Respondents Brief — Watts v. Seward School Bd.

ea? ~ Seu"

ERRATA | :

Table of Contents, line 5, change “Overboard” | to “Overbroad”;

and line- 32, change “Rpter. ” to “Rptr.”.

. Page 2, first full paragraph, line 4, change “and” to “an”.

broad! 4, first full Paragraph, line 6, change “evetoonsst” to “over-

Page 9, third p = a line 2, after “conduct” and before

“may” ‘insert phic

age 10, second full paragraph, tes 4, change e “petitioner” to

ipa tidners”; ‘line 5, change “petitioner ’s” to “petitioners’ ”;

and line 9 after “criticize” and before “its” insert the following:

“public officials and not with a state’s power to dismiss”.

Page 12; first full paragraph, line 3, delete “legislative”.

& hn Bae 13, second full peragearh. line 20, — “ligitamate” to

10.

“legitim

Page 1 15 second full paragraph, line 11, chuinge “Counsel” to

“ ounc

Page .21, third -full -paragraph, 4, change “innocous” to.

“innocuous” and line 6, change “Court” te to “court”. —

Page 22, first full paragraph, line 1, change “overboard” to

“overbroad”: and line 4, change “overboard” to “overbroad”.

TABLE OF CONTENTS _

Statement of Facts : ei

_ Summary of Argument ) Se aoe ae

—- bara ae

I. The' Statute Under Which Petitioners Were Nonre-. ‘

tained Was Neither. Vague-nor Overboard ...:............ ae Sean

A. The Statute was not the Kind of Statute that os

Would be Subject to the Objection of Overbreadth 6

B. The Statute was not Void for Vagueness . cveseseceemeese 8

II. Petitioners’. Nonretention. Pursuant to os Statute

was Valid 10

A. The Appropriate Standard of Review is Whether |

. There is Evidence in the Record Which Rationally Ve oo

_Justifies a Finding.of Good Cause .......: -) 10

B. Petitioners’ Dismissal. was Justified by School —

Board Interests Whick were both Reasonable and -

Compelling Te

III. Petitioners’ Nonretention for Substantial aichiconnpl- Se

_ ance with School Board — E-7° was Valid - 18 |

- Conclusion ......:...4 co a

ratty : of

we

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES *

' CASEs:

Appeal of Sullivdn County Joint School: Ba., 410 Pa: “222,

189 A:2d 249 (1963) . sai ll

- Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499,

. 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409 (1966) .. omg SY

_ Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, (1958) ...............5, 8, 11

Board of Educ. v. Swan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953), ae

cert. denied, 347, U.S. 937 (1954) ; a

' Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ; etme: a

Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, (1961) . - 5°

Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) .............. ances 14, 16

Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 61 Cal. 2d $31, Roser. A a

+ $92 P.2d 385.-(1964) ....- 6, 18, 14, 16

Henry v. Mississippi, 379 US. 443, (1965) .. bid ——

Houston v. United States, 297 F.2d 838 (Ct. Cl: 1962) : . :

Hunter v. Board of Educ., 265 Ky. 162, 96 sake 265, endl

ea Table of Authorities Continued

e Pa

' Jepsen v.Board of Educ., 19 ™ “AP. ‘24 2044158 N. E.2d 417, |

(1958) ° : 19

Jordan v. State Bd. of Ins., 334 S.W. 2d 278 (Tex, 1960)... 7

‘Keytshian, v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) ............ 10.

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif. 368 U:S. 36: (1961) ...... os 0,01

Minielly v. State, 242 Ore. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966) ................. 13

N,A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S..415 (1963) ° - 9

| New York Times v. Sullivan, 876 U.S. 254 (1964) 00° 10

Parks v. Brown, 368 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1962) .. ine ~. a

Pollastrine v. Severance, 375 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1962) -........ 20

Sanuita v. Common Laborers’ Union, 402 P.2d 199: —

. 1965) - 20

-Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232

~4?. .

(1957) ne om 10, 11,

Speiser v. Randall, 357.U.S: 513 (1958) .. : 9

United Pub. Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 US. 75

J (1947) 10, 12, 14, 15

_” United States vu. Robel, —US.-, 88 Sup. Ct. 419, (1967) ........ Ae

Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) ............ 16 |

Watts v. Seward School Bd., 421 P. 2d 586,

‘(Alaska 1966) : 5, 18, 20, 22

Watts v. Seward School Bd., 423 P.2d 678 (Alaska 1967) ........ Gon ae

Wolfe v. North Cerolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960) ...... oa ae

.Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) jena (17

’ Yakus v. United States, 321 US. 414 (1944) .. . ae

_ STATUTES 7

5 USCA. $7501 (a) (1967) ‘87

5 U'S.C.A. §7512 (1967) .......- . aa of

S.L.A. 1957, Ch. 71 §1 ..... - 7 +.

" . §JL.A..1957, Ch. 71: $2 ...:. ; 2S

.. Seward School Board Regulation E-9 19

Seward School Board. bet err “si Cahaiionees $, 4, 18, 19, 20, 1, 22

TREATISES 7

; reste Administrative Law SR. $2. 05 (1959) dcicacineaial 7.

ARTICLES - Ye

Comment: The Supreme Court’s Bill of Attainder Doctrine:

A Need for Clarification, 54 Cal. L: Rev. 212, (1966) ... 7

IN THE: °°... >

ana

_OcTOBER be coe 1967 se

No. 325

. i ) Re: ce . ' \ °

_ JAMES A. WATTS and WALTER. B. BLUE, Petitioners.

: : oe, Vv. ° ane

SEWARD SCHOOL BOARD AND BOARD OF EDUCATION, -

APPEAL HEARING COMMITTEE, Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT © '&

SEWARD SCHOOL BOARD

eke _STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The facts of this case are eidccaretedy anid fully set forth in’ the

majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Alaska, reported at

421 P.2d 586. Réspondent adopts the recitation of facts contained

‘there. Briefly summarized, the relevant facts are as follows.

‘Petitioners were teachers in Seward, Alaska, a willage of less

than 2,000 people. In March of 1960, the Seward School Board sent

petitioners notices that they would not be retained for the next

school year. In accordance with Alaska law then in effect! ‘the.

