Opposition Brief — In re Solerwitz

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No. 88-502 JOSE F. SPANIOL, JR

| CLERK

Supreme Geutt, U.S. ]

FILED ;

BEC 44 1988

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

IN RE JACK B. SOLERWITZ

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

DONALD B. AYER

Acting Solicitor General

JOHN R. BOLTON

Assistant Attorney General

DAVID M. COHEN

SANDRA P. SPOONER

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 633-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether an attorney who prosecuted 142 frivolous

appeals, notwithstanding repeated warnings from the

court that such conduct would subject him to sanctions,

engaged in “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar”

within the meaning of Fed. R. App. P. 46(b) and was

therefore properly subjected to the sanction of a one-year

suspension from practice before that court.

2. Whether an attorney subjected to disciplinary pro-

ceedings under Fed. R. App. P. 46(b) is entitled to have

the decision made by a tribunal other than the court before

which the misconduct occurred.

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Adams v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d

488 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984) ..... 4,5

Amodeo vy. Department of Transportation, FAA, 788

F.2d 1549 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 849

Ns a aad plese es wwe Oe 5

Anderscn v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

F.2d 2537 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

Te ae aca eS abc ek bx cas ws vO 4

Bithoney, In re, 486 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1973) ............ 15, 17

Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) ............0.... 17

Brown v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

ee re 13

Burr, Ex parte, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824) .......... 17

Campbell v. Department of Transportation, FAA,

735 F.2d 497 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881

na Soe ag ok bike ed- ack xe 6's 4

Chandler, In re, 450 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1971) ....0...... 17

Des Vignes vy. Department of Transportation, FAA

791 F.2d 142 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853

Sie AIOE ig ar ean Lor SNP RA, Cones atte ge

DiMasso vy. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

F.2d 526 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

GRE S Se sisi niod Te Da eg 4

IV

Cases — Continued: Page

Dorrance v. Department of Transportation, FAA,

735 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

SE Sa-cu cess choad aa ne eeee Lh Rees eeeersinieant< 4

Garland, Ex parte, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867) ......... 17

Martel v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

F.2d 504 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

SOU cs xo i dk xk ooking ob tase es aed e eae an ose RS 4

Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) ......... 18

Moylan v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

F.2d 524 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

GR Se oo esin eae sk Sea cee eee a eek ek ee 4, 13

Novotny v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

oe bP Be ke AR a oe 3

Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) ............. 18

Schapansky v. Department of Transportation, FAA,

735 F.2d 477 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

EN css hed ses Sad SAREE ON eh awed Oona ae eas 2, 4, 13

Snyder, In re, 472 U.S. 634 (1985) ..............-4-. 16, 17, 18

Tatum, In re, 587 F.2d 682 (Sth Cir. 1979) ............. 17

Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) ..............-... 17-18

Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S.

EE oa ae val ad eke cress Rea he wae se 17

Statute and rules:

a ae ewe age Cae eS are a ei 3

Fed. Cir. R.:

Sa SO aren ates OR oe mtiey OA ge UR caer ene wee ma ery 5

oe cn od ae waa aie ene ain Gee Aer 6

Fed. R. App. P.:

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Ea eae ae tear ie Se nei Ae my tans scree ke 6

ee ea Sth os uh kt aracie ips nee ia We Re 19

A Se Rc ia WER RRO Recah Seat ee her erm 7, 11, 19

DN sb ge n'a Ware eed bk arse katy Wik Soe 16

SARIS eet ae doe reer OM ae We et 2, 8, 10, 11

Fed. R. Civ. P.:

NG Se ee ke a eee ad eas 19

EEE Ac koe cu ea okt be ne be ae nn ee CRN 19

Rules — Continued: Page

Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983):

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Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

No. 88-502

IN RE JACK B. SOLERWITZ

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL GEARCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App.

A163-A201) and its opinion denying petitioner’s motion

for reconsideration (Pet. App. A202-A206) are reported at

848 F.2d 1573.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

June 17, 1988, and a petition for reconsideration was

denied on July 20, 1988 (Pet. App. A202-A206). The peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 16,

1988. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENI

Petitioner is an attorney who was found by the court of

appeals to have filed more than 140 frivolous appeals from

decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB),

(1)

2

after having been repeatedly warned by the court that such

conduct would be improper and would subject him to

sanctions. In these distinct proceedings, the court of ap-

peals found that petitioner’s litigation practices con-

stituted “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar”

within the meaning of Fed. R. App. P. 46(b), and it

therefore suspended him from practice before that court

for one year.

1. More than 11,000 air traffic controllers were

removed from their positions for having participated in

the illegal nationwide strike called by the Professional Air

Traffic Controllers Organization in August 1981. More

than 10,000 of the former controllers appealed their

removals to the MSPB, and more than 4,600 filed peti-

tions for review of adverse MSPB decisions in the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Pet. App.

A165-A166).'

By order dated February 24, 1983 (App. A, infra,

la-3a), after consultation with counsel who elected to par-

ticipate, the court of appeals designated seven of the ap-

peals raising controlling legal issues as “lead cases.” It

scheduled those cases for expedited briefing, oral argu-

ment and decision, and suspended proceedings in the re-

maining appeals by directing the clerk to withhold

docketing. The lead cases consisted of the two cases

already pending before the court that had received full

MSPB review and five others then pending before the

MSPB that the MSPB itself had designated as lead cases.’

| A discussion of the strike and the litigation it spawned may be

found in Schapansky v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735

F.2d 477 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).

