aries of the Radical Repudlicans made it clear

in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36

(1873), that this amendment was originally

intended for the protection of certain

groups of people, primarily those who were

considered slaves prior to 1863. During the

next eighty years many groups used the

Shelter this amendment provides. During the

1950's the movement for minority rights

used the protection afforded by the Four-

teenth Amendment in Brown v. soard of rduc-

ation, 347 U.S. 483, 73 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed.

873, (1954), and other school desegregation

26

cases that followed. The plaintiff is in

full agreement with the general past use of

this amendment. Ip. 9I Should he apply this

amendment in this case and fail, his action

would tend to weaken the sound provisions

of this amendment.

The fact that the plaintiff has not

invoked the right to equal protection of

the laws does not imply a denial of this

right. The plaintiff chooses to emphasize

other rights. The selective service process

in operation during the 1960's did not

provide for equal protection of the laws.

Colleges, universities, and the defendants

made few, if any, alterations in their pro-

zrams to account for a selective service

system that obligated only men to service.

During this period men were required to

take at least twelve semester hours of course

work each semester and take a test each May

to retain their draft deferments. Women were

exempt from these rules and regulations.

They were free to take as few hours of

SP de Re Sg litho lied Asc incl dpa iad

27

course work as they chose and they were able

to withdraw from school for a semester or

two if they wished. ***

There is no firm rule regarding appli-

cation of due process in educational insti-

tutions at the university level. One of the

plaintiff's objectives is to move the court

to develov such a rule. The Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ruled in Dixon vv.

Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d

150 (1961), that college students have the

rictht to procedural due process in disciplin-

ary situations. The court record does not

indicate what these students were accused of.

In a Similar case involving junior and senior

high school students suspended for ten days

for misconduct, without notice or Ip. 10I

hearing, the supreme court drew the same

conclusion in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,

95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725, (1975). The

court's divided opinion was written by Mr.

Justice White who was also responsible for

the opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.

28

145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 1412, re-

hearings denied 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270,

20 LeEd.2d 1412, (1968). The balance of the

court shifted in soard of Curators of the

University of Missouri _v. Horowitz, 98 S.Ct.

943 (1978). an opinion written by Mr. Just-

ice kenquist. His opinion clearly distingu-

ishes between due process procedures to be

used in disciplinary situations and those to

be used in academic situations. In general,

procedures required for poor academic per-

formance are less stringent than those

required for bad conduct dismissals and

suspensions.

The opinion in Horowitz is clear cut.

Taken alone, this opinion gives college

and university professors a blank check in

the area of suspensions and dismissals for

poor academic performance or unsatisfactory

job performance in training situations.

Horowitz fails to take into consideration

the possibility that a professor or admin-

istrator will choose to dismiss a student

4 ies, Serio dals o easss

ap RATE fete slagha a)

12 ta RN

29

on academic grounds when the real basis for

the dismissal is false accusation of miscon-

duct. in addition to this inequity, the

dictum in Horowitz is directly opposed to

the doctrine of preparation for “additional

odligations" enunciated in Meyer, Pierce,

and Loder, Supra. What happened to Miss

Horowitz after she was forced out of medical

school? Ip. 11I

In this case the results of the defend-

ants' actions are clear. In the case of the

Air Force RUTC Program, if we assume that

the professor's actions in November 1966 met

the minimum requirements for due process in

Horowitz - verbal notice and oral hearing -

did the professor's actions prepare the

student to take on “additional obligations"?

The plaintiff is prepared to prove that his

actions did just the reverse, not bdecause

he did not perform his duties as he should

have; but, because the rules under which he

was operating did not provide for adequate

procedural due process.

30

In the case of defendants LSAC and

LSAS the sane is true. Assuming that the

defendants provide adequate notice and

hearing procedures mandated in Horowitz,

does this process provide the plaintiff

with the opportunity to take on"additional

obligations"? The plaintiff's answer is no.

**#* ‘his process does not meet the standards

in Meyer, Pierce, and rfoder. *** Ip, 12I

III. Conclusion: The Problem of Relief

Rule 12 (b) (6) allows dismissal of a

complaint for "failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted". ‘The plain-

tiff believes that the defendants should be

able to raiseone dollar. *** The plaintiff

‘further believes that the defendants can be

expected to provide adequate due process

procedures for the people with whom they

work in academic situations. If policemen

Can provide due process in criminal situa-

tions, professors should be able to provide

the same due process in academic situations.

It should be easy for the Association of

31

American Law Schools and the American Bar

Association to provide the same information

on Viet Nam veterans that it provides on

women and other minority groups, even though

they do not merit special protection under

the Fourteenth Amendment. Ip. 12I

*#® TTIhe court may grant the additional

relief necessary to comply with Federal Rule

12 (b) (6).

el RECT AS PRY * Ste Ce AOL EIT EIT elle al

861209 Memorandum Supporting a Motion

Requesting Certification of Jurisdiction

**## IP, 5I The most tangible injury

suffered by the plaintiff was the fact that

he was inadequately prepared for basic mil-

itary training during the summer of 1969.

A university academic program does not

adequately prepare the physical body for

basic military training. The English lang-

uage is deficient in words that accurately

describe the internal emotional trauma

associated with substandard performance in

basic training. *** It took the plaintiff

more than a decade to realize that the real

32

problem was not an internal deficiency,

but a simple lack of proper physical

conditioning he joined the Air Force

Program to get.* *#* Tp, 61

5+ The Eagle's Wings Individual

Freedom in National Unity

Mr. James Madison was five feet, six

inches tall and had a penchant for black

attire. While we have most of his personal

papers, his fine library was dispersed by

his widow. His home was engulfed in new

additions by a movie star and a horse breed-

er. His memory has been eclipsed in the

popular mind by his more flamboyant contem-

poraries. Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin

Franklin head the list. The Wall Street

Journals; November 28, 1986, page 1, column 4,

He is called to mind because it is his

spirit, along with that of Lady Justice,

that motivates the plaintiff.

A After writing this paragraph the

appellant had an opportunity to view Full

Metal Jacket, a dramatic presentation by

Stanley Kubrick. Question 13 is the direct

result. M-I-C-K-E-Y M-O-U-S-E 7-7-7

(Notes: Lettered footnotes do not appear

in the original record.)

a lil

UN ebe De AC Ret ak ode od

es

. pitta

33

The primary objective of this project

is to bring the elementary rules of due

process to college and university campuses

in the United States. Raising the issue of

sovereign immunity in the context of this

case goes far beyond the plaintiff's orig-

inal intent. There is little doubt that

current case law supports the defense's

position. It is within reason that the

legal profession and the university commun-

ity have developed layers of legal insulation

over the past two-hundred years.

In the mind of the Constitution's pri-

mary author, however, Ip. 7I the pro se

litigant onposed to a state or its agents is

in a unique relationship with the national

government as it relates to the operation

of the government.. The individual may seek

refuge in the protection of the federal

courts when a state or its agents have aban-

doned him. When the individual's rights have

been restricted by the state, the individual

may seek the protection of the federal courts.

trad Phe RO EDs

ree ly

34

In a national government there is a direct

relationship between the individual and

the national government in its daily oper-

ations. In a federal government the state

government and its agents are a reflection

of the collective will of the sovereign

people. The state in a federal government

may deal directly with the individual, with

little or no interference by the federal

government. Mr. Madison states clearly, in

The Federalist, Number 39, that in the trial

of controversies to which states may be

parties the operation of the government. on

the individual makes the government national

in character. The emphasis in the following

passage is Mr. Madison's. He makes the case

far better than the plaintiff ever could.

The difference between a federal and a

national government, as it relates to the

operation of the government, is supposed to

consist in this, that in the former the

powers operate on the political bodies com-

nosing the Confederacy, in their political

capacities; in the latter, on the individ-

ual citizens composing the nation, in their

individual capacities. On trying the Consti-

tution by this criterion, it falls under the

35

national, not the federal character};

though perhaps not so completely as has

been understood. In several cases, parti-

cularly in the trial of controversies to

which States may be parties, they must be

viewed and proceeded against in their

2 collective and political capacities only.

So far the national countenance of the

government on this side seems to be Ip. 8I

disfigured by a few federal features. But

this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any

plans; and the operation of the government

on the people, in their individual capac-

ities, in its ordinary and most essential

proceedings, may, on the whole, designate

it, in this relation, a national govern-

ment.

