Jurisdictional Statement — City of New York v. United States
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SUBJECT INDEX
( pinion Velo eae nsonntisanbaee alle
"Jurisdiction Seas Been ey”
(uestions “Present dl ; ss pisasees ise
Statutes Involved , ; ee
Maitethent oot the Case. : ‘ +t ae 4
hie Ouestions Are. Substantial “10
Phe. Notice ot Pleartings and’ the Hearing Itselt
Parted to Mee thi Standjerd ot ue Process of
Law 7 : ; oo RS
P é
Phe Dstriet Court) Erred dw Nat Requiring ca
Shy thay? | haat ; thie: Pyvven mer CBee i lecrer
\\ as | am, | cpurrtirdole canned yy thie Pathe Interest >
Phe D)ystret- Court Erred by Aperoving the 4 cn
sent Deeree i tts. Proposed tarm W ittyoart bn
clusion ita Ndlossion of the. \lepa
74 { omdatyon ti) Aye
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Preotys tt} thre { yitoharn
pera vicel dl ‘ . _& ’ . 22 ;
The -tetrict Court Atiused His DPiseretion hy
Dyerivigiy (Co onsoledatear of Che Ths Vetionms 4)
( carn he beth ; . : 52
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INDEN JO APPEN DICH
ca °
Viper . \- ] ly rent } ay rare 4 aeet |
npoudix FR. Momorandim Opinion rie
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PABLE OF AUTHORITIES CEPED .
Cases, Leages
Allen Caleulators, Ine. v. National Cash Register
Co.,. 322 U.S. 137 (144)... ,
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Atlanta Pivelratane: Gras. Ineo ve Lowery Vime Coa..
4) ERD. 164 OND. Miss.: 1900) oun te
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Diruces Mntices.- lhc \ \rer wan Can 4 Cee
743 se ee ? ae ; 3
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. vo EL Paseo. Natural Gas
Cw 5 38h iB + [20 { 1'%), j ey \ 4
Cinatimmon v, Abner A] Wolt. Ine. 215 bo Sapys
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» 833 (BD. Mich. 1963) a : 23, 26
Clark \ Viner ny Alanine ( ae reity 1) Jey |: Supp, PF
1308-4 BD Lia 1D) 5 1
Cranston v; Freeman, 200 F.Supp, 785 (NJ) Nev,
LOO) J a 15
DuPontv. Southern Pacitie Company, 360 bo 2d 1o3
(ath Cap Woe . . 3
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betsen ae | artisie. & voopetia, aE - Jil sS5 | nal
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ennch. Motors Corp ovo General Veotors Corp, lo ;
US. S58 41951) Se eee tna 4: er
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| wir 4 pr perathend ome | rurteaP tity Add | | Jin :
Hh { Fins 3 i a AS . a
( por det 1" clay! + \ "VRas ly Nout . } foxiuet itr
25 -] Ser: iat, Case | 5 ie +] i
Hlatiover. Shoe bea \ { bitten Sahin \] i betty 1 \ e ry)
i y, } i ra 1 sal i i? ]th, . ut! «I tt "puart.
ewe edd in part. 3 PLS ASE Gd ‘ 23. Se
Plagisterty vo bie 4d @. Om. Pon ee | . 15
th 4 , wy ; ° ¢ =a ;
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(Hh Cir, FO55) | & ovat
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Minnesota Minin and \bartactearing “Cow New
" Jersey Woodtinishing @o.. BSP US S1b eo pogs,
° e :
Missourt Wansas Pipe Line Coo. United States
" JON | 2d] Po Srd iy VOB). cont den. Buk LS
ON, ¢ Pedy “
\itkine vo Central Hanover 7} &T ¢ ae ae &
800 (POSBO) O , : cas
New Jey wy \W og tins bangy: ir Pa \bitinies: tei Manin
cnn Vani fereturine (ir. Hi |: Ju Adt i dred (it
Thad) atta wey . 4h o8 DOH :
Philadelphia Thoarting. \uthortiy «American Rad
ator *and Standard Santtary 269 1 Supp
_ 240006. D Penn 19607) :
Schultz vo Mianutacturers ands Ftidens trast Ce, 89
Supp 37 i Wob NY Pad) be |
Crited Siatesty Athed Cheuteal Core et oC EI
Lerch ee Jara PhP y it) \hiw 1 gest j
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inp "452. it 1) i ali }th,
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lited States vo kX AL Sehaetter Brewing Com
pany amd Anheiser Buseh. Ine. 1968) CCL
Trade Cases, Para. 72,345 (© Ir N \ Poe) Ix
uited Tlates \ q hint \epolnalt sinned Petroleum Cour ail
Massachusetts, 1900 COC OTL “Prade” Cases. Para
HORSS C1 Mass 100) OX
uted States -vwo Pan \merean. World Airways
lue., JOO CC OH race ASC . Para 75.1
PSY) NY. TORO): os Is
. , , . ® : eho Las
ited State Iavcdics 4 A) ce) Vinerien AG
1 Supp) he ie 1) | deel pong y type il iStarssed! 3 E&
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©. Bicks, The Deqartinerit ot dustice and Private Treble
Damage \etions, 4 A\aritirist Bull 5 (1969)
(Comment, Vntitrusi I. nforcement hy Private Parties
Analysis ot the Develop ments ithe Trebie Dam
age Sut, ol V iile ae LOO {4952 )
. Docket Noo 3h oot the Judicial Patel on Multadistrict
Tatiati®n of the Lonifed States ‘District Courts
lore’. Multidistriet Private Cival Treble Danaiapre
Vitiorust Latyeation Invelyving Motor Velicle Agr.
Polhitton Control, hagapment | oa
1 ocument of Record
Detendants’ Opposition te \pplication tar Leave te
Hntervetie” Pte . ee 3 8
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frovernineny! hey Sphobiet te Applica tres tor Interven
tron, bet ,
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Order to Sheaw Cause and Notee ‘ot learnt, ot
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ad
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States.
IWISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
a
—Z-—— E
substantial legal questions affecting the health and well
. being of the American public are presented. -
‘Opinion Below,
- The judgment of the District Court for the Conta
District, of California is reported in C.C.H. Trade Cases
Para. 72,907 (19609). The Gourt’s Méniorandum Opin-
ion is-unreported. Copies of the judgment’ and opinion _
are attached hereto as Appendices A and B respectively.
. Jurisdiction.
The United States’ action was brought to obtain a
declaration that defendants-appellees were in violation
*f ‘Section. 1 of the Sherman: Act (15 U.S.C. Section
~ 1), to enjoin them from pursuing various actions in
_ violation thereof, and for geneval relief. On September
17, 1960, appellants filed a national. class action on be-
lialf of the American public under Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure against the same defend-
- ants-appellees pursuant. to Section 4 of the- Clayton:
Act (15 U.S.C. Section 15), alleging in material part
a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and
seeking injunctive, treble damage, and generat ‘relief.
Similar actions have been filed by numerous states, lo-
cal governments and private citizens. They -are now
—docketed (#31).before the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation of the United States Courts.
Appellants moved the District Court to disapprove
the. proposed Consent Judgment. and to allow consoli-
‘dation’ of the two actions under Rie 42(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 29, 1969,
the District Court entered an order approving the Stipu-
lation for Entry of Consent Judgment, entered judg-
“%s
| 3
ment thereon, and denied appellants’ motion to consoli-.
_ date. Notice of appeal to this Court was filed in the
District Court on December 15, 1969. The jurisdic- —
tion of the Supreme Court to review this decision by
direct appeal is conferred by 15 U.S.C. Segtion 29,
commonly known as the “Expediting Act”. he fol-
lowing ‘decisions sustain this direct appeal to the Su-
‘preme Court: Utah P. S. Com. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co.,
cack USS. ......, 23 L.“Ed. 474 (1969); Cascade. Nat-._
ural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S.
129 (1967); Allen Calcilators, Inc. v. National Cash
Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944); United States v.
California Co-op Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 (1929); and
Missouri- Kansas Pipe Line Co. @. United States, 108
FB. 2d 614 (3rd Cir. 1939), _cert. denied 309 U.S. 687
(1940).
Questions Presented.
1. Where a District Court is requested to approve a
proposed antitrust consent decree of critical public con-
cern, does the hearing thereon and subsequent final
judgment meet the requisites of due process. of law if
notice of the hearing is ordered given only to a modi-
cum of the persons adversely affected.
2.. Where a District Court is requested to approve
a proposed antitrust consent decree of critical public
"concern, does due process require that adversely af-_
fected persons be permitted to cross-examine parties and
witnesses and to inspect documents material to the sub-
ject matter of the proposed consent decree.
