Amicus Curiae Brief — California v. Krivda

INDEX

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE............ 2

ARGUMENT:

The Rule Excluding Evidence Improperly Seized

Should Be Applied Only When The Seizure Con-

stitutes A Substantial Violation Of Rights And

Only After The Court Weighs The Question Of Ex-

clusion In Light Of The Public Interest In Obtain-

ing Reliable Evidence For Tie Prosecution Of

memepes Crimes OF Violemee... 2... cscs ccc cecces. 3

CONCLUSION :

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases Cited:

Bivins v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403

U.S. 388 (1971)

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)

Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160 (1949) 6, 12

City of Chicago v. Lord, 7 Ill. 2d 379, 13 N.E. 2d 505

(1955) 2

Coolidge v. New a 403 U.S. 443 (1971). ..4, 9, 14

Lawrie v. Muir, [1950] Scots LTR 37

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)

People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923)..

People v. Castree, 311 Tl. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924)...

People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926)....

People v. Defore, 213 App. Div. 643, 211 NYS 134

(1925)

People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E. 2d 591 (1944)....

People v. Moore, 35 Ml. 2d 399, 220 N.E. 2d 443 (1966)

ii.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)...........-.. li

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)... ...........- ee eee 7

Trask v. State, 151 Ill. 523 (1894).................. 2

United States v. Jackson, 448 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971)

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).......... 11

Other Authorities Cited:

ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, § 8.02

(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1971)...............00-.. 11

Barrett, ‘‘Exclusion of Evidence Obtained By Illegal

Searches’’, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 565 (1955)........ 8, 10, 13

Burger, ‘‘Who Will Watch the Watchman’’, 14 Am.

cee RS) | eee err Terre T Te Peete 3

Dash, ‘‘Cracks In The Foundation of Criminal Jus-

tice,’’ 46 Tl. L. Rev. 385 (1951)...............60-- 5

Friendly, ‘‘The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal

Procedure,’’ 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929 (1965).......... 11

Horowitz, ‘‘ Excluding the Exclusionary Rule,’’ 47 L.A.

NG dj cae hence hd cae awae nena sees 8, 10

LaFave, ‘‘Improving Police Performance Through the

Exclusionary Rule,’’ 30 Mo. L. Rev. 391 (1965).... 7,9

LaFave and Remington, ‘‘Controlling the Police: The

Judge’s Role in Making and Reviewing Law En-

forcement Decisions,’’ 63 Mich. L. Rev. 987 (1965).. 9

Oaks, ‘‘Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and

Seizure,’’ 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970)............ 3,5

Peterson, ‘‘Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seiz-

ure,’’? 52 Nw. L. Rev. 45 (1957)..............-05: 5

Plumb, ‘‘Illegal Enforcement of the Law,’’ 24 Cornell

ee a | Ter! rrr reer ern 3

Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, 219 (1966).......... 7

‘‘The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign* Law,’’ 52 J.

0 pl RS me erent ree 3

. a

Waite, ‘‘Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence,’’ 42

iii.

Mich. L. Rev. 679 (1944)..........ccccccccccecss 7

Wigmore, Evidence, §§2183-84a (McNaughton Rev.

IGRI i I eae 3

Wigmore, ‘‘Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search

and Seizure,’’ 8 A.B.A.J. 479 (1922)..............

a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octrosen Term, 1972

No. 71-651

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Petitioner,

V8.

JUDITH KRIVDA and ROGER T. MINOR,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME

OOURT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

AS AMICUS CURIAE

The State of Illinois has a substantial interest in the

seope and application of the exclusionary rule. In particu.

lar the Supreme Court of Illinois has always f:llowed

applicable federal precedents in search and seizure cases.

The cognate provisions of the Illinois Constitution are

construed as identical in scope and effect as the pro-

visions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United

States Constitution. See People v. Grod, 285 Il). MH,

53 N.E. 2d 591 (1944). Initially, the Supreme Court of

Illinois refused to apply the exclusionary rule. See Trask

v. People, 151 Ml. 523, 529 (1894). After the adoption of

the exclusionary rule in federal courts, the [llinoi« rule

was changed in reliance upon the opinions of thi« Court.

See People v. Brocamp, Wi Mil. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923);

People v. Castree, 311 Ill., 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924); City

of Chicago v. Lord, 7 I. 2d 379, 130 N.E. 2d 505 (1955).