In brief, sovereign immunity should not apply

when an individual and a state agent are in

controversy. If the professor in this case

was not a representative of the Air Force as

the defense claims, he must have been a

State agent!

It is easy for modern Americans to take

the Constitution out of context. The Feder-

alist was written for a Constitution strip-

ped of additions. There were no amendments

to hamper the sleek, unified theme. The

authors clearly intended that the rights of

the individual be guaranteed not by the writ-

ten word, but by the unspoken contract

36

forged during the Revolution, Mr. Alex-

ander Hamilton, in his summary of Mr. Mad-

ison's thinking on this subject in The

Federalist, Number 84, says that a Bill

of Rights is unnecessary in a government

founded on the power of the people. Since

the people surrender nothing and retain

everything, they have no need of particular

reservations. This is a living contract born

in the Magna Charta and renewed periodically

over the past eight hundred years. In

essence, this contract transends the bonds

of time and the written rules of lesser

political entities.

One of the lesser issues in this case

is whether intelligence or common sense

should dominate in the area of practical

education. Had our forefathers sided with

intelligence, they would have Ip. 9I chosen

a dolphin or a chimpanzee Ias a symbol for

this new nationI. They chose a bald eagle,

a bird of prey known for its excellent

Sight. With this symbol they cast their eye

37

over many generations of Americans, includ-

ing our own, to ;guard the rights of the in-

dividual from any encroachment by the state.

The eagle's wing offers shelter to all who

request it. ***

861217 Reply Memorandum of Defendants Law

School Admission Council and Law School

Admission Services, Inc. to Plaintiff's

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to

Dismiss

##% TP, 2T Argument

I. Statutes of Limitations and Laches

Bar Plaintiff's Claims.

Plaintiff seeks to excuse his long de-

lay in bringing this action by arguing that

he “exhausted all other reasonable alter-

natives prior to bringing his complaint to

this court." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4.

: Plaintiff's civil rights claim, if considered

: as a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, is

not subject to any requirement that state

judicial or administrative remedies be

exhausted before suit can be filed. ***

Plaintiff's motives for voluntarily waiting

beyond the limitations period are irrelevant.

38

Plaintiff next argues that because his

college transcript affects his present and

future opportunities, he should be permit-

ted to bring suit despite the applicable

statutes of limitation and the doctrine of

laches. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4. Ip. 31

According to the rationale advanced by the

plaintiff, an action could never be brought

too late if a college transcript were involv-

ed. Furthermore, since LSAC and LSAS are

plainly not responsible for the contents of

plaintiff's college transcript, this argument

is no impediment to dismissal of the complaint

against LSAC and LSAS.

Plaintiff cites four United States

Suvreme Court cases to show that his claims

should not %e time-barred. Plaintiff's

‘emoranium at 4-5. These authorities are all

inapposite. Plaintiff's citation of Tinker

v. Des inoines Independent Community School

District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), is inapposite

because the civil rights of minors are not

at issue here; plaintiff does not argue that

39

the statutes of limitation were tolled by

reason of plaintiff's infancy. Plaintiff

also cites Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390

(1923); Fierce v. Society of Sisters, 268

U.S. 510 (1925)3 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205 (1982), each of which involved

a constitutional challenge to a state stat-

ute regulating education. None of these

three cases has anything to do with limita-

tion of actions. Plaintiff cites all these

cases in support of his claim that "a school

» « must prepare a student to take on addit-

ional obligations when he graduates." Plain-

tiff's iiemorandum at 5. Later, plaintiff

argues that defendants LSAC and LSAS, among

others, breached this claimed duty. Id. at

7, 10-11. The remarks in Pierce v. Society

of Sisters to which plaintiff refers, Ip. 4I

however, do not deal with the duty of schools

to provide adequite preperation. Rather, they

stand for the proposition that parents have

the right to direct the upbringing of their

minor children. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,

4oO

supra, 406 U.S. at 232-33 (quoting Fierce

v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535

(1925)). The other cases cited by plaintiff

also do not suprort his argument. ***

III. Pleintiff's Civil Rights Claim Is

Without Werit.

Defendants LSAC and LSAS had anticipated

that the Court might be willing, under the

circumstances, to read plaintiff's complaint

as including a demand for relief based on

Fourteenth Amendment violations, even though

plaintiff's allesations are confined to Fifth

Amendment violations. Accordingly, defendants

argued that the Fourteenth Amendment is Ip.

5I inapplicable to LSAC and LSAS. Plaintiff,

believing that LSAC and LSAS have put words

in his mouth, states that he does not invoke

either the Fourteenth Amendment or, more

specifically, the Equal Frotection Clause.

Plaintiff's iiemorandum at 8-9. Plaintiff

then cites Bo»rd of Curators of the Univer-

sity of iissouri v. Horowitz 435 U.S. 78

(1978), a cise in which the plaintiff

41

brought suit for denial of due process of

law under 42 U.S.C. # 1983, a federal stat-

ute enacted pursuant to the authority of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever route

plaintiff wishes to take, the result is the

samet defendants LSAC and LSAS are not

sovernnental entities or state actors and

thus cannot be charged with depriving plain-

tiff of his constitutional rizhts. Plaintiff's

merrorandum is unresponsive on this point.

870105 Reply Iiemorandum by Flaintiff in

Response to Rerly Memorandum by Vefendants

LSAC and LSAS Dated: 12-10-86

IP. 8I ILetter in evidence from the

University of Colorado School of Law; dated

April 15, 1983. The text has been omitted.I

87040S lotion Requesting a New Trial or

Grant of Leave to Appeal to the Court of

Appeals

*#*# Prayer for Relief IFp. 2-31

9. The plaintiff requests that the

Lepartment of the Air Force stipulate the

degree to which it relied on family refer-

ences in the admissions process for the

United States Air Force Reserve Officer

42

Training Program. He also would like to

know the relative weights placed on other

factors contributing to the admission

decision,

10. The plaintiff also asks that the

School of Education in the University of

Colorado be required to state the degree

of reliance it placed on both formal,

written references and informal, word-of-

mouth references in its various decisions

relative to the plaintiff's participation

in the Student Teaching Program at the Uni-

versity both durtne the Spring of 1969 and

during the 1980-81 school year.

ll. The plaintiff further requests that

the individual members of the Admissions

Committee of the University of Colorado

School of Law during the 1982-83 admission

seasons be required to present themselves

for questioning before the court regarding

the degree to which each member relied on the

formal written record and informal word-of-

mouth references while considering the

43

plaintiff for »sdmission. ***

12. In light of the new evidence

presented with this motion, the plaintiff

requests that the court order a specific

list of steps to be taken to legally resolve

any dispute that may still linger regarding

the disposition of the estate of Mr. and

irs. Joseph Sawaya. At minimum, this legal

resolution must include a personal visit

by a representative of the court to Mr. Jess

Sawaya's residence to explain to him each

step in the probate of his father's will,

why there was no court recognition when his

mother died, the specific steps taken by his

Sister eas executrix of her father's estate,

and any other questions Mir. Sawaya may still

have. This conversation should be recorded

and mode a part of the court record. The

court's personal representative should ode

an expert on Colorado law regarding wills,

estates and trusts. ***

44

IP. 5Iii Letter from Robert John Arko

to Mr. and Mrs. Jess Sawaya, dated March

23, 198711

This letter is to reiterate in writing

the substance of our phone conversation

after 8 asm. on Saturday morning, March 21,

1987.

As I understand it you hold my mother,

Josephine Arko, personally responsible for

improper administration of your father's

estate, probated in the State of Colorado

shortly after his death in January 1945.

Should my mother die or otherwise be inca-

pacitated, you will then hold me personally

liable for the improper administration of the

estate of Joe Sawaya until a list of un-

specified questions assembled by you are

answered to your personal satisfaction.

Your questions relate to a group of

approximately 50 documents you sent to my

mother shortly after the death of Hazel

Sawaya, your mother, on April 19, 1980. The

questions accompznied the documents in a

45

packet sent by certified mail you claimed

on the phone.

You also indicated that your difference

of opinion with my mother has an unspecified

impact on my daily life. At the same time

you indicated that there is little or noth-

ing I can do or say at present that would

resolve this difference of opinion between

yourself end my mother. Once I take her place

due to her death or incapacity, however, we

will be able to meet in an open area,

secured for all parties personal protection,

so that I can respond to the same questions

you have for my mother.

