Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Arko v. United States Department of the Air Force
Supreme Court brief1988
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88-5 50. MAY 9 1988
POSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,
In the Supreme Court of the United States
1988-89 Term
Robert John Arko,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Ve
The United States Department of the Air
Force; The School of Education, Univer-
sity of Colorados The School of Law,
University of Colorado; The American sar:
Associations; The Association of American
Law Schools; The Law School Admission
Councils; and, The Law School Admission
Services, Inc.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the.
Tenth Circuit
Robert John Arko, Pro Se
404 Animas Street
Trinidad, Colorado 81082-3233
Telephone: 719-846-3672
Khe bobo Loker
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Questions Presented by this Appeal
1. Should the American Bar Association.
(ABA) and the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) be required to respond to
the original complaint and subsequent fil-
ings (a) in the district court? (b) in the
court of appeals? or, (c) in this court?
861103, I 18-19 Iy and 870727, 1 77 1.
2. Does a request that an individual
student leave an educational program sup-
ported by state and federal funds require
due process protections guaranteed by
Amendment Five of the Constitution of the
United States of America? 880223, I 3-4 1;
860902, I 5-9 Is 870527, 163-64 I, quest-
ion 4; and 17870917, I 92-93 I.
4 Unless otherwise noted, citations
are to the Joint Appendix Prepared by the
Appellant. Each reference is to the Docu-
ment Number in the Table of Contents and
the bracketed I X I Page Number in the
Joint Appendix. The title of each document
is provided in the Joint Appendix Table of
Contents, but not in the notes to this
Petition.
2
3. Does the applicant for admission
to a college educational program have a
right to due process of law when he is
denied admission without specific cause?
860902, I 5-6 I, number 8; 870626, I 76 I,
870806, I 89-90 I; and 17870917, I 92-93 I.
4, Is it desirable and/or equitable
to have a unitary legal education system
closely associated with a unified legal
profession that combine to screen entry
into law related training and employment
opportunities? 860902, I 6-8 I, numbers
9 and 103 and 870806, I 84-86 I.
5. When public information is inadequ-
ate to support or reject a position, is it
acceptable to limit a request for relief to
a demand for due process and publication of
the information derived from that process?
860902, I 8-9 I, numbers 11,12,13, and 143
861105, I 23 I, number 4; 870409, I 41-43 I,
numbers 9, 10, 11, and 12; 870806, I 81 I;
and 17870917, I 92-93 I.
2
6. Are private parties closely asso-
Ciated with state agents imune from com-
pliance with the due process provisions
of our Constitution? 861103, I 19-21 I;
and 17870917, I 92-93 I. ;
7- Is it necessary for a pro se lit-
igant to assert that his rizhts to life,
liberty, property, and the pursuit of
happiness (adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and education) have been restricted to make
a private claim under our anti-trust laws?
861103, I 21-22 I; 870727, I 77-79 I; and
870806, I 87-90 I.
8. Is an individual's right to choose
a particular military service and type of
arms guaranteed by the First and Second*
Amendments to our Constitution? 861118,
I 23-24 I; 870527, I 63-64 I, number 4;
and 17870917, I 92 I.
2 On one or more occasions the appel-
lant has referred to Amendment Three when
he should have referred to Amendment Two.
870527, I 63-64 I, number 4,
| |
4
9. Is the appellant's request for due
process “unprecedented” or the reassertion
of a dormant rule of common law evidenced
in the biography of Paul of Tarsus? 861118,
I 24 I; 870727, I 79 Is and 17870917, I 92-
93 I.
10. Is it possible to seperate a claim
for due process in civil cases from the
problem of minority rights and equal pro-
tection of the laws for identifiable ethnic
groups? 861118, I 25-27 I; and 17870917.
I 92-94 I.
11. Should the precedent set in Board
of Curators of the University of Missouri
ve Horowitz, 98 S.Ct. 948 (1978), be limited
to cases involving dismissals from medical
schools for lack of cleanliness? 861118,
I 27-30 I.
12. Is it within the discretionary
powers of a district judge or a court of
appeals to define adequate relief? 880223,
I i-5 I; 860902, I 8-9 I, numbers 11, 12,
13, and especially 14; and 861118, I 30-31 I.
5
13. Does the individual citizen have
a right to a yearly physical examination,
and non-military physical counseling and
training to prepare his/her mind and body
for military service after age 187 (a) In
grade school? (b) In junior high school?
(c) In high school? (d) In college? (e)
In a private or parochial school? 861209,
I 31-32 I.
14. May the individual claim protec-
tion “under the eagle's wing" when in con-
troversy with a state or its agents?
861209, I 32-37 I.
15. Have the governments of the var-
ious states and/or the federal government
assumed the right to direct the upbringing
of minor children? 861227, I 37-40 I.
164. Given their close association with
law schools receiving state and federal
support, have the Law School Admission
Council (LSAC) and the Law School Admission
Services, Inc. (LSAS) become state agents?
861217, I 40-41 I.
lil
6
17. Letters presented in evidence in
870409, I 44-48 I, clearly indicate that
any or all aspects of the appellant's
character may be called into question.
Given the fact that the defendants have
failed to provide adequate reasons for
their past actions, is this evidence
irrelevant? 870417, I 48-49 I, note 1.
18. Is it acceptable within the
jurisdiction of this court for a private
citizen with little or no legal training
to ordain and establish himself as court
clerk, prosecutor, judge and jury? 870424,
I 50-52 I; and 870512, I 52-59 I.
19. Can the appellant, or one of his
immediate relatives, be held accountable
for irregularities in the probate of his
grandparents' estate in Colorado courts
more than forty years ago? 870527, 1 59-62 I.
20. Is it acceptable within the juris-
diction of this court for an individual to
be indirectly associated with the crime of
forgery while he is denied due process of
law? 870512, I 57 I, number 14; and
870527, I 62 I.
21. Does the final paragraph of Article
One, Section Eight of our Constitution give
the Congress the authority to restrict
enumerated civil liberties, like due process,
with statutes of limitation? 870527, I 62-
63 Is and 17870917, I 90-91 I.
22. liust exorbitant monetary damages
be at issue in constitutional cases?
870626, I 64 I; and I 70-71 I.
23. Which guide for action takes
precedence: (a) state statute, (b) federal
statute, (c) amendments to the Constitution,
or (d) articles of the Constitution? 870626,
I 65-68 I.
24. Is it within the discretionary
powers of a district judge to waive rest-
rictions like statutes of limitation when
a pro se litigant is the weaker party?
870626, I 68-69 I.
25. When the weaker party would not
otherwise be heard, should the chief judge
8
insure that he/she receive judicial notice
and representation? 870626, I 69-70 I.
26. Does a citizen have the right to
use the First Amendment as a sword to ob-
tain education for the practice of law; and
as a Shield to actively participate in the
production of dramatic presentations that
offer a balanced view of his participation
in government service? 870626, I 71-76 I. 3
3 This question has broader applica-
tion to treatment of Supreme Court cases by
the legal media. Compare Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491
(1968) in Morris, Arval A. The Constitution
and American Education: Second Edition.
(Saint Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Com-
pany; 1980.) pp. 51-53; with treatment of
this case in Lockhart, William 8.3; Yale Kam-
isar; Jesse H. Choper; and Steven k. Shif-
frin. Constitutional Rights .and Liberties:
Cases-Comments-Questions; Sixth Edition.
(Saint Paul, hhinnesota: West Publishing Com-
pany; 1986.) (Hereinafter cited as: Lockhart,
Constitutional Rights.) pp. 100, 104, 107-
111, and 697. in each treatment the distor-
tion is. so bad it is not possible to deter-
mine what Duncan did to merit the attention
of the state of Louisiana.
A variation on this theme appears in
Lowy, Joan. “Local: Justice's talk may have
violated ethics". Rocky Mountain News. (Den-
ver, Colorado: Denver Publishing Companys
9
27. Can actual or implied liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution as amended
be restricted by state statutes “borrowed"
to fill in gaps in federal law? 870227,
I 79 Is: and 870806, 1 86 I.
28. Should each school have its own
constitution, including a system of checks
and balances on the educational process?
870806, I 81-83 I.
29. If no trial is held and relief is
not granted in a civil action, do state
legislative acts like statutes of limitation
amount to bills of attainder when they are
used to limit access to relief requesting
due process? 870527, I 62 I; 870727, I 80-
81 1; 870806, I 87 1; and 17870917, I 91 l.
30. Does a litigant have an obligation
to bring new material to the court's atten-
tion, even during the appeal process, if
the evidence may be related to the issues
before the court? 880223, I 5 I.
10
of Appeals Jor the Tenth Circuit
All parties listed in the caption of
the original complaint and in uocuments
submitted to the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit are listed in the caption of
this case in this court.
It was determined in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado
that the proper party defendant should be
a branch of the military or a federal
agency. 870227, I 10 1. In the court of
appeals and in this court "The United States
Department of the Air Force" has been addres-
sed as the proper party defendant.
The ABA and the AALS did not respond
in the district court or the court of
appeals. They may have no interest in the
outcome of this appeal. Question 1, page 1,
above.
It is rignt and proper, however, that
the appellant move this court to request
their presence and meaningful response.
11
For fear of citing one or more cases that
may be “inapvosite", 861217, I 38 I.
reference is made to no specific case to
support this rosition.
Since the 14th Century it has been
customary for the judicial district of the
plaintiff to bc the forum for any complaint.
Since the American Revolution, however, it
has become a cherished right of defendants
to skirt legal action by claiming residence
in another judicial district. These rules
of law should be retained in tact.
The ABA and the AALS no doubt claim
residence.in another judicial district. lt
is the contention of the appellant that the
residence of a member of these associations
“ The appellant relies on a layman's
cursory reading of one or more cases in
Cound, John J.3 Jack H. Friedenthal; and
Arthur R. Miller. Civil Frocedure: Cases
and Materials; Second Edition. (Saint Faul,
Minnesota: West Puolishing Companys 1974.)
Hereinafter cited as: Cound, Civil Procedure.
The court may request the appellant's
comments on any questions it may have
regarding material presented in this peti-
tion, in the joint appendix, or in any
cited authority.
12
is the residence of the association. That
a complaint should be filed by the plain-
tiff with the national office of one of
these associations is appropriate when a
clearly recognized representative is not
identified in the judicial district of the
plaintiff.
In any case, no defending party should
be permitted to exercise contempt of court
by failing to appear when it is properly
served with the original complaint. He
should be required to resvond by claiming
that his residence is outside the jurisdic-
tion of the originating court. Ideally, the
case will be transferred to the jurisdic-
tion of the Judicial Panel on Multi-vist-
rict Litigation for assignment to the proper
forum. United States Code, Title 28, Section
1407. Jurisdictional rules would eventually
develop and become firm.
Table of
supreme
Court
Rule
Rule Description
21.1(a)
21.1(b)
21.1(c)
21.21(c)
21.1(d)
21.1(e)
21.1(f)
21.1(g)
2i.1(h)
21.1(i)
21.1(j)
Questions Presented by this
Appeal eoeeeeeeeeeeeeeseee
Parties to the Proceedings
in the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit eee.
Table of ContentS ceccoccce
Table of Authorities esecere
Orders and Judgments of the
District Court and the
Court of AppealS ceveceece
Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court SGC eeeereessecosececse
Constitutional Frovisions .
Statement of the CaSe ceeee
Index to Federal Questions
in the Joint: Appendix
Prepared by the Appellant
Basis of federal
Jurisdiction in the
District Court and the
Court of AppealS eeseeoes
Amplified Reasons for
Allowing this Writ eevese
ConcluSion cececosecececes
13
21
22
24
29
14
Table of Authorities
Page
Description Number
Cases
Board of Curators of the University
of Missouri v. Horowitz, 98 S.Ct.
948 (1978) @eeeveeseeeseeeeeeeeeee ser 4
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 S.Ct. 1444,
20 L.Ed.2da 491 (1968) @e@eeseeeeeeweeeve¢e8 8
Constitutional Provisions
Article One, Section Eight
Commerce ClauSe seccccseccvece 23-24, 29
Congressional Powers Clause .eesee 7y 29
Militia Training Clause .e.eeee 23-24, 29
Weights and Measures Clause e. 23-24, 29
Article One, Section Nine eesessee 24, 29
Article One, BOCCLON TEN ccoecccecece 9
Article Three, Section One seceveoes 23
Article Three, SSOCtiONn -TWO seccees 17 « 22
Amendment One ecvecsecccscceveseseses 3, 8
Amendment Two eeenevoeoveeaeoeeeeeeeoeeee8 @ 3
Amendment TNFES cecoseceseesevsevecee i
Dee DEW op o,ccesees 1, 25 32 4% 6-7
Amendment Fourteen wccccccccccccoccce 4
15
Page
Description Number
Statutes
United States Code, ‘'itle 28
Section 44 eevee ereeereeeseseeseeeees 23
Section B85 eeceeseeeeeeeseeeseeeeees 23
Section 1254 (1) cscccccecceccccces 17
Section 1291 eoeeeeereeeeeeaeeeeseees 23
Section t33% eeoerereeeeseseeeeseseeee 23
Section 1407 eeoecereeeeeereeeeeeeseee 12
United States Code, ‘itle 42
Section 1983 Ceoveeeeereeeeereeeeoeen 25
Textbooks
Cound, John J.3 Jack H. Friedenthalys
and Arthur R. Miller. Civil
Procedure: Cases and Materials;
Second Edition. (Saint Paul,
Wiinnesotat West Publishing Company}
1974.) eesneeeveseeoeeseseeeesesne 11, 25-26
Lockhart, William B.; Yale Kamisar;
Jesse H. Chopers and Steven H.
Shiffrin. Constitutional Rights and
Liberties: Cases-Comments-Quest-
ions; Sixth Edition. (Saint Paul,
Minnesota: West Puolishing Com-
pany 3 1986.) eoeeseeeseeseoseseeeee 8, 25
Morris, Arval A. The Constitution
and American Education: Second
Edition. (Saint Paul, Minnesotas
West Publishing Companys 1980.) ees. 8
Books
Steinbeck, John. East of Eden. (New
York: The Viking Press; 1952.) eeos 28
16
Page
Description Number
NewSpaper Articles
Lowy, Joan. “Vocals Justice's talk
may have violated ethics". Rocky
Mountain News. (Venver, Colorado:
Denver Puolishing Company; May 2,
1987.) Pp. 6 and 4O, eeoeoeeeevoeveeese 8
Dramatic Fresentations
Full Mie tal Jacket eeeceveeoveeeeeeeee 19
Orders and Judgements of the District
Court and the Court of Appeals
Finesilver, Sherman G.3 Chief Judge. Order
and Judgment. (Denver, Colorado: United
States District Court for the District
of Colorado; February 24 and 27, 1987.)