It is therefore reasonable to asx«ume that any change in

the exclusionary rule made by thi« Court will affect

directly the rules applied by the state courts.

,

THE RULE EXCLUDING EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY

SHOULD BE APPLIED ONLY WHEN THE

SEIZURE CONSTITUTES A SUBSTANTIAL VIO.

LATION OF RIGHTS AND ONLY AFTER THE

COURT WEIGHS THE QUESTION OF EXCLUSION

IN LIGHT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN OB.

TAINING RELIABLE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSE.

CUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES OF VIOLENCE.

I

The exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases hax

heen the subject of intense debate throughout its existence.

The commentary ix substantial.

The historical and logical foundations of the rule have

heen ably and persuasively criticized. See Wigmore,

“Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure”,

$ A.B.AJS. 479 (1922); Plumb, “ INegal Enforcement of

the Law”, 24 Cornell LQ, 337, 354-58, 370-81 ( 1939);

Wigmore, Evidence, Secs. 2183-844 (McNaughton Rev.

1961). Nearly every civilized nation in the world has

marvived as a civilized nation without the benefit of the

aelusionary rule. See “The Exelusionary Rule Under

Poreign Law” 52 J. Crim. L. C. & PS. 270 (1961).

(series of articles). To our knowledge, no civilized na-

tion hax an absolute rule which mandates the exelusion

od evidence regardiex« of social intereste which support

its admission. See Lawrie y. Muir (1950) Seots L.T.R. 27.

The policy arguments against the rule have heen well

dated. See Burger, “Who Will Watch the Watchman”, 14

Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1964): Oaks, Studying the Exelusionary

Rale In Search and Seizure, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970).

And concern over the validity of the rule has not heen

emfined to academicians, prosecutors and policemen in

4

recent years. See Bivens v. Siz Unknown Fed. Narcotics

Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C. J. dis-

senting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 490,

493, 510 (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring) (Black and

Blackmun, JJ, concurring and dissenting).

II.

At the risk of repeating what has been said before, we

think it appropriate to restate our objections to the ex-

clusionary rule.

On ethical grounds, the rule in its direct application,

seems unfair. It benefits only the guilty. The innocent

man whose rights are violated must sue civilly to secure

damages; he must pursue a remedy that this Court has

found to be ineffective. Further, the application of the

rule punishes society and not the offending officer.

In terms of judicial administration, the rule requires

diversion from the fundamental concerns of guilt or in-

nocence. At the very least, the determination of the ulti-

mate question is substantially delayed and witnesses for

both sides become discouraged or unavailable. At the

worst, counsel for defendants become so concerned with

the question of suppression that they never seriously

prepare for trial or explore defenses on the merits.

The public perception of the delay, the procedural

gamesmanship and the clear benefit to the guilty serves

to diminish confidence in the courts.

The exclusionary rule creates a haven for a corrupt

policeman or prosecutor. The rule allows the officer to

immunize an offender while appearing to do an aggres-

sive job of law enforcement. An officer may conduct 4

massive gambling raid without securing adequate evi-

5

dence of probable cause. The officer appears to be doing

his job cracking down on gambling only to be frustrated

by the courts. The officer may reap both the benefits of

public approval and consideration from the gambler. One

study found that “an examination of the records and a

period of observation of this practice in the court is

fairly convincing that the raids are made to immunize

the gamblers while at the same time satisfying the public

that gamblers are being harassed by the police.’”? Dash,

“Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice,” 46 TIl.

L. Rev. 385, 392 (1951). See also, Peterson, “Restrictions

in the Law of Search end Seizure,” 52 NW. L. Rev. 45, 57-

58, 58-59 (1957). The courts are compromised by aiding

this kind of corruption. And the courts, not the police,

are the recipients of public disapproval when they sup-

press meaningful, or overwhelming evidence. The corrupt

policeman blames the courts for his ineffectiveness and

the Courts cannot respond.

The exclusionary rule ix thought to deter illegal police

conduct. There is no evidence that proves this is so. See

Oaks, “Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and

Seizure,” 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970). The fact that

there is no proof of deterrence should cause the rule to

be abandoned. If due process requires the exclusionary

rule, it would seem clear that the proponent of the rule

ought to sustain the burden. It seems clear to us that

even without statistics a realistic analysis of the incen-

tives and pressures upon the police would show that the

exclusionary rule cannot deter.