Through this conversation you indicated

that over the years other versions of your

allesations expressed in this letter have

surfaced in Trinidad, Albuquerque, Denver,

and Phoenix, among other places. The alleg-

ation of forgery in the administration of

your father's estate, for example, is some

distance from the truth and was not made by

yous

46

I will be looking forward to a written

response to this letter from you to verify

its accuracy on or before April 13, 1987.

No response from you will indicate your

substantial egreement with all statements

made. I iam taking the liberty of sending a

copy of this letter to your brothers Fred

and George and your sisters Josephine and

Jane.

IP. 6IILetter from Mr. and Mrs. Jess

Sawaya to Robert John Arko, dated March 28,

198781

It was nice hearing from you. We here

in Albuquerque are all fine.

Bob, I too, share with your concern.

I've heard of stories like this, but I never

thought that they would ever enter our

family.

Bob, why don't you reverse your

Strategy, and put the cart behind the horse,

because unless and until your mother admits

her actions to you and me, her and I will

leave this world, taking its contents with us.

47

As far as what the people will and are

saying, it is their own perogative, because

I made the remark to Snider and Fozie Skeff

long ago, that "I was disappointed with the

way your mother probated the will", and

that's 311 I said.

Since then, the people have come up

with their own conclusions, and I think as

time continues to go forward, this matter

will no doubt get worse.

To this date, I fail to understand why

your mother continues to ignore this matter,

and above all, why she hasn't discussed it

with you and perhaps Nancy, because if she

is afraid that I will take action against

her, tell her that I've been compensated

many many fold by the good lord for this

heartbreak, and that I don't need it.

All I ever want from the Sawaya Estate

now is a true and honest explanation of how

and why they chose this way and method of

settling the estate.

48

Whether I should olame myself for not

persuins this moitter lons ago, can be con-

tributed to your Aunt tiary and to your cou-

sin Joseph, because I'm to chicken to embar-

rass the family as it now is.

Bob, I'm sure that if you go about this

in a different manner, that your questions

will be answered, because faith has its way

of zuiding ones life.

I hope that I have answered some or all

of your questions, and I will close with

Love **#* Uncle Jess and Aunt hiary ***

870417 Defendant's Response to Flaintiff's

Motion Requesting a New Trial or Grant of

Le2ve to Appeal to the Court of Apreals

##* TP, 3; Footnote iI Pursuant to Fed.

Re. Civ. F. 60(b)(2), newly discovered evi-

dence canbe a basis for relief from judg-

ment only if by due diligence it could not

have been discovered in time to move for a

new trial under Rule 59(b). Plaintiff's

"newly discovered evidence" is a March 28,

1987, response to a letter he sent on March

23, 1987. Due dilizence by plaintiff could

49

have resulted in the timely discovery of

his “newly discovered evidence",

Even assuming the evidence was newly

discovered, it is clearly irrelevant to

plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed. R.

Evid. 402.

870424 Motion Requesting Relief from Final

Judgment and Permission to Submit New

Evidence

IP. 4IlILetter from Mrs. Josephine

Arko to hir. Jess Sawaya, undatedsI

I've read the recent flow of letters

pertaining to the accusations against me

and I do feel that we have resched the

point of a show-down.

I don't believe I did anything against

you or anyone else for that matter, but the

only way to air the problem is to boring it

out in the open for all to view.

l want you to set up a meeting for us

together with Fred, george and Jane because

this situation, in’ my opinion, involves all

of us «nd not just Me.

Let me know when end where the meeting

50

is to be held and I'll arrange to be there.

HUN

IF. 5jJiLetter from Wir. Jess Sawaya to

Kirs. Josephine Arxo, dated April 18, 1987:I

I received your letter and was very

happy to see that you have decided to help

solve our matter with Dad's Will.

First of 311, Fred Sawaya knows nothing

about tis matter, and at this time, we will

have nothins to do with Fred Sawaya. As for

Jane or Georse, I doubt very much if they

are capable of n»ssisting you.

There's only one person that knows the

real truth, and that's Jess Sawaya.

1 will accept your challenge on the

following conditions only. -

1. That ,;ou answer all questions sub-

mitted to you in writing, and I in turn do

the same for you.

2. That erch party has the right to

submit all the questions they desire to

submit, for three (3) times, at three (3)

different occasions, and all questions

51

submitted must be answered within twenty

(20) days after receipt of same.

3. That each party will have the

right to secure any person or persons, to

assist in the answering of the questions,

and that all answers to all questions

answered be cide tierod final.

4, That all answers sent through the

mail, be sent via Certified Mail, to in-

Sure received by noth parties.

5+ That in the event that more time

is required to help solve this matter,

that it be mutually agreed to between both

parties.

If this clan meets with your approval,

we c2n end will start once I hear from you.

4%

IP. 6IILetter from Mrs. Josephine

Arko to fer. Jess Sawaya, dated April 23,

198711

O K Jess, send me a list of your

accusations and srievances and let me see

what I can do about answering them at this

late date.

Why you didn't face me with them forty

(40) years ago, I'll never know. ***

870512 Motion Requesting Permission to

Submit Additional New Evidence

IP. 2I1ILetter from Mr. Jess Sawaya to

lirs. Joesphine Arko, dated April 27, 1987:sI

Referring to your letter of the 23rd

last, I'm goinz to »e honest and say that

I don't and can't believe what-you wrote.

For a start, let's start with the

questions in my letter to you on May 10,

1980 which I am inclosing a copy of it.

I_ will appreciate your sending me «the

answers in the following manner.

Question Ilo. 1

Why Wasn't _I Included in the Probation

of the Will.

Answers

le a a a a

ee ee ee he he he he he ee ee ee ee ee 8 8

You indicated that you were doubtful

that you could answer these questions at

53

such a late date. 1 don't think you will,

yecnuse I can rememver all of the

happenings as though they were happening

rizht now.

I shall look forward to receiving your

answers as azreed to.

Thank you. ***

IPp. 3 and 4IILetter from Mr. Jess

Sawaya to lirs. Josephine Arko, dated May

10, 1980. It accom :nnied the preceeding

letter dated April 27, 1987:I

It was zood talking to you last night.

I was concerned as to why I hadn't heard

from you sooner. 1 was also very disappointed

as to the provress made. This matter just

can't be discussed over the phone.

Joserhine, I had better be versed on

the contents of the will, and I feel that

only you can do it.

I think that L should have your version

of the followin:, »ecause I feel that the

following questions will be «sked, and as

it is rizht now, I couldn't begin to have

54

anawerna for them,

L. Why wosen't L ineluded in the proba-

tion of the will.

2. Why wisn't Lt ever briefed on the

progress of the Joe Sawaya & son, and the

Joe Sawaya & Sons firms.

J. What consideration did I receive,

for my participition in the Joe Sawaya &

Son and the Joe Suwaya & Sons firms.

4. What vortion, if any, did I own of

the Joe Sawaya & Son, and the Joe Sawaya &

Sons firms.

5. What were or payment did I receive,

if any, for my contribution in these firms,

from the betinnine of their existance, un-

til the time that I left, in November 1945.

6. What contri®ution or consideration

was made by Fred J. Sawaya, to Joe sawaya &

vawaya & sons.

7. Accordinsz to the Will, it shows

)

)

: ’

son, when the title wis changed to Joe

that all of Joe sawaya's children, namedy,

Josephine, Jess, fred, Jane and George,

~ P,

were equal partners, in the Joe Sawaya &

Son and the voe Siwiaya & Sons Firms. lf so,

what contribution and consideration was

made oy Jane, ;:ceorge and Hazel, the

deceased wife, ind “red, when it was known

that the Joe Sawayi & Son and the Joe Sawaya

and Sons firms, were manazed and operated by

Joe Sawaya (Deceased), Jess J. and Josephine.

8. If, accordinz to the Will, it shows

that Jess J. Sawayva's portion of the estate

was $1,198.95 then what contribution or con-

cideration was tiven Jess J. and Josephine

for their work and interest in the Joe

Sawaya & Son and-the Joe Saway2 and sons

firms, from the time that they degan operat-

ing, until the death of Joe Sawaya (deceased.)

in Jonuary 1945, and until the departure of

Jess J. Saway: from the firm of Joe Sawaya

& Sons, in ixovember 1945.

