Jurisdictional Statement — City of New York v. United States

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SUBJECT INDEX

( pinion Velo eae nsonntisanbaee alle

"Jurisdiction Seas Been ey”

(uestions “Present dl ; ss pisasees ise

Statutes Involved , ; ee

Maitethent oot the Case. : ‘ +t ae 4

hie Ouestions Are. Substantial “10

Phe. Notice ot Pleartings and’ the Hearing Itselt

Parted to Mee thi Standjerd ot ue Process of

Law 7 : ; oo RS

P é

Phe Dstriet Court) Erred dw Nat Requiring ca

Shy thay? | haat ; thie: Pyvven mer CBee i lecrer

\\ as | am, | cpurrtirdole canned yy thie Pathe Interest >

Phe D)ystret- Court Erred by Aperoving the 4 cn

sent Deeree i tts. Proposed tarm W ittyoart bn

clusion ita Ndlossion of the. \lepa

74 { omdatyon ti) Aye

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Preotys tt} thre { yitoharn

pera vicel dl ‘ . _& ’ . 22 ;

The -tetrict Court Atiused His DPiseretion hy

Dyerivigiy (Co onsoledatear of Che Ths Vetionms 4)

( carn he beth ; . : 52

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INDEN JO APPEN DICH

ca °

Viper . \- ] ly rent } ay rare 4 aeet |

npoudix FR. Momorandim Opinion rie

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PABLE OF AUTHORITIES CEPED .

Cases, Leages

Allen Caleulators, Ine. v. National Cash Register

Co.,. 322 U.S. 137 (144)... ,

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Atlanta Pivelratane: Gras. Ineo ve Lowery Vime Coa..

4) ERD. 164 OND. Miss.: 1900) oun te

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Diruces Mntices.- lhc \ \rer wan Can 4 Cee

743 se ee ? ae ; 3

Cascade Natural Gas Corp. vo EL Paseo. Natural Gas

Cw 5 38h iB + [20 { 1'%), j ey \ 4

Cinatimmon v, Abner A] Wolt. Ine. 215 bo Sapys

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» 833 (BD. Mich. 1963) a : 23, 26

Clark \ Viner ny Alanine ( ae reity 1) Jey |: Supp, PF

1308-4 BD Lia 1D) 5 1

Cranston v; Freeman, 200 F.Supp, 785 (NJ) Nev,

LOO) J a 15

DuPontv. Southern Pacitie Company, 360 bo 2d 1o3

(ath Cap Woe . . 3

2 .

betsen ae | artisie. & voopetia, aE - Jil sS5 | nal

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r ; . tee, © sd

ennch. Motors Corp ovo General Veotors Corp, lo ;

US. S58 41951) Se eee tna 4: er

< ay 4- ‘ ‘

| wir 4 pr perathend ome | rurteaP tity Add | | Jin :

Hh { Fins 3 i a AS . a

( por det 1" clay! + \ "VRas ly Nout . } foxiuet itr

25 -] Ser: iat, Case | 5 ie +] i

Hlatiover. Shoe bea \ { bitten Sahin \] i betty 1 \ e ry)

i y, } i ra 1 sal i i? ]th, . ut! «I tt "puart.

ewe edd in part. 3 PLS ASE Gd ‘ 23. Se

Plagisterty vo bie 4d @. Om. Pon ee | . 15

th 4 , wy ; ° ¢ =a ;

Herbst «Able, 47 FRY If tS. NV 1909) 1

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Irvinesv. Marshall ol oS) 55s

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Karseal Corp. vo BRichtield On) Corps 22P F.2d 358

(Hh Cir, FO55) | & ovat

4 o* . : a .

Minnesota Minin and \bartactearing “Cow New

" Jersey Woodtinishing @o.. BSP US S1b eo pogs,

° e :

Missourt Wansas Pipe Line Coo. United States

" JON | 2d] Po Srd iy VOB). cont den. Buk LS

ON, ¢ Pedy “

\itkine vo Central Hanover 7} &T ¢ ae ae &

800 (POSBO) O , : cas

New Jey wy \W og tins bangy: ir Pa \bitinies: tei Manin

cnn Vani fereturine (ir. Hi |: Ju Adt i dred (it

Thad) atta wey . 4h o8 DOH :

Philadelphia Thoarting. \uthortiy «American Rad

ator *and Standard Santtary 269 1 Supp

_ 240006. D Penn 19607) :

Schultz vo Mianutacturers ands Ftidens trast Ce, 89

Supp 37 i Wob NY Pad) be |

Crited Siatesty Athed Cheuteal Core et oC EI

Lerch ee Jara PhP y it) \hiw 1 gest j

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{ hited! tele 2 Vile ( iif Lange Companys: 2 ‘ }.

inp "452. it 1) i ali }th,

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US, 554 (1020):

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lited States vo kX AL Sehaetter Brewing Com

pany amd Anheiser Buseh. Ine. 1968) CCL

Trade Cases, Para. 72,345 (© Ir N \ Poe) Ix

uited Tlates \ q hint \epolnalt sinned Petroleum Cour ail

Massachusetts, 1900 COC OTL “Prade” Cases. Para

HORSS C1 Mass 100) OX

uted States -vwo Pan \merean. World Airways

lue., JOO CC OH race ASC . Para 75.1

PSY) NY. TORO): os Is

. , , . ® : eho Las

ited State Iavcdics 4 A) ce) Vinerien AG

1 Supp) he ie 1) | deel pong y type il iStarssed! 3 E&

U"S, 796 | 0

ital strate \ ert \ {4% Pale, i jaw, i ogy HY

nted Stites vo United: States Goepaume: | Ao

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° Miscellaneous: Pa

©. Bicks, The Deqartinerit ot dustice and Private Treble

Damage \etions, 4 A\aritirist Bull 5 (1969)

(Comment, Vntitrusi I. nforcement hy Private Parties

Analysis ot the Develop ments ithe Trebie Dam

age Sut, ol V iile ae LOO {4952 )

. Docket Noo 3h oot the Judicial Patel on Multadistrict

Tatiati®n of the Lonifed States ‘District Courts

lore’. Multidistriet Private Cival Treble Danaiapre

Vitiorust Latyeation Invelyving Motor Velicle Agr.

Polhitton Control, hagapment | oa

1 ocument of Record

Detendants’ Opposition te \pplication tar Leave te

Hntervetie” Pte . ee 3 8

ae ae ;

frovernineny! hey Sphobiet te Applica tres tor Interven

tron, bet ,

\fy moray, ist bh), fendant 11) Ne er) t ti Panel

Order to Sheaw Cause and Notee ‘ot learnt, ot

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Vemoranciinm: Opn

‘Thoctments at Rei red Transcript: 2

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len Vries }*y ie Y ate \, Pret | ie Stroma 4 Pillay i?

Vititrttst, So \ntitrist dull te JOSS) ;

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teat bint eit \; ost Vall. 1] 1m,

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ad

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States.

IWISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

a

—Z-—— E

substantial legal questions affecting the health and well

. being of the American public are presented. -

‘Opinion Below,

- The judgment of the District Court for the Conta

District, of California is reported in C.C.H. Trade Cases

Para. 72,907 (19609). The Gourt’s Méniorandum Opin-

ion is-unreported. Copies of the judgment’ and opinion _

are attached hereto as Appendices A and B respectively.

. Jurisdiction.

The United States’ action was brought to obtain a

declaration that defendants-appellees were in violation

*f ‘Section. 1 of the Sherman: Act (15 U.S.C. Section

~ 1), to enjoin them from pursuing various actions in

_ violation thereof, and for geneval relief. On September

17, 1960, appellants filed a national. class action on be-

lialf of the American public under Rule 23 of the Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure against the same defend-

- ants-appellees pursuant. to Section 4 of the- Clayton:

Act (15 U.S.C. Section 15), alleging in material part

a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and

seeking injunctive, treble damage, and generat ‘relief.

Similar actions have been filed by numerous states, lo-

cal governments and private citizens. They -are now

—docketed (#31).before the Judicial Panel on Multidis-

trict Litigation of the United States Courts.

Appellants moved the District Court to disapprove

the. proposed Consent Judgment. and to allow consoli-

‘dation’ of the two actions under Rie 42(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 29, 1969,

the District Court entered an order approving the Stipu-

lation for Entry of Consent Judgment, entered judg-

“%s

| 3

ment thereon, and denied appellants’ motion to consoli-.

_ date. Notice of appeal to this Court was filed in the

District Court on December 15, 1969. The jurisdic- —

tion of the Supreme Court to review this decision by

direct appeal is conferred by 15 U.S.C. Segtion 29,

commonly known as the “Expediting Act”. he fol-

lowing ‘decisions sustain this direct appeal to the Su-

‘preme Court: Utah P. S. Com. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co.,

cack USS. ......, 23 L.“Ed. 474 (1969); Cascade. Nat-._

ural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S.

129 (1967); Allen Calcilators, Inc. v. National Cash

Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944); United States v.