Notices contained bills of ee setting forth the causes of |

non-retention.

iam other . charges, the bills of particulars stated -that peti-

_ tioners had assisted in the printing and distribution of an open

~Tetter containing false statements against the superintendent of

schools = the intent of’ ne his eet standing and

1 SLA. 1957 Ch. 71 §1

2

destroying community arid public confidence in the administration

‘of the schools. The petitioner Watts was charged ‘with taking part

. in. and encouraging clandestine activities of teachers -with the

. purpose of ousting the superintendent of schools. Petitioners were

_ also charged with substantial non-compliance with the regulations

of the Seward School Board relating to the. filing of complaints

and grievances against the wae eee and’ the school board.

- Petitioners appealed theif non-retention to the school board as

they had .a right to do under Alaska law.2 Hearings were held

before; the Seward School Board. Petitioners appeared and were

represented by counsel. Petitioners both admitted distributing and

‘open letter to the Seward School Board. The. open letter contained

¢ a list of ten allgged incidents which were stated to be “definitely

detrimental to the morale of our: teaching staff and the effective-

ness of the local education system.” The open letter accused the

“superintendent of the Seward Public Schools of misconduct ranging

from “dictatorial treatment of teachers” to neglect of the music

department. ‘The open letter, dated May 18, demanded a con-

. frontation with the school board on May 19. It contained a demand

for “immediate, — substantial improvement in its ad-

ministrative policies .

' The open. letter was distributed by mail to the 5 ialeaai public

in Seward. bgaron: of Hearing of Seward School Board, No-

vember 1960, p. 41; 66; hereinafter “Tr”. Petitioners admitted that

many of the charges set forth in the open letter had ‘never previ-

. ously been brought to the attention of the superintendent (1 r. 76).

_ The petitioner Watts, in April of 1959, solicited support from

teachers for a private move to oust the superintendent (Tr. 12,

21, 24,297.)

_ The Seward School Board entered detailed findings. The chotgen

of the superintendent's misconduct contained in“the-open letter

were found, with one minor exception, to false. The school

board also found that. petitioners were ‘guilty of substantial’ non-

‘compliance with the school ‘board regulations in distributing the

open letter before presenting the grievances and ong, which

it . contained to the dcnieksecame eran

2 SLA. 1957 Ch. 71 §2.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

. Petitioners .were nonretained for “immorality” according to ‘the

nonretention statute then in effect. “Immorality? was. interpreted

by. the Alaska Supreme Court as a catch-all phrase serving the

same purpose as nel such as — cause” or ee }

conduct.”

A Statute which states that an employee may be dismissed for

_ cause is not the kind of statute that, is subject ‘to the. objection of

overbreadth. There i is NO ‘specific legislative judgment that a certain

“, activity justifies the ‘penalty of dismissal. Rather there is a delegi-

tion to an agency to judge appropriate cases for the imposition of

penalties. It is the specific, agency a om is reviewed on

appeal not the statute itself.

The statute eatin dismissal for cause is not void for vagueness,

because members,of a profession must be charged with. knowledge of

what kinds of actions are unprofessional. Furthermore, it is impoe-

sible to list all specific acts which might. constitute “good cause”

Therefore a state has no alternative but: to employ. a dismissal- for

cause technique.

Petitioners’ nonretention pursuant to the statute was valid, be-

cause their actions did constitute good’ cause. In reviewing an ad-

ministrative decision such as the- present one the standard to’ be

- used is whether there is evidence in the record to rationally justify

- a finding of good cause. Petitioners only challenge the existence of

good cause by asserting that they had a constitutional right to en-

gage in the activities for which they were dismissed: It is clear, how-

ever, from an examination of the cases involving specific regulations

of conduct, that petitioners did not have a right to engage in soli-

citations; of other. employees on school’ time and to distribute an . .

open letter to the public of Seward which contained many false ~

- and -misleaditig statements. Since these activities. could have been

regulated and forbidden to public employees by. specific statutes

, without constitutional objections, then these actions .can also con-

stitutionally form the basis of an adjudication # K good cause.

Petitioners’ issal must be we for the additional reason

that they violated oy sebvtation E-7 of the Seward School Board.. The _

regulation provided that grievances are to be submitted first to - -

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_able interest. but. i$ a apne need. |

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- the snalihaiiiiied to allow him tp act. ‘upon them, and then an

ye «appeal may be ‘taken.to the School Board. Petitioners violated the ©

lation by distributing an open letter. simultaneously to the

_ superintendent , and the.Schdol Board. The open letter contained

many giyance and complaints, noné of which, with one possibie |

- exception;-Hiad, previodsly. been ¢ unicated to the superinten-

“‘dent.’ Petitioners’ «dismissal baged on the violation of. E-7 should

-thefefore be sustained. The School Board’s’ interest in having their’

_ employees’ grievances go jthrough els ‘before being taken to

-“the. public by means of strike-or open’ stens, $8 is Hot gnly a reason-. »

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Péitioners’. ina ‘objection’, to’ E-7 of vagueness and».

overbreadth should not be considered: because they were not timely

raised. Im any case, the objections are. without’ merit. E-7 is riot, ’

vague; it thearly sets fortha simple. ‘procedure for processing griev-

~-anées. Furthermore, the regulation. “was applied literally. The, regu-

lation is also not-ovetboard: It is not true that the regulation covers

~ gomnd cases wher€ the state interest does not justify the. restrictions.

Regulation E-Acould not be made narrower..

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ened? “ARGUMENT

ikea I. THE. STATUTE UNDER WHICH PETITIONERS WERE.

risa | NONRETAINED "WAS NEITHER VAGUE NOR OVER- -

“’BROAD.. P _° i = ¢

Petitioners. were non-retained under S.L.A. “1957, Ch 71, $2, At

the time in question, tenure teachers could. - be dismissed for

cause.? “Cause” was defined as: * aa ve

(a): incompetency: which ‘is ‘defined as the inability or the

) unintentional or intentional failure to perform one’s legiti- .

ye : mate duties in a satisfactory manner; or (b) Immorality which is

_-defined as conduct of the person tengling to bring thé individual .

concerned or the teaching pfofession into publie~disgrace or

BS | “disrespect; {c) Substantial non-compliance with the school /

5 er _ laws of the Territory or such regulations of the Territorial

LW | Board of Education or any other nara, seeney as are

% ae applicable or of the employing school district;

% .*§.L.A. 1957, Ch. 71 $2. a . .