9. Accordinz to the Will, it shows

that Jess J. Sawzyi had only $1,198.95 up to

the death of Joe Sawaya, in January 1945,

end uv to and including the time that the

56

will was rrobated in October, 1945, and

still one month lster, in November 1945,

just one (1) month later, when Jess J.

Sawaya left the firm of Joe Sawaya &

Sons, he was paid 430,000.00 for his shere

in the business. How, ‘\ihy and Where was

this figure arrived at.

10. Accordins to the will, it shows

that Jess J. Sawaya attended the hearing

of the probate of the Joe Sawaya estate.

Jess J. sawaya had no knowledge of the

he2ring, and if so, why wesn't the $1,198.95

due him, vaid to him.

11. How is it possible, when no notice

was tiven Jess J. S3w2ya of the hearing,

that he could have been present.

12. iho Sizned the name Jess Saw2ya

to the acknowled sement of the hearing,

when Jess J. Saway2 wasn't present, and if

he was, why didn't the court acknowledge

the "letal" title of Jess J. Scwaya and

instead of just Jess Sawya, as it shows.

13. Who sitned or acknowledged receipt

57

of this money ($1,198.95). Whose posses-

Sion is this hloney in now.

14. Who forged the name “Jess Sawaya" |

as the person who received the $1,198.95

when it should have been Jess J. Sawaya,

the "legal" title.

15. Who, where and how, was the Inven-

tory of the Assets of the Joe Sawaya & Son,

& the Joe Sawaya & Sons Firms arrived at as

shown on the Will.

16. If the inventory is a certified

accounting of the Assets of Joe Sawaya & Son

and the Joe Sawaya & Sons firms, then why

w2sn't such assets as (Semi-Trailers, Swift

Building, Frost Street Building, Animas

Street Home,” and the West Nain Street prop-

erties included in the inventory, including

Accounts Receivable, etc.

Joserhine, I could go on and on, and

inasnuch as you and you alone is the only

rerson who can answer these questions, I

B This is 415 Animas Street; VJrinidad,

Colorado; not 4O4 Animas Street, the current

residence of the aprellant.

58

firmly believe that everyone, that everyone,

includinz Fred J. Sawaya, shouldn't inter-

fere, beciuse if Fred is so well briefed in

this matter, then why wasn't I.

Josephine, I don't intend fighting with

any of you, and above all, I don't intend

employing an attorney as Fred suggested,

because if I tel) the story as it really is,

then the whole burden is going to fall on

vou.

Azain, I say that we should get

totether, and see what’s on each of our

minds, because if we don't, tnen one of us

is solnz to eat each others words, and

avove all I don't intend fizhting with any-

one to arrive at this understanding.

Josephine, aren't you concerned that

if the IRS miltinlies the 5 partners by

the. zmount given me, as the Will shows,

that the estate of Joe Sawaya, is going to

mushrvom wel: over the 300 to $500 thous-

ana ficure.

Josephine, this is a serious problem,

7

so may I hear from you at your earliest

convenience. ***

870527 United States Court of Appeals for

the Tenth Circuit: Pro Se Docketing

Statement

IP. 2I On September 2, 1986 the appel-

lant filed his original complaint with the

U.S. District Court for the District of

Colorado requesting due process of law

under Amendment Five of the Constitution

of the United States. Due process was

requested concerning three civil experien-

ces the appellant had as a student at the

University of Colorado and as an applicant

in the law school admission process. A num-

ver of motions and briefs were filed by the

plaintiff as well as by cne Or more of the

defendants. Oral argument was not heard and

no trial was held. Judgment was issued by

the Honorable Sherman G. Finesilver, Chief

Judge for the United States District Court

for the District of Colorado on February 27,

1987. The court found that federal and state

statutes of limitations and doctrines of

60.

laches bar the plaintiff-appellant's claims

against each of the responding defendants.

On or about February 10, 1987 it came

to the attention of the plaintiff that he

has been, is, and will continue to be asso-

ciated with certain secret or, quasi-

secret, agreements either directly or in-

directly associated with the estate of Mr.

and Mrs. Joseph Sawayasy the plaintiff-

appellant's grandparents. Information re-

lated to this Ip. 31 legal problem contin-

ues to come to light at this writing. As

it began to appear that the plaintiff's

experiences as a student and law school

applicant may be related to long-standing

rancor over disposition of his grandparent's

estates the appellant sought relief from

judgment or grant of leave to appeal. Un

May 11, 1987 the plaintiff's motion for

relief from final judgment was denied; but

his request for grant of leave to appeal

to this court was granted.

The appellant requests that the court

61

of appeals relax the strict application of

the applicable statutes of limitations and

doctrines of l»ches to permit the relief

requested in the court below to be granted

in the court of anpeals. The court of

appenrls should take into consideration a

numoer of factors not given appropriate

weight by the district court, First, the

appellant lacks experience at bringing his

claims to court. In this case the inexper-

ience of the appellant is a major factor.

His numerous applications for admission to

a school of law were unanimously rejected.

Consequently, he could not learn the rules

rezarding statutes of limitations and

doctrines of lachés using the normal path

for this education. On other matters he has

been denied lezal counsel in writing oy at

least two attornies. The fact that the

statutes referred to by the defendants are

not generally available at or near the

residence of the anpell2nt should also be

considered. Any one or two of these

62

factors taken alone are insufficient defense

against the pleas made by the appellees in

the district court. Taken together, however,

they effectively violate the right of the

appellant to counsel under Amendment Six ***,

The court of appeals should also re-

view the evidence submitted since the

district court's judgment dated February 27,

1987. One allegation in that evidence is the

claim that the appellant may be indirectly

associated with the crime of forgery. The

accusation is repugnant. Should the judgment

of the inferior court stand, *** ItIhe plead-

ings of the defendants and the judgments of

the district court would amount to a bill of

attainder. The Congress of the United States

is strictly forbidden from passing such bills

by Article One, Section Nine, Paragraph 3 of

the Constitution ***, Article Une, Section

Ten, Parazraph One prohibits the states from

doing the same.

Finally, there is no article or amend-

ment in the Constitution that limits its

63

provisions to a specified period of time.

While the congress and the various state

legislatures have the right to make all

laws required for the operation of our soc-

iety, they can not use those laws to limit

the rights of people that are expressly

stated in the document. It is the belief

of the appellant that the Constitution is

a contract between the individual and the

society as a whole that is signed at birth”

and valid for the life of the citizen.

Express rights, like due process, can not

be limited by statute. IP. 4I ***

Does an individual have a First Amend-

ment right to speak by wearing a particular

military uniform? Does the ISecondI Amend-

ment permit the individual to choose the

type of arms he will bare? Does the Fifth

Amendment insure the right to due process

of law in civil matters? Apart from the

length of one's hair, is there any right

C After giving this issue much thought,

the word "birth" should be changed to "con-

ception".

64

retained oy the people under the Ninth

Amendment’ In spite of the Fourteenth Am-

endment, can due process of law ve avoided

in state institutions because it would be

unpleas2nt or inconvenient to do otherwise?

$ 4 3%

870726 Brief of the Appellant

IP. 9I *** Then, on Sunday afternoon,

Lecember 20, 1981, according to the appel-

lant's notes, that impression began to

chanze. The event is only meaningful now.

It went unnoticed at the time. Because

there was nothin: better to do the appellant

picked up a »ook that had been around for

many years. ‘Ihe case of Paul Crump was

dravatic. It was read in one sitting. The

remainder of this douk was interesting,

out not on a per with the first chapter.

The Jury Returns by Louis Nizer is still a

bur under the arvellant's saddle. (Garden

City, New York: DLouoleday & Company, Inc.}3

1966.) *** IP. 111

The treory of our law and government,

65

as well as the facts in this case, speak

against the court's opinion. Uiven the

facts in thiscase the appellant could have

made either a tort claim or a claim that

his constitutional rights had been violated.

He chose the latter course. In a tort claim

the plaintiff has been either physically or

mentally injured and seeks monetary damages

in compensation for the wrong that has been

done. The plaintiff making a constitutional

claim charses that the Constitution has

been abused and seeks to alter the law to

ameliorate the abuse. Ionetary awards are

not at issue.

The appellent accepts the district

court's definition of what the law is in

this case. What is at issue here is what

the law ought to »%e. The court's Order, ***

States:

«ss AS there is no federal statute of

limitations for claims brought under 42

U.S.C. #1983, the Colorado statute of

limitations for actions under federal

Statutes apolieS. ee.

