Petitioners Brief — World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1968
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_ SUPREME COURT. U. &
"Wort Amwavs, Inc., TRaNs Totenpapsoinas, ‘ies Inc., .
Saturn, Amyays,, Inc., Purpvz Arronavutics Corp.,
‘Carrtoz, aTionaL Amways, Ino., and Crvm, AERO-
_ " NAUTIOS Boanp, and American. Society or - TRAVEL
4 ‘Acute, Ino, :
a tar © Petitioners,
Paw American Wort, Airways, [nc., Trans Wort .
Armuuves, Ino. and AMERICAN AIRLINES, Ino., .
aapeeteme,
on WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
- APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
a
. BRIEF apse I aoe.)
rc Epwarp R. Neaner |
25 Broadway
_ New York, New York 000
Counsel for Respondents -
Cant 8. Rowz
Gertrupe §. Roserrpar
CHADBOURNE, Parke, WHITESIDE & Wourr
New York, New York
Of Counsel.
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. * Questions Presented. wr Nodame siiadistinieaice” a.
- Statement of. the Case: 7 2
~ ie Introductory Summary . Sinipinenatinteebcaguitens”
| B.. The Parties be : aa Oe 4
( “©. The Orders, Set Aside : es oo te
wes
plementals’ Activities ‘Which N ecessitated the ‘
< 1962 Amendment, . daniel aoe
=z The Legislative ‘History: of the 1962 Amend-
_Mient: Public Law 87-528 , L censeset 13
1, The ‘Board’s Legislative Proposals iiian aan
The Senate Committee’s Modification, of the
Bills Introduced ~....... : 19.
2 3. The Hoise Committee’ 8 “Modifications an ae
a 4. The Conference Committee’s Action see — oe
. F. “The Board’s Thclusive Tour Regulations. ances) OT f as
a The Decision of the bei Below ....... me
ee "Summary of Argument : . eaann _— 3
| ere
~ The Regulatory. Problems Created by the Sup- .
PAGE
| Anoumen?:
| tf The Board’s Qeteris Granting Inclusive Tour
", _ Authority to Supplementals Involving Solic-
NN. , itation and‘Individual Ticketing of the Gen-
} » eral Public Were Correctly Set Aside as Vio-
lating the Federal Aviation Act .. 48
A. The 1962 Amendment Does. Not Author-
ize the Grant of Inclusive Tour Authority
to Supplementals ‘. . % / 50
a The statute itself does not, authorize
ra ant of indiyidually ticketed, i in-
we elt sive tour- authority - ec - 50
gh ‘The 1962 Amendment sine Not
a ; ee gave: Refer to itelnsive Fours — ‘50 -
- eer
“Charter trips in air transporta-
ot, 5 ” tion” Do Not Include Inclusive
a ¥ x Tours - 50 .
mS (6) The ‘Distinction Between “Char-—
inns + ters” and: “Individually Ticketed
ee ea Services” in the 1962 Amendment
| Demonstrates That “Charters”
Do Not Include Inclusive Tours .: 54 |
2. The legislative history of the 1962
¢ ° Amendment confirms that individually .
" @ ticketed, inclusive tour authority “is
. not authorized a : 56
3. The use of travel ‘agents “does not
transform inclusive fours into char-
aia Pets ters .
a ¥ “a *
* ha
, . ‘
: . ;
»% ; » ’
c - es ‘ ae . °
: *
: ‘
. -
’
Ro
D.
. The Board Cannot by Regulation Over-
ride the ae Intended’ by Con-
_ Data the Board Relied On:
‘ ‘Petitioners’ Attempt to Prevent Adju-
gress
The Pe itioners’ ~~ on: ‘Motor Gar. ;
rier € ases Ts Misplaced re
een: Advantages to. the Beppe.
mentals Cannot Justify Disregard of the
1962 Amendment
i
The Board Tagatiy poe rer Certificates
.
a
The oard Was ited ta Give Poti.
72
I. The] Board Unlawfully Respondents. -
of a Hearing in th a Transatlantic :
a Charter Investigation
A.
& Without a Hearing
B.
73
‘ . 74.
‘The- Board Did Not. Meet the Hearing 7
_ Bequirements of the Act Before Granting
Inclusive Tour Authority in New Cer-
- tificates.
76
tiorérs the Opportunity. to Meet New Ss
77
dication of the ‘Board’s Failure .to Meet ;
Procedural Requirements
Ii. "The Orders Challenged Are Subject to Re-
view a — by the a
Cpreuosion
o
3
Committee Members mae Bi a rae il
AppENDIX B: . |
Inclusive Tours Authorized by the Board | sash ee B-1
APPENDIX C: ae .
Specimens of Advertising by the Supplementals
and Tour Operators ............: ) C-1
. : . - t 2 - :
° Appenprx D: Pace ieee
| Brochures for Inclusive Tours wii a
‘Taste or AUTHORITIES ©
Cases:
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) ..
Aero-Peninsular Compliance 7. 24 Cc A.B. 469
j= I seilnciiisaieall | 11
| Air America Enforcement ret 18 C.A.B. 393
American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil ‘hicuaadiin Board, 035
~F,2d 845 (D.C.. Cir. 1956), cert. den: 353 U.S. 905
(4957), preeeener" eb |
* American Airlines, Ine. v. Civil iavesaaties ‘pioal: 348 .
F.2d 349 (D.C. Ci. 1965) - weer 42, 82
American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 365°
F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1966) eine 9, 41
| _ American Shipbuilding Co. v. National’ Labor Rela-
tions Board, 380 0.8. 300 (1965) 66
t
. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) | 85
- Banco Nacional de bac v: Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398
© (1964) -......... 85
Barenblatt v. United en "360 U.S. 109: (1959) ........ ae
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294. (1962) 60 —
Burfenning ‘ v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha
RR. Co., 163 US. 321 (1896) : : 67
oO
66, October Term, 1967), 36 U.S. L. Week e-
Case. Swane Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Ine. (Slip 0 F No.
cember 18, 1967) ....: ee
Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103 (1948) 2... 41, 47, 48, 83, 85
The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924) ....... -
Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 1956) 85 _
The Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, oe
357 U.S. 28 (1958). 60 q
Deep South Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 347 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ...... 79
' DeGraw v. Toon, 151 F.2d 778 (2 Cir. 1945) ... ————
Delta | Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Beard, 980
F\2d 43 (3 Cir. 1960), affd 367 U.S. 316 (1961) ....47, 74,
* 0%
Duplex Piiating Presi Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 3 - .
(1921) ;' 7 : 61
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) en. 85
_Federal Communications Commission v. American
_. Broadcasting Co., 347 UrS. 284 (1954) rn 67
Federal Trade Commission \ v. Raladam Co., 283 van
643 (1981)
PAGE
First National Bank v. Walker Bank vas tomeicaas Co, 385
. US. .252 (1966) 60" |
Fordham Bus Corp. v. United States, in F. ‘Supp. 712
GDN. -_ nancy ~—
Gray v. Powell, 314 US. 402 (1941) siceaaeas” a
Greyhound Corp. v. Edwards, 100 M.C.C. 453 (1966) 70
Hacienda Hotels-Motels, Rooms and Flight Suseeei- .
tions, Inc. and U.S. Aircoach, 25 C-A.B. 741 (1957) 11
Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) ..61, 66
- International Association of Machinists AFL-CIO v.
Central Airlines, Inc.,:372 U.S. 682 (1963)................. 84
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nauh-
“ville RR Co.,.227 U.S. 88 (1918) | : 77)
- Kent v. Dullbs, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) ... . 85
lasee Irregular Air Canein Investigation, 22 C.A. B.
838 (1955) ....... 10
' Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 28 C.A.B.
224 (1959), affd. subnom. Great Lakes Airlines, Inc.
v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 294 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. © '-
1960), cert. den. 366-U.S: 965 (1961) ..... .8, 11, 12
Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
_v. Ni ational Labor Relations Board, 365. U. S. om
(1961) , oe 60
Mastro Plastics sida v. N ational Labor Relations
" Roard, 350 US. 270 (1985) | , 61
cal
PAGE
Mitchell .v. Kentucky Finance Gs, 359 US. "990.
i“ ad
(1959) a Ye
Morgan v. United. States, 304 U. 8. 1 Frags eladiadninds "76
National: Labor Relations Board v. Allis Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). 61
National Labor ‘Relations Board | v. Brown, 380 i: Sa
278 (1965) - ; x 66
_ National an Relations Board v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 350 U.S. 264.(1956) ..:....... 67
‘National Labor Relations Board v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58
- (1964): = 61
_ National Labor Relations teaed v. Insurance Agents :
International Union, 361 U.S. 477 ( 1960) baladasntiniel 60, Jiees
National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v.
National Labor Relations Board, 386 U.S. 612 (1967) 61,
Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronauties-Board, — __
345 F.2d 484 (1 Cir. 1965), cert. den. sub nom.- ,
Kastern Aif Lines, Inc. v. Northeast ae, Inc, ~
382 U.S. 845 (1965) .............. aia 79
of
- Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commis- |
sion of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) - ....17-78
| Pan American World Airways, Ine. v. ‘Civil Acronau-
ties Board, 380 F.2d 770 (2. Cir. 1967) <i 4, 42, 48, 49
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp. " 3tl US.
884 (1951). : 61
Securities and Exchange Commission v. New England |
Electric System (Slip Op. No. 305, October Term, ds,
1967), 36 U.S.L. Week 4190 (March 5, 1968) .......... 67
\ viii
| PAGE
“Social Security Board v.N Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946) 67
"Stank. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944) °.... 66
Tauck Tours, Ine.'54 M.C.C. 291 (1952), 63 M.C.C. 493
(1955), affd..sub nom., National Bus Traffic Asso-
ciation v. United States, 143 F.Supp. 689 (D.N.J.
1956), affd. 352 U. S. 1020 (1957) 69, 70, 71
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
339 F.2d 56 (2 Cir. 1964), cert. den., Hughes Tool Co.
v..Trans World Airlines, Inc., 382 U.S. 842 (1965) 76.
Twentieth Century Airlines, Inc., et al.°Compliance _
Proceeding, Q1\C.A.B. 133 (1955), affd. sub nom.,
North Aniérican Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
.. Board, 240 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. den. 353.
wv. S.. 941 (1957)
Udall v. ‘Tellman, 380 US. 1 (1965) . 7 67
United States v. Abilene & Southern Railway Co., 265
U.S. 274 (1924) : 17
- United States v. Penn-Olin Chansiaad Co., 378 U. 8. 158 :
(1964) ...... | 66
United States v. Third N ational Bank of Nashville
(Slip Op. No. 86, October Term, 1967), 36 USL. :
Week 4178 (March 4, 1968) ....... - 60
United States v. Wrightwood mr Co., 315 U.S. 110
~ (1942) 61
United States Overseas Airlines, Inc., Order’ No. = 9643
(October 11, 1955) - ; oe — 11
‘Volkswagenwerk v. Federal Maritime Commission |
(Slip Op. No. 69, October Term, 1967), 36 U. SL. -
Week 4197 Angie 6, rest ; 66
W. 8. Butterfield Theatres, Inc. v. Federal Communi- |
eations Commission, 237 F. 2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1956) .. 79
» Youngstown Sheet oi Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1962) + a. Be
Zemel v. Busk, 381 U.S. 1 965) Siete 85
Statutes: :
Administrative Procedure Act: . Kae
§7 [60 Stat. 241, 5 U.S.C. §1006]. 74
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938: 05.
[52 Stat. 977, 49 U.S.C. §401] ....: . 4
By Anti‘Trust Act: — eo ;
§7 [38 Stat. 734, 15 U.S.C. say. 60
Ye ie Aviation Act of 1958: |
ee _ $101(32) [72 -Stat. 737, as amended, 49
US.C. §1301 (32) ] 5
§101(33) [72 Stat. 737, as. amended, 49
U.S.C. §1301(33)] . 5
§401 [#2 Stat. 754,. as ae 49 U.S.C.
ae . . 3, 4,73
Mele §401(d)(1) [72 Stat. 754, as amended, 49
-U.S.C. .§1871(d)(1)] vreinness 22
-$401(d)(2) [72 Stat. -754, as amended, 49. ;
——- U.S.C. $1371(d) (2)] 22
i §401(d) (3) [72 Stat. 154, 49 U.S.C. §1371(a) ait
(3)] aaninconeiecraly OA; OD
| §401(e) (72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. §1371(e)] -...19, 26,
TOE RR C108 OPO REE, att Et ete al PRES ENEN TE Ce ONE RA ts LOOP oee TPES aad
3 | ; PAGE
§401(g) [72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. §1371(g)] . . 75
_ $416 [72 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C. §1386] 1... g ead
§801 [72 Stat. 787, 49 U.S.C. $1461] ............. 84,85 |
_ $1005 [72 Stat. 794, 49 U.S.C. §1485] -...........84, 85 se
§1006. [72 Stat. 795, 49 ‘U. 8.0. §1486] ss gk
7 Motod Carrier Act eee iC
Det §207a [49 Stat. 552, 49 U.S. C. s307(0)].. apie 69
‘National Labor ‘Relations Act: rene |
§8(b) (3) [61 Stat, 140, 89 U.S.C. §158(b)(3)].. 68°
PLL. 86-661 [74 Stat. 527) 22 13 |
@ =P.L. 87-528 [76 Stat. 143] | 2, 3, 5, 13
-iPicietieen of the Civil Aeronautics. Board:
) | ios
- PLL, 89.554 [80 Stat 378) eT ee
: see
;
14 CFB §207. L(a)(2)_ anf |
14 CFR 4208... Elileidciescetieereconacceninnsie lig AR |
14 CFR §295.2(k) icin ERS Y
1 CFR $296.2(m) nection i ae
ei 8 cas |
LE CFR §302:24(m)(1) eens ntceeneentlfeeenngeneneeDy 78 i
“14 CFR £302.24(1m)(3) ican
Congressional Matoriat:
Conference Report, House Report No. 1960, — Con- |
pi ahaa 2d - Session seneeeeenens . 29
$
iy ‘
&
2
Congressional Record: ~~ 3 oe)
107 Cong. Rec. 17163 ........... paisa 26
107 Cong. Rec. 20081-20082... tecceretnnnen 26
108 Cong. Rec. 3706 .. : gresseincnssanndsnons Selukinne: ae
108 Cong. ‘Ree. 4049-4052 “eo 3 aiseeslTy 28
_ 108 Cong. Rec. 12282-12285 i -ssusenne-30, 31; 32, 33, 34
108 Cong. Ree. 12318 . nha lca: AM
108 Cong. Ree, 12822-12395 ..........24, 25, 38, 35, 36, 60
Hearings. Before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Rep- |
resentatives, 86th Congress, 2d Session . ) 12
, ee Before a ‘Subcommittee of the Committee
ae Interstate atid Foreign Commerce on Limited
Air Carrier Certificates, House of Representatives, |
87th Congress, 1st Session , : 12, 14, 18
Hearings . Before the Aviation Subcommittee of the
Committee’ on Commerce -on. Supplemental Air |
Carriers, Senate, 87th Congress, oe Session .. ..12, 15, 16,
sf : he | 17, 18, 52
‘ ae
House of Representatives’ Bills:
> H.R. 7318, 87th Congress, Ist Sension al
H.R. 7512, 87th Congress, 1st Session . ae
| ‘AE. R. 7593, 86th Congress, 2d Session |
H. R. 9738, 75th ee. 3d Session.
xii ‘ j /
; ' PAGE. ©
House Report No. 117, 87th Congress, 1st Session .. 12, 13, «.
