Appendix — City of New York v. United States

Supreme Court brief1970

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

la

Se

v

_ APPENDIX A—OPINIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Oral Opinion, October 28, 1969

———Fhie Court | Curtis, J »): Ver vy well. I take it, ther, the

hearing has come to a completion. .

Mirst of all, | want to‘thank all those who have appeared

as friends of the court. TRave appreciated your comments

and they have been very helpful.

I have, of course, had the benefit of all ‘of the arguments

of. counsel for some time, and | have re: id them. My law

clerk and | have done research which seems to have been.

nee wessttated here, so | must admit that T came into the

hear ing with a pretty fair idea of what the outcome of this

case would probably be unless there were some suggestions.

made here today ,or some argument which I -had_ not

thoroughly considered.

Of course, as T stated this morning, T éan only say again

that it is very—well, first of all, before T commence that.

| should state that it is my intention to write an opinion

and file a written opinion here which will cover the legal

aspects of the ease and which will be published and which —

all attorneys will. understand so that they can understand |

my position.

| realize, though, that a lot of people have come a long

way and there are a lot of people in the audience who have

been asked to come here and appear. I feel that it might

he wise for me to,‘since | know what Tam going to do, .

speak informally and in & non-legalistie fashion so that you

may better understand the problem that confr onts this court

and the conclusion to which the court has come.

| have already expressed my personal feelings about air

pollution, the importance of the problem, .and the urgency

of its solution. T have ‘already mentioned that it is a prob-

lem of Government and that it is the function of the Ad- |

ministration ae ting through various departments and agen-:

cies to initiate and to pursue a program of research and

(i

. dev elopment of its own and to acquir

jt emt

all possible knowl-

edge in order that it, may make its prdyer recommenda-

tions to Congress and Congress mnmay pass Mie needed legis-—

lation # order that it‘may be informed to Jhe point where

et up effective administrative Megs for the regu-

lation and control of these factors.contributing to the prob-

lem.

Congress has a duty, too, that of making laws which are

helpful and necessary. The courts have a function and that

is to stand ready to assist at all times in the implementation |

of these administrative decisions.

It is our constitutional .coneept of Government that Gov-

ernment moves forward smoothly when our three branches

* of Ciav ernment—the executive, the legislative and the judi-

cial—each Tune tions in.its own sphere of aunthority.. It is in-

appropriate for any one branch of Government to exercise

the prerogative of another, “It is elementary -political

science which I_ know we all know. ae ‘

The Departinent of Justice, whom this court must as-

sume is the representative of the people, has Mrought this

action by way of an administrative decision made by the

- Department of Justice to fashion an aetion of this kind.

‘

They brought this action into this court alleging that the

automobile manufacturers had engaged in a conspiracy to

eliminate competition and asking as its sole remedy that

the court enjoin the defendants from engaging in conduet

consisting of a long series of acts enumerated in the com-

plaint and thonght by dlie Government to be a violation of

the Antitrust Act.

Now, | am not going into the technical aspects of the

Government’s theory here. We only know fr om some of

the intimations what its theory is. But it. Seomed quite

clear to those who are knowledgeable in this field that the

Government is proceeding on a somewhat novel theory, and —

it is one in which there has heen no precise court decision,

So, after having filed this avtion and after many months of

3a

working where parties have worked together with technical

advisers, they have negotiated and reached a settlement of

_ this Jawsnit upon terms and: conditiouis which have been

set forth im the proposed consent decree and which they -

now ask this court to approve. :

Tn approaching this problem the court must move ecau-

tiotsly lest ‘it override an. administrative decision based

upon matters of policy with w lich this court cannot prop-

erly inter fere,

“Consent decrees which result from infor oe eaitlatons

between the Antitrust: Division and defendants in fhiese

cases are numerous, and they are most always without

exception ratified by the court with little or no change.

Under well-established law, this decree must be approved |

unless this court finds some legal defect in it suc’ as its un-

enforceability according to its terms, or its failure to pro-

vide relief which is consistent with the complaint.. It is

. the court’s duty to protect. the rights of persons who are

not parties to the action and, of course, the deeree should

not be approv ed if it is contrary to the public interest.

After a careful review of. the proposed decree and a-

reading of the voluminous ‘opposition to it,: and in light of

the’ research which we have: dove and the hearing here

today, it seems clear to me that the deeree must be ap-

proved for the following reasons. -

In the first place, the dine ree is legally enforce: bie. on its. .

face. .I have heard no contention 16 the contrary.

Secondly, it is consistent with the prayer in the eom- °°

_plaint, in spite of what has been said-here, It is, as has been

said, substantially consistent. The. alley: ifions with re-

spect to prior antitrust violafions is a necessary allegation

and a necessary finding if this case were to go to judgment,

but if it is.not to go to judgment it does not heeome a

necessary finding.