A review of 42 U.S.C. # 1983 leads to the

66

conclusion that Colorado statute cannot be

applied in this case because it would vio-

late the intent of the framers of 42 U.S.C.

#1983. It reads:

Civil action for deprivation of rights.

Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to

the ceprivation of any rights, privileges

or imunities secured by the Constitution

and lews, chill be liable to the person

injured in an action of law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress. IP. 12I

Study of this quotction leads to the con-

clusion that state statutes of limitations

cannot be used to deprive an individual

citizen like the appellant of his right to

due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-

ment of the Constitution .... Given the

court's opinion, this conclusion must be

in error.

Jiven the court's opinion, the appel-

lant's conclusion after reading 28 U.S.C.

Section 1652 must also be in error.

67

The laws of the several states, except

where the Constitution or treaties of

the United States or Acts of Congress

otherwise require or provide, shall be

regarded as rules of decision in civil

actions in the Courts of the United

States, in cases where they zpply.

It is tne apvellant's belief that the

Constitution takes precedence over the

Acts of Congress. The Judiciary Act of

1789 gives the federal courts the author-

ity to use the state law that applies with-

in the jurisdiction of the court. The dist-

rict court exercised that right in this

case. This is the law. But, the law ought

to be that rights guaranteed by the Con-

stitution take precedence over Acts of

Congress and the laws of the several states.

This does not mean that the appellant

claims that 28 U.S.C. Section 1652 is un-

constitutional. lt is the argument of the

appeliant that when an individual citizen

speaking pro se makes a claim for one or

more rizhts guaranteed by the Constitution

iri a case where state actors are prominent

defendants, it should be within the

68

discretionary powers of a district judge

to waive technical points of the law,

like statutes of limitations, to allow

airing of the real argument and granting

of appropriate relief. It should be kept

in mind that the framers of the Constitu-

tion were primarily interested in develop-

ing an effective government. That this

document did not Ip. 131 meet every con-

c@ivable rule of logic was unimportant to

them. It did matter, however, that govern-

ment worke

This unique relationship between the

individual citizen and the national gov-

ernment was discussed at some length in

the plaintiff's lemorandum Supporting A

Motion Requesting Certification of Juris-

diction, Document 6, dated Lecember 5,

1986, at pp. 6-9. The appellant adds here

that the law as it is should remain in

place, but it should also include assur-

ances that the individual citizen will

receive a minimal amount of assistance

69

in federal court in situations in which he

is clearly the werker party. It may not be

clear that the appellant is the weaker

party in this case. A hyrothetical case

using an extreme example may illustrate

the point. B is a woman in her early teens

who has recently conceived A. B decides to

set rid of A. A would have few, if any,

defenders in this case. It is the appél-

lants argument that the district judge

Should be A's advocate. At A's oirth the

court should pay B for her services, wish

her well in the future, and then pay A's

food, clothings, Ishelter, and educationl

costs trrough age 22. A might be expected

to return some or all of these costs after

age 22.

There are many A'S in our society. The

poor, the homeless, those who are ill, are

all A's. Each one should be taken under

the protection of 2 court until he or she

has vecome a vroductive, contributing mem-

ber of our society. In this case the

70

appellant is an A asking for due process

rather than food, clothing, shelter, and

education.

Before leaving the topic of 42 U.S.C.

#1983 (first introduced in this case by the

attornies for the defendants!) the appellant

Ip. 14I would like to add reference to a

number of cases in which this section of

the United States Code is referred to.

These cases ares

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 237, 98 S.Ct.

1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)3

Smith ve. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 5.Ct. 1652,

75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)3

Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.

207s 108 Saets 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981);3

Bivins v. Six Unknown -Agents, 403 U.S. 388

91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 Lelid.2d 619 (1971)3

Davis v. Passman, 439 U.S. 1113, 99 S.Ct.

1014, 59 L.Ed.2d 71 (1979)3 and

Carlson v. sreen, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct.

1468, 64% L.Ed.2d 15. (1980).

The appellant expresses no opinion on these

items. The sources available to the court

of appeals, as well as to the attornies for

the appellees, should give the full text of

71

each casee *** IP, 151

To this point the argument assumes

that the district judge exercised all the

powers that he had, but given the rules

he was unable to grant the plaintiff a

trial of the case. It is assumed, for

example, that pursuant to Rule 6 (b) of

the Rules of Civil Procedure for the

United States District Courts the honor-

able Sherman Finesilver could not enlarge

the various statutes of limitations men-

tioned in his Order, dated February 27,

1987, document numbered: 8, to permit

trial of the real issues in this case,

Given this assumption, the judge was

orerating at 100% efficiency.

For the sake of argument assume that

the judze has more nowers and greater auth-

ority than he in fact exercised. Assume

that he was operating at significantly less

than 100% efficiency. His sub-conscious

judgment may have been swayed without his

conscious awareness. In the popular medias

————

72

of T. V. and motion pictures there is a

prevailing bias against active participants

in the Viet Nam conflict. The judge's con-

scious judgment may have been swayed by

this Sub-conscious bias. He may not even

be aware that it exists.

The "V.C. Whore" episode of Miami Vice,

and the movies Platoon and Lethal Weapon

are indicative of this bigotry. In the

"V.C. Whore”" episode of Miami Vice, the

"men" from liiami team up Ip. 161 with a

former colonel in the North Viet Namese

regular army, (now a high ranking officer

in the secret police of the "Republic" of

Viet Nam), to catch or kill a group of

Viet Nam veterans who travel the world assas-

Sinating world leaders and prostitutes!!!

The movie Platoon is devoid of a scene in

which no one is killed. lt climaxes when

one American soldier kills another in cold

blood!!! Lethal Weapon is about a group of

sex perverted, drug adicted, high ranking

Viet Nam veterans who operate a multi-

73

national drug ring to service greater Los

Angeles, California. Even the 'Zood guys"

are veterans, one of whom claims the dis-

tinction of having killed a man at the

age of 21 with a rifle at 1,000 yards.

Few men could do this, even with the best

modern equipment!!! These productions are

indicative of a pervasive sub-conscious

cultural milieu of bigotry that few groups

based on race, religion, or gender would

tolerate without protest.

*#* Equal protection of the laws may

not be possiole in such a milieu.

lire Justice Frankfurter, speaking for

the Supreme Court of the United States in

Beauharnais v. lllinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72

S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952) extended the

protections afforded the individual under

our libel laws to cover identifiable

groups as well. The justice states that

e+e a man's job and his educational

opportunities and the dignity accorded him

may depend as uch on the reputation of

the racial and religious group to which he

willynilly belongs, as on his own merits.

74

Since the original complaint, the appellant

has claimed that his own merits may be

clouded by association with Viet Nam vet-

erans in general. iwiembers of law school

admission committees may be totally un-

aware of their negative responses to Viet

Nam veterans. Federal judges may respond

the same way. In either case their emotional

responses may have been formed by fictional

representations which have no basis in fact.

In either case their one on one associations

with actual veterans are probably limited.

Few veterans have gone to law school and

even fewer have become federal judges. Those

with whom they would most likely come in

contact are defendants in criminal proceed-

ings. These would be the least desirable

representatives of the Viet Nam veteran

group.

The court should clearly understand

this section of the argument. lWisunder-

standing is so easy. Law school admission

committee members do not actively reject

75

Viet Nam veterans because they are veterans

and federal judzes do not disfavor them be-

cause the judzes are onerating an active.

conspiracy. The vruo»lem is that these people

have deen conditioned to associate a long

list of undesirable qualities with veterans

aS a group which have no basis in fact. A

Significant part of the provlem is that

there is no physical contact between the

elements in the equation. Through all the

law school application processes the appel-

lant has experienced he has spoken to one

anonymous live huaman being on the telephone.

Ip. 181 More than a year has elapsed since

the first version of tne original complaint

was submitted to the district court. In

that veriod the appellant has spoken to one

live female Washington attorney who called

to Find out who the appellant's attorney

was. She Laughed on the indication that he

would be speaking pro Se.

The apv:ellant is well aware of the

fact that a number of decades ago the

76

academic admission process was abused

when personal contact was allowed to

influence admission decisions. The same

was also true in the administration of

justice. The present arrangement is equally

abusive. It is the appellant's argument

that the current arrangement strips Viet

Nam veterans of their right to use the

First Amendment as either sword or shield.