. 22, 23, 26, 66 |
ienate Bill, S. 1969, 87th Congress, ist Session . 14, 19, 20 |
. Senate Report No. 688, 87th Congress, 1st Sessions...13, 62
2
Other Authorities:) i :
C. A.B. Air Carrier Financial Statistics, June 1967 5
C.A.B. Air Carrier Analytical Charts and a:
_- mental Carrier Statistics, June 1967 ............: s
—_
iit, ‘°° _ Ix ram
Supreme Court: of the Buited States |
Ooronin Tena, 1967
Nos. 800, 946, 969 > ee
“Wom. Amaware, Ino., Trans INTERNATIONAL Amiinzs, Ino. i
Saturn. Airways, Inc., Punrpvz AERONAUTICS Corp.,
Caprrou InTERNatTIonaL ArrwAys, Inc., and Crvm AERO-
NAUTICS Boazp, and American, Society oF TRAVEL Acusns,
Tee,
ie Rea —against—_ Bae ia
. —ag Y
h
Paw AMERICAN Woritp Armways, Inc., Teas Wortp ee"
- AraunEs, 7. and waren Amuinzs, Ino.,
Respondents.
' ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT oF
APPEALS ° FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
<9
- BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS.
| Questions Presented
. ae | - Petitioners,
.”
The questions framed by. petitioners’ avoid the basic —
3 . question at issue by assuming its answer. That question
is not whether the Civil-Aeronauties Board (“Board”)
may authorize “inclusive tour charter service” (C. A. B..
ikchetieaenli nal ietielies ot oeaae cont a 7 ~~ cee > ° dere eon =.
- es TOU ee eer
Br., p. 2)? or “a type of charter called: ‘inclusive tour
charter’ > (ASTA Br., p. 3; Supp. Br., p. 2). Such ques-
tions assume that inclusive tours are charters. Since the
statute . involved—Public Law 87-528 (the “1962 amend-—
iment” —speaks of “charter” and not “inclusive tours”, the
basic. question is precisely whether inclusive tours are.
' , charters in gupplemental air transportation.’ :
i «eon | naa of the Case
A. Int vw ductory. ‘Summary.
‘At issue here are five orders of the ‘Boal awarding
supplemental air carriers certificates which authorize them
. to operate in conjunction with: ‘tour operators. ‘(travel
~ agents) so-called “Gnelusive tours” between points in. the ’
United States.and various foreign points’ served by respon- —
dents. (543a-565a, - - §96a-607: a, fl060a-1082a, 1097a-1106a, -
1089a-1096a). : The orders ass _— carriers ian derive *
ww
. ¥C. ae B. Br.” refers to. pages of the: Board’s Bria i in No. 946."
: <a ” refers to pageg of the brief of World Airways, Inc.,.
in No.‘ 800. “ASTA Br.” refers to pages-of the brief.of the .
: , Amerjean Society of Travel Agents (“ASTA”) in-N6?949. Numbers
»'_in parentheses followed by the suffix “a” refer to’ pages of Peti-.
<*. tioners’ Appendix; numbers in brackets followed by the suffix “b”
\ refer to pages of the separate froncagnne to Petitioners’ Brief _—
a ‘lative Materials”.
~~
2°The Court of Appeals. answered this daiation in the angutlive
\and hence did not’ reach the. ‘question -whether respondents were
ce denied a hearing in connection with the inclusive-tour authorize- .
. ,..- tions granted by the Board in the transatlantic area (380 F: 24-770, -
= 774 (1125a) (2 Cir. 1967) ). If this Court séts aside the judgment. -
> °
| \
= court below, respondents, forthe reasons stated infra, pp. —
. ee , respectfully submit that the Board’s orders in the trans-
, a tic area = be’ set —_ hecduse bao orders were entered .
: withont a hearing.
8 Ke term Sesinaive tour”, as the Court of rome noted (380
F. 2d at 771-n. 1 Tee? has on occasion been teed synonymously
\
* a
-€
£
f
ee
» ‘
. .
.
3
patronage for these tours by individual solicitation and
individual ticketing ‘of members-of ‘the general public.
The orders in question were issued under the 1962 amend-
* : ment of the Federal Aviation Act (P. L, 87-528, 76 Stat.
' 143,49 U.S. €. §1371(d) and §1301(33)). That amendment
: expressed a clear-cut Congressional policy decision, that
supplemental air carriers (“Supplementals”) were not to
. ertgage in individually ticketed transportation but were to.
be confined to “charter trips .in ‘air transportation . ‘ + to,
supplement the scheduled. service” which regular route . |
carriers such as respondents are authoyized to provide (49
U.S. C. §§1871(4), 1301(83))., Tae nt
The certificates awarded the ‘Supplementals, however,
nec ited ; engrafted upon. the charter authority
in each certific te was the further grant “(including in-
- elusive tour chafter authority)” (1088a, 1086a, 1107a, 1113a, ©
_1116a). New ulations adopted as part-of the Board’s
orders made: it clear that travel agents who became “tour
operators” by contract with the Supplementals would. enjoy
Board-exemption as “indirect air carriers” for the sole pur-
” pdse of effectuating the’ inclusive tour authority granted
' the Supplementals. Respondents accordingly. challenged, i -
the Court of. Appeals, the Board’s orders and regulations
and -the certificates issued to the Supplementals, insofar as
inclusive tour authority is concerned. taal court; — :
with “all-expense” or aatiea tours. The” Board: used the term
“Snelusiye tour” designedly, however, begause the Board’s orders
oe require only that air and surface transportation (if any) and some ~
hotel ‘accommodations be included in the tour price, ‘which may. be
.as low as 110% of respondents’ lowest fare (including: discount)
.- applicable between.the same points (417a). None of the other land
a arrangements, mealg and sightseeing ordinarily part of an “all-
- expense” or “package” tour need be included, despite yee
cdntentions, here. (C. A. B. Br., p. 2n. 2; Supp. Br., p. 4; ASTA
Br., p. 4and.n.’).
oe
_ reviewing ‘the legislative history of the 1962 amendment,
held that “the Board lacked: the power to authorize ‘inclu-
sive tours’ and that the challenged: provisions should “be
‘stricken from the certificates awarded to the intervéning
carriers" ‘{Supplementals]” ia F. ad at 772 ——
B. The Parties
Respondents, Pan American World Airways, Inc. (“Pan
American”), Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”), and
American Airlines, Inc. (“American”), have been scheduled
air carriers for over three decades. Since enactment of
the Civil Aeronautics Actin 1938* :they have been con-
: tinuously engaged in the transportation of persons, prop-
erty and mail by aircraft pursuant to certificates of public
: convenience. and necessity issued to them under the Act.
Respondents and other scheduled air carriers alone are
authorized by statute to solicit and ticket individual mem-
bers of the general public for travel in the transatlantic, —
foreign and overseas areas they are certified to serve (49
U. S. C. $1371). A substantial portion of these carriers’
revenue is derived from the sale of all-expense and other
-tour air travel to the — public through travel ‘agents
> (728a).° 5 .
- The ‘Seiasebits including petitioners’ in No. 800 are 7
_ themselves, or are successors to, carriers once known. as
x
- “#52 Stat. 977, as’ amended, ‘49 U. 8. ¢. yon, now the Federal
Aviation Act (“et”).
°E Qos approximately 13% of Pan ssieettoan' S passenger reve-
‘nues in the Pacific area is derived from all-expense ‘tour passengers _
_ (35a-36a). As pointed out in ASTA’s brief, travel. ag.-ts promote ~
and sell.from 75% to 90% of all international air transportation
saga in this country a Br. » P. 3)...
5
“non-scheduled”, or “irregular” air carriers. Their author-
», ity is derived.entirely from the 1962 amendment,* which
limits them to the performance of charter transportation
(and not individual ticketing) that will supplement the ser-
vice offered by resPondents and other scheduled air carriers
(49 U.S. C. $§1301(32), (33), 1371(d)(3)). Pursuant to.
_ their charter authority (excluding the inclusive tofirs chal-—
lenged here) the Supplementals perform extensive services
> in the air transportation of both persons and property for
- the military and for commercial and other —
— of.all types.’ a
C. The Orders Sot Aside
The five orders set aside by the court below granted not
only charter authority but added “(including inclusive tour,
charter authority)” in the certificates issued to the Supple-
mentals. The Board’s regulations adopted as an integral
_ part of the orders create a class of travel agents (“tour -
operators”) authorized in conjunction with the Supple--
mentals to sell inclusive tours by means of direct solici-
' tation and individual ticketing of the general public. This .
is done by what is called a “charter” of the aircraft by a
Supplemental to the tour operator (althongh the aircraft
°P. L, 87-528, ‘inated July 10, 1962, 76 Stat. 143 (infra, p. 18).
__ "Their operations in recent ‘years have been very. successful.
For instance, in the 12 months ending June 30, 1967, World Air-
- ways, Inc. had’ total operating revenues of $57 million, up $19
million from the previous year. -Capitol International
Inc, had operating revenues of $33 million. Trans International
Airlines, Inc. had operating revenues of $29 million. Saturn Air-.
ways, Inc. had operating revenues of $26 million. The operating
profit margin of the Supplementals for this period was 15.7%. The
_ operating rE margin of the certificated route air carriers Was
11.8% (C. A. B. ‘Aw Carrier Financial Statistics, June, 1967 ;
C. A. B. Air Carrier “Analytical Charts and nd Boppladioniel | Carrier
Statistics, —, 1967).
Py
is always under complete control of the Supplemental and _ .
operated entirely by its personnel) and the grant by the
Board of exemption to the tour operator to act’ as an. in-
| direct air carrier. 7
“As such, the orders violate ‘the terms of. the 1962 iene. |
ment limiting Supplementals to charter service and the *
-. express restriction against their operation of: inclusive
tours unequivocally set out in the legislative history of that
'- statute. The orders also violate the express terms of the
1962 amendment since they sanction individual ticketing
of the general public by Supplementals and thus permit
operations which substitute for, and do not. “supplement”,
respondents’ services. — 7 ae
The orders set sail: arose out of two elie proceed-
_ings conducted by the Board: (1) the Transatlanti¢ Char-
ter Investigation (Docket 11908) originally commenced in
November 1960 and re-opened in April 1964 as Reopened .
Transatlantic Charter Investigation (same Docket 11908),
and (2).The Supplemental Air Service Proceeding ee
13795) instituted in March. 1964. .
‘Order No. E-24237 (543a-565a), ‘issued in the Supple-
mental proceeding, and Order No. E- 24242 (1097a-1106a),
issued in the Reopened Transatlantic proceeding, granted
new certificates to certain of the Supplementals* to engage .
_ in “supplemental air transportation (including inclusive .
tour charter authority)”, in foreign and overseas areas
served by respondents (566a, 569a, 581a, 587a, 590a). |
Order No. E-24240 (1060a-1082a), issued in the Reopened
Transatlantic Lscigoaaed provided for amendment. of the .
* American Flyers Airlines corp Trane International st
Ine:; World — Ine.
.
= NN NR Ae
.
A OO et AO AO a AN = EN 8 He
7
outstanding’ final certificates of two Supplementals® to
add “inclusive: tour charter authority” to the charter au-
thority previously granted. That order not only granted
inclusive tour authority which was beyond the power of
the Board but amended certificates without a hearing in
contravention of the Act. ©
ef
ok
Order No. E-24242 (1097a-1106a) relied on Order No.
. H-24240 (1060a-1082a) in incorporating inclusive tour
authority in the charter certificates issued to additional
Supplementals (1100a). The sole basis of both these orders
‘is a previous record\completed before the original cer- |
tificates were granted—and on the basis of which inclusive
tour authority had been denied—and “Form 41 reports and
‘other data of: ‘which we [the Board] may take official no-
tice”,.without specification of the portions of the reports
‘and the other data so noticed (Opinion and Orders
Nos. E-24240, 24241 (1077a, n. 24)).%°.
Order No. E-24238 (596a-607a), issued in the Supple-
"mental: proceeding, and Order No. E-24241 (1089a, 1096a),
issued in the Reopened Transatlantic proceeding, adopted
regulations respecting “inclusive tours” previously re-
ferred to (supra, p. 5;-see also infra, pp. 37-41). |
' BD The Regulatory Problems Created by the Supple
mentals’ Activities Which Necessitated the 1962
ie Amendment ; en
‘The close of World War II brvegt a substantial number _
of so-called “nonscheduled”, “irregular” or, as known to-
day, “supplemental” air carriers: into commercial aviation.
- ® Capitol Airways, Inc. ; Saturn Airways, Inc.
- 7 Form 41 reports are d | aceounting reports o of operations
and of financial condition. afd investment, filed with the Board
— oaaey: semi-annually and annually by each air carrier.
8
Previously the Board had granted blanket exemptions is- :
sued under Section 416(b) of the Act to such non-certifi-
cated operators. These relieved those carriers from obtain-
ing certificates of public convenience and necessity and .
