Jurisdictional Statement — Marks v. Chief of Police of Los Angeles

A . : ’

IN THE

i '

2 Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1969

° ONO...

BURTON MARKS,

Petition ;,

vs

THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF

LOS ANGELES, and THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES.

. Respondents

On Appeal from the California Court of Appeal,

Second Appellate District

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

MARKS, SHERMAN &

LONDON :

BY BURTON MARKS

9720 Wilshire Boulevard

Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212

Telephone - (213) 278-2301

Attorneys for Petitioner

-

Offset printed by: Dean-Standefer Co., 315 3rd St, Huntington Beach, Ca 92646

.

| TOPICAL INDEX

: %

Petitioner appeals trom the judgment

of the California Court of Appeal,

Second Appellate District. 22000... Pe

Opinions below ........2........ eee uee

Jurisdiction 2.0. ...... ttre core ey Seve re

Questions presented

Statute involved 2. .........

Gtatoteit oF the case... . eee cn Peer

The substantiality of the questions ............ |

[1] Whether the assessment of a penalty

under California Rule of Court 26(a)

is impermissible due to the vagueness

Be ene re ieee ek

[2] Whether a court’s refusal to consider >

an otherwise valid claim for property.

because that property was connected’

with an illegal transaction is a forfeiture

of such property without a hearing and

is thus violative of the due process

pRB em Sale aD Rae nese tA he I Sas

TABLE OF AU THORITIES CITED

Cases

Aptheket v. Secretary of State, 378 ULS. 500°

Cammer v. United States, 350 US. 399° 00.

Connally v. General Constr. Co., 209 U.S. 385

"yd

_)

as

St

St

my

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Dombrowski ¥. Ptister, SOUS AT eS

Giaceto v. Pennsviy a, S82 US, 300 SERS SOAS 3,6

Ice v. Louisville & N. R os ae wick . Sree f 7 |

Kevishian v. Bou of Regents, 385 Us syo ‘ 5

“Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306-US. 451 2... oO 3

MAA. 8: GOR, STLUS. GIS oc ck es ane

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S, 91 2.2... 3

Southern Ry. Co ove Irs, ATU © S. 190° ae oan 7

‘ apr = '

Statutes (United States) .

United States Constitution

First Amendment : 5

Fourteenth Amendment .... 0.5. ....05., 7.8

EO RO Med Mad A cA a Osis Winks bet tek ee 2

Rule (California)

Cahtornia Rules of Court

Rule 26(a) [See Appendix “B™] o. 0. oe

- IN THE

" SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1969

BURTON MARKS,

| Petitioner,

VS. dlls ‘ ay

THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF

LOS ANGELES, and THE CITY OF LOS ANGELE S.

R esponder ents.

On Appeal from the California Court of Appeal,

Second Appellate District

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT |

~ Petitioner appeals from the judgment of the California

Court of Appeal. Second Appellate District, entered on Oct- -

“ober 23, 1969, affirming a judgment against him by the

Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the

County of Los-Angeles, and submits this Statement to show

that the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction - -

of this appeal and that a substantial question is raised.

: t _ ORTNIONS BELOW

There were tfo reported Opareas befow W ¢ are attach-

ing hereto as Appendix “AY UP) the opinion of the Court

of Appeal of the State of Cabtonua, Noond Appellate Dis-

trict, certified for noppudlratvoa ( Appendix 7A” pp. 1-7)

[2] notice of denial of Petetron foi ‘Rehearing tiled in the

Court of Appeal of the State of Cahtoraua, Second Appeilate

District (Appendix “A™ pS). ) 3) aotics o f deniai & Petition

for Hearing filed, in the Supreme Court of the State of Califor

nia (Appendix “AY p. DQ). aunt [4] the Piadings of Fact of the

Superior Court of the State of Cahtorma, for the County of

Los Angeles (Appendix “AS op. TTS)

| JURISDICTION

The judgment agaiast, petrtroner was catered in the

s Superior Court of Los Angeles County oa Apri ls, i8ox.

it.was affirmed by the-Court of Apweal of the St ate of Calit-

ornia, Second Appellate Distesst. on October 23, 1968 a

_ Petition for Rehearing beute Somead on October.29, [Yoee:

"the Supreme Court of the Nate of Caltfornia denied a hear

ing on December 17, 1YO9 ant a Notes Of Appeal was filed tae,

in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appet

late District, on January 27) Potnoner made a timely

objection to-a stale statute Se teading that it was void and

standardless. As the state cow's Soom was in WVGror tte —

validity of a statute gomten sen tO DO repugn rat te the United

States Constitution, jurintic: tnt IS OowtTerred by TS ULS.C

oth py? Te > 5 . es SPE n au Net thy, eNtNe>-al are?

section 125 7(2). Cases wit? sapport thus appeal ure

\4.4.0P v, Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), Aptheker v.

Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964): Giaccio v. Penn-

svivamia, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,

300 US. 481 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co.,

09 US. 385 (1926); Scapws v. United States, 325 U.S

9] (1943 3).

\ % .

+ _ QUESTIONS PRESENTED

] 7 : :

Whether the assessment of a penalty under Calit-

ornia Rule of Court 26(a) i is impermissible due to the vague-

ness OFthat rule.

{2] |

~ Whether a court’s refusal to consider an otherwise

valid claim tor property because that property was connect-

ed with anallegal transaction is a forfeiture of such property

without a hearing and is thus violative of the due process clause.

STATUTE INVOLVED

i

Rule 2o0(a), California Rules of Court, [West 1964] is set

forth as Appendix “B.”:

= /

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petinoner, assignee of Barbara Williams, filed an action

for claimand delivery of $12,020.00 held by the Chief of

Police of the City of Los Angeles (respondent here along with

the City of Los Angeles). Judgment was entered in favor ot

dof pre T 30, Appendix A. infra) on: April 1S, 1968.

The achon-Was tor the rec overy of sums of money paid by

a ps

Barbara Williams to Paul G: Franey, a Police Officer of

the City of Los Angeles. I The money was turned over,

by the officer to the Los Angeles Police Department and

was segregated by that Department to be used as evidence _

in a bribery prosecution against Miss Williams. (CT 30)

Petitioner dully appealed the judgment against him to

the California Court of Appeal. On’ October 23, 1969, the .

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and assessed a © oS

penalty of $250.00 against petitioner for filing a “frivolous”

appeal (Appendix A, infra). Petitioner petitioned. the Court

of Appeal for a rehearing, contending that Rule 26(a) of

the California Rules of Court, under which the penalty was

_assessed, was.unconstitutionally vague and was therefore

void as violative of the due process clause. The petition for -

rehearing was denied on October 29, 1969 (Appendix A,

infra). Petitioner then petitioned the California Supreme |

Court for a hearing on the same grounds, and it, too, was

. denied (Appendix A, infra). The denials by the Court. of

Appeal and the California Supreme Court of petitioner’s

pétitions for rehearing and hearing were, in effect, findings

that the Rule is not in conflict with the strictures of the

United States Constitution, and petitioner appeals to this

1 The following sums were paid: Ae

a) August 4, 1965, $220 as partial payment of $500 for ©

obtaining a continuance of a sentencing matter ($20 of this sum was to - ,

reimburse Officer Franey for long distance telephone calls) (RT 49).

b) August 26, 1965, $3,300, of which $1,500, or so

much thereof as Franey decided was needed, was to be used as restitution

to the victim of a “bunco scheme,” Officer Franey to keep any balance of .

the $1,500 for himself; the rest, was to “fix” the case (RT 49, 51, 52).

c) August 26, 1965, $300 as the balance of the $500

for obtaining the continuance referred to in “‘a)”’ above (RT 53).

d) August 26, 1965,°$500 for the arrest of two men (RT

76, 77). ;

°) September 27, 1965, $8,500, of which $2,000 was a

es y-off” for Franey and $6,500 was to be used for restitution in “b)”

above (RT 55, 56).

ia

‘ Honorable Court for a review of these decisions

THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE QUESTIONS

[1] The conduct that Rule 26(a), California Rules of Court,

can be used to punish the filing of a ‘‘frivolous” appeal is not -

' unimportant conduct when viewed in light of the First Amend-

ment and the cases of this Court discussing that amendment.’

“[P] recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an, area

so closely touching-our most precious freedoms. : . for

~ standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the

area of free expression.” N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra, 371

U.S. 415, 428, 432 (1963). See also Keyishian v. Board of

Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-604 (1967); Dombrowski v.

Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of

State, supra, 378 U.S. 500, 516 (1964).:

While this Court has consistently held that freedom of

expression isa precious right (see, e.g., N“A.A.C.P. v. Button,

supra; Dombrowski v. Pfister, supra), in the instant case this

right is especially so. For here, the expression penalized is

expression of the highest,order: the request of counsel for

judicial review of an adverse détermination of his client’s

rights. Thus, the factor of the freedom of counsel also

enters this’ case. oe je

_ In Cammer v. United States, 350 US. 399 (1956), this

- Court quoted Congressman James Buchanan on the independ-

- ence of the bar: “The public have almost as deep an interest

in the independence of the bar as of the bench” (350 US. at

407). Cammer restricted the applicability of summary contempt °

and quoted Buchanan’s statements at the trial of Judge James

Pike, whose abuse of his contempt power led to the passage of

the Contempt Act.

The inquiry here is not dissimilar, for we have a

Statute, without standards. which allows a judge to deter-

mine what is “frivolous” and then fashion a penalty to fit

‘the crime. Surely’ the limits of frivolity would depend

‘upon the outlook of the judge, and the penalty would

depend upon the extent of his anger. |

‘— As this Court can see by viewing the Rule, which is

set forth as Appendix “B.” it is not at all precise. Aside

from the fact that the word “frivolous” is not defined, the

section makes reference to a party being “guilty of any

other unreasonable infraction of the rules,” and says that

the court may “impose _ . . such penalties... as the cir-

cumstances of the case and the discouragement of like con-

duct in the future may require.” This.is not the kind of

statute which tells'men of common intelligence what it

requires (see Commally » General Constr. Co., supra, 269 ©

U.S. 385, 391 (1920) ). nor does it fix standards as to what

is prohibited (see Gisecio » Pennsylvania, supra, 382 U.S.

399, 402-403 | 1960) ): but leaves judges “‘free to decide,

without any legally fixed standards. what is prohibited

and what is notin each partycular case” Giaccio v. Pennsyl-

vanig, supra, 382 U.S. at 402-403. |

“The teaching of these cases. especially when viewed in

light of the strict test required by N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,

supra, requires a finding that the Rule is violative of the due .

process clause. ed re

_ [2] The trial court’s refusal to consider the merits of

petitioner's claim to the money in question because some

‘of it was fainted by tilegaht, was a‘denial of that property

4 Bm, Fae

without due process and violated petitioner’s rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment. Without considering whether

the court could, ‘consistent with the Constitution, refuse to

consider petitioner’s suit had he tried to get the “illegal

objects {of the contract] carried out” (C onclusion of Law

III, CT 337), where one party was-the State, it seems clear

that the case at bar did not involve such a request. Here.,,

petitioner wished to have specific and identified monies, ©

held by the State, returned to him. The fact that some of

the money was paid to a police officer in the form of bribes

caused the courts below to deny petitioner the right to all

of the money; and to eschew a hearing to determine if, in

fact, some of the money was untainted. |

- The right to a hearing to consider “‘adjudicative” ques-

tions is not a novel or new one. In 191] 3, this Court said the

following in discussing the importance of a hearing:

“A finding without evidence is arbitrary and base-

less. [I] f the Government. . . is correct. . .

[i]t would mean where rights depended upon facts,

the Commission could disregard all rules of evidence,

and capriciously make findings by administrative

fiat. Such authority . . . is inconsistent with rational

justice, and comes under the Constitution’s condem-

nation of all arbitrary exercise of power.””

ICC v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 327 U.S. 88,

91. (1913); |

see also Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginja; 290 U.S. 190 (1933).

a ————— — _ ———

ae Conclusion of Law WI - ~ “That the Assignor, Barbara Williams, was a party

to an illegal contract, and neither the Assignor, nor the Assignee, Burton Marks,

may come into a court of law and ask to have the illegal objects carried out, nor

can they set up a case in which they must necessarily disclose the illegal purpose

as the groundwork of their claim.” (CT 33)

on

_ The failure of the trial court to attempt, by use of

a hearing, to segregate those sums which were not tainted

by the illegality —and which therefore should be available

to petitioner—requires reversal. Further, a review of the

doctrinaire approach to denying a litigant access to a court

on the ground of “in pari delicto” requires new analysis in

light of constitutional rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth

Amendment, which cannot be legislated away by the courts.

Petitioner contends that the decisions below failed to

treat properly the questions of vagueness and denial of a hear-

ing raised below. We feel that the questions presented by this

appeal? are substantial and that the decisions below are in

‘conflict with those of this Court.

o :

Respectfully submitted,

MARKS. SHERMAN &

LONDON

BY: BURTON MARKS

Attorneys for Petitioner

3. If this appeal be improvidently taken, it is respectfully requested that

this statement be treated as a petition for certiorari.