870227, I 9-13 I.
- Order. (Denver, Colorado: United
States District Court for the District
re Colorado; May 11, 1987.) 870511, I 14-
16 I.
. Minute Order. (Denver, Colorado:
United States District Court for the
District of Colorado; Way 21, 1987.)
870521, I 17 I.
Brimmer, Clarence A.;3 Chief Judge; and
Moore and Tacha, Circuit Judges. Order
and Judgement. (Denver, Colorado: United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
ert ig February 23, 1988.) 880223,
I 1-4 I.
17
Jurisdiction of the Suvreme Court
Statutory jurisdiction for this
court to review the Fer Curiam Order and
Judgment by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued
February 23, 1988 is Section 1254 (1),
Title 28, United States Code.
Constitutional jurisdiction for this
review lies in Article Three, Section Two,
of our Constitution. 17870917, I 91-92 I.
As noted at pages 22 through 24, the juris-
dictional statements in the District Court
and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit should have had a far broader base
in the Articles of our Constitution. To
rely on federal statute and Article Three
is insufficient in this case.
Constitutional Provisions
Constitutional provisions and federal
statutes are quoted in this Petition and in
the Joint Appendix Prepared by the Appellant,
17870917, I 90-94 I, when they are relevant
to the argument presented.
18
Statement of the Case
The Clerk of the District Court for
the District of Colorado accepted the Com-
plaint filed September 2, 1986. 860902,
I 5-9 I. Motions and briefs were filed by
the plaintiff and one or more of the de-
fendants. 861103 through 870105, I 18-41 I,
The district court found that the plaintiff's
claims were barred by various statutes of
limitation. From March through May 1987 new
evidence came to the attention of the plain-
tiff While refusing to grant a new trial,
the District Court did grant leave to
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit. 870227, 870511, and
870521, I 9-17 Is and 870409 through 870512,
I 41-59 I.
A number of motions and briefs were
filed by the appellant as well as one or
more of the appellees. 870527 through
870806, I 59-90 I. The Court of Appeals
found that the District Court may not raise
affirmative defenses sua sponte when a
S
19
complaint is filed pro se, but not in forma
pauperis. ‘'he opinion of the appellate
court further found, however, that the
plaintiff's complaint failed to state a
federal cause of action. It also rejected
the "new" evidence presented by the appel-
lant. The judgment of the district court
was affirmed. 880223, I 1-5 lI.
The following facts are also “material
to the consideration of the questions pre-
sented". To date the ABA and the AALS have
not given recognition to the questions at
issue in this case. (Q. 1) One of the pri-
mary reasons for bringing this case to this
court is that the information requested in
the courts below is not generally available
near the residence of the appellant - or he
has not been thorough in his search for it.
(Q. 5)
Since comvosing the plaintiff's brief
dated 861209, I 31-32 I, the appellant has
viewed Full Metal Jacket, a Stanley Kubrick
film. While viewing this film the personal
20
experience of the appellant during basic
military training served to under score
the very important questions raised in
this dramatic presentation.w One or more
broadcasts by Howard Cossell, an ABC radio
sportscaster, on the proper relationship
between education and sport also came to
mind. In order to perform successfully in
combat on the battlefield the individual
soldier must have proper mental and physical
conditioning from an early age regardless of
the character of the school he attends. It
must follow that funding for this condition-
ing and training must be apportioned on a
per capita basis regardless of the type of
school the student chooses to attend. While
the Department of Lefense should have the
authority to set goals and objectives that
each student must meet, each student should
have the right to choose any school approved
for this training and conditioning. (Q. 13)
A consistent theme in the record is
that the appellant has born full
21
responsibility for each error in judgment
that he has made. Une or more of the appel-
lees, on the other hand, have ignored their
own neglizencee They have permitted one cit-
izen to make accusations which they must
have believed.(Q. 17) They have sanctioned
vigilante law for a period of at least seven
years. (Q. 18) They have constructed the
laws of the state of Colorado to permit a
will to be called into question more than
forty years after recognition in probate
court. (Q- 19) And, they have permitted
criminal accusation without benefit of
trial by jury. (Q. 20) Most damaging of all
is that they have denied the appellant the
right to adequately prepare for his own.
defense. (Q. 3 and Q. 7) This continuing
disregard of their own inadequate performance
must be looked on with disfavor by this court.
Index to Federal ‘Juestions in the Joint
Appendix Frepared by the Appellant
The Joint Appendix Prepared by the
Appellant and this Petition are cross indexed.
22
The Fetition refers to the Joint Appendix
by using the six or eight digit document
number and bracketed I X I page number
that make up each reference in the Petition.
The “Table of Contents" in the Joint Appen-
dix correlates "Vocument Numbers", "Docu-
ment Titles", and leading “Fage Numbers".
Basis of Federal Jurisdiction in the Dist-
rict Court and the Court of Appeals
The basis of federal jurisdiction in
this case in the court of first instance
was summarized in 870626, pp. 1-2:
eee the plaintiff claimed that the
District Court for the District of Colorado
had original jurisdiction in this case. be-
cause the plaintiff resides in the court's
jurisdiction and one of the defendants is
an agency of the government of the United
States. The Department of the Air Force is
an agency of the government of the United
States, a party to this controversy, and
under Article Three, Section Two of the
Constitution... subject to the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. The School of Educ-
ation and the School of Law in the Univer-
sity of Colorado at. Boulder are agents of
the State of Colorado and subject to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
the same article. The United States Dist-
rict Court for the District of Colorado
and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit are both inferior courts
to the Supreine Court of the United States
and thereby have jurisdiction in this case
23
under Article Three, Section One of the
Constitution.
Section 1331 of the United States Code,
Title 28, zives the district court original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution. Title 28, Section
1291 of the ... Code gives the courts of
appeal jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of tne district courts....
Section 85 zives jurisdiction over the
State of Colorado to the District Court
for tne District of Colorado. Apreals from
decisions of this court fall under juris-
diction of the United States Court of
Appeals for tne Tenth Circuit pursuant to
Title 28, Section 41 of the United States
Code.
This comment is deficient in that it fails
to note that the ABA and the AALS are both
subject to federal jurisdiction under the
Commerce Clause and the Weights and Measures
Clause of Article One, Section Eight of our
Constitution. 17870917, I 90 Ile The follow-
ing vortion of Article One, Section Eight
Should also have been included in this pas-
sage
The Congress shall have Power To .e.
provide for organizing, arming, and discip-
lining the Militia, ... reserving to the
States respectively, the Appointment of the
Officers, and the Authority of: training the
Militia according to the discipline prer
scribed by Congress. eee
Each of the defendant-appellees traffics in
24
interstate commerce, is responsible for
establishing and operating a system of
weizhts and measures, and/or may assist in
"training the Militia” thereby establishing
a nobility based on intelligence in viola-
tion of Article Une, Section Nine of our
Constitution.
Amplified Reasons for Allowing this Writ
The District Court and the Court of
Apveals decided very important questions
of federal law by ignoring the real issues
and basing their decisions on narrow legal
points. These problems of federal law have
not been, but should be, settled by this
court.
A brief comment is required on the
ruling oy the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit. 880303, I 3 I. it
reads:
Plaintiff's complaints against the
defendants ... failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. ee.
The appellant's various claims for relief
may be found in the Joint Appendix at
25
860902, I 8-9 1, numbers 11, 12, 13, and
14%, and 870409, 1 41-43 I, numbers 9, 10,
11, and 12.
In at least six other cases this court
has ruled on the measure of damages under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 870626, I 70 I.
The sources available to the Supreme Court,
as well as to the attornies for the appel-
lees, should give the full text of each of
these ooinions. 3
There are three types of remedy:
declarative, specific, and compensatory.
Declarative relief consists in a court's
defining the rights and duties of the par-
ties in a particular legal context. This
type of relief is not common and is often
limited by statute, but in many cases it is
6
invaluable.
y Lockhart, Constitutional Rightsys
Op cit.; p. 1143, footnote i.
6 The following comment is a summary
of Cound, Civil Procedure, “Section C. A
Note on Remedies", opcit.es pp. 18-21.
26
Specific relief is an order directing
conduct. The defendant may be ordered to
return a jewel he has taken from the plain-
tiff, or stop operating a pig farm ina
residential neighborhood. Specific relief
will be granted only when damages would be
completely inadequate.
Compensatory relief requires that the
defendant pay a sum certain in money to
the plaintiff. The measure for determining
the loss sustained when the object in quest-
ion is 100 shares of General Motors stock,
your leg, your reputation, or your peace
of mind is different in each case.
In the first prayer for relief, 860902,
I 8-9 I, item 11 requests compensatory
relief. Item 12 requests specific relief.
Item 13 requests a combination of declara-
tive and specific relief. Item 14 gives
this court the opportunity to fashion
relief of its choice.
In the second prayer for relief,
870409, I 41-43 I, the appellant requests
27
a combination of both declarative and
specific relief in items 9 through 12.
Item 13 is now moot.
The six cases cited at 870626, I 70 I,
of the Joint Appendix define the measure
of compensatory damages in similar cases.
The court should be mindful that we still
live in a free market economy. The plain-
tiff-appellant continues to believe that
once due process has been achieved and the
facts are aired, the free market will make
appropriate benefits available.
This court may mold relief to fit its
final decision. The appellant, however,
continues to be restricted in the demands
that he can make by both moral and ethical
constraints not applicable to most liti-
gants. The original complaint, 860902,
I 5-9 I, was framed in its first editions
without reference to actual military ser-
vice and veteran status. Had one of these
early versions been accepted by the Dist-
rict Court the appellant would have been
28
in a stronger position to request addi-
tional relief that any court could grant.
Given veteran status, however, the
appellant is obligated to frame relief
that is generally applicable to every
citizen and has little to no personal
benefit attached. In East of Eden John
Steinbeck is one step from claiming that
a veteran has no preference at bar, or in
society generally, based on prior military
service. He,in fact,assumes duties and
obligations other citizens never know.
The appellant favors this perspective. ?
The individual citizen is obligated,
however, to preserve, protect and defend
our Constitution whenever it is within his
Capacity to act. It makes no difference —
what the status of the individual is when
One or more civil liberties are abused.
The individual citizen must act within the
law when his experiences indicate that one
? Steinbeck, John. East of Eden. (New
York: The Viking Press; 1952.)
29
or more civil liberties are threatened.
The Court of Appeals also found that
the appellant's allegations fail to state
a federal cause of action. 880303, I 4-5 I.
As noted on pages 23 and 24 of this Peti-
tion, the appellees are subject to federal
regulation under various portions of
Article One, Sections Eight and Nine of
our Constitution. 17870917, I 90 I.
Conclusion
Following military service the veteran
is responsible for safeguarding the reputa-
tion of his fallen brothers in arms. He is
obligated to assist his former adversary in
meeting basic needs. He consequently has a
duty to achieve these goals and objectives
through legal education for the practice of
law, through active participation in the
diplomatic service of his country, and by
analysing historical events and making a
true and correct record of them.
While the events at issue in this case
were taking place these responsibilities,
30
obligations and duties were not recognized.
As time passed they were only dimly
perceived. Unly now as this case comes to
court does the appellant realize the great
debt he owes these men.
Few of them understood the cause for
which they sacrificed their lives on the
rim of Asia. Even now we have difficulty
defining the right to process as one of the
central issues in that conflict. But, in
the land of their birth this gift of pro-
cess is at risk. To demand process in this
court for students, for the unborn, and
for others who may require it is to espouse
their cause.
This case is about elementary liber-
ties we have held dear for more than two
hundred years. This court should sugzest to
the Congress a rule of discipline for men-
tal and physical training prior to military
service. It should provide for the reasser-
tion of the right to due process in civil
matters for students as well as for others.
31
It should also mandate congressional
regulation of lezal education in this soc-
iety. The right to equal protection of the
laws should be more clearly defined.
The rights, duties, obligations and
responsibilities of litigants, advocates,
and judges in any legal proceeding should
be clearly defined. Jurists should be
admonished to avoid setting themselves
apart as a nobility based on intellect.
lt should ve established that the
individual's primary relationship is with
his family, community, county, and state
in that order. When all else fails, however,
he should be aware that he m2y always rely
on the federal system when each of these
other relationships have failed him.
For the foregoing reasons the plain-
tiff-appellant humbly requests that this
Supreme Court of the United States grant
this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit this 25th day of July, 1988.
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Signeds
Robert J Arko, Plaintiff-Appel-
lant, Fro Se
404 Animas Street
Trinidad, Colorado 81082-3233
Telephone: 719-846-3672
FO Re OAT N
Docket Entries
and
Joint Appendix Prepared by the Appellant
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Table of Contents
Document Document Page
: Number Title Number
Table of Contents i
Docket Entries
880223 Order and Judgment: United
States Court of Appeals -
Tenth Circuit eevvecsceosece 1
860902 Comvlaint cocccsceccsecece 5
870227 Judgment and Order: United
States District Court -
District of Colorado eeee 9
870511 Order: United States Dist-
rict Court - District of
Colorado ecoeseoeveeeeeeeesne 14
870521 liinute Order Entered by
Chief Judge Sherman G.