- 4a

The prayer for such relief as may seem proper is a gen-

eral catchall clause, as all attorneys know, and it means

little if anything. |

With those exee ‘ptions, the decree prov ides substantially,

as near as Lam able to tell, wads of the benefits which the

complaint seeks, |

Thirdly, the decree does ’ not prejudice the rights of

treble damage claimants. It has been, of course, contended

that the Government has the duty to bring this case. to

judgment so that trebké damage-claimants may have the

benefit of its judgment, as prima facie proof of liability. fr ~

treble damage suits. T he law does provide that treble dam-

age. claimants: may use sucha judgment .as prima facie

evidence of liability, but it also provides that cases of. this

kind may be settled without an-admission of liability.

| Congress did th: it for’a very definite reason and that is

. for the reason, such as exists here, to permit a ready and

definite conclusion to these eases’ without the long expense

of a trial.

. And as has been mentioned here, this is nothing unusual,

this is done all the time. The Government scéttles between

70 and: 75 percent of its antitrust eases in this fashion.

If it didn’t.it would not have the personnel to run the

office.

T ‘here is no authority to’ the effect that the Government

has the duty to try any case merely for the purpose of

aiding treble damage claimants in their: individual suits.

| have had none cited to me. As far as T know there is

no such authority, and I see no basis to compel the Gov-

ernment here to.do that.

The treble damage claimants are free fo bring any kind

of an action they wish. he State of California and the

other States may bring Any kind of an action which they

can maintain withont Peing affected in the least by the -

decree in this action. : . a

da

Lastly, it appears to me that this anaes 3 is'in the publi¢

interest for it gives the Government all the relief it could

have gained if it had fried the case and won. It avoids a

tremendous expenditure of taxpayers’ money and the ex- °

haustion of Antitrust Division manpower, And it brings

immediate results.

If this ease were to go to trial, although there has been

some contention about it.to the contrary, I think there is

little doubt but what it would take between four and five

years of discovery, preparation and trial of this case. The

small amount of evidence which is now in the hands of the

Department of Justice and was obtained through the Grand

Jury investigation, | think, would be a small thimbleful

of evidence. in comparison with that whicli would be re-

quired if this were to go to judgment.

Furthermore, this decree brings ‘an assured result. The

thing that amazes me is that all of the opponents seem to

assume With such assurance that if this case were tried the

iovernment would win. Now there are many knowledge-

able people who disagree with this.

It would seem to me it would be tragic if this court would

refuse to sign the decree and compel the Government to

go to trial only to lose the ease, which would mean that

the benefits of this deeree, which are great, would be lost

to the entire country forever, and it would help the treble

damage claimants not a whit.

The proposed deeree, for the reasons which T have

enumerated, will be approved. .

I have not mentioned all of the arguments that have been

made here, There have been a lot of them made. It does

not seem to me that the others need answering in view of

my Views as expressed here. +

Now, | think it is plain that from what T have said that

I shall deny all petitions of those wishing to intervene in

this action as parties.. I think it has not been seriously -

6a

urged and, if so, not convincingly so, that these petitioners

are Ontitled to intervene as ‘a matter of right. Almost all

of those wishing to intervene are treble damage claimants—

that is the basis of their contention that they intervene

because of their treble damage claims—and the cases are

very clear that the interest of treble damage. claimants is

not cognizable as an interest such as will entitle the elaim-

ant to intervene in an injunction action of this kind.

Rule 24(b). suggests that permissible intervention shall

be allowed only where it will not delay or prejudiee the

adjudication of the rights of the original parties. Now,

there can be no yaa = what permitting the intervenors

here to beeome /parties in-this suit conld do nothing but

prejudice and delay’ on cause interminable confusion in’

_ handling the action which is now pending before this court.

~The other intervenors,-there are cout who have other

claims. upon which they would base their right to inter-

vene—they are yaried, and T think’ each one ean be an-

swered from a substantive standpoint. But, in any event,

noué of them have been made timely, and they will be

denied for the reason thaf they have not been timely made.

To admit them at this time even though they have some

legitimate canse for -intervention would cause undue delay

in the adjudication of this ease.

Now, a lot has been said about the Grand Jury tran-

scripts and the evidence there. T think there is a lot

misunderstanding, too. The mere fact that they have not

been released, it is assumed by everybody to indicate that

there is some mystertous amount of evidence in the hands

-of the Grand Jury that if ever released would be of great

value fo ‘somebody, and \the court is a part of a great con-

spiracy. trying to keep this from being released. —

Tt has been traditional in federal courts that Grand Jury

proceedings be kept seeref for at least two very apparent

reasons. One is that the Grand Jury is permitted to delve

into matters which but for public necessity would be an

7a

invasion of privacy protected by the Constitution. Evi-

dence so obtained must be kept seeret in order to protect

the innocent and must not be released unless a need there-

for be shown of such a high order as would justify a court

in overriding constitutional considerations.

A second reason for the secreey is that witnesses appear-

ing before the Grand Jury afford better cooperation and

are more willing to testify with the knowledge that. pro-

ceedings are secret,

Now, we have to clothe all Grand Jury: proceedings with

that aura if we are going to maintain ‘a: proper Grand

Jury concept. The Supreme’ Court has been adamant that

District Courts be véry careful and be very reluctant to

release Grand Jury transcripts of any kind in any ease

“unless there is a need shown.