2 Because some of the petitioners involved in the seven lead cases re-

tained different counsel on appeal, the original seven cases ultimately

resulted in eleven different lead cases before the court of appeals. See

Pet. App. AS-A7 n.3.

a |

The court believed that it was appropriate to “determine

the common controlling legal issues as soon as possible

and thus avoid repetitious and unnecessary decision of the

Same issues in many cases” (App., infra, 2a). See Pet.

App. A166-A167. Petitioner was counsel in one of the lead

cases (id. at A167; see Novotny v. Department of

Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 521 (Fed. Cir. 1984)), and

he also represented between 800 and 1000 former con-

trollers before the MSPB and filed petitions for review in

the court of appeals on behalf of 736 individuals (ibid.).?

On May 18, 1984, a five-judge panel of the court of ap-

peals decided the lead cases. See 28 U.S.C. 46(b). On the

same date, the court sent notices to counsel and petitioners

in all pending air traffic controller appeals, enclosing

copies of the lead-case decisions and stating that counsel

and the petitioners would be notified upon “final disposi-

tion” of the lead cases and would be requested at that time

to state their intentions with respect to maintaining their

appeals (App. B, infra, 4a). Counsel and petitioners were

cautioned about the impropriety of maintaining frivolous

appeals and were furnished with citations to decisions in

which the court below had imposed sanctions for such

conduct. /bid.; see Pet. App. A167-A168.

In a notice dated December 10, 1984, the court of ap-

peals informed all counsel and petitioners in the pending

controller cases that this Court had denied review in the

lead cases in which certiorari petitions were filed and that

mandates had been issued in those cases to the MSPB

> Petitioner’s standard fee was $750 for representation in ad-

ministrative proceedings through the regional level of the MSPB and

$2500 for all subsequent appeals, although petitioner apparently

waived that fee for some of his clients. Pet. App. A23-A24 & n.7,

Al7S.

4

(App. C, infra, 5a-6a).* Each recipient of the notice was

informed that the suspension of non-lead cases would re-

main in effect until January 10, 1988, and that before that

date, the recipient must either withdraw his then-present

petition for review or file a renewed petition; if the reci-

pient did neither, the pending petition would be dismissed.

The court also once again warned counsel and petitioners

of the impropriety of maintaining frivolous appeals.

Finally, the notice informed the recipient that if a new

petition was filed on or before January 10, 1985, the ap-

peal would be docketed on the date of receipt and the peti-

tioner’s brief would be due 60 days thereafter. [bid.,; see

Pet. App. A168-A169.°

2. a. Petitioner had initially filed a total of 154 peti-

tions for review on behalf of the 736 former controllers

whom he represented (Pet. App. A167). After the lead

cases were concluded and the suspension lifted, petitioner

filed renewed petitions for review in all of those cases (id.

4 Petitions for writs of certiorari were denied in Schapansky v.

Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 477 (Fed. Cir.), cert.

denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Adams v. Department of Transporta-

tion, FAA, 735 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018

(1984); Campbell v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d

497 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984); Martel v. Depart-

ment of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 504 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Dorrance v. Department of Transportation,

FAA, 735 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984);

Moylan v. Department of Transportation, FAA; 735 F.2d 524 (Fed.

Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); DiMasso v. Department of

Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 526 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 us.

1018 (1984); and Anderson v. Department of Transportation, FAA,

735 F.2d 537 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).

5 On July 12, July 31, and August 30, 1985, the court again advised

all counsel to review the propriety of maintaining their appeals in light

of the need to avoid abuse of the judicial process resulting from

frivolous appeals (Pet. App. A8).

at A10). Petitioner’s three-person law firm had difficulty

in meeting the court’s 60-day deadline for filing briefs in

that large number of cases, although petitioner at the same

time filed motions to exceed the 50-page limit for briefs

under Fed. R. App. P. 28 and Federal Circuit Rule 13,

which were denied (id. at A10-A11). Petitioner also failed

to file an appendix in 51 of the cases within the time

allowed by the court, even though the court granted one

extension of time (id. at Al2-A14).

b. On May 2, 1986, the court of appeals decided Des

Vignes v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 791 F.2d

142 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986), one of

petitioner’s air traffic controller cases.6 The court first

reviewed each of petitioner’s arguments and found them to

be either patently frivolous or foreclosed by decisions that

no reasonable attorney could expect to be overturned,

modified, or withdrawn (791 F.2d at 143, 145): his con-

stitutional challenge to the court of appeals’ efforts to

manage its docket in the face of the extraordinary caseload

occasioned by the air traffic controller cases was not sup-

ported by citation to any legal authorities and was con-

trary to settled law; his statutory arguments had been re-

jected in the lead cases and yet were advanced without any

effort to distinguish those precedents; and his factual

* Ten of petitioner’s appeals arose out of the same MSPB pro-

ceeding that produced one of the lead cases, Adams v. Department of

Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.

1018 (1984). In its lead-case decision in Adams, the court of appeals

observed that the issues presented by that case appeared to have been

decided in the lead cases, and that the other ten appeals would be

dismissed unless the court received notification that the appeals would

be pursued. Petitioner decided to pursue the appeals, and they were

among those found to be frivolous. Amodeo vy. Department of

Transportation, FAA, 788 F.2d 1549 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 479

U.S. 849 (1986).

6

arguments were unsupported by evidence in the record or

even by any references to the record, as required by Fed.

R. App. P. 28(a)(3) and Federal Circuit Rule 13(a). See

generally Pet. App. A1l43-A145.

The court of appeals in Des Vignes then proceeded to

review the briefs petitioner had filed in his other air traffic

controller cases, which also were before the same panel

(791 F.2d at 145-146). It noted that except for a paragraph

or two relating to individual controllers, the briefs in 107

of those cases were identical and that the remaining cases

were divided into two categories in which the briefs were

also essentially identical to one another (id. at 145 & n.3).