“a”

APPENDIXES | —

Opinion of the Court of Appeal

of the State of California, Second

Appellate District ..........

Notice of denial of Petition for

Rehearing, Court of Appeal ..........

Notice of denial of Petition for

Hearing, Supreme Court of the

State of California. ..........

%

Findings of Fact of the Superior

‘Court of the State of California

Fogthe County of Los Angeles

California Rules of Court,

Rule 26(a) [West 1964] oe

“_* *# # # *

2s + 2 se

2 2 se 8B

Page

10

14

APPENDIX “AT 2

OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL

OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

Pa ad

(Certihied for nonpuablication) |

BURTON MARKS, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. THOMAS

REDDIN, as Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles, and

the CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ.No. 33712...” |

Filed October 23, 196%

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court, Los

Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Affirmed.

Judgment for Defendants in a complaint for claim and

‘delivery, affirmed.

Marks, Sherman & London and Burton Marks (in propria

persona) for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), John A.

Daly and George J. Franscell, Assistant City Attorneys, and

_ William B. Burge, Deputy. City: Attorney, for Defendants and

Respondents.

Plaintiff, an attorney at law, sues, as the assignee of Bar-

bara Williams,to recover $12,020, held by the Chief of Police

of the City-of Los Angeles. As disclosed by the pleadings and

record, the defendants came into possession of this sum of

money under the following circumstances:

\

“a

\

\

. Barbara Williams was interested in assisting Vine

Appendix “A” : 2

Stevens, Catherine Adams and Keki Williams, who were

being prosecuted, or who were in danger of being prose-

cuted, for certain criminal conduct, and to secure the

arrest and prosecution of Miller Guy and Nido Lee. In:

that connection, she paid the total sum of $12,020 to

Officer Franey of the Los Angeles Police Department, for

the following purposes:

(a) August 4, l%@5, $220 as partial payment

-of $500 for obtaining a continuance in a sentencing -

matter of Vine Stevens ($20 of this sum was to reim-

burse Officer Franey tor long distance telephone calls).

. (b) August 20, 1905, $3,300, of which $1,500,

orso much thereof as Franey decided was needed to

“be used as restitution to the victim of a bunco scheme

perpetrated by Catherine Adams in order to stop the

prosecution of said Catherine Adams, Officer Franey

to keep any balance of Said $1,500 for himself; and |

$1,000 for Officer Franey to use to “fix” the case

against Catherine Adams, that is to fix the case so it

wouldn't be prosecuted.

(c) August 26, 1%O5, $300 as the balance of

$500 promised Officer Franey for obtaining a contin-

uance for the sentencing of Vine Stevens.

August Do, MoS, $800 to arrest Miller Guy

and Nido Lee.

(d) September 57, 19%S8, $8,500 of which

$6,500 was “to take care of itso Cathy (Catherine

Adams) won't be prosecuted” and a warrant for Keki

Williams be withheld or withdrawn on a charge which

Officer Franey had previously annulled. Officer Franey

4

Appendix “A” ay

was to use part or all or more of this sum as restitu-

tion to the victim and to keep any balance for him-

self; and the sum of $2,000 as payment to Officer

Franey for not prosecuting either Catherine Adams

or Keki Williams.

At all times, Officer Franey was acting in the course

and scope of his duties as a police officer with the know-

ledge of and under the orders of his superiors; he received

the monies in that capacity and without intent to be influ-

enced in any official action ; he turned the monies, as receiv-

ed, over to his superiors and they are held by the defendant

city in segregated accounts. Barbara Williams has‘ pled guilty

to a violation of section 67 of the Penal Code (bribery) in

connection with the transactions above set forth.

The trial court entered judgment for defendants on the

ground that plaintiff had not filed a claim as required by the .

Government Code and on the ground that plaintiff.was barred

from recovery on grounds of public policy. Since we affirm

on the latter.ground, we need not consider Whether or not

plaintiff’s claim, if otherwise cognizable, falls within the —

claims statute. )

Plaintiff argues as follows: 7

(1) To permit the city to keep the money is a “forfei-

ture” prohibited by the Penal Code and by the Constitution.

(2) That, even if a bribe was involved, not all the money

was tainted by a bribe, and therefore plaintiff was entitled to

some of the money. |

(3) There was no contract between the police officer

and the assignor.