California Co-op Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 (1929); and

Missouri- Kansas Pipe Line Co. @. United States, 108

FB. 2d 614 (3rd Cir. 1939), _cert. denied 309 U.S. 687

(1940).

Questions Presented.

1. Where a District Court is requested to approve a

proposed antitrust consent decree of critical public con-

cern, does the hearing thereon and subsequent final

judgment meet the requisites of due process. of law if

notice of the hearing is ordered given only to a modi-

cum of the persons adversely affected.

2.. Where a District Court is requested to approve

a proposed antitrust consent decree of critical public

"concern, does due process require that adversely af-_

fected persons be permitted to cross-examine parties and

witnesses and to inspect documents material to the sub-

ject matter of the proposed consent decree.

_- 3. Where a consent deéree is proposed involving

highly complex issues of critical ‘public concern, may

the Court approve the decree and enter final judgment

°

sicaliae

‘s

thereon without presentation for its consideration of

any evidence or facts ‘sufficient to. enable the Court to.

determine if the pr cra decree is fair, equitable anid

‘in the public interest.

4. Where the enforcement policy underlying the pro-

visions of -Seétion + of the Clayton Act would be sigé

nificantly frustrated by entry of judgment upon a pro-

posed consent decree, should entry of judgment be con-

" ditioned ‘upon the inclusior of a provision in the. de-

cree providing for a limited’ admission by the defend-

ants of the allegations in the government complaint,

for the sole purpose of giving such judgment the prima

facie effect in subsequent private actions provided in

Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, (15 U.S.C. Section

16(a)). :

5: Where two suits are pending before the District

Court involving identical and complex. issues of signifi-

cant public importance, and where separate trials

these issues would create unnecessary duplicity of time

and expense, does a District Court abuse its discretion-

ary powers in denying a motion to consolidate them

under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil hig

‘cedure.

Statutes Involved.

; 45 U. SC Sections «1; 15, 16(a). The full text of

these, statutes i is attached hereto as Appendix C.

Statement of the Case.

In mid-1966,-a Federal Grand Jury commenced i inves-

tigation of the practices of the automotive industry

‘regarding possible anti-competitive practices in the fail-

ure to develop automotive anti-pollution devices. As a

— See

ese of the ev idetice assembled by the Grand es over

an eighteen month period, the United States, on January |

10, 1969, filed a civil complaint charging that defend-

ants-appellees General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor

Company, Chrysler Corporation, American Motors. Cor-

poration and Automobile Manufacturers Association

had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by con-

spiring to eliminate competition in the research, de-

velopment, manufacture and installation of automotive

air pollution control equipment, and in the purchase

of patents and patent rights covering such equipment.

Automobiles are shipped to each of the fifty states

of the United States. In 1966, for example, 78,315,000

passenger cars and 15,864,000 trueks and buses, exclu-

sive of off- the- road vehicles, were registered in the

United States. In that year, 8,604,712 passenger cars

valued at more than $17™% billion and 1 791,587 com-

mercial vehicles valued at more than $3.9 billion were

produced in this country. These figures have each in-

creased in each succeeding vear.

Since at least 1952 it has been established that mo-

‘tor ‘vehicles contribute to air pollution by the emission

of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, oxides of: nitrogen

and other contaminants. For example, in Ios Angeles

County, as of January 1967, gasoline-powered_ motor

vehicles accounted for 12,465 tons out of a total of

14.610 tons, or 85.3% of contaminants emitted into

the ambient air daily. A large and growing market

for the production and installation of air pollution con-

1S million tons of deadly carbon monoxide are discharged each

vear by automobiles in this country. Procress IN THE PREVEN-

TION AND Controt or AiR PoLeuTion, First REPoRT OF THE

SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Eptucation Ann’ WELFARE TO THE

Unirep States Concress, June 28, 1968, at. 16,

cielbicin

trol devices has developed. Such devices are shipped in

interstate tommmerce either as engine or system modifi-

cations or as equipment attached to automobiles.

Beginning at least as-early as 1953, and continuitig

to the date of the filing of the United States’ action,

the defendants-appellees and co-conspirators were en-

gaged in a combination and conspiracy in unreasonable

‘restraint of the aforesaid interstate trade ‘and com-

merce in motor vehicle air pollution control equipment.

The combination and conspiracy consisted of a cor-

tinuing agreement, understanding, and concert of ac-

tion among the defendants and co-conspirators, namely :

(a) To eliminate all competition among themselves

in the research, development, manufacture and installa-

tion of motor vehicle air pollution. control equipment ;

and. ° | ei

(b) To eliminate competition in the purchase of pat-.

ents and patent rights from other parties covering mo-

tor vehicle air pollution control equipment.

In furtherance of that conspiracy, defendants-appel-

lees did the following :

(a) Agreed that all industry efforts directed at the

research, development, manufacture and installation of

motor vehicle air pollution control equipment should be

undertaken on a non-competitive basis 5.

(b) Agreed to seek joint appraisal of patents and

patent rights submitted to any of them by persons not

parties to a cross-licensing agreement entered into on

July 1, 1955, and amended and renewed periodically,

and to require “most-favored-purchaser” treatment of

all parties to the cross-licensing agreements if any one

were licensed by persons not.a party to that. agreement ;

b

(ce) Agreed to install motor vehicle air pollution con-

trol equipment only upon a uniform date determined by

agreement, and subsequently agreed on at least three

separate occasidns to’ attempt to delay, the installation

of motor vehicle air pollution control equipment :

(1) In 1961 defendants-appellees agreed among) them-

selves to delay installation of “positive crankcase

ventilation” on vehicles for sale outside of Califdrnia

until the model year 1963, despité the fact that this

anti-pollution device could have been installed ha-

tionally for the model vear. 1962 and that at least

some automobile manufacturers expressed willing-

ness to do so, in the absence of a contrary indus;

try-wide agreement; - : 4

(2) In late 1962 and extending into 1963, de-\

fendants-appellees agreed among themselves. to de- \

lay installation of an improvement to ‘the positive

crankcase ventilation device, an improvement which

the California Motor Vehicle Pollution Control

Board ‘had indicated it would make mandatory;

(3) In early 1964 defendants-appellees agreed

among themselves to attempt to delay the introdue-

tion of new exhaust pollution control measures on

motor vehicles sold in California until the model.

year 1967 ;* despite the fact that all were capable of

installing the iniprovement for the model year 1966,

the defendants agreed to tell California regulatory

officials that installation of exhaust anti-pollution

measures would be technologically impossible before

1967, and only under regulatory pressure made pos-

sible by competing device manufacturers not in the

automobile industry did the defendants agree to a

California regulatory requirement that exhaust de-

vices be installed for the model year 1966; and

ellen '

(d) Agreed to restrict publicity relating to research

and development efforts concerning the motor vehicle air.

pollution problem.

The aforesdid.combination and conspiracy has had,

among others, the following effects:

(a) Hindering and delaying the research, develop-

-ment, and manufacture—both by the defendants and

co-conspirators ‘and by others ‘not parties to the agree-

ments

and the installation of motor vehicle air pollu-

tion control equipment ;

(b) Restricting and suppressing competition among

the defendants and co-conspirators in ‘the research, de-

velopment, manufacture and installation: of motor ve-

/.

-hicle air pollution control equipment.

The foregoing facts are alleged in the Uifited States’

complaint.

The closed door and nefarious conduct complained of

was characterized by counsel for the ‘defendants-ap-

pellees at the evidence—and fact-free hearing for ap-

proval of the proposed consent decree as follows

“Basically, the conduct evolyes around coopera-

tive efforts of the automotive industry as an. in-

dustry to develop methods and equipments for re-

‘ducing: the level of objectionable’ emissions from

motor vehicles in--response to the urging of the

California officials to reduce the impact of motor

vehicle emission on smog.

“This case does not involve, your Honor, any:

sinister form of combination or conspiracy. On the’

contrary, what is involved. is an open and _ public

7 forum of industry cooperation known to all regu-

latory bodies, a fact which we believe the court

can take judicial notice of” (Transcript, pp. 27-

28

saiiien

Defendants-appellees were never required to plead to

the United States’ complaint. On September 11, 1969

there was filed in the District Court a proposed final

judgment together with a Stipulation that judgment.

could be entered after 30 days unless the United States

withdrew its consent before.the expiration of that peri-

od, On, its own motion, by ordet dated September 17,

1969, the. District Court invited all interested persons

to express their views -on the proposed consent decree

and ordered that a hearing be held on October 28, 1969.

However, the District ‘Court ordered copies of this

order sent only to: the parties to the United States’

action, the California Attorney General, the Los An-

geles County Counsel, the Los Angeles City Attorney,

and the Los Angeles Air -Pollution Control District.