* The Alaska Supreme Court aaron that “immorality asde- ss

\, . -fined in the ‘statute was intended to be a catch-all, . Serving the » |

. \ Same purpose. as phrases such as “‘good cause”, “unprofessional

‘- conduct”, or “conduct unbecoming a teacher.” Watts v. Seward

\ School Bd., 421 P.2d 586, 590 (Alaska 1966). This authoritive in-

terpretation of the statute should be accepted by this court. Cramp

A v. Board of Pub. ‘Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 285 (1961). Such dismis-

a | *sal- for-cause statutes are quite common and are employed as a

iY ee: Ba technique by many states and the Federal Government. For example,

aca 2h an employee : may. be removed from the federal .civif service “for |

_ such cause as will promote the efficiency of such service.”4 These

phrases necessarily cover a broad range of conduct, because RO)

aaa statute could be framed to include with specificity all the particular |

. '- acts which might render an employee unqualified to continue his

| eaake ise” Before consideration of the issues of legitimate’ staté:

3 SLA. 1957, Ch:71 61 & are ; es

45.U8CA, §7501(a) (1967) ‘compete .

rs, _ Am individual in the com eg ve service may .

removed or suspended Pog auch

‘Bee 5 omet toll eet te 512 (1967) (pre ue oyees) “and

: em) see

statutes cited in ever 399, 406. n.8

(1958) ae arte Ae ra

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interests and protected civil liberties, it is of the utmost. importance

to riote the kind of statute: undei, which: petitioners were non-

retained and i” petitioner’s. challenge that the statute was

vague and overbroad. - ©

ie * - The aie Was Not The Kind of Statute That iS

o* ' be Subject al the scat! of Overbreath.

In such dismissal- for-cduse statutes. no Legiilattve judgment has

been made that any particular action justifies the imposition of the.

penalty of dismissal. For example no judgment has been made that -

failure to sign an oath renders an employee unfit for employment. |

The legislature has not declared that a state’s interest will be

advanced by dismissing ‘those employees who engage: ‘in a specified

activity. Instead, in dismissal-for-cause statutes an\ agency has been

entrustéd ws the task of finding whether a particular employee’s

. actions constitute good cause for dismissal. Thus the decision that.

“o

a state’s interest will be advanced by the dismissal ’of an employee. -

has been delegated and is to be’ made*in a judicial fashion on a,

case by case basis.

<a

_ Statutes which do contain a legislative ay var that a sevice

act renders an employee unfit, i.e., impose a penalty for the doing of

an act, should be reviewed by different standards than statutes

allowing dismissal for cause. In a case such as Fort v. Civil Serv.

Comm'n, 61 Cal. 24-331, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d°385 (1964) a

county charter forbade all county employees from directly making -

‘ or receiving any contributions to any political party.5 The con-

stitutional defect was clear. The errorieous: legislative judgment

_ had been made .that a state interest would be advanced by denial of

-. employment to all employees who contributed money for. any

political_party or purpose’ whatsoever. A penalty had been imposed

by the legislature on an overly broad basis. Any. judicial or agency

hearing the employee received would only involve the question of

--whether in fact the employee did’ the forbidden act. Thus, the

only means the employee could have of seeking judicial review of

the legislative — that his act should. be — would

5 NO. officer or cncueiin of the county in the classified civil

; service shall directly or indirectly make, solicit, or a.

. or be in any manner. gyn ase! in making, soliciting, o

recei any assessment, subscri or. contribution i

any political party or any sa purpose whatsoever.

392 P.2d at 386.

ate phat haar ipas. Stati maias th

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be to attack the statute for overbreath.¢ By litigating this issue,

the employee would be able to make sure that the legislative judg-

ment would be applicable to his case and ‘that benefits wer@ not

.being denied him without the advancement of.a state’ interest.

To not allow a recipient of benefits this kind of judicial review -

before permitting a denial-of his benefits, would in effect sanction .

a Bill of Attainder. See Comment: The Supreme Court's Bill of

Attainder Doctrine: A Need For Clarification, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 212, -

250. (1966). a

In a case where employment can be denied for unprofessional

conduct, or as in the federal civil service “for such cause as will

promote the efficiency of such serviee,” 5'U.S.C.A. §7501 (a) (1967),

the need ‘for and type of judicial reviéw is quite different. There

is no legislative judgment that a penalty may be imposed or: a |

pubjic benefit may be denied for a particular reason. Rather, there

is a delegation to an agency to judge appropriate cases for the

imposition of penalties. Since there is no legislative judgrhent in the

‘dismissal-for-cause statutes, a fortiori the legislative judgment cannot

_ be overbroad, and the issue of overbreadth need not be considered

on judicial reView. In a dismissal-for-cause statute, an employee is

directly given the opportunity to litigate whether what ‘he did, ;

in fact justifies the denial.of employment to him. The judgment

that the state’s interest: demands the dismissal of the employee is

\made specifically in each individual case. The task of judicial

review of this kind of procedure is not to decide if the statute

is overbroad, but is only to determine if there has been a valid

delegation of power,” and ifthe adjudication. made under the

statute was correct, ie., that it was not arbitrary, that it was in |

* accordance with substantial evidence, and that the state’ s interests in |

the particular case warranted the’ denial of the benefit.

6 In United States v. Robel,—_U.8.—.88 Sup. Ct. 419, 427 (1967) Jus-

tice Brennan (concurring g) pointed to the fact that the defense plant

worker received no opportunity “to prove that the- statute’s _--

sumption that he is a security risk [because of membership in |

Communist-action fd a A is invalid as applied to him.”