_- 3. Where a consent deéree is proposed involving
highly complex issues of critical ‘public concern, may
the Court approve the decree and enter final judgment
°
sicaliae
‘s
thereon without presentation for its consideration of
any evidence or facts ‘sufficient to. enable the Court to.
determine if the pr cra decree is fair, equitable anid
‘in the public interest.
4. Where the enforcement policy underlying the pro-
visions of -Seétion + of the Clayton Act would be sigé
nificantly frustrated by entry of judgment upon a pro-
posed consent decree, should entry of judgment be con-
" ditioned ‘upon the inclusior of a provision in the. de-
cree providing for a limited’ admission by the defend-
ants of the allegations in the government complaint,
for the sole purpose of giving such judgment the prima
facie effect in subsequent private actions provided in
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, (15 U.S.C. Section
16(a)). :
5: Where two suits are pending before the District
Court involving identical and complex. issues of signifi-
cant public importance, and where separate trials
these issues would create unnecessary duplicity of time
and expense, does a District Court abuse its discretion-
ary powers in denying a motion to consolidate them
under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil hig
‘cedure.
Statutes Involved.
; 45 U. SC Sections «1; 15, 16(a). The full text of
these, statutes i is attached hereto as Appendix C.
Statement of the Case.
In mid-1966,-a Federal Grand Jury commenced i inves-
tigation of the practices of the automotive industry
‘regarding possible anti-competitive practices in the fail-
ure to develop automotive anti-pollution devices. As a
— See
ese of the ev idetice assembled by the Grand es over
an eighteen month period, the United States, on January |
10, 1969, filed a civil complaint charging that defend-
ants-appellees General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor
Company, Chrysler Corporation, American Motors. Cor-
poration and Automobile Manufacturers Association
had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by con-
spiring to eliminate competition in the research, de-
velopment, manufacture and installation of automotive
air pollution control equipment, and in the purchase
of patents and patent rights covering such equipment.
Automobiles are shipped to each of the fifty states
of the United States. In 1966, for example, 78,315,000
passenger cars and 15,864,000 trueks and buses, exclu-
sive of off- the- road vehicles, were registered in the
United States. In that year, 8,604,712 passenger cars
valued at more than $17™% billion and 1 791,587 com-
mercial vehicles valued at more than $3.9 billion were
produced in this country. These figures have each in-
creased in each succeeding vear.
Since at least 1952 it has been established that mo-
‘tor ‘vehicles contribute to air pollution by the emission
of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, oxides of: nitrogen
and other contaminants. For example, in Ios Angeles
County, as of January 1967, gasoline-powered_ motor
vehicles accounted for 12,465 tons out of a total of
14.610 tons, or 85.3% of contaminants emitted into
the ambient air daily. A large and growing market
for the production and installation of air pollution con-
1S million tons of deadly carbon monoxide are discharged each
vear by automobiles in this country. Procress IN THE PREVEN-
TION AND Controt or AiR PoLeuTion, First REPoRT OF THE
SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Eptucation Ann’ WELFARE TO THE
Unirep States Concress, June 28, 1968, at. 16,
cielbicin
trol devices has developed. Such devices are shipped in
interstate tommmerce either as engine or system modifi-
cations or as equipment attached to automobiles.
Beginning at least as-early as 1953, and continuitig
to the date of the filing of the United States’ action,
the defendants-appellees and co-conspirators were en-
gaged in a combination and conspiracy in unreasonable
‘restraint of the aforesaid interstate trade ‘and com-
merce in motor vehicle air pollution control equipment.
The combination and conspiracy consisted of a cor-
tinuing agreement, understanding, and concert of ac-
tion among the defendants and co-conspirators, namely :
(a) To eliminate all competition among themselves
in the research, development, manufacture and installa-
tion of motor vehicle air pollution. control equipment ;
and. ° | ei
(b) To eliminate competition in the purchase of pat-.
ents and patent rights from other parties covering mo-
tor vehicle air pollution control equipment.
In furtherance of that conspiracy, defendants-appel-
lees did the following :
(a) Agreed that all industry efforts directed at the
research, development, manufacture and installation of
motor vehicle air pollution control equipment should be
undertaken on a non-competitive basis 5.
(b) Agreed to seek joint appraisal of patents and
patent rights submitted to any of them by persons not
parties to a cross-licensing agreement entered into on
July 1, 1955, and amended and renewed periodically,
and to require “most-favored-purchaser” treatment of
all parties to the cross-licensing agreements if any one
were licensed by persons not.a party to that. agreement ;
b
(ce) Agreed to install motor vehicle air pollution con-
trol equipment only upon a uniform date determined by
agreement, and subsequently agreed on at least three
separate occasidns to’ attempt to delay, the installation
of motor vehicle air pollution control equipment :
(1) In 1961 defendants-appellees agreed among) them-
selves to delay installation of “positive crankcase
ventilation” on vehicles for sale outside of Califdrnia
until the model year 1963, despité the fact that this
anti-pollution device could have been installed ha-
tionally for the model vear. 1962 and that at least
some automobile manufacturers expressed willing-
ness to do so, in the absence of a contrary indus;
try-wide agreement; - : 4
(2) In late 1962 and extending into 1963, de-\
fendants-appellees agreed among themselves. to de- \
lay installation of an improvement to ‘the positive
crankcase ventilation device, an improvement which
the California Motor Vehicle Pollution Control
Board ‘had indicated it would make mandatory;
(3) In early 1964 defendants-appellees agreed
among themselves to attempt to delay the introdue-
tion of new exhaust pollution control measures on
motor vehicles sold in California until the model.
year 1967 ;* despite the fact that all were capable of
installing the iniprovement for the model year 1966,
the defendants agreed to tell California regulatory
officials that installation of exhaust anti-pollution
measures would be technologically impossible before
1967, and only under regulatory pressure made pos-
sible by competing device manufacturers not in the
automobile industry did the defendants agree to a
California regulatory requirement that exhaust de-
vices be installed for the model year 1966; and
ellen '
(d) Agreed to restrict publicity relating to research
and development efforts concerning the motor vehicle air.
pollution problem.
The aforesdid.combination and conspiracy has had,
among others, the following effects:
(a) Hindering and delaying the research, develop-
-ment, and manufacture—both by the defendants and
co-conspirators ‘and by others ‘not parties to the agree-
ments
and the installation of motor vehicle air pollu-
tion control equipment ;
(b) Restricting and suppressing competition among
the defendants and co-conspirators in ‘the research, de-
velopment, manufacture and installation: of motor ve-
/.
-hicle air pollution control equipment.
The foregoing facts are alleged in the Uifited States’
complaint.
The closed door and nefarious conduct complained of
was characterized by counsel for the ‘defendants-ap-
pellees at the evidence—and fact-free hearing for ap-
proval of the proposed consent decree as follows
“Basically, the conduct evolyes around coopera-
tive efforts of the automotive industry as an. in-
dustry to develop methods and equipments for re-
‘ducing: the level of objectionable’ emissions from
motor vehicles in--response to the urging of the
California officials to reduce the impact of motor
vehicle emission on smog.
“This case does not involve, your Honor, any:
sinister form of combination or conspiracy. On the’
contrary, what is involved. is an open and _ public
7 forum of industry cooperation known to all regu-
latory bodies, a fact which we believe the court
can take judicial notice of” (Transcript, pp. 27-
28
saiiien
Defendants-appellees were never required to plead to
the United States’ complaint. On September 11, 1969
there was filed in the District Court a proposed final
judgment together with a Stipulation that judgment.
could be entered after 30 days unless the United States
withdrew its consent before.the expiration of that peri-
od, On, its own motion, by ordet dated September 17,
1969, the. District Court invited all interested persons
to express their views -on the proposed consent decree
and ordered that a hearing be held on October 28, 1969.
However, the District ‘Court ordered copies of this
order sent only to: the parties to the United States’
action, the California Attorney General, the Los An-
geles County Counsel, the Los Angeles City Attorney,
and the Los Angeles Air -Pollution Control District.
‘No other ‘notice of the hearing jvas ordered given,
served or published and the aforesaid notice was not
ordered published at all. |
On September 17, 1969, appellants Marshall B. Gross-
man and S. Jerome Tamkin, Ph.D., individually and on
behalf of all United States: residents, .filed a separate
complaint against defendants-appellees in the same Dis-
trict Court. This complaint and the complaint filed by
the United States alleged like acts and violations on
‘the part of defendants-appellees. To avoid the expense
and delay of proceeding separately with these two suits,
‘ _ appellants Grossman, et al., filed a motion for consolida-
tion of these two cases’ under Rule42(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in October,f'1969, together
with their objections to entry of the proposed consent
judgment. be
Others also filed objections of the proposed consent
decree and some filed applications to intervene: Only
4,
po
one comment’ supporting the decree was filed. In addi-.
tion, many letters were directed LQ the Court pleading
for disapproval of the decree.