_ from complying. with certain statutory provisions and
regulations. . The postwar influx of large, transport-type —
’ aircraft and flight personnel, however, created enforcement
problems arising from the devices employed by the Supple-
. mentals to divert passengers from the certificated carriers.
The pre-1962. history of the Supplementals reflects their
constant endeavor to engage in individually ticketed opera-
tions without certification in violation of the Act and the
Board’s regulations and orders. The Board’s efforts to pre-
vent the Supplementals from usurping the functions of the .
- eertificated carriers proved largely ineffectual.”
Essential to an understanding of. the limited authority
the Supptementals subsequently derived under the 1962
- amendment is a clear picture of the operations they con-.
ducted and the authority the Board purported to give them
“before 1962. That authority, generally speaking, confined
them to infrequent and irregular interstate and overseas
air transportation of —: and “ain tase d _— foreign
a
11 The “combine” device cited as a principal abuse in the Board’s |
> brief (C. A. B. Br, p. 10 n. 9) was but one of many schemes ,
thought up by these carriers to enable them to conduct the équiva-
lent of certificated operations. Many of these schemes involved
the use of ticket selling activities by travel agents and others (see,
€.g., Twentieth Century Airlines, Inc., et al., Compliance Proceed-
img., 21 C. A..B. 133, 135, 192-193" (1955), affd. sub.nom. North
American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil- Aeronautics Board, 240 F.2d 867,
_ 870 (D. C. Cir: 1958), cert. den. 353°U. 8. 941 (1957)) ; ; Large Ir.
regular Air Carrier Investigation, 28 C. A. B. 224, 464 (1959), affd.
sub nom. Great Lakes Airlines, Inc.-v. Civil: Aerofautics Board,
294 F. 2d 217 -(D. C. Cir. 1960), cert. den. 366 U. S. 965 (1961) ;
Air America Enforcement ee 18 C..A. B. 393, 400 (1954).
"2
air transportation of property only) and planeload charter
operations (56a-57a). In granting such authority (later set
aside by the courts) the Board “had never authorized in-
elusive tour authority for the supplementals” (see Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 365 F. 2d
939, 946 (D. C. Cir. 1966) ): Indeed, as ASTA acknowledges
(ASTA Br., p: 9), “[t]he inclusive tour charter concept,
whereby a tour operator sells tours utilizing the charter for
the to-and-from transportation element of the tour was not:
then known in the air travel industry in this country” (see:
also ASTA Br., p. 18; Supp: Br., p. 22).* Indeed, the
Board’s regulations specifically prohibited travel agénts .
from soliciting individual members of the general public
(the essential feature of the inclusive tour authority’
‘granted by the orders. under review). - |
v
= Thus tliere. was ‘no “preexisting authority ee operate ITCs
‘ [inelusive tour chartérs],” as the District of ‘Columbia Court was
led to believe and as ASTA is now trying to-convince this Court
Giibee a.
The Board had consistently prohibited travel agents from partak-
hs ing in the formation of groups and barred public solicitation for the
formation of groups for purposes of charter transportation. 16 Fed:
Reg. 2700 (1951), 14 CFR § 207.1(a)(2) (1952 Edition) ; 24 Fed.
Reg. 4908 (1959), 14 CFR § 295.11(b). (Supplement to 1956 Edi- |
tion) ;-25 Fed. Reg. 5323 (1960), 14 CFR. § 295.11(b) (1961
Edition) ; 26 Fed. Reg. 3631 (1961), 14 CFR § 295.11(b) (1962
Edition) ; 29 Fed. Reg. 6005 (1964), 14 CFR § 295.11(b) (1966.
_. Edition) ; 29 Fed. Reg. 13249 (1964), 14 CFR § 207.1 (1966 Edi-
_ tion). This consistent prohibition refutes the Board’s contention -
here that it had “approached the inclusive tour concept” (C. A. B.
Br., p. 18 n. 29). . See Coad ae
' The Supplementals’ attempt to equate study groups with in-
clusive tours is also wide of the mark (Supp. Br., p. 38): So-called -
“study groups” are not; under the Board’s regulations, ipso facto, .
affinity groups which may charter a plane. They. are simply ex-
empted in thé transatlantic area from the affinity rule (14 CFR
295.2(k)). The Board has been very careful to define what a proper .
study group-is (14 CFR 295.2(m)), and it is clear they are not
just members of the general public as are purchasers of inclusive
e
10.
The Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation instituted
by the Board (C. A. B. Br., pp. 10-11) failed to resolve
“the regulatory problems: created by thé activities of . the
large irregular carriers and its end results were ultimately
-declared unlawful by the courts. In that case the Board’s
-Bureau of Air Operations had proposed that the large
__ irregular carriers be limited to charter operations and not
permitted to “accept traffic from persons whose business,
either directly or indirectly, is the formation of passenger
| groups from the general public, or the solicitation or sale
of individual transportation services” (22 €. A. B. 838, 938
_ (1955)). The large irregular carriers sought in addition .
.authority for “special-service flights”, which the Board’s
_ Examiners described as. “sales of transportation to. indi-
viduel members of the public on an individual ticket sale_
- » oYr.individual waybill basis where the service offered is. of
tt
a special character distinguishing it from the aad
scheduled services” (ibid. at 937). 7% D
_ In their decision. of March 29, 1955, the Examiners rec-
~ ommended permitting the large irregular carriers an un-.
limited number of charter flights and three ‘ ‘special service”
flights per month. The Board, however, determined to
- give these carriers, by exemption, not only charter author-
ity but also individually ticketed or individually-waybilled —
authority not to exceed 10 trips per month in the same
direction between any single pair of points.’* The Board
thought this limited individual ticketing authority would.
c fill the need for. ‘special service. watharity and refused to
| ia ase “duibaely ‘in eealiewi ‘en, of ‘nitemn, tail which
had been long established in air transportation. The “inclusive |
- tour” concept was not employed in the air travel industry as an
element of charter, as ASTA and the Supplementals concede _
(ASTA Br., pp. 9, 18; Supp. Br., p. 22). ise
o
oun the latter ‘authority (ibid. " 853 and 857; see also .
—6:28 CL A. B. 224, 487 (1959) ). X
It should be noted that throughout fhe Board ieibls
ings “charter” was used in’ contradistinction both to “in- .
dividually-ticket ” authority and to authority to accept
traffic “from persons whose business, either directly\or i in-
directly, is the formation .of passenger groups from\ the
- general public, or the solicitation or sale of individual
transportation services” (ibid., p. 938).
The Board’s order permitting operations by the Supple-
mentals on an exemption basis was set aside in 1956 in
American Airlines, Inc. y. Civil’ Aeronautics Beagd, 235
F’, 2d 845 (D. C. Cir. 1956), cert. den. 353 U. S, 905 (1957).
The Court having granted a stay of its order, hearings
as to individual carriers then resymed. Meanwhile, the
irregular carriers continued their “frequent and regular:
7 operations” without authority. In some instances letters
of registration were revoked; in others the Board continued _
issuance Of cease and desist orders in a largely unsuccess-
ful effort to keep thése carriers from engaging in illegal
_ operations."
Finally, on Jar anuary 28, 1959, the Board seissin certain
irregular carriers certificates of public convenience and
necessity which included the authority to operate an ional
anion
| 14 United States Overseas Airlines, Inc., Enforcement Printetine,
Order No. E-9643 (October 11,.1955); Twentieth Century Aér-
‘lines, Inc., et al., Compliance Proceeding, 21 C. A. B. 133 (1955),
affd. sub nom. North American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 240 F. 2d 867 (D. C. Cir. 1958); Aero-Péninsular Com-
pliance Case, 24 C. A. B. 469 (1957); Hacienda Hotels-Motels,
Rooms and Flight ee anata Inc. and U. *. Atrcoach, 25 C. A. B.
pes 74 (1987).
12
limited number of charters and no more ini 10 snub’
individually ticketed one-way flights per month between any
-.. two points (28 C, A. B. 224). This grant of authority
was set aside in United Airlines, Inc..v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 278 F. 2d 446°(D. C. Cir. 1960), vacated sub nom.,
All American Airways, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 364:
U. S. 297 (1960), the court, holding tet certificates of
this type could not be lawfully issu
_ Jdst before the decision in United, the. ‘Biecd had. sought
legislation to permit the creation by certificate of a class
of “limited service air carriers” (4.€.,- Supplementals)
whose certificates would contain such limitations as were
. necessary “to assure that ‘the service’ offered thereunder
does not exceed the authorization” (H.. BR. 7893; see also
‘ Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the. Committee on
_ . Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representa-
"tives, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. on H. R. 7593, p. 1).
: In view of thé. decision in United, the Board proposed
a change in its bill. It now sought legislation which- “would
have granted the Board the. authority which . the court
held it did not possess and which would have permitted
_ the Beard to authorize supplemental operations to con-
- tinue along the lines of present operations” (H. Rep., p. 6
[32b]; see also Statement by Alan Boyd, Chairman of the | .
Board, Ss. Hearings, p. 5 ) paar, H. ca p. 10.
"18 See Sas. a p. 4. The ‘Beard te, therefore, i in error when it
contends that “the Board was authorized, as it previously had been,
to nape a definition of ‘charter’ ” (C. A. B. Br., p. 17), insofar as
this implies there was any legitimate basis for any of the Supple-
mentals’: operations at this time. This Conrt vacated the United
. Judgment for the reason that oe was = considered by.
Congress.
- The Board had unsuccessfully ‘ought such legislation before.
—~pretu.
oe
[207b}""). ‘The Doard did not seek - this 5 Inpipiation, 0s
it now contends, power to authorize a type of operation the |
Supplementals | were not then even trying to condfitt.
In order to have time to consider the Board’s sugges.
tions Congress, in J uly 1960, enacted “temporary legisla-
tion” to permit ‘the Supplementals. to continue their -.
existing, and previously held improperly’ authorized, op-
erations pending hearings on permanent legislation pro-
i. posed by the Board and the Weare, (see P. L. 86-
| 661, 74 Stat. 527).
E. The Legislative History of the 1962 Aimendment:
Public Law 87-528 .
Two months after the close of testes in the Tramsatlan-
tic Charter Investigation Congress on J uly 10, 1962 enacted
P. L. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143. The measure enacted into: law |
represented Congress’ own handiwork and departed sig-
nificantly from. the legislative proposals submitted by the
Board and the Supplementals. In summary, it established,
for the first time, a legal basis for. part of: the authority the
Board had theretofore attempted to grant to the Supple. °
mentals.. It did not, however, empower the Board to permit
all the activities the Supplementals had been engaged in or
all the Board had tried to authorize. It gave “some, but
not all, of the authority requested by” the Board (H. Rep.,
_ —p. 6 [33b]): Basie tothe new law was -the concept: that ..
es “a air ceeamienee shonld a be
-
17 ey == *' ae to Houle Report No. 1177, 87th Cnarein. ;
Ist Session; “H. Hearings” refers-to Hearings Before a Subcom.
-Inittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
Limited. ser Carrier Certificates, House of Representatives, 87th
Congress, Ist Session; “S. Rep.” refers to Senate Report No. 688,
87th Congress, 1st Session; “S, Hearings” refers to ‘Hearings Be
fore the Aviation Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce on .
Supplemental Ar an, Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, :
“°
’
be ed
‘: > limited ¢ te penne operatipns as thai | ‘wate: was understood .
a i the’ aviation field. - | ee
ieee mentals. had ‘ih.the past been permitted by the Board to
_ + © engage in individually ticketed service. “The. statute there-
ee —. fore’ authorized the Board to‘ continue > authorizations to.
mo | provide such service:for-a -a kwe-yedir phase-out period. termi."
= a Ft hating. in July: 1964. “Thereafter; except under certain un-— \
7: egual temporary conditions, the Supplementals were to\be '
avi cae completely “separated - from ‘ait transportation involving.
Eh individu ual: spied of the general public. si
pd ow Ml "Phe ¢ Board's 2 Legislative ‘Proposaly’ \S
as poe \Pollowing. its’ a tive attempts in the’ B6th Congress, «
: ‘s.- the'Board sought a uthority from the 87th Congress to issue
+. eertificates- of . public . convenience. and necessity to ‘the
__. Supplenienitals. containing limitations as to, the type’ and —
extent of service they ‘might render. Identical bills drafted
_. by the. Board were introduced i in’ the Senate and the House
~\ (8. 1969 and... R. 7318). Alan Boyd, Chairman of the
'_ , correct the deficiencies isi the ‘Board’s legal authority which... |
ware found tqexist by the court” { H. Hearings, p: 10 [207b}).
eae Ee The ‘Board’s bill proposed. the following definition of.
aD ““suppleinental air: transportation” : - , ;
. = . ” ° i.
1 game eipe tee 7 de
- : ‘The. 1962 cinenditiant also. ‘cncmeiah that the* Supple. Sa
a ~ Board, made clear the: limited scope of the legislation | : a
Sought. / The purpose ‘of the .Board’s: bill was ‘simply. “to \ |
Mes pe ae «(33) ‘Supplemental air Sia dalicd Sinan air |:
eee _ \transportation_rendered pursuant to a. certificate. of /
. 5” “pinblie convenience ‘and ‘necessity which contains sneh
See | “limitations. as to frequency of service, size: or: type of
@ I AC equipment, or ——! as will asaure that the service a
: ae Bhd | a: oor ~We 4 F: ; feos ; ht ig seaman ~ ee =
ai" el 4 +o all oe ae *
15.
80 authorized remains: suppleniental to the service
authorized by ‘certificatés. of public convenience and
~ necessity issued pursuant ‘to Sections 401(d) (1) and
(2) of this-Ac.” *
The definition was ‘identical to that proposed i in-the previ-
ous session and would have allowed the Board to certify
é -Supplemehtals to perform on a permanent basis. not only -
charter services but also individually ticketed transportation
of the type thé temporary legislation by Congress pérmitted.
Chairman Boyd made it clear that under the Board’s bill
charter would continue to have the sage meaning it then
had. under thé Board’s regulations which prohibited sales
to individual members of the general public (see Statement
by Chairman Boyd ‘to ‘Senate, ‘Committee; 8. ‘Hearings,
p. 26):
. “Senator ‘Monironey: They [the supplemental air
_ earriérs] would be certificated to fill in the heavy traffic :
period when seats might not be available « on the other
American aircraft? .