The order which hes been prepared—and T have not had

an opportunity to examine it carefully—but it is my inten-

tion to sign an order which—if this does not so provide, we

will See that one does will impound all of the testimony:

and all exhibits which have been presented to the Grand

Jury so that they may not be destroyed or lost or dissi-

pated. If-these were to be released generally they would

have to be released by the persous from whom they were

obtained, and the only way they could be recovered would”

he by a subpoena. They would suffer the possibility of

loss or destruction or mutilation. In order that this evi-

dence be maintained and be available to treble damage |

claimants or anyone else who is interested in further Jiti-

gation, all of this material will be impounded with the

Department of Justice and will be available to any such

Claimant upon a proper showing.

Right now any request for the release of Grand, Jury |

records will be premature. There has been no showing and

there have been no arrangements made for their release,

ie

Sa

But the details of the release and the conditions under

which they ean be released, 1 am are, will be liberal enough

to satisfy anybody who makes any reasonable demand.

That, | think, disposes of all mations to consolidate and

the Grand Jury niatter.

I did want to make one more comment. I have’ lost my

notes, but T will make it anyway. In this case it has seemed

to me—well, | just wanted to express again my apprecia-

tion in having all the members of the Bar here from vari-

ous parts of the country who have appeared as friends of

the court.

What | wanted to say at this point is—and I don’t want

to be misunderstood—it has been pretty clear to me ever

since the issues were crystallized what the result would be.

There have. been some efforts made here by political inter-

ests, I feel, to make this court a useful court for their own

purposes. This-court as a result has been deluged with

letters from good people, sincere people, throughout the

United States who, T think, have been deluded to some ex-

tent as to the issues presented here. It is obviously an

intent on the part of some politicians, T think, to divert the

fire which—or, the heat which their own constituents have

placed upon them and to attempt to exercise some pressure

on this court. Now, pressure isn’t new to a judge; we get

used to it.and simply ignore it. But this kind of pressure

‘is-not proper, and is inappropriate in a court of this kind

where it’is used in an attempt to influence the court to do

‘something other than what the law requires’ them to do.

I resent the implication that this court is susceptible to

that kind of influence. The decision T have come to is a

decision which is based upon the law as T understand it to

he, and T feel pretty eertain that the decision which the

eourt has reached is consistent with ‘the law.

Thanks. all of von, bai coming.

There being nothing further the ecouyt stands adjourned.

9a

4

Memorandum Opinion, November 7, 1969:

, on « [Caption Omitted]

This is an action brought. by the United States of

America charging that the defendants, Automobile Manu-

facturers Association, Inc.,; General Motors Corporation ;

se Motor Company; Chrysler Corporation; and Amer-

‘an Motors ¢ rporation have conspired with other motor

dace manuf turers, in violation of $1 of the Sherman

Act (15 U.S.C. $1), to climinate -competition in the re-

search, development, manufacture and installation of mo-

tor vehicle air pollution control equipment, and in the pur-

chase from others of patents and patent rights, covering

such equipment. By way of relief, the plaintiff, is seeking

an order enjoining these defendants from continuing the

alleged unlawful’ conduct.

After eight months of negotiation, the parties have

agreed to settle this case upon terms and conditions em-

bodied in the proposed consent decree now before this

court for approval. ; | 3

On September 11, 1969, the proposed decree was .-made

publie and all interested parties, including the State of

California,.County of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles, |

aml the Air Pollution Control District of the County of

Los ‘Angeles, were invited to express their views as to

whether or not the consent deeree should be approved.

The United States reserved the right to withdraw from

the stipulated judgment, however, at any time within

thirty days after its submission in the event any -objec-

tions brought to its attention might seem meritorious.

On ‘October 28, 1969, after the ,thigty day period had

expired, this court held an open hearing: at which. time

all persons wishing to appear as amici curiae were per-

mitted to voice their objections. Appearances have been.

made on behalf of many states, counties, cities, air pol-

lution control districts, congressional groups, associations

and interested individuals.

10a

Petitions to intervene, as parties plaintiff, were -filed by.

the County of Los Angeles; County of Santa Barbara;

the Bay Area: Air Pollution Control District; Air Pol-

lution Control District of the County of Los Angeles;

the State of New York; the State of Connecticut; the

State. of Maryland; the State of New Jersey; ‘City of

New York; American Civil Liberties Union; two aldermen

from the City of Chicago; M. B. Grossman and S. J.

Tamkin, plaintiffs in a class action now pending in this

court; and William J. A. Sturtz. With the exception of

petitioner Sturtz, all) prospective piesa ‘sought in-

tervention in order to assert treble damage claims.

Tt has not been urged scriously, or if so, not convine-

ingly, that these petitioners may intervene’ here as a

matter of right, for it is well settled that treble damage

claimants do not have am ‘interest’? cognizable under

Rule 24(a) FUR.Civ.P. in Government anti-trust actions

‘seeking injunctive relief. United States -v. Blue Chip

Stamp Company, 272 F. Supp. 480 (C.D. Cal. 1967), -aff'd

sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Company vy. United

_ States, 389 US. 580 (1968): Commonwealth Edison Com-

pany Vv. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 207 F.

Supp. 252 (ND. TL 1962) aff'd 315 F.2d -564 (7th Cir.