Without protection against libel, they may

not advocate their own cause. ***

IP. 22IILetter from Betsy Levin, Deans

University of Colorado, Boulders School of

Laws to Robert John Arko; dated April 15,

1983. The text has been omitted.I

IP. 231ILetter from Lewis and Clark

College; Northwestern School of Law; to

Robert John Arko; dated: January 20, 1984.

The text has been omitted.1***

870727 Brief for Defendants-Appellees Law

School Admission Council and Law School

Admission Services, Inc.

IThe following excerpt is from the title

pageril

Robert John Arko,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-against-

The United States Air Force Reserve

Officer Training Program; The School

of Education, University of Colorado;

The School of Law, University of Colo-

rados The Law School Admission Council;

and The Law School Admission Services,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

The American Bar Association, and The

Association of American Law Schools,

Defendants. ***

IP. 10I In their motion to dismiss,

LSAC and LSAS argued that plaintiff's

antitrust claim should have been dismissed

as a matter of law because plaintiff had

suffered no injury to those interests pro-

tected by the antitrust laws. Memorandum in

Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed Novem-

ber 3, 1986, at 8. LSAC and LSAS continue

to press that argument. Plaintiff is not

entitled to sue for damages under the fed-

eral antitrust laws because his “business

or property" were not injured when he was

78

denied admission to law school. *** Plain-

tiff was not necessarily entitled to be

admitted to Law school, and thus no cog-

nizable property interest was harmed by

the rejection of his application. *** Nor

does the complaint allege that there is a

threat of future harm to any interest that

may be protected oy a Ip. 111 private suit

for equitable relief under Clayton Act

section 16, 15 U.S.C. section 26. ***

In response, plaintiff made no attempt

below to establish that he was entitled to

maintain an antitrust claim. On the con-

trary, plaintiff revealed how baseless the

antitrust claim is by acknowledging that

he had raised the issue "only in passing."

Plaintiff's Upposing Memorandum, filed

November 18,1986, at 11-12. None of the

documents that vlaintiff has submitted to

the district court and to this Court has

the slightest bearing on whether LSAC and

LSAS injured plaintiff in violation of the

antitrust laws. The letters attached to

79

plaintiff's second brief indicate only

that plaintiff's applications were denied

by two law schools. Plaintiff's constant

refrain is that he was denied due process.

Since plaintiff's antitrust claim cannot

be maintained as a matter of law, plain-

tiff's due process claims should be measured

only by the applicable two-year statute of

limitations. *** IP, i121 |

It is simply not the case that civil

rights claims may never be time-barred.

Congress clearly intended federal courts

to look to state statutes of limitations to

determine the timeliness of claims under

42 U.S.C. section 1983, and the Supreme

Court has approved this "borrowing" of state

statutes to fill in gaps in the federal law.

**# Plaintiff is asking for an unprecedented

extension of due process when he asks this

Court for a personal exemption from the

statutes of Limitations.

80

B. No Bill of Attainder Is Involved

in This Case.

Plaintiff's argument that the proceed-

ints below are equivalent to a bill of at-

trinder is meritless.

A bill of attainder is a legislative

act which inflicts punishment without a

judicial trial.

*** The bills of attainder clause of

article I, section 9 of the Constitution

serves as a check on congressional power

to single out the persons who will be bur-

dened by federal statutes. *** Article I,

section 10 of the Constitution imposes Ip.

13I a similar prohibdition on state govern-

ments. No such legislative act was at issue

in the district court, and claintiff should

not ve permitted to raise this absurd con-

tention for the first time on appeal. In-

deed the history of the proceedings reflect-

ed in the record below reveals that the

district court gave plaintiff every oppor-

tunity to submit papers and so-called “newly

discovered evidence” to the judge.

81

Without doubt, plaintiff's claims were

heard and decided in full accordance with

the due process of law. ***

870806 Reply Brief of the Appellant

IP. 11 *** With regard to the appel-

lees‘ section titled: Plaintiff's New

Evidences Ibid. at p. 73 it is not possible

to know if the appellant's reputation has

been abused by the family fude in quest-

ion, by the fact that he is associated with

other Viet Nam veterans, by the fact that

he has a low grade-point average and low

Law School Admission Test Scores, or by his

association with some other unknown charac-

teristic. Only due process can clearify

this issue. If thé appellant knew, for

example, that his association with the

family fude in question was the reason for

his rejection by these educational programs,

he would have no need for due process. A

claim for other relief would be more approp-

riate. Ip. 2I ***

It is mandatory, however, that other

82

individuals who are in similar situations

have a forum for due process of law. Sim-

ilar complaints would be more difficult

to make if all participants entering the

schoolhouse door were governed by a writ-

ten constitution applicable to the institu-

tion in which they are enrolled as students,

where they work as teachers, or where they

supervise as administrators. A written con-

stitution with appropriate checks and bal-

ances should govern relations among students,

faculty and administration from pre-school

through post-graduate education. While a

general constitution should apply to each

level of education, each school should have

the authority to amend the rules to account

Ip. 31 for local needs. ***

In law schovl admissions the present

system should be maintained in tact, with a

few exceptions. Each applicant should be

allowed to take the Law School Admission

Test only once in each of three calendar

years. After making unsuccessful applications

83

to at least ten schools during the three

years the applicant should be permitted to

take an alternate route. The minimum requ-

irements for this alternate admissions pro-

gram might include two years of military

service, two years of work experience with

more than one employer, and a M.A. degree.

The alternate approach would culminate in

a court proceeding in which the unsuccess-

ful applicant must speak pro se. Opposing

counsel would be third year law students

enrolled in a course organized to encour-

age law students to become prosecutors.

Retired federal judges would oversee these

proceedings held in law school moot court

rooms during term breaks. Federal rules of

civil procedure, including Ip. 4I normal

rights of appeal, would govern proceedings.

Precedent would be governed by prior years'

proceedings. The federal government and the

various legal education systems would share

the cost of administering this plan with

the applicant paying a nominal fee.

84

At the same time, law schools should

be encouraged to provide alternative

approaches in legal education. Of the law

school programs that the appellant has re-

viewed he is able to say that they are re-

markably similar. Admission procedures,

course offerings, and the professional

background of the professors is uniform.”

The best these organizations can say is

that they accept applicants who will be

successful in their programs. They should

be required to say that their programs have

helped train the most just members of our

society.

The appellant brought his original

complaint to court to encourage the appel-

lees to improve their programs. To be re-

jected as often as the appellant has would

be tragic if no good comes from these ex-

periences. Une officer, one teacher, or

D This was written before the District

of Colum»ia School of Law, formerly the

Antioch School of Law, came to the attention

of the appellant.

}

85

one lawyer - more or less - is insignificant.

In a democracy it is required that each in-

dividual work to improve the system when

it is within his capabilities to do so.

Within the context of this case tolling

the various statutes of limitations would

contribute toward improving the educational

system in gereral, and legal education in

particular.

The appellees‘ argument at pp. 10-11,

Ibid., misses the point. The plaintiff-

appellant is not suing for damages. He is

not claiming that he was injured when he

was denied admission to law school. He

also does not claim that his business or

property were injured Ip. 5I when he was

denied admission to law school. What he

does claim is that the appellees have devel-

oped a legal education system that routinly

stretches the meaning of the term “due

process" to the breaking point. They have

done this by developing a system that is

vertically integrated from the point of law

86

school admission testing through post-

graduate certification and job placement.

The appellees can pnoint to no effective

competing organization. The system is so

non-competitive that no one is aware of it.

It may be true that a modern day

Supreme court has 2pproved a “borrowing"

of state statutes to fill in the gaps in

federal law. But, was that the intent of

the founding fathers? In the Articles of

Confederation they had a constitution that

was based on the notion that the source of

the national authority was the collective

will of the various state governments. The

system self-destructed. Seventy-five years

later the southern states took the same

approach in forming the Confederate States

of America. It did not survive childhood.

The :ppellees now suggest that what could

not be achieved with revolution or civil

war can be codified into law through

inconspicuous judicial review. The appellant

objects!

87

The appellant may have made comments

in his orief dated June 1, 1987 that stretch

the meaning of the applicable phrases of the

Constitution beyond acceptable limits.