'¥ “Mr. Boyd: That is correct, sir, with the added : pro-
_ viso that it would be subject to the conditions estab-
lished by the Board providing for the homogeneity of |
the charter growp” (emphasis supplied).
. aca Boyd. emphasized that the Misiihie iis |
: regulations were designed to _prevent travel agents from
r solisiting the iis public (tbid., p, 29): re
ca
one ‘Thus the Board did not, as the Supplementals now sia tell
“the House Committee that supplemental carriers should be
granted charter authority . . ., and that the matter of what con-
stituted 4 eparter should be flexib a ee Br., p. 6).
|
or 4
“Mr. Boyd: ... The regular route carriers have got
to be protected. We can’t just turn loose completely —
and permit.charters to operate as we see it today on ©
this no-holds-barred basis, because the result would be
to put travel agents in the business of soliciting groups
-at.the expense of the regular route operators.
“Senator Monroney: I can well understand that you. |
_ could, through no-holds-barred on charters, very seri- | -
(el
. ously threaten the integrity: of the certificated route
_ structure. Sometimes I question whether we do not
“go the extreme limits. ,
rn i a a a ar |
.° “Senator Monroney: With respect to international
- charters by supplementals can’t the Board police those |
as well as they police domestic charters ‘with respect , fe a
to travel agents simply manufacturing the charter
groups?
“Mr. Boyd: Well, we think We do.” i
_ The Supplementals also ttnndinied a ill (f. R. 7512).
Clayton L. Burwell, president of the Independent Air-
lines Association and Supplemental Air Carrier Confer-
_ ence, and attorney here for petitioner Trans International
Airlines, Inc., explained to both Houses why the Supple- |
mentals sought. legislation expressly providing for “unlim-
_ ited charter operations.” He testified that all-expense tours
ae were not charter trips but he stated that the Supplementals
. sought to broaden the concept'of charter in air transporta-
“tion so as to include all-expense tours (ibid., p. 111):
“Mr. Burwell: '. . . it seems to me that it is well
worth a look of the committee in the promotion of
tourism and so on to take a look at the all-expense tour’
method of mee,
x
s
17
“Senator Monroney: Would that be ona charter.
basis, in your estimation?
“Mr. Burweli: I don’t think it is Sialic
- it is not a charter basis under the present Board ‘rules.
Under the definition that we would like to get it would
be.
: “Senator. Siete 3 What I was getting at, would
you recommend that as a charter, a full planeload that
would have to go the whole trip, the whole tour, or -
- would you want it on the exemption basis of SO. many
round trips a month, or so? 2
_ “Mr. Burwell: We would like to have it as a ak
ter.” (Emphasis supplied.) — 7 ;
Chairman Boyd opposed the span authority. re-
quested by the Supplementals. He explained ‘why in ‘an
exchange with Senator Cotton (ibid., p. 36)!
“Senator Cotton: ‘What would be your reaction if
the bill were to specifically authorize unlimited plane-
load charter service. in addition to giving the Board .
discretion as to additional types of service? |
“In other words, to open the door for charter service _
‘and retain-the Board’s discretion on individual ticketed
service and other service.
“Mr. Boyd: I think we would have to oppose that, .
Senator. | : ;
ss ® & & &
“This term ‘unlimited charter service’, as we understand
it, would create a real monster in that it would permit
individuals, presumably travel agents to go out and
solicit people, individuals, to join in » group to fly
charter instead of taking trips on individual ticketed
flights. We think this could have a very dangerous i im-
pact on regular route carriers.”
18
‘ It was also in opposition. to such “unlimited charter au-
thority”, and in favor of giving the Board power to prevent _
the Supplementals from operating individually ticketed ser-
vices under the guise of charters, as some had so often
tried to do in the past—and not, as petitioners claim, in
support of complete flexibility for the Board (cf. Supp.
Br., pp. 6-10, 44)—that Stuart Tipton, President of the Air
Transport Association, made his comments quoted by the
‘Supplementals here. Tipton’s concern was that the bill ©
- should not tie the Board’s hands so that it Would be. unable
to prevent the Supplementals from abusing the charter au-
‘thority which they would receive pursuant to the proposed
legislation. Critical portions of Tipton’s comments make _
this crystal clear (H. Hearings, pp. 239-240) : 3
“The problem is basically:a regulatory one. It is essen-_
__.tial to maintain standards of charterworthiness which |
‘safeguard against fictitious charters being set’ up by
ticket agents or others who sell individual tickets ‘to: the
—_— os
* oe o * we 5 ;
“Tt {H. R. 7512] ‘is sialon and, indeed, dangerous. It -
fails to incorporate any controls to prevent fictitious —
. charters which would actually entail sale of individual
tickets to the general public.” ~*~ . |
And, as Tipton beret is to the Senate (8. Heating, ;
p. 278):
“The basic guideline being this leat, an n appropriate
‘function of the Board is to prescribe regulations, as
* needed ‘from time to time, to prevent abuses through
ticket agents, solicitation of the general public, or
'. other devices for conducting. individually ticketed op-
a sie
. y 19 ae
erafions under the guise of ‘charter’. nas ‘(Emphasis
supplied. )* +.
2. The Senate Committee’s Modification of the
Bills Introduced ©
The Senate Senuaitnie was not satisfied with the Board’s
bill and proceeded to modify it. “Charter service” was de-
fined in. Section 101(13). of the First Print of the Senate
Committee’s bill as pe ae | =
“air transportation performed by an air carrier hold-
ing a certificate of. public convenience and necessity
where the entire capacity of one or more aircraft has
been engaged for the movement of persons and their :
baggage or. for the movement of property on a time,
‘Inileage or trip basis, but shall not include transporta-
. tion services offered by an air carrier to individual
~- members of the general public or performed by an air
carrier under an arrangement with any person who
’ provides or offers to provide Bearcat of persons
to the general public.”
Section 401(e) of this print provided, in pertinent p side
“A certificate issued under this Section to engage in.
supplemental ° air transportation ‘shall authorize the.
carrier to provide charter service and may also au-
_ thorize the carrier to provide ie aaa airen or
_ waybilled amen service.” *°
“The Committee drew a clear distinetion between “charter”
and ee ticketed” service.
19 See ‘ive statement quoted at page 9 of ASTA’s brief. |
_ ® Committee Print, S 1969, Jaly 10, 1961.
90.
The definition of charter service appearing in the First _
Print was modified in the Second Committee Print pre- —
. pared a few.days later." At the end of the definition was:
added of ee
“. .., other than in ‘connection with all-expense-paid
tours.” * | .
Ce]
Committee-Print Three made no change in. this addition
but Print Four* provided that-only a member of agroupon —
an all-expense paid tour would be permitted to fly ona .
charter by changing the language. to read:
“~..., other than as a member of a group on an all-
expense paid tour.” —
These changes were in substance contained in the final |
version ‘(Committee Print Five) —- by the Senate
Committee. anes
_ The Senate Committee bill as reported thus would have
--@xpanded the meaning of charter in air transportation so
as to permit the Board to authorize all-expense tours by
groups as charters. If defined as charters, inclusive tours
- would then not be subject té another requirement in the
Senate bill that no certificate for individually ticketed ser-
- Committee Print No. 2, § 1969, July 14, 1961. .
2 Noteworthy, although petitioners would ignore the distinction
(e.g., C. A. B. Br., pp. 6, 12),-is that the Senate print referred te
_ “all-expense paid tours” ‘and not “inclusive tours.”
28 Committee Print No. 4, S 1969, July 24, 1961.
oe ‘ Committee Print, S 1969, sind 29, 1961.
21
vices could be issued if it resulted in significant diversion
from the-seheduled carriers.* ~
The Senate Committee thought that its bill.“incorporated |
the common law definition of charter” and stated in its’
Report that “an all-expense-paid group tour” could be -
offered to individual members of the public by a carrier or
travel agent and still conform to “the traditional concept
of charter”. Petitioners emphasize these statements with
the implication that according to the Senate Committee
Report all-expense-paid tours are included within the
meaning .of “charter trips” as used in air transportation. .
The Senate Report, of course, nowhere says that all-ex-
pense-paid tours are included within the meaning of char:
ter trips in air transportation. As is apparent from the
balance of the legislative history, and, as pointed out more ©
~ fully below, the exact. contrary is the case. 7
3. The House Committee’s Modifications
_ While the Senate bill would have given the Board au- _
. thority to authorize‘the Supplementals to engage in all the
_- activities invalidly permitted heretofore and all-expense
tours in addition, the House. Committee felt that the Board
should not even be permitted to authorize all the operations
' the Board had previously attempted to allow, as the Board |
** This history of the development of the Senate bill, and par-
ticularly the change in the definition of “charter” after the First
Print, completely refutes the argument of the Board here that the .
_ Senate only included this proviso in line with its attempt to limit
individual ticketing and was not’ a grant of authority which the
Board would otherwise have lacked (see C. A. B. Br., pp. 14-15). -_
The Board’s inclusive tour regulations, in addition to not meeting
the requirement of the Senate bill for an’ all-expehse tour, do not
Meet the added.requirement included in the Senate proposal that
all-expense tours be sold only to one who is “a member of a group.”
. @
v9 das , . |
Was requesting. As its Report pointed out. (HL Rep., PP:
6-7 [32b-33b])': :
- The committee is reporting herewith a substitute
for-H. R. 7318, a bill drafted by the Civil Aeronautics |
Board to permit the granting of limited -certificates. |
' to supplemental air carriers, authority which the U. S. |
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has |
~ held the Board does not have under existing law. - |
' . HL RB. 7318, as imtroduced, would have granted the
_ Board the authority which the court held it did not — '
_ possess and would have permitted the Board to author- |
ize supplemental operations to continue along the lines
of present operations.
“The .committee ‘substitute, drafted afféx careful :
consideration by: the full committee and the Subcom-
mittee on Transportation and Aeronautics, would give _ Ba ae
"the Board some, but not all, of the authority requested =~
by it. The committee substitute would establish guide-
lines for the Board to follow in exercising its author-
ity to certificate supplemental carriers, especially, in
the field of individually ticketed operations.” 4g —
phasis supplied.)
rn
“The House Committee bill thus provided:
“(33) ‘Supplemental air “ transportation’ means —
charter trips in air transportation, other than the
transportation of mail by aircraft, rendered: pursuant . -
to a certificate -of public convenience and necessity
issued pursuant to section 401(d) (3) of this Act to
' supplement the scheduled service authorized by cer-
tificates of public convenienee and necessity issued |
pursuant to sections 401(d)(1). and (2) of this Act.”
S (Emphasis ——
23
The House Committee bill in addition disiat distin-
guished between “charter”. .and “individually ticketed ser-
vices”. It permitted the Supplementals to engage in the ~
latter in two limited circumistances: (1) for a two-year |
period after enactment the Board could permit the Supple-'
mentals to perform certain individually ticketed services in
order “to permit an orderly transition to all-charter opera-
_ tions”; and (2) the Board was given authority to issue a
* special operating authorization to a Supplemental authoriz-
ing it to engage in air transportation between two points for
& maximum period of 90 days when there isa temporary _
requirement for such air transportation either because the _ 7
capacity being offered by certificated air carriers is tem- °
, porarily insufficient to meet the requirements of the public
. or.the Postal Service or because one or both points is not
regularly served by any air carrier. Only i in these limited
situations would Supplementals be ene to_ engage
in individually ticketed service. ~~
_ As explained by the House Committoe (a Rep. +» Pp.
~10-11 [41b-42b]):
“The basic concept written into the substitute bill
. reported herewith is that the. supplementals essen-
tially are charter operators. The committee recognizes
_ that under special circumstances and in temporary
situations, ‘individually ticketed supplemental service
- fills-a definite need in our, transportation system.. The
committee recognizes also that individually ticketed
supplemental Service must necessarily be subject to -
_ ¢lose scrutiny by the Civil Aeronautics Board to make
' ‘certain that such service is restricted to supplemental
needs and does not provide unfair or re
i. 7 to scheduled carriers,...”%. aa
:
*
*
: : ?
.
° ° . .
7 . . . a
24 E 1 a
° ° . . ®
“ 3
Unlike the Senate bill, the House bill did not expand
/the established méaning of “charter” in air transporta- +
- tion by. defining “charter service” to include all-expense - 7
paid group tours. |
The House Committee “came to the conclusion that under
the circumstances, authority to define charter services -
should be left, as at present, with the Board, subject to
the limitations contained in the reported bill” (H. "Rep. oD
11 [42b]; emphasis supplied). ** The House thus clearly rec-
. ognized that the Board’s authority to define charter service
was limited and did not include the power to change the
established meaning and wipe out the distinction between
“charter” and “individually ticketed service” expréssly
recognized i in the House bill.
’ Representative’ Williams, the Chicicinen of the Suboom-
mittee, pointed out (108 Cong. Rec. 12322, June 29, 1962
| [230b]) : | .
“The all-expense tours that ‘were provided far in 1 the
Senate definition were not accepted by the House, . .
Representative Harris, Chairman of the Honse iin. *
explained further (108 Cong. Rec. 12322, June 29, 1962
[230b, 231b]) :
“The Senate seepened to change’ the well established }
| meaning of ‘charter. ’* The House a to changing |
« al it.” ; y
e* «© ee @ @
{3
se © The italicized words are omitted entirely by ASTA in its sum-,"”-
_ _. mary of the House Committee Report (ASTA Br., p.°24). The 4 My
' “House did not, as petitioners would have this Court believe, leave: S
the definition of “charter” entirely to the Board (€. A. B. Br., ,p. 7; ;
STA Br., p. 24; Supp. Br., p. 48). It simply wanted the Board.
have sufficient authority to Py effectively with any attempt = -
to — the charter concept” (C. A ~ & & hs 75 emphasis. sup:
" plied mie
; | Any =
|
. 25 : 7
‘Ne, “The law is well established that, in' air transporta-.
sae ‘tion, charter means essentially the lease of the entire
Mie capacity of an aircraft for a périod of. time or a
*. particular trip, for the transportation of cargo or per-
‘36ng_and baggage, on a basis which does not include |
; solicitation of the general public, or any device where
ee individually ticketed services would be offered or per-
- formed under guise of charter. The ‘basic concept
being’ thus clear, it is important that the Civil Aero-
- nauties Board, by. regulation and. other appropriate
“Measures, make sure that charter serves its planeload : bo
service concept and is not employed as a , Subterfuge. }
to perform individually ticketed services. Manifestly,
the nature of such subterfuge may change from time.
to time,-and the regulatory agency needs some flexi-
bility to modify its regulations to guard against any
new subterfuges that may emerge. For this reason, .
