Motion — Gerstein v. Coe

— — rn > om

| FEB 25 1974

IN THE MICHAEL RCOAK, 8 ct

Supreme Court of the United States

Octonen Tee, 1973

No. 73-1157

Ricnam E. Gersreiws and Rommr L. Suevix,

Appellants,

Ve

Nixe Cor, Patnuicta Nor, Un. Lyxs P'. Carmicu art,

and all others similarly situated,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida

MOTION TO AFFIRM OR DISMISS,

AND BRIEF

Roy Lucas

Suite 1501

Watergate South

70% New Hampshire Avenue,

N..

Washington, D.C. 20037

Tel.: 202-338-6955

torun " for Apyn Neos

Uf Counsel:

JostPH P. Farina

A717 Northeast Second Avenue

Miami Shores, Florida 33138

Tel.: 305-759-5756

Puss of Breom S. Avance Pauwrunc, c, Wasmiuxctom, D. C.

=.

INDEX

Page

tatement of the Ca ioe

[RGUMENT :

I. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over this Appeal

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, Because Injunctive Re-

lief Was Not Granted Against Or Denied to

These Appellan ie 2

II. The Court Has Jurisdiction to Treat the Appeal

as a Rule 20 Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Before Judgment in the Court of Appeals, Grant

D ² 3

III. The Spousal and Parental Consent Clauses of

the Florida Abortion Law, F. S. A. § 458.22(3)

(a), (b), Are So Plainly Unconstitutional and

Overbroad In Light of Roe v. Wade and Doe v.

Bolton that Summary Affirmance is Appro-

/// ͥͥͥ00ðiͤꝛ;m *

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CoNsTITUTIONAL PRovisions :

United States Constitution—

h,! passim

Srarurrs AND Rvues:

„„ „ „ passim

/ Ä—ͤdt VA passim

, passim

D lininlilil¹ 4

D ůͤlejlllllll!! ssesavecs 4

8

WO Ge ee

ii Index Continued

P

CASES: 7

Bolton v. Doe, 402 U.S. 936 (1971) (per curiam) . ;

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)... . 1)

Burroughs v. Crichton, 48 App. D.C. 596 (1919) . ... f

Coe v. D.C. General Hospital, Civ. No. 1477-71 (...

June 5, 1972) (nreportedl e 0000, f

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (19733))))))ů:ũ passin

Doe v. Rampton, 366 F.Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973). . . 5, 6.

Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 10

HEisenstadt v. Baird. 405 ee f

Engel v. Vitale, 370 US b I

Gault, In re. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) C

1.

Harris v. Lee, 1 P. W ms. 482. 24 E. R. 482 (Ch. 1718).

Herko v. Uviller, 203 Mise. 108, 114 N. X. S. 2d 618 (Sup.

CCC f

Jones v. Smith, 278 So.2d 339 (Fla. D.Ct. App. 1973),

petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S. L. W. 3434 (U.S. Jan.

C —T— f

Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 224 P.2d sds

CC a

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968ũꝶ ?D))))) 1]

Maryland v. 8 170 Md. 162 16 Atl 282

(1888) „„ ²˙˙ů3ñ ns — f

MeCann v. Babbitz, 400 U.S. 1 (1970) (per curiam)... |

M’Clallen v. Adams, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 333 (1837)..... f

Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970) / ;ũ u „% :

O Beirne v. Superior Court, 1 Civ. 25174 (Cal. Sup. Ct.

. . caseerin 6

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (194443) I

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (197 3)) „% passin

Rosenberg v. Feigin, 119 Cal. App. 2d 783. 260 P.2d

ee Oh, ek SN ee

School District of Abington v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203

7 c ͤ ee eusneeas hen I

Sheldon v. Sheldon, 146 App. Div. 430, 131 N. V. S. 291

D Qaadcebeel cisbeswasbocennt f

Smith, In re, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (Ct. Spee.

— ͥ ¶2½2½ , · paniunse

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.

c aesaabouers If

Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per

1 TTT :

Winship, In re. 397 U.S. 358 (197oh:·· „% 1:

Index Continued iii

Page

rn AUTHORITIES:

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,

Statement on Teenage Pregnancy (1970) ........ 9

Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 36, U.S.