Nothing in the brief of the appellees, how-

ever, leads the appellant to retract one

word regarding bills of attainder. Without

due process no one could learn whether a

legislative act played a part in the various

decisions at issue in this case, or whether

other non-legislative factors controlled

these decisions; ***,. IP. 6I The appellant

continues to believe that eacn of the appel-

lees had very good reasons for making each

decision in question. But, the appellant

has no documentary proof that this was the

case. Consequently, oills of attainder

remain real possibilities in this case. ***

IP. 8I

Conclusion

The following quotation is taken from

the appellees’ brief dated July 27, 1987:

at De lls

88

«ee None of the documents that plaintiff

has submitted to the district court and

to this Court has the slightest bearing

on whether LSAC and LSAS injured plaintiff

in violation of the antitrust laws. The

letters attached to plaintiff's second

brief indicate only that plaintiff's

applications were denied by two law

Schools. eee

The following letters are submitted to this

Court as evidence in direct rebuttal to this

argument. The Court must conclude that the

appellant does have an antitrust claim that

has been timely filed against the American

Bar Association, the Association of Amer-

ican Law Schools, the Law School Admission

Council, and Law School Admission Services,

Inc. The Court must also conclude that the

appellant's experiences in the Air Force

ROTC Frogram and the Student Teaching Pro-

gram sponsored by the University of Colo-

rado School of Education had a direct, neg-

ative impact on his various applications to

the University of Colorado School of Law,

as well as his applications to other law

schvols. ***

89

ILetters from 13 law schools are pre-

sented on pases 9 through 21 of this brief.

Each letter is addressed to Robert John

Arko. The paragraphs that follow give the

name and location of the school submitting

the letter, and its effective date. The

page in this brief concludes each entry.

The text of each letter has been omitted.

The University of New Mexico School of

Law; Albuquerque, New Mexico; February 15,

19823 pe 9.

Collese of Laws; The University of

Wyoming; Laramie, Wyoming; March 5, 19823

p.- 10.

Brigham Young University; J. Reuben

Clark Law Schools Frovo, Utah; March 30,

1982; p. il.

The University of Kansas School of

Law; Lawrence, Kansas; April 5, 19823 p. 12.

solden Gate University School of Laws

San Francisco, California; April 12, 1982;

pe 13-

The University of Arizona College of

aa a i

90

Law; Tucson, Arizona; April 19, 1982; p. 14.

Arizona State University College of

Law; Lfempe, Arizonas April 20, 19823 pe 15.

University of Denver College of Laws

Denver, Colorado; April 20, 1982; p. 16.

New York Law School; New York, New

York; Arril 26, 1982; p. 17.

The University of Utah College of Laws

Selt Lake City, Utah; Arril 30, 19823 p. 18.

Loyola Law School; Los Anseles, Cali-

fornias May 5, 1982; p. 19.

Creighton University School of Law;

Umaha, Nebraska; hiay 7, 19823; p. 20.

University of Pittsburgh School of

Law; Pittsburgh, Fennsylvanias May 14, 1982;

pe 21.1

17870917 The Constitution of the United

States of America

Article Une, Section Eight

The Congress shall have Power eee TO

retulate Commerce ... among the several

Btates, «ss TO oss fix the Standard of

Weights and Measures; ..e And To make all

POTTER mmr

———————

91

Laws which shall be necessary and proper

for carrying into Execution the foregoing

Powers, and all other Powers vested by

this Constitution in the Government of the

United States, or in any Department or

Officer thereof.

Article Une, Section Nine

eee No 3111 of Attainder ... shall be

Ppasseds eee

Article Une, Section ‘Ten

No State shall ... pass any Bill of

Attainder, «es. -«

Article Three, Section One

The judicial Power of the United

States, shzll be vested in one supreme

Court, and in such inferior Courts as the

Conzress may from time to time ordain and

establish. The Judes, both of the supreme

and inferior Courts, shall hold their

Offices during good Behavior, ee. .

Article Three, Section Two

The judicial Power shall extend to all

Cases, in Law 2nd Equity, arising under this

PN I me OP BER

eee.

92

Constitution, the Laws of the United

States, and Treaties made, or which shall

be made, under their Authoritys ee. -to

Controversies to which the United States

shall be a Party; IandI ...-between Citizens

of different States ... .

ee» In all other Cases before men-

tioned, the supreme Court shall have

appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and

Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such

Rezulations as the Congress shall make. eee

Amendment One

Congress shall make no law ... abridg-

ing the freedom of speech, ... or the right

eee to petition the Government for a redress

of grievances.

Amendment Two

A well regulated Militia, being neces-

sary to the security of a free State, the

right of the people to keep and bear Arms,

shall not be infringed.

Amendment Five

No person shall be held to answer for

a

ee

93

a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,

unless on 3 presentment or indictment of

a Grand Jury, e+. nor shall be compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process

Of laws «ee »

Amendment Nine

The enumeration in the Constitution,

of certain rights, shall not be construed

to deny or disparage others retained by

the people.

Amendment Fourteen, Section One

All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of thie

United States and of the State wherein

they reside. No State shall make or enforce

any law which sh3ll abridge the »vrivileges

or immunities of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, with-

out due process of law; nor deny to any

[ee sag eee

94

person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws. ***

Table of Authorities eeeeeeesr Page Number

Cases

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250. 72

Se Ct. 725 96 Le Ed. 919 (1952) eeeeee 73

Bivins v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S.

388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed. 2d 619

(1971) *eeeenseenereenwneeneeeeee@eneeeeenseeneneeese 70

Board of Curators of the University of

Missouri v. Horowitz, 98 S.Cy. 948

(1978) @eeveeveeeeneeeeeeeenene 28-30, 40-41

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.

483, 73 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, (1954)

eeeeveevaeevpeeeveeeeeeeevpeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeae 25

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 237, 98 S.Ct.

1042, 55 LeEd.2d 252 (1987) eessseeee 70

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct.

1560s. 108 emeene £5 (1980) cecccassce 70

Davis v. Fassman, 439 U.S. 1113, 99 S.Ct.

1015, 59 Lice 20 71 (1979) ccccceccce 70

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of

——_ S| - e-em eer er

Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (1961) eseee 27

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88

S.Ct. 1444, 20 u.Ed.2d 1412, rehearing

denied 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270, 20

Letd.2d 1412, (1968) eeeeeevveeeese 27-28

Goss v. Lepez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct.

729, 42 beEd.2d 725, (1975) ececccccee 27

International Telephone & Telegraph Co.

v. seneral Telephone & Electronics

95

Table of Authorities .«....+e++ Page Number

Corp.e, 518 F.7d 913, 929 (9th Cir.

1975) . . 7 eo*eeeevreveoevoeeeeeveeeeveeeeee es 13

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43

BSeCte O25, Of LbeBAe 1042, (1923) ceocce

eeeevevpeve eevee eeeeseeseeeeeeenes 29-30, 39

Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.

247, 101 SeCt. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616

(1981) *oeeweeeeneeneneeaeensnene#eeeeeeeseeeeeeeeneest 70

Pierce v. society of the Sisters of the

lioly Name of Jesus and Mary and Fierce

v. Hill hiilitary Academy, 268 U.S. 510,

45 S.Ct. 571, 69 LeEd. 1070, (1925) eco

eeeveevoeaeeevreeeeeeeeeeen eee 29-30, 39-40

Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873)

@eeeeveeveeoeeveeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeene 25

Smith v. Wade, H61 Usd- 30, 130 SeCte

1625, 75 LeEd.2d 632 (1983) weveevee 70

Tinker v. Des Bioines Independent

Community school District, 393 U.S.