7 In Jordan v. State Ba” of Ins., 334 8.W.2d 278 280-81 (Tex. 1960)

the Texas court u upheld the use of the. -“not worthy of the

public confidence” as a standard by w. insurance companies

could be judged and their licenses revoked. The court held.that the

true constitutional test was whether the standard was certain

nets © as tan adequate judicial’ review. ‘The court cited Davis,

A tive Law Treatise, §2.03 (1959). This issue has not been

raised in the present case.

ta

8

-B. ‘The Statute Was Not Void: For Vagueness, 4

In the*few cases. where a. dismissal-for-cause statute has been

‘attacked for vagueness it has been upheld. The question of vague-: -

‘ness, appears to be governed by Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357

U.S. 399 (1958). In that ‘case a teacher ‘was dismissed under the dis-

qualifying ground of “‘incompetency.” His offending conduct* was

refusing to answer questions propounded by his superior in private

‘concerning his possible association with communist groups. The

teacher’s contention that due process of law was violated by ‘in-

cluding his refusal to’ answer within the term “incémpetency”

was rejected by the Court. The court mentioned that the Penn-

sylvaniia statute under. which he had been ‘dismissed, “unlike those ©

of manly other states, contains no catch-all phrase, such as ‘qgnduct

unbecoming a teacher,’ to cover disqualifying conduct not included

‘within the more specific-provisions.” 357 U.S. at 406. By. inference *

then, it would have been constitutionally permissible to have

dismissed. the teacher under a catch-all standard. The Court pro-

ceeded to note that the term “incompetency” had been broadly

interpreted by the Pennsylvania Court and’ that ‘its’ dictionary

_ definition. was not particularly prescriptive. Since this was so, the

. Court held, the he extensioh of the term égncompetency” to include

the teacher's refusal to answer was not. inconsistent with the United .

States, Constitution. ;

In Board of Educ. U,.§wan, 41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261, 266

- (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954) the Court rejected an

attack on the standard “Unprofessional conduct” as being void for

vagueness, with the following statement: ioe

As-was said in the Goldsmith case, 66 Cal. App. at page 168, 225

P. at page 787: “the-calling- (of a teacher) is so intimate, its

duties so delicate, the things in. which a teacher might prove

- . unworthy or would fail so numerdus, that they are incapable —

-of.enumeration in any legislative enactment . . . the teacher

is entrusted with the custody of childrén and their high pre- .

paration for..useful life. His habits, his speech, his good

_ name, his cleanlinéss, the wisdom and propriety of his unofficial | |

utterances,’ his ‘associations, all are involved. His~ ability to

inspire children and.o govern them, his power as a teacher, and

the character for which he stands are mattersof* major con-

cern in a teacher’s selection and retention. How can all these

i)

| shienin be provided for and: thainen oon them be particularly as

specified in a single statute? ae

CG @

While it is true that when one must guess what conduct may

lose him his position, one may steer wider of the dnlawful zone® and

_that the threat of sanctions may deter almost as much as the appli-

‘ cation of sanctions,® these considerations do not compel the result

‘that a statute allowing dismissal for cause. or unprofessional .con-

- duct is void for vagueness. As shown above, the necessity of such

statutes have been recognized. It is impossible to accurately en-

umerate .all possible grounds which could justify dismissal. Thus,

. the state has no alternative but to employ the dismissal- for-cause

technique. c on

Second, members of the profession must be ileal with ipeneral

knowledge of what conduct is unprofessional or may. constitute

“cause”. Unprofessional conduct: like “good moral character”,

condition to the practice of law, is not unconstitutionally uncer-

tain merely because subjective factors are involved.'0 All employees,

public or private, know they may be dismissed for cause, yet. no’

_ one really knows exactly which acts’ may be considered sufficient’

cause. However, an employee is protected from arbitrary, irrational.

or discriminatory interpretation of “good cause” by the procedure

--of a fair hearing, notice of the charges and by general guidelines

set by the ethical standards of his ‘profession.'1 =

Furthermore, the Statute is not rendered any less valid by-the ..

fact that some conduct. may be unprofessional involves otherwise

,protected speech activities. If an employee were dismissed for what

was determined to be an ‘exercise of his constitutional —. it

v

® Speiser v. Randall, 357. US. 513, _ (1958).

3 NAACP. v. - Button, 371 U.S. 415, "433 (1963).

10 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 US. ‘232, 248-49 (1957)

(concurring opinion indicating ‘‘moral character” not too vague. )

+ 11 For example, the preamble the Cafiins of Professional Ethics .

of the American ar an eroneats te tae <

*%

the

a general > e enumeration of par-

af be construed as a denial of the

existence of others aati a ne —— not specifi-

ated mentioned.

;

would not,mean that the statute was unconstitutional, but only

that his specific dismissal was without valid cause. Comipare Schware

v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) with. a .

v. State’ Bar ‘of Calif 366 US. 36 (1961).

- In attacking the’ present statute for vagueness 1 and’ overbreadth,

a petitioners have made a fundamental error. The only issue in the

present case is whether the state’s interest justified denial of

employment to petitioners because of their specific actions.’ The

statute which has been interpreted .as a dismissal-for-cause statute,

cannot be attacked as’ overboard or vague;!2 only specific decisions

a

made under the statute can be attacked on the basis of a-lack of |

actual good cause.

2 I. PETITIONERS’ NONRETENTION PURSUANT TO THE

STATURE, Was VALID.

we

A. The Appropriate Standard of Review is Whether There

is Evidence in the Record Which Rationally — a

oe Good Cause.

' This case involves-an administrative adjudication that certain -

actions taken by petitioners constituted valid grounds for their non:

retention as teachers. Because of the broad grounds of ihvalidity

asserted by petitioner, it is important to note what issues are not

presented. Although cited more than a dozen times in petitionet’s -

brief, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) does not

directly bear on the present case. New York Times was concerned

with a state’s power to enforce its defamation laws against those

who criticize its own employees in furtherance of legitimate state

interests. Eg. Houston v. United States, 297 F.2d 838, 841 (Ct. Cl..

‘ 1962). If a public employee made a personnel report ota a public ‘of- -

ficer containing negligently false and defamatory statements, the em-

‘ployee may be shielded. from a libel suit, but he’ ere could

be fired for incompetence.

12 This is not a case of a condition being attached to publi c em-

Ba Be0 and for that reason ne F - Board of

ec BE ge 4 is irrelevant. Also United Pub. Workers of Ameri

330 U.S. 75 (1947) ahd Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 C

a's $1 5 38 5 'Gal Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385 (1964) are not y rele-

vant. these the issue of protecting political act vie was

Eh Ge comet of reviewing a specific legisia

contained in a statute; in ae case there is is no legislative

—— of a particular vity

mts, 385 —

tive restriction

~—y

-

"the standard to be used is whether. there is evidence to rationally.

jastify a finding that a dismissal. was made for good cause. Cf.

Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S.°36. (1961); Beilan v. *

“Board of Pub. E@ttc:, 357 U.S. 399 (1958); and Schware v. Board

of Bar.Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).. In Schware, the state de-

cision denying membership in the bar .because of lack of: moral

character, was held to be a violation of due process because there

was “no evidence in the regord which rationally justifie[d].a finding

that Schware was morally unfit to practice law.” 353 U.S. at 246-47.

In general, the standard for review of school board decisions on

the nonretention of teachers is the same ds the standard for the

review of. any agency decision. For example, in Hunter v. Board

-.* of Educ., 265 Ky. 162, 96 S.W.2d 265, 269 (1936), the court stated

that it would riot review the wisdom of the teacher’s removal but

would overturn the agency’s decision if it was arbitrary, corrupt;

or made without competent evidence. Appeal of Sullivan County

Joint School Bd., 410 Pa. 222, 189 A2d 249, 251 (1963), . . States

the same standard for review in similar terms:

“[A] court of commons pleas should look to see only if there |

is a manifest abuse of discretion or an error of law on the

"pat of the Superintendent . . .” . This rule is especially ap-_

_ propriate where, as here the question involves the competency

of a teacher. Not only does the Superintendent possess greater

expertise for this difficult: determination, but the legislature... ©

- _ has assigned to him the very fob of establishing the standards

by —— pcos of competency have to be made. —

The issue of constitutional rights in ie present case is raised -

only in the following context: if after a consideration of all rele-

_ vant factors, petitioners had a constitutional right to do what they

did; then it would be arbitrary and unlawful to deny them employ-

ment. Whether petitioners had or had not a constitutional right to

do what they did is a conclusion, not a premise. It is the condlusion

to be reached after weighing the state’s interest in regulating the kind

of conduct petit? uners engaged in, against any restraint on their

right, to engage in the activity. dt ‘is. misleading -to state as peti- -

tioners do, that since citizens have a right to criticize the government,

the activity is protected; and singe the activity, is protected, then . ~

‘ petitioners cannot be fired for engaging in it. See Brief for. Peti-

12

‘tioners, p. 26.13, What must be decided i is hot the shine question

whether citizens have a right to criticize government., This case

does not involve merely the state’s relationship to its citizens as

a soverign; for the relationship here is that of employer to em-

' ployee. The question here is whether the Seward School Board had

a legitimate ‘interest in dismissing these. teacher’.

Bz Petitioners’ Dismissal was Justified by Scheol Board. in-

_ terests Which Were Both Reasonable and Compelling.

In asserting the School Board's interest ‘in ‘regulating the kind of .

conduct that petitioners engaged in, it is helpful to examine cases

which involve ’the review. of a legislative statute which regulates

_ specific conduct. In reviewing that kind of siatute, vagueness and.

overbreadth are the issues, unlike the present case; however, in .

deciding a statute is overbroad courts usually set forth a narrower

area of permissible governmental regulation. Logically, a specific

adjudication, such as the present case, should be sustained, if it

dismisses an employee for reasons which fall within an area of per-

missible regulation. If certain conduct constitutionally could be

prohibited by statute for ‘a public employee, then dismissal for

- the same conduct cannot be attacked on constitutional gr ounds -

if such dismissal is deren by an agency under a dismissal-for-cause

statute.

By the standards set forth in cases involving specific prehibitions,

petitioners’ non-retention was for reasons. which fai within the

area of permissible regulation. In United:Pub. Workers of America

v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) this court nosed in cere) the .

Leah a.

The e essential rights of the First Amendment in some instances | |

are subject to the elemental need for order without which the |

_ guarantees of civil rights to others would be a mockery.

‘$30 U.S. at 95. This court went on to hold that restrictions which

rationally relate to legitimate governmental interests. are permissible.

It was recognized that political activities on the employer’s premises

and during working hours clearly justify restrictions, $80 U.S. at 95

n. 29, and aeents that active at masa - oxen — <

13 Brief for Petitioners will hereinafter be cited as “Op.”. g

13

_ campaigns could be’ the subject of regulation. The interest were

served by these restrictions, and which was recognized as legitimate,

is the promotion of efficiency and integrity, and the maintenance

of proper discipline in the —. service. 330 U.S. at 96-97.

If this is a legitimate area of regulation ae if the regulations

. of the Hatch Act were ‘properly sustained as reasonably related to-

pate the legitimate interests, then petitioners’ dismissal for cause, when

| the cause would come within the provisions of the Hatch Act,

cannot be invalidated on constitutional grounds. If petitioners’

actions could have been regulated, then petitioners can be dismissed

for. their actions under a dismissal- for-cause statute without raising

on a constitutional i issue. E

Some stsiee courts , have defined the area of permissible constitu-

, tional regulations by a standard more stringent than that set forth

in Mitchell. See for example, Minielly v. State, 242 Ore. 490, 411

.P.2d 69 (1966); Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 61-Cal. 2d 331, 38 Cal.

“Rpt. 625, 392 P.2d 385 (1964). In Bagley v. Washington Township

Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409 (1966)

it was held that the interest of the state must be a “compelling”

one to justify the imposition of restraints on political | activities: of .

public employees. ee ee tae vs

o [W]e hold that a jeveremniat agency which ‘would require

. a waivér of constitutional rights as a condition of public em-.

: _ ployment must demonstrate: (1). that the political restraints

_, rationally relate ‘to the enhancement ef the public service; (2).

Weigh the resulting impairment of constitutional rights, and

@3) that no alternatives less subversive of constitutional rights

are available. 6 | WH | :

% parca : ° od 4 ILCs.

421. P.2d at:411. AH of these cases recogpize.that the government _

has some legitimate interests as employer. Furthermore, the -one ~

interest recognized as ligitamate by each of, the above cases, is

the interest in eee an employee from campaigning against |

his mayen.

-No one can reasonably deny the need to limit some political -

activities such as the use of official influence to coerce political

action, the solicitafion of. political contributions from fellow

that the benefits which the public gains by the restraints out- < _

a ; : - 14

_ employees, and the pursuit of politital purposes during those -

' hours that the employee should be discharging the duties of his:

- position. A strong case, we think, can also be made for the

‘view that permitting a public employee to run or campaign

ia against his own superior has so disruptive an effect on the |

ms public service as od warrant. restriction.

Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 392 P. 2d 385, 389 “(Calit 1964)

Gags added).

| As stated. before, if conduct can- be regulated by statute, then it

can: be constitutionally made the grounds for..dismissal under a

dismissal-for-cause statute. On the facts of this case, petitioners’

conduct falls within, the unprotected. area as defined either in

Mitchell or by the Califorina ‘court in. Fort and saatielll

The Alaska Supreme Court and the ‘School Board found'4 that

_ Petitioner Watts, acting in-his individual capacity and not as a

member of any group,'5 during school hours and on school premises

_ (Tr. 12) attempted to solicit the support of Mr.-and Mrs. Framp*

ton, two fellow teachers, in his attempt to oust the superintendent,

~

Mr. Fabricius. Both teachers refused to support Watts, and Mrs. -

Frampton testified that she. wes “completely shocked” at’ the

request. (Tr. 21) Watts also solicited teacher Monty Richardson

(Tr. 24) and made representations during school hours to another

' teacher, E.G. Nagel, that “if it was the last thing they would do,

’ they would get the superintendent.” (Tr. 397). Thus, the record

_ Clearly shows that-Mr. Watts made repeated efforts to solicit the .

support of his fellow onqreyes * to dae a — campaign to —.

. their: 1. canes - %

- In United Pub. Workers of America -v. Mitchell, “330 US. 75

(1947) this court reaffirmed the principle set forth in Ex parte

Curtis, 106 US:. 371 1882): that public employees do not have

a right to sdlicit func from other public employees for political

purposes. It was also recognized in Mitchell that “political con-

tributions of ey * stand on.an — footing —= ——

14° Petitioners oe hot specifi argued that any of these

factual soabhek tay the teeer record. ‘

ot Phy vs v. ‘School rp =: P.2d =, 597-98 (aba 1966)

a i saa

i en

of money. 330 U.S. at 98. Based on the Mitchell: case, the conclusion |

. Yeyinescapable that petitioner Watt's solicitations of support; from

his tlow employees fall squarely within the area where the in-

dividu Avge as employee and citizén do not’ outweigh the

governm 's interest as — ;

ee a m °

The court has recognized that there is a deep conviction “that

an actively partisan” ‘government personnel threatens good admin-

istration.” Ibid. There cannot be harmony and- efficiency in an

administration in which the employees are forced .to choose sides.

and in which féar exists that political position rather than ‘merit

may determine the course of one’s career. For these reasons, it

was held in Mitchell that active participation in political cam-. , '

paign’ could be forbidden to rabtic employees.

- The distribution to the public at large of the.‘ ‘open letter’ by

both petitioners was exactly the kind of activity’which was recog-

nized in Mitchell as a disruptive practice which should be forbidden

to public employees. It-js true that the publishing of the open_letter —

did not involve a political party per se. However, in a small com- —

munity such as Seward and in a dol system of only 30 teachers

’ (Tr. 126) the disruptive result is the same. Instead of working

through proper channels, petitioners took their grievances to the

public, thus forcing other employees and the citizenry into two

camps. Watts admitted he did not think of appealing to the City

Counsel or the State Board of. Education for help in remedying

the grievances, (Tr. 85) nor did he first present the grievances to ~

Superintendent Fabricius (Tr, 76)..Mr. Blue stated that there had

been friction between the Board and the teachers and that the.

Board. was attempting to implement a program of better discipline

among the teachers (Tr. 307-8). It is against this background of a

troubled relationship between employer and employee that ‘the

rash action of petitioners must be’ viewed. Mr. Swick, who also

participated in the publication of the letter, stated that the purpose

of the letter was to stimulate public reaction, short of a Tecall

election, to bring pressure to bear on the School Board ,to take

the steps outlined in the letter (Tr. 284): Since the effort failed

to coerce the Board, a recall ‘election, was the next step. This, too,

tailed. age te

had . ne : - » 7 . | : . ;

Petitioners were not merely expressing their views on a subject

of general concern. They were attempting: to motivate a com--

,

&

_. Givil Serv, Comm'n, supra, and Bagley v. Washington’ Township

F B

aie to support Deni in their collie with their employer. They :

were instigating # local political .campaign against their own — Se

supériors, which is at least as disruptive an activity as participating |

. in party politics ‘while in the Federal Civil Service.'¢ There can be

no question but that the conduct of petitioners in publishing the |

_ open, letter was: within the area of Ppermisible’ regulation as set :

forth in Mitchell. _ < site ee. Pa e °

It is equally clear that the condu sebilnaia ia also falls witht .

the narrower. area ‘of permissible régWfation as set forth in Fort v.

" Hosp. Dist., supra. While these cases seem to use 4 more restrictive .

test-than. earlier cases, they indicate the facts of the earlier casés — ee

would i. .cét their more restrictive test. For example, in Fort it was .

“recognized that solicitation’.of political contributions from fellow -

employees (Ex parte Curtis, supra) could constitutionally be re-

stricted. Fort also stated that pursuit “of political purposes. during

- working hours ‘was unpry ed; and that an employée should not

be permitted, to campaiggr against his, superiors. Since as, has been

shown petitioners did just exactly what was described as unpro- ‘

tected in Fort, the facts of the case also place it within the hayrower -

, area of permissible’ regulation defined in the State cases, and hence,

* the adjudication that petitioners’ actions were good cause for dis-

_ Missal cannot be atacked on. constitutional erqunds.

- Petitioners admit, as they must, that “the right to criticize 2 public

Officials and to associate for thé purpose of ousting them peace-

ie fully” is not absolute ‘but canbe outweighed by state interests. (Op.