- the House committee objected to any attempt to freeze -
into the act a definition of charter service which would
- prevent theBoard from dealing effectively with abuses.
Thus the bill, as passed by the House, contained no " ‘é
definition of charter.” | eer
>
¢e
See also statement of Representative Collier, a aeeeget
of the bill (108 Cong. Ree. 12324, June 29, 1962 [232b-
233b]).*" . ; )
The House Cnnsalieee further ebeisinbeni that .the
Board should include “limitations” i in the certificates of the
Supplementals 80 as “to assure that thé services are |
_ ** This is the “identical statement” referred to in the brief. of
the Supplementals (Supp. Br., pp. 17, 49). The statement was
prepared by Chairman Harris’ (108 Cong. Rec. 12322 [231b])..
Representative Collier apparently was so strongly in agreement with -
_. , the comments of the Chairman of his Committee that he felt com-
* " pelled to repeat them. . 3
2: . & y . oe s
pleinental air transportation” . ‘even in the
r operations to which the Supplementals
"alo, H. Rep. p. 18 [58b]): ot ss gene
‘Harris. indicsited élearly- in describing thie
| Committee bill to the House, as Senator Monroney had
indicated to the Senate: (107 Cong. Ree. 17163, August 28, .
& vices ‘were two entirely: distinct things. He explained ial
- Cong. Rec: 20081, September 18,1961):
“Under this reported bill, Mr. ‘ieee the Civil |
- Aeronautics Board is authorized: t6 ‘issue. certificates
to supplementafyair. carriers to conduct, first, charter. °
operations. Second, the Board would be authorized to
| permit carriers to furnish individual ticketed services .
oe fs | temporary basis. i in order ‘to meet certain situa-
tions ® where additional air. transportation is needed _
-. _guch as is required for holiday seasons or resort trans: >
a ae portation and similar cases.” « ‘= e
: Representative. Williams iptiee 4 in a ailiie: vein (107
Cong. Ree.- 20082, September 18,1961).
Chairman Harris ‘made clear that. any ‘Tieed for holi- °
day travel, the alleged need met by all-expense tours
were confingd under the House bill’ (Section eect see 5
~ 1961), that charter operations and individual ticketed ser- — |
"(see ASTA Br., p. 4),.would be met by another provision -
_. of the House bill (107 Cong. Rec. 20081, September 18,
.. °1961), Representative Williams explained that the reported .
bill would (107 Cong. ‘Rec. 20082; September 18, 1961): ’
“Second. Permit the Board to authorize the supple- ..
ba ess ae mentale to. provide individually. ticketed service on a
Riera temporary basis in situations where additional air
transportation is needed. These situations, for ex.
’
‘. The Conference Commitiee’s Action
: bathe - a oT an | Beas
a ample, would: include holiday and vacation travel, and °
such ‘things as transportation to summer resorts or -
_ vaeation spots we Renin facilities are defi-
—- pe arie
4
™ :
Because of. the confliét in the bills reported. to and passed
5 by the Fespective. Houses; a conference became: ‘mecessary.°
- But there wag‘no time for such action’ before adjournment.
After Congress réconyened, modifications in the legisla-
tion were introduced to-meet problems of air safety of
the Supplementals which had been. highlighted by a recent
air crash (see ASTA Bt. » pp. 13, £2).
When the modified legislation was introduced on the floor
~ of the Senate, further discussion ensued about “all-expense
tours.” Senator Morton, a member of the Senate Sub- |
si committee arid a mariager of the ‘bill, expressed the first —
doubts as to all-expense tours before that body (108-Cong.
Ree. 37065 March 8, 1962): Ts.
. - “There i is one. area in the proposed legislation, how-
ever, that raises grave doubts in my. mind. This is
_ the grant of power .to the CAB +o permit the sup-_
‘plemental carriers to carry individually ticketed traffic
: and afl-uxpenee-paid-tout traffic.” **- ’
The House began consideration of the’ riodified: bill .
few-days later, March 14, 1962 (108 Cong. Rec. 4049). The
difficulties that ‘the House had with the Senate bill, par-
= ner with the Provision for =e four authority, ;
8 This dietienas, tnctdenealty, was not mnie pan after the Con-
gress learned that the Bureau of Economic Regulation would seek
_ ’ °all-expense tour authority, as ASTA would have this Court be-
— nen Br., PP- 18, 22), but three’ ‘months: earlier.
?
2 %\ 4 . 3 -
‘ er
‘ime tinmediately brought out ‘into the open. " Representes |
“tive Walter stated (108-Cong. Ree. 4050, March 14, 1962) :
_, “The part of the Senate bill which was written last
summer, however, still ‘has several undesirable fea-
tures. The worst of these is the one giving the Board °°
_. power to Brant. broad -individwally ticketed authority ,
to these carriers. That authority has been used by.
some of the nonskeds ever. since the end/ of World War. *:
I. In every year since then—every year, mind you—
at least one, and often ‘several, nonskeds’ have beén -
Ss) engaged in regular, continous, — viguriee -
"that nai 3
“The Senate pill ‘in has a definition of charter
authority: which would let a nonsked carry -anyone,
Rep: anytime—much more ‘than even our main trunklines .
‘have authority to do—if only the carriage is part of
“tours in _— the only significant item was the air
“fare... .
"Representative Hemphill, a member of the House-Com- _
‘mittee, also .expressed his views on the all-expense tour
authority set out in the Senate bill (108 Cong. Rec. 4052,
_ March 14, 1962): . +
“Tt is beyond dispute that the individually ticketed
2 so-called all-expense tour. The result would be phony -
authority which the Senate: bill would provide is po- —
tentially much broader than the past unenforceable
Beal Sonne system. Moreover, the Senate would grant the non-.
skeds the right to carry so-called all-expense-paid tour a
business. In the past, ne regulation. failed be-
at Rep srenentative Walter, moreover, was & proponent, not an op-
ponent, Pf the Soe a (as the Supplementals contend, Sepp. Br.,
. p. 48). See 108 Ree. 12325 “—_ 29, mee
. Cause it wasrimpossible ni! the CAB to police , each ~
flight conducted by the nonskeds. Under the Senate -
bill, the CAB. would be required to -police. each
passenger to determine whether he was a bona fide
_ all-expense-paid tour passenger. This is clearly less .-
\qrorkable than the already proven unworkable system.” AR
The Conference Committee adopted the provisions of . —
the House bill on all matters. here. relevant, omitting both —
the Senate ‘Committee's definition of charter and.-the au-°
~ thority in the Senate bill, for the i issuance of certificates for -
other than charter transportation. (See Conference
" port, pe i4 [199b-200b] ; C. A. B. Br., pp. 7; 17; ASTA Br.,,.
: pp. 11-12; Supp. Br., p. 14).° Also omitted was the Senate.
provision. that certificates: authorizing individually ticketed
. Service should be so limited as to prevent significant diver-
‘sion from scheduled. carriers. The Conference Committee
Report stata that the Conference bill _—— Report, |
p. 14) . ee os
‘tnbiite the provisions of the House amendment with
. respect to the prohibition of individually. ticket od_and
~ waybilled’ services on a permanent basis.”
It also states that after the d-yenn period during. which -
individually ticketed services could be continued (tbid.)
“supplemental air transportation would be limited to
all-charter operations, except for limited individually
ticketed service which may be en i by the Board -——
, one nemporery basis.”
The Conference: Committes acide dis siso “distin.
guishes between charter operations and iridividually tick-
eted services. And it confirms that, with the exceptions
noted, ee ticketed services are Rebsasus under:
* .the ‘Conference ‘bill. Since inclusive tours are individually
_ ticketed services, they are prohibited by the. Conference :
- .. bill, which is the 1962 amendinent.
‘Senator Monroney, Chairman of the Pinte Subcom- ;
. mittee, described the Conference Report as follows (108
‘Cong. Ree. 12282-12283, June 29, 1962) : |
% mechs ck ee 4 regret. to bene: to report to the Senate that the
| ; Dill as agreed upon in conference departs quite sub-
stantially from the economic provisions which . the
- Senate has endorsed on two occasions in passing this
_ ‘pil The: conference report contemplates ' a supple-
7 mental air carrier industry much more limited i in terms
_ of its role in air transportation than that which was °
ne ey envisaged by the committee = endorsed by the
a : “The conference report adopts the provisions of the -
House bill limiting the’ permanent role of these car-
riers to charter service. The Senate bill had-provided-~
___that-the-Board might isgue certificates: to these car- -
.Yiers permitting them ‘to engage in individually tick- *
. eted operations as might be required by public con- -.
venience and necessity, but ‘tequired the Board +o
impose such limitations qn éertificates. as are neces-
eae, gary to insure that individpally ticketed operations
5
did not result in a significant diversion of traffic from . -
>) | ___ the ‘regularly-vertificated route carriers. “ —. |
~~~" +. This’ amendment was included by reason of the
diligence’ of the distinguished Senator from New
Hampshire [Mr. Corror], .
“I am convinced that. the provisions of the Benet .
bill would have produced a stronger supplemental in-
dustry, one better able to serve the needs of the Nation
-in both peace and war. However, it becaine apparent |
that the only way legislatién could be obtained was .
by accepting the House provision limiting: these car-
riers to charter operations.”
Further explanation of. the action of the Conference .
Committee appears in a statement. by Senator Cotton; : es
manager of the bill and. member‘of the Conference and:
Senate Subcommittees (108 Cong. Rec. 12284, June 29,1962.
[236b]):
“F do. wish to comment briefly on‘one aspect of the
. conference committée’s action.. The ‘conferees agreed _
‘to drop the language. in the Senate bill which defined «
_ charter service, and permitted the sale. of tickets on
charter flights to individual members.‘of, the general
‘public who were ‘on all-expense-paid tours. I am
_ wholly in accord with the action in eliminating the |
_. all-expense tour provision and thus refusing to confer
, this power on the Board.” © 0
To this Senator Scott, another member of the-Senate _
Subcommittee and of the Conference Committee, added ‘the —
-following (108 Co |
238b]):° ,
“The Senate bill proposed to modify the: established .
concept of charter by permitting charters to ‘a group
on an all-expense-paid tour’... 0°
¥:
‘ - oe: oe 2. se. = . ‘ S
“The committee of conference wisely eliminated the
_, Senate provision: The bill thus, in effect, confirms the
established Jaw as to a charter in air transportation.
_ There should be no question about that. The Congress ©
has considered, and: has rejected, a proposai to change
the established meaning of charter so as to have per-.
‘
ng. Rec. 12284-12285, June 29, 1962 [937b--. - °
ae . noe * ¥ be : es
— 3 ee
/orystal clear (108 Cong. Ree. 12285, June 29, 1962 [239b] ).
“concept be grafted onto the existing charter definition.
This would be intolerable, and has. been expressely re-
. provision. '
“Therefore, I want to ‘aiapanien that thé-CAB must
of this concept-would defeat the purpose of this sup-
| b gucrgaes intent that the supplemental, . after the
trate. excludively on fall planeload charters.
ae individually ticketed operations. The law violations in
tions of safety provisions as well. It is for this reason
that. I want to emphasize the ‘insistence of Congress
that supplemental operations shall be confined to. full
| planeload charter operations exclusively.”
~ Monroney’s statement (108 ai Ree. — J une 29, 1962
ae: : :
ae mitted travel. agent’ chaxiers for - all-expense ‘tours.
“ Such'tharters. have no place in air ee meet.
-Resptindsiite do not. question that the Senators were os 5
\ aware that the Board was considering the idea of permit-
ting the Supplementals to operate all-expense tours. Sena- ©
jor Thurmond; 2 another Committee: member, made this —
“] am advised: that the. CAB Bureau of. Econom- .
ies has. advocated that a so-called all-expense tour —
‘continue its historic, charter definition. Any erosion -
plemental, legislation, and would undermine the con:
ad r phasing out period, shall not conduct any in-
ronan ticketed business, but,. rather, shall eqneen- oe
this area have all too frequently .extended to infrac- |
The Board (C. A. B. Br,, p. a hi sinait Measdor :
: jected by the conferees.. The Senate receded from its. .
. charter definition which papas this all-expense tour my
“Air transportation has suffered from the abenes of:
_ “The charter defigition contained in the Senate ver.
_ sion of the bill was omitted from the bilPagreed to by
_ the conferees. ‘This was done unilaterally by the Sen- -
ate confered& because of the decision which had been
“made on individually ticketed authority..."
The Board incorrectly implies that by his statement Sena..
tor Monroney was saying that the Board had been given a
sufficiently wide “latitude in defining eharters”.so that it
: . could reinstate into the. bill’ the. all-expense tours the con-
-ferges had just: removed. But what the Senator actually.
seems to have been saying is ‘that all-expense tours were
omitted from the ‘Senate bill bedause they involved indi-
__vidually ticketed, authority and the conferees had decided
. the Supplementals should have no individually ticketed
authority.
°
“Moreover, the Board did not quote all that Senator Mon-*
Toney said: “In the ‘sentences immediately following it is
3 _ ticketed authority . (
“=~ :[235b-236b]):
clear that the attention of the Senate conferees was focused
on the question-of permitting the Board to authorize Mplita:
s
~ ¢harters-<which, of course, did not ‘involve any individually
108 Cong. Rec. 12283, June 29, 19657
-. “The charter definition. would have viata to prohibit
the granting of split charters—that is, the transporta- _
-. tion of more than one charter group. in a single air- °
' craft. We felt that the Board should ‘be left free to
determine on its merits the desirability of permitting
the supplemental carriers to conduct such:charters, in . .
__ View of-the fact that the charter business ‘will ulti-
_ mately represent the only’ source of revenue for these .