Qn Octobeg 28, 1969, the hearing, as ordered, was’
- sheld, at which time the Court announced its decision
approving the consent decree and denying the motions .
_to intervene and consolidate, At the hearing, neither the
United States nor the defendants-appellees introduced
or presented any evidence or facts. They called no
- witnesses. They did not summarize the substantive con-
tentions of the United States or the defendants-appellees.
They did not advise the Court what evidence supported —
their - respective positions. Appellants requested and
weré denied the opportunity of cross-examining the par-
ties and inspecting relevant and material documents.
Judgment was entered on October 29, 1969, together
with an -order impounding certain of the documents
gathered by the Federal Grand Jury in its investigation
of the defendants. 7
Appellants filed a notice of appeal to this Court under
the Expediting Act (15 U.S.C. Section 29) on Decem-
ber 15, 1969.
The Questions Are Substantial.
The subject matter of this appeal is perhaps of great-
er potential effect upon the lives and well being of all
persons within this country than any other litigation in
this century. We are here concerned with the inten-
tional polluting and poisoning of air. According to the
charges of the United States’ complaint, the’ defend-
ants-appellees have combined and conspired in such a
manner as to insure the continuing pollution of the at-
mosphere. The effects upon th€ American people have
™
in for sixteen years;
sia Races Se a
4
“been staggering. The one éssential ingredient of life,
air, has become impr egnated with visible and invisible
poisons, Our children are herded into cafeterias and
gymnasiums during
‘smog alerts’. Their ability to par-
‘take of the pleasures of childhood is stifled. The well
get sick and the aged and infirm become ill and die.
Travel throughout the country is less enjoyable and
less pleasurable as one journeys from smog belt to smog
belt. And all the, while, unbeknown to but a few Ameri-.
cans, the executives. of one of our largest industries
were combining and conspiring to perpetuate the evil
for their own pecuniary self gain.
Presented with the basic information and facts, the
District Court might have: felt impelled to reject the
proposed ‘consent decree and either require dit ferent
terms as a condition to approval, such as remedial re-.
lief; that the parties proceed to trial. Yet the parties
saw fit to present the Court with no evidence, no facts,
no contentions.. In short, the Court was left in the dark
and had before it only-the. government’s complaint, the -
proposed consent decree, and the arguments of persons
who were generally uninformed on the merits.
The defendants-appellees were permitted a settlement.
consisting of little more than a promise “never to do
it again” in light of at least the following facts: —
(1) The conspiracy and combination was persisted
ee ,
(2) The conspiracy reflected a callous disregard for
the health and well Wiis of human beings ;
‘ (3) The conspirators’ secreted from the public and
government agencies information respecting the develop-
ment of anti-pollufion devices and. affirmatively misrep-
resented their claimed inability to secs in the dev elop-
ment of same;
—12—
Ld
(4) The defendants-appellees rank. among the elite
of American industry in pow er, economic strength, and
influence ; and
(5) The: proposed consent decree requires no remedi-
al action.
When a consent decree is proposed in a matter ‘of
such ‘great moment, surely due process requires that ade- —
quate notice of the hearing be’ given to those persons
directly affected.and that those persons be permitted ‘the
opportunity to cross-examine parties and witnesses and
inspect documents material to- the subject matter of the
proposed consent decree. Each of these rights was re-
quested. None of themwere granted. And neither. the
Court nor the parties to the action bothered to address
themsely es to these serious and basic constitutional. ques-
tions. |
By reason of the systematic silence of the appellees
and the emptiness of the record, the District Court
was stripped of its ability to independently exercise its
judicial duty of determining whether the: proposed con-
‘sent decree was fair, equitable and in the public interest.
Given the life and death importance of this litiga-
tion, the District Court had-a duty to-the public not to
allow itself. to be unduly bound by a simple agreenient
between the parties. Nevertheless. the C ourt below was ~
_of the opinion that air pollution was
“simply not a problem which the Courts can
deal with, and this action today has nothing to do
with correcting smog. As a matter of fact, there
- is nothing T can do in this case that would have any.
direct or profound effect upon smog whatsoever.”
{Transcript, p. 9]. ° é
mn
The Notice of Hearing and the Hearing Itself Failed.
4
to Meet the Standard of Due Process of Law.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover B & T Co., 339 .
U:S. 306 { 1950), this Court stated that:
‘This right to be heard has little reality or worth
_ unless one is informed that the matter. is pending
and can choose for him Avhether to appeal or
default,-to acquiesce or contest.” Id. at 314.
The appellees did not even request that a hearing, be
held upon the proposed consent decree. The District
Court, however, set a hearing: However, notice of the
hearing was given only to the parties in the United
States’ ‘action, to the California. Attorney General, the
Los Angeles County Counsel, the Los Angeles City At-
torney, and the L. wos Angeles Air Pollution Controf Dis-
:, - 7 | | é :
Local and state governments and individuals with
rights which would be adversely affected by a consent
decree should have received notice under Court super-
vision. The consent decree effectively strips those suf-
fering damages from the conspiracy of the prima facie
effect of judgment as provided in Section 5(a). of the
Clayton Act (15 U'S.C. Section 16(a)y). |
The Department of Justice ‘did not. even follow its
own policy of obtaining the views of all parties affected“
-. by the proposed consent judgment :
“(a) It is hereby established as ‘the policy of the
} Department of Justice to consent to a proposed
_ judgment in an action to prevent or restrain viola-
tions of the antitrust laws only after or on condi-
The. fund; unental requisite of “due process of
law is the opportunity to be-heard.’ Citations.) -
tion that ait opportunity ts afforded persons (natu-
ral er corporate) who: may be affected by such
judgment and who are not-named as parties to the
action to state Comments, views or relevant allega-
tions prior tothe entry ef such proposed judgment
‘by the Court.” ( Emphasis added. ), 28 C.F.R. Sec-
tion oe |
Analogy may be made to the mandatory, /discretion-
ary notice requirements for-class actions brought under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The
Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 23 indicates the rea-
son for notice requirements’ in representative type ac-
tions: . ° eee rs, ere ae
“This mandatory notice pursuant to Subdivision
¢(2), together with any discretionary, notice which
the Court may find it advisable to give under
~ Subdivision d(2), is designed to fulfill require-
‘ments of due process* to ‘which the’ class action
procedure is, of ¢ nurse, subject.”
: P
*
In recent Federal Court decisions, it has been held
that even the discretionary notice provisions under
F.R.C.P. 23(b) must comport with due process of ‘law.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F. 2d 555 (2nd
Cir. 1968), the Court in discussing the discretionary
notice requirement held that; = ~ «
+s
... notice is required as a matter of due process
in all representative actiotis, and 23(c)(2) merely
requires a particularized form of notice in 23(b) (3)
| actions.” Jd. at S64- 360.
and that |
‘6
. the procedure - aie must conform to the
haseliiaaatd of due process and fairly insure the
—15—
protection of absent. parties who are to be bound.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.°32, 42, 61 S.Ct. 115,
85 L.Ed. 22 (1940). Notice as an integral part of
due process must be ‘reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to appris€ interested parties
of the pendency or the action and afford them an
opportunity to. present their objections...” Id. at
568.
See also: Cranston v. F reeman, 290 F. Supp. 785 (N.D
N.Y. 1968) at 787; Clark 2. -Imerican Marine Cor pora-
tion, 297 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. La. 1969) at 1306; and
Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 1 (S:D.N.Y. 1969) at 22.
Even those who received notice and appeared at ‘the
hearing were denied the effective opportunity to be
heard. They were stripped of all ability to inform. them- ~
selves or to assist the Court in informing itself. They.
were dénied the right to cross-examine and inspect
documents. : ;
The District Court Erred by Not Requiring a Show-
* ing That the Proposed Consent Decree Was
Fair, Equitable and in the Public Interest.
No consent decree haul be approved unless it is es-
tablished to the satisfaction of the Court that it is
fair, equitable, and in the public interest.
. Appellees successfully barred the introduction. of any
evidence at the hearing by arguing that such evidence
would remove any consent decree from the proviso to
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act regarding the non- -
prima facie effect of consent decrees entered “before
any testimony has been taken. 2° (Defendants’ Op-
osition to Applications for Leave to Intervene and
—16—
+ Other Petitions and Comments Regarding the Pro-
posed Decree, and Memorandum of Points and A thori-
. -
ties, p. 20). However, as appellants argued below ;
“ . the only. logical way that provision can be
read is to read it with referenge to testimony on the
merits of the cause and certainly not’ testimony
which may be adduced to help make the bench
better informed as to whether or not the settlement
which is propused is fair, reasonable and adequate. sf
[ Transcript, pp. 140-147].