Finesilver eeceensceeeeseees 1-7
Joint Appendix Prepared by the Appellant
861103 Motion of Law. School
Admission Council and Law
School Admission Services,
Inc. to Dismiss the
Complaint eeeeeeveevnesevce 18
861105 Motion to DisSmiSS ceeeecooes 23
a 861118 Memorandum Opposing
j Motions by Three Defend-
ants to Dismiss the Com-
plaints Against Them eeee 23
- 861209 iwemorandum Supvorting a
4 Motion Requesting Certi-
fication of Jurisdiction 31
8
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ps — =r a a2 ~ > er ee Diets A p= eer, fi ee
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ii
Document Document Page
Number Title Humber
861217 Reply Memorandum of De-
fendants Law School Ad-
mission Council and Law
School Admission Serv-
ices, Inc. to Flaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition
to Notion to Dismiss eee. ae
870105 Reply Memorandum by Plain-
tiff in Response to Reply
Memorandum by Defendants
LSAU and LSAS Dated
12-10-86 eeoeeevoeee eee eee 44
870409 Motion Requesting a New
Trial or Grant of Leave
to Appeal to the Court of
Appeals eecveeseenseeseeeen 44
870417 Deféndant's Response to
Plaintiff's Motion Re-
questing a New Trial or
Grant of Leave to Appeal
to the Court of Appeals . 48
870424 Moticn Requesting Relief
from Final Judgment and
Permission to Submit New
EVIGENCE accccccceccceces 49
870512 Motion Requesting Fermis-
sion to Submit Additional
New Evidence ceecsccccveves 52
870527 United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit: Pro Se Docketing
Statement ceccovcsecccvsioce 59
870626 Brief of the Appellant oe. 64
Document
Document
Title
870727 3rief for Defendants-
Appellees Law School Ad-
mission Council and Law
School Admission Serv-
ices, InCe ceovcccsesccecece
870806 Reply Brief of the Appel-
lant eeeeveeeeeeeseoeeeeses
17870917 The Constitution of the
United States of America
Table of Authorities eevee
CaSe€S ceoccccccesscesecvese
Constitutional Provisions
StatuteS ceeovocevesscscveece
Court RuleS ececcessvvcece
Congressional ActS eervess
BOOKS ececcoeseorsevesccssece
DocumentS esceccsesvccseses
Law ScChoolS esrsecoecevece
Dramatic Presentations .e.
Private Letters in
Evidence @eeseeaecevoesvsesese#eevee01ee@
Newspaper ArticleS eevee
Certificate of Mailing ...
iii
Page
Number
76
Docket Entries
880223 Order and Judgment: United States
Court of Appeals - Tenth Circuit
IP. 11 After examining the briefs and
appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. Apo. P. 34(a)s 10th Cir.
R. 34.1.8. The Cause is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his
complaint and the denial of his subsequent
Rule 60(b) motion. Plaintiff alleges Ip. 2I
that numerous state and federal actors de-
prived him of due process of law by deny-
ing him educational opportunities in the
Air Force Reserve ''raining Program, the
University of Colorado, and the University
of Colorado Law School. Plaintiff also
alleges that some of the defendants discri-
minated against him.
The United States Air Force Reserve
Officer Training Program moved to dismiss
2
on several grounds. The Law School Admise
sion Council and the Law School Admission
Services moved to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The University of Colo-
rado, the Colorado University Law School,
and the Senv ibaa’ tex Association did not
answer the complaint or move to dismiss.
The court dismissed plaintiff's com-
plaint in its entirety as barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. No de-
fendant, however, had raised the statute of
limitations as a defense. Statute of limit-
ations is an affirmative defense. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(c). This court has noted that
“Iglenerally, it is the duty of the defend-
ant to plead affirmative defenses, and the
court cannot raise such defenses sua sponte.”
Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F. 2d 1471, 1476 (10th
Cir. 1987). This court has made an exception
to this rule for in forma pauperis com-
plaints. Id. Plaintiff here, however, is
proceeding pro se, but not in forma pauperis.
Thus, the district court could not sua sponte
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dismiss plaintiff's complaint based on the
affirmative defense of statute of lLimitat-
ions.
Plaintiff's complaints against the de-
fendants, however, fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Plain-
tiff's complaint against the Air Force Re-
serve Officer Training Program Ip. 3I is
that a professor of air military science at
the University of Colorado asked plaintiff
to withdraw from the training program.
Similarly, plaintiff's complaint against the
Universit; of Colorado is that in 1969, he
“was asked to withdraw from the Student
Teaching Program offered by the School of
Education at the University of Colorado...
ITIhe plaintiff did so without comment."
The plaintiff complains that these requests
were not accompanied by due process protect-
ions. However, a “request” that pliintiff
leave these programs, without more, did not
require due process protections. lloreover,
because plaintiff also states that he later
4
completed the teacher certification program,
his prayer for relief as to the University
of Colorado, with the possible exception of
the request for one dollar in damages, is
now moote
Plaintiff's counts against the Univer-
sity of Colorado Law School include the com-
plaint that unfavorable decisions of the
admissions committee cannot be appealed ex-
cept by reapplying. Plaintiff argues that
due process requires a hearing before an in-
partial third party. Plaintiff further al-
leges that the Law School's admission pro-
cess is the same one used by other’ law
schools, and that this process is used by the
ABA, the Association of American Law Schools,
the Law School Admission Council, and the
Law School Admission Services to deprive
"Vietnam veterans with low grade point aver-
ages and low Law School Admission test
scores" admission to law school. Plaintiff
contends that defendants' actions deprived
him of Equal Protection of the laws and
5
violated the spirit of the antitrust laws. |
Yhese allegations do not state Ip. 4la
federal cause of action. We accordingly af-
firm the district court's dismissal of
plaintiff's comolaint on other grounds.
In his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b), plaintiff sought to raise new alleg-
ations that "plaintiff's experiences as a
student and law school applicant may be re-
lated to long-standing rancor over dispos-
ition of his grandparents’ estate." The
district court properly denied this motion.
The judgment of February 26, 1987, and
the order of lay 11, 1987, of the United
States District Court for the District of
Colorado are Affirmed.
The mandate shall issue forthwith. ***
860902 Complaint Ip. 2I ***
8. Durinz Seotember 1965 the plaintiff
entered the University of Colorado as a pre-
law student. While the University of Colo-
rado is the only state supported institution
in Colorado offering a law degree, it does
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not offer specific courses for pre-law
students. Durinz September 1965 pre-law
students were instructed that no specific
course of study was required for law school
admission. Since graduation from the Univer-
sity of Colorado in June 1969the plaintiff
has taken the Law School Admission Test and
made application for admission to the Uni-
versity of Colorado School of Law more than
once. Each request for admission has been
denied. The only method for appealing an un-
favorable decision of the admissions committee
is to reapply for admission. Applicants denied
admission have no recourse to a hearing before
an impartial third party. Without recourse to
a hearing in one of the courts inferior to the
Supreme Court, the right to due process
Zuaranteed by amendment five is abridged.
IP. 31 9. The plaintiff further alleges
that the law school admission process employ-
ed by the University of Colorado School of
Law is similar to the procedure used by
other law schools that belong to the
7
Association of American Law Schools. This
process is constructed to screen applicants.
Unly desired classes of students are permitted
to enter schools holding membership in the
association. The American Bar Association
uses the Association of American Law Schools,
the Law School Admission Council, and the
Law School Admission Services to restrict
entry into the legal profession to certain
classes of people. The plaintiff alleges
that Viet Nam veterans with low grade point
averazes and low Law School Admission Test
scores have been denied admission to law
schools holding memoership in the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools in dispropor-
tion to their number in the general popula-°"
tion of law school applicants each year
Since 1965.
10. Non-competitive professional assoc-
iations are permitted by the Sherman and
Clayton Anti-trust Acts. While these assoc-
iations are permitted by the letter of the
law, they violate the spirit of it.
In this case the right of professional
associations to avoid competition violates
the rights of both the plaintiff and those
unsuccessful law school applicants unwilling
to speak for themselves. ***
11. The plaintiff requests that the
court award him one freshly minted dollar
bill in the currency of the United States.
12. The plaintiff demands that the
defendants be required to develop an adequate
appeal procedure for situations similar to
those described in paragraphs (6) through
(10). This procedure will include, but not
be limited to, (a) a written statement of
reasons for summary dismissals, (b) a right
to a hearing »efore an impartial third party,
and, (c) the right of appeal to one or more
of the courts inferior to the Supreme Court.
tH
13. The plaintiff asks that the
Association of American Law Schools be
required to study admission patterns at its
member schools IandI be required to publish
as
,
PO eae,
one
ot
Lean
its findings *** if the charge made in
paragraph (9) proves to be true.
14. The Court may grant other relief
it deems appropriate. ***
870227 Judgment and Orders United States
District Court - District of Colorado Ip. iI
Plaintiff's pro se Complaint alleges
numerous causes of action against the above-
named defendants. First, he claims a Pro-
fessor at the University of Colorado asked
him to withdraw from the Air Force Reserve
Officer Training Program in November, 1966.
He withdrew, without being given an oppor-
tunity for a hearing. Plaintiff also asserts
he w2s asked to withdraw from the Student
Teaching Program at the School of Education
at the University of Colorado during the
spring of 1969. Again, he withdrew, without
opportunity for a hearing. Lastly, he claims
he has been denied admission to the University
of Colorado School of Law more than one time.
He contends his denial of admission occured
without due process. Additionally, he claims
10
Viet Nam veterans with low grade point
averages and low Law School Admission Test
scores have been denied admission to law
schools more readily than other applicants
since 1965. He also contends defendant pro-
fessional associations are operating in
violation of the Sherman Act and the Clay-
ton Act. Ip. 2I
Only the United States Air Force Reserve
Officer Training Program, the Law School Ad-
mission Council (LSAC), and the Law School
Admission Services (LSAS) have appeared to
date. Each has filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint on numerous grounds. We find the
plaintiff's claims are barred by the applic-
able statutes of limitation.
Plaintiff's claim against the United
States Air Force keserve Ufficer Training
1 is barred by the statute of
Program
The Reserve Officer Training Program
is not the proper party defendant. Plaintiff
should have breught his claim against a
branch of the military or a federal agency.
However, we assume for purposes of this
Order that a proper U.S. defendant has been
named.
11
limitations. Under 28 U.S.C. #2401(a), a
cause of action against the United States
or one of its agencies is time-barred if
not commenced "within six years after the
right of action first accrues." Flaintiff's
claim against the United States, contained
in Paragraph 6 of the Complaint, admittedly
accrued in 1966. He did not file his Com-_
plaint until September .2, 1986. He has made
no showing that the statute of limitations
was somehow tolled during the twenty years
between his departure from the Training
Program and commencement of the suit. Hor
does the Court know of any cognizable reason
for tolling the statute. Defendant United
States Air Force Reserve Officer Training
Program's Motion to Vismiss is Granted.”
Plaintiff's claims against the LSAC
and the LSAS are similarly barred. Ip. 31
2 Plaintiff appears to argue that the
due process violation at issue has somehow
been continuting to this date. However,
plaintiff has not brought a class action,
and cannot purport to assert the rights of
Others not before the Court.
12
His due process and equal protection claims
are apparently brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
#1983. As there is no tederal statute of
limitations for claims brought under 42
U.S.C. #1983, the Colorado statute of limit-
ations for actions under federal statutes
applies. Under Colo.Rev.Stat. #13-80-102
(z)(1986Cum.Supp.), such claims are barred
if they are not commenced within two years
after the cause of action accrues. Again,
we can conceive of no reason why the statute
of limitations on plaintiff's constitutional
claims was tolled during the period at issue.
As such, defendants LSAS and LSAC's Motion to
Dismiss those claims is Granted.
Plaintiff also asserts antitrust claims
against LSAS and LSAC. Section 4B of the
Clayton Act, at 15 U.S.C. #15b, provides a
3 Again, plaintiff appears to assert
some sort of continuing constitutional vio-
lation. However, we confine our analysis to
the violations asserted on behalf of the
plaintiff himself, between the years 1965
and 1969. See footnote 2, above.
res
oe
13
four year statute of limitations for pri-
vate antitrust actions. The limitations
period begins to run when the cause of act-
ion accrues. * The Ninth Circuit has held
#4B does not apply to equitable claims
under the Clayton Act, but a defense of
laches does apply and bars equitable claims
four years after accrual of the cause of
action. International Telephone & Telegraph
Coe ve General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 518
F.2d 913, 929 (9th Cir. 1975). We concur.
Because again, no sufficient reason exists
for tolling the statute, the Motion to Dis-
miss plaintiff's antitrust claim is Granted.
Accordingly, defendants' Motions to Dis-
miss are Granted. Accordingly, the remainder
of plaintiff's claims fail under the respect-
ive statutes of limitation, for the reasons
expressed above. Therefore, those claims
are dismissed, sua sponte.
A cause of action under the Sherman
Act does not accrue until damages are ascer-
tainable. However, in this case, any damages
to plaintiff were ascertainable upon his
denial of admission to law school.
14
The Clerk of the Court is Directed to enter
judgment for defendants and against plain-
tiff Robert John darko. Plaintiff's claims
are Bismissed, with prejudice. The Clerk of
the Court is Directed to enter judgment in
favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff. Each party to bear its own costs.
Hee
870511 Order: United States District Court
- District of Colorado Ip. il
This matter comes before the Court on
Plaintiff's liotion Requesting a New Trial
or Grant of Leave to Appeal filed April 7,
1987. Plaintiff has since filed a motion
requesting leave to redesignate his request
as a Motion Requesting Relief from Final
Judgment and Permission to Suomit New Evi-
dence. Plaintiff's Request for Fermission to
File a Motion is Granted. The Clerk of the
Court is Directed to file plaintiff's tend-
ered Motion Requesting Relief.
Defendant's have responded to plaintiff's
initially tendered motion. The responses apply
15
as well to the newly filed motion. The
issues are therefore fully briefed and ripe
for resolution. Plaintiff's Motion Request-
ing Relief is hereby Denied.
It appears plaintiff's motion is now
asserted only under the provisions of Rule
60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. However, inasmuch as
the motion may still Ip. 21 be construed as
a Motion for New Trial, the motion is denied
as untimely and procedurally inappropriate,
This action was concluded prior to trial by
entry of judgment on motion to dismiss.
Even if a motion for new trial were approp-
riate, plaintiff's motion was filed more
than 10 days after entry of judgment, and
was therefore untimely. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(b).
Inasmuch as plaintiff's motion may be
construed as a motion to alter or amend
judgment, it was also untimely filed. Fur-
Suant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), a motion to
alter or amend must be filed within 10 days
after entry of the judgment. Additionally,
we find the motion lacks substantive merit.
16
In our ruling of February 27, 1987, we
found the statute of limitations had run on
plaintiff's various claims. The evidence
tendered with plaintiff's motion does not
affect that judgment. None of the evidence
submitted warrants a finding that the
applicable statutes of limitations were some-
how tolled. Plaintiff's claims are still time
barred.
Plaintiff's newly tendered motion was
filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.
This motion was timely filed, but lacks merit.