‘No other ‘notice of the hearing jvas ordered given,

served or published and the aforesaid notice was not

ordered published at all. |

On September 17, 1969, appellants Marshall B. Gross-

man and S. Jerome Tamkin, Ph.D., individually and on

behalf of all United States: residents, .filed a separate

complaint against defendants-appellees in the same Dis-

trict Court. This complaint and the complaint filed by

the United States alleged like acts and violations on

‘the part of defendants-appellees. To avoid the expense

and delay of proceeding separately with these two suits,

‘ _ appellants Grossman, et al., filed a motion for consolida-

tion of these two cases’ under Rule42(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure in October,f'1969, together

with their objections to entry of the proposed consent

judgment. be

Others also filed objections of the proposed consent

decree and some filed applications to intervene: Only

4,

po

one comment’ supporting the decree was filed. In addi-.

tion, many letters were directed LQ the Court pleading

for disapproval of the decree.

Qn Octobeg 28, 1969, the hearing, as ordered, was’

- sheld, at which time the Court announced its decision

approving the consent decree and denying the motions .

_to intervene and consolidate, At the hearing, neither the

United States nor the defendants-appellees introduced

or presented any evidence or facts. They called no

- witnesses. They did not summarize the substantive con-

tentions of the United States or the defendants-appellees.

They did not advise the Court what evidence supported —

their - respective positions. Appellants requested and

weré denied the opportunity of cross-examining the par-

ties and inspecting relevant and material documents.

Judgment was entered on October 29, 1969, together

with an -order impounding certain of the documents

gathered by the Federal Grand Jury in its investigation

of the defendants. 7

Appellants filed a notice of appeal to this Court under

the Expediting Act (15 U.S.C. Section 29) on Decem-

ber 15, 1969.

The Questions Are Substantial.

The subject matter of this appeal is perhaps of great-

er potential effect upon the lives and well being of all

persons within this country than any other litigation in

this century. We are here concerned with the inten-

tional polluting and poisoning of air. According to the

charges of the United States’ complaint, the’ defend-

ants-appellees have combined and conspired in such a

manner as to insure the continuing pollution of the at-

mosphere. The effects upon th€ American people have

™

in for sixteen years;

sia Races Se a

4

“been staggering. The one éssential ingredient of life,

air, has become impr egnated with visible and invisible

poisons, Our children are herded into cafeterias and

gymnasiums during

‘smog alerts’. Their ability to par-

‘take of the pleasures of childhood is stifled. The well

get sick and the aged and infirm become ill and die.

Travel throughout the country is less enjoyable and

less pleasurable as one journeys from smog belt to smog

belt. And all the, while, unbeknown to but a few Ameri-.

cans, the executives. of one of our largest industries

were combining and conspiring to perpetuate the evil

for their own pecuniary self gain.

Presented with the basic information and facts, the

District Court might have: felt impelled to reject the

proposed ‘consent decree and either require dit ferent

terms as a condition to approval, such as remedial re-.

lief; that the parties proceed to trial. Yet the parties

saw fit to present the Court with no evidence, no facts,

no contentions.. In short, the Court was left in the dark

and had before it only-the. government’s complaint, the -

proposed consent decree, and the arguments of persons

who were generally uninformed on the merits.

The defendants-appellees were permitted a settlement.

consisting of little more than a promise “never to do

it again” in light of at least the following facts: —

(1) The conspiracy and combination was persisted

ee ,

(2) The conspiracy reflected a callous disregard for

the health and well Wiis of human beings ;

‘ (3) The conspirators’ secreted from the public and

government agencies information respecting the develop-

ment of anti-pollufion devices and. affirmatively misrep-

resented their claimed inability to secs in the dev elop-

ment of same;

—12—

Ld

(4) The defendants-appellees rank. among the elite

of American industry in pow er, economic strength, and

influence ; and

(5) The: proposed consent decree requires no remedi-

al action.

When a consent decree is proposed in a matter ‘of

such ‘great moment, surely due process requires that ade- —

quate notice of the hearing be’ given to those persons

directly affected.and that those persons be permitted ‘the

opportunity to cross-examine parties and witnesses and

inspect documents material to- the subject matter of the

proposed consent decree. Each of these rights was re-

quested. None of themwere granted. And neither. the

Court nor the parties to the action bothered to address

themsely es to these serious and basic constitutional. ques-

tions. |

By reason of the systematic silence of the appellees

and the emptiness of the record, the District Court

was stripped of its ability to independently exercise its

judicial duty of determining whether the: proposed con-

‘sent decree was fair, equitable and in the public interest.

Given the life and death importance of this litiga-

tion, the District Court had-a duty to-the public not to

allow itself. to be unduly bound by a simple agreenient

between the parties. Nevertheless. the C ourt below was ~

_of the opinion that air pollution was

“simply not a problem which the Courts can

deal with, and this action today has nothing to do

with correcting smog. As a matter of fact, there

- is nothing T can do in this case that would have any.

direct or profound effect upon smog whatsoever.”

{Transcript, p. 9]. ° é

mn

The Notice of Hearing and the Hearing Itself Failed.

4

to Meet the Standard of Due Process of Law.

In Mullane v. Central Hanover B & T Co., 339 .

U:S. 306 { 1950), this Court stated that:

‘This right to be heard has little reality or worth

_ unless one is informed that the matter. is pending

and can choose for him Avhether to appeal or

default,-to acquiesce or contest.” Id. at 314.

The appellees did not even request that a hearing, be

held upon the proposed consent decree. The District

Court, however, set a hearing: However, notice of the

hearing was given only to the parties in the United

States’ ‘action, to the California. Attorney General, the

Los Angeles County Counsel, the Los Angeles City At-

torney, and the L. wos Angeles Air Pollution Controf Dis-

:, - 7 | | é :

Local and state governments and individuals with

rights which would be adversely affected by a consent

decree should have received notice under Court super-

vision. The consent decree effectively strips those suf-

fering damages from the conspiracy of the prima facie

effect of judgment as provided in Section 5(a). of the

Clayton Act (15 U'S.C. Section 16(a)y). |

The Department of Justice ‘did not. even follow its

own policy of obtaining the views of all parties affected“

-. by the proposed consent judgment :

“(a) It is hereby established as ‘the policy of the

} Department of Justice to consent to a proposed

_ judgment in an action to prevent or restrain viola-

tions of the antitrust laws only after or on condi-

The. fund; unental requisite of “due process of

law is the opportunity to be-heard.’ Citations.) -

tion that ait opportunity ts afforded persons (natu-

ral er corporate) who: may be affected by such

judgment and who are not-named as parties to the

action to state Comments, views or relevant allega-

tions prior tothe entry ef such proposed judgment

‘by the Court.” ( Emphasis added. ), 28 C.F.R. Sec-

tion oe |

Analogy may be made to the mandatory, /discretion-

ary notice requirements for-class actions brought under

Rule 23 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The

Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 23 indicates the rea-

son for notice requirements’ in representative type ac-

tions: . ° eee rs, ere ae

“This mandatory notice pursuant to Subdivision

¢(2), together with any discretionary, notice which

the Court may find it advisable to give under

~ Subdivision d(2), is designed to fulfill require-

‘ments of due process* to ‘which the’ class action

procedure is, of ¢ nurse, subject.”

: P

*

In recent Federal Court decisions, it has been held

that even the discretionary notice provisions under

F.R.C.P. 23(b) must comport with due process of ‘law.

In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F. 2d 555 (2nd

Cir. 1968), the Court in discussing the discretionary

notice requirement held that; = ~ «

+s

... notice is required as a matter of due process

in all representative actiotis, and 23(c)(2) merely

requires a particularized form of notice in 23(b) (3)

| actions.” Jd. at S64- 360.

and that |

‘6

. the procedure - aie must conform to the

haseliiaaatd of due process and fairly insure the

—15—

protection of absent. parties who are to be bound.

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.°32, 42, 61 S.Ct. 115,

85 L.Ed. 22 (1940). Notice as an integral part of

due process must be ‘reasonably calculated, under

all the circumstances, to appris€ interested parties

of the pendency or the action and afford them an

opportunity to. present their objections...” Id. at

568.

See also: Cranston v. F reeman, 290 F. Supp. 785 (N.D

N.Y. 1968) at 787; Clark 2. -Imerican Marine Cor pora-

tion, 297 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. La. 1969) at 1306; and

Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 1 (S:D.N.Y. 1969) at 22.

Even those who received notice and appeared at ‘the

hearing were denied the effective opportunity to be

heard. They were stripped of all ability to inform. them- ~

selves or to assist the Court in informing itself. They.

were dénied the right to cross-examine and inspect

documents. : ;

The District Court Erred by Not Requiring a Show-

* ing That the Proposed Consent Decree Was

Fair, Equitable and in the Public Interest.

No consent decree haul be approved unless it is es-

tablished to the satisfaction of the Court that it is

fair, equitable, and in the public interest.