Appellees argued that because the proposed consent
decree allegedly provided for substantially all the relief
expressly asked for, by the government in its complaint,
the decree should be aeeie Yet, as pointed out by ap-
pellants, the government complaint also’ requested “such
ether, further and different relief as the nature of. the,
case may require and the Court) may deem just and
proper in the premises.” (United ‘States Complaint,
~ p. 10, lines 11-13). [Transcript, p. 149, lines 6-13]. By
reason of. this prayer the Court, after observing the
gravity of the appellees’ violations during trial, could
- have decreed any further equitable relief necessary to
< adequately meet the magnitude of the violations. For
example, the Court could have required the defendants-
appellees to recall and equip those cars manufactured
during the period of the conspiracy with adequate air
pollution control devices at their expense. Nevertheless,
the District Court judge was of the opinion that
“The prayer for -such relief as may seem proper
is a general catchall clause,,as all attorneys know,
and it means little if an tee |‘Transcript, p.
162, lines 6-8].
|
In United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327
(1964), the complaint also contained a oe gen-"
eral relief. After consent decree negotiations, )he de-
fendants submitted a proposed ¢ consent decree apd the
District Court ‘ordered the government to show cause
_why’the proposed judgment should not be entered. The
government urged the inclusion of two additional in-
junctive relief provisions. The District Court was of the
opinion that the proposed judgment provided all the re-
lief to which the government would be entitléd were a
decree entered after trial, and approved the proposed
consent decree. In vacating the judgment of the District
Court this Court stated:
ee
‘it “cannot. reasonably be ‘assumed that the
government’ could not, at the trial, have introduced }
evidence justifying, in whole or in part, the relief
sought.” This is not to say, of course, that the
District Court could not correctly have concluded,
after trial and an ‘opportunity to know the record
and to appraise the need for prohibitions or affirma-
tive actions.’ United States v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., supra, 340 U. S. at 89, 95. L.Ed. at 101, |
that the requested relief:was not warranted. Under
the circumstances of this case, however, it could
not so conclude without a trial.
‘The disputed provisions certainly may be re-
garded as within the general scope of the relief
sought in the complaint, which included a request
for ‘such further, general, and different relief
as the nature of the case may require and the
Court may deem appropriate in the premises.’ It
should be noted in this regard that the. compa-
nies did accede to a number of government de-
=r) aa
_ mands which went beyond the violations charged
or the specific relief requested.” Jd. at 332-333
(Emphasis added. ) | :
The IWard case makes it clear that a prayer for gen-:
eral relief cannot be ignored in comparing the provisions
ota proposed consent decree with those of a complaint
in determining the adequacy of relief granted by the
consent decree. Moreover, IVard is support for appel-
lants’ contention that the District Court committed er-
ror in not allowing itself, in the words ‘of the Coyfrt,
“an opportunity to know the record and to Appraise the
“need for prohibitions or aftirmativ e actions”.
The District Court had the power to reject the. pro-
posed consent decree.
| In United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Company, 272
F. Supp. 4382 (C.D. Calif. 1907), the Court, after a
hearing, refused to sign a proposed consent decree. In
United States v. Pan American | Vorld clirways, Inc.,
1959 C.C.H. Trade Cases, Paray 75,138 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), the Court would not EE a proposed consent
— and ordered the parties.to trial. In United States _
v. F. r M. Schaef fer Brezving Company and Anhetse¢
, Sey Inc., 1968 C.C.H. Trade Cases, Para. 72,345
(C.D.N.Y. 1967), the Court recognized the judicial
function of the Court when a consent decrée had been
offered and new parties objected to it, and: then set the
‘matter for a hearing:
“TAlsa judicial act, the consent decree constitutes
the determination by the Court that its content is
equitable and in the public interest. * * * Report
—19—
of the Antitrust Subcommittee (Sub. Comm. No.
5) of the Committee .on the Judiciary, H.R. 27,
‘86th Cong., Ist Sess., Consent Decree Program of
the Pepartment of Justice, January 30, 1959 at p. -
3." Jd. at p. 84,940, . ; |
In United States @. First National Bank and Trust
Company of Lexington, Kentucky, 280 F. Supp. 260
(E.D. Ky. 1967), Chief Judge Swinford when faced
with an analogous situation in an antitrust case of es-_
sentially local concern, stated:
“T do not question the right of the United States.
or any other public agency to compromise litigation
in which it.is involved, but I do believe that. the
United States should go very slowly in cases of this
character’ where the whole community,, compara-
tively small though it may be, is deeply concerned. |
: . . Compromising cases. of this magnitude, when:
they have reached the stage that. this case has
reached, creates a feeling of uneasiness in the pub-
lic mind. American justice is so constituted that
not only should it ‘be fair and impartial but the
litigants and the public should know that it is fair
and impartial.” Jd. at 263.
In Esco Corporation ‘v. United States, 340 F. 2d
1000, (9th Cir. 1965), Judge Barnes, who was once
in charge of the Antitrust Division; wrote:
“While a consent decree, forged by agreement be-
tween private and government attorneys, may not
_be a product of the trial judges own effort, it must
be scrutinized carefully and approved; both as to
form and content, by the court entering it, prior
to such entry.” Jd. at 1005. -
In United States D> Radio Corporation of America,
46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942), appeal dismissed 318
U. S. 796, Circuit Judge Maris wrote:
“A consent decree although ba: ed upon agreement
of the parties rather than a finding of facts by the
court, is not a mere authentication or recording: of
that agreement. It is a judicial act (United States
v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115, 52 S. Ct. 460,
760 L. ed. 999) and, therefore, involves the de-
termination by the chancellor that it is equitable
“and in the public interest. The fact that the Court
may Consider the opinion of the Department of Jus-
tice to the same effect does not’ mean, that the
Court has abdicated its power, or failed to carry
out its responsibility, to make an independent. de- -
‘termination of the propriety and equity of the de-/
cree. proposed by yarties. .. . It is fundamental
to our form of gove ent that in such suits,
as in all other matters brought before them for
- judicial action, the Court must act ‘in accordance
with their own convictions; uninfluenced by the
opinions of any and every other department of the
~ government.’ Irvine v. Marshall, 61 U.S. 558, 567,
20“How. 558, 15 L. ed. 994.” Id. at. 655.
In United States v. Carter Products, Inc., 211 F.-
Supp. 144°(S.D.N.Y. 1962), when the Court was called
upon to sign a consent decree between the government
and one of two defendants charged with violating the
antitrust laws, Judge Weinfeld made the following ob-
servation :
_ “In passing upon the oint application of the Gov-
“ernment -and Carter for approval of their stipula-
tion, the Court performs a judicial function and
is called upon to decide whether it is equitable to
enter the decree as proposed by them or with neces-
sary modification to effectuate its basic purpose.
While the public interest is a dominant considera-:
_ tion, the rights of third parties may not be ignored.”
Id. at 147-148. | :
- These authorities establish the independent -function
which the District Court in this case was called upon:
* to perform. The Court had to do justice between the.
parties to the action, as well as every man, woman and
child who suffered during the sixteen year conspiracy.
To accomplish such a formidable task within the struc-
tures of due process of law, the Court had to ‘insure
that it was presented witha record sufficient to inform
it of all relevant facts upon which it could intelligently
make the determination it was asked to make. ois
For example, the Court was not advised whether the
proposed injunction would terminate conduct then being
‘engaged in. In fact, the defendants’-appellées’ brief an
_ support of the settlement implied that the conduct com-
plained of (after its sixteen year history) was no.
longer being engaged in. (Defendants’ Opposition to. -
Application for Leave to Intervene, Etc. p. 19). Further,
the government at no time expressed its opinion of its
potential for success on the merits. The government’s
brief in support of the settlement, however, cofitains the —
candid admission that “As a practical matter, access to
the documentary evidence obtained by the Government
in its investigation of this case may well. prove to be
nearly as helpful as an adjudication of violation.” (Gov-
ernment’s Response to Applications for Intervention,
Etc., p. 22, lines 1-5). Did the Court. therefore, accept
a consent decree consisting of-a promise not to engage
—22—
in conduct previously engaged in for sixteen years; but
not then being engaged-in, in the face of government
possession of documentary evidence sufficient to clearly
establish liability on the part of the defendants? .
The question before the Court was a judicial event
of such magnitude, having such far-reaching conse-
quences for American ‘society, that the bare record be-
fore the Court was entirely inadequate and could not
justify approval of the i see consent decree.
The District Court Erred by Approving the Consent
Decree in Its Proposed Form Without Inclu-
sion of a Limited Admission of the Allegations
in the Complaint as a Condition to Approval.