As stated above, our judgment of February 27,
1987 is not affected by the evidence submit-
ted to the Court. As such, plaintiff's motion
is denied.
Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for
Grant of Leave to Appeal. In that motion,
plaintiff appears to request a stay of judg-
ment. Plaintiff has not shown sufficient
reason for stay of judgment pending appeal.
the lotion is denied. Plaintiff is hereoy
granted until May 18, 1987 to file a
17
properly framed Notice of Appeal. No fur-
ther extensions will be granted.
Accordinsly, it is Ordered that Plain-
tiff's Motions filed pursuant to Rules 59(a),
59(e) and 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. are Denied.
Further, plaintiff's Motion for Stay of
Judgment pending Appeal is Denied at this
time, ***
870521 Winute Order Entered by Chief Judge
Sherman G. Finesilver Ip. il
Plaintiff's Kequest to File a lotion
and Motion Requesting Permission to Submit
Additional New Evidence filed May 18, 1987
are Granted. The Court has reviewed the
tendered evidence. The newly submitted
evidence does not alter the views expressed
in our Orders of February 26, 1987 and May
11, 1987. Plaintiff has submitted a timely
Notice of Appeal. ***
18
JOINT APPENDIX FREPARED BY THE APPELLANT
861103 Motion of Law School Admission Council
and Law School Admission Services, Inc. to
Dismiss the Complaint
IP. 51 Il. Plaintiff Has Not Established
Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants LSAC
and LSAS.
The complaint fails to show that this
Court has personal jurisdiction over LSAC
or LSAS. Plaintiff does not rely upon any
federal statute authorizing extraterritorial
service of process upon nonresidents of Colo-
rado. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(e) and (f), state long-arm statutes may
be used to assert personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants.
The Colorado long-arm statute, C.R.S.
# 13-1-124(1)(a) and (b), would not suodjéct
defendants to personal jurisdiction unless
they had transacted Dusiness or committed
a tort within Colorado. Plaintiff does not
allege any injury from the administration of
the LSAT in Volorado, and this is the only
contact that could conceivably be attributed
to LSAS or LSAC for these purposes. Under
19
the prevailing constitutional "minimum
contacts" test for assertion of long-arm
jurisdiction, the fact of plaintiff's tak-
ing the LSAT cannot be used to establish
personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants for the purposes of determining
liability for other, unrelated acts compre-
hended by plaintiff's conspiracy Ip. 61
theory. *** It would offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial just-
ice" to force LSAC and LSAS to defend against
this action in Colorado simply because plain-
tiff was rejected by a Colorado law school.
*#* Thus, there is no personal jurisdiction
over LSAC and LSAS as a matter of law.
III. Plaintiff's Civil Rights Claim Is
Without Merit.
The complaint purports to state a claim
against all defendants under the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The
Fifth Amendment restricts federal government
activities and does not apply to LSAC and
LSAS. If taken as asserting a Fourteenth
pave * 9
. "I a
20
Amendment claim against LSAC and LSAS, this
claim still must fail as a matter of law.
The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause
only applies to actions that can fairly be
attributed to the statess; a suit cannot be
maintained under 42 U.S.C. # 1983 against
wholly private entities, such as LSAC and
LSAS. *** Wor can plaintiff avail himself
of 42 U.S.C. # 1985, which has consistently
been held to protect only victims of invi-
dious race- or class-based discrimination.
*#* Ip. 7I Vietnam veterans with low grades
and LSAT scores are not such a protected
Class. *** No sction by LSAC and LSAS could
have infringed plaintiff's rights to sub-
Stantive or procedural due process under
either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
Count nine of plaintiff's complaint
may be interpreted as a claim for denial of
the equal protection of the laws. Plaintiff
allezes that Vietnam veterans with low
grades and low uSAT scores have been discrim-
inated against in the area of law school
21
admissions. Since plaintiff is suing in his
individual capacity, he must establish that
he has suffered injury himself as a member
of a protected class, and he is not entitled
to assert the constitutional rights of third
parties, whether Vietnam veterans or others,
in this action. *** The complaint fails to
show any such injury at the hands of LSAC
and LSAS. And, as noted adove, the actions
of LSAC and LSAS are not the actions of the
federal government or any state government
to which equal protection guarantees apply.
Plaintiff's civil rights claim should there-
fore be dismissed as against LSAC and LSAS
as a matter of law. Ip. 8I
IV. Pleintiff's Antitrust Claim Is
Without Merit.
The complaint does not allege a single
fact to support the allegation of a conspir-
acy in violation of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. Plaintiff's "business or property"
were not injured as required by Clayton Act
#4, 15 U.S.C. # 15. Plaintiff was not
22
necessarily entitled to be admitted to law
school, and thus no cognizable property in-
terest was harmed by his rejection. ***
The complaint does not allege that plaintiff
is threatened dy LSAC and LSAS with future
harm to any interest which may be protected
by a private suit for equitable relief under
Clayton Act # 16, 15 U.S.C. # 26. *** The
complaint thus fails to allege that LSAC
and LSAS have harmed any interest that plain-
tiff has which is protected by the federal
antitrust laws.
Past injuries cannot be redressed under
the federal antitrust laws unless they were
proximately caused by the defendant's con-
duct. **#* On a fair reading of the complaint,
it is evident that whatever injuries plain-
tiff alleges were not directly or Ip. 9l
even remotely c2used by LSAC and LSAS. Plain-
tiff's antitrust claim against LSAC and LSAS
Should therefore be dismissed as a matter
of law.
23
861105 Motion to Dismiss
“## TP, 22 4. The complaint fails to
state a cluvim upon which relief can be
granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R.
Civ. P. Assuming all of the allegations
made against the named federal defendant are
true, for purposes of this motion only, the
allegations still fail to state a claim
against the federal defendant upon which
relief can be granted. Assuming that plain-
tiff was in the RuUTC program at the Univer-
sity of Colorado in November, 1966, and
“wes asked to withdraw" from the ROTC pro-
cram, and "did so without comments" those
allegations fail to state a cause of action
or claim for damages upon which relief can
be granted.
861118 Memorandum Opposing Motions by Three
Defendants to Dismiss the Complaints
Against Them
IP. 31 *** Federal Law 42 U.S.C. # 1983
authorizes law suits in federal court when a
State agent has deprived the plaintiff of
his constitutional rights. The First
al le
24
Amendment gives the people the right to peti-
tion the government for a redress of griev-
ances. Consequently, this court has juris-
diction in this case.
The plaintiff could have claimed tnat
his First Amendment rizht to Freedom of
Speech was also violated by this defendant.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733,
21 LeEd.2d 731, (1969), the Supreme Court
ruled that wearing an item of clothing is an
expression of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment. It follows that denying an indiv-
idual the same right is also a violation of
that amendment. ***
IP. 71 Re®rring to the Bidle again, it
is relevant to cite the case of Paul of
Tarsus, “Acts of the Apostles", chapter 22,
verses 22-29. After claiming Roman citizen-
Ship by birth, Paul was granted a Ip. 8I
Statement of charges, a hearing at the
district court and appeal to Rome. The charge
against him was *** bad teaching. ***
25
IP. 8I *** At no point in the complaint
did the plaintiff invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment. While the plaintiff does not
reject any of the benefits to be derived
from the guarantees this amendment makes, he
chooses to base his arguments on firmer
ground.
In its long history the Fourteenth
Amendment has become the I-25 of Constitution-
al Law. A Supreme court composed of ccontempor-
aries of the Radical Repudlicans made it clear
in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36
(1873), that this amendment was originally
intended for the protection of certain
groups of people, primarily those who were
considered slaves prior to 1863. During the
next eighty years many groups used the
Shelter this amendment provides. During the
1950's the movement for minority rights
used the protection afforded by the Four-
teenth Amendment in Brown v. soard of rduc-
ation, 347 U.S. 483, 73 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed.
873, (1954), and other school desegregation
26
cases that followed. The plaintiff is in
full agreement with the general past use of
this amendment. Ip. 9I Should he apply this
amendment in this case and fail, his action
would tend to weaken the sound provisions
of this amendment.
The fact that the plaintiff has not
invoked the right to equal protection of
the laws does not imply a denial of this
right. The plaintiff chooses to emphasize
other rights. The selective service process
in operation during the 1960's did not
provide for equal protection of the laws.
Colleges, universities, and the defendants
made few, if any, alterations in their pro-
zrams to account for a selective service
system that obligated only men to service.
During this period men were required to
take at least twelve semester hours of course
work each semester and take a test each May
to retain their draft deferments. Women were
exempt from these rules and regulations.
They were free to take as few hours of
SP de Re Sg litho lied Asc incl dpa iad
27
course work as they chose and they were able
to withdraw from school for a semester or
two if they wished. ***
There is no firm rule regarding appli-
cation of due process in educational insti-
tutions at the university level. One of the
plaintiff's objectives is to move the court
to develov such a rule. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit ruled in Dixon vv.
Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d
150 (1961), that college students have the
rictht to procedural due process in disciplin-
ary situations. The court record does not
indicate what these students were accused of.
In a Similar case involving junior and senior
high school students suspended for ten days
for misconduct, without notice or Ip. 10I
hearing, the supreme court drew the same
conclusion in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,
95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725, (1975). The
court's divided opinion was written by Mr.
Justice White who was also responsible for
the opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
28
145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 1412, re-
hearings denied 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270,
20 LeEd.2d 1412, (1968). The balance of the
court shifted in soard of Curators of the
University of Missouri _v. Horowitz, 98 S.Ct.
943 (1978). an opinion written by Mr. Just-
ice kenquist. His opinion clearly distingu-
ishes between due process procedures to be
used in disciplinary situations and those to
be used in academic situations. In general,
procedures required for poor academic per-
formance are less stringent than those
required for bad conduct dismissals and
suspensions.
The opinion in Horowitz is clear cut.
Taken alone, this opinion gives college
and university professors a blank check in
the area of suspensions and dismissals for
poor academic performance or unsatisfactory
job performance in training situations.
Horowitz fails to take into consideration
the possibility that a professor or admin-
istrator will choose to dismiss a student
4 ies, Serio dals o easss
ap RATE fete slagha a)
12 ta RN
29
on academic grounds when the real basis for
the dismissal is false accusation of miscon-
duct. in addition to this inequity, the
dictum in Horowitz is directly opposed to
the doctrine of preparation for “additional
odligations" enunciated in Meyer, Pierce,
and Loder, Supra. What happened to Miss
Horowitz after she was forced out of medical
school? Ip. 11I
In this case the results of the defend-
ants' actions are clear. In the case of the
Air Force RUTC Program, if we assume that
the professor's actions in November 1966 met
the minimum requirements for due process in
Horowitz - verbal notice and oral hearing -
did the professor's actions prepare the
student to take on “additional obligations"?
The plaintiff is prepared to prove that his
actions did just the reverse, not bdecause
he did not perform his duties as he should
have; but, because the rules under which he
was operating did not provide for adequate
procedural due process.
30
In the case of defendants LSAC and
LSAS the sane is true. Assuming that the
defendants provide adequate notice and
hearing procedures mandated in Horowitz,
does this process provide the plaintiff
with the opportunity to take on"additional
obligations"? The plaintiff's answer is no.
**#* ‘his process does not meet the standards
in Meyer, Pierce, and rfoder. *** Ip, 12I
III. Conclusion: The Problem of Relief
Rule 12 (b) (6) allows dismissal of a
complaint for "failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted". ‘The plain-
tiff believes that the defendants should be
able to raiseone dollar. *** The plaintiff
‘further believes that the defendants can be
expected to provide adequate due process
procedures for the people with whom they
work in academic situations. If policemen
Can provide due process in criminal situa-
tions, professors should be able to provide
the same due process in academic situations.
It should be easy for the Association of
31
American Law Schools and the American Bar
Association to provide the same information
on Viet Nam veterans that it provides on
women and other minority groups, even though
they do not merit special protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Ip. 12I
*#® TTIhe court may grant the additional
relief necessary to comply with Federal Rule
12 (b) (6).
el RECT AS PRY * Ste Ce AOL EIT EIT elle al
861209 Memorandum Supporting a Motion
Requesting Certification of Jurisdiction
**## IP, 5I The most tangible injury
suffered by the plaintiff was the fact that
he was inadequately prepared for basic mil-
itary training during the summer of 1969.
A university academic program does not
adequately prepare the physical body for
basic military training. The English lang-
uage is deficient in words that accurately
describe the internal emotional trauma
associated with substandard performance in
basic training. *** It took the plaintiff
more than a decade to realize that the real
32
problem was not an internal deficiency,
but a simple lack of proper physical
conditioning he joined the Air Force
Program to get.* *#* Tp, 61
5+ The Eagle's Wings Individual
Freedom in National Unity
Mr. James Madison was five feet, six
inches tall and had a penchant for black
attire. While we have most of his personal
papers, his fine library was dispersed by
his widow. His home was engulfed in new
additions by a movie star and a horse breed-
er. His memory has been eclipsed in the
popular mind by his more flamboyant contem-
poraries. Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin
Franklin head the list. The Wall Street
Journals; November 28, 1986, page 1, column 4,
He is called to mind because it is his
spirit, along with that of Lady Justice,
that motivates the plaintiff.
A After writing this paragraph the
appellant had an opportunity to view Full
Metal Jacket, a dramatic presentation by
Stanley Kubrick. Question 13 is the direct
result. M-I-C-K-E-Y M-O-U-S-E 7-7-7
(Notes: Lettered footnotes do not appear
in the original record.)
a lil
UN ebe De AC Ret ak ode od
es
. pitta
33
The primary objective of this project
is to bring the elementary rules of due
process to college and university campuses
in the United States. Raising the issue of
sovereign immunity in the context of this
case goes far beyond the plaintiff's orig-
inal intent. There is little doubt that
current case law supports the defense's
position. It is within reason that the
legal profession and the university commun-
ity have developed layers of legal insulation
over the past two-hundred years.
In the mind of the Constitution's pri-
mary author, however, Ip. 7I the pro se
litigant onposed to a state or its agents is
in a unique relationship with the national
government as it relates to the operation
of the government.. The individual may seek
refuge in the protection of the federal
courts when a state or its agents have aban-
doned him. When the individual's rights have
been restricted by the state, the individual
may seek the protection of the federal courts.
trad Phe RO EDs
ree ly
34
In a national government there is a direct
relationship between the individual and
the national government in its daily oper-
ations. In a federal government the state
government and its agents are a reflection
of the collective will of the sovereign
people. The state in a federal government
may deal directly with the individual, with
little or no interference by the federal
government. Mr. Madison states clearly, in
The Federalist, Number 39, that in the trial
of controversies to which states may be
parties the operation of the government. on
the individual makes the government national
in character. The emphasis in the following
passage is Mr. Madison's. He makes the case
far better than the plaintiff ever could.