. Appellees successfully barred the introduction. of any

evidence at the hearing by arguing that such evidence

would remove any consent decree from the proviso to

Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act regarding the non- -

prima facie effect of consent decrees entered “before

any testimony has been taken. 2° (Defendants’ Op-

osition to Applications for Leave to Intervene and

—16—

+ Other Petitions and Comments Regarding the Pro-

posed Decree, and Memorandum of Points and A thori-

. -

ties, p. 20). However, as appellants argued below ;

“ . the only. logical way that provision can be

read is to read it with referenge to testimony on the

merits of the cause and certainly not’ testimony

which may be adduced to help make the bench

better informed as to whether or not the settlement

which is propused is fair, reasonable and adequate. sf

[ Transcript, pp. 140-147].

Appellees argued that because the proposed consent

decree allegedly provided for substantially all the relief

expressly asked for, by the government in its complaint,

the decree should be aeeie Yet, as pointed out by ap-

pellants, the government complaint also’ requested “such

ether, further and different relief as the nature of. the,

case may require and the Court) may deem just and

proper in the premises.” (United ‘States Complaint,

~ p. 10, lines 11-13). [Transcript, p. 149, lines 6-13]. By

reason of. this prayer the Court, after observing the

gravity of the appellees’ violations during trial, could

- have decreed any further equitable relief necessary to

< adequately meet the magnitude of the violations. For

example, the Court could have required the defendants-

appellees to recall and equip those cars manufactured

during the period of the conspiracy with adequate air

pollution control devices at their expense. Nevertheless,

the District Court judge was of the opinion that

“The prayer for -such relief as may seem proper

is a general catchall clause,,as all attorneys know,

and it means little if an tee |‘Transcript, p.

162, lines 6-8].

|

In United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327

(1964), the complaint also contained a oe gen-"

eral relief. After consent decree negotiations, )he de-

fendants submitted a proposed ¢ consent decree apd the

District Court ‘ordered the government to show cause

_why’the proposed judgment should not be entered. The

government urged the inclusion of two additional in-

junctive relief provisions. The District Court was of the

opinion that the proposed judgment provided all the re-

lief to which the government would be entitléd were a

decree entered after trial, and approved the proposed

consent decree. In vacating the judgment of the District

Court this Court stated:

ee

‘it “cannot. reasonably be ‘assumed that the

government’ could not, at the trial, have introduced }

evidence justifying, in whole or in part, the relief

sought.” This is not to say, of course, that the

District Court could not correctly have concluded,

after trial and an ‘opportunity to know the record

and to appraise the need for prohibitions or affirma-

tive actions.’ United States v. United States Gyp-

sum Co., supra, 340 U. S. at 89, 95. L.Ed. at 101, |

that the requested relief:was not warranted. Under

the circumstances of this case, however, it could

not so conclude without a trial.

‘The disputed provisions certainly may be re-

garded as within the general scope of the relief

sought in the complaint, which included a request

for ‘such further, general, and different relief

as the nature of the case may require and the

Court may deem appropriate in the premises.’ It

should be noted in this regard that the. compa-

nies did accede to a number of government de-

=r) aa

_ mands which went beyond the violations charged

or the specific relief requested.” Jd. at 332-333

(Emphasis added. ) | :

The IWard case makes it clear that a prayer for gen-:

eral relief cannot be ignored in comparing the provisions

ota proposed consent decree with those of a complaint

in determining the adequacy of relief granted by the

consent decree. Moreover, IVard is support for appel-

lants’ contention that the District Court committed er-

ror in not allowing itself, in the words ‘of the Coyfrt,

“an opportunity to know the record and to Appraise the

“need for prohibitions or aftirmativ e actions”.

The District Court had the power to reject the. pro-

posed consent decree.

| In United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Company, 272

F. Supp. 4382 (C.D. Calif. 1907), the Court, after a

hearing, refused to sign a proposed consent decree. In

United States v. Pan American | Vorld clirways, Inc.,

1959 C.C.H. Trade Cases, Paray 75,138 (S.D.N.Y.

1959), the Court would not EE a proposed consent

— and ordered the parties.to trial. In United States _

v. F. r M. Schaef fer Brezving Company and Anhetse¢

, Sey Inc., 1968 C.C.H. Trade Cases, Para. 72,345

(C.D.N.Y. 1967), the Court recognized the judicial

function of the Court when a consent decrée had been

offered and new parties objected to it, and: then set the

‘matter for a hearing:

“TAlsa judicial act, the consent decree constitutes

the determination by the Court that its content is

equitable and in the public interest. * * * Report

—19—

of the Antitrust Subcommittee (Sub. Comm. No.

5) of the Committee .on the Judiciary, H.R. 27,

‘86th Cong., Ist Sess., Consent Decree Program of

the Pepartment of Justice, January 30, 1959 at p. -

3." Jd. at p. 84,940, . ; |

In United States @. First National Bank and Trust

Company of Lexington, Kentucky, 280 F. Supp. 260

(E.D. Ky. 1967), Chief Judge Swinford when faced

with an analogous situation in an antitrust case of es-_

sentially local concern, stated:

“T do not question the right of the United States.

or any other public agency to compromise litigation

in which it.is involved, but I do believe that. the

United States should go very slowly in cases of this

character’ where the whole community,, compara-

tively small though it may be, is deeply concerned. |

: . . Compromising cases. of this magnitude, when:

they have reached the stage that. this case has

reached, creates a feeling of uneasiness in the pub-

lic mind. American justice is so constituted that

not only should it ‘be fair and impartial but the

litigants and the public should know that it is fair

and impartial.” Jd. at 263.

In Esco Corporation ‘v. United States, 340 F. 2d

1000, (9th Cir. 1965), Judge Barnes, who was once

in charge of the Antitrust Division; wrote:

“While a consent decree, forged by agreement be-

tween private and government attorneys, may not

_be a product of the trial judges own effort, it must

be scrutinized carefully and approved; both as to

form and content, by the court entering it, prior

to such entry.” Jd. at 1005. -

In United States D> Radio Corporation of America,

46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942), appeal dismissed 318

U. S. 796, Circuit Judge Maris wrote:

“A consent decree although ba: ed upon agreement

of the parties rather than a finding of facts by the

court, is not a mere authentication or recording: of

that agreement. It is a judicial act (United States

v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115, 52 S. Ct. 460,

760 L. ed. 999) and, therefore, involves the de-

termination by the chancellor that it is equitable

“and in the public interest. The fact that the Court

may Consider the opinion of the Department of Jus-

tice to the same effect does not’ mean, that the

Court has abdicated its power, or failed to carry

out its responsibility, to make an independent. de- -

‘termination of the propriety and equity of the de-/

cree. proposed by yarties. .. . It is fundamental

to our form of gove ent that in such suits,

as in all other matters brought before them for

- judicial action, the Court must act ‘in accordance

with their own convictions; uninfluenced by the

opinions of any and every other department of the

~ government.’ Irvine v. Marshall, 61 U.S. 558, 567,

20“How. 558, 15 L. ed. 994.” Id. at. 655.

In United States v. Carter Products, Inc., 211 F.-

Supp. 144°(S.D.N.Y. 1962), when the Court was called

upon to sign a consent decree between the government

and one of two defendants charged with violating the

antitrust laws, Judge Weinfeld made the following ob-

servation :

_ “In passing upon the oint application of the Gov-

“ernment -and Carter for approval of their stipula-

tion, the Court performs a judicial function and

is called upon to decide whether it is equitable to

enter the decree as proposed by them or with neces-

sary modification to effectuate its basic purpose.

While the public interest is a dominant considera-:

_ tion, the rights of third parties may not be ignored.”

Id. at 147-148. | :

- These authorities establish the independent -function

which the District Court in this case was called upon:

* to perform. The Court had to do justice between the.

parties to the action, as well as every man, woman and

child who suffered during the sixteen year conspiracy.

To accomplish such a formidable task within the struc-

tures of due process of law, the Court had to ‘insure

that it was presented witha record sufficient to inform

it of all relevant facts upon which it could intelligently

make the determination it was asked to make. ois

For example, the Court was not advised whether the

proposed injunction would terminate conduct then being

‘engaged in. In fact, the defendants’-appellées’ brief an

_ support of the settlement implied that the conduct com-

plained of (after its sixteen year history) was no.

longer being engaged in. (Defendants’ Opposition to. -

Application for Leave to Intervene, Etc. p. 19). Further,

the government at no time expressed its opinion of its

potential for success on the merits. The government’s

brief in support of the settlement, however, cofitains the —

candid admission that “As a practical matter, access to

the documentary evidence obtained by the Government

in its investigation of this case may well. prove to be

nearly as helpful as an adjudication of violation.” (Gov-

ernment’s Response to Applications for Intervention,

Etc., p. 22, lines 1-5). Did the Court. therefore, accept

a consent decree consisting of-a promise not to engage

—22—

in conduct previously engaged in for sixteen years; but

not then being engaged-in, in the face of government

possession of documentary evidence sufficient to clearly

establish liability on the part of the defendants? .

The question before the Court was a judicial event

of such magnitude, having such far-reaching conse-

quences for American ‘society, that the bare record be-

fore the Court was entirely inadequate and could not

justify approval of the i see consent decree.