In objecting to entry of judgment on the consent de-
cree as proposed, appellants, and others, requested the
inclusion Of a provision in the consent decree in which.
the deferidants make a limited admission of the allega-
tions in the government complaint. In rejecting. this
proposal the District Court seemed to be concerned
‘more with settlement of the pending action than with
protection of the public interest :
“However, the defendants have made it clear:
‘that they would not consent to such a clause and
if it were to be insisted upon, no settlement of the
Ase would be possible. * * * [The value of such
a clause} is doubtful, for insistence upon it would,
for all practical purposes, eliminate the possibility
4f settling antitrust cases.” [ Memorandum Opinion,
vi lines 5-8, 29-32]. Wot. Ae
Thitdoverriding concern for the protection of the settle--
ment mechanism does not give adequate consideration
to Congressional antitrust enforcement policy for the
protection of the public. ,
| wae
Congress envisaged both government and private ac- -
tions to achieve the broad social object of the statute.
New Jersey Woodfinishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining
~~ and Manufacturing Co., 332 F. 2d 346 (3rd-Cir. 1964)
at 350-351, aff'd. 381 U.S. 311. (1965); United: States
v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941) at_ 608-610;
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F. 2d 358
(9th Cir. 1955) at 365; see also MacIntyre, The Role
of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7
Antitrust Bull. 113 (1962). oF
This Court has recognized the Congressional intent
to “
ment of the antitrust laws”. Bruces Juices, Inc: v. olmer--
» ican, Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947) at 751, and that
private parties were to receive the benefits of prior
government suits. Minnesota Mining and Manufactur-
ing Co. v. New Jersey Woodfinishing Co., 381 U.S.
311 (1965) at. ig eBoy Motors Corp. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951) at-566-568:
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery oye
377 F. 24.776 (3rd Cir. 1967) at 784-785, aff'd.
part, reversed in part, 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Philade ne
phia Housing Authority v.° American Radiator and
Standard Sanitary Corp., 269 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Penn:
1967) ‘at 542; Cinammon v. Abner A. Wolf, Inc., 215
F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Mich. 1963) at 834.
The historic intent of Congress ‘to utilize private”
suits as a method of achieving effective antitrust com-
- pliance was well expressed by President Woodrow. Wil-
son in 1914 when he urged Congress to facilitate’ the
interaction of private and government actions by: |
“cc
. giving private individuals who claim to have
been injured by these processes the right to found
. use private self-interest as a means of enforces . —
tt |
“their suits for redress upon the facts and judg-
-. ments proved and entered in suits by the govern-
ment where the government has upon its own in-
itiative sued the combinations complained. of and
won its suit... . It is ‘not fair that the private
litigant should be obliged to set up and establish
again the facts which the government. has proved.
He cannot afford, he has not the power, to make
use of such processes of inquiry as the government
has command of. Thus, shall individual justice be,
done while the processes of business are -rectified
and «squared with the general conscience.” Wood- -
row Wilson, “Special Address Delivered at,a Joint
Sessic in of Congress” January 20, 1914, Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, Volume XVI, Bu-
réau of National Literature, Inc., p. 7918.
In 1955, Congrggsman Wright Patman echoed Presi-
dent Wilson's statement when he stated to the House
Antitrtist Subcommittee: — -
“We have ' recognized that a flecessary and inte-
gral part of any such policy is full and effettive
enforcement.of our antigmonopoly laws. For many
years it has been reeognized that the government
alone is not able to provide all the necessary, ‘en-
forcement. The help Of all citizens is needed. We
know that private parties will help in this endeavor
tf we afford them rightful opportunity.” Statement
of Represent: ative Wright Patman before the ‘Anti-
trust Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary,
House of Represe ntatives on HLR. 10243, August
... 6,.1988.
Thee Senate Committee, Report on Proposed Amend-
ments to Section 5 of the Clayton Act also emphasized
— —25—
the need for the joint effort of. the government and
private litigants as an antitrust enforcement weapon:
“The enactment of -the Clayton Act in 1914 was
in-part a recognition by the Congress that Section
7 of the Sherman Act had ‘not successfully ‘stimu
lated private litigation for enforcement of . the
Sherman Act... . , ~
Since the “enactment of. the Clayton Act, the
bulk of private antitrust litigation has followed
successful governnfent action, so that. the judg--
ments anc decrees and. the Federal’ proceedings
could be used. to establish a case. Amassing eévi-
dence for-antitrist cases would’ étherwise be a-pro-
hibitively expensive task for most plaintiffs.” (S.
Rep:- No. 619, 84th Congress, Ist Session, June
. £5, 1955; -U;,S. Code oe & Ad. News (1955) at.
‘ 2329. ey
In Emich Motors Corp. a General Motors Corp., 340.
-ULS. 558 (1951). this Court. examined the history of
the policy of assisting’ private litigants by prior govern-
ment action: |
“Seetion S-of the Clayton Act was adopted in re--
sponse to a recommendation by’ President Wilson
that Congress ‘agree’ in siving private ‘individuals
. the right to found their (antitrust). suits for
redress upon the facts Land judgments proved and
entered im suits’ by’ “the Government where: the
Government has... sted the combinations ¢ m-
plained of and won its ant. © . 7.’ S1 Cong... Ree.
1964... Congression: il reports and debates on the
proposal which ultimately became section 5 reflect
the purpose to miinimive the burdens o f litigation
for injured private suitors by making available to
them all matters previously ‘established’ by the
- government in antitrust actions, . . .” Jd. at 567-508.
In Cinammon v. clbuer A. Wolf, Inc., 215 F. Supp. |
833 (E.D. Mich, 1963). the Court ‘discussed the policy
_ of the antitrust laws with respect to private treble dam-
age actions : | ‘
“The purpose of. Section 4+-of the Clayton Act,
Title 15, U.S.C. Section. 15, which provides for
private triple damage suits is ‘to enlist “the busi-.
ness public’. . . as allies of the government in en-
forcing the antitrust laws; the means. chosen, on
the ‘other hand, is to give the “injured party am-
ple recompence for the wrong suffered” by allow-
ing three-fold recovery of damages.’ Report. of the
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws, p. 378 (1955). In other words,
the private antitrust suit is a substantial weapon
in eftectuating a national policy of protecting, pre-
serving and promoting free competition in the mar-
ket place by blending ‘antitrust policy with private
compensatory law.’ ” 215 F. Supp. at 834.
Three Assistant Attorneys General in charge of the
Antitrust’ Division (two of them while in office) in
articles and testimony before Congressional committees,
have stated that private actions are a desirable and nec-
essary supplement to Ce enforcement efforts.
See Bicks, The Department- of Justice and Private
Treble Damage Actions, + veri Bull. 5 (1959) at.
8: Loevinger, Private Aetion—The i caaice Pillar of
Antitrust, 3 Antitrust Bull. 1607 (1958) at 168: State-
ment of Lee Loevinger, Hearings Beforé Subcommittee
~
ee, ae
f the Select Committee on Small Business, U.S. Sen-
te 85th Congress, 2nd Session (1958), pp: 7, 16;
as
Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties:
Analysis of the Developments in the Treble Damage -
Suit, 61 Yale L.J. 1010 (1952) at 1046, quoting testi- .
iony of TH. Graham Morrison, Hearings on H.R. 3408,
Subcommittee on Monopoly Power of the Housé
udiciary Committee, p. 12. | |
Richard W. McLaren, the present Assistant Attorney
‘Waeree, .
General in charge of the Antitrust Division, stated on
December 11, 1969: 3
“Private antitrust proceedings today are not merely
a means of compensating victims of antitrust cen-
spiracies: they provide a substantial and meaning-
ful deterrent to violations of the antitrust laws: In-
deed, until the Congress acts on our recommenda-
tion to increase the maximum Sherman Act. fine
for corporations from $50,000 to $500,000, the
treble-damage action provides the only meaningful
financial, deterrent to antitrust’ violations.” Re-
marks of Richard W. McLaren before the Anti-
trust Committees of the Federal. Bar. Association
and the Philadelphia Bar Association, December
11, 1969. a .
The Federal Trade Commission: has also stated that
- its policy in enforcement shall lye directed toward assist-
ing private litigants. //. 2. Hood & Sens, Inc., Docket
No. 7709; 58 FT.C. 1184 (1961) at 1189-1190.
~The decree as approved by the District Court frus-
.trates the’ Congressional policy of joint governmental-
“private effort in enforcement of the antitrust laws.
a”
While Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act does give ree-
ognition ‘to the consent decree procedure used by thé
United States in disposing ot antitrust cases, this statu-
tory recognition camiot be regd as obliter rating the over-
all Congressional policy fer protection of Tree competi-
tion upon agreement of the parties to an action,
The public funds, manpower and facilities which
were employed by the Department of Justice in its in-
vestigation gt Unis sixteen year conspiracy, and which
could be employed in the prosecution of this action,
far exceed the resources available to iy private plain-
tiff. The magnitude ot the alleged Violations demand
that such resources be used to effectuate: compliance
with the antitrust: laws. The delays necessarily created
by the several: fold dupjication of the government et-
fort by the many parties attected by this action would
be avoided by the prosecution of the United States’
action.