The difference between a federal and a
national government, as it relates to the
operation of the government, is supposed to
consist in this, that in the former the
powers operate on the political bodies com-
nosing the Confederacy, in their political
capacities; in the latter, on the individ-
ual citizens composing the nation, in their
individual capacities. On trying the Consti-
tution by this criterion, it falls under the
35
national, not the federal character};
though perhaps not so completely as has
been understood. In several cases, parti-
cularly in the trial of controversies to
which States may be parties, they must be
viewed and proceeded against in their
2 collective and political capacities only.
So far the national countenance of the
government on this side seems to be Ip. 8I
disfigured by a few federal features. But
this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any
plans; and the operation of the government
on the people, in their individual capac-
ities, in its ordinary and most essential
proceedings, may, on the whole, designate
it, in this relation, a national govern-
ment.
In brief, sovereign immunity should not apply
when an individual and a state agent are in
controversy. If the professor in this case
was not a representative of the Air Force as
the defense claims, he must have been a
State agent!
It is easy for modern Americans to take
the Constitution out of context. The Feder-
alist was written for a Constitution strip-
ped of additions. There were no amendments
to hamper the sleek, unified theme. The
authors clearly intended that the rights of
the individual be guaranteed not by the writ-
ten word, but by the unspoken contract
36
forged during the Revolution, Mr. Alex-
ander Hamilton, in his summary of Mr. Mad-
ison's thinking on this subject in The
Federalist, Number 84, says that a Bill
of Rights is unnecessary in a government
founded on the power of the people. Since
the people surrender nothing and retain
everything, they have no need of particular
reservations. This is a living contract born
in the Magna Charta and renewed periodically
over the past eight hundred years. In
essence, this contract transends the bonds
of time and the written rules of lesser
political entities.
One of the lesser issues in this case
is whether intelligence or common sense
should dominate in the area of practical
education. Had our forefathers sided with
intelligence, they would have Ip. 9I chosen
a dolphin or a chimpanzee Ias a symbol for
this new nationI. They chose a bald eagle,
a bird of prey known for its excellent
Sight. With this symbol they cast their eye
37
over many generations of Americans, includ-
ing our own, to ;guard the rights of the in-
dividual from any encroachment by the state.
The eagle's wing offers shelter to all who
request it. ***
861217 Reply Memorandum of Defendants Law
School Admission Council and Law School
Admission Services, Inc. to Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss
##% TP, 2T Argument
I. Statutes of Limitations and Laches
Bar Plaintiff's Claims.
Plaintiff seeks to excuse his long de-
lay in bringing this action by arguing that
he “exhausted all other reasonable alter-
natives prior to bringing his complaint to
this court." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4.
: Plaintiff's civil rights claim, if considered
: as a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, is
not subject to any requirement that state
judicial or administrative remedies be
exhausted before suit can be filed. ***
Plaintiff's motives for voluntarily waiting
beyond the limitations period are irrelevant.
38
Plaintiff next argues that because his
college transcript affects his present and
future opportunities, he should be permit-
ted to bring suit despite the applicable
statutes of limitation and the doctrine of
laches. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4. Ip. 31
According to the rationale advanced by the
plaintiff, an action could never be brought
too late if a college transcript were involv-
ed. Furthermore, since LSAC and LSAS are
plainly not responsible for the contents of
plaintiff's college transcript, this argument
is no impediment to dismissal of the complaint
against LSAC and LSAS.
Plaintiff cites four United States
Suvreme Court cases to show that his claims
should not %e time-barred. Plaintiff's
‘emoranium at 4-5. These authorities are all
inapposite. Plaintiff's citation of Tinker
v. Des inoines Independent Community School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), is inapposite
because the civil rights of minors are not
at issue here; plaintiff does not argue that
39
the statutes of limitation were tolled by
reason of plaintiff's infancy. Plaintiff
also cites Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Fierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925)3 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1982), each of which involved
a constitutional challenge to a state stat-
ute regulating education. None of these
three cases has anything to do with limita-
tion of actions. Plaintiff cites all these
cases in support of his claim that "a school
» « must prepare a student to take on addit-
ional obligations when he graduates." Plain-
tiff's iiemorandum at 5. Later, plaintiff
argues that defendants LSAC and LSAS, among
others, breached this claimed duty. Id. at
7, 10-11. The remarks in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters to which plaintiff refers, Ip. 4I
however, do not deal with the duty of schools
to provide adequite preperation. Rather, they
stand for the proposition that parents have
the right to direct the upbringing of their
minor children. See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
4oO
supra, 406 U.S. at 232-33 (quoting Fierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925)). The other cases cited by plaintiff
also do not suprort his argument. ***
III. Pleintiff's Civil Rights Claim Is
Without Werit.
Defendants LSAC and LSAS had anticipated
that the Court might be willing, under the
circumstances, to read plaintiff's complaint
as including a demand for relief based on
Fourteenth Amendment violations, even though
plaintiff's allesations are confined to Fifth
Amendment violations. Accordingly, defendants
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment is Ip.
5I inapplicable to LSAC and LSAS. Plaintiff,
believing that LSAC and LSAS have put words
in his mouth, states that he does not invoke
either the Fourteenth Amendment or, more
specifically, the Equal Frotection Clause.
Plaintiff's iiemorandum at 8-9. Plaintiff
then cites Bo»rd of Curators of the Univer-
sity of iissouri v. Horowitz 435 U.S. 78
(1978), a cise in which the plaintiff
41
brought suit for denial of due process of
law under 42 U.S.C. # 1983, a federal stat-
ute enacted pursuant to the authority of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever route
plaintiff wishes to take, the result is the
samet defendants LSAC and LSAS are not
sovernnental entities or state actors and
thus cannot be charged with depriving plain-
tiff of his constitutional rizhts. Plaintiff's
merrorandum is unresponsive on this point.
870105 Reply Iiemorandum by Flaintiff in
Response to Rerly Memorandum by Vefendants
LSAC and LSAS Dated: 12-10-86
IP. 8I ILetter in evidence from the
University of Colorado School of Law; dated
April 15, 1983. The text has been omitted.I
87040S lotion Requesting a New Trial or
Grant of Leave to Appeal to the Court of
Appeals
*#*# Prayer for Relief IFp. 2-31
9. The plaintiff requests that the
Lepartment of the Air Force stipulate the
degree to which it relied on family refer-
ences in the admissions process for the
United States Air Force Reserve Officer
42
Training Program. He also would like to
know the relative weights placed on other
factors contributing to the admission
decision,
10. The plaintiff also asks that the
School of Education in the University of
Colorado be required to state the degree
of reliance it placed on both formal,
written references and informal, word-of-
mouth references in its various decisions
relative to the plaintiff's participation
in the Student Teaching Program at the Uni-
versity both durtne the Spring of 1969 and
during the 1980-81 school year.
ll. The plaintiff further requests that
the individual members of the Admissions
Committee of the University of Colorado
School of Law during the 1982-83 admission
seasons be required to present themselves
for questioning before the court regarding
the degree to which each member relied on the
formal written record and informal word-of-
mouth references while considering the
43
plaintiff for »sdmission. ***
12. In light of the new evidence
presented with this motion, the plaintiff
requests that the court order a specific
list of steps to be taken to legally resolve
any dispute that may still linger regarding
the disposition of the estate of Mr. and
irs. Joseph Sawaya. At minimum, this legal
resolution must include a personal visit
by a representative of the court to Mr. Jess
Sawaya's residence to explain to him each
step in the probate of his father's will,
why there was no court recognition when his
mother died, the specific steps taken by his
Sister eas executrix of her father's estate,
and any other questions Mir. Sawaya may still
have. This conversation should be recorded
and mode a part of the court record. The
court's personal representative should ode
an expert on Colorado law regarding wills,
estates and trusts. ***
44
IP. 5Iii Letter from Robert John Arko
to Mr. and Mrs. Jess Sawaya, dated March
23, 198711
This letter is to reiterate in writing
the substance of our phone conversation
after 8 asm. on Saturday morning, March 21,
1987.
As I understand it you hold my mother,
Josephine Arko, personally responsible for
improper administration of your father's
estate, probated in the State of Colorado
shortly after his death in January 1945.
Should my mother die or otherwise be inca-
pacitated, you will then hold me personally
liable for the improper administration of the
estate of Joe Sawaya until a list of un-
specified questions assembled by you are
answered to your personal satisfaction.
Your questions relate to a group of
approximately 50 documents you sent to my
mother shortly after the death of Hazel
Sawaya, your mother, on April 19, 1980. The
questions accompznied the documents in a
45
packet sent by certified mail you claimed
on the phone.
You also indicated that your difference
of opinion with my mother has an unspecified
impact on my daily life. At the same time
you indicated that there is little or noth-
ing I can do or say at present that would
resolve this difference of opinion between
yourself end my mother. Once I take her place
due to her death or incapacity, however, we
will be able to meet in an open area,
secured for all parties personal protection,
so that I can respond to the same questions
you have for my mother.
Through this conversation you indicated
that over the years other versions of your
allesations expressed in this letter have
surfaced in Trinidad, Albuquerque, Denver,
and Phoenix, among other places. The alleg-
ation of forgery in the administration of
your father's estate, for example, is some
distance from the truth and was not made by
yous
46
I will be looking forward to a written
response to this letter from you to verify
its accuracy on or before April 13, 1987.
No response from you will indicate your
substantial egreement with all statements
made. I iam taking the liberty of sending a
copy of this letter to your brothers Fred
and George and your sisters Josephine and
Jane.
IP. 6IILetter from Mr. and Mrs. Jess
Sawaya to Robert John Arko, dated March 28,
198781
It was nice hearing from you. We here
in Albuquerque are all fine.
Bob, I too, share with your concern.
I've heard of stories like this, but I never
thought that they would ever enter our
family.
Bob, why don't you reverse your
Strategy, and put the cart behind the horse,
because unless and until your mother admits
her actions to you and me, her and I will
leave this world, taking its contents with us.
47
As far as what the people will and are
saying, it is their own perogative, because
I made the remark to Snider and Fozie Skeff
long ago, that "I was disappointed with the
way your mother probated the will", and
that's 311 I said.
Since then, the people have come up
with their own conclusions, and I think as
time continues to go forward, this matter
will no doubt get worse.
To this date, I fail to understand why
your mother continues to ignore this matter,
and above all, why she hasn't discussed it
with you and perhaps Nancy, because if she
is afraid that I will take action against
her, tell her that I've been compensated
many many fold by the good lord for this
heartbreak, and that I don't need it.
All I ever want from the Sawaya Estate
now is a true and honest explanation of how
and why they chose this way and method of
settling the estate.
48
Whether I should olame myself for not
persuins this moitter lons ago, can be con-
tributed to your Aunt tiary and to your cou-
sin Joseph, because I'm to chicken to embar-
rass the family as it now is.
Bob, I'm sure that if you go about this
in a different manner, that your questions
will be answered, because faith has its way
of zuiding ones life.
I hope that I have answered some or all
of your questions, and I will close with
Love **#* Uncle Jess and Aunt hiary ***
870417 Defendant's Response to Flaintiff's
Motion Requesting a New Trial or Grant of
Le2ve to Appeal to the Court of Apreals
##* TP, 3; Footnote iI Pursuant to Fed.
Re. Civ. F. 60(b)(2), newly discovered evi-
dence canbe a basis for relief from judg-
ment only if by due diligence it could not
have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b). Plaintiff's
"newly discovered evidence" is a March 28,
1987, response to a letter he sent on March
23, 1987. Due dilizence by plaintiff could
49
have resulted in the timely discovery of
his “newly discovered evidence",
Even assuming the evidence was newly
discovered, it is clearly irrelevant to
plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 402.
870424 Motion Requesting Relief from Final
Judgment and Permission to Submit New
Evidence
IP. 4IlILetter from Mrs. Josephine
Arko to hir. Jess Sawaya, undatedsI
I've read the recent flow of letters
pertaining to the accusations against me
and I do feel that we have resched the
point of a show-down.
I don't believe I did anything against
you or anyone else for that matter, but the
only way to air the problem is to boring it
out in the open for all to view.
l want you to set up a meeting for us
together with Fred, george and Jane because
this situation, in’ my opinion, involves all
of us «nd not just Me.
Let me know when end where the meeting
50
is to be held and I'll arrange to be there.
HUN
IF. 5jJiLetter from Wir. Jess Sawaya to
Kirs. Josephine Arxo, dated April 18, 1987:I
I received your letter and was very
happy to see that you have decided to help
solve our matter with Dad's Will.
First of 311, Fred Sawaya knows nothing
about tis matter, and at this time, we will
have nothins to do with Fred Sawaya. As for
Jane or Georse, I doubt very much if they
are capable of n»ssisting you.
There's only one person that knows the
real truth, and that's Jess Sawaya.
1 will accept your challenge on the
following conditions only. -
1. That ,;ou answer all questions sub-
mitted to you in writing, and I in turn do
the same for you.
2. That erch party has the right to
submit all the questions they desire to
submit, for three (3) times, at three (3)
different occasions, and all questions
51
submitted must be answered within twenty
(20) days after receipt of same.
3. That each party will have the
right to secure any person or persons, to
assist in the answering of the questions,
and that all answers to all questions
answered be cide tierod final.
4, That all answers sent through the
mail, be sent via Certified Mail, to in-
Sure received by noth parties.
5+ That in the event that more time
is required to help solve this matter,
that it be mutually agreed to between both
parties.
If this clan meets with your approval,
we c2n end will start once I hear from you.
4%
IP. 6IILetter from Mrs. Josephine
Arko to fer. Jess Sawaya, dated April 23,
198711
O K Jess, send me a list of your
accusations and srievances and let me see
what I can do about answering them at this
late date.
Why you didn't face me with them forty
(40) years ago, I'll never know. ***
870512 Motion Requesting Permission to
Submit Additional New Evidence
IP. 2I1ILetter from Mr. Jess Sawaya to
lirs. Joesphine Arko, dated April 27, 1987:sI
Referring to your letter of the 23rd
last, I'm goinz to »e honest and say that
I don't and can't believe what-you wrote.