" carriers. Another reason why. we desired to leave the _
Board sufficient flexibility sc that it might permit split
: dhartece was the effort of the: Difense Department to -
encourage these carriers’ to acquire modern - curbine-
powered equipment for the éivil reserve air fleet. ‘The
size of such aircraft. makes it virtually impossible to
find a charter group eeanly — to fill an entire i
_ aircraft.” | a
> ea
to authorize split charters, not to change the meaning of
charter to include: - individually ticketed service, —
In view of-the crucial importance the issue of authoriz- \
+ ing all-expense tours had assumed, and the statements of
_ three Senators on his Committee that such authority was
°o
eet flexibility he wae retecrinig to was. sufficient flexibility .
not permitted by the Conference bill, one would have ex- ° :
; pected Senator Monroney to have expressed his disagree-
ment, if, in fact, he did disagree with that construction. ©
However, in contrast to his: statement on split charters,
nowhere is there any. statement by him suggesting that
the Board should be free to determine the desira. hility of
pee permitting; Supplementals to carry all-expense. tours.
"Senator Scott’s explanation. of the omission of the defini-
tion of “charter” sheds much further light (108 ane. 2 Rec.
12284, June 29, 1962 1236b-237b]) :
. “While the: bill: thus contemplates only charter ser-
‘vices by the suppignentals, it does not define ‘charter’.
_It doés not need to do so. The act has, since au-
thorized charter trips by scheduled airlines wi out
regard to-the points named in their’ certificates under
Board regulations. The ‘meaning of charter in air
transportation has become well established law, and
it would ‘have been superfinous to write = into the.
is sremened a tar
Oc ®. 2 ef le es. ."
ox
"-_*: “Another essential element is that the person who
viduals or Solicit the general public to buy space. ‘This .
* 48 necessary to prevent breakdown of thé regulatory. ‘
’ system, and most particularly the rate regulatory sys-
tem. If this were not one of the rules, a ‘travel agent .
could charter an. aitplane, and’ then offer the seats to
the general public at less per head than the tariff fares
the airplane must observe as to each Passenger.” *
-
The members of the House Committee ‘were also con-
cerned lest the omission of a charter Aefinition be mis: «: -
; abe Representative Williams stated (108 Cong. Be,
- Ree, 12322, June 29, 1962 ou, | Ca ae aaa on Ra
. “The Senate receded, and acéepted the position’ ef.
the House on that provision. So, there is no statutory —
definition of ‘charter’ in the bill, That definition will
‘be the one which is presently. in effect under a regula-"
tion of the Civil Aeronautics Board. The all-expense
tours that were provided for in the Senate definition
were not accepted by the House and the Senate receded
and concurred in our position on that, also.”
_ Chairman Harris, who presented the Conference Re.
“pott.to the House, explained (108 Cong. Rec. 12320, 12321;
12322-12323, June 29, 1962) : Ae ee a
. “As is well known, the most difficult problem was.
that. of transportation of individually ticketed passen-
. gers. The bill as passed by the House last September
- 18 sought to limit the supplemental carriers to charter _
- operations, with no individually ticketed or individn-.
Sly waybill authority except in certain limited emer-
gency situations, = ==... 8 ie
i
XQ.
—
f ‘ai the supplemental air carrier bill passed by eo
€ House proposed to first, authorize the ‘Board to
issue ‘certificates to. supplemental. carriers to conduct —
- charter operations; second, authorize individually
‘, 4 ge mE
. : ‘ . 2 ae
~* ‘aes ona temporary basis for special situa- -
un
, , tions r regulations of the Board; ae |
ee a me Ok Tae NS
“The bill agreed to in conference adopts the House
. provisions, prohibiting individually ticketed and indi-
f » ” vidually wayhilled services on a permanent basis.” ?
‘Chairman Harris then went on to ‘point’ oft that the bill
as pasved by the House contained no definition of. charter
_.for the reasons already noted (supra, p. 25). He ex- .
plained why the Senate bill had contained such a defini--
3 tion (108 Cong. Rec. 12323, June 29, 1962 [232b])::
nition of charter service. This was: necessary, in large
' part, because the Senate proposed to modify the es-
tablished: concept of charger in order to permit car-
riage, as charter, -of ‘a group on.an all-expense paid
-sistence on the all-expayse-paid tour exception, it fol-.
lowed that the remainder of the Senate definition was
: superfigous since it merely stated. established law and .
: policy. "(Emphasis gga fe
e- . * ‘@
pp the bi bill reported by the conferges contains nd defi-
nition of charter becatise the Senate. receded. The —
language the ee. was s concerned about is not. in -
the bill: ee
-: charter in ‘a avintion field. has hee meant .
the emgrgecient of the entire —* of. the aircraft
tour’. The Senate conferees having receded from in-.. -
' “The Senate bill, on the other hand, contained a defi-__ Mi
or ener, 3
. for 4 particular purpose by a‘single engaging party.
Fravel agents, being agents for transportation ser-_
_ Vices, rather than carriers themselves, have neyer beeii’
allowed to engage airplanes in their own name for . |
| ‘their own accdunt. Nor -should they: be allowed to.
_ That is why the House objected to the proposal of the.
. Senate including the ‘all-expense: tour” language. As —
* “explained in thé House ‘report, we felt the Board
should be in a position to deal effectively with any
efforts to abuse the Meaning of charter. *- eo
- re
o e -% . oe. if
°
~ “The Senate. conferees having receded from insistenc
* onthe all-expense-paid, tour exception, it followed that
_. the remainder of the Senate definition was superfluous
. since it merely stated established law and policy.”
Both ‘Houses agreed on.this version prohibiting all- °
expense tours. The final ver@on, -as did earlier versions,
drew a sharp distinction between “charter” and “individu-
ally-ticketed” services. Generally, the Supplementals were
limited to charter operations. Individually ticketed travel
was permitted. only under very limited circumstances,
which :no one claims to be a basis ‘for the inclusive tour -
. _ authority granted by. the Board. “gh pe vealen
F. The Board's Inclusive Tour Regulations _ © a
.. As noted ‘above (supra, p. 7), the Board; in order to a
effectuate the. inclusive tour authority granted the Sup-
plementals, ‘adopted certain ‘Tpgulations (Orders Nos. E-
- 24238, H-24241, 596a-607a, 1 a-1096a). Far from insuring
any significant difference between inclusive tours and re-
spondents’ individually-ticketed ‘services ( Supp. Br., p. 24);
the regulations simply highlight how ‘this inclusive tour.
a
e ‘
7 ‘
—
Birnie amare eee ai — pare .
aon tah
ke °
. oe
@ *
o authority alienen such services of respondents. Essen-
tially, the regulations require nothing more than round-
trip air transportation, limousine service from the airport
to the hotel (surface transportation) and hotel accommo-
dations at-the three places (stops) which qualify the trip
as a “tour”—all for'a price only slightly above the lowest
point-to-point air fare of the petitioners:* There is ‘no
Yequirement that the “tour” include meals.” ‘There is no
requirement that the “tour” include sightseeing activi-
ties.* There is no requirement that the “tour” participants
stay at the same hotel.” There is no requirement that the.
participants engage: in any “group” function. ‘The only
.time that a tour participant even has to see any of the
persons assembled from the general ‘public by the travel _
' agent for this “charter” is on the airplane to and seas
‘points of f origination and destination.
” endian sadiuesibiliie of. the ieiaieeaails is set forth in
Appendix C. Such advertising shows that the Supplementals have
extensively advertised the availability of the low cost transportation
to.individuals (see Appendix C, pp. C-1, C-2). Indeed, these “tour |
charters” have been advertised as allowing “individuals to fly at
‘organizations’ rates . . . at far less cost than before. So much: less
that Liberty [an agent] tosses in trips’ to the neighbor islands,
superior hotels, sightseeing excursions, parties, eVén tips” (see 3
Appendix C, p. C-5). And Berry advertises flights on. World “at
. low charter prices,” permitting the traveler to “See.and do every-
and save big money! And still ‘enjoy Berry more-fun-for-
your-money extras” (see Appendix C, p. C-3). |
81 Illustrative of it urs” where meals were not included are
:those approved by Orders Nos. E-23888 (July 1, 1966); E-24041
{amie 7 1966) ; E-24487 (December 7, 1966) ; B-24581 (Decem-
ber 29, 1966). See also Appendix C, pp. 0-8, C-4, C-5.
a Illustrative of tours where si sightseeing is optional are those ap-
proved by Orders Nos. E-23888 (July 1, 1966) ; E-24001 Sa 22,
1968) ; ; H-24038 (August 3, 1966) ; ; B-24845 (March 10, 1967).
on See; €0 Appendix C, pp. 0-4, C-5.
ae a? te
_@
oC
. q ,
PNT RT
E-24886 (November 9, 1966).
39
The seven days minimum for an “inclusive” tour is no
restriction, since it is far less than- the number of days.
spent by the averagé air trayeler over respondents’ inter-
national routes (25a-26a). The regulation minimum of three
stops on an inclusive tour again Places no meaningful re-
striction on such travel, since the average traveler on re-
spondents’ aircraft visits at least three countries in the
transatlantic area and six in the Pacific area (25a-26a,
959a). i me Sri eat. 5
The information ‘the Board requires for approval of a
tour, ¢.g:, “name of ‘hotel” (Supp. Br., p. 26), provides no
. Significant basis for distinguishin inclusive tours from
respondents’ services.** Other requirements serve no better, _
many of them having been waived by the Board in practice.
For example, the Board has approved. an application for
a change in itinerary filed a week after the tour departed.*
Surety bond requirements (Supp. Br., p..27) have often .
been waived, as has , the requirement... that a .tour
application be ‘Submitted 90 days ini advance.”
54 The Board obviously will not disapprove an “inclusive tour”
because .it does ‘not like the name of the hotel. Indeed, it has ap-. .
proved inclusive tours ‘specifying a number of alternative hotels
for the same stop. See, e.g., Order No. E-25149 (May 15, 1967),-
approving application which included brochure annexed hereto as
part of Appendix D, page Del. . eo |
*5 See, e.g., Order No. E-25246 (June 2, 1967).
** See, ¢.g., Order No. E-26496 (March 1l, 1968); Order Nos.
E-24581 (December 29, 1966) ; Order No. E-24487 (December 7, .
1966) ; Order No. E-26160 (December 21, 1967) ; Order No. E-24828 ©
(March 7, 1967): Order No. E-25265 (June 7, 1967); Order No.
E-24473 (December 2, 1966) ; Order No. E-25140 (May 12, 1967) ;
Order No. E-25149 (May 5, 1967).
*? See, ¢.g., Order No. E-24586 (December 30, 1966) ; Order No.
4 See
The suggestion that the Board is strictly voliging inclu-
sive tour authority i is belied by the fact that 1,250 inclu-
sive tours have been approved since July 1966." The na-
tional advertising of the Supplementals, directly appealing
td the general public for patronage, and brochures filed in
connection with inclusive tour applications show. how un-
“regimented” (ASTA Br., p. 25) is the travel involved and
how it overlaps the very services offered by respondents —
to the public at large through travel agents.” As one
brochure for an approved tour put it: ih at €
“Azour REGIMENTATION- There xiniply isn’t any!
You fly as a group, but once you arrive at your destina-
‘tion you do as you please” (Appendix D, p. D-4).”: |
ee
” Annexed as 5 Appendix B is a list’ of the anes tours approved |
since July 1966.
%° Appendix D contains aoe brochures filed with inclusive
tour applications. Illustrative of lack of regimentation -is a tour
program for two tours to Hawaii, including’ stops’at San Francisco
— e" Vegas, jointly offered by Trans International Airljnes, _...
f the petitioners here, and Male-Travel-Bureau and approved.
- og Board (Orders Nos. E-23886 (June 30, 1966), E-24001 (July
22, 1966), E-24038 (August 3,1966), E E-24845 (March 10, 1967) ). ;
Apart from accommodations and transfers to’ hotels, all activities
are optional; indeed, extra charges are made for just about all ©
of them, including an extra charge for meals not in-flight, Nothing
. is said about staying at the same hotels; at an extra cost other ~
hotel space is available (Appendix D, pp. D-5, D-7).
A tour application filed jointly by Overseas National Airlines
Male Trayel Bureau and approved by the Board (Orders Nos. -
E- 8 (July 1, 1966), E-24001 (July 22, 1966) ) is another illus- ~
tration. The brochure states “a choice of . . Sightseeing Available
"in each city (at additional cost)” (Appendix D, p. D-77)... The
itinerary provides many leisute' days in Las Vegas, Los Angeles,
San Francisco and Hawaii with information as td what ‘one might
do with the time if one wishes but no more. Meals are not included.
ad Brethare for tour applicgtion filed jointly by Overseas Na-
tional Airways American International Travel Service ap-
_. proved by the | (Order No. E-25149 (April-7, 1967), modified —
in other er Order No. E-25245 (June 2, 1967) ) (Appendix
z.
i
The ‘regulations adopted by the Board do. not in fact
' restrict but actually permit widespread solicitation and in-
dividual ticketing of the general public in contravention of
o the intent and purpose of the 1962 amendment (see infra,
pp. 60-63). As the Court of Appeals held, moreover, they
are immategial to the question of the power Congress gave
the Board. _- eee os “23 |
G. The Decision of the Court Below )
- In making its decision that the Board lacked the power
_ to authorize ‘inclusive tours, ‘the Court of Appeals. recog-
_ nized that the District of Columbia Court had reached a |
diametrically opposite result based on the same statute in
‘American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Agronautics Board, 365 F.
—, 2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1966), in ‘which ‘an order of the Board
‘relating to the domestic area had been reviewed, . -
. The. Court of Appeals eonsidered the contention, made-
____—By-the Supplementals,* but not by. the Board," that any . .
review was barred by the decision of this Court in Chicago
. & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman 8.8. Corp., 333 U. S.
103 (1948). The court noted that in Waterman (380. F.2d.
at 775 (1128a)): : 7 : :
e “.. . Petitioner did not challenge the regularity of °
the Board’s proceedings and apparently raised no issue.
as to the Board’s statutory authority; instead ‘it at. f
_ taaked-the correctness of the Board’s findings. and the /
adequacy of the evidence supporting them....” /-
D, pp. D-1 to D-4). An advertisement for a “tour” under the aus- ag
' -pices-of these same two companies also emphasizes “Never Any ges
Regimentation” (Appendix C, p. C4). | Th eee,
“in, AS Shown infra, pp. 82-83, the Board’s failure to raise Water-
"mam below in connection with the question of statutory power was °
_* RO mere oversight, but an expression of its view that review was
> ,Ptoeper. or Seabee: gaa the
. . - .
. - .
: : a,
5 » .