Appendix “A” q-.

Plaintiff's contention that allowing the city to keep

the money is a “forfeiture” promi OV Penal Code we

tion 2604 is not well take, Te Sourt in the case of Lee

On v. Long (1951) 37 Cal. 2g 488. @ated in part as tollows.

-, “Consistent wet Tre gene ral ‘rule governing —

the constructigit o PAtatuds ravolving forfertures

QQ? Cal.Jur. see. 3 we. AS30354), the trial court

properly recogimzeds Yh buts of its express ss statu-

tory authority amd Somes the county’s petition

for forfeiture “as far ax tre arones [was] concern”

ed.” (Cf CRaprnure x &egolor, 47 Cal. App. 2d 848.

860-861 [119 P.2g LOS)) Howerer. the present

case On appeal LOEs WOE ComcE™ the law of forfet-

_ ture, but rather reigeex So Oke Question of whether )

plaintiffs, admitiedl» LMMAGOT IN legal gurndiing

activities al the Curree or Phe rard and their arrest,

@re in @ PUsillon (Vv axxo PAI OWNership and

right to possession of “ee money that was then

in actual use in suc? accemes, and to enlist the

aid Of the court tt sexo co have it restored to

them. | | : |

m2 ‘No principle of low iw better settled than

that a party to ait tllegal contract canmmet come -

into a court of law dine ar ¢ "0 have his dlegal

objects carried Out. ror dan he wt up a Case In

which he must tteeesnu ts Gisclose an ulegal pur

pose as the groumiwork of hus clam.” (1? CS

sec. 272, p. O56.) (Enmhasis added.)

Pie Plaintiff argues that the J ee Ow case ws “net the law

of this state any longer.” Phaurfet® ortes ae case overruling

Appendix “A” .—5-

_ Lee On, and our own research has not disclosed any. Nor

‘are plaintiffs attempts to distinguish Lee On v. Long from

the instant case persuasive. The principles of law are the

same whether the facts‘involved gambling, as in Lee On, or

a bribe, as in the instant case. .

Plaintiff next argues that, even assuming some illegal

transaction, not all of the transactions were tainted. The

rule js that a party. to an illegal contract may not success-

fully mnvoke judicial aid to have his illegal objects carried

Out, nor set up a casein which he must necessarily disclose

ba

an illegal purpose as a basis for his claim. The test is whether

the plaintiff can establish his case otherwise than through the

Yhedinm of an illegal transaction to which he himself is a

party. (Lee On v. Long, supra (1951) 37 Cal.2d 499.)

Since plaintiff cannot establish his case without raising the

illegal transactions, whether or not each and every individual

transaction, considered alone and not in the context of a-

series of transactions, is in itself illegal, does not help plain- |

nits case. *

b urther, it is clear that all the moneys given by Officer

Franey were related to illegal transactions. The word “bribe”

is defined as follows: ,

“The word ‘bribe’ signifies anything of value or

ed, with a corrupt intent to influence, unlawfully,

the person to whom it is given in his action, vote,

Or opinion, in any public or official capacity ;”

(Pen, Code, sec. 7, subd. 6.) !

advantage, present or prospective, or any promise °

or undertaking to give any, asked, given, or accept-

Appendix “A” | —6— .

A bribe contemplates a promise to give a public officer

; anything, which may have a future existence and value,

with the intent to unlawfully influence him in his official °

action. (People v. Vincilione (1911) 17 Cal.App. 513,

515.) It is clear that plaintiff's assignor in the case*at

bench was attempting to unlawfully influence the officer

in his official action in each transaction.

Plaintiff argues that some of the money was paid to

Officer Franey to be paid by him to the victims of the

various fraudulent transactions indulged in by the persons

arrested or suspected of such crimes and that reimburse-

ment of victims is a lawful—even a commendable— act and

not illegal. But the arrangement was that the officer could

keep for himself all monies.not needed to satisfy the several —

victims; as far as the record discloses, the victims might have

been satisfied with minimal amounts. It follows that plain-

tiff cannot segregate any specific sum that was devoted to

a lawful purpose, even if he legally could disengage the parts

of single payments. Since the record does not disclose the

purpose of the telephone calls involved in the August 4th

payment, we cannot say that they were not made i as part of

the over-all bribery scheme.