For a start, let's start with the
questions in my letter to you on May 10,
1980 which I am inclosing a copy of it.
I_ will appreciate your sending me «the
answers in the following manner.
Question Ilo. 1
Why Wasn't _I Included in the Probation
of the Will.
Answers
le a a a a
ee ee ee he he he he he ee ee ee ee ee 8 8
You indicated that you were doubtful
that you could answer these questions at
53
such a late date. 1 don't think you will,
yecnuse I can rememver all of the
happenings as though they were happening
rizht now.
I shall look forward to receiving your
answers as azreed to.
Thank you. ***
IPp. 3 and 4IILetter from Mr. Jess
Sawaya to lirs. Josephine Arko, dated May
10, 1980. It accom :nnied the preceeding
letter dated April 27, 1987:I
It was zood talking to you last night.
I was concerned as to why I hadn't heard
from you sooner. 1 was also very disappointed
as to the provress made. This matter just
can't be discussed over the phone.
Joserhine, I had better be versed on
the contents of the will, and I feel that
only you can do it.
I think that L should have your version
of the followin:, »ecause I feel that the
following questions will be «sked, and as
it is rizht now, I couldn't begin to have
54
anawerna for them,
L. Why wosen't L ineluded in the proba-
tion of the will.
2. Why wisn't Lt ever briefed on the
progress of the Joe Sawaya & son, and the
Joe Sawaya & Sons firms.
J. What consideration did I receive,
for my participition in the Joe Sawaya &
Son and the Joe Suwaya & Sons firms.
4. What vortion, if any, did I own of
the Joe Sawaya & Son, and the Joe Sawaya &
Sons firms.
5. What were or payment did I receive,
if any, for my contribution in these firms,
from the betinnine of their existance, un-
til the time that I left, in November 1945.
6. What contri®ution or consideration
was made by Fred J. Sawaya, to Joe sawaya &
vawaya & sons.
7. Accordinsz to the Will, it shows
)
)
: ’
son, when the title wis changed to Joe
that all of Joe sawaya's children, namedy,
Josephine, Jess, fred, Jane and George,
~ P,
were equal partners, in the Joe Sawaya &
Son and the voe Siwiaya & Sons Firms. lf so,
what contribution and consideration was
made oy Jane, ;:ceorge and Hazel, the
deceased wife, ind “red, when it was known
that the Joe Sawayi & Son and the Joe Sawaya
and Sons firms, were manazed and operated by
Joe Sawaya (Deceased), Jess J. and Josephine.
8. If, accordinz to the Will, it shows
that Jess J. Sawayva's portion of the estate
was $1,198.95 then what contribution or con-
cideration was tiven Jess J. and Josephine
for their work and interest in the Joe
Sawaya & Son and-the Joe Saway2 and sons
firms, from the time that they degan operat-
ing, until the death of Joe Sawaya (deceased.)
in Jonuary 1945, and until the departure of
Jess J. Saway: from the firm of Joe Sawaya
& Sons, in ixovember 1945.
9. Accordinz to the Will, it shows
that Jess J. Sawzyi had only $1,198.95 up to
the death of Joe Sawaya, in January 1945,
end uv to and including the time that the
56
will was rrobated in October, 1945, and
still one month lster, in November 1945,
just one (1) month later, when Jess J.
Sawaya left the firm of Joe Sawaya &
Sons, he was paid 430,000.00 for his shere
in the business. How, ‘\ihy and Where was
this figure arrived at.
10. Accordins to the will, it shows
that Jess J. Sawaya attended the hearing
of the probate of the Joe Sawaya estate.
Jess J. sawaya had no knowledge of the
he2ring, and if so, why wesn't the $1,198.95
due him, vaid to him.
11. How is it possible, when no notice
was tiven Jess J. S3w2ya of the hearing,
that he could have been present.
12. iho Sizned the name Jess Saw2ya
to the acknowled sement of the hearing,
when Jess J. Saway2 wasn't present, and if
he was, why didn't the court acknowledge
the "letal" title of Jess J. Scwaya and
instead of just Jess Sawya, as it shows.
13. Who sitned or acknowledged receipt
57
of this money ($1,198.95). Whose posses-
Sion is this hloney in now.
14. Who forged the name “Jess Sawaya" |
as the person who received the $1,198.95
when it should have been Jess J. Sawaya,
the "legal" title.
15. Who, where and how, was the Inven-
tory of the Assets of the Joe Sawaya & Son,
& the Joe Sawaya & Sons Firms arrived at as
shown on the Will.
16. If the inventory is a certified
accounting of the Assets of Joe Sawaya & Son
and the Joe Sawaya & Sons firms, then why
w2sn't such assets as (Semi-Trailers, Swift
Building, Frost Street Building, Animas
Street Home,” and the West Nain Street prop-
erties included in the inventory, including
Accounts Receivable, etc.
Joserhine, I could go on and on, and
inasnuch as you and you alone is the only
rerson who can answer these questions, I
B This is 415 Animas Street; VJrinidad,
Colorado; not 4O4 Animas Street, the current
residence of the aprellant.
58
firmly believe that everyone, that everyone,
includinz Fred J. Sawaya, shouldn't inter-
fere, beciuse if Fred is so well briefed in
this matter, then why wasn't I.
Josephine, I don't intend fighting with
any of you, and above all, I don't intend
employing an attorney as Fred suggested,
because if I tel) the story as it really is,
then the whole burden is going to fall on
vou.
Azain, I say that we should get
totether, and see what’s on each of our
minds, because if we don't, tnen one of us
is solnz to eat each others words, and
avove all I don't intend fizhting with any-
one to arrive at this understanding.
Josephine, aren't you concerned that
if the IRS miltinlies the 5 partners by
the. zmount given me, as the Will shows,
that the estate of Joe Sawaya, is going to
mushrvom wel: over the 300 to $500 thous-
ana ficure.
Josephine, this is a serious problem,
7
so may I hear from you at your earliest
convenience. ***
870527 United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit: Pro Se Docketing
Statement
IP. 2I On September 2, 1986 the appel-
lant filed his original complaint with the
U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado requesting due process of law
under Amendment Five of the Constitution
of the United States. Due process was
requested concerning three civil experien-
ces the appellant had as a student at the
University of Colorado and as an applicant
in the law school admission process. A num-
ver of motions and briefs were filed by the
plaintiff as well as by cne Or more of the
defendants. Oral argument was not heard and
no trial was held. Judgment was issued by
the Honorable Sherman G. Finesilver, Chief
Judge for the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado on February 27,
1987. The court found that federal and state
statutes of limitations and doctrines of
60.
laches bar the plaintiff-appellant's claims
against each of the responding defendants.
On or about February 10, 1987 it came
to the attention of the plaintiff that he
has been, is, and will continue to be asso-
ciated with certain secret or, quasi-
secret, agreements either directly or in-
directly associated with the estate of Mr.
and Mrs. Joseph Sawayasy the plaintiff-
appellant's grandparents. Information re-
lated to this Ip. 31 legal problem contin-
ues to come to light at this writing. As
it began to appear that the plaintiff's
experiences as a student and law school
applicant may be related to long-standing
rancor over disposition of his grandparent's
estates the appellant sought relief from
judgment or grant of leave to appeal. Un
May 11, 1987 the plaintiff's motion for
relief from final judgment was denied; but
his request for grant of leave to appeal
to this court was granted.
The appellant requests that the court
61
of appeals relax the strict application of
the applicable statutes of limitations and
doctrines of l»ches to permit the relief
requested in the court below to be granted
in the court of anpeals. The court of
appenrls should take into consideration a
numoer of factors not given appropriate
weight by the district court, First, the
appellant lacks experience at bringing his
claims to court. In this case the inexper-
ience of the appellant is a major factor.
His numerous applications for admission to
a school of law were unanimously rejected.
Consequently, he could not learn the rules
rezarding statutes of limitations and
doctrines of lachés using the normal path
for this education. On other matters he has
been denied lezal counsel in writing oy at
least two attornies. The fact that the
statutes referred to by the defendants are
not generally available at or near the
residence of the anpell2nt should also be
considered. Any one or two of these
62
factors taken alone are insufficient defense
against the pleas made by the appellees in
the district court. Taken together, however,
they effectively violate the right of the
appellant to counsel under Amendment Six ***,
The court of appeals should also re-
view the evidence submitted since the
district court's judgment dated February 27,
1987. One allegation in that evidence is the
claim that the appellant may be indirectly
associated with the crime of forgery. The
accusation is repugnant. Should the judgment
of the inferior court stand, *** ItIhe plead-
ings of the defendants and the judgments of
the district court would amount to a bill of
attainder. The Congress of the United States
is strictly forbidden from passing such bills
by Article One, Section Nine, Paragraph 3 of
the Constitution ***, Article Une, Section
Ten, Parazraph One prohibits the states from
doing the same.
Finally, there is no article or amend-
ment in the Constitution that limits its
63
provisions to a specified period of time.
While the congress and the various state
legislatures have the right to make all
laws required for the operation of our soc-
iety, they can not use those laws to limit
the rights of people that are expressly
stated in the document. It is the belief
of the appellant that the Constitution is
a contract between the individual and the
society as a whole that is signed at birth”
and valid for the life of the citizen.
Express rights, like due process, can not
be limited by statute. IP. 4I ***
Does an individual have a First Amend-
ment right to speak by wearing a particular
military uniform? Does the ISecondI Amend-
ment permit the individual to choose the
type of arms he will bare? Does the Fifth
Amendment insure the right to due process
of law in civil matters? Apart from the
length of one's hair, is there any right
C After giving this issue much thought,
the word "birth" should be changed to "con-
ception".
64
retained oy the people under the Ninth
Amendment’ In spite of the Fourteenth Am-
endment, can due process of law ve avoided
in state institutions because it would be
unpleas2nt or inconvenient to do otherwise?
$ 4 3%
870726 Brief of the Appellant
IP. 9I *** Then, on Sunday afternoon,
Lecember 20, 1981, according to the appel-
lant's notes, that impression began to
chanze. The event is only meaningful now.
It went unnoticed at the time. Because
there was nothin: better to do the appellant
picked up a »ook that had been around for
many years. ‘Ihe case of Paul Crump was
dravatic. It was read in one sitting. The
remainder of this douk was interesting,
out not on a per with the first chapter.
The Jury Returns by Louis Nizer is still a
bur under the arvellant's saddle. (Garden
City, New York: DLouoleday & Company, Inc.}3
1966.) *** IP. 111
The treory of our law and government,
65
as well as the facts in this case, speak
against the court's opinion. Uiven the
facts in thiscase the appellant could have
made either a tort claim or a claim that
his constitutional rights had been violated.
He chose the latter course. In a tort claim
the plaintiff has been either physically or
mentally injured and seeks monetary damages
in compensation for the wrong that has been
done. The plaintiff making a constitutional
claim charses that the Constitution has
been abused and seeks to alter the law to
ameliorate the abuse. Ionetary awards are
not at issue.
The appellent accepts the district
court's definition of what the law is in
this case. What is at issue here is what
the law ought to »%e. The court's Order, ***
States:
«ss AS there is no federal statute of
limitations for claims brought under 42
U.S.C. #1983, the Colorado statute of
limitations for actions under federal
Statutes apolieS. ee.
A review of 42 U.S.C. # 1983 leads to the
66
conclusion that Colorado statute cannot be
applied in this case because it would vio-
late the intent of the framers of 42 U.S.C.
#1983. It reads:
Civil action for deprivation of rights.
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the ceprivation of any rights, privileges
or imunities secured by the Constitution
and lews, chill be liable to the person
injured in an action of law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. IP. 12I
Study of this quotction leads to the con-
clusion that state statutes of limitations
cannot be used to deprive an individual
citizen like the appellant of his right to
due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment of the Constitution .... Given the
court's opinion, this conclusion must be
in error.
Jiven the court's opinion, the appel-
lant's conclusion after reading 28 U.S.C.
Section 1652 must also be in error.
67
The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the Courts of the United
States, in cases where they zpply.
It is tne apvellant's belief that the
Constitution takes precedence over the
Acts of Congress. The Judiciary Act of
1789 gives the federal courts the author-
ity to use the state law that applies with-
in the jurisdiction of the court. The dist-
rict court exercised that right in this
case. This is the law. But, the law ought
to be that rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution take precedence over Acts of
Congress and the laws of the several states.
This does not mean that the appellant
claims that 28 U.S.C. Section 1652 is un-
constitutional. lt is the argument of the
appeliant that when an individual citizen
speaking pro se makes a claim for one or
more rizhts guaranteed by the Constitution
iri a case where state actors are prominent
defendants, it should be within the
68
discretionary powers of a district judge
to waive technical points of the law,
like statutes of limitations, to allow
airing of the real argument and granting
of appropriate relief. It should be kept
in mind that the framers of the Constitu-
tion were primarily interested in develop-
ing an effective government. That this
document did not Ip. 131 meet every con-
c@ivable rule of logic was unimportant to
them. It did matter, however, that govern-
ment worke
This unique relationship between the
individual citizen and the national gov-
ernment was discussed at some length in
the plaintiff's lemorandum Supporting A
Motion Requesting Certification of Juris-
diction, Document 6, dated Lecember 5,
1986, at pp. 6-9. The appellant adds here
that the law as it is should remain in
place, but it should also include assur-
ances that the individual citizen will
receive a minimal amount of assistance
69
in federal court in situations in which he
is clearly the werker party. It may not be
clear that the appellant is the weaker
party in this case. A hyrothetical case
using an extreme example may illustrate
the point. B is a woman in her early teens
who has recently conceived A. B decides to
set rid of A. A would have few, if any,
defenders in this case. It is the appél-
lants argument that the district judge
Should be A's advocate. At A's oirth the
court should pay B for her services, wish
her well in the future, and then pay A's
food, clothings, Ishelter, and educationl
costs trrough age 22. A might be expected
to return some or all of these costs after
age 22.
There are many A'S in our society. The
poor, the homeless, those who are ill, are
all A's. Each one should be taken under
the protection of 2 court until he or she
has vecome a vroductive, contributing mem-
ber of our society. In this case the
70
appellant is an A asking for due process
rather than food, clothing, shelter, and
education.
Before leaving the topic of 42 U.S.C.