28,0
. r ~ ae as — € r
3
It held, as had the. District of Columbia Circuit before
it in American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,.
348 F. 2d 349, 352 (D. C. Cir. aie that (380°F.2d at 775
(1f28a)) : . 3
— - the Waterman oes not. ‘ govern a situation
hii the action of ‘the Board, .before the matter
bmg President, is beyond the Board’s a to ie
9 99
act. . < : oe
ca ‘eens decided that. mimesis Gane considered care-
fully the-con tion that the Board had the power to include
inclusive. tour authority in the certificates of the Supple-
TMmentals. ./ PASE ae. ¥
It reviewed -the bill as criginally proposed and recog-
nized that the scope of the authority finally conferred on
the Board was hammered out in the Conference Committee.
It considered the Committee Reports on the bills proposed
by the House Committee and the Senate Committee. It :
correctly concluded therefrom that’ the Senate Committee
bill would have permitted, but not required, the Board to
- authorize all-expense- tours in charter operations by the.
. Supplementals.’ It then went .on to find that the House
Committee bill would: nét have permitted such’ inclusive |
tours. It determined that, in refusing to accept the Senate
bill and in accepting the House bill, the Senate con-
ferees receded from the position ‘of the’ Senate bill. per- -
mnitting inclusive tours and.by so doing outlawed such tours -
as any part of the charter authority which might be granted
to Supplementals. It also looked to the uniform state-
ments of the floor managers, -which it found were in
conformity with the Comfitittee Reports, that inclusive
- 48 Indeed’ hi Board ‘Tesdqniaw here that the colt did ‘not’ ook
be urea rae: caste Br., p. 5).
~_ ,
. wae ‘ ‘ ~ ¢ pve 2 ° )
i.> : . . “ ° °
; P
.
.
‘
‘
‘ e ) . R
43 ; mae
tours were not within. the’ authority contemplated by the
‘bill as reported by the Conference Committee (and as
finally enacted). In reaching its conclusion that inclusive
tour authority was not granted to the Board, the court
also recognized, as, indeed, all petitioners do here,’ the im-
portance to Congréss of maintaining the distinction between _ :
~ group and individually ticketed travel. iS, Ss :
‘Petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc filed by |
all the petitioners here were denied, but a ‘Stay of the
order of .the court below has been granted (1146a-1150a).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In enacting ‘the 1962 amendment “a prime concern of |
Congress was to maintain the integrity of the charter con-
cept—to preserve the distinction between group and indi-
_ Vidually ticketed travel.” That amendment does not even —
refer to “all-expensé tours” or “inclusive touts.” Under ., |
the statute the Supplementals are limited to “charter trips
in air transportation.” Since “charter” ig not defined in the .
- Statute it can only. mean what was meant by “charter” in
air transportation at, the time the statute was amended.
ae
As used in air transportation “charter” did \not include ©
all-expense or inclusive tours sold to individual members
of the general public by travel agents. The Board’s char- |
_- , ter regulations had for years prohibited travel agents from:
soliciting the general public for the Supplementals under
the guise of “charter” operations. The Chairman’ of; the
Board pointed this oui to Congress in testimony on this
very bill and said that charters would be subject to the
» Board’s existing regulations as to the homogeneity of the
“charter group. The-Supplementals’ principal witness told
; . ‘ ) , é
pues
Lk
the Committee considering the bill that all-expense. tours.
were not . charters, but would be under the definitior the’
Supplementals sought (but failed to get); ASTA cory:es
that the »ll-expense tour charter concept was not. known im
air transportation when.the 1962 amendment "was. adopted. :
That “charter” as used in air transportation. did . not
include all-expense tours was explicitly confirmed to Con-
gress«by managers of the bill in both Houses before it
was enacted. As Senator Scott said, the Senate bill with —
- its definition of charter, which the’ conferees rejected, pro-
posed to “modify the established concept of charter by per-
mitting charters to ‘a group on an all-expense-paid tour’.”
- And as the Chairman of the House Committee, =
man Harris, explained, “in air transportation, charter...
does not: include solicitation ‘of the general public, or any
device where individually ticketed services would be “6f-
« fered or. performed under guise of charter. ‘eg
The 1962 amendment excludes the iciiiiaionials from |
all ‘individually ticketed services except under special tem- —
, porary circumstances not applicable here ‘and ‘thus pre- -
cludes inclusive tours which involve such services. Through- .
out the industry, in the Board’s regulations and in the
iS Congressional hearings, both before and during consider-
. \
7 » °
ation ‘of the 1962 gmendment, a definite’ and clear dis-
- tinction was drawn between “charter” and “individually.
- “tieketed”. service. That Congress’ clearly did not intend .
‘ that the Supplementals should be authorized, to engage in
any individually ticketed services pursuant td certificates
_ issued under Section 401(d) (3) of the Act is apparent from
\an examination of the amendment as a whole. The House.
bill, which became the law, expressly permitted individual ~
| ticketing 1 ‘in only two very limited exceptions, a temporaty
: pease pharing out — and a special — au-
: « |
thorization for a maximum period of 90 days where there
'. is'a terhporary inability of. scheduled carriers to meet the |
- Tequirements for service. It is plain tHat no other indi-
- vidual ticketing was contemplated, ‘as stated in the Con-
‘ference Report... Since the inglusive tours here involve in-
dividually Hicketad service they cannot be charters, is
_ + Since “charter” does not include all-expense tours—and.
80 obviously not the even - restrictive inclusive tours-— ~,
the Board is without power 0 authorize the Supplementals —. ~
. to operate them. = es | .
°°
Besides, the Board and the Supplementals recognizé:that .
_ the Supplementals themselves cannot sell inclusive tours.
For the Board to authorize them*to do this through the
warned Congress against and which the Congressional man-
If there could be Any doubt what Congress meant when.
it‘used the term “charter”, it would be dispelled by the . 3
legislative history. The final Senate ‘bill would have ex. Be
~ pressly authorized the Suppleméntals to operate individually
ticketed services, including group all-expense tours. -But
‘the Senate bill was rejected by tlie Conference Committee
and the House bill was adopted. On the question of indi-
~ _ vidually ticketed Service and all-éxpense tours, the Senate « .
receded. The Conference Committee Report said that the.
° Conference bill adopted the provisions of the House bill.
ao
¢
4
. >
prohibiting wuscenard ticketed services on a permanent :
| basis. 3 ;
The stenten of the House bill and the ejection of the
Senate bill should by itself be more than sufficient to estab-
. lish Congressional intent. But the managers of the bill in»
- both Houses left no room for speculation. Senator Cotton
referred to:the action of the conferees in “eliminating: the
all-expense tour provision and thus refusing to confer this
- power on the Board.” Senators Scott and Thurmond also -
_ expressly stated that the Senate.had receded on this point.” .
' So did Chairman Harris and Representatives Williams and
Collier. All were members of the subcommittees concerned
: with the legislation; all were ‘members’ of the Conference -
. Committee; all were managers of the bill. Not a single “s
- member of either: House expressed any contrary position ©
or disagreement. : eis Se het ¥. ie
The legislative eater decision made by iicciaaie: to pro- |
hibit inclusive tours cannot be overridden by regulations —
- adopted by the Board. These regulations, in’ fact, disclose.
the extent to which the inclusive tours authorized duplicate SS
-“yather than supplement the individually ticketed services
of respondents.
. : “¢
ae “Casts under the Motor iedae “Act relied upon rm the -
Board arise under a different statutory scheme, do not ~~ _
establish fhe meaning of “charter trips in air ‘gansporta- -
tion” and do not support the Board’s position. .
While’ one of the purposes of the 1962 amendment was
to aid the economic well-being of the - ‘Supplementals this
does not override the equally important and spetific, pur-.
pose that Supplementals, should be, prohibited: from oper-.
— as “charters” individually ticketed eee —
7% .
v
s
any k
wy «
a .
_ The Board amended certificates earlier granted to.two ~~
Supplementals without holding a hearing, as demanded. “a
. by respondents here. In 89 doing,.the Board contravened ~
the requirements of the -Aet and due process:” Its action
¢ Was. also if diametric opposition to the decisior of this
Court: in: Delta: Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
SOT UM. 106 (00M). | ce ge a BS toe a
;» When the Board originally granted the certificates in.
7 question, it refused to grant ‘inclusive tour authority to. - ~~
_ these carriers. “In reaching -its © conclusion to. reverse this; —
earlier decision arid amend the certificates to ‘include in- |
élusive tour authority, the: Board relied Sn the record on
‘the basis of which it had reached ‘its earlier decision not. =e
to grant inclusive tour atithority and on officially noticed
“Form 41 reports and other. data.” In granting new cer- :
‘tificates to’.other ‘Supplementals which included inclusive ~
tour authority, the Board similarly relied on such officially
_ noticed data. The Board did -not specify the icular
data of which it“was taking official notice and id not,
give respondents the. opportunity to rebut the. implica. -
~. tions which the Board drew from this data. This was: in ae
violation of the Act, the Board’s regulations, the Admin- °°
istrative Procedure Act and the decisions of this Court,
. ‘ $0 ., OL Paes
. | © © ithe fact that the President appraved the orders set aside
below ‘does not bar judicial review of either » question of
statuto®y power ora question of procedural due process, .
‘the only issues: involved here, Chicago & Southern Air. .
' Lines; Inc. v. Waterman'8.8. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, cited it
this. connection, involved“only a question of- substantial “—
, :
» tm
\ : oo a ie tes aes
Ne a 8S: “@ &
“ g 4
«48
evidence. That case is, therefore, inapposite. The lower
Federal courts have indeed refused to extend. Waterman
to a.question of statutory power and both the Department 2
of Justice and the Board have- concurred with that con-
struction. Questions of procedural due process involve not
only questions of statutory power but constitutional ques- a
' tions, as well, and so should be similarly: ‘reviewable.
‘The ‘Act itself does not bar. judicial review of an order _
involving United States air-carriers’ foreign operations..
The President’s approval of the Board’s action here arises
solely from a statute and as such is’ abject 1 to — |
review. |
aGiment
The Board’s orders granting | inclusive tour aythority
_° té Supplementals involving solicitation and’ individual
ticketing of the general ‘public were correctly set aside
as violating the Federal Aviation Act.
Jn setting aside the Board’s orders te the. extent they ;
granted inclusive tour authority. to the Supplementals, the
_ Court of Appeals noted. its agreement with the District of |
Columbia Court’s understanding | of the basic purpose of. :
. the 1962 amendment. As it said (380 F. 2d at 779 (1135a)) : Seghes
’ “In deciding whether grant of inclusive tour author-
_ ity violates the limitations of the statute it must be. *.
_. remembered ‘tha®a prime concern of Congress was to
_ * maintain the integrity of the charter concept—to pre-
' serve the distinction senna! group and oe
: ® . ne
ae. ee
~ ‘ 2,
49
ticketed’ travel.’ American Airlines \. Civil Acronian- es
ties Board, supra, 348 F. 2d at 354. See Conference _
' Report, H.R. Rep. No. 1950, 87th Cong., 2d Seges. 14
(1967). ar : me ene |
The Court declared the _opders invalid because (ibid.) :
“To permit’ the selling of individual tickets to the gen-
eral public. in direct Aompetition .with the ‘regularly.
scheduled airlines, regardless of whether such selling
is done through the medium of a travel agent who -
has first ‘chartered’ the plane, does violate basic poli.
ciesof the Act,” « 7
The Court thus focused on the Care vice of the ce
authority gramted—a vice from ‘which petitioners seek to
’ divert attention by arguing, in effect, that Congress could.
Ly not have meant wh. it said about its purpose and intent
when it considered and adopted the 1962 amendment.
But nothing advanced by- petitioners is sufficient to over-
_come these facts: () the statute on its makes no
provision for “inclusive tour authority”; (2) he meaning
of “charter” as used in air transportation does not include
- inclusive tours; (3) the distinction between “charter trips”
and “individually ticketed services” -in the statute demon.
strates that “charter trips” do not include inclusive tours;
and (4) the legislative history manifests an explicit Con-.
gressional intent.“to forbid the Board to authorize inclu.
sive tours” (380 F. 2d at 781 (1140a)). °°. :
Oo
‘a
A. The 1962 Amendment Does Not Authorise the
Grant of Inclusive Tour Authority to Supplementals.
1. The statute itself does*not authorize the grant of
individually ticketed, inclusive tour authority.
~ (a) The 1962 Amendment Does Not Even. Refer
_ to Inclusive Tours. |
“The 1962. amendment doés not authorize the Supple-
mentals to. operate inclusive tours. Neither “inclusive
tours” nor “all-expense-paid tours” are even ‘referred to
‘in the 1962 amendment. The reference to “all-expense-paid
tours” that had at one time appeared in the Senate. bill
was intentionally omitted from the final bill: Since inclu-
- sive tours are not mentioned they cannot be authorized by
' the Board unless they are included in the 1962 amendment
by: implication. .
(b) “Charter trips in air transportation”
Do Not Include Inclusive Tours. *
The 1962 amendment. authorizes the Board to issue cer-
; tificates for “supplemental air transportation”. Supple-
mental air transportation is defined as “charter ‘trips in
air transportation * * * to sppplement the scheduled ser-
vice authorized by certificates” issued to airlines such as
respondents. Under the terms of the statute, therefore,
the Board has no authority to authorize the Supplementals,
to engage in anything other than “charter trips.in air
transportation.” °
Theré is no definition of “charter trips” in the 1962
"amendment. Hence the meaning “of “charter trips in air
transportation” can only be derived from the established .
‘meaning of “charter” in air transportation at the time the
1962 amendment was adopted. There is ‘no question what °
that meaning was. As the Chairman of the House Com-
. ” .
4 = .
aT - . :
2 - eee ‘
PT TT Pee bs aes = ae tate |
51
- mittee, which formulated the version of the 1962 amendment
' that became law, stated ( supra, | See ae a ;
“The law is well established that, in air r transportation,
charter means essentially the lease of the entire -ca-
pacity of an aircraft for a ‘period of time.or a par-
ticular trip, for the transportation of cargo or persons
' and baggage, on a basis which does not include solici- -
tation of the general public, or any . device where.
individually ticketed services would be offered or. per-
o
formed under guise of charter.”