Bureau of the Census (1971777 9

Cutright, The Teenage Sexual Revolution and the Myth

of An Abstinent Past, 4 Family Planning Perspec-

RE Pe a ene 9

Family Planning Population Reporter (Dee. 1973).... 5,8

Menken, Health and Social Consequences of Teenage

Childbearing, 4 Family Planning Perspectives

ae OP CRO SOE ei ckcvelcucnbeeune doses 9

8

“// ¾² ˙—— ¼ ( sd 5

Pilpl & Zuckerman, Abortion and the Rights of

Minors, 23 W. Res. L. Rev. 779 (1972)

Tietze & Lewit, Joint Program For the Study of

Abortion (JPSA), 3 Studies In Family Planning

c T 5. 9

— ME oe ee ee ee oe ee 5,8

—

r ¼à AP RET IR MONE 8 NE IY

1

f

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-1157

Rich E. GERSTEIN and RokkRT L. SHEVIN,

Appellants,

Ve

Yancy Cok, Patricia Nor, Dr. LyNN I'. CARMICHAEL,

and all others similarly situated,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida

MOTION TO AFFIRM OR DISMISS

Appellees respectfully move the Court to treat the

Jurisdictional Statement as a Rule 20 Petition for

Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment in the Court of

Appeals, grant the writ, and affirm, or in the alterna-

tive, to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.

Respectfully submitted,

Roy Lucas

Attorney for Appellees

Of Counsel:

JosepH P. Farina

*

*

. LE LIE INT SOT LOO LET IE LE CI TR PS BE enn |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-1157

RicHarp E. GERSTEIN and Rosert L. SHEVIN,

Appellants,

v.

cv Cor, Patricia Nor, Dr. LYNN P. CARMICHAEL,

and all others similarly situated,

Appellees,

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida

BRIEF INSUPPORT OF MOTION TO AFFIRM

OR DISMISS

Appellees respectfully submit this brief in support

fthe motion to affirm or dismiss.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In four respeets Appellees must supplement the

tatement of facts submitted by Appellants.

First, whether the three-judge district court im—

pliedly recommended“ (J. S., at 1, 10a) that Appel-

ants not enforee unconstitutional provisions of the

Florida abortion laws or not, that court denied Ap-

pe Qk pte per er Oe ge ae ae

ne

pellee’s requests for injunctive relief, and even dic

missed from the case plaintiffs Paula Poe, Rita Re

aud Pamela Harris. The assuraption by the disrc

court that Appellants would reeognize the declarator;

judgment was the rationale for denying injunctin

relief. It was not the grant, but denial of an in-

tion.

Second, Appellants have appealed only two parts ¢

the declaratory judgment, namely the parental an/

spouse consent requirements, The judgment, howere

invalidated further provisions, which are involved &

an appeal to this Court by Appellees, and as to w

injunctive relief was alen denied.

Third, under Jvnmouction at J. S. p. 2. Appellans

state: ** Plaintiffs filed their corrected notice of appeal

from the denial of injunctive relief on December

1973.“ The record shows that Plaintiffs’ notice o

appeal was filed December 21, 1973, not the 10th.

Finally, Appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement omit

the presence of three Appellees who were dismine

without opinion from the case at preliminary tag

Paula Poe, Rita Roe, and Pamela Harris. The judg

ment in this case was not final as to any party uti

denial of rehearing. and there Appellees are all a par

of the appeal.

ARGUMENT

L

The Court Lacks Jurisdiction over this Appes! under 28 USC

§ 1253. Beceuse Injunctive Relief Was Not Granted Agee

or Denied to These Appellents

The three-judge district court invalidated certas

provisions of the Florida abortion law, but fen

it unnecessary to provide plaintiffs injunctive reel

_

JS. at 10a). No injunction was entered against Ap-

from which to appeal. Only the Appellees

sere adversely affected by the denial of an injunction.

Accordingly, Appellants may not properly appeal here

der 28 U.S.C. §1253. Bolton v. Doe, 402 US, 936

(1971) (per curiam); McCann v. Babbitz, 400 US 1

(1970) (per curiam); Public Service Comm'n v. Bra-

dear Freight Lincs, M U.S. 204 (1999) (per curiam).

So direct appeal under 28 U.S.C, § 1255 lies from an

sdverse declaratory judgment. Mitchell v. Donovan,

8 US. 427 (1970). Cases cited by Appellants all

igvolve proper direct appeals by parties adversely

flected by the granting or denial of an injunction.

This appeal, however, is not such a case.

It follows that the appeal per , must be dismissed

for want of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C, § 1253.

The Court Has Jurisdiction To Treat the Appesl as « Rule 20

Petition for Writ of Certioreri before Judgment in the

Court of Appeals. Grant the Writ. and Affirm.

The present case involves a bifureated lower court

disposition whereby Plaintiff-Appellees were granted

a declaratory judgment, but denied injunctive relief.

Under such circumstances, Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113,

123 (1973), reeommended for Defendants a Rule 20

mtition for certiorari before judgment in the Court of

Appeals. Appellants recognize this in a footnote, J. S.