The primary pressure upon the police is to apprehend

criminals and prevent crime. It is an unceasing public

pressure which arises not from some irrational public

prejudice but from the indisputable assessment that

6

crime is both an ethical and social evil.’ Further, there

is the internal standard of every ordinary man in law

enforcement that murderers, robbers, etc., ought to be

punished for their crimes. The effect of the exclusionary

rule in search and seizure cases is not deterrence but per-

jury. The rule fosters false testimony by law officers

who feel they must apprehend offenders and are fearful

that minor technical errors will result in their escape.

In short, police officers who would not alter their testi-

mony in any respect to help the prosecution establish

guilt may well be driven to such extremes when the ques-

tion is not one of guilt but rather of the admissibility of

reliable evidence.

There are institutional pressures which work against

deterrence. The police organizational structure asks the

policeman why he didn’t arrest rather than why he did.

The police encourage seizure of contraband and place a

premium on police alertness. The desire to prevent crime

often causes the police to engage in practices which are

not permitted when the object is the prosecution of of-

fenders. The police structure is responsive to public

1. There are similar pressures upon courts to distort

probable cause concepts in order to sustain the admis-

sibility of evidence. See Brinegar v. United States, 338

U.S. 160, 183 (1949).

2. One eminent judge has adopted a standard for

search and seizure which reflects this concern: “When a

police officer could justifiably be disciplined for failure

to act, his action can hardly be characterized as unreason-

able.” People v. Moore, 35 Ill. 2d 399, 403, 220 N.E. 2d

443, 445 (1966) (Schaefer, J.).

3. In this case the problem was present. According to

both opinions in the case, the police were informed that

—

norms. The police do not feel morally blameworthy be-

cause the public does not condemn. See Skolnick, Justice

Without Trial, 219-26 (1966). La Fave, “Improving Police

Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule,” 30 Mo. L.

Rev. 391, 442-44 (1965).

It is this abiding, powerful and rational pressure to

suppress crime that leads police to prefer, in many cases,

to engage in the forbidden practices and forego prosecu-

tion. The Court has recognized the inability of the rule to

deter in certain contexts. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

12-15 (1968). Studies have shown that the police have

an incentive to arrest without any thought of conviction.

An arrest disrupts illegal business and clears the streets

for a time. Narcotics and weapons are destroyed and the

arrestee bears the costs of freeing himself threugh court

action. See La Fave, “Improving Police Performance

Through the Exclusionary Rule,” 30 Mo. L. Rev. 391, 422-

29, 447-55 (1965); Waite, “Police Regulation by Rules of

Evidence,” 42 Mich. L. Rev. 679, 685-87 ( 1944). It is im-

portant to reiterate that the police do not act out of mal-

ice, they act because the public demands that they act

and that demand is more forceful than the demands made

by judges.

7

It is our view that the only effective control upon

police conduct is the community in which the police fune-

tion. Excesses and abuses of police power occur rarely

because the citizens will not tolerate them, not because

the police fear that months later a judge will suppress

respondents were injecting respondent’s two children with

methedrine. Upon checking the premises the police did

observe two children. There were additional cireum-

stances which would lead any law officer to consider the

necessity for prompt action to rescue the children even

at the cost of ruining the prosecution.

8

evidence they seize. In our experience, the only effective

means of changing police procedures which aggrieve

segments of the community is by community pressure.

The exclusionary rule has been in effect in Tilinois since

1923 and yet there is no evidence that complaints concern-

ing police abuses have diminished. In one city in Illinois,

it is claimed that one minority group is persistently har-

assed by police. Though many allegations have proven un-

founded, there have apparently been enough incidents to

cause several changes in police procedure and high rank-

ing personnel. The incentive for change was not a new

rule of court or a far-reaching opinion but rather the

pressure of citizens groups. In light of several recent

jury verdicts acquitting unpopular defendants, it seems

absurd to argue that the community will tolerate police

excesses against minority groups.

In this connection, it is worth observing than an of fi-

cer who acts in good faith is not going to be deterred by

the exclusionary rule. See Horowitz, “Excluding the Ex-

clusionary Rule,” 47 L.A. Bar Bull. 91, 92 (1972). By

definition, such an officer acts because he thinks, albeit

mistakenly, that he is acting within the law. The officer

who acts in bad faith will not be deterred either. “The

officer who takes bribes or shakes down prisoners, or eX-

torts money on threat of arrest, or brutally mistreats

prisoners or otherwise consciously abuses his authority

ean be controlled only by the imposition of direct penal-

ties . . . the exclusionary rule has no impact in such a

situation.’’ Barrett, “Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by

Illegal Searches,” 43 Calif. L. Rev. 5G, 592-93 (1955).