The court observed that “[e]Jach [brief] contains the same

type of patently frivolous constitutional arguments, re-

jected contentions, and unsupported assertions of fact”

(id. at 146) and that “{ajll 131 briefs reflect violations of

the court’s rule requiring citation to the record” (id. at 145

n.3, 146). The briefs did not attempt to persuade the court

that its decisions in the lead cases were wrong; they simply

made the same arguments that had been rejected in those

cases (id. at 144, 146). Moreover, petitioner did not in-

form the court of appeals that his briefs were identical,

thereby forcing the court to review every one to ensure

against the possibility that it might contain a meritorious

argument (id. at 146).

The court in Des Vignes also pointed out that

petitioner’s conduct imposed a substantial burden on

government counsel in their representation of the Federal

Aviation Administration, the respondent in the court of

appeals (791 F.2d at 146):

Respondent prepared briefs in response to each of

counsel’s 131 virtually identical briefs. Counsel’s

failure to refer to the record forced Respondent to do

the work incumbent upon counsel. Counsel’s failure

to supply an appendix in some cases forced Respond-

ent to do so in those cases. Respondent cited the

frivolous, rejected and unsupported contentions

discussed above. Respondent also cited counsel’s fre-

quent, repeated, and brazen violations of this court’s

rules. [Petitioner’s] reply briefs simply ignored those

citations, merely stating that the earlier cases were

distinguishable (but citing no distinguishing facts), ig-

nored Respondent’s charge that he had failed to cite

to the record, and stated that the appeal was filed to

give Des Vignes access to the court. Faced with clear

and insurmountable indication that all 131 appeals

were frivolous, [petitioner] has continued to maintain

this and the other 130 appeals.

On the basis of these findings, the court held that peti-

tioner’s conduct in Des Vignes “constitute[d] a flagrant

and totally inexcusable abuse of the judicial process,” and

it therefore ordered petitioner to pay the government a

monetary sanction in the amount of $1000 (791 F.2d at

146).’

Thereafter, the court of appeals issued decisions in all of

the remaining appeals prosecuted by petitioner. It general-

ly found them to be frivolous and imposed monetary sanc-

tions under Fed. R. App. P. 38 totalling $78,300 (plus

costs totalling $11,843.94) for such conduct as filing

frivolous appeals, abuse of the judicial process, failing

even to attempt to distinguish controlling precedent, and

violating the court’s rules. Petitioner did not contest either

the imposition of these sanctions or their amount. Pet.

App. Al7.

’ Petitioner sought review in this Court of the court of appeals’

holding in Des Vignes that the appeal was frivolous, but the petition

for a writ of certiorari was denied. 479 U.S. 853 (1986). As we pointed

Out in Our memorandum in opposition in Des Vignes, the certiorari

petition was out of time.

8

3. On January 21, 1987, the court of appeals entered

an en banc order requiring petitioner to show cause why he

should not be suspended from practice before the court of

appeals for two years under Fed. R. App. P. 46(b) for

“conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the court”

(App. D, infra, 7a-10a).§ The order recited petitioner’s

conduct in the air traffic controller discharge cases

discussed above and noted that despite the sanctions im-

posed in those cases, petitioner was subsequently sanc-

tioned for filing three more frivolous appeals in cases that

involved the rehiring of controllers (ibid.). Petitioner's

motion to disqualify all of the judges of the en banc court

was denied (Pet. App. A20), and the matter was referred

to Senior Judge Bennett for a hearing and recommended

decision (id. at A20-A21). At the hearing, testimony was

received from petitioner’s wife and former law partner,

three former air traffic controllers, and three expert

witnesses on legal ethics. Petitioner did not testify, relying

instead on an affidavit he had submitted in support of his

motion to disqualify the judges (id. at A173).

On December 10, 1987, Judge Bennett issued a written

opinion (Pet. App. Al-A99) and extensive findings of fact

concerning petitioner’s actions (id. at Al100-A162), in-

8 Rule 46(b) provides:

Suspension or Disbarment. When it is shown to the court that any

member of its bar has been suspended or disbarred from practice

in any other court of record, or has been guilty of conduct

unbecoming a member of the bar of the court, the member will be

subject to suspension or disbarment by the court. The member

shall be afforded an opportunity to show good cause, within such

time as the court shall prescribe, why the member should not be

suspended or disbarred. Upon the member’s response to the rule

to show cause, and after hearing, if requested, or upon expiration

of the time prescribed for a response if no response is made, the

court shall enter an appropriate order.

9

cluding an extensive list of examples of individual cases in

which the Federal Circuit had imposed monetary sanctions

on petitioner (see id. at A105-A113). Judge Bennett noted

the court’s conclusion in Des Vignes regarding petitioner’s

conduct and performance, and he found those conclusions

“confirmed by an independent review of [petitioner’s]

briefs as part of this [disciplinary] proceeding, which in-

dicates, by clear and convincing evidence, that his at-

tempts to comply with the court’s notices, rules, and in-

structions were dramatically deficient in each of the

respects” identified in the order to show cause (id. at A67).

Judge Bennett further found by “clear and convincing

evidence” that petitioner’s “continued course of conduct in

filing and maintaining multiple frivolous appeals in the

face of this court’s orders, notices, instructions, rules,

precedents, and previous sanctions constitutes conduct

unbecoming a member of the bar of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit” (id. at

A84-A85). Finding it “certain” that petitioner “was con-

sciously aware of the court’s rules and orders regarding

overlong briefs, the filing of appendices, citations to the

record, and the need to cite and distinguish the lead cases”

(id. at A92), Judge Bennett recommended that petitioner

be suspended from practice before the court of appeals for

two years, but that enforcement be suspended pending

petitioner’s demonstration of good behavior during a

period of probation (id. at A97).