#1983 (first introduced in this case by the
attornies for the defendants!) the appellant
Ip. 14I would like to add reference to a
number of cases in which this section of
the United States Code is referred to.
These cases ares
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 237, 98 S.Ct.
1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)3
Smith ve. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 5.Ct. 1652,
75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)3
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
207s 108 Saets 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981);3
Bivins v. Six Unknown -Agents, 403 U.S. 388
91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 Lelid.2d 619 (1971)3
Davis v. Passman, 439 U.S. 1113, 99 S.Ct.
1014, 59 L.Ed.2d 71 (1979)3 and
Carlson v. sreen, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct.
1468, 64% L.Ed.2d 15. (1980).
The appellant expresses no opinion on these
items. The sources available to the court
of appeals, as well as to the attornies for
the appellees, should give the full text of
71
each casee *** IP, 151
To this point the argument assumes
that the district judge exercised all the
powers that he had, but given the rules
he was unable to grant the plaintiff a
trial of the case. It is assumed, for
example, that pursuant to Rule 6 (b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts the honor-
able Sherman Finesilver could not enlarge
the various statutes of limitations men-
tioned in his Order, dated February 27,
1987, document numbered: 8, to permit
trial of the real issues in this case,
Given this assumption, the judge was
orerating at 100% efficiency.
For the sake of argument assume that
the judze has more nowers and greater auth-
ority than he in fact exercised. Assume
that he was operating at significantly less
than 100% efficiency. His sub-conscious
judgment may have been swayed without his
conscious awareness. In the popular medias
————
72
of T. V. and motion pictures there is a
prevailing bias against active participants
in the Viet Nam conflict. The judge's con-
scious judgment may have been swayed by
this Sub-conscious bias. He may not even
be aware that it exists.
The "V.C. Whore" episode of Miami Vice,
and the movies Platoon and Lethal Weapon
are indicative of this bigotry. In the
"V.C. Whore”" episode of Miami Vice, the
"men" from liiami team up Ip. 161 with a
former colonel in the North Viet Namese
regular army, (now a high ranking officer
in the secret police of the "Republic" of
Viet Nam), to catch or kill a group of
Viet Nam veterans who travel the world assas-
Sinating world leaders and prostitutes!!!
The movie Platoon is devoid of a scene in
which no one is killed. lt climaxes when
one American soldier kills another in cold
blood!!! Lethal Weapon is about a group of
sex perverted, drug adicted, high ranking
Viet Nam veterans who operate a multi-
73
national drug ring to service greater Los
Angeles, California. Even the 'Zood guys"
are veterans, one of whom claims the dis-
tinction of having killed a man at the
age of 21 with a rifle at 1,000 yards.
Few men could do this, even with the best
modern equipment!!! These productions are
indicative of a pervasive sub-conscious
cultural milieu of bigotry that few groups
based on race, religion, or gender would
tolerate without protest.
*#* Equal protection of the laws may
not be possiole in such a milieu.
lire Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
the Supreme Court of the United States in
Beauharnais v. lllinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72
S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952) extended the
protections afforded the individual under
our libel laws to cover identifiable
groups as well. The justice states that
e+e a man's job and his educational
opportunities and the dignity accorded him
may depend as uch on the reputation of
the racial and religious group to which he
willynilly belongs, as on his own merits.
74
Since the original complaint, the appellant
has claimed that his own merits may be
clouded by association with Viet Nam vet-
erans in general. iwiembers of law school
admission committees may be totally un-
aware of their negative responses to Viet
Nam veterans. Federal judges may respond
the same way. In either case their emotional
responses may have been formed by fictional
representations which have no basis in fact.
In either case their one on one associations
with actual veterans are probably limited.
Few veterans have gone to law school and
even fewer have become federal judges. Those
with whom they would most likely come in
contact are defendants in criminal proceed-
ings. These would be the least desirable
representatives of the Viet Nam veteran
group.
The court should clearly understand
this section of the argument. lWisunder-
standing is so easy. Law school admission
committee members do not actively reject
75
Viet Nam veterans because they are veterans
and federal judzes do not disfavor them be-
cause the judzes are onerating an active.
conspiracy. The vruo»lem is that these people
have deen conditioned to associate a long
list of undesirable qualities with veterans
aS a group which have no basis in fact. A
Significant part of the provlem is that
there is no physical contact between the
elements in the equation. Through all the
law school application processes the appel-
lant has experienced he has spoken to one
anonymous live huaman being on the telephone.
Ip. 181 More than a year has elapsed since
the first version of tne original complaint
was submitted to the district court. In
that veriod the appellant has spoken to one
live female Washington attorney who called
to Find out who the appellant's attorney
was. She Laughed on the indication that he
would be speaking pro Se.
The apv:ellant is well aware of the
fact that a number of decades ago the
76
academic admission process was abused
when personal contact was allowed to
influence admission decisions. The same
was also true in the administration of
justice. The present arrangement is equally
abusive. It is the appellant's argument
that the current arrangement strips Viet
Nam veterans of their right to use the
First Amendment as either sword or shield.
Without protection against libel, they may
not advocate their own cause. ***
IP. 22IILetter from Betsy Levin, Deans
University of Colorado, Boulders School of
Laws to Robert John Arko; dated April 15,
1983. The text has been omitted.I
IP. 231ILetter from Lewis and Clark
College; Northwestern School of Law; to
Robert John Arko; dated: January 20, 1984.
The text has been omitted.1***
870727 Brief for Defendants-Appellees Law
School Admission Council and Law School
Admission Services, Inc.
IThe following excerpt is from the title
pageril
Robert John Arko,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-against-
The United States Air Force Reserve
Officer Training Program; The School
of Education, University of Colorado;
The School of Law, University of Colo-
rados The Law School Admission Council;
and The Law School Admission Services,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
The American Bar Association, and The
Association of American Law Schools,
Defendants. ***
IP. 10I In their motion to dismiss,
LSAC and LSAS argued that plaintiff's
antitrust claim should have been dismissed
as a matter of law because plaintiff had
suffered no injury to those interests pro-
tected by the antitrust laws. Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss, filed Novem-
ber 3, 1986, at 8. LSAC and LSAS continue
to press that argument. Plaintiff is not
entitled to sue for damages under the fed-
eral antitrust laws because his “business
or property" were not injured when he was
78
denied admission to law school. *** Plain-
tiff was not necessarily entitled to be
admitted to Law school, and thus no cog-
nizable property interest was harmed by
the rejection of his application. *** Nor
does the complaint allege that there is a
threat of future harm to any interest that
may be protected oy a Ip. 111 private suit
for equitable relief under Clayton Act
section 16, 15 U.S.C. section 26. ***
In response, plaintiff made no attempt
below to establish that he was entitled to
maintain an antitrust claim. On the con-
trary, plaintiff revealed how baseless the
antitrust claim is by acknowledging that
he had raised the issue "only in passing."
Plaintiff's Upposing Memorandum, filed
November 18,1986, at 11-12. None of the
documents that vlaintiff has submitted to
the district court and to this Court has
the slightest bearing on whether LSAC and
LSAS injured plaintiff in violation of the
antitrust laws. The letters attached to
79
plaintiff's second brief indicate only
that plaintiff's applications were denied
by two law schools. Plaintiff's constant
refrain is that he was denied due process.
Since plaintiff's antitrust claim cannot
be maintained as a matter of law, plain-
tiff's due process claims should be measured
only by the applicable two-year statute of
limitations. *** IP, i121 |
It is simply not the case that civil
rights claims may never be time-barred.
Congress clearly intended federal courts
to look to state statutes of limitations to
determine the timeliness of claims under
42 U.S.C. section 1983, and the Supreme
Court has approved this "borrowing" of state
statutes to fill in gaps in the federal law.
**# Plaintiff is asking for an unprecedented
extension of due process when he asks this
Court for a personal exemption from the
statutes of Limitations.
80
B. No Bill of Attainder Is Involved
in This Case.
Plaintiff's argument that the proceed-
ints below are equivalent to a bill of at-
trinder is meritless.
A bill of attainder is a legislative
act which inflicts punishment without a
judicial trial.
*** The bills of attainder clause of
article I, section 9 of the Constitution
serves as a check on congressional power
to single out the persons who will be bur-
dened by federal statutes. *** Article I,
section 10 of the Constitution imposes Ip.
13I a similar prohibdition on state govern-
ments. No such legislative act was at issue
in the district court, and claintiff should
not ve permitted to raise this absurd con-
tention for the first time on appeal. In-
deed the history of the proceedings reflect-
ed in the record below reveals that the
district court gave plaintiff every oppor-
tunity to submit papers and so-called “newly
discovered evidence” to the judge.
81
Without doubt, plaintiff's claims were
heard and decided in full accordance with
the due process of law. ***
870806 Reply Brief of the Appellant
IP. 11 *** With regard to the appel-
lees‘ section titled: Plaintiff's New
Evidences Ibid. at p. 73 it is not possible
to know if the appellant's reputation has
been abused by the family fude in quest-
ion, by the fact that he is associated with
other Viet Nam veterans, by the fact that
he has a low grade-point average and low
Law School Admission Test Scores, or by his
association with some other unknown charac-
teristic. Only due process can clearify
this issue. If thé appellant knew, for
example, that his association with the
family fude in question was the reason for
his rejection by these educational programs,
he would have no need for due process. A
claim for other relief would be more approp-
riate. Ip. 2I ***
It is mandatory, however, that other
82
individuals who are in similar situations
have a forum for due process of law. Sim-
ilar complaints would be more difficult
to make if all participants entering the
schoolhouse door were governed by a writ-
ten constitution applicable to the institu-
tion in which they are enrolled as students,
where they work as teachers, or where they
supervise as administrators. A written con-
stitution with appropriate checks and bal-
ances should govern relations among students,
faculty and administration from pre-school
through post-graduate education. While a
general constitution should apply to each
level of education, each school should have
the authority to amend the rules to account
Ip. 31 for local needs. ***
In law schovl admissions the present
system should be maintained in tact, with a
few exceptions. Each applicant should be
allowed to take the Law School Admission
Test only once in each of three calendar
years. After making unsuccessful applications
83
to at least ten schools during the three
years the applicant should be permitted to
take an alternate route. The minimum requ-
irements for this alternate admissions pro-
gram might include two years of military
service, two years of work experience with
more than one employer, and a M.A. degree.
The alternate approach would culminate in
a court proceeding in which the unsuccess-
ful applicant must speak pro se. Opposing
counsel would be third year law students
enrolled in a course organized to encour-
age law students to become prosecutors.
Retired federal judges would oversee these
proceedings held in law school moot court
rooms during term breaks. Federal rules of
civil procedure, including Ip. 4I normal
rights of appeal, would govern proceedings.
Precedent would be governed by prior years'
proceedings. The federal government and the
various legal education systems would share
the cost of administering this plan with
the applicant paying a nominal fee.
84
At the same time, law schools should
be encouraged to provide alternative
approaches in legal education. Of the law
school programs that the appellant has re-
viewed he is able to say that they are re-
markably similar. Admission procedures,
course offerings, and the professional
background of the professors is uniform.”
The best these organizations can say is
that they accept applicants who will be
successful in their programs. They should
be required to say that their programs have
helped train the most just members of our
society.
The appellant brought his original
complaint to court to encourage the appel-
lees to improve their programs. To be re-
jected as often as the appellant has would
be tragic if no good comes from these ex-
periences. Une officer, one teacher, or
D This was written before the District
of Colum»ia School of Law, formerly the
Antioch School of Law, came to the attention
of the appellant.
}
85
one lawyer - more or less - is insignificant.
In a democracy it is required that each in-
dividual work to improve the system when
it is within his capabilities to do so.
Within the context of this case tolling
the various statutes of limitations would
contribute toward improving the educational
system in gereral, and legal education in
particular.
The appellees‘ argument at pp. 10-11,
Ibid., misses the point. The plaintiff-
appellant is not suing for damages. He is
not claiming that he was injured when he
was denied admission to law school. He
also does not claim that his business or
property were injured Ip. 5I when he was
denied admission to law school. What he
does claim is that the appellees have devel-
oped a legal education system that routinly
stretches the meaning of the term “due
process" to the breaking point. They have
done this by developing a system that is
vertically integrated from the point of law
86
school admission testing through post-
graduate certification and job placement.
The appellees can pnoint to no effective
competing organization. The system is so
non-competitive that no one is aware of it.
It may be true that a modern day
Supreme court has 2pproved a “borrowing"
of state statutes to fill in the gaps in
federal law. But, was that the intent of
the founding fathers? In the Articles of
Confederation they had a constitution that
was based on the notion that the source of
the national authority was the collective
will of the various state governments. The
system self-destructed. Seventy-five years
later the southern states took the same
approach in forming the Confederate States
of America. It did not survive childhood.
The :ppellees now suggest that what could
not be achieved with revolution or civil
war can be codified into law through
inconspicuous judicial review. The appellant
objects!
87
The appellant may have made comments
in his orief dated June 1, 1987 that stretch
the meaning of the applicable phrases of the
Constitution beyond acceptable limits.
Nothing in the brief of the appellees, how-
ever, leads the appellant to retract one
word regarding bills of attainder. Without
due process no one could learn whether a
legislative act played a part in the various
decisions at issue in this case, or whether
other non-legislative factors controlled
these decisions; ***,. IP. 6I The appellant
continues to believe that eacn of the appel-
lees had very good reasons for making each
decision in question. But, the appellant
has no documentary proof that this was the
case. Consequently, oills of attainder
remain real possibilities in this case. ***
IP. 8I
Conclusion
The following quotation is taken from
the appellees’ brief dated July 27, 1987:
at De lls
88
«ee None of the documents that plaintiff
has submitted to the district court and
to this Court has the slightest bearing
on whether LSAC and LSAS injured plaintiff
in violation of the antitrust laws. The
letters attached to plaintiff's second
brief indicate only that plaintiff's
applications were denied by two law
Schools. eee
The following letters are submitted to this
Court as evidence in direct rebuttal to this
argument. The Court must conclude that the
appellant does have an antitrust claim that
has been timely filed against the American
Bar Association, the Association of Amer-
ican Law Schools, the Law School Admission
Council, and Law School Admission Services,
Inc. The Court must also conclude that the
appellant's experiences in the Air Force
ROTC Frogram and the Student Teaching Pro-
gram sponsored by the University of Colo-
rado School of Education had a direct, neg-
ative impact on his various applications to
the University of Colorado School of Law,
as well as his applications to other law
schvols. ***
89
ILetters from 13 law schools are pre-
sented on pases 9 through 21 of this brief.