The Department of Justice has previously recognized
the need to cooperate with private litigants in’ pursuit -
of its obligation to further Congressional policy. The
Department has. ackomplished this, objective by inelud-
ing within certain consent deeress specitic provisions
(conimonly known ay an Vasphalt clause’) admitting
the allegations of the Xormplaint for the benefit ‘of sub-
sequent private litigants. The consent decrees in United
States v7. Lake cAsphalt\and Petroleum Co. of Massa-
chusetts, 1900 C.CLHL Trade Cases, Para. 69,835. (1).
-» Mass. 1960); and United: States v. vlllicd Chemical
~ Corp., 901 CCL ‘Prade Cases, Para. 069,92 9(D. Mass.
1961) contained such) provisions for -the purpose of
private actions by states’ and local governments which
followed Federal govefument SUItS,
—29—
Defendants-appellees strenuously objected to the in-
clusion of an “asphalt clause” in the consent ‘decree,
and threatened to litigate the case fully if such a clause
was included (Defendants’ Opposition to Applications
for Leave to Intervene and Other Petitions and Com-
ments Regarding the Proposed Consent Decree, and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, p. 23).
That settlement may offer an expedient resolution
of many or Most antitrust cases. does not mean that
settlement in a particular case, this case, will produce the
Most satistactory result, This case is unique in the ex-
tent of its impact upon the public interest. It can be
fairly said that every individual in this country who
“breathes will he affected by the outcome of this action.
The general importance of a dual governmental-private -
effort in combating antitrust violations as severe as
those alleged in the government complaint make it clear
that in this case the only viable alternative to a com-
plete litigation of the issues is a consent decree contain-
ing a limited admission by the defendants of the allega-
tions in the compkaint. This admission would be solely
for the purpose and to the extent necessary to give
prima facie effect to the decree in subsequent private
treble damage actions. The defendants-appellees readily
recognize the onerous effects of the consent judgement
obtained. Doeket No. 31 of the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litteation of the United States District Courts
is “In re: Multidistrict Private Civil, Treble Damage
Anti-trust Titigation Involving Motor Vehicle Air Pal-
lution Control Equipment’. In the Tanuary 1970 “\Mem-
orandum of Defendants in Response to Panel Order to
Show Cause and Notice of -Hearing’’. the defendants-
—30—
: - &
appellees make the following statement and observa-
tion: | 5
“Tf, after limited discovery, these motions [pre-
trial motions] are not successful, it- would appear
that exhaustive full-scale discovery is likely to oc-
cur involving the examination.of numerous wit-
“nesses and voluminous documents. This is especial-
ly so because, unlike some antitrust cases which «4
have been the subject of consolidated pre-trial pro-
ceedings in the past, there has been no adjudica-
tion of liability here and, in addition, the right to
~ assert a claim for damages is far from clear. In
many of these other treble damages cases, the pri-
vate plaintiffs have available to them a prior adjudi-
cation of antitrust violations which had prima facie
effect, and, accordingly, the basic issue in those
cases was not whether, but how much, the plain-
tiffs had been injured.” (Pages 1 and 2).
The District Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying
Consolidation of the Two Actions.
Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
“CONSOL ID: ATION. When setiond inv volving a
common, question of law or fact are pending be-
fore the Court, it°may order a joint. hearing or
trial’ of any or all the matters in issue. in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated ;
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend t@ avoid unnecessary costs of
_ delay.”
*Consolidation may be ordered before issues are joined
where common questions are involved. Schultz -v. Afan-
—31— |
ufacturers and e ‘raders Trust Co., 29 F. Supp. 37
(W.D.N.Y. 1939). To expedite the trial and eliminate
unnecessary repetition and confusion trial judges have
been urged to make use of Rule 42(a). DuPont v.
Southern Pacific Company, 366 F. 2d 193 (5th Cir.
1966).
Each of the two cases pending before the District
Court involves like questions of law and fact and the
same defendants. | ce
“The consolidation of an action brought by the
United States with another action in whfch either
the United States or a private person is plaintiff
should be governed by the general principles of |
Rule 42, since the Federal rules are generally
applicable to the United States and these actions
do not involve any problem of sovereign immunity
from suit.” 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, Para. 42.02,
p. 42-19 (2nd Ed. 1968).
See also Gerber Products Co, v. Beech-Nut Lifesavers,
Inc., 25 F.R. Serv. 42a.1, Case 1 (consolidation of two
antitrust cases against the common defendant, despite
one unrelated issue in each case); Atlanta Hydratane
Gas, Inc, v. Lowry Tims Co., 41 F.R.D. 164 (N. D.
Miss. 1966), (four actions by different plaintiffs con- ’
solidated where all plaintiffs sought relief against com-
mon defendant for alleged discrimiuation in pricing prac-
tices in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act). The
delay, duplicity of expense, and time and inconvenience
to witnesses created by maintaining these suits. as sep-
arate actions could have -been avoided by consolidating
these essentially identical cases.
—32—
Conclusion.
~The issues involved in this appeal are substantial.
The resolution thereof will have a significant impact
on the public interest. Plenary consideration . by this
Court is required. Historians may hopefully read Wil-
liam Shakespeare's observation as an anachronism:
oe
: . . this most excellent canopy, the air, look you,
this brave o’erhanging firmament, this majestical
roof fretted with golden fire,—why, it appears no
Other thing to me than a foul and pestilent congre-
gation of vapours.”
William Shakespeare, Hamlet,
Act II, Scene II. :
Respectfully submitted,
SCHWARTZ.& ALSCHULER,
By Benjamin F. Scuwartz,
and
: = ~ Herpert A, KARZEN,
; Counsel for Appellants,
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APPENDIX A.
Judgment of the District Court.
[472,907 | United: States v. Automobile Mfrs. Assn.,
Inc., General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Co., Chrysler
Corp., and American Motors Corp.
In the United States District Court for the ventral
District of California. Civil Action No, sata IWC.
Entered October 29, 1969,
Case No. 2037 in the Antitrust Division of the De-
partment of Justice.
Sherman Act.
Conspiracy — Automobile. Manufacturers 4 De-
velopment of Smog Control Devices—Joint. Activities. —
Four automobile’ manutacturers and their trade associa-
tion were prohibited from conspiring to delay and -ob-
struct the development and installation of eieeen | con-
trol devices for motor vehicles. The decree prohibitions
include: (1) restraining in any way the individual de-
cisions of each auto company. as to the date avhen it will
install emission control devices ; (2) agreeing not to file .
individual statements with governmental agencies’ con-
cerned with auto emission and safety standards and
from filing joint statements on such standards unless
the governmental ag gency involved expressly authorizes
them to do so; (3) continuing a 1955 cross. licensing
agreement and refusing to Jgrant royalty-free livenses
on auto emission control devices under patents subject
to the 1955 agreement to:all who miav request them: (4)—
agreeing to exchange their companies’ contidential jn-
formation relating to emission control devices or to ex-
_ change patent rights covering future inventions " this
pat-
area; and (5) continuing their joint assessment o
*¢
*
ae - lander, Allen Fo Me Allester, \ hares VB Me Meer, and
ened an. auc emission control devices offered to cany
ul them by outside parfics its welluas their practice of
. * requiring eutt side partics tw license” alt of them on equal
‘terns. “* . A eas ae
. See ‘Combination anid’ Canispiracy, Vol. on TO00),
Th partment, of Justice I forcement and | ‘ncedure, Vol.
2,0 RES ty See ary am
For the plaintift ‘Richard: WL Mel waren, Asst: \tty.
Gen., Baddia J. KR: itshiid, Lewis. Bernstein,- William 1)
Kiltore. Jr. Rayiond WW Philipps, Berigrd ME bel
OC. Brooke Arniat,” Atfys:, Dept ot Justice. ”
fF of the de fendants A silence ots, I rernin & Crurcher, Jutian
.O. Von Kaliness ski. Maul Lower: Wilmer, Cather &
Pickering, Lhewd N Cunhed, ane Dhoward DP Wolletis.- tes
\itomobile, Mit s Asst, The’; Ki rss & Malem +. lL iaavher,
Felis A bhai, VE Petts \fattson. and Robert PAyetntge seat)
tor’ Getieral Motors Corp. ; CWertin, Yinan & Prine
Carl _ Schucl Waste 2 Kiel shed fear Mesten
“og MeO ae lack Verleger & Shea, Philip Ko Ver
Aeger. and WVilliten (1: Shea, ter Chrysler Corp: OY Mel
. vente & Myers, Allen O. Kr ges, ated Cpa Pe Betedrecaes
N ton Amerwan Mateus ( ony ets Wise .