The District Court Erred by Approving the Consent

Decree in Its Proposed Form Without Inclu-

sion of a Limited Admission of the Allegations

in the Complaint as a Condition to Approval.

In objecting to entry of judgment on the consent de-

cree as proposed, appellants, and others, requested the

inclusion Of a provision in the consent decree in which.

the deferidants make a limited admission of the allega-

tions in the government complaint. In rejecting. this

proposal the District Court seemed to be concerned

‘more with settlement of the pending action than with

protection of the public interest :

“However, the defendants have made it clear:

‘that they would not consent to such a clause and

if it were to be insisted upon, no settlement of the

Ase would be possible. * * * [The value of such

a clause} is doubtful, for insistence upon it would,

for all practical purposes, eliminate the possibility

4f settling antitrust cases.” [ Memorandum Opinion,

vi lines 5-8, 29-32]. Wot. Ae

Thitdoverriding concern for the protection of the settle--

ment mechanism does not give adequate consideration

to Congressional antitrust enforcement policy for the

protection of the public. ,

| wae

Congress envisaged both government and private ac- -

tions to achieve the broad social object of the statute.

New Jersey Woodfinishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining

~~ and Manufacturing Co., 332 F. 2d 346 (3rd-Cir. 1964)

at 350-351, aff'd. 381 U.S. 311. (1965); United: States

v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941) at_ 608-610;

Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F. 2d 358

(9th Cir. 1955) at 365; see also MacIntyre, The Role

of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7

Antitrust Bull. 113 (1962). oF

This Court has recognized the Congressional intent

to “

ment of the antitrust laws”. Bruces Juices, Inc: v. olmer--

» ican, Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947) at 751, and that

private parties were to receive the benefits of prior

government suits. Minnesota Mining and Manufactur-

ing Co. v. New Jersey Woodfinishing Co., 381 U.S.

311 (1965) at. ig eBoy Motors Corp. v. Gen-

eral Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951) at-566-568:

Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery oye

377 F. 24.776 (3rd Cir. 1967) at 784-785, aff'd.

part, reversed in part, 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Philade ne

phia Housing Authority v.° American Radiator and

Standard Sanitary Corp., 269 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Penn:

1967) ‘at 542; Cinammon v. Abner A. Wolf, Inc., 215

F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Mich. 1963) at 834.

The historic intent of Congress ‘to utilize private”

suits as a method of achieving effective antitrust com-

- pliance was well expressed by President Woodrow. Wil-

son in 1914 when he urged Congress to facilitate’ the

interaction of private and government actions by: |

“cc

. giving private individuals who claim to have

been injured by these processes the right to found

. use private self-interest as a means of enforces . —

tt |

“their suits for redress upon the facts and judg-

-. ments proved and entered in suits by the govern-

ment where the government has upon its own in-

itiative sued the combinations complained. of and

won its suit... . It is ‘not fair that the private

litigant should be obliged to set up and establish

again the facts which the government. has proved.

He cannot afford, he has not the power, to make

use of such processes of inquiry as the government

has command of. Thus, shall individual justice be,

done while the processes of business are -rectified

and «squared with the general conscience.” Wood- -

row Wilson, “Special Address Delivered at,a Joint

Sessic in of Congress” January 20, 1914, Messages

and Papers of the Presidents, Volume XVI, Bu-

réau of National Literature, Inc., p. 7918.

In 1955, Congrggsman Wright Patman echoed Presi-

dent Wilson's statement when he stated to the House

Antitrtist Subcommittee: — -

“We have ' recognized that a flecessary and inte-

gral part of any such policy is full and effettive

enforcement.of our antigmonopoly laws. For many

years it has been reeognized that the government

alone is not able to provide all the necessary, ‘en-

forcement. The help Of all citizens is needed. We

know that private parties will help in this endeavor

tf we afford them rightful opportunity.” Statement

of Represent: ative Wright Patman before the ‘Anti-

trust Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary,

House of Represe ntatives on HLR. 10243, August

... 6,.1988.

Thee Senate Committee, Report on Proposed Amend-

ments to Section 5 of the Clayton Act also emphasized

— —25—

the need for the joint effort of. the government and

private litigants as an antitrust enforcement weapon:

“The enactment of -the Clayton Act in 1914 was

in-part a recognition by the Congress that Section

7 of the Sherman Act had ‘not successfully ‘stimu

lated private litigation for enforcement of . the

Sherman Act... . , ~

Since the “enactment of. the Clayton Act, the

bulk of private antitrust litigation has followed

successful governnfent action, so that. the judg--

ments anc decrees and. the Federal’ proceedings

could be used. to establish a case. Amassing eévi-

dence for-antitrist cases would’ étherwise be a-pro-

hibitively expensive task for most plaintiffs.” (S.

Rep:- No. 619, 84th Congress, Ist Session, June

. £5, 1955; -U;,S. Code oe & Ad. News (1955) at.

‘ 2329. ey

In Emich Motors Corp. a General Motors Corp., 340.

-ULS. 558 (1951). this Court. examined the history of

the policy of assisting’ private litigants by prior govern-

ment action: |

“Seetion S-of the Clayton Act was adopted in re--

sponse to a recommendation by’ President Wilson

that Congress ‘agree’ in siving private ‘individuals

. the right to found their (antitrust). suits for

redress upon the facts Land judgments proved and

entered im suits’ by’ “the Government where: the

Government has... sted the combinations ¢ m-

plained of and won its ant. © . 7.’ S1 Cong... Ree.

1964... Congression: il reports and debates on the

proposal which ultimately became section 5 reflect

the purpose to miinimive the burdens o f litigation

for injured private suitors by making available to

them all matters previously ‘established’ by the

- government in antitrust actions, . . .” Jd. at 567-508.

In Cinammon v. clbuer A. Wolf, Inc., 215 F. Supp. |

833 (E.D. Mich, 1963). the Court ‘discussed the policy

_ of the antitrust laws with respect to private treble dam-

age actions : | ‘

“The purpose of. Section 4+-of the Clayton Act,

Title 15, U.S.C. Section. 15, which provides for

private triple damage suits is ‘to enlist “the busi-.

ness public’. . . as allies of the government in en-

forcing the antitrust laws; the means. chosen, on

the ‘other hand, is to give the “injured party am-

ple recompence for the wrong suffered” by allow-

ing three-fold recovery of damages.’ Report. of the

Attorney General's National Committee to Study the

Antitrust Laws, p. 378 (1955). In other words,

the private antitrust suit is a substantial weapon

in eftectuating a national policy of protecting, pre-

serving and promoting free competition in the mar-

ket place by blending ‘antitrust policy with private

compensatory law.’ ” 215 F. Supp. at 834.

Three Assistant Attorneys General in charge of the

Antitrust’ Division (two of them while in office) in

articles and testimony before Congressional committees,

have stated that private actions are a desirable and nec-

essary supplement to Ce enforcement efforts.

See Bicks, The Department- of Justice and Private

Treble Damage Actions, + veri Bull. 5 (1959) at.

8: Loevinger, Private Aetion—The i caaice Pillar of

Antitrust, 3 Antitrust Bull. 1607 (1958) at 168: State-

ment of Lee Loevinger, Hearings Beforé Subcommittee

~

ee, ae

f the Select Committee on Small Business, U.S. Sen-

te 85th Congress, 2nd Session (1958), pp: 7, 16;

as

Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties:

Analysis of the Developments in the Treble Damage -

Suit, 61 Yale L.J. 1010 (1952) at 1046, quoting testi- .

iony of TH. Graham Morrison, Hearings on H.R. 3408,

Subcommittee on Monopoly Power of the Housé

udiciary Committee, p. 12. | |

Richard W. McLaren, the present Assistant Attorney

‘Waeree, .

General in charge of the Antitrust Division, stated on

December 11, 1969: 3

“Private antitrust proceedings today are not merely

a means of compensating victims of antitrust cen-

spiracies: they provide a substantial and meaning-

ful deterrent to violations of the antitrust laws: In-

deed, until the Congress acts on our recommenda-

tion to increase the maximum Sherman Act. fine

for corporations from $50,000 to $500,000, the

treble-damage action provides the only meaningful

financial, deterrent to antitrust’ violations.” Re-

marks of Richard W. McLaren before the Anti-

trust Committees of the Federal. Bar. Association

and the Philadelphia Bar Association, December

11, 1969. a .

The Federal Trade Commission: has also stated that

- its policy in enforcement shall lye directed toward assist-

ing private litigants. //. 2. Hood & Sens, Inc., Docket

No. 7709; 58 FT.C. 1184 (1961) at 1189-1190.