29).. However, in assessing what state interests might »utweigh

First Amendment rights, petitioners make the following claims:

Vit is irvétevant that almost all of their allegations in the open . pile ae ik

"letter were found to be false, because such statements have a quali- gi os 3

brakes te a ae 3 ae woe he

of 388 U.S. 307 (1967) citing Cox. v. Louisiana,

- U8. 536,-555, (1965) as. follows: : |

oy

&

4

es wm

° ~ ’ *

‘ 2) Watt’ s solicitation of the: FrampiSi co — not bring discredit

; _on him’ ‘because dorian ni duty, to criticize (Op. 32). poeoe

~ out regard to the truth, popularity or social utility of 03 foun i

or beliefs which: ‘are offered.” (Op. $4). ot

_ simply. recited the same general

3) ‘The sélicitation could ‘not’ discredit the teaching profession

because that would be a libel on sini nea gh ‘which can’t be

panished (Op. 34). We ce | Breen *

th

4) It is irrelevant that the letter was s arbitrary and high- iain. \

- because the “constitution protects expression and association with- *

“It-can be seen that in making these esata petitioners ‘unve not:

in the slightest degree concerned themselves with weighting the

interest of the governinent as employer against. the rights of indi-

viduals who are. government employ . Petitioners have ‘instead,

which show. that in other

contexts ard when other interests are at stake, citizens should~not

” be penalized for expressing. their opinioris. Petitioners‘are not being

sued for libel. The issue is whether. the School Board must con-

tinue to employ them. Respondent believes that teachers who.

circulate ‘falacious and’ inflamatory open letters to the public at >

“large, without first’ allowing their employer ‘an- “opportunity to

\ explain, have demonstrated their unfitness to be teachers.

PE a,

Petitioners do ‘ekeitalape * “that the morale and discipline « of

the public service are dmong those interests which may require

an accomodation between legislative power and individual ex-

ercise of First Amendment rights.” (Op 36) Petitioners suggest that

the appropriate test for deciding when the morale and discipline ©

of public employees requires a restriction ‘of their personal liberties, —

‘is the clear and present danger test used’ in Wood v. Georgia, 370

’ U.S. 375 (1962) which involved the punishment of a sheriff for

ry try

contempt because he .criticized in a ‘press rélease a ruling of a

local court. Wood is not helpful in analyzing the present case. .

An Wood, this Court found that no allegation had been made that

‘the sheriff's position, as sheriff, related to the-harm his statements.

could produce, and that there was no question of the performance ..

of his duties as sheriff. 370 US. at 393. The sheriff was being.

punished for-the mere expression of his views as any other citizen

‘might be subject to the contempt power. ‘There was no special

_ employer-employee relationship in Wood as there is in this case.

~\ AG 4 o

2

~~ of an open Jetter to the superintendent and members of the Seward _

° ‘ . .

-- There was ‘no element of conduct as opposed to “pure speech” as

there is in the present case. Most important the state interests to.

- he protected’ are much stronger in the present case where t the state’s ©

interest as eniployer.in maintaining the discipline and effectiveness

of — employees thas been. cma to be a compelling one,

“Mm. PETITIONERS’ NON. RETENTION FOR | SUBSTAN.

'+ TIAL NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SCHOOL BOARD.

_» REGULATIONS. E7 WAS VALE d 2

. >

ad ine ms ~ {

Petitiqners’ teaching contracts were not renewed becainse, among _

-. other reasons, they substantially. failed to comply/ with Seward .

‘ School Board Regulation E 7. That. regulation states: : E

3 Geiesinens, cckiphali and communications from eiaployees & . Ss -

- - shall be submitted to the Board through.the Superintendent.

Any employee, “or group. of employees, may at any time —

to thie Board. -

All ain were given copies of the regulations ‘of the board;

petitioners admitted they were familiar with regulation E-7. (Tr.

149 66). The Supreme Court of Alaska noted that the .regulation.

required that grievances “should be submitted to the Board through

the’ Superintendent. It provided @ right of appeal from. the Super-

intendéft ' to the Board.” Watt’s v. Seward School Bd., 421 P2d _

586, 601 (Alaska 1966). Petitioners violated this “regulation by .

participaging ‘in the preparation and simultaneous distribution

Pd

. School Board. 421 P.2d at 601. The opén letter contained many ,

grievances and complaints, none of which, with one possible ex- Pee Ty a

ception, had previously been communicated to the Superintendent.

bain P2d at ol; ae - . .

e“ sustaining the Seward School ‘Board's conclusiori that peti-

-tioners were guilty of substantial non-compliance ‘with Board _ -

Regulation E-7, the Supréme Court of Alaska noted that not only no

had a substantial violation of the’ regulation taken place, but the :

_ purpose of the regulation, supplying an orderly process for deciding’ ari aca ae eT

qrickences. had been subverted by petitioners’ conduct, ieee,

The factual basis for the charges could have been verifiéd by ae oe

" appellants if. they had taken the. time to do so. Appellants ~

8 . a : ry

. : .

\taining redress. Instead, they attempted to arouse and inflame

the public against the Superintendent and the Schook Board

- . on charges which were largely untrue. They chosé to attempt |

to substitute the. mass meeting | for = ~~ en ‘of hear-

ing and =—" . : ,

; qn at 607°

The. regulation does not, ‘as Petitioners suggest, conffict with

regulation E-9 which provides. that copies of communications. —

addressed to the Superintendent inay be sent, to the School Board.

.The plan envisaged: by. ‘these regulations is that grievancés are to -

be submitted first to the Superintendent to allow him te act upon

them, although copies can-be sent to the Board at the same: time. .

_The Board is only to.act dn appeal from the decision of the Su

intendent. ‘The open letter was addressed to the School Board not

the Superintendent. The letter’s _purpose was to force the Board .

to act directly and within 24 hours ‘on matters which the Super-

intendent had not considered. ya the letter’ was indeed a vio-

lation of E- 7.

A sined far regulations which define and govern grievance pro-

cedure is not unique to the Seward School system, but is widely .

* recognized as ‘essential to orderly school administration: Even in the

absence of a — statute ‘or r regulation, an —— court said: .

a Sinaia: be no. doubt dc I aclecr heim of a.censorable

infraction of interscholastic athletic. regulations by his school,

“he should seek to correct it. However, promotion, of the best

“interest of his school dictates that he would first call it to the

‘ attention of the coaches and of his principal. or superintendent ;

of his school, and, failing action there, call it to the attention

’ of the. Board of Education, and then, if necessary, make a -

formal protest or report to the proper officials of ‘the ae 3

State High School. Athletic Association.