“a2

Turner v. City of Memphis, 269 U.S, 350 (1962) (per

earlam), took the Rule 20 course. A unanimous Court

treat fed] appellant’s jurisdictional statement as a

petition for writ of certiorari prior to judgment in the

4

Court of Appeals... “ citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1),

2101(e).

Appellees recognize the public importance and reeur.

ring nature of the questions presented by this appeal

Accordingly, Appellees have no objection to Rule 2

treatment. However, as shall appear, the question

presented appear suitable for summary disposition is

light of Roe v. Wade, 410 US, 195 (1973), and Dor +

Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

The Spouse! and Parental Consent Clauses of the Floris

Abortion Law. F.S.A. § 456.2213) (a). (b) Are So Pla

The present appeal involves two provisions of the

Florida Abortion Law, characterized by the three-judge

District Court as the “spousal or parental consent”

requirements. 15 Fria. Strat. Axx. § 458.22, at *

(Cum. Pkt. Pt. 1973). These may be treated pe-

rately.

A

The “Spowssl Consent Clause” of the Floride Abortion Lew levreta

«& Pregnant Married Woman's Individual Right of Privacy &

Viclation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Ament

ment

Neither Roe nor Doc, supra, involved an abortion

law purporting to bestow veto rights on the pregnant

woman's spouse. Roc, in fact, expressly declined to

address the issue of the father’s rights, if any...”

410 U.S. at 165, 1.67.

The issue, however, is squarely presented by this

appeal. 15A Fra. Stat. Axx. §458.22(3)(a), at ®

oo

(Cum. Pkt. Pt. 1973), expressly provides that a mar-

ried woman seeking a therapeutic abortion must pro-

vide the physician with written consent of her hus-

band, unless the husband ie voluntarily living apart

from the wife or in case of life-threat. sing emergency.

Id. $458.22(3)(¢), at . This written consent, more-

over, amounts to a veto, because the hushand may

withbold consent for any reason, for reasons forbidden

to the State by Roe v. Wade, or for no reason at all.

N jo other voluntary medical or surgical procedure

for which (Florida) requires confirmation by .. the

busband can be found. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, 410 US.

179, 199 (1973) (invalidating requirement that two

other physicians approve an abortion). No require-

ment of spouse consent was contained in the Model

Penal Code or Uniform Abortion Act proposals. Doc

t. Bolton, supra, 410 US, at 194.

At least fifteen States, however, require spouse eon-

wnt by statute for therapeutic abortion under some

creumstances amounting te a veto.’ Nationwide

studies on abortion show that substantial numbers of

women are affected, in that at least 20.0%. of abortion

patients are currently married.“ Hospitals and clinies,

of course, may well impose a spouse consent require-

ment as an added element of presumed self-protection,

regardless of local law.

* These are Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, (‘olorade, Idaho, Indiana.

Leaisians, Nebraska, Nevada, (regen, South Carolina, South

Dakota, Virginia, Utah, and Washington. N 2 Family Planning/

Population Reporter 150-54 (Dee 197%): «+ alee Doe ¥. Rampton,

* F. Supp. 189 D Utah 1973) | three-judge court) (invalidating

eotive Utah statute).

e Tietae & Lewit, Joint Program for the Study of Abortion,

I Studies in Family Planning 47. 1), Table 1 (June 1972)

—

.

Case law provides some guidance.’ The decision of

this Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453

(1972) favors Appellees in stating:

“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the

right of the individual, married or single, to be

ee

4The only three-judge federal court decisions ruling ups

spouse consent provisions found them unconstitutional in light of

Roe v. Wade, supra, and Doe v. Bolton, supra. These are the

present ease and Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. Is9 D lub

1973). See also Coe v. D.C. General Hosp, Civ, No. 1477-71

(Dp June 5, 1972) (unreported) (spouse consent not require!

in DC).

Periodic injunctive actions to prevent an abortion have u

formly rejected any paternal interest. Ser Jones v. Smith, 27.

0.24 229 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1973), petition fer cert. filed, &

US.LW. 3444 (US. Jan. 1, 1974) (No. 73-1195); O Beirne +

Superior Court, 1 Civ, 25174 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dee. 6, 1967) (an.

reported).