°o
- Pitsal Lielernene.
CURTIS, D.-4 tin polars, Lnited Sqaten. of
4
Amertal avin tiledoit compat nt feerenmy cn Tarynars
10). Jim am! thn igtit amd thy ale fete Ants liv
thetr réspective attorneds basing severally comented t
theentrt oft thes Pinal loeléinenyt Wethoat trailor addline
vat t) af -erg trrveba rigs oth SUTTR Pees eel Guat «a bees hereary .
and without thre Pinal Judgment csivsitatiog exidem re
er an admission by any at Chem in respect -t ANY su if
’
‘Mine The retin e, ‘+. fare any testimony has been: taken,
“and w inbw nit trial or ‘ad judic ation of or finding on any
ISstie Ot Lact of aw chet rein, and’ pen consent of the
parties is aforesaid, it is he reby | : , °
Ordered. “Adjudged.and Decreed as follows:
Rake
+ | Surisdic tow |:
’
‘Thus A nurt hess piriscietieany of the subject - matter
| heron satu of the parties herets. Thy comiphagnit’ states” ay.
« aim Agen, which relief may be’ granted apapist the “de
tendants wader Section dot “the Vite at Congress: of.
8 haly 20 DS9OO) entitled Ap wet 1" pretect trade and com.
Mere agaist wnlawtul restr avis "and nv ticny lies”
Commnenty haown as. ‘the She INN; Mm \ititrtist, Net, as
aamnended ‘ : :
mad 4h se ; we
. ; ee Definitions) ate
Ns aseeel in this r "ni al Vavedgrsvvenst
* (A) “Devices” mesins far pellttion emission control
desigrins, ete Pepe etlwwds oe querts tered!’
for aneter vehicles ee ‘
“AD “Restricted imtcrmation® meat call tiagaspli shed
titer ate 1} sete thy Axpwr, fascilly clMissttiod it i mtguan?g
cont yede titi! cette’ rors atl ij’ st k Aistingeny hey! trey
mgr bast research “i gaining a ‘faller. iniwdedes a
Doce or t,t? hh ove i y Mweerning 1 lee deweli pitnent ithe :
. ’ ° , ‘
A aot “Nhat iifetire tye she af estialbation et | Th
abe ‘tartita (TP iTatle sceret £ tee TOOL hes Cea ges
puiliyes ytul ates night) het technical infurmation for
HoMoepingy waking. img: lowering the ent of
' A evn’ hime. ftir veltic! Thafien! wtnerey — “Rettricted
. wite rt nT ! vets hal! jut "ni ae " rapatiiw ncern
“understanding ot the presence, Nature, amount, causes,
sources, effects or theories of control of moter vehicle |
‘F emissions in the atmosphe ‘re, or (i) information relat-
~~
ing primarily ta equipment, methods or procedures, for
the testing or measurement of Devices, or (ii) in-
formation fer or resulting from the testing or measure-
miemt et ¥ production prototypes at Devices, of can
“advanced sh ise exch: mged? solely for such Purposes. In-:
formation shall be deemed te he: published when it ts
ise lose. without, restriction to the public, orto media
“ot general ‘ Jrethation, orto the trade press, or to meet-
"ing “of “Steckh, Aders, “dealers, - financial analysts, or
Bt Tneetings af profess aval, cuir ‘or engineering
Societies, or commiittdes thereof, the membership of
/
which is Hot limited to persons empl ved ‘Ty de fendants j
or 455 Muelor r vehicle mann ac Curers, aor tor Mie an cs a cilben !
“by ? TOPTCSentaAnives anf - Federal, state of lowal povern.
yyCHTS or cher neies | canat Te rized to tssuecmeotor vehicle
’
Cemisstoy control regulations.
|,
Applicabitity | . :
The provisions Of this Final Judgment shall be bind
Hage yp ag a fendant and upon cach of its stibsids
aries: afticers, directors, agents, servants, cmiplovees,
weeessors ath atetins, and ayponcall other “persens in
active eoncert Of participation with any of them whe
Wall hav receive retinal” netice: ot this Vinal Iudy
“10 vit bev ques nal service of cot ty rm ise’, fornt sdoadd ryeot ap
° pl feo carry fran acti between or annem ct fiarengt com
any ‘f aly ilart . ol teers, direttars, agents, Sery
ants and or emploweese Nothing inthis Frval Ieulornyent
shal] have at v ettecl with re sporet Tey canny aa tivities ‘ont
oe 4 .
.
e? ¢
?
po ae
side the United States which do not adversely and sub-
stantiaily affect the foreign commerce of the United
States ; \
¢. cee |
sii cpsnacaed C ontrol Devices)
4
limit the deve hopnient, Roe eae AA dis-
«
trsbution or salle of Devices ; hast ae
(2) Enterfng into, adhering: to. enforces ing or claim-
ing any-rights under any provisions of any agreement,
arrangemens, understanding, plan or program: (heréin-
after “agrepment’’y with anyother, de fendant or manu ;
facturer of motor vehitles or Devices :
(a) to xchange restricted information : {
(b) ta cross license patents or patents rights on De
vices which cross-litense | iicludes patents or patent
Tights yequired subsequent tte the date of any such
CTOSS Ih ense: ; \
oO delay installation af Devites ‘or otherwi ise re
to restrie 1s oaadieils #f research and development
(dg) to empley jomt assessmeitt gt the value of pat
or patent rights of cany third party relating to {
;
Pad
to require that aedqaisition of patent rights re
° 4 “~ ‘ . .
lafing to Devices ‘be conditioned upon atailabiline of
syich rights te others upon a mest favored purehaser
4g) to tile, in thy abseneesobk a written authorization.
eh
ar
for a jomt. statement by the ageney invelved, with any +
_ governmental regulitery. ageney in the United States
aut ln Wh cd
hor new gretor v®ueles or Federal moter velicl satety
“standards
, vie suche
; : . ; - fe , Ee :
Mhevits relating te Try the autherty of the agency on
Voted. on
y rR ‘
eravia't al
“ . ;
Titi Va
vided thi
Cys ( the
worthy unt
\
\
“standards or “repulatiens except yout’ state
or Stutdards or repulitiedis. ait test procedures ar test .. + ;
Hata rele,
rig’
sed aipon pubhely adilable mitermation : pro
ytooissue cmsston standards er regulations
er repularteys, aa qgort statement regard
Jothe drattsmanship Gt oof the: scientitie need ; =
mote standards or rewulidions., or Civ) the mae ©
cooing requitements-ot standards or ree ¢
ther pert gabon nf hall 48 tiled whieh ls :
Uihity Qh one or more detendants te cotiiply :
. . a
reotthar standard ov regathatia? oy ter clo sch byw ace
particmter toe. ty the absence ofeqeseritren. qoeendy an
Hy . : ij ° ' .
1] ' resrhl go qpomt statement. and Avovided
. © . ‘ : . . ‘i ‘ ’
! tty bt) at ty 4d ryt peoeegyetyee Ooty gy yeootnyt sti Were!
FE eye, Creernernnd - aarereacacht is tngwe? pitty
‘ ' ! ! .
eof Piet rodivtdaeadl statements with anv ev .
i t¢ ty! , 7 1 \ if er | ‘?) thy | “tted Stites au : \
thy i ! o 1%, avert oret trrclaee rey refers htop fot
. ' bea? e hraecle oor lel f | ryeiteny woody Je ater
‘ Tithe "9% onyhiyes ts, }
| Noothune ou thy letra) ltrdement: hall percohat tort ; 4
rT A chat! : . ; . 3 .
| ny trp te ob Geatuiiwine ane ore trieted oan
beat yy) if ‘ fav hy heepdat ri yy meer ten raf iy, tiers
. ' + lovey
3 ') eoaute wie " eryty, aie jt Coorpyyerpey nnder. mys
pty lawitat acereetiwe pth thy sary other “person uit : .
2 “ : Pals , .