I]

‘Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to recover because

_a contract was never formed between Officer Franey and

plaintiff's assignor. The court in the Vollman case said: -

“In this connection it must be remembered that no ‘meeting

‘of the minds’ is required to establish an agreement to take a

bribe.” (People v. Vollman (1946) 73 Gal.App.2d 769, 788.)

Further. in Schur v. Johnson (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 680, it

Appendix“A” 9 °° =7—

was held that courts will not lend aid to transactions

founded on illegal contracts or acts'in violation of law.

And in Berka v. Woodward (1899) 125 Cal. 119, the

~ California court. quoting from an earlier case, said that .

no court shall lend its aid to aman whose grounds for

action are based on an illegal or immoral act. .

Thus, the existence or nonexistence of a contract

is irrelevant. It is clear that the money was given with a

corrupt intent by plaintiff's assignor to influence official

action, and that is sufficient to preclude plaintiff from

using the courts to recover money.

The judgment is affirmed. The appeal is strictly

frivolous. In addition to the usual costs on appeal, appel-

lant shall pay, to the clerk of this court, the sum of $250

as a penalty for taking a frivolous appeal.

KINGSLEY. J.

We concur:

JEFFERSON, Acting P.J.

DUNN, J.

Certified for nonpublication in the Official Reports.

pursuant to rule 976.

JEFFERSON, Acting P.J.°

KINGSLEY. J. ©

DUNN. J.

Appendix ates ah. 8

NOTICE OF DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

Court of Appeal of the State of California

Secund Appellate District

P a

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NOTICE OF DENTAL OF PLITIION LOR HEARING

Supreme Court of the State of California

Chi, re

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Appendix “A” : ~10—

FINDINGS OF FACT

Of

The Superior Court of the State of California

_ For the County of Los Angeles

BURL ON MARKS, Plaintiff, vs. THAD BROWN,

Chief of Police of the City o* Los Angeles; et al., Defend-

ants.

No. 898 013.

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial

on the 22nd day of March, 1968, in Department 24, the -

Honorable Arnold Praeger, Judge Presidi.iz, the Court sitting

without a jury, neither party having requested same;

and the cause having been heard, and the evidence, both oral

and documentary having been introduced and received on

behalf of said Plaintiff and said Defendants, and the Court

having considered the same. and having considered the stipu-

lations entered into by and between said Plaintiff and said

Defendants, and having heard ‘the arguments of counsel, and

being fully advised, makes the following FINDINGS S OF FACT:

It is true that: :

; | 1

The CITY OF LOS ANGELES is a tcnicipal corporation,

.. anized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the

State of California, and that THOMAS REDDIN is the Chief of

_ Police of the City of Los Angeles. . °

. lI .

’ The CITY OF LOS ANGELES has the sum of $12,020.00

which is being held pursuant to DR No. 65-537976." .

Appendix “A” 11.

il

At all times mentioned in Plaintitt’s Complaint Paul

J. Franey was, and now is, a duly qualified. appointed, and,

acting police officer of the City of Los Angeles and peace

officer of the State of Califormia, acting within the scope

of his authority and engaged in the regularly assigned duties

of his offige in good faith and without malice.

o. . | IV

On August-4, 1965, Barbara Williams, a gypsy. gave to

Paul J. Franey, a police officer, the sum of $220.00. That

twenty dollars of this sum consisted of two ten-dollar bills,

given to Paul J. Franey to reimburse him for the cost of tele-

phone calls made by him to her in San Francisco. “That the

balance consisted of two one hundred-dollar bills, given to

Paul J. Franey for having obtained a continuance of a crimin-

al trial concerning a fellow gypsy named Vine Stevens. That —

this sum. was to forestall and keep Vine Stevens from going to

jail.

- | |

On August 26, 1905, Barbara Williams gave to Paul J.

Franey, acting as a police officer, $3,300.00. Thatof this

sum $1,500.00 was to alfempt-to make restitution to a vic-

tim of a bunco involving a fellow gypsy. Phat it was under-

stood that Sgt. Franey could give all of this sum to the

victim, or any sum, or keep all of the sum for himiselt

Phat $1,000.00 was given to fix Katherine Adams grand

theft case, $500.00 was given to Paul J) Praney to atrest

Miller Guy and Nido Lee on any charge Sgt Franey desired.

and $300.00 was given as u fiaal payment to Set. Praney for

having obtained a continuance of the criminal tral involving

Vine Stevens, thus forestalling sand petsen from being

Appendix **A”’ —12

incarcerated.

: VI .