After receiving petitioner’s exceptions to Judge

Bennett’s findings and recommendations, the court of ap-

peals issued an en banc decision on June 17, 1988, agree-

ing with and adopting Judge Bennett’s determination that

petitioner had engaged in conduct unbecoming a member

of the bar of the court (Pet. App. A163-A201). The court

concluded, however, that the suspension should be for only

_—

10

one year and that imposition of the suspension should not

be delayed beyond the time permitted for filing of a peti-

tion for a writ of certiorari (id. at A164). The court denied

petitioner’s petition for reconsideration on July 20, 1988

(id. at A202-A206).

ARGUMENT

The court of appeals acted well within its authority in

suspending petitioner from practice before that court for a

period of one year on the ground that his handling of

numerous frivolous appeals and abuse of the judicial proc-

ess constituted “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar

of the court” (Fed. R. App. P. 46(b)). The en banc court’s

unanimous decision to impose that limited sanction does

not conflict with any decision of this Court or of another

court of appeals, and it presents no issue of general impor-

tance warranting review by this Court.

1. Petitioner first contends (Pet. 23-32) that the ap-

peals he filed were not actually frivolous and that the court

of appeals’ decision therefore effectively requires lawyers

to become gatekeepers for the courts by screening out

cases that their clients are entitled to have heard by the

courts. This contention is without merit for a variety of

reasons.

a. It is too late for petitioner to contend that he did

not prosecute frivolous appeals or otherwise engage in

conduct that warrants suspension from practice before the

court. Prior to the decision of the en banc court of appeals

in these proceedings, the court of appeals had already

made findings on a case-by-case basis in Des Vignes and

numerous other individual cases that petitioner had pur-

sued frivolous appeals or otherwise engaged in unprofes-

sional conduct, and it had imposed monetary sanctions on

petitioner in those individual cases (Pet. App. A17-A18,

1]

AS54-A55, A105-A113). This Court denied certiorari when

petitioner sought review of the order finding the appeal

frivolous and imposing sanctions in Des Vignes (see note

7, supra), and petitioner did not contest the finding of un-

professional conduct in any of the other individual cases in

which monetary sanctions were imposed (Pet. App. A17).

Those decisions therefore should properly be regarded as

binding on petitioner here. The only question in these pro-

ceedings is whether the cumulative effect of this course of

concededly unprofessional conduct—in the face of re-

peated warnings and despite the imposition of monetary

sanctions in some cases— warranted the further sanction

of suspension from practice before the court of appeals

for a period of one year. If we take as a given—as we must

for present purposes—that petitioner pursued frivolous

appeals or engaged in other improper conduct on the

numerous occasions for which sanctions were imposed

under Rule 38, then the one-year suspension under Rule

46(b) was patently warranted.

Moreover, petitioner was not suspended from practice

before the Federal Circuit solely on the basis of the court’s

prior findings in the individual cases. Judge Bennett and

the en banc court unanimously concluded, on the basis of

their independent review of petitioner’s prior filings and

conduct, that petitioner in fact had prosecuted numerous

frivolous appeals and otherwise engaged in unprofessional

~conduct (Pet. App. A65-A70, A182-A184). This confir-

mation of the prior findings in Des Vignes and other cases

removes any possible doubt regarding the existence of a

factual basis for the suspension.

b. This is not a case, as petitioner claims (Pet. 26, 30),

of a court’s closing its doors to litigants because of the in-

convenience of a heavy caseload. Rather, the court below

reasonably determined to manage an _ extraordinarily

heavy docket of closely related cases by adopting a “lead

12

case” approach that would finally resolve—at least at its

level—the controlling legal issues. In order for that pro-

cedure to be of any benefit to the court and the parties, it

was necessary for the parties to treat the resolution of

issues raised in the lead cases as thereafter controlling the

resolution, by a panel of the court of appeals, of any iden-

tical issues presented in the other cases that were held in

abeyance—especially after this Court denied certiorari in

the lead cases. It therefore was entirely reasonable for the

court of appeals to inform counsel that the parties could

not simply ignore the disposition of the lead cases. In any

event, petitioner is in no position to question the fairness

of this special “lead case” procedure, because he raised no

objection when it was first instituted or at any time before

the lead cases were decided, and he was the sole counsel in

one of the lead cases (Pet. App. A9, A162).

Moreover, the procedure followed by the court below

did not prevent counsel from (1) attempting to distinguish

their cases from the lead cases on legal or factual grounds,

(2) seeking en banc reconsideration of the legal issues that

had been decided, or (3) simply acknowledging the court

of appeals’ precedents and preserving the issues for possi-

ble review by this Court. But petitioner followed none of

those legitimate courses. Instead, he simply reargued the

issues previously decided —disregarding the court’s rules

and notices, failing to distinguish the lead case authorities,

ignoring the authorities cited in the government’s briefs,

and making factual arguments without citation to the

record (Pet. App. A170). There accordingly is no merit to

petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 7-9, 26) that the numerous

briefs he filed were addressed to questions left open by the

decisions in the lead cases.? This conclusion is confirmed

® Because none of petitioner’s briefs cited to the record below, peti-

tioner cannot argue that he properly raised any factual issues, such as

13

by the court’s exhaustive analysis of petitioner’s brief in

Des Vignes, which was substantially identical to almost all

of the other briefs and which demonstrated that petitioner

neither attempted to distinguish the lead cases nor

acknowledged those adverse precedents and argued for

their reversal or modification; he merely repeated the same

arguments that a five-judge panel of the court had only

recently rejected (Pet. App. A189-A190). Nor, contrary to

petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 26), did he prosecute the ap-

peals in a manner that simply preserved the issues for con-

sideration by this Court. He took the position that he was

entitled to prevail in the court of appeals, thus requiring

government counsel and the court below to examine each

and every case and brief that he filed so that any

meritorious issue left open by the lead cases would not be

overlooked.!°

the propriety of consolidation by the MSPB (see Pet. 7). See Moylan

v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 524 (Fed. Cir.),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984) (petitioner waived any right he may

have had to object to consolidation). Moreover, contrary to peti-

tioner’s suggestion (Pet. 8), the appropriateness of the penalty of

removal for the offense of participating in the illegal strike was settled

by Schapansky v. Department of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 477

(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984), one of the lead cases.