7 4) cee. aor

Jepsen v. Board of Educ:, 19 Il. App. Od 204, 1583 N.E.2d 417,

420 (1958). In Jepsen the’ failure of a teacher to follow orderly .

channels..in processing his grievance was held to be sufficient

cause fi oe his

forth the specific — to be followed. .

v

admittedly ignored established diiiieanie procedure for ob-

dismissal even in the absence of a regulation setting

"Petitioners have ‘stated that. the. interest of the School Board

in maintaining an orderly grievance procedure is “truly inconse-

_ | quenital’”, (Op. 35), and that -public officials should not he able

_. to. impose “vows of silente to, be o ed on pain of. discharge.”

.. (Op. 36).An employer's interest, in having employee grievances go _

_ through chanels before being taken to the public by means of strike

or “open letters”, is not only a reasonable interest, but’ is a com-

' pelling need. “What separates democracy from mob rule is the.

" existence of procedural meanis for orderly «change. .

Pn Petitioners. have -not contested the fact that théir open letter of |

"> May 18, 1959, to members of the Seward School Board and the

. superintendent was in direct violation of ‘the policy and outlined

procedure of regulation .E-7. it is a well-established principle that

this Court will not disturb state court judgments which rest on .

independent’ and adequate grounds, even’ where these judgments

“also decide Federal questions. Henry v.. Mississippi,’ 379 U.S: 443,

446 (1965.) Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960.) Petition-

ers’: noncompliance with. regulation E-7 is an. independent and.

. sufficient state ground for the decision to nori-retain escent

for that reason, it should not be disturbed. =

Petitioners. have also raised coristitutional objections, vagueness

7 gat and overbreadth,to Regulation E-7. Op. 45. These objections were

first raised in a petition for rehearing to the Alaska a aemceurgrndl —

; 423.P.2d 678 (Alaska 1967) after-that court inade its second de: -

—— tision, 421 P. 2d 586 (Alaska _ The Alaska Court refused the.

rehearing and stated. .

& This court has not overlooked or failed to consider any ques:

. tion presented to it. The fact is that at no time during the six

- years this case has been in existence hay it ever been urged,

&. 2 the administrative tribtinals or courts, that there were

"..* any constitutional questions related to the issue-o -of the Validity

and application of :

498 P. 2d ‘at 678. The’ raising of the constitutional issues on re-

hearing was held to violate two established procedural rules of the ,

Supreme Court of Alaska. One, the court will not consider matters

on —. which were not fitst eee" to the lower courts. 17

i

— + ‘anette ¥, Clllimbn Laborets’ Union, 402 P.2d 199, 201. (Alaska

1965) Pollastrine v. Severance, 315 Pad 528, 531 (Alaska 1 1962).

°

a :

see

Two, the ¢ court will not consider fae matters which have noi »

. been presented in compliance with its rules, which require a state-

"ment of points on appeal, and: which require, the appeal brief to .

~ list the es presented for, review, and —— of error. 18

.

Since petitioners’ constitutional slipcase” were not properly

raised according to State procedure, they should not be considered

in this court. The importance of rajsing constitutional questions

“i due’ time” and in accordance with state procedure was discussed

by Chief — Stone in Yakus v.. United States,” $21 US. 414,

444-45 (1944):

_ &

No procédural principle is more familiar to this Court than

that a constitutional right.may be forfeited in criminal'as wéll

as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right

’ before a tribunal having jurisdiction to. determine it. . . ..

Courts may for that ‘reason refuse to consider .a constitutional

objection even though a like objection had previously been

" sustained in a case in. which it was properly taken. While this

Court in its discrétion sometimes departs from this rule in

| _ cases from lower federal courts, it invariably adheres to it in

" cases from state courts, see Brandeis J. concurring jn Whitney

_¥«-People of the State - California, “ee sid U; S. at page 380.

; ee

a in as much as Retiticners have waited six’ years before asserting

their tonstitiational: objections to E-7_and ‘the issues were never

properly before the state courts, this Court’ should refuse to comevar it

them. ne

: : ; hg , wn aa

; one : . , . i; ~ ss eat :

' Moreover, the supposed constitutiortal “objections to regulation

_E-7 are completely insubstantial. It is difficult to understand peti-

tioners clai##¥.that the regulations’ s interpretation was a “grotesque

transformation of. its innocous. Tanguage”’ because no one*could

know it would affect “the rights of teachers to communicate with

the public.” Op 46. The difficulty arises because the Court did

not find that E-7 was violated because of the distribution of ‘the

ne open letter to the public. ‘The violation occurred because the letter

-was’sent to the School Board demanding their immediate action

: without first ong it to. the superintendent. At was not sub- -.

J 1

18 Rules of the Supreme . Court of. Alaska 9(e). sated (8), (6),

See, for example, Parks v. Brown, : 368 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1962

ee -#Q

3 2 : mee eee

~* " Ynitted shrotigli the sindbis to the Board. 19. In 9 '

“ec -Tegulation was tanerprened literally. : et ‘

Petitioners also claim that Regulation E E-7 is overboard because eee

it requires all grievances no matter how genuine or immediate to

be submitted to the School Board before being bro

spublic attention. In order to be overboard, a statuse- oa

some’ instances of ‘activities which. are protect

Petitioners point to no instance wher the right to y feienndllate abe + Ee

disclosure would be. protected f ‘om what is essentially a regulation ee

Place: In fact, it is hard to. imagine howa st:

as E-7 could be made narrower. Are petitioners \

esting - the regulation should ‘only cover -unitaportant griev- .

— a ances? Such a regulation could not .be made Yo work, Petitioners

can not expect employees with. ‘grievances to admit* that their com- - .

3 f= » plaints are not. genuine or immediate. Ree eS eee Ge ay

ff : © hs _ : M . a . oa

“CONCLUSION

For. the biegeig reasons and on ‘die strength of the toiealag

authorities, this Court should guitain the decision of the Alaska —

Supreme Court.’ ‘ Present oe

‘ y a BA. eS

_ . © Turopore M. Pease, a

Ss ps Bice Warren W. MATTHEWS, JR.

ae eo 2 Burr, ‘Boney & PEASE

ae a. 825 West Eighth Avenne .

ees ' “Anchorage, Alaska 99501

et ty

< 4

19. Watts v. Seward School Bd., 421 P.2d 586, 600: (Alaska 1966). - =,

(School Board findings 9 and 10.) ee Sheen Ce