On September 27, 1965, Sgt. Paul J. Franey received

the sum of $8,500.00 from Barbara Williams. That $2,000.00

of this sum was given to Sgt. Franey to quash any and all crim-

inal actions contemplated and/or pending against Kathy

Williams and Keki Williams. That the balance, $6,500.00,

was given to Sgt. Paul J. Franey to satisfy the victims of various

buncos from gypsies. That it was understood that Sgt. Paul J.

Franey may keep this sum, or use whatever portion he believed

would be necessary to satisfy the victims.

ack VII

All victims mentioned in the preceding paragraphs did in

fact receive restitution. ‘i

Jv ee

Barbara Williams assigned whatever right, title, and interest

she may have had to the sum of $12,020.00 to BURTON

MARKS, Plaintiff herein. 3

| 1X

BURTON MARKS is an attorney at law, and duly licensed

to prac tice 1 in the State of California. :

xX

At no time did the Plaintiff, BURTON MARKS, or Barbara

Williams,-or anyone acting on their behalf, file a claim with the

City Clerk of the City of Los Angeles pursuant to Section 900

et sequitur of the Government Code of the State of California. -

Xl

The allegations in the Second, Separate and Distinct

Defense as set forth in the Answer of the Defendant, CITY OF

LOS ANGELES, to the Plainutt s Amended (¢ ompk aint for |

Claim and Delivery i are true:

ae

Appendix “A” | l.

Xl

Asa result, the ASsignor, Barbara Williams, Was sen-

tenced to State Prison. ;

XI-

The only parties Defendant involved in this lawsuit are

the CITY OF.LOS ANGELES and THOMAS REDDIN, as

Chiet of Police, only. aes

DATED: This «..:.....:. day: of April, 1908.

v

4

APPENDIN “B"

CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE 26(a)

[West 19o4|

Rule 26. Costs On Appeal |

(a) [Right to costs} bxcopt as herematter provided,

the prevailing party shall be cutitled Co his costs on appeal

as an incident to the judgment on appeal In the case of a

general and unqualified attirmance of the judgment, or the’

dismissal of an appeal, the respoadent shall be deemed the

prevailing party in the case of 4 reversal. in whole or in part,

-or of a modification of the judgment, the appellant shall be

deemed the prevailing party la aay casein which the inter-

ests of justice require if, the review iag court may make any

award or apportionment of costs which uw deems proper. In

probate cases, in the absence of ta express direction for costs

by the reviewing court, costs OF appeal shall be awarded to

the prevailing party, but the supeuiom court shall decide against

whom such award sha be made The foregoing provisions.do

not apply-in enmiunal cases) Whete the appeal is frivolous or

taken solely for the purpose of delay or.where any party >

shall have required in the typewritten or printyd record on

appeal the inclusion of any matter not reasonably material

to the determination of the appeal. or has been guilty of any .

other unreasonable infraction of the rules governing appeals,

the reviewing court may IMpose Upon oftending attorneys or

parties such penalties. including the w ithhiolding or imposing

of costs, as the circumstances of Hic Case and the discourage-

ment of hke conduct in the future ma require. As amended,

effective Jan. 1, L959. .

. \)

State of California. 7

County of Orange )

I, the undersigned, say: I am and was at all times herein mentioned a citizen

_ of the United States and employed in the County of Orange, over the age of

eighteen years and not a party to the within action or proceeding; that

My business address is 315 Third Street, Huntington Beach, California 92646,

that on JANUARY __ , 1970, 1 served the within JURISDICTIONAL STATE-

MENT (MARKS v. THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

et al.) on the following named parties by depositing the designated copies thereof

in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States Post

Office in the City of Huntington Beach, California, addressed to said parties at

the addresses as follows:

COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

111 NORTH HILL STREET

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

FOR: HON. ARNOLD PRAEGER, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR

COURT [1 copy]

CITY ATTORNEY, CITY OF LOS ANGELES

2102 CITY HALL

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012 [2 copies]

THE-SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES +H _

WASHINGTON, D.C. [ 2copies]}

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

217 WEST FIRST STREET

. LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012 [3 copies]

aA

co

.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on JANUARY , 1970, at HUNTINGTON BEACH, CALIFORNIA.

D.A,Standefer

41 copies to the Supreme Court of the United States

a D.C.

Dean- Standefer Co., 315 3rd St., Huntington Beach, Ca. 92646 |

viidti 536-7161 ;