Petitioner’s reliance (Pet. 8) on Brown v. Department of Transporta-

tion, FAA, 735 F.2d 543 (Fed. Cir. 1984), for the proposition that

there was still doubt on this point after Schapansky is completely

misplaced, because the offense in that case was not participation in a

strike. Finally, while it is true that the decision in Schapansky left

open the possibility that individual controllers who were absent during

the strike could prove facts showing that their absence was not at-

tributable to participation in the strike (see Pet. 8-9), petitioner’s

briefs did not legitimately raise this issue because they did not cite to

supporting evidence in the record.

'0 As Judge Bennett pointed out (Pet. App. A81I), only four cer-

tiorari petitions were filed in the 154 cases in which petitioner pros-

14

c. Petitioner erroneously relies (Pet. 15-17, 28 n.8,

31-32) on the views of several experts on legal ethics who

testified at the hearing before Judge Bennett on the ques-

tion of when an appeal should be regarded as “frivolous.”

Although the court below properly concluded that the

responsibility to judge the conduct of members of its bar

resides with the court, rather than petitioner’s witnesses, it

nevertheless observed that the conclusions drawn by peti-

tioner’s witnesses were stated in general terms and did not

address the specific grounds upon which the court had

already found the appeals to be frivolous (Pet. App.

A50-A51, A186-A187).

The experts premised their testimony largely on the view

that petitioner was obligated to pursue the appeals because

his clients insisted that he do so. That proposition,

however, is clearly incorrect. The American Bar Associa-

tion’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983), which

codify broadly accepted professional standards, prohibit

the maintenance of frivolous litigation.'' Although those

Rules do permit a lawyer to make “a good faith argument

for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law”

(see note 11, supra), when pursuing that course, it is im-

ecuted appeals on behalf of 736 controllers, and all of those petitions

were denied. %

'' Rule 3.1 provides:

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or con-

trovert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is

not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an exten-

sion, modification or reversal of existing law. * * *

As Judge Bennett’s recommended opinion explains, the relevant pro-

visions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were

adopted in 1983, are fully consistent with the corresponding provi-

sions of the superseded Model Code of Professional Responsibility

(Pet. App. A32-A38).

|

15

perative, as Judge Bennett observed, “that the attorney

cite and attempt to distinguish the contrary precedent and

provide arguable reasons supporting an _ extension,

modification, or reversal of existing law” (Pet. App. A80).

Yet petitioner “consistently did neither” (ibid.). Because

petitioner’s experts focused on the propriety of such

legitimate efforts to confront and distinguish countervail-

ing authority, their testimony did not address the conduct

in which petitioner actually engaged. In addition,

although the Model Rules require a lawyer to represent his

client with diligence, that duty does not extend to the use

of unlawful or unethical measures.'? See Jn re Bithoney,

486 F.2d 319, 322 (ist Cir. 1973). As the court below prop-

erly concluded, a lawyer may not escape responsibility for

his own unethical conduct by asserting that his clients in-

sisted that he engage in it (Pet. App. A187).

d. Petitioner asserts (Pet. 11) that his firm took “ap-

propriate, lawyerly steps” to deal with the problem of fil-

ing dozens of briefs within the 60-day period prescribed by

the court of appeals after the lead cases were decided.

However, that contention ignores the fact that petitioner

apparently was able to prosecute the numerous appeals

only by flagrantly disregarding the court’s rules and

'2 Rule 1.3 provides: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence

and promptness in representing a client.” However, the comment to

this rule states that a lawyer “may take whatever lawful and ethical

measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor” (em-

phasis added). Similarly, although Rule 1.2 states that “[a] lawyer

shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of

representation,” it provides only that the lawyer “shall consu/t with the

client as to the means by which they are to be pursued” (emphasis

added). Thus, as between the lawyer and the client, the lawyer must

decide what means are lawful and ethical. The client’s authority is

limited “by law and the lawyer’s professional obligations,” and “a

lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply

because a client may wish that the lawyer do so.” Rule 1.2, comment.

EC

16

notices and by filing “canned” briefs that did not mean-

ingfully address the governing precedents or even

acknowledge the individual records upon which the ap-

peals were based. It was not sufficient for counsel to cope

as best he could; it was his responsibility not to take on

cases that he could not competently handle.'?

e. Finally, the decision below does not, as petitioner

maintains (Pet. 25), require members of the Federal Cir-

cuit’s bar to serve as its “gatekeepers.” The decision below

simply enforces the “almost universally recognized” duty

of officers of the court to avoid conduct that is “prej-

udicial to the administration of justice.” Jn re Synder, 472

U.S. 634, 645 (1985). It cannot be doubted that filing more

than 140 frivolous appeals in the face of repeated warnings

was prejudicial to the administration of justice, because it

detracted from the court’s ability to devote its limited

resources to deserving litigants and required unwarranted

additional efforts of government counsel in responding to

petitioner’s submissions. For these reasons, petitioner’s

conduct was “unbecoming a member of the bar of the

court” and properly subjected him to the one-year suspen-

sion.