Each letter is addressed to Robert John
Arko. The paragraphs that follow give the
name and location of the school submitting
the letter, and its effective date. The
page in this brief concludes each entry.
The text of each letter has been omitted.
The University of New Mexico School of
Law; Albuquerque, New Mexico; February 15,
19823 pe 9.
Collese of Laws; The University of
Wyoming; Laramie, Wyoming; March 5, 19823
p.- 10.
Brigham Young University; J. Reuben
Clark Law Schools Frovo, Utah; March 30,
1982; p. il.
The University of Kansas School of
Law; Lawrence, Kansas; April 5, 19823 p. 12.
solden Gate University School of Laws
San Francisco, California; April 12, 1982;
pe 13-
The University of Arizona College of
aa a i
90
Law; Tucson, Arizona; April 19, 1982; p. 14.
Arizona State University College of
Law; Lfempe, Arizonas April 20, 19823 pe 15.
University of Denver College of Laws
Denver, Colorado; April 20, 1982; p. 16.
New York Law School; New York, New
York; Arril 26, 1982; p. 17.
The University of Utah College of Laws
Selt Lake City, Utah; Arril 30, 19823 p. 18.
Loyola Law School; Los Anseles, Cali-
fornias May 5, 1982; p. 19.
Creighton University School of Law;
Umaha, Nebraska; hiay 7, 19823; p. 20.
University of Pittsburgh School of
Law; Pittsburgh, Fennsylvanias May 14, 1982;
pe 21.1
17870917 The Constitution of the United
States of America
Article Une, Section Eight
The Congress shall have Power eee TO
retulate Commerce ... among the several
Btates, «ss TO oss fix the Standard of
Weights and Measures; ..e And To make all
POTTER mmr
———————
91
Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.
Article Une, Section Nine
eee No 3111 of Attainder ... shall be
Ppasseds eee
Article Une, Section ‘Ten
No State shall ... pass any Bill of
Attainder, «es. -«
Article Three, Section One
The judicial Power of the United
States, shzll be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Conzress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judes, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, ee. .
Article Three, Section Two
The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law 2nd Equity, arising under this
PN I me OP BER
eee.
92
Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authoritys ee. -to
Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party; IandI ...-between Citizens
of different States ... .
ee» In all other Cases before men-
tioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Rezulations as the Congress shall make. eee
Amendment One
Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, ... or the right
eee to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.
Amendment Two
A well regulated Militia, being neces-
sary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.
Amendment Five
No person shall be held to answer for
a
ee
93
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on 3 presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury, e+. nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process
Of laws «ee »
Amendment Nine
The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.
Amendment Fourteen, Section One
All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of thie
United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which sh3ll abridge the »vrivileges
or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any
[ee sag eee
94
person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. ***
Table of Authorities eeeeeeesr Page Number
Cases
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250. 72
Se Ct. 725 96 Le Ed. 919 (1952) eeeeee 73
Bivins v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S.
388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed. 2d 619
(1971) *eeeenseenereenwneeneeeeee@eneeeeenseeneneeese 70
Board of Curators of the University of
Missouri v. Horowitz, 98 S.Cy. 948
(1978) @eeveeveeeeneeeeeeeenene 28-30, 40-41
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483, 73 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, (1954)
eeeeveevaeevpeeeveeeeeeeevpeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeae 25
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 237, 98 S.Ct.
1042, 55 LeEd.2d 252 (1987) eessseeee 70
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct.
1560s. 108 emeene £5 (1980) cecccassce 70
Davis v. Fassman, 439 U.S. 1113, 99 S.Ct.
1015, 59 Lice 20 71 (1979) ccccceccce 70
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
——_ S| - e-em eer er
Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (1961) eseee 27
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88
S.Ct. 1444, 20 u.Ed.2d 1412, rehearing
denied 392 U.S. 947, 88 S.Ct. 2270, 20
Letd.2d 1412, (1968) eeeeeevveeeese 27-28
Goss v. Lepez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct.
729, 42 beEd.2d 725, (1975) ececccccee 27
International Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. seneral Telephone & Electronics
95
Table of Authorities .«....+e++ Page Number
Corp.e, 518 F.7d 913, 929 (9th Cir.
1975) . . 7 eo*eeeevreveoevoeeeeeveeeeveeeeee es 13
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43
BSeCte O25, Of LbeBAe 1042, (1923) ceocce
eeeevevpeve eevee eeeeseeseeeeeeenes 29-30, 39
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247, 101 SeCt. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616
(1981) *oeeweeeeneeneneeaeensnene#eeeeeeeseeeeeeeeneest 70
Pierce v. society of the Sisters of the
lioly Name of Jesus and Mary and Fierce
v. Hill hiilitary Academy, 268 U.S. 510,
45 S.Ct. 571, 69 LeEd. 1070, (1925) eco
eeeveevoeaeeevreeeeeeeeeeen eee 29-30, 39-40
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873)
@eeeeveeveeoeeveeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeene 25
Smith v. Wade, H61 Usd- 30, 130 SeCte
1625, 75 LeEd.2d 632 (1983) weveevee 70
Tinker v. Des Bioines Independent
Community school District, 393 U.S.
503, R9 UeCt. 7335 21 Le kd. 2d 731,
(1969) eeeeveeeeeeeveeeeeeeeeaeaeses 24, 38
Wisconsin v. soder, 406 U.S. 205, 92
9eCt. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, (1972) cooce
eveveeveeveeeeeveeeeeevreeeeeeesd 29-30, 39-40
Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F. 2d 1471, 1476,
~—6((10th Crrs 1987) oon eeeseeeeseseeeeere 2
Constitutional Provisions
Generally »« 33, 35, 63, 64-65, 67-68, 82
Article One, Section Eight «escseee 90-91
Article Une, sect ton Nine eevoeeseeeeveseses
eereveveeeereeereeeeeseeseves 62, 80, 87, 91
96
Article Une, Section Ten. 62, 80, 87, 91
Article Three, Section Une esecesosees Ji
Article Three, Section Two eeecsee 91-92
Amendment One o.ereeee 23-24, 63, 76, 92
AmemAmORe THO ciccccianciccecssees O3e 92
Amendment Five esesecccceccccscveesseves
aavees Ma the 12, 19, 20,°390, 334 90:
63, 66, 70, 79, 81, 82, 85, 87, 92 = 93
Amendment Six ccccccsccccccccccesccse O2
Amendment Nine ...... cvscscoese G29O8, 93
Amendment Fourteen esscecoserseseoee 4, 12,
19-20, 25-26, 31, 4O, 41, 64, 73 93-94
Statutes
United States Code
Title 15, Section 15 ceecvesee 12-13, 21
Title 15, Section 26 eccesccscee 225 7S
Titie 26, Bection 1652 i..ccsccee 66-67
Title 28, Section 2401 ceeccccceseeee Al
Title 42, Section 1983 eeooeseoseeeeneeerees
oeee 12, 20, 23, 37, 41, 65-66, 70, 79
Title 42, section 1985 eeeccseesecce 20
Colorado Revised Statutes
13-1-124 @eeeosvsevvreeeeveevoeeeeeeeoeeeveee & 18
13-80-102 @eeeveeveeoeveeveeeeaevpeeeeeeeeeee® 12
Le ee
97
Table of Authorities ....... Page Number
Court Rules
Federa
1 ivil Procedure for the
United 5
i
trict Courts
of L
Dis
DONE Bh bshewsssconccsocsecceecer 83
Rule © cccccsccstvssccscevccccscccsce 18
DUIUMMREWER SS See eezdoctecccscecse 71
Rule 8 cecccecsccrscccscscseccccsevsesece 2
Rule 12 ee >t 23, 30, 31
DR ED SESUGeRaesecebeccecsse 15, 17, 48
MRO OO Bavskecsce 1, 5, 15, 16, 17, 48
Federal Rules of Evidence for the United
States Vourts and Magistrates
Rule 4O2 seeesevoe@eveeeseeeeevpeeweeeeeeeseee ®@ 4g
Federal kKules of Apvellate Frocedure
Rule 34 @®eeevevoveeveeeeeeepeeeeeeeeeevnen ee 1
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure -
“United States Court of Apveals for the
lenth Circuit - Local Rules of Practice
Rule 34 e®eeteeoeeveeeseeeeoseeesvseseeeeeeeeeae 1
Congressional Acts
Clayton Act eene ie 10, 12-13, 21-22, 78
Judiciary Act of 1789 eseeseeeeeseeees 67
»hermane eeereeeseeesenes 7° 10, 13, 21
98
Table of Authorities eveovece Page Number
Bouks
The Holy Bible: Containing the Old and
New Testaments in Confraternity and
Douay _‘lexts. (llew York: Abradale Press,
Publishers; 1965.) eeseeeneseseseeee 24
Hutchins, Robert Maynard; ed. Great
Books of the Western Workds Volume 43
American State Papers, The Federalist,
J. S. Mill. (Chicago, Illinois: William
Benton, Fubdlisher-Encyclopaedia ¥ritan-
nica, Inc.; 1952.) (Hereinafter cited
as Hutchins, Urezt Books.) The Federal-
ist, PPe 21-259 eeeoeevee eoeoeeseanesd 34-36
Nizer, Louis, the Jury Returns. (Garden
City, llew York: Doubleday and Company,
Ince} 1966. ) evesceoeoseseeneeeeneeeeeeeee
Documents
Articles of Confederation. Hutchins,
Great Books. (Up. cit.3; pp. 5-9.) «+ 86
Law Schools
Sere Bere. GO. LAW ccaccdaccosrsceae OF
Arizona State University College of Law
eeeoveveveeveoeeeeeveeseoeeevseeeoeeeereeeeeves 90
Brisham Young University; J. Reuben
Clark Law school @cevesveeeeveeeeeeeee@ 89
College of Law, The University of
Wyoming Core eerr ese sesereeeeeeeesese 89
Creighton University School of Law .. 90
District of Columoia School of Law .. 84
Golden Gate University School of Law. 89
ee
99
Table of Authorities .«..«.e... Page Number
Lewis and Clark Colleges Northwestern
De: Oe AM Sa ccccesoccscesusse 704 79
Loyola Law School seooeeeeeseerevneeeeee 90
New ork Law ‘School ccccccccsececscces 90
University of Arizona College of Law ee.
@eeeeveeevoeeereeveaeeeeneesvseeseeeeeeeee ee 8 89-90
University of Colorado School of Law ...
s 1, 2» 4, 6, 9, 41, 42, 76, 77> 79% 88
University of Denver College of Law. 90
The University of Kansas School of Law .
@eeeseeseeeeeeeeveeseesee#espeeeeweeseeaneeeseese 89
University of New hiexico School of Law .
e*eveeseeoeeeeeeeveeeeeveeeeeeepeeeeeeeeeeeenee 89
University of Fittsburgh School of Law .
@eeeeoeseeoevoeepevpeeeweseeveeeeveeeeeesve eee eeeeeee 90
University of Utah College of Law ... 90
Dramatic Fresentations
Lethal Weapon aeeesvevesvpeeeeeeeeeee 72-73
Full Metal Jacket ceecvccvncvvsesceveces 32
Miami Vice, "V. C. Whore" episode ... 72
Flatoon eeeveeeervreoeeeeeeeeeeseseeeseee 72
Frivate Letters in Evidence
From Mrs. Josephine Arko to Mr. Jess
Sawaya, undated eeeoeveeoeseeoseeeveeee @ 49-50
From irs. Josephine Arko to Mr. Jess
Sawaya, 04-23-87 eeceoeseeeneseeeeeee 51-52
100
Table of Authorities .«...+.. Page Number
From Rovert Jotm Arko to Mr. and Mrs.
Jess Sawaja, 03-23-87 cocccce 4HuK6G, 48
From bir. Jess Saw2ya to Mrs. Josephine
Arko, 05-10-30 eeoeeeeceeeseeee 52, 53-59
From Iir. and Mrs. Jess Sawaya to Robert
John Arko, 03-28-87 @eeeeeveoeveeveee0 46-48
From Mr. Jess Sawaya to Mrs. Josephine
Arko, 04-13-87 e@eseeveeseseveeeeeeeee08 50-51
From Mr. Jess Sawaya to Mrs. Josephine
Arko, 04-27-87 eeveevoneeseeeeeeese 52-53
Newspaner Articles
Fialka, John J. “Constitutional Issues
Tne Dimming Aura of James Madisons
Document's Frincipal Author Is So
Forzotten a du runt Eclipses Him at His
Home". The Wall Street Journal. (Den-
ver, Colorado: Vow Jones & Company,
Inc.3; November 28, 1986.) Volume CXV,
Number 106. Western Edition. Page 1,
column 4 and page 4, column 4. eeeve 32
101
Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 28.5 (c) I have this
Abt. day of Rese, 1988 mailed the
original document or a true and correct
copy of the original Fetition and accom-
panying Joint Apprndix Prepared by the
Appellant, three of each to a set, tos
Honorable Charles Fried, Solicitor
General
The Department of Justice
Washington, DL. C. 20530
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Department of the Air Force
The Department of Defense
Washington, UV. UC. 20003
Robert WN. bhiiller, United States Attorney
Attn.: Richard J. Nolan, Assistant United
states Attcrney ;
1200 Byron G. Rogers Federal Building, Dr.
3615
1961 Stout street
Denver, Colorado 80294
liajor steven J. Pecinovsky, USAF, Trial
Attorney
General Litigation Vivision
Office of the Judge Advocate [General
Washington, LD. C. 20330-5210
John V. McDermott, Attorney
Jensen, Byrne, Parcons and Ruh, P. C.
Equitable Building - Suite 338
730 seventeenth Street
Denver, Colorado 80202
102
Glen S. verstell, Esq.
LD. Stephen Mathias, Esq.
Milbank, ‘tweed, Hadley and hbicCloy
International Square Building
1825 Eye Street,N. W.
Washington, DL. C. 200063 and
Joanne M. licDevitt
Uffice of University Counsel, Litigation
Division
University of Colorado, Denver
1200 Larimer Street - Campus Box 183
Denver, Colorado 80204
by placing these documents in the United
States Nails, first class postage prepaid,
and addressed to the above named persons
as noted.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.