The incentives and pressures which work against the

exclusionary rule are not the only factors which account

for its limited value as a tool of deterrence. The rule

eC

itself is applied in a context inimical to its purposes.

There is, first, a distinct failure to communicate the

rules of search and seizure laid down by courts to the

police in a manner comprehensible to the police. La Fave

and Remington, “Controlling the Police: The Judge’s

Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Deci-

sions,” 63 Mich. L . Rev. 987, 991-93, 1003-1008 (1965).

There is also the admitted failure of courts to prescribe

consistent and comprehensible rules governing search

and seizure. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.

443, 483 (1971). It may be inherently impossible to devise

coherent Fourth Amendment precepts. If that is the case

then the exclusionary rule is clearly out of place. It is

unreasonable to expect deterrence when the subject does

not know what he is forbidden to do. The lack of clar-

ity in the law contributes to both public and police

disrespect for the rules of search and seizure. Nothing is

more incomprehensible to the policeman who accepts ju-

dicial supervision of searches by securing a warrant than

to have another court say that the first court was wrong

in issuing the warrant. See La Fave, “Improving Police

Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule,” 30 Mo. L.

Rev. 391, 411-415 (1966).

There is a particularly striking and inexplicable anoma-

ly in our treatment of police officers vis a vis lawyers.

We excuse a lawyer who mistakenly judges a law to be

constitutional and advises his client to plead guilty. See

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-757 (1970).

Yet by a divided court we condemn a police officer who

decides to search upon his mistaken judgment that he

has met the requirements of the law. It is unfair to tax

an officer, usually a layman, with the endless permuta-

tions of search and seizure law. The appearance to the

officer is that the law is capricious and meaningless, an

attitude which scarcely encourages eager compliance.

9

10

III.

Many who recognize the validity of objections to the

rule will advocate that the rule not be abandoned until

a reasonable alternative is provided. The most popular

suggestion for an alternative is to provide a remedy remi-

niscent of Industrial Commission (Workmen’s Compensa-

tion) procedures. See Horowitz, “Excluding the Exelu-

sionary Rule, Can There Be an Effective Alternative,”’

47 Los Angeles Bar Bull. 91, 94 et seq. (1972); Barrett,

Exclusion of Evidence Obtained By Illegal Searches, 43

Calif. L. Rev. 565, 594-95 |(1955). Bevins v. Six Unknown

Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Bur-

ger C. J. dissenting).

It seems to us that concern over a viable alternative

should not prevent this Court from reconsidering the ex-

clusionary rule. If the exclusionary rule were effective and

meaningful as a deterrent, it might be proper to ponder

the necessity for replacing it with something else. But

it appears that the exclusionary rule cannot and does not

serve the purpose of deterrence. If the exclusionary rule

has no deterrent effects, its absence will not leave a void

to be filled. It might be said that an outright abolition of

the exclusionary rule may have a symbolic effect and en-

courage police abuse. We doubt that this would occur.

The public resentment of arbitrary police conduct is now

and will remain the primary restraint on the police. Fur-

ther, the continuation of the exclusionary rule will en-

courage the other police abuses attendant upon the ad-

ministration of the rule. 4

This Court need not resolve the issues presented by a

complete abandonment of the exclusionary. Instead, a

more modest approach can and ought to be pursued.

11

The exclusionary rule in federal cases was adopted

in Weeks vy. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The

crime there was use of the mails to transport lottery

tickets. The police action there was conducted without

any authority. It consisted of a complete search of the

room of the defendant in his absence and a seizure of his

private letters and correspondence and other private

papers. Under the rule in Boyd v. United States, 116

U.S. 616 (1886), the seizure may well have violated the

Fifth Amendment.

The exclusionary rule was imposed upon the States in

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The conduct of the

police in that case can properly be characterized as flag-

rant. The offense charged could not today be constitu-

tionally classified as a crime. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394

U.S. 557 (1969). The Court held that it must exclude

“evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse

of that basic right [of privacy]” 367 U.S. at 654-55.

The nature of police conduct in both Weeks and Mapp

was exceptionally violative of the suspect’s rights. Indeed,

in neither case, did the officers attempt to defend their

actions on the merits or as taken in good faith. No ra-

tionale appears in either case for applying the exclusion-

ary rule to reasonable, good faith but erroneous action

by the police.