2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 33-40), however, that the

suspension was defective because he was entitled to, but

did not receive, certain “procedural safeguards” — prin-

cipally a “neutral and unbiased tribunal” (Pet. 33, 36), by

which he means a tribunal other than the court of appeals.

However, there is no support for petitioner’s contention

that it is improper for the court before which an attorney

engages in misconduct to make determinations under and

enforce Fed. R. App. P. 46. To the contrary, the Rule ex-

'’ The comment to Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules of Professional

Conduct states: “A lawyer's work load should be controlled so that

each matter can be handled adequately.”

17

pressly provides for the court itself to take the disciplinary

action. See note 8, supra. Vesting that responsibility in the

court is consistent with the fact that it is the court itself

that admits attorneys to practice in the first place, and

with this Court’s recognition of the inherent power of the

federal courts, in the absence of a governing Act of Con-

gress, to regulate the conduct of attorneys and to suspend

or disbar an attorney from practice before them. See /n re

Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985); Ex parte Garland, 71

U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-379 (1866); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S.

(9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824). Moreover, as Judge Bennett

pointed out (Pet. App. A44-A45), the standard procedure

in the courts of appeals is for the court itself to make the

final determination whether an attorney should be sus-

pended, disbarred, or otherwise disciplined. See /n re

Snyder, 472 U.S. at 638-642; In re Bithoney, supra; In re

Tatum, 587 F.2d 682 (Sth Cir. 1979); In re Chandler, 450

F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1971).

Petitioner seeks to bolster his argument that all judges

on the en banc court of appeals should have been dis-

qualified by arguing (Pet. 33-36) that disciplinary pro-

ceedings are like criminal contempt proceedings, in which

disqualification is sometimes required. The two situations

are, however, very different. A criminal contempt, to

which various procedural safeguards attach, “is a crime in

the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public

wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or

both.” Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968); accord,

Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S.

787 (1987). This Court therefore has held that in some cir-

cumstances, where the conduct involves a personal attack

on the judge that is likely to leave a personal sting, the

contempt proceedings should be presided over by a dif-

ferent judge. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488,

18

501-503 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455

(1971); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954). A pro-

ceeding concerning the possible suspension of a lawyer for

“conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the court” is

quite different from a criminal prosecution. Such a pro- —

ceeding focuses on the individuai’s adherence to the widely

accepted standards of his profession, including the

avoidance of conduct that is inimical to the administration

of justice (Jn re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 645), and a proceeding

concerning the possible suspension or disbarment of an at-

torney is an aspect of the court’s broad regulatory power

over the attorneys who practice before it. It therefore is

untenable to suggest that all judges of the particular court

must be disqualified from participating in an attorney

disciplinary proceeding. Moreover, even in cases of

criminal contempt, there is no absolute rule barring the

judge who presided in the underlying proceeding from also

presiding in the contempt proceeding, if the conduct does

not personally embroil the judge. Here, petitioner’s un-

professional conduct was not personally directed to any of

the judges of the court of appeals, and therefore would

not require the disqualification of those judges even if the

principles of the contempt cases were fully applicable in

this setting.

b. There is no basis for petitioner’s underlying premise

that the court below was partial or biased in some manner.

There is, for example, no evidence that the court of ap-

peals had prejudged the question whether petitioner

should be suspended from practice before that court. All

evidence is to the contrary. The court appointed a re-

spected senior judge, who had not previously been involved

in the air traffic controller appeals, to take evidence and

issue a recommended decision,'* and petitioner par-

'4 There is no indication that Judge Bennett considered himself

bound by the court’s previous conclusions regarding the frivolous

19

ticipated in a full evidentiary hearing at which none of his

evidence was excluded (Pet. App. A22). Petitioner also ex-

ercised his right to take exceptions to Judge Bennett’s

recommended decision, and the court addressed and

responded fully to each of his arguments — both initially

and on reconsideration. In the absence of any concrete

evidence of bias, petitioner’s argument that disqualifica-

tion was required in this case, if carried to its logical con-

clusion, would lead to the disqualification of all judges in

all matters relating to sanctions for misconduct in the

course of litigation, because of a supposition of bias.'°

That simply is not the law.

c. Relying on an analogy to an increase in a penalty on

appeal, petitioner maintains (Pet. 38-39) that the en banc

court impermissibly imposed a “more severe” penalty by

rejecting Judge Bennett’s recommendation that the

suspension be deferred pending petitioner’s demonstration

of good behavior. This contention is without merit. The

order to show cause made it clear that the court would

nature of petitioner’s appeals; to the contrary, Judge Bennett stated

that he made an “independent review” of the briefs petitioner filed in

order to determine whether they were frivolous (Pet. App. A67). In

any event, as explained above (see pages 10-11, supra), Judge Bennett

would not have been wrong to have regarded himself as bound by the

court’s prior determinations. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion (Pet.

38), those findings were made in adversary proceedings. In each of the

briefs it filed in those individual cases, the government argued that the

appeal was frivolous and requested that sanctions be imposed.

Although petitioner did not respond to those contentions, he clearly

had an opportunity to do so.

'S See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 38 (damages for delays caused by

frivolous appeals); Fed. R. App. P. 30(b) (sanctions against counsel

for unreasonably increasing the cost of litigation); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11

(sanctions for violation of requirements that pleadings be well

grounded in fact and law, etc.); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (sanctions for

failing to obey pretrial orders, etc.).