1963); United States vy, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc,

unreported opinion (N.D. HL, E.D., Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd:

‘sub pom.. City of New York vy. United States, 390 U.S

715 (1968) 3° United States v. Western Electric Co. 1968

CCIE Trade Cases 72,415 (D, N.J., 1968), aff’d sub

' Petitioner Sturtz sought intervention to compel the defendants

to buy his smog device, alleging their previous failure to do ‘so

constituted an anti-trust violgtion.

* Here the Supreme Court affirmed a denial of intervention in

a consent decree proceeding where the - states and municipalities

were seeking virtually the same relief as is being sought here, in-

eluding an ‘‘asphalt clause’’, access to grand jury records and a

summary of evidence. -

lla

nom. Clark Walker and Sons, Ingxy. United States, 392

U.S. 659 (1968); United States VY Mirnesota Mining &

Manufacturing Company, wireported opinion. (NX.D. TIL.

1. Sept. 2, 1969); United States v. Alaminum Company

of America, AV ERD. Shaft ds per curiam sub nom. j

Lupton Mfg. Co, v. United States, BSS US. 457 (1967)3

It also seems clear that the intervenors are not entitled

to permissive intervention, Rule 24(b) E.R.Civ.PL re-

quires the court, in considering Whether to allow permis-

sive intervention, to consider whether the intervention.

will ‘Sunduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the

rights of the original parties.’** * :

The main goal of the intervenors here is to block the

proposed decree in the hopes of compelling the parties

to litigate this case to judgment. A favorable judgment

could then be used as a basis for theg own treble damage

actions. Ino the alternative, they are seeking the in-

clusion of an admission of liability, commonly ealle® an

® But see Cascade Natural Gas vy. hl Paso Natural Gas, 886 U.S,

129 (1967). Tn this case, upon which intervenors heayily rely,

the Supreme Court upheld intervention asa matter of right. But

“this Was a case df divestiture in-which the decree had a direct effect

upon. the intervenors. In any event, in the light of subsequent

cases it now appears that that ruling is sui generis and must be

limited to the facts of that case, United States vo Western Electric

Co., supra; Hobson vo Manson, 4A ERD. Ts (DE DLC. 1968) 87

Harvard. Law Review 306 at 106 1967): United States vo Alum:

num Company of America, supras Lupton Mfg. Co. vo United

States, supra: United States vo llarper & Row Publishers? Tne.,

supra; City of New York’yv, United States, supra,

Rule LA. Kederal Rules of Civil Procedure, :

~(b) Permissive Intervention, Upon timely application anyone

may be permitted to intervene in an action: (Py... er (2) whet

an applicant's chiim or defense and the main action have a question

. . . . ! . . .

of law or fact in common oo.) In exercising tts discretion the

court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.

‘asphalt clause’’,° which would produce the same result.

However, the defendants have made it clear that) they.

would not consent to such a clause and if it were to be

insisted upon, no settlement of the ease would be possible.

To allow permissive intervention in this case would

certainly. delay and prejudice the adjudication of the

original parties. Courts, generally, have consistently

denied’ intervention under Rule 24 ELRCiv.P. in’ Gov:

ernment anti-trust cases where the purpose is to defeat

the entry of a consent decree. Uvited States ve Blue Chip

Stamp Company, supra. =

All petitions for intervention should, therefore, be de

nied.

° ‘ s

Prior to the institution of this action, the Government

impaneled a grand jury to investigate charges that these

‘defendants were. engaging in anti-trust activities. Alter

etehteen months, . the ‘rand jury was dismissed, without

an indictment having been returned. However, during its

- investigation, a tremendous amount of evidentiary. ma

terial was gathered together and reviewed and the tes.

timony of many witnesses was obtained. It has ‘been

contended by many appearing here as amici curiae that

the proposed decree should contain some provision re-

leasing this material, as well as the transeript of the

grand: jury proceedings, from the cloak of seereey tra

* An ‘asphalt clause’? gets its name from r vroup of antitrust.

cases.against defendants cngaved in the asphalt’ business, wherein

a consent decree containing an admission at lability. was approved

United States vo Allied Chem. Corp. ret Ngaude Cas, 9 69,923, wy

77.641 (D. Mass. 1960): United States vo Bituminous Conercte

Ass'n, Tne. 1960 Trade Cas. © OU S7s at TT AST CD. Mass.) ; United

States vo Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co, 1960 Trade Cas. © G9 835,

‘at W7.272 (D. Mass.d, So faras the court is aware, such a clause

had never been used before and has never been Used since. hur

thermore, its value is doubtful, for insistence upon it would, for

all practical purposes, eliminate the possibility of settling “anti

trust cases. — %

13a

ditionally surrounding such proceedings, in order that

it might become available to treble damage claimants.

At the hearing, a proposed order was presented to the

court, to which all parties have’ agreed and \which this

court has signed, requiring that all evidence obtained by

the grand «jury, as well as its own’ transcript, be im-

pounded in the hands of the Justice Department, where

it may be obtained by treble damage claimants, or others,

by subpoena‘or other appropriate means, where ggod cause

therefor ean be shown. This appears. to satisfy those

making this contention.

Let us now turn to a consideration of the proposed

consent decree.

Seetion 5(a) of the Clayton Act, after providing that a .