~The decree as approved by the District Court frus-

.trates the’ Congressional policy of joint governmental-

“private effort in enforcement of the antitrust laws.

a”

While Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act does give ree-

ognition ‘to the consent decree procedure used by thé

United States in disposing ot antitrust cases, this statu-

tory recognition camiot be regd as obliter rating the over-

all Congressional policy fer protection of Tree competi-

tion upon agreement of the parties to an action,

The public funds, manpower and facilities which

were employed by the Department of Justice in its in-

vestigation gt Unis sixteen year conspiracy, and which

could be employed in the prosecution of this action,

far exceed the resources available to iy private plain-

tiff. The magnitude ot the alleged Violations demand

that such resources be used to effectuate: compliance

with the antitrust: laws. The delays necessarily created

by the several: fold dupjication of the government et-

fort by the many parties attected by this action would

be avoided by the prosecution of the United States’

action.

The Department of Justice has previously recognized

the need to cooperate with private litigants in’ pursuit -

of its obligation to further Congressional policy. The

Department has. ackomplished this, objective by inelud-

ing within certain consent deeress specitic provisions

(conimonly known ay an Vasphalt clause’) admitting

the allegations of the Xormplaint for the benefit ‘of sub-

sequent private litigants. The consent decrees in United

States v7. Lake cAsphalt\and Petroleum Co. of Massa-

chusetts, 1900 C.CLHL Trade Cases, Para. 69,835. (1).

-» Mass. 1960); and United: States v. vlllicd Chemical

~ Corp., 901 CCL ‘Prade Cases, Para. 069,92 9(D. Mass.

1961) contained such) provisions for -the purpose of

private actions by states’ and local governments which

followed Federal govefument SUItS,

—29—

Defendants-appellees strenuously objected to the in-

clusion of an “asphalt clause” in the consent ‘decree,

and threatened to litigate the case fully if such a clause

was included (Defendants’ Opposition to Applications

for Leave to Intervene and Other Petitions and Com-

ments Regarding the Proposed Consent Decree, and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities, p. 23).

That settlement may offer an expedient resolution

of many or Most antitrust cases. does not mean that

settlement in a particular case, this case, will produce the

Most satistactory result, This case is unique in the ex-

tent of its impact upon the public interest. It can be

fairly said that every individual in this country who

“breathes will he affected by the outcome of this action.

The general importance of a dual governmental-private -

effort in combating antitrust violations as severe as

those alleged in the government complaint make it clear

that in this case the only viable alternative to a com-

plete litigation of the issues is a consent decree contain-

ing a limited admission by the defendants of the allega-

tions in the compkaint. This admission would be solely

for the purpose and to the extent necessary to give

prima facie effect to the decree in subsequent private

treble damage actions. The defendants-appellees readily

recognize the onerous effects of the consent judgement

obtained. Doeket No. 31 of the Judicial Panel on Multi-

district Litteation of the United States District Courts

is “In re: Multidistrict Private Civil, Treble Damage

Anti-trust Titigation Involving Motor Vehicle Air Pal-

lution Control Equipment’. In the Tanuary 1970 “\Mem-

orandum of Defendants in Response to Panel Order to

Show Cause and Notice of -Hearing’’. the defendants-

—30—

: - &

appellees make the following statement and observa-

tion: | 5

“Tf, after limited discovery, these motions [pre-

trial motions] are not successful, it- would appear

that exhaustive full-scale discovery is likely to oc-

cur involving the examination.of numerous wit-

“nesses and voluminous documents. This is especial-

ly so because, unlike some antitrust cases which «4

have been the subject of consolidated pre-trial pro-

ceedings in the past, there has been no adjudica-

tion of liability here and, in addition, the right to

~ assert a claim for damages is far from clear. In

many of these other treble damages cases, the pri-

vate plaintiffs have available to them a prior adjudi-

cation of antitrust violations which had prima facie

effect, and, accordingly, the basic issue in those

cases was not whether, but how much, the plain-

tiffs had been injured.” (Pages 1 and 2).

The District Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying

Consolidation of the Two Actions.

Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides:

“CONSOL ID: ATION. When setiond inv volving a

common, question of law or fact are pending be-

fore the Court, it°may order a joint. hearing or

trial’ of any or all the matters in issue. in the

actions; it may order all the actions consolidated ;

and it may make such orders concerning proceedings

therein as may tend t@ avoid unnecessary costs of

_ delay.”

*Consolidation may be ordered before issues are joined

where common questions are involved. Schultz -v. Afan-

—31— |

ufacturers and e ‘raders Trust Co., 29 F. Supp. 37

(W.D.N.Y. 1939). To expedite the trial and eliminate

unnecessary repetition and confusion trial judges have

been urged to make use of Rule 42(a). DuPont v.

Southern Pacific Company, 366 F. 2d 193 (5th Cir.

1966).

Each of the two cases pending before the District

Court involves like questions of law and fact and the

same defendants. | ce

“The consolidation of an action brought by the

United States with another action in whfch either

the United States or a private person is plaintiff

should be governed by the general principles of |

Rule 42, since the Federal rules are generally

applicable to the United States and these actions

do not involve any problem of sovereign immunity

from suit.” 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, Para. 42.02,

p. 42-19 (2nd Ed. 1968).

See also Gerber Products Co, v. Beech-Nut Lifesavers,

Inc., 25 F.R. Serv. 42a.1, Case 1 (consolidation of two

antitrust cases against the common defendant, despite

one unrelated issue in each case); Atlanta Hydratane

Gas, Inc, v. Lowry Tims Co., 41 F.R.D. 164 (N. D.

Miss. 1966), (four actions by different plaintiffs con- ’

solidated where all plaintiffs sought relief against com-

mon defendant for alleged discrimiuation in pricing prac-

tices in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act). The

delay, duplicity of expense, and time and inconvenience

to witnesses created by maintaining these suits. as sep-

arate actions could have -been avoided by consolidating

these essentially identical cases.

—32—

Conclusion.

~The issues involved in this appeal are substantial.

The resolution thereof will have a significant impact

on the public interest. Plenary consideration . by this

Court is required. Historians may hopefully read Wil-

liam Shakespeare's observation as an anachronism:

oe

: . . this most excellent canopy, the air, look you,

this brave o’erhanging firmament, this majestical

roof fretted with golden fire,—why, it appears no

Other thing to me than a foul and pestilent congre-

gation of vapours.”

William Shakespeare, Hamlet,

Act II, Scene II. :

Respectfully submitted,

SCHWARTZ.& ALSCHULER,

By Benjamin F. Scuwartz,

and

: = ~ Herpert A, KARZEN,

; Counsel for Appellants,

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APPENDIX A.

Judgment of the District Court.

[472,907 | United: States v. Automobile Mfrs. Assn.,

Inc., General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Co., Chrysler

Corp., and American Motors Corp.

In the United States District Court for the ventral

District of California. Civil Action No, sata IWC.

Entered October 29, 1969,

Case No. 2037 in the Antitrust Division of the De-

partment of Justice.

Sherman Act.

Conspiracy — Automobile. Manufacturers 4 De-

velopment of Smog Control Devices—Joint. Activities. —

Four automobile’ manutacturers and their trade associa-

tion were prohibited from conspiring to delay and -ob-

struct the development and installation of eieeen | con-

trol devices for motor vehicles. The decree prohibitions

include: (1) restraining in any way the individual de-

cisions of each auto company. as to the date avhen it will

install emission control devices ; (2) agreeing not to file .

individual statements with governmental agencies’ con-

cerned with auto emission and safety standards and

from filing joint statements on such standards unless

the governmental ag gency involved expressly authorizes

them to do so; (3) continuing a 1955 cross. licensing

agreement and refusing to Jgrant royalty-free livenses

on auto emission control devices under patents subject

to the 1955 agreement to:all who miav request them: (4)—

agreeing to exchange their companies’ contidential jn-

formation relating to emission control devices or to ex-

_ change patent rights covering future inventions " this

pat-

area; and (5) continuing their joint assessment o

*¢

*

ae - lander, Allen Fo Me Allester, \ hares VB Me Meer, and

ened an. auc emission control devices offered to cany

ul them by outside parfics its welluas their practice of

. * requiring eutt side partics tw license” alt of them on equal

‘terns. “* . A eas ae

. See ‘Combination anid’ Canispiracy, Vol. on TO00),

Th partment, of Justice I forcement and | ‘ncedure, Vol.

2,0 RES ty See ary am

For the plaintift ‘Richard: WL Mel waren, Asst: \tty.

Gen., Baddia J. KR: itshiid, Lewis. Bernstein,- William 1)

Kiltore. Jr. Rayiond WW Philipps, Berigrd ME bel

OC. Brooke Arniat,” Atfys:, Dept ot Justice. ”

fF of the de fendants A silence ots, I rernin & Crurcher, Jutian

.O. Von Kaliness ski. Maul Lower: Wilmer, Cather &

Pickering, Lhewd N Cunhed, ane Dhoward DP Wolletis.- tes

\itomobile, Mit s Asst, The’; Ki rss & Malem +. lL iaavher,

Felis A bhai, VE Petts \fattson. and Robert PAyetntge seat)

tor’ Getieral Motors Corp. ; CWertin, Yinan & Prine

Carl _ Schucl Waste 2 Kiel shed fear Mesten

“og MeO ae lack Verleger & Shea, Philip Ko Ver

Aeger. and WVilliten (1: Shea, ter Chrysler Corp: OY Mel

. vente & Myers, Allen O. Kr ges, ated Cpa Pe Betedrecaes

N ton Amerwan Mateus ( ony ets Wise .