A number of tort, malpractice, and contract actions appear “

hold that a married woman may consent for herself alone whe

secking medical or surgical care. See Rosenberg v. Feigin, 11%

Cal. App. 2d 783, 20 P.2d 143 ( Ct App. 1953); Herko +

l'viller, 203 Mise, 108, 114 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Kriteer

„ Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 224 Pd 808 (1D. Ct. App. 1950

Burroughs v. Crichton, 48 App. D.C. 596 (1919); Maryland +

Housekeeper, 170 Md. 162, 16 Atl. 382 (1885) ; M’Clallen » Adam

19 Pick. ( Mass.) 333 (1837).

Early common law cases often suggest that medical care is 4

necessity for which a hushand is obligated to pay. These date

as far back as Harris v. Lee, I F. Wms. 482, 24 EKR 482 (Cb

1718).

A bizarre variation is an action for separation. Sheldon 1

Sheldon, 146 App. Div. 430, 131 XVS. 291 (2d Dep't 1911)

Dr. Sheldon had apparently anesthetized his wife each time *

became pregnant and aborted her, thereby depriving her „of the

maternal joy so highly prized by every good woman *

was granted the requested separation.

7

free from unwarranted governmental intrusion

into matters so fundamentally affecting a person

as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.“

(Emphasis in Opinion).

Similarly, the reasoning of Roe v. Wade hardly sug-

gests that the important rights recognized there could

be swept away by a state law allowing third party veto

over exercise of the right. As Roc stated:

“The detriment that the State would impose upon

the pregnant woman by denying this choice alto-

gether is apparent. Specitie and direct harm

medically diagnosable even in early pregnaney may

be involved, Maternity, or additional offspring,

may force upon the woman a distressful life and

future. Psychological harm may be imminent.

Mental and physical health may be taxed by child

care. There is also the distress, for all concérned,

associated with the unwanted child, and there is

the problem of bringing a child into a family al-

ready unable, psychologically or otherwise, to care

for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional

difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed mother-

hood may be involved. All these are factors the

woman and her responsible physician necessarily

will consider in consultation. 410 ULS. at 153.

It is inconceivable that the Court intended to leave

married women and minors wholly unprotected by the

Roe and Doe decisions. Yet, that is the reach of

Appellants’ position. Moreover, to bestow a veto over

the abortion decision is to allow the third party to

invoke arbitrary and irrational considerations ex-

pressly forbidden to the State itself. This is inconsis-

tent with everything Moe stands for.

B. *

The “Parental Consent Clause of the Florida Abortion Law Invades u

Pregnant Minor Woman's Individual Right of Privacy in Violation

of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Roe and Doe also declined to express any view on

the constitutionality of state laws bestowing veto

rights on the parents of a pregnant minor. 410 Us,

at 165, 0.67.

The parental consent issue, however, is squarely

presented here, WA Fra. Stat. ANN. § 458.22(3)(b),

at 38 (Cum. Pkt. Pt. 1973), expressly requires the

physician to obtain. if the pregnant weman is

under eighteen years of age and unmarried . . . the

written consent of a parent, eustedian, or legal

guardian. . .."" except in case of life-threatening emer-

geney. Id. §$458.22(3)(¢), at 38. This third party

consent, moreover, sanetions a veto, because the par-

ents may deny permission for any reason, for reasons

denied legitimacy by Roe and Doc, or for no reason

at all. No parental consent provision was embodied

in the Model Penal Code or Uniform Abortion Act

proposals cited in Doe v. Bolton, supra, 410 US. at

194.

At least eighteen States, however, require parental

consent by statute for therapeutic abortion in the ease

of all or some minors, and in cireumstances granting a

virtual absolute veto.“ Such provisions have serious

‘These are Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Colorado, Delaware.

Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico.

Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Utah, and

Washington. Ne, Family Planning/Population Reporter 15053

(Dee 1972); Pilpel & Zuckerman, Abortion and the Rights of

Minors, 23 W. Res. I. Rev, 779 (1972); sce also Doe v. Rampton,

266 F. Supp. 189 (1D). Utah 1973)

9

impact. As many as 24, of abortion patients are

less than 20 years of age.” In addition to statutes,

minors must also contend with restrictive hospital and

elinie rules not necessarily required by statute or case

law.

The language and rationale of Roc v. Wade, 410 U.S.

113 (1973), apply with equal or greater force to pro-

tet the right of privaey of a pregnant minor from

parental veto. Unwanted pregnaney in a minor can

be a far greater threat to physical and mental health

than in the ease of a healthy unmarried adult. See

Menken, Health and Social Consequences of Teenage

Childbearing, A Family Planning Perspectives No, 3,

at 45 (July 1972). Moreover, illegitimate births

among young wemen in the 15 to 19 age range more

than doubled between 140 and 1968." Teenagers gave

birth to an estimated 180,000 illegitimate children dur-

ing the vear 1970. US. Burcau of the Census, Current

Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 36 (1971). How-

ever,

„It ſhese figures do net take into aeeount the num-

ber of premarital pregnancies which have forced

early marriages... . In one state in which figures

are available, 48 pereent of teenage marriages in-

volved a premarital pregnaney. Approximately

one-half of these marriages end in divoree within

the first four years." Statement on Teenage Preg-

nancy, American College of Obstetricians and

(rynccologists (Apr. 10, 1970).