“final judgment or decree in an ‘anti-trust action brdught by

the Government may be used with prima facie effect in

treble damage actions, expressly excepts from these. pro-

‘visions consent deerees entered in’ such actions, _In so

doing, it implicitly recognizes consent decrees as ja means

of terminating civil anti-trust actions brought by the Gov-

ernment, and their use has become a most effective tech-

nique in anti-trust enforeement. It is reported that be-

tween TO and 75 per cent of all such Government cases

are settled-in this manner, which allows the Government

to obtain a large measure of injunctive relief. without

tremendous consumption of the limited manpotwer and

finaneial resources available to the Anti-trust Division.

~The decision to settle an-anti-trust case in this fashion,

hike the decision to commence it in the first place, is’ an

administrative decision and is a part of the implementa-

tion of the general policy of the Exeeutive Branch of

government, As such, it is not subject to review by this

court, | |

This court does have the power to disapprove the pro-

posed settlethent, but its use requires the exercise of

l4a

diseretion, based upon legal, as distinguished from ad-

ministrative, considerations. For instance, the court

should withhold its approval if the decree be unenfor

able gv if it should provide for, relief not consistent with

the prayer of the complaint. The court may properly

coufder whether or vot the rights of persons not partie-

to the ation ure je opaurddizs «land whether the consent

_ decree, on the whole, is aagatinint. the publie interest.

The proposed decree ; appears to te enforceable, and ne

contention to the contrary has been made, Furthermore,

the relief which the decree provides is consistent with

the prayer of the complaint.

It hia ‘the notrged that the decroe adversely i Tects Ahi

right< of. treble damage claimants in: thes prosee ition ef’

their own claims. Dut, while it ix true thisit the decree

docs ‘not’ afford prima lacie ‘proof ‘of liabilify, the right

of the ‘claimants to prosecuty their own Glaims is not.

atherwise affected. We-eknow of no authority, and none

his been brought to our attention, which would reqiire

the Government to prosecute thiscask to judgment. solely

for the purpose of anling treble damage claimants, The

Government is the designated representative of the public,

anal scinel poliey requirés that it be free to cae ined

control ifs lifigation in the .publie interest. This objec

tion to the deeree is not valid.

Vt is strongly urged by many that the decree should by

rejected us. pot Ietree in tye public interest, it ner enn!

reason appears to this court for finding this to be se

“oTn the Nret) place, it ‘provides the Government with «ub

Aantially all the relief that it could have obtained if. it

had tried the ease and won. Ht avoids’ the: tremiendon

expense af time aid money which would be required of.

the Notitrust Division in the event .of a trish -The

deeree brings immediate results, whereas if this ehsce wer

to lye tried, any bye he fit of oe final lee ‘ree would be at lave! i]

many years, I brings anassured result, Those abjectine

. ”

Dba

have all assumed that the Government would win the

aetion if it were brought to trial. But the Government ’s

cease is-based upon a’ novel and unadjudicated theory.

Knowledgeable people disagree as to’ the final result. If

the Government should, try this ctse. and lose, the bene.

fil=, of the decree would by lost. For these reasons, if

appears to the cours that the proposed Gere . is in the

public interest. 7

For the foregoing reasons, all petitions to intervene,

iis partie ‘, are hereby denied and the proposed consent

deeree is hereby approved. |

- Daten: November 4 1969,

~ Jesse W. Curtis

Jesse W, Curtis ves ‘)

United States: District Judec

‘

APPENDIX B—STATUTES INVOLVED

e ’

Section O(a) of the Clavtoa Net, PD US.) #100),

provides :

¢ : wee, ‘

AN final judlerient or aleeresr berrertertonne on hereafter

Minteread in any civil or epiminal proceeding boned

hy on anny be half af thie United Stiatvus aiedes thy sed

frist Taws tothe coffee thisit a le ferelant litts Violated

said) Iyws shall be prima facie etidence against <teb

Tefendant in anew aetion on preocteding roudht byw any

cthet parts ibucattnt ieh defetulant under sated) law-

ee Iny the Utitedl Staite /nede’t af Then Vin of this tithe.

sim fen cM omisitfer “Fespoetinigw WV lately wsuul ra Cali Ht or

cleawoe wothd be me 4 totwel ony bert ve om-ethy pearte

thy betes I") cd, PT hyat this’ ao trent sdeall pyeot apy

te con pd optpeherrepeonet ant thereto entered bref eore Pibie:

“tyre tie Peenetohen of te Ttilemient. on deere

" etitered in aetion under scetion Maa of thise itd

: a

16a

Rule 24. 0f the Federal Rules of Civ il Procedure prov ides,

in pertinent part:

/

- (a) Intervention of Right. Upson timely application |

anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:

“(): When a statute of the United States confers an

unconditional right to intervene: or (2) when the:

‘applicant claims an interest relating to the property

oor transaction which is the subject of the action and he

is so situated that the disposition -of- the action may

us a practical matter impair or impede his ability to

protect that interest, og ‘ss the applicant's inferest is

adequately orepresented by existing parties.