°o

- Pitsal Lielernene.

CURTIS, D.-4 tin polars, Lnited Sqaten. of

4

Amertal avin tiledoit compat nt feerenmy cn Tarynars

10). Jim am! thn igtit amd thy ale fete Ants liv

thetr réspective attorneds basing severally comented t

theentrt oft thes Pinal loeléinenyt Wethoat trailor addline

vat t) af -erg trrveba rigs oth SUTTR Pees eel Guat «a bees hereary .

and without thre Pinal Judgment csivsitatiog exidem re

er an admission by any at Chem in respect -t ANY su if

’

‘Mine The retin e, ‘+. fare any testimony has been: taken,

“and w inbw nit trial or ‘ad judic ation of or finding on any

ISstie Ot Lact of aw chet rein, and’ pen consent of the

parties is aforesaid, it is he reby | : , °

Ordered. “Adjudged.and Decreed as follows:

Rake

+ | Surisdic tow |:

’

‘Thus A nurt hess piriscietieany of the subject - matter

| heron satu of the parties herets. Thy comiphagnit’ states” ay.

« aim Agen, which relief may be’ granted apapist the “de

tendants wader Section dot “the Vite at Congress: of.

8 haly 20 DS9OO) entitled Ap wet 1" pretect trade and com.

Mere agaist wnlawtul restr avis "and nv ticny lies”

Commnenty haown as. ‘the She INN; Mm \ititrtist, Net, as

aamnended ‘ : :

mad 4h se ; we

. ; ee Definitions) ate

Ns aseeel in this r "ni al Vavedgrsvvenst

* (A) “Devices” mesins far pellttion emission control

desigrins, ete Pepe etlwwds oe querts tered!’

for aneter vehicles ee ‘

“AD “Restricted imtcrmation® meat call tiagaspli shed

titer ate 1} sete thy Axpwr, fascilly clMissttiod it i mtguan?g

cont yede titi! cette’ rors atl ij’ st k Aistingeny hey! trey

mgr bast research “i gaining a ‘faller. iniwdedes a

Doce or t,t? hh ove i y Mweerning 1 lee deweli pitnent ithe :

. ’ ° , ‘

A aot “Nhat iifetire tye she af estialbation et | Th

abe ‘tartita (TP iTatle sceret £ tee TOOL hes Cea ges

puiliyes ytul ates night) het technical infurmation for

HoMoepingy waking. img: lowering the ent of

' A evn’ hime. ftir veltic! Thafien! wtnerey — “Rettricted

. wite rt nT ! vets hal! jut "ni ae " rapatiiw ncern

“understanding ot the presence, Nature, amount, causes,

sources, effects or theories of control of moter vehicle |

‘F emissions in the atmosphe ‘re, or (i) information relat-

~~

ing primarily ta equipment, methods or procedures, for

the testing or measurement of Devices, or (ii) in-

formation fer or resulting from the testing or measure-

miemt et ¥ production prototypes at Devices, of can

“advanced sh ise exch: mged? solely for such Purposes. In-:

formation shall be deemed te he: published when it ts

ise lose. without, restriction to the public, orto media

“ot general ‘ Jrethation, orto the trade press, or to meet-

"ing “of “Steckh, Aders, “dealers, - financial analysts, or

Bt Tneetings af profess aval, cuir ‘or engineering

Societies, or commiittdes thereof, the membership of

/

which is Hot limited to persons empl ved ‘Ty de fendants j

or 455 Muelor r vehicle mann ac Curers, aor tor Mie an cs a cilben !

“by ? TOPTCSentaAnives anf - Federal, state of lowal povern.

yyCHTS or cher neies | canat Te rized to tssuecmeotor vehicle

’

Cemisstoy control regulations.

|,

Applicabitity | . :

The provisions Of this Final Judgment shall be bind

Hage yp ag a fendant and upon cach of its stibsids

aries: afticers, directors, agents, servants, cmiplovees,

weeessors ath atetins, and ayponcall other “persens in

active eoncert Of participation with any of them whe

Wall hav receive retinal” netice: ot this Vinal Iudy

“10 vit bev ques nal service of cot ty rm ise’, fornt sdoadd ryeot ap

° pl feo carry fran acti between or annem ct fiarengt com

any ‘f aly ilart . ol teers, direttars, agents, Sery

ants and or emploweese Nothing inthis Frval Ieulornyent

shal] have at v ettecl with re sporet Tey canny aa tivities ‘ont

oe 4 .

.

e? ¢

?

po ae

side the United States which do not adversely and sub-

stantiaily affect the foreign commerce of the United

States ; \

¢. cee |

sii cpsnacaed C ontrol Devices)

4

limit the deve hopnient, Roe eae AA dis-

«

trsbution or salle of Devices ; hast ae

(2) Enterfng into, adhering: to. enforces ing or claim-

ing any-rights under any provisions of any agreement,

arrangemens, understanding, plan or program: (heréin-

after “agrepment’’y with anyother, de fendant or manu ;

facturer of motor vehitles or Devices :

(a) to xchange restricted information : {

(b) ta cross license patents or patents rights on De

vices which cross-litense | iicludes patents or patent

Tights yequired subsequent tte the date of any such

CTOSS Ih ense: ; \

oO delay installation af Devites ‘or otherwi ise re

to restrie 1s oaadieils #f research and development

(dg) to empley jomt assessmeitt gt the value of pat

or patent rights of cany third party relating to {

;

Pad

to require that aedqaisition of patent rights re

° 4 “~ ‘ . .

lafing to Devices ‘be conditioned upon atailabiline of

syich rights te others upon a mest favored purehaser

4g) to tile, in thy abseneesobk a written authorization.

eh

ar

for a jomt. statement by the ageney invelved, with any +

_ governmental regulitery. ageney in the United States

aut ln Wh cd

hor new gretor v®ueles or Federal moter velicl satety

“standards

, vie suche

; : . ; - fe , Ee :

Mhevits relating te Try the autherty of the agency on

Voted. on

y rR ‘

eravia't al

“ . ;

Titi Va

vided thi

Cys ( the

worthy unt

\

\

“standards or “repulatiens except yout’ state

or Stutdards or repulitiedis. ait test procedures ar test .. + ;

Hata rele,

rig’

sed aipon pubhely adilable mitermation : pro

ytooissue cmsston standards er regulations

er repularteys, aa qgort statement regard

Jothe drattsmanship Gt oof the: scientitie need ; =

mote standards or rewulidions., or Civ) the mae ©

cooing requitements-ot standards or ree ¢

ther pert gabon nf hall 48 tiled whieh ls :

Uihity Qh one or more detendants te cotiiply :

. . a

reotthar standard ov regathatia? oy ter clo sch byw ace

particmter toe. ty the absence ofeqeseritren. qoeendy an

Hy . : ij ° ' .

1] ' resrhl go qpomt statement. and Avovided

. © . ‘ : . . ‘i ‘ ’

! tty bt) at ty 4d ryt peoeegyetyee Ooty gy yeootnyt sti Were!

FE eye, Creernernnd - aarereacacht is tngwe? pitty

‘ ' ! ! .

eof Piet rodivtdaeadl statements with anv ev .

i t¢ ty! , 7 1 \ if er | ‘?) thy | “tted Stites au : \

thy i ! o 1%, avert oret trrclaee rey refers htop fot

. ' bea? e hraecle oor lel f | ryeiteny woody Je ater

‘ Tithe "9% onyhiyes ts, }

| Noothune ou thy letra) ltrdement: hall percohat tort ; 4

rT A chat! : . ; . 3 .

| ny trp te ob Geatuiiwine ane ore trieted oan

beat yy) if ‘ fav hy heepdat ri yy meer ten raf iy, tiers

. ' + lovey

3 ') eoaute wie " eryty, aie jt Coorpyyerpey nnder. mys

pty lawitat acereetiwe pth thy sary other “person uit : .

2 “ : Pals , .