503, R9 UeCt. 7335 21 Le kd. 2d 731,

(1969) eeeeveeeeeeeveeeeeeeeeaeaeses 24, 38

Wisconsin v. soder, 406 U.S. 205, 92

9eCt. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, (1972) cooce

eveveeveeveeeeeveeeeeevreeeeeeesd 29-30, 39-40

Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F. 2d 1471, 1476,

~—6((10th Crrs 1987) oon eeeseeeeseseeeeere 2

Constitutional Provisions

Generally »« 33, 35, 63, 64-65, 67-68, 82

Article One, Section Eight «escseee 90-91

Article Une, sect ton Nine eevoeeseeeeveseses

eereveveeeereeereeeeeseeseves 62, 80, 87, 91

96

Article Une, Section Ten. 62, 80, 87, 91

Article Three, Section Une esecesosees Ji

Article Three, Section Two eeecsee 91-92

Amendment One o.ereeee 23-24, 63, 76, 92

AmemAmORe THO ciccccianciccecssees O3e 92

Amendment Five esesecccceccccscveesseves

aavees Ma the 12, 19, 20,°390, 334 90:

63, 66, 70, 79, 81, 82, 85, 87, 92 = 93

Amendment Six ccccccsccccccccccesccse O2

Amendment Nine ...... cvscscoese G29O8, 93

Amendment Fourteen esscecoserseseoee 4, 12,

19-20, 25-26, 31, 4O, 41, 64, 73 93-94

Statutes

United States Code

Title 15, Section 15 ceecvesee 12-13, 21

Title 15, Section 26 eccesccscee 225 7S

Titie 26, Bection 1652 i..ccsccee 66-67

Title 28, Section 2401 ceeccccceseeee Al

Title 42, Section 1983 eeooeseoseeeeneeerees

oeee 12, 20, 23, 37, 41, 65-66, 70, 79

Title 42, section 1985 eeeccseesecce 20

Colorado Revised Statutes

13-1-124 @eeeosvsevvreeeeveevoeeeeeeeoeeeveee & 18

13-80-102 @eeeveeveeoeveeveeeeaevpeeeeeeeeeee® 12

Le ee

97

Table of Authorities ....... Page Number

Court Rules

Federa

1 ivil Procedure for the

United 5

i

trict Courts

of L

Dis

DONE Bh bshewsssconccsocsecceecer 83

Rule © cccccsccstvssccscevccccscccsce 18

DUIUMMREWER SS See eezdoctecccscecse 71

Rule 8 cecccecsccrscccscscseccccsevsesece 2

Rule 12 ee >t 23, 30, 31

DR ED SESUGeRaesecebeccecsse 15, 17, 48

MRO OO Bavskecsce 1, 5, 15, 16, 17, 48

Federal Rules of Evidence for the United

States Vourts and Magistrates

Rule 4O2 seeesevoe@eveeeseeeeevpeeweeeeeeeseee ®@ 4g

Federal kKules of Apvellate Frocedure

Rule 34 @®eeevevoveeveeeeeeepeeeeeeeeeevnen ee 1

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure -

“United States Court of Apveals for the

lenth Circuit - Local Rules of Practice

Rule 34 e®eeteeoeeveeeseeeeoseeesvseseeeeeeeeeae 1

Congressional Acts

Clayton Act eene ie 10, 12-13, 21-22, 78

Judiciary Act of 1789 eseeseeeeeseeees 67

»hermane eeereeeseeesenes 7° 10, 13, 21

98

Table of Authorities eveovece Page Number

Bouks

The Holy Bible: Containing the Old and

New Testaments in Confraternity and

Douay _‘lexts. (llew York: Abradale Press,

Publishers; 1965.) eeseeeneseseseeee 24

Hutchins, Robert Maynard; ed. Great

Books of the Western Workds Volume 43

American State Papers, The Federalist,

J. S. Mill. (Chicago, Illinois: William

Benton, Fubdlisher-Encyclopaedia ¥ritan-

nica, Inc.; 1952.) (Hereinafter cited

as Hutchins, Urezt Books.) The Federal-

ist, PPe 21-259 eeeoeevee eoeoeeseanesd 34-36

Nizer, Louis, the Jury Returns. (Garden

City, llew York: Doubleday and Company,

Ince} 1966. ) evesceoeoseseeneeeeneeeeeeeee

Documents

Articles of Confederation. Hutchins,

Great Books. (Up. cit.3; pp. 5-9.) «+ 86

Law Schools

Sere Bere. GO. LAW ccaccdaccosrsceae OF

Arizona State University College of Law

eeeoveveveeveoeeeeeveeseoeeevseeeoeeeereeeeeves 90

Brisham Young University; J. Reuben

Clark Law school @cevesveeeeveeeeeeeee@ 89

College of Law, The University of

Wyoming Core eerr ese sesereeeeeeeesese 89

Creighton University School of Law .. 90

District of Columoia School of Law .. 84

Golden Gate University School of Law. 89

ee

99

Table of Authorities .«..«.e... Page Number

Lewis and Clark Colleges Northwestern

De: Oe AM Sa ccccesoccscesusse 704 79

Loyola Law School seooeeeeeseerevneeeeee 90

New ork Law ‘School ccccccccsececscces 90

University of Arizona College of Law ee.

@eeeeveeevoeeereeveaeeeeneesvseeseeeeeeeee ee 8 89-90

University of Colorado School of Law ...

s 1, 2» 4, 6, 9, 41, 42, 76, 77> 79% 88

University of Denver College of Law. 90

The University of Kansas School of Law .

@eeeseeseeeeeeeeveeseesee#espeeeeweeseeaneeeseese 89

University of New hiexico School of Law .

e*eveeseeoeeeeeeeveeeeeveeeeeeepeeeeeeeeeeeenee 89

University of Fittsburgh School of Law .

@eeeeoeseeoevoeepevpeeeweseeveeeeveeeeeesve eee eeeeeee 90

University of Utah College of Law ... 90

Dramatic Fresentations

Lethal Weapon aeeesvevesvpeeeeeeeeeee 72-73

Full Metal Jacket ceecvccvncvvsesceveces 32

Miami Vice, "V. C. Whore" episode ... 72

Flatoon eeeveeeervreoeeeeeeeeeeseseeeseee 72

Frivate Letters in Evidence

From Mrs. Josephine Arko to Mr. Jess

Sawaya, undated eeeoeveeoeseeoseeeveeee @ 49-50

From irs. Josephine Arko to Mr. Jess

Sawaya, 04-23-87 eeceoeseeeneseeeeeee 51-52

100

Table of Authorities .«...+.. Page Number

From Rovert Jotm Arko to Mr. and Mrs.

Jess Sawaja, 03-23-87 cocccce 4HuK6G, 48

From bir. Jess Saw2ya to Mrs. Josephine

Arko, 05-10-30 eeoeeeeceeeseeee 52, 53-59

From Iir. and Mrs. Jess Sawaya to Robert

John Arko, 03-28-87 @eeeeeveoeveeveee0 46-48

From Mr. Jess Sawaya to Mrs. Josephine

Arko, 04-13-87 e@eseeveeseseveeeeeeeee08 50-51

From Mr. Jess Sawaya to Mrs. Josephine

Arko, 04-27-87 eeveevoneeseeeeeeese 52-53

Newspaner Articles

Fialka, John J. “Constitutional Issues

Tne Dimming Aura of James Madisons

Document's Frincipal Author Is So

Forzotten a du runt Eclipses Him at His

Home". The Wall Street Journal. (Den-

ver, Colorado: Vow Jones & Company,

Inc.3; November 28, 1986.) Volume CXV,

Number 106. Western Edition. Page 1,

column 4 and page 4, column 4. eeeve 32

101

Certificate of Mailing

I hereby certify that pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 28.5 (c) I have this

Abt. day of Rese, 1988 mailed the

original document or a true and correct

copy of the original Fetition and accom-

panying Joint Apprndix Prepared by the

Appellant, three of each to a set, tos

Honorable Charles Fried, Solicitor

General

The Department of Justice

Washington, DL. C. 20530

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Department of the Air Force

The Department of Defense

Washington, UV. UC. 20003

Robert WN. bhiiller, United States Attorney

Attn.: Richard J. Nolan, Assistant United

states Attcrney ;

1200 Byron G. Rogers Federal Building, Dr.

3615

1961 Stout street

Denver, Colorado 80294

liajor steven J. Pecinovsky, USAF, Trial

Attorney

General Litigation Vivision

Office of the Judge Advocate [General

Washington, LD. C. 20330-5210

John V. McDermott, Attorney

Jensen, Byrne, Parcons and Ruh, P. C.

Equitable Building - Suite 338

730 seventeenth Street

Denver, Colorado 80202

102

Glen S. verstell, Esq.

LD. Stephen Mathias, Esq.

Milbank, ‘tweed, Hadley and hbicCloy

International Square Building

1825 Eye Street,N. W.

Washington, DL. C. 200063 and

Joanne M. licDevitt

Uffice of University Counsel, Litigation

Division

University of Colorado, Denver

1200 Larimer Street - Campus Box 183

Denver, Colorado 80204

by placing these documents in the United

States Nails, first class postage prepaid,

and addressed to the above named persons

as noted.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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