(b). Perinissive Intervention. Upon time ‘ly application

“—Gunvene inay be permitted to intervene in-an action:

( 1) when a statute of. the U nite “al States wOUsers a Con

dhe rid teitervene: or (2) when an applieant ’s

_vlaintor deforse. aiid the main action have a question

wt law or fact in common, —W lie Wa party to an action

relfe~ for eround of elaim or defense Hpon any statnte

or executive order filutinis tered byw a federal or state

goverininential OC eer Or avenes Or ipon aiy regulation,

(order, requirement, or agreement issied or made pur

‘ant fo the “atute or ex: cutive order, the officer on

n¥veney Bpen finely application may be permitted to

imfiervene tithe action. Dexercising its discretion the

court shall cotinteet Whether the intervention will an

duly delayoor pretadicee the adjudication of the rights

of the oreinal parties, |

17a

APPENDIX C—COMPLAINT

v NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CE XN TRAL DISTRIC TOF CALIFORNIA’

Civin No. 69-75-IWC

Filed: 1/10/69

Usirep States or America, Plaintiff,

» ; id

AUTOMOBILE Mancracrunenrs Associ tion, Exc. ;

Gexenan Merors C ORPORATION j

' Fonp Moron COMPANY;

Crieysten ConponaTion ; and

Amencan Morons Corvoration, ~* >

. Defendants,

Complaint |

The United States of America, plaintiff, by its attorneys,

acting under the direction of the \tjorney General of the

United States, brings this civil aétion against the defend

ants named herein, and complains and alleges: as follows:

J

Jerisprerion axp VENUE

This complaint is. filed and these proceedings are

instituted under Section “a the Net of ( ‘ongress of July 2,

ISOO, as ame ded gi le G OF . £4). commponty known: as the

Sherman Net, in order to prevent and restrain continuing

violation by the defendants, as hereinafter alleged, of

Section Toof. the Sherman Net.

4 hae I of the corpor: ite defendants named . herein

trans: wets business'and is found within the Cemtral District

of California.:

18a

i.

Derr NDANTS

Automobile Manufacturers Association; Ine., a corpo.

pation orgauized and existing under the laws of the State

of Now York with its principal place of business in Detroit,

Michigan, is made a defendant herein, Automobile Manu-

factiirers Association, [we is a) trade association whose

membership consists mainly of firms engaged in’ the

business of manufacturing and selling motor vehicles and

component parts and accessories thereto in various: states

of the United States,

The Corporations named iss low are made defendants

het Mach of said corporations is organized and exists

under the laws of the State indieated and has its principal

place of busitiess in the. city indicated. Within the period

of ‘tinte covered by this on int said defendants have:

primarily eheaged in the business of manufacturing and

xe ‘Ming motor vehicles in various stat. of the United

States, and also manufacture ane sell coinponent parts and

ACCESSOrIES ‘thereto, : 4

cae

. State ot ’ Principal Place

Dietendant Corporation ; Dine ar porution ol Business

Caeneral Motors Delaware Detroit, Michtean

Corporgtion

deord Motor Compan % Delaware 1), reborn. Micha

Vhrysler Corporation Delaware Hisvhlaned Part. Michioa

American Motors © Marsviand: - Detroit, Michtean

( ‘orporat heety

o Whenever in this complaint references is mitde to any

cnet, deed oor transaction of a corporate defendant, such

allegation shall be deemed tocmvean that Sid corporation

Sengaged in said act, deed or transaction by or through its

officers, directars, aeents or employer. While they Were

netively wnenowed imp oD haer Peesedeseere tis! cbereetion or centred.

of corporate Dusiness affairs...

194 ; 7 . - . .

im, i

Co-CoNnsPIRATORS

6. Mach of the corporations listed below in this. para-

graph is not named a defendant herein but is named, as

a co-conspirator and has participated as a co-conspirator

with the defendants in the offer nse hereinafter charged and

has beasties acts and made sthtements in further ance

thereof,

Stateof- Principal Place

* Corporation : ; Tacorporat on of Busine NS

Checker Motor Corporation Ni W Jersey Kalamazoo, Mic higs un

(successor to Checker Cab ‘

Manufactdring Corporation }

. e .

“Diamond T Motor Car Compons : Iinois ° Cleveland, Ohio

-Tnterndtional Herrsester Conmipreny ©. Delaware Chicago, THlineis

(nm comsohids tion oft Tete mu: itonnl

Ilarvester © CME, Now bot rss

Corporation, and International

Harvester Corporation, nu Del: were

Corporation) : ere e

Studebaker Corp ation Cstecessor Mic lan South Bena, Drlisince

‘fo Studcbiker Packard Corpdration :

oe ; ; ; .

White Moter Corporyution ecesseor Ohne - z Cleveland, Ohio

te Thee Wyte Motor (Comper °

Kestscr de yp fr rpreyitioy . Neva Fr Oakland, California

(steer ssor fo Wilivs Motors, fr » * Fs ¢

1 Pernnssiyanin Co rporation r

» Mack Trucks, Tne : : ° New York New York

(suceessor to Mack Manufacturing

‘ pet ifion

7. Various other persons, firms and corporations not

rinde defendants therein dav partichpated Hf CO CONS PATA

tors with the defendants “in the offense charged in this: _

complaint and have performed nets and made statements

im furfherunce thereof, ;

IV

DeriniTion -

SAS need herem, the term ‘tmotor veliicle air porlliution

control cquipment means equipment, or any part thereof,

designed for ristallation Ono a Motor vehicle or any -vstem ‘

or engine modification on a motor vehicle whieh is designed

to cause a reduction of pollutants emitted from the:

vehicle, including, but not limited to, any device for the

control of emissions of pollutants from the exhaust system,

the er anke: ise, the ‘arburetor, or the fuel tank.