. oi oe : 7
vie —7—
conducting boita fide negotiations looking to any- such
agreement: _ | 7 : me
(a) tor the purchase or-sale of specific commercial
prodyets: oe | ae i
(b) Jor the license of specitic eNisting patent rights
or trom including in’ any such agreement provision tor,
a None sclus sive grant back wot patent rights on improve
ments abt; ined by 4 licensee during. the term f the
license « yw 2 reasonable ceTIod thereafter:
(C) tor the purchase, sale or license 2 SPecihic ENXist-
Inve restricted IN-OrMatON or specrtic engineering. Serv:
ees rélating to Devices or from including In any such
“agreement provision for a nonexclusive grant-back «of
_ Patent rights on Improvements obtained. by the license’
| during the term of the heense or a ‘reasonable period
‘thereafter: or trom furnishing or acquiring any re
stricted inform: itton directly relating thereto:
(3) froin - entering inte, renewing or performing
tinder ANN otherwise haw far] agreement with any non
defendant person, firm ar es poration that does not ac
count for more than 2% af world praduction. of me
tor vehicle passenger cag. truck and Iytas units in the
calendar vear preceding: the entering into or renewing
such agreement f See Appendis \ [ Not Reproduced | &
ae Nia ais Bn |
(4) trom. entering inte, renewing oor performing —
under ANV aereement Which is’ submitted in writing 4 O"
the plaintiff and to awhieh plamtity consents nm owrit
ne,
(Co) Nethine jn Seetim IVGEN (26a) shall proliibit
any defendant from @neaeine in Any activity. outside
Hie Upqred states reasonably: pece ssary:
(1) to the development of, response to, or compli-
ance with existing or proposed vehicle emission laws,
regulations or standards. of a foreign. governmental,
body, or’: °
(2) te the -performance under any otherwise - law.
ful agreement for the production of motor vehicles
‘outside the United States with any person, firm or
corporation net engaged ine the production of motor
vehicles 11) the United Stites iat the tame of entering inte
or renewing such agreement,
[HWotthdrawal from Cross-Licensing -lgreement |
~ (A) Each manufacturing detendant -is ordered’ and:
4
directed to exercise its right to withdraw from the
AMA. Cross-licensing Sagreement zof July 1, -1953% as
; i ;
amended, and to take such steps as are necessary tac
complish aid withdrawal within Gone hundred ‘twenty
(120)"davs trom phe date of entryv-of this Pinal Judy
ment. Notwithstanding such withdrawal detendants:
may continue to exercise these rights and claims relat
‘
ing to roVvalty-tree licenses under ‘the cross-licerising
° ‘
agreemiemt which have accrued up to the date @f entry
- . Le -; any - -
of this Pinal ludgment. / .
(B) Defendant ANE A GS ordered and directed to re
linquish i@s responsibtlines undeé the AMA ‘cross Ii
ce Ising areement ot Pwo d. O55. ge amended, with
in, sixty-(00) days from the date ef entry of this Final
: Lay,
.
Judgment. i
a
.
°
Vi.
[Ce o- ope ration with: Li icensee sy .
= .
(A)’ Upon written request therefor and subject to
the doridittonta Set forth herein:
(t) Each andtaclarina detendant is ordered and
directed to grant to any per the extent: that. it.
has the power to do oso’ a nonexclusive, non-transfer- ’
able .ane, revalt y bree leense to rile : Thave made, usec,
P zs. om ssf - ee Soke
Jeake or sell Devices under any claim of any” United
° - Kc : 7 . . : . . ‘ . . x
Mates patent orm any Cmited States juitent ‘application ;
owned. or controled: by said detendant or under. which: |
it has subkeensing, rights, whieh patent was issued
“application was filed prior te the date of entry of this
Pinel Jud lerment osind ligens ed unde the AMA crOSs
licensing agreement ot huly 1 . 1958. as amended,’ pro-
vided their if the mahufacturing ‘detendant is oblivaied
tO pay novalties to another on othe sales of the licemsee’
the Heense under this parayraph may? provide . for the
payment ot those same rovalties to the degendant ;
(2) Teach manutacturing detchidant hall grang to
any dicensee undey (1) above. te the extent that, it has
<
the power to do se. ay immunity trom sit under ary
foreign counterpart patent ar patent application ‘for any
product manulactured in the t rited 1 ates ‘or the li-?
cense for sale abroad or tear van product wutactured
abroad and sold in te United States. provided that if
the manutacturing -detendgnt is obligated to pay roval-
ties to another on the sales ot the licensee the license -
” c
may provide for the payment of those same royalties to
the defendant ; and eee |
. (3) Defendant AMA is ordered and directed to make
available for examination and copying by any person the
technical reports in its possession or control prepared
or exchanged by: defendants pursuant to said CTOSS- |
‘license within two vears prior to the entry of this Final.
Judgment, which are identified in Appendix Bo [not re-
produced | ; ep a eoneatce i
(B) Any existing licensee of any manufacturing de-
fendant shall have the right to apply for and receive a
license or Heenses urider this ‘Final: Judgment in sub-
stitution for its existing: license or licenses from any
mManutracturing defendant. insofar as future abligutions, |
and licenses’ are concerned, Any licenste shall be free’
to contest the. validity and scope of any’ licensed pat
ent. . . ; 2
Vit
| Votrfication |
Defendant AMA is ordered and directed to nial a
copy of this Final Judement to all signatwries to the
“AMA cross licensing agreement of July 1, 1055."as
amended, and to all known domestic manufacturers of
motor veltickes and motor vehicle engines within thirty
(30) davs freagn the date of entry’ of this: inal Jude
ment, and toadssue a press release to the domestic trade
and business press relating the substance of the Final
Judgment..
Shall he divuleed be am
otherwise required by daw,
on; ne
; VI
‘| /aspection and Compliance +
°
For the purpose: of determining .ors securing compli-
ance with this Final Judgment, duly-authorized repre-
sentatives of the Department of Justice shall, upon
Written request of the Attorney General in charge of
the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to any
defendant made to its. principle office, be permitted,
subject to any legally: recognized privilege, access during
the ottice Thours of said detendant to all books, ledgers,
accounts, Correspondence, memoranda, and other records |
cand documents in the possession or under the con
trol ot said detendant relating to any matters contained
In this Pinal Judgment, and subject to the reasonable
convenience ot said defendant. and without restraint
or interference frome it, te interview officers or em
ph Kees of said defendant. who may have counsel pres
ent, regarding any such matters. Said detendant, stpon
the written request cof the Attorney General or the
\ssistant Attorney, General in charge of the Antitrust
Pdivasaeny, shoal) saaborvint <ucl Written reports wath respect
to anvoet the matters contamed on this Pinal Tndemeng
was, fromtime te time mav be requested, Neo imteorma
tion obtaimmed, Dy the means provided ot ssabiis Section
representative of. the depart
i ‘
s 4 °
ment of fustice te oanveperson other thiun Ja duly au
thorized representative Of the Pe sceutive Branch of the
polcanntitt except om thy Course ate Ve ol 1? moodle {i
which thee United States 4 party tor the purypocise
; De “
ot | eine C miphianes ewith thy bey alse dyredlonn 1)! v 4
| ae
a
IX
DES; rpiration |
Section lV (AVC 2) Ca) and ¢g) of this Final Judy:
‘ ment shall expire ten vears atter ye date of entry here.
of, provided that plaintitt may apply to this Court for
the continuation of one or both oof said) provisions,
od such application to be made not later than nine years
after the date of entry of this Final Judgment.
See
| Jurisdiction Retained |
Jurisdiction at this cause ds retained for the purpose
of enabling any of the parties to vthis Final Judgment.
Jocapply ctec this Court at any time for sich further,
orders and dircetions as mit hes heeessary or appre
priate iy relating try the SONSstruction ey oan varry
. mngeout at this Perma ee ca tor the modification or
nee vacating Ot any ‘i the provisions. thereof, and for the
purpose od the entorcement of compliance therewith and
«the puniishmiens of Viokitions thereat,
‘ -
‘
<<? . ‘ ?
. sa
—s> "
o
—13—- |
APPENDIX, B.
Musscvaniueis Opinion.
Cited States District Court, Central District of
Cahtornia. |
k’nited States of America, Plaintit?, vs. Automobile -
Manufacturers Sssocnition, Inco; General Motors: Cor-
poration ; Ford Motor Company; Chrysler Corporation ;
and American Motors Corporation, Detendants. O97 5.
IWC.
This is an action brought by the United States of:
America charging that) the detendants, Automobile
Manutacturers Xssociation, Ine, General Motors Cor
poration; Ford Motor Cy muapany » Chrysler Cs Corporation ;
and American Motors ( orporation have comspiedd with
other motor vebiick min ractarers. in violation of & 1 of
the Sherman Act (15 0 $1), te eliminate’ Compe.
Htton in the researeh, Pariah manufacture and in
stallation of motor vehicle ai pollution control equip
ment, and in the purchase from others of patents and
patent rights, covering: sucéh equipment. By w woot re
het, the plaintiff is seeking an order enjointng: these
@detendants trom. continuing the alleged unlawiul con
— duet.
Viter eight months of negotiation, the parties have
agreed te settle thisscase upon terms and conditions em
hoched. 1) the proposed COMSeTY decrec TOW be tiore this
court for approval
On September, TL L969] the 4 roposed del re Wath
made public and all interested’ parties. including the
State of California, County, of tot Angeles. City of
los Angeles and th Vir Pathation Control: District
; : j ‘
ot the Canmntyv otf Ta \iarels wer jnivited -f CN press
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.