20

determine the appropriate sanction and that Judge Ben-

nett’s role was that of a master assigned to take evidence

and recommend a course of action. Petitioner was clearly

on notice, as of the date of the show cause order, that he

risked being suspended from practice before the court for

a period of two years.'®

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

DONALD B. AYER

Acting Solicitor General*

JOHN R. BOLTON

Assistant Attorney General

DAVID M. COHEN

SANDRA P. SPOONER

Altorneys

DECEMBER 1988

'6 In any event, as a result of petitioner’s request for reconsidera-

tion, the en banc court considered all of his arguments in favor of the

sanction proposed by Judge Bennett, and rejected them (Pet. App.

A206).

* The Solicitor General is disqualified in this case. Although

counsel for the government did not participate in the proceedings in

the court of appeals leading to petitioner’s one-year suspension, we

deem it appropriate to file a response to the certiorari petition in the

name of the United States, on behalf of the court of appeals, in light

of the fact that an agency of the federal government was the opposing

party in the individual cases in which petitioner was found to have

engaged in unprofessional conduct and the government sought sanc-

tions in those individual cases. The court of appeals requested this Of-

fice to file a response to the certiorari petition, but it has not reviewed

the content of this brief.

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

In re

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS LITIGATION

Before FRIEDMAN, RICH, and DAvis, Circuit Judges.

[Filed Feb. 24, 1983]

ORDER

There are pending before the court more than 225 peti-

tions for review by former air traffic controllers challeng-

ing decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the

Board) sustaining the discharge of the controllers by the

Federal Aviation Administration (the Administration) for

participation in an illegal strike in August 1981. In most of

the cases the petitioners filed suit in this court following

decisions of various regional offices of the Board and did

not ask the Board itself to review the cases. In two of the

cases, however, the petitioners sought review by the Board

of regional office decision and then filed petitions to

review the final Board decisions in this court.!

The various cases raise a number of issues, including

challenges to both the Administration’s discharge of the

controllers and the Board’s affirmance of that action.

In addition to the cases before the court, the Board ad-

vises that it has pending more than 1,500 cases challenging

' Schapansky vy. Department of Transportation, Appeal No.

83-663; Johnson v. Department of Transportation, Appeal No.

83-664.

(la)

2a

decision[s] of its regional offices. The Board will review

five of those cases on an expedited basis as “lead cases,”’?

and it is expected that we will review Board decisions in

those five cases. The decisions of this court in those five

cases and the two cases already before us that the Board

itself has reviewed are expected to determine most, or

perhaps all, of the legal issues in the air traffic controllers

litigation.

On February 15, 1983, we suspended proceedings in

three of the cases before us in which the petitioners direct-

ly challenged the decisions of the Board regional offices

but did not seek review by the Board. We did so because,

in view of the large number of cases, it is appropriate that

this court first determine the common controlling legal

issues as soon as possible and thus avoid repetitious and

unnecessary decision of the same issues in many cases.

We conclude that we should follow the same practice in

the remaining cases until the seven lead cases finally have

been determined.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. All appeals from the Board, except for the seven

cases listed in footnotes | and 2, in the Air Traffic

Controllers litigation now pending before this court

are stayed pending final disposition of those seven

cases.

2 Richard T. Adams, et al. v. Federal Aviation Administration,

MSPB No. NY075281F0347; Kipp C. Anderson v. Federal Aviation

Administration, MSPB No. SL075281F0347; Gary S. Baracco v.

Federal Aviation Administration, MSPB No. DC075281F0895;

Robert L. Campbell v. Federal Aviation Administration, MSPB No.

DE075281F0697; and Joseph R. Noa (Richard E. Golle, et al.) v.

Federal Aviation Administration, MSPB No. NY075281F0697.

3 Thomas R. Ferrando v. United States, No. 83-687; John M.

srickson v. United States, No. 83-688; and Michael J. Zullo v. United

States, No. 83-689. de

3a

The Board is to withhold transmission of the cer-

tified lists normally submitted to the court in lieu of

the record.

Pending disposition of the seven cases, the Clerk of

this court is directed to retain in a suspense file all

pending petitions for review filed by Air Traffic

Controllers, with accompanying fees, and to with-

hold docketing of any petition as an appeal.

4a

APPENDIX B

NOTICE TO COUNSEL AND PETITIONERS IN AIR

TRAFFIC CONTROLLER LITIGATION

Enclosed are opinions in the Air Traffic Controller

“Lead Cases”.

The suspension entered by the Court on February 24,

1983 in all other Air Traffic Controller cases will remain in

effect until final disposition of all the “Lead Cases.”

You will be notified upon final disposition of all “Lead

Cases.” Within 30 days from the date of that notification

you must notify this court in writing if you want to pros-

ecute your appeal. If you do not so notify the court, your

appeal will be dismissed. Retained filing fees will be

returned.

The court has directed attention to the prosecution of

frivolous appeals. Wright v. United States, 728 F.2d 1459

(1984); Beachboard v. United States, 727 F.2d 1092

(1984); Connell v. Sears, 722 F.2d 1542 (1983); and

Asberry v. United States, 692 F.2d 1378 (1982).

May 18, 1984

/§/ GEORGE E. HUTCHINSON

George E. Hutchinson, Clerk

Sa

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

717 MADISON PLACE, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20439

GEORGE E. HUTCHINSON TELEPHONE 633-6550

CLERK AREA CODE 202

NOTICE TO COUNSEL AND PETITIONERS IN AIR TRAFFIC

CONTROLLER LITIGATION

The Supreme Court has completed final disposition of

all “Lead Cases” and mandates have been issued in those

cases to the Merit Systems Protection Board.