TRADE AND COMMERCE

9. Automobiles for the most part are manufactured in

the State of Michigan and are shipped therefrom to each

of the fifty states of the United States. Some automobiles

are assembled an various states of the United States from

parts manufactured in the State-of Michigan and other,

‘states. In 1966, 78,515,000 passenger cars and 15,864,000 .

trucks and buses, exclisive of olf the-road vehicles, were

registered in the United States. In that vear, 8,604,712

passenger sears Valfied at more than $17!5 billién and

1791587 commercial vehicles: valued at more than 3:9

bition | Were produced: in this country. Of the trucks

produced, 96,560 were bnilt-ewith> diesel motors.

10. The largest numbtr of passenger cars registered

and new: ars Sold in any state of the United States in 14

was in the State od ( ‘alifornia where 7,621,792 curs were *

registered and Sazaas new ¢ ars’sold. ‘The largest number @

of passenger Cares revistered: 4n any county: of any state °e-

in the United State in 1966) was in Los Aneeles County,

Where 2OR2Z98O0 cars were registered, Similarty, jn 1aG6

California accounted for the largest number ef truck regis

Arations and new truck sales with 1.542.984 tracks rgeis

tered and 150.027 new trucks yold, and os Anecles County

accounted for the. largest Qumber of trugks rewistered,

numbering 4302 TS. : ome

11. Since at least 1952 it has-been established that motor

vehicles contribute te air pollution by they emission of

hvdrocarbons, carbon monoxide, @xides of nitrewen and

other contaminants, Io! example, Th Los Aneeles County, «

as of Jannary 1967, rasoline powfred motor vehicles

. a = : +

‘

‘ . ° g

om ; ;

< .

Seovatel for 12,465 tons out of a total of 14,610 tons, or

85.360 of contaminants emitted into the ambient ‘air daily.

As a result of new. and contmuing requirements that

automotive vehicles be equipped with air pollution control

devices, a large and growing market for the production

and installation of such devices clas developed. Motor

vehicle air pollution contro devices’ are skipped in inter-

state commerce either as engine or System moditications '

or as equipment attached to autotiobiles, which are shipped

from Michigan and other states to each of the fifty states .

of the United States. ‘ pa

NVI

(* Orrense ALLEGED

‘

» Beginning at feast as early as 1993, and continuing

m bain ‘roup te and ine lnding the date of this complaint,

the defendants and co-conspirators havé been engaged in

aa combination and conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of

the aforesaid interstate *trade and commerce in motor

Velricle aire pollution control equipment in viekution of

Section 1 of is Sherman Net (15 USC: 8-1).

The aforesaid combination and conspiracy has ean

sisted of a contingding agreement, understanding, and

cou ert of aetion AInOne the defendant ~ and eco conspirators,

the substantial terms Of whieh have been and aves

(a) to clittinate all competition amone themselves in.

the research, development, miaunutaetire and inst: ill: iA

tion oof moter Vehicle an pollution c control equipine nts

anid :

(hh) to eliminate competition ino the purchase of paitents

inal patent rights from: other parties.covering tatar

Veliele air pollution control equipment,

4. For the purpose of forming dnd offeetuating the

iforesaid combination and conspiraeyy the defendants and

co-conspirators did’ those things which they combined and

ar 99.

oe &

-conspired to do, including, among other things, ‘the follow-

:

ye

ing:

(a)

agreed that all industry efforts. directed at the

research, development, manufacture and installation

of motor Vehicle air pollution contral equipment

should be undertaken on a néwcompetitive basis ;

agreed to seek joint appraisal of patents and patent

rights submitted to any of them by persons not

parties to ad erosslicensing agreement entered into

con July 1, 1955, and) amended: and renewed

>

periodically, and to require **most-favored-pur-

chasey’* treatment of (all) parties to the. eross-.

licensing agreement if any one were licensed by a

person not a party to that agréement; |

(¢) agreed to install motor vehicle air pollution control

equipment only upon yo uniform date determined by

agreement, and subsequently agreed omat least three

separate occasions to attempt to delay the installa

tion of motor vehicle air pollution control equip.

ment: °°. ro

(1) in W967 the defendants agreed among them

“selves to delay installation of “*positive cragkease

ventilation?’ on vehicles for sale outside of Cali

fornia until the model year 1963, despite the facet

that this antipollution deviee could have been

Installed nationally for the model vear T9620 and

that oat) least some automobile mianufaetivers

expressed. willingness to dotso, in the absenee ofa

contrary tndustevewide: agreement: pa =

(2) in date P9G2 and extending into 1965, the

defendants aereed among themselves to elias

Instalhation of oun Iproverens to the positive

eran Chse Ventilation deview, HL Pp roweriene Which

the Caligornia Motor Velnele Pollution -Contiol

Board had indicated if would make mandatory:

(3) in earh D904 the defeadants agreed amony

themselves to attempt to deley the introduction, of

-@

Joa

new exhaust pollution control measures on motor

vehicles sold in’ California until the model wear

N67; despite the facet that all were expable of .in-

stalling the improvement for the model year 1966,

“the defendants avreed to tell ( ‘alifornia recuhitory

Ollicials that installation of exhaust antipollution -

measures would be tex hnologieally Hmpossible before

W967, and only under regulatory pressure made

possible by competing devices manufacturers not in

the automotive *indus! ry did’ the defendants agree

Fs

toa California reguhitory requirement that exhaust

devices be installed for the model Yoar L966: and

(d) agreed to restrict publicity relating to resedareh and.

development efforts coneeruing the motor vehicle

“air pollution problem,

Wan

. as Mirrets

fo lo. Phe aforesaid combination and conspiracy has had,

among others, the following effects:

d

(aS hindering and delaving the researeli, development,

and manufacture both by the defendants and co

conspiretors and by others not parties to the were’

ments alleged hereii: and the installation of motor

Vehicle air pollution control equipment :

(b) restricting and suppressing competition aamiong the

ls Pendants rel Co con pirators in) the researeh,

development, mannfactire and tistallation of moter

Veliele air pollution central equipment’ ened

(¢) restricting and suppressing competition in the pur

chase of patents amd patent right covering motor

Vebiele an ‘pollution conmtrad Cpu bey erpe nee

; - Praveen

Wiiererone, the plaimtit po

| Thar thar ¢ our't ach pucdire snd deeroe that the defend

ants hive eng tered noi Combination nie COMSPMPAeV, In un

a

reasonable restraint of the aforesaid interstude trade and

commeres, In viokition of Scetion Lot the Sherman Net.

2. That Gach of the defendants tuned in this complaint,

. ; ~ 3 oe .

its suecessors, Wstenees and transferees and the respecte

| é '

offigers, directors, agents and emplovees thereat, aud all

Prersotys veting or clatmine toonet on behall thereat:

, >

(a)

(b)

be enjoined Prom) Conbiningy Mittin OP Penne

Ine, directly or indirectly, the combination ar eon

spiracey hereibotore atleged, or Prom cnet in

wy other” practiee, plu, program, er device lian

ine a similar etheet; Srey RoNN

be enjarned Prom centering ante uN eereemenbs,

arrangements, Understandings, plein er provrain

With any other person, partnerships or Orporalign,

directly ar indirectly: |

(1) te delay installation of aan pollution cong rel

eyMpiiedt art athemmase restragn anictiv tela!

tleeisfaus Sas to agstalhation abate

.

“ >

(2) te restriet Srmdlivedial partelicity of: réseuineh

he alee etepmertt: rehutiime tes aa padthation

ty oy : ee < Boe we ora

control Heater be vees : ;

_ @- .

(8) te require qoute ssesstment abe the varbue cod

‘ . : a ;

ae pretend ot pratent risht Velatiiug toe gan pret

bration ‘contral Creps ce peerie WE 3. ‘/

(4) ty Peqnires theit sequibsition ot: putea rion

relating fan pollution: teachable loess an

clittonedt Liprenty Wiathabibity of uch rast te

Otbiets ripen. a niast Pavored purcliaasenr laa

or

10) Eb re portal youret hy to revpiests DV waceninriene

pevetihatens hire dietes > fa rrebeorrrie bien tet pores

Jour vl Coeerrihye iit parbliitien eontral ts 1)

robo toh wel peered s Peepide ! in fever!

An prenti ? a3} 4 party ha whee: tne

. ‘ -

o

oN sistant \ttorney fieneral

Losvcdedace | aashiad

Pha

; *

(ec) be required to issue to any applicant interested in

developing motor vehicle air pollution technology.

thvestricted, royalty-free licenses and production

Kriow how tinder-all United States patents owned, |

cont rolloder applied for to which the cross-lHeensing

agreement-adated duly 1, 1955, as amended, has been

applicable, and to make available to any Such ap

phicant all other know-how related to-air pollution

control technology which has been exchanged with

camy other d@Fendant. * e :

OPhat the plaintiifl have: such other, further and dif.

Ferent relief as the nature of the ease may require ane

the Court hia deem just an proper in the Premises,

rneludine eaneellation of the cross licensing’ agreement

dated uly 2. TOA, ae aiiended, and an injunction en

Whine that all totute joint arrangements relating to air

pollution contre Pech nology Ihe appropriately limited its

fo subject matter of joint effort and numbers of partic

Paints se-as too miaintain competition in the development |

of oar pollution technology.

4. Vhat the jolarntatl recover the costs of this suit.

Ramsey Clark |. Ravinond W. Philipps

“A\ttorney General a . .

e (diarkes LL. Marindecio

ie ee WA) sini’ F

| In ite Mo Zbraiertnsein Attorneys, Department of

J ustice:

.

\tten Hen yi Department of |

ly tice Fe

Win. Matthew Burne, di 2 !

| 1 teal States \tternes .

.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.