—

Se Tietze & Lewit, supra note 2, at 100, Table !

‘Cutright, The Teenage Sexual Revolution and the Muth of An

Abstinent Past, 4 Family Planning Perspectives No. 1, at 24 (1972).

—

10

By its terms the Fourteenth Amendment embraces

the rights of minors as much as adults. The Amend.

ment, for example, defines citizenship as being con.

ferred upon those born or naturalized”’ in the United

States, not just adults.

Case law, also, repeatedly applies the First, Fourth,

Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and un

merous clauses therein, to secure rights for minors.

The First Amendment guarantee against laws ‘re.

specting an establishment of religion’’ has been sue-

cessfully invoked by school children to bar compulsory

prayers. Sce Engel vy. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962),

Neither Engel nor the many other school-prayer and

Bible-verse decisions suggest that the minor's right to

be protected from government imposed religion could

be waived by a parent. Indeed, the presence of a

minor with standing to sue was held absolutely indis-

pensable to a similar prayer ease in Doremus v. Board

of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). See also School

District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 US.

203 (1963): Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158

(1944).

First Amendment free speech rights have similarly

been held available to minors and School children.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep, Community School Dist.

393 U.S. 503 (1969). A majority of the Court in

Tinker held:

„School officials do not possess absolute authority

over their students. Students in school as well as

out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution.

They are possessed of fundamental rights which

the State must respect. . ..“ (393 U.S. at 511).

11

Inno way did the Court suggest that the First Amend-

ment protected only those students whose parents

shared their views.

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),

also spawned a line of decisions barring discrimination

against minors, not only in access to education, but in

numerous respects where neither race nor education

was an issue. Indeed, fourteen years after Brown,

the Court was to hold:

„Ijhegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’

They are humans, live, and have their being. They

are clearly ‘persons’ within the meaning of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.“ Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68.

70 (1968).

If illegitimate children, regardless of age, are **per-

ons“ under the Fourteenth Amendment, a fortiori,

unmarried pregnant minors have comparable con-

stitutional status.

In virtually all spheres of litigation the minor person

has received the protections and benefits of the Bill

of Rights. Nowhere has this been more consistently

the ease than with respect to the rights of minors

aceused of juvenile offenses.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), was the fountain-

head of juvenile rights in offender proceedings. The

ease pointedly held :

“(Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the

og Dg Rights is for adults alone.“ (387 U.S.

at 13).

— *

12

Gault applied the procedural constitutional rights of

notice, confrontation, eross-examination, and the privi-

lege against self-inerimination to minors in juvenile

proceedings. The Court has repeatedly reaflirmed

Gault, most recently ineluding the right to insist that

proof be beyond a reasonable doubt. Zn re Winship,

397 U.S. 358 (1970).

In sum, a substantial body of case law acknowledges

the fact that the Bill of Rights is not marked “adults

only.“ With respect to freedom of religion, free

speech, freedom from invidious discrimination, and

fundamental fairness in juvenile offender proceedings,

a minor is protected by the Bill of Rights, and not ex—

eluded as a ‘*non-person.”’

The cases and language of the Constitution support

this approach to the protection of fundamental per—

sonal rights in general, Indeed, the reasons behind the

Bill of Rights have very little to do with chronological

age. Similarly, a young woman's need for medical care

to terminate pregnancy is also wholly unrelated to age.

State authority to enforce the obedience of minors

to parents is a practice which must be challenged in

this area. If one parent can veto an abortion for any

reason, another parent may attempt to compel an abor-

tion. The latter was the factual setting of Jn re Smith,

16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (Ct. Spee. App. 1972),

where an appellate court in emergency session pre-

vented a sheriff from taking a young woman to the

hospital for a forced abortion insisted upon by ber

mother.

13

CONCLUSIONS

For the reasons set out, the Court should dismiss the

appeal, bit grant a petition for writ of certiorari under

Rule 20 and affirm the declaratory judgment rendered

below.

Respectfully submitted,

Roy Lucas

Suite 1501

700 New Hampshire Avenue,

N. W.

Washington, D.C. 20037

Attorney for Appellants.

Of Counsel:

Joseru l'. Farina

"717 Northeast Seeond Avenue

Miami Shores, Florida 33138

Dated: February 25, 1974.