Judge Friendly has suggested that “the object of deter-

rence would be sufficiently achieved if the police were

denied the fruit of activity intentionally or flagrantly

illegal—where there was no reasonable cause to believe

there was reasonable cause.” Friendly, The Bill of Rights

as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929,

%2 (1965). See also A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraign-

ment Procedure, §8.02 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1971). It

12

appears to us at least that this is what Mapp said.

When Mr. Justice (then Chief Judge) Cardozo rejected

the idea that the criminal should go free because the con-

stable “blundered’* he meant exactly what he said. A

blundering constable was not the subject of Mapp, rather

there a deliberate, methodical violation of a suspect's

rights was involved.

The exclusionary rule ought to be applied also in light

of the severity of the crime involved. Justice Cardozo’s

opinion in People v. Defore is often cited but there is

significant language in the opinion of Justice Finch in

the Appellate Division opinion:

“To be unable to find a murderer guilty, although

competent evidence is before the court to warrant

a conviction, for the reason that someone else is

guilty of petty larceny in connection with obtaining

such evidence seems a handicap rather than a help

to the administration of justice.” People v. Defore,

213 App. Div. 643, 652; 211 N.Y.S. 134, 142 (1925).

4. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N. EK. 585,

587 (1926).

5. “ . . . judicial exceptions . . . should depend some-

what upon the gravity of the offense. If we assume, for

example, that a child is kidnapped and the officers throw

a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every

outgoing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating

use of the search. The officers might be unable to show

probable cause for searching any particular car. However,

I should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action,

executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be

reasonable to subject travelers to thaf indignity if it

was the only way to save a threatened life and detect

a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such

a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles

of bourbon and catch a bootlegger. Brinegar v. United

States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (Jackson J. dissenting).

Ye

13

Tne ethical quandary posed by the application of the

exclusionary rule without regard to the nature of the

crime involved is a significant one. “However much we

may be revolted by the methods used by the police to

obtain the evidence we cannot rationally say that the de-

fendant whose crime may be at least equally revolting

should have a personal right to go free as a result.” The

exclusionary rule assumes “that the policeman’s action

always involves a greater social evil than the defend-

ant.” Barrett, Haclusion of Evidence Obtained By Illegal

Searches, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 565, 581 (1955).

In this case, the crime does not involve violence nor

is it an offense against the person. We would freely ad-

mit that the offense in this case would not be a factor

requiring the relaxation of the exclusionary rule. Never-

theless, it is a factor that ought to be considered whether

it weighs in favor of the prosecution or the defense.

The other factor that ought to be considered is the

nature of the police conduct. In this ease, it is clearly

inappropriate to characterize the police conduct as flag-

rant, deliberately abusive of basic rights or intentionally

violative of obvious rules governing search and seizure.®

It is difficult to characterize police conduct approved by

three judges of the California Court of Appeal and three

justices of the California Supreme Court as flagrant and

obviously illegal.

6. This assumes, arguendo, that the trash was protected

by the Fourth Amendment. On that issue we agree with

the petitioner and join its argument. See United States

v. Jackson, 448 F. 2d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 1971).

14

It has never been adequately explained why a case

like Mapp involving extremely flagrant police misconduet

used for the prosecution of the most trivial offense leads

to the suppression of evidence seized with probable cause

in good faith reliance upon a statutorily authorized war-

rant used for the prosecution of murder as in Coolidge v.

New Hampshire, 403 US. 443 (1971). Without that ex-

planation the rule should never have been extended to its

present breadth.

We do not ask now for the overruling of Mapp; we ask

that the exclusionary rule be limited to those cases like

Mapp which caused the rule to be promulgated, The ex-

clusionary rule has assumed a scope far beyond the jus-

tifieations offered when it was put upon the States.

There is no valid rationale for its automatic extension to

all classes of cases regardless of the nature of the police

conduct and the gravity of the crime. As a minimum

measure, the reach of the rule should be reduced to con-

form with the reasons offered for the rule in Mapp.

CONCLUSION

The People of the State of Illinois, as amicus curiae,

respectfully urge the reversal of the judgment below and

the adoption of the suggested modifications of the rule in

Mapp v. Ohio.

Respectfully submitted,

Wussam J. Scort,

Attorneys for the State of Illinois ¢