In accord with this court’s notice of May 18, 1984, you

are hereby notified that:

(1.) The suspension entered on February 24, 1983 will

remain in effect to and including January 10, 1985. Before

that date you must withdraw your present petition for

review or file a renewed petition. If you do neither, your

petition will be dismissed.

(2.) Any renewed petition must include a statement of

the issues relied on and not decided in any of the “Lead

Cases”.!

(3.) Checks received with the initial petition are being

returned with this notice. If you file a new petition, you

must enclose a new check for the $65.00 filing fee.

(4.) The Court again directs attention to the im-

propriety of frivolous appeals. Asberry v. United States,

692 F.2nd 1378 (1982); Connell v. Sears, 722 F.2nd 1542

(1983); Beachboard v. United States, 727 F.2d 1092

(1984); and Wright v. United States, 728 F.2d 1459 (1984).

' The “Lead Cases” can be found in 735 F.2d, pages 477 through

549.

6a

(5.) If you file a new petition, on or before January

10, 1985, your appeal will be docketed on receipt of that

petition. You must file your brief within 60 days

thereafter.

(6.) If you file a new petition, a certified list will not be

required. If need arises, the list of documents of record

may be ordered by the court, on motion or sua sponte.

(7). The Court will not act on motions of respondent

to dismiss or for summary affirmance in relation to a new

petition until petitioner’s brief/appendix has been filed.

FOR THE COURT

December 10, 1984

/s/ GEORGE E. HUTCHINSON

Clerk

7a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Misc. No. 145

In re

JACK B. SOLERWITZ

Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, FRIEDMAN, RICH, DAVIS,

SMITH, NIES, NEWMAN, BISSELL and ARCHER, Circuit

Judges.

[Filed Jan. 21, 1987]

ORDER

On May 18, 1984, this court sent a “Notice to Counsel

and Petitioners in Air Traffic Controller Litigation”. That

notice enclosed copies of opinions in the precedents of this

court referred to as the Lead Cases and directed attention

to the impropriety of maintaining frivolous appeals, citing

published opinions of this court on that subject.

On December 10, 1984, this court again sent a “Notice

to Counsel and Petitioners in Air Traffic Controller

Litigation”. That notice informed recipients that the

Supreme Court had completed final disposition and man-

dates had issued in all Lead Cases, and that all pending

petitions would be dismissed unless withdrawn or replaced

with a new petition, stating “faJny renewed petition must

8a

include a statement of the issues relied on and not decided

in any of the ‘Lead Cases.’ ” That notice also gave the cita-

tions for the Lead Cases, and emphasized the impropriety

of frivolous appeals, citing published opinions of this

court on that subject.

The above-described Notices were sent to Jack B. Soler-

witz, Esquire. In addition, on July 12, 1985, July 31, 1985,

and August 30, 1985, this court wrote Mr. Solerwitz re-

questing that he review the propriety of maintaining his

appeals in light of the need to avoid frivolity and the ac-

companying abuse of the judicial process.

Mr. Solerwitz was thus repeatedly and expressly warned

by this court against filing and maintaining frivolous ap-

peals in air traffic controller cases that presented legal

issues and fact patterns indistinguishable from those

presented and decided in the precedents represented by the

Lead Cases. Ignoring those warnings, Mr. Solerwitz, who

was sole counsel in one Lead Case, maintained 11

frivolous appeals pending on May 18, 1984 and filed and

maintained another 131 separate frivolous appeals in air

traffic controller cases. In his briefs in those appeals, 107

of which were virtually identical, Mr. Solerwitz disre-

garded Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and this

court’s rules, failed to file appendices, provided no cita-

tions to the record, ignored authorities cited by the

government, advanced numerous arguments On issues not

on appeal, and repeatedly raised contentions not raised

before the Merit Systems Protection Board. Mr. Solerwitz’

briefs were devoid of any showing on which the decision

appealed from could even possibly be reversed, devoid of

any basis on which the precedents of this court could be

distinguished in law or fact, and devoid of any effort to

make such distinctions, in total disregard of this court’s

written instructions of December 10, 1984.

9a

Despite repeated warnings and imposition of sanctions

totalling $74,500, Mr. Solerwitz continued his improper

pattern of conduct before this court. In three air traffic

controller “rehiring” cases, Mr. Solerwitz filed appeals and

had sanctions imposed because those appeals were

frivolous.

Mr. Solerwitz filed and maintained an appeal in a non-

air traffic controller case for which a sanction was im-

posed.

Mr. Solerwitz’ conduct in filing and maintaining

frivolous appeals having no colorable basis in fact or law

has wasted the time and limited resources of this court, has

denied availability of the court’s resources to deserving

litigants, and has constituted flagrant and totally inex-

cusable abuse of the judicial process. Mr. Solerwitz’ con-

duct has been “unbecoming a member of the bar of the

court”, Fed. R. App. P. 46(b). See e.g., In re Snyder, 105

S.Ct. 2874 (1985); In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319 (Ist Cir.

1973).

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

(1) That Jack B. Solerwitz, Esquire, by written answer

filed within thirty days from the date of this order, show

cause why he should not be suspended for two years from

representing clients before this court.

(2) That said answer shall state whether Mr. Solerwitz

desires oral argument or evidentiary hearing.

(3) That any oral argument or evidentiary hearing

shall be strictly limited to the above-described conduct of

Mr. Solerwitz.

(4) That Mr. Solerwitz complete and return within

said thirty days, the attached “Declaration of Admission

10a

to Practice” form. Waiver of answer does not remove the

necessity of completing and returning the attached form.

FOR THE COURT

Jan. 21, 1987 /s/ FRANCIS X. GINDHART

Date Francis X. Gindhart

Clerk

US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1966 — 24169900013

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