. oi oe : 7

vie —7—

conducting boita fide negotiations looking to any- such

agreement: _ | 7 : me

(a) tor the purchase or-sale of specific commercial

prodyets: oe | ae i

(b) Jor the license of specitic eNisting patent rights

or trom including in’ any such agreement provision tor,

a None sclus sive grant back wot patent rights on improve

ments abt; ined by 4 licensee during. the term f the

license « yw 2 reasonable ceTIod thereafter:

(C) tor the purchase, sale or license 2 SPecihic ENXist-

Inve restricted IN-OrMatON or specrtic engineering. Serv:

ees rélating to Devices or from including In any such

“agreement provision for a nonexclusive grant-back «of

_ Patent rights on Improvements obtained. by the license’

| during the term of the heense or a ‘reasonable period

‘thereafter: or trom furnishing or acquiring any re

stricted inform: itton directly relating thereto:

(3) froin - entering inte, renewing or performing

tinder ANN otherwise haw far] agreement with any non

defendant person, firm ar es poration that does not ac

count for more than 2% af world praduction. of me

tor vehicle passenger cag. truck and Iytas units in the

calendar vear preceding: the entering into or renewing

such agreement f See Appendis \ [ Not Reproduced | &

ae Nia ais Bn |

(4) trom. entering inte, renewing oor performing —

under ANV aereement Which is’ submitted in writing 4 O"

the plaintiff and to awhieh plamtity consents nm owrit

ne,

(Co) Nethine jn Seetim IVGEN (26a) shall proliibit

any defendant from @neaeine in Any activity. outside

Hie Upqred states reasonably: pece ssary:

(1) to the development of, response to, or compli-

ance with existing or proposed vehicle emission laws,

regulations or standards. of a foreign. governmental,

body, or’: °

(2) te the -performance under any otherwise - law.

ful agreement for the production of motor vehicles

‘outside the United States with any person, firm or

corporation net engaged ine the production of motor

vehicles 11) the United Stites iat the tame of entering inte

or renewing such agreement,

[HWotthdrawal from Cross-Licensing -lgreement |

~ (A) Each manufacturing detendant -is ordered’ and:

4

directed to exercise its right to withdraw from the

AMA. Cross-licensing Sagreement zof July 1, -1953% as

; i ;

amended, and to take such steps as are necessary tac

complish aid withdrawal within Gone hundred ‘twenty

(120)"davs trom phe date of entryv-of this Pinal Judy

ment. Notwithstanding such withdrawal detendants:

may continue to exercise these rights and claims relat

‘

ing to roVvalty-tree licenses under ‘the cross-licerising

° ‘

agreemiemt which have accrued up to the date @f entry

- . Le -; any - -

of this Pinal ludgment. / .

(B) Defendant ANE A GS ordered and directed to re

linquish i@s responsibtlines undeé the AMA ‘cross Ii

ce Ising areement ot Pwo d. O55. ge amended, with

in, sixty-(00) days from the date ef entry of this Final

: Lay,

.

Judgment. i

a

.

°

Vi.

[Ce o- ope ration with: Li icensee sy .

= .

(A)’ Upon written request therefor and subject to

the doridittonta Set forth herein:

(t) Each andtaclarina detendant is ordered and

directed to grant to any per the extent: that. it.

has the power to do oso’ a nonexclusive, non-transfer- ’

able .ane, revalt y bree leense to rile : Thave made, usec,

P zs. om ssf - ee Soke

Jeake or sell Devices under any claim of any” United

° - Kc : 7 . . : . . ‘ . . x

Mates patent orm any Cmited States juitent ‘application ;

owned. or controled: by said detendant or under. which: |

it has subkeensing, rights, whieh patent was issued

“application was filed prior te the date of entry of this

Pinel Jud lerment osind ligens ed unde the AMA crOSs

licensing agreement ot huly 1 . 1958. as amended,’ pro-

vided their if the mahufacturing ‘detendant is oblivaied

tO pay novalties to another on othe sales of the licemsee’

the Heense under this parayraph may? provide . for the

payment ot those same rovalties to the degendant ;

(2) Teach manutacturing detchidant hall grang to

any dicensee undey (1) above. te the extent that, it has

<

the power to do se. ay immunity trom sit under ary

foreign counterpart patent ar patent application ‘for any

product manulactured in the t rited 1 ates ‘or the li-?

cense for sale abroad or tear van product wutactured

abroad and sold in te United States. provided that if

the manutacturing -detendgnt is obligated to pay roval-

ties to another on the sales ot the licensee the license -

” c

may provide for the payment of those same royalties to

the defendant ; and eee |

. (3) Defendant AMA is ordered and directed to make

available for examination and copying by any person the

technical reports in its possession or control prepared

or exchanged by: defendants pursuant to said CTOSS- |

‘license within two vears prior to the entry of this Final.

Judgment, which are identified in Appendix Bo [not re-

produced | ; ep a eoneatce i

(B) Any existing licensee of any manufacturing de-

fendant shall have the right to apply for and receive a

license or Heenses urider this ‘Final: Judgment in sub-

stitution for its existing: license or licenses from any

mManutracturing defendant. insofar as future abligutions, |

and licenses’ are concerned, Any licenste shall be free’

to contest the. validity and scope of any’ licensed pat

ent. . . ; 2

Vit

| Votrfication |

Defendant AMA is ordered and directed to nial a

copy of this Final Judement to all signatwries to the

“AMA cross licensing agreement of July 1, 1055."as

amended, and to all known domestic manufacturers of

motor veltickes and motor vehicle engines within thirty

(30) davs freagn the date of entry’ of this: inal Jude

ment, and toadssue a press release to the domestic trade

and business press relating the substance of the Final

Judgment..

Shall he divuleed be am

otherwise required by daw,

on; ne

; VI

‘| /aspection and Compliance +

°

For the purpose: of determining .ors securing compli-

ance with this Final Judgment, duly-authorized repre-

sentatives of the Department of Justice shall, upon

Written request of the Attorney General in charge of

the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to any

defendant made to its. principle office, be permitted,

subject to any legally: recognized privilege, access during

the ottice Thours of said detendant to all books, ledgers,

accounts, Correspondence, memoranda, and other records |

cand documents in the possession or under the con

trol ot said detendant relating to any matters contained

In this Pinal Judgment, and subject to the reasonable

convenience ot said defendant. and without restraint

or interference frome it, te interview officers or em

ph Kees of said defendant. who may have counsel pres

ent, regarding any such matters. Said detendant, stpon

the written request cof the Attorney General or the

\ssistant Attorney, General in charge of the Antitrust

Pdivasaeny, shoal) saaborvint <ucl Written reports wath respect

to anvoet the matters contamed on this Pinal Tndemeng

was, fromtime te time mav be requested, Neo imteorma

tion obtaimmed, Dy the means provided ot ssabiis Section

representative of. the depart

i ‘

s 4 °

ment of fustice te oanveperson other thiun Ja duly au

thorized representative Of the Pe sceutive Branch of the

polcanntitt except om thy Course ate Ve ol 1? moodle {i

which thee United States 4 party tor the purypocise

; De “

ot | eine C miphianes ewith thy bey alse dyredlonn 1)! v 4

| ae

a

IX

DES; rpiration |

Section lV (AVC 2) Ca) and ¢g) of this Final Judy:

‘ ment shall expire ten vears atter ye date of entry here.

of, provided that plaintitt may apply to this Court for

the continuation of one or both oof said) provisions,

od such application to be made not later than nine years

after the date of entry of this Final Judgment.

See

| Jurisdiction Retained |

Jurisdiction at this cause ds retained for the purpose

of enabling any of the parties to vthis Final Judgment.

Jocapply ctec this Court at any time for sich further,

orders and dircetions as mit hes heeessary or appre

priate iy relating try the SONSstruction ey oan varry

. mngeout at this Perma ee ca tor the modification or

nee vacating Ot any ‘i the provisions. thereof, and for the

purpose od the entorcement of compliance therewith and

«the puniishmiens of Viokitions thereat,

‘ -

‘

<<? . ‘ ?

. sa

—s> "

o

—13—- |

APPENDIX, B.

Musscvaniueis Opinion.

Cited States District Court, Central District of

Cahtornia. |

k’nited States of America, Plaintit?, vs. Automobile -

Manufacturers Sssocnition, Inco; General Motors: Cor-

poration ; Ford Motor Company; Chrysler Corporation ;

and American Motors Corporation, Detendants. O97 5.

IWC.

This is an action brought by the United States of:

America charging that) the detendants, Automobile

Manutacturers Xssociation, Ine, General Motors Cor

poration; Ford Motor Cy muapany » Chrysler Cs Corporation ;

and American Motors ( orporation have comspiedd with

other motor vebiick min ractarers. in violation of & 1 of

the Sherman Act (15 0 $1), te eliminate’ Compe.

Htton in the researeh, Pariah manufacture and in

stallation of motor vehicle ai pollution control equip

ment, and in the purchase from others of patents and

patent rights, covering: sucéh equipment. By w woot re

het, the plaintiff is seeking an order enjointng: these

@detendants trom. continuing the alleged unlawiul con

— duet.

Viter eight months of negotiation, the parties have

agreed te settle thisscase upon terms and conditions em

hoched. 1) the proposed COMSeTY decrec TOW be tiore this

court for approval

On September, TL L969] the 4 roposed del re Wath

made public and all interested’ parties. including the

State of California, County, of tot Angeles. City of

los Angeles and th Vir Pathation Control: District

; : j ‘

ot the Canmntyv otf Ta \iarels wer jnivited -f CN press

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