“Charter” @id not include i nelusive tours since they am
- not even known in air tr rtation at the time of the
1962 amendment. As ‘A has cies conceded (ASTA |
. Br., p. 9): |
hee The inclusive tour charter concept, whereby a
tour operator sells tours utilizing the charter for the
_ to-and-from transportation element of the tour, was
not then known in: the air travel ee in this
country”
‘The Board’s charter regulations | in effect at the time
of the 1962 amendment and for years prior thereto con- .
tained provi lons prohibiting travel agents from solicit-
ing members pf ‘the general public for the Supplementals
under ‘the guide of “charter” operations. It was in order °
to prevent solicitation of the general public in the guise
of selling a charter that the Board developed its “affinity” .
Tules holding in effect that there was a charter if the par-
ticipants have an association separate and apart from the
transportation’ concerned, e.g., if they are members: of: the a
same club, since then they are not members. of the general
public.* ~ (ceapcenne
~~
** Part 208 of the’ Board’s 8 regulations, even now eputicatiis to
the sales of air. transportation by Supplementals emaves (437a),
xe
i : oa i 5.
| ‘The Board’s sient recognize that “charter” as used
'. in air transportation does not permit a “charter” of air-
_. eFaft to a person whose business is the formation of groups.
‘They have consistently prohibited this practice. Obviously,
were such a practice permitted, the integrity of the charter _
concept would collapse oanERy a the interposition |
_of an intermediary.“
In Congressional hearings leading up to the e19 62 8 a
ment, Board Chairman Boyd had advised that the authority
to be given the Supplementals under the Board’s bill .
“would be subject to the conditions established by the Board
providing for the homogenéity ° of the charter group”, %.e.,
- the Board’s affinity rules.* 7
The principal “witness for the asinine in the
Congressional hearings and one of their attorneys in this
case, Clayton L. Burwell, stated that all-expense tours were
not charters in air. transportation. Asked by Senator Mon-
roney whether the all-expense.tour authority he was re- -
_ questing would be on a charter basis, he — (supra,.
p. 11):
nies prohibits a “solicitation of the general public” defines
that phrase as a solicitation going beyond the “bona fide members
of an organization (and their immédiate families)”; and defines
- the last quoted phrase as. “members of a charter organization. who
have not joined the organization merely to participate in the charter _
as the result of solicitation directed to the general public” (446a-
447a; see also 193a). The effect of this prohibition. has been com-
ag undercut by the Fegulations adopted in the orders set aside Z
Ww és:
' ‘#4 This ‘pnetisi, which is specifically prohibited in Part 208: of .
the Board’s Regulations (448a), would be encouraged by the rege-
lations adopted in the orders set aside.
” eg. Hearings, p. 26, supra, D. 15.
58
“Mr. ‘Burwell: I don’t think it is technically—well,
it is not a charter basis under the ‘present Board
rules. Under the definition that we would’ like to. get. cs Se
itwouldbe” ©
| A This fact’ was specifically ‘confirmed by managers of the
_—-—~ pill in both ‘Houses. According ta Senator Scott (supra,
oe D.teee oe ee : ° a is
“The’ Senate bill proposed to modify the established
concept of charter by permitting charters to ‘a group ¢
on.an all-expense-paid tour.’ . . es |
Ina similar vein Chairman Harris° advised the House
. (supra, p. 36): ° ven = |
|
“The Senate proposed. to ehange the well established |
meaning of ‘charter.’ The House objected to changing
it eee ™ ° ‘ ; . ae : ;
~ Other Congressmen made similar statements, supra, pp. .
ea 2) ee | |
| The Senate Report: also recognized including an “all-
expense paid tour” would change the meaning of charter
as it was used in the air transportation industry.“* Part of
the Senate Report not quoted: by. the Board says’ (see .
8. Rep., p. 13): | |
. “A charter, by. common law and general practice in the’
transportation industry, means: essentially the lease of
the entire vehicle, in this case the aircraft, for a period
. The Board would have the Court. ignore this distinction alto-
gether. (see C. A. B. Br., pp. 7, 18) and therefore suggests that .
the definition of charter .was not really necessary, except insofar
> 48 it was designed to prevent individual ticketing “under the guise
of charter” (see C. A. B. Br., pp. 1#15, 19). a
ee
54
" of time or for a particular trip. Because the develop--
"ment of the charter market has been inhibited by. arti-
ficial restrictions which have been imposed by Board
~—~yeptilations-on.a legal charter, particularly in ‘interna-
tional air transportation, the committee has incorpo- .
rated the common law definition of- charter in the
statutory definitions s contained i in the Federal Aviation
Act.” ©
As ASTA says (ASTA Br.° p. 91):
. the Senate Committee was aware that it would
havi pe define charters legislatively in order to vali-
date ITCs Lingiosive tours].” :
(ce) The Distinction Between “Charters” and “Individually
_ Ticketed Services” in the 1962 Amendment Demon-
_ strates that “Charters” Do Not Include ie ae Tours.
That “charter. trips in air transportation” in ‘in the. 1962
_ amendment does not include inclusive tours, whieh, as here,
' involve individually ticketed service, is also clearly shown
| by! the distinction consistently drawn between charters in air
_ transportation and individually ticketed services. That dis-
tinction is recognized: by petitioners. ‘For example, ASTA
points out (ASTA Br., p. 4):
“Scheduled. carriers are suthorised tO carry pas- .
-sengers on an indiyidually ticketed or charter basis.
_ Supplemental carriers may carry passengers only on
_ . a charter basis.”
a i iad This distinction nies appears throughout the hearings lead-. .
_ ing up to the 1962 amendment and in its legislative history.“
og “#t See supra, pp. 8-11, 13-14, 20.24, 29-30. The wn exception is
6 oo the statement in the Senate ‘Committee Report that if a travel
55
Witnesses and Congressmen repeatedly referred to “char-
ters” on the one hand and “individually ticketed service” on
; the other. — 4
The 1962 amendment, itself, viewed as a whole makes clear.
that “charter trips” as used therein could not: include the
_ individually ticketed inclusive tour service here involved. -—
‘The amendment specifically authorized individttally ticketed
‘ services by. Supplementals during a 2-year phase-out period
“to. permit an orderly transition to an all-eharter opera-
tion”. It also permits the Board to issue special operating
authorizations to Supplementals to engage in general air
transportation but only when there is a temporary inability
of other carriers to meet the requirements: for service.”
_ This special operating authorization would be valid for not .
more than 30 days and could be extended for not more than
_an additional 60 days. These were the only individual
ticketing authorizations permitted the Supplementals. The
| extremely limited power given the Board to authorize indi-
agent “Chatters” an dircraft for an all-expense-paid ‘tour and offers
to individual members of the public “the right to participate as a
_member of a group” this is a very different sort of service from
- individually ticketed transportation. This statement, as did the
Senate bill itself, required participation as a member of a “group”, -
& concept hot involved in inélusive tours. What is more significant,
_ however, is that this statement. is. directly contrary tg all other
statements on the subject made in connection with co ideration
and passage of the 1962 amendment and is contrary to the dis- .
tinction made between charters and individually ticketed services —
in the First Print of the Senate bill. There is, of course, no ques- -
. tion that the Senate Committee wanted the Supplementals to be
Permitted to operate inclusive tours as charters. The fact is, how- -
ever, that the Senate bill-and the Senate position were rejected by
the Conference Committee and ‘ir the legislation as finally enacted.
ie statements, supra, pp. 15-18 and 24-26, 28, 30-82, '34-37.
“* These two provisions of the 1962 Amendments are omitted from
involved. eo
the Board’s Appendix of the “relevant provisions” of the statute:
ee cS
vidually ticketed services plainly confirms that no other
individually ticketed services were to be authorized under ;
the guise of “charter”. ir
It is clear that “charters” aid not. “include. individually
ticketed services. An operation must be either one or the’
other. Since inclusive ‘tours-of the type here. authorized”
’ involve solicitation and individual ticketing of members of
the general.pu lic, they ar@hot charter operations as that
term was understood in-air transportation at. the: time
the 1962 amendment was adopted. ‘
\
2... The legislative history of she 1962, pe
-- confirms that individually ticketed, inclusive
@our authority is not authorized.
he history of the various bills resulting in the 1962
amendment, the Committee reports and all statements made
by managers of the bill in both Houses confirm the intent
of Congress to ‘prohibit the Board from authorizing Sup-.
plementals to operate inclusiye tours whose patronage, as —
here, is derived from soliciting and: individually er :
_ members of the general public.
The fina] Senate bill would’ have expressly ‘gathotinnd
the Board to permit the: Supplementals to operate, in addi- -
tion to charters, (1) certain individually ticketed services
and (2) group all-expense-paid tours. .The bill.would have
done the latter’ by adding to the definition of A charter” a
| provision that charter included “transportation services
offered by an air —s to individual members of thte gen- :
—_
8 Not ‘Involved here are ‘sllatipiee tours provided in. proper
. charters, such as those charters operated by both the: Supplementals
‘and respondents for business and social organizations. Respondents
jhave never questioned the validity of charters for tours that do not
involve solicitation and inthividual — of the general public.
%
a ee met
’
eral public * * * as a member of a group on an all-expense-_
paid tour”. ° Sahel igh ade 3
_ But thé Senate bill was not adopted. The Conference
Committee rejected it and Tecommendefl the House bill,
which contained no such definition of “carter” and would.
not have permitted the Supplementals to operate any per- |
_, » manent individually ticketed services. Of the question of
individually ticketed service and all-expense tours, the Sen-
ate “receded”, as was made clear in the Conference Com-_
‘inittee report, and in statements by managers of the bill -
- in both Houses." a : . Ea ae
The Conference Committee adopted the provisions of the ©
. House bill on: all matters “here relevant, omitting both the
Senate Committee’s definition of charter and the authority
in the Senate bill for the issuance of certificates for other
‘than charter transportation. The Conference Committee
Report states that the Cofference bill “adopts the provi-
sions of the House amendment with respect to the prehibi-—
tion-of individually ticketed afd waybilled services on a
permanent basis.” It also states that after the 2-year period
during which individually ticketed services could be con-_
. tinued “supplemental. air transportation would be limited
‘to all-charter ‘operations, except for limited individually
“ticketed service which may be authorized by. the Board on.
a. a ‘temporary basis.” i : |
sc
~The Conference Committee Report thus also distinguishes
between charter operations and individually ticketed ‘s6r-
vices. And it confirms that individually ticketed services
are prohibited under the Conference bill.
Tle statements madé ‘not by one. biit by six managers’ .
of the bill, stati D ents made both in the ‘House and in the
" See supra, pp. 29°82, 35-37. eer ag
a
Be mentals to engage in all-expense tours
A pe ; ale
’ ; 58
. .
4 eR *,
‘
Senate, expressly. and unequivocally confirm what is clearly.
implicit in the 1962 amendment itself, its legislative devel- °
opment and the Committee reports. The six;managers of
the bill who spoke on this. subject stated ressly that the
- Board ‘was not. given the power to authorize ithe Supple-.
d fortiori, not
_ inclusive tours). Senator: Cotton referred to the action of
' the conferees in “eliminating the all-expense tour provision
and thus refusing to confer. this power on the Board.”
Senators Scott and Thurmond also expressly stated that —
the Senate had receded on this point. So did ‘Chairman
Harris ‘and Representatives Williams and Collier. ala
Petitioners, recognizing that statements by the managers
~ of the bill in both Houses unequivocally support respon- —
dents’ position,™ * urge the Court in effect to ignore these _
_ Statements.“ They argue that these statements must ‘be .
disregarded since they (1) contradict the Committee Re-
_ ports (ASTA Br, pp. 24,25; Supp. Br., p. 32); (2). are by
opponents of the bill ( (Supp. Br., p. 32); (3) repregent the.
views of only six members ({ASTA Br., p. 23); (4) are
_ simply “planted” statements entitled to no weight whatever
' (Supp. Br.; pp. 33, 49);-and (5) arise in an area where
there are strong ames! economic interests (Supp. Br. i
1) ee
\ .
, 35-36, for oo statements on this
= Bee, €.9.; ASTA’s assertion that the “floor faahias . were
intended to have that effect”, é.c., to “éstablish a statutory guideline --
which prevents the Board. from defining charter so as to include
I.T.C. [inclusive tour charters)”. (ASTA Br., p. 20).
'. “ The Board and the Supplementals recognize that statements by
those in -charge of a bill cannot be-entirely ignored, but contend
they cannot be given the same weight as Committee Reports
' (C. A. B. Br., p. 21; Supp. Br., p. 49). They then give no weight —
whatever to the statements by e Bill managers. *
s
(1) It is perfectly clear that the statementa of the man- a= >
agers of the bill do not contradict the Committee Reports’ {
and. the statute, since the Committec Reports and thes =
“statute do not support petitioners’ position here, as we.
have shown (pp. 13-14, 21-24, 26, 29-30). ;
“
(2) The debates quoted here, supra, pp. 24-37, and relied.
upon by the court below constitute all of the: statements
made by managers® of the bill regarding all-expense tour —
charters: The Congressmen making them were not easual «© —
debaters; nor were they “opponents” of the bill; they were A
principals in the entire. legislative process. As. indicated, 7
in Appendix A to this brief, Mr: Oren Harris was the
Chairman.of the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce. Mr. John ‘Bell ‘Williams was ‘the Chairman
of the Subcommittee on. Transportation and Aeronautics.
It was he who presided at the House hearings at which
appeared representatives of petitioners and respondents. —_
‘Mr. -Collier was also a member of that Subcommittee.
_ Senators Scott, Thurmond and Cotton were all members of ~
the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate Committee on
‘+, Commerce. before’ which’ the Senate hearings were held,
(8) The fact that. only six of the 17-members of the.
‘Conference’ Committee spoke on the subject of all-expense
tours does not’ make this .a minority view. Surely, if.
ee, —
‘ .
eer
, “ e. . "
‘ . + bd . . ‘ °
SNe > , oe C
604 :
. others disagreed, they could and would have so stated. -
There was certainly no need for ev@y member of the
, Committee to state again what had just been said by others...
(4) There is, of course, not one. scrap of -evidence to “ -
indicate that the floor statements were “planted”. ‘Chair-
‘ .man Harris, for one, expressly stated that he prepared
his own statement (108 Cong. Rec. 12322, June 29, 1962
[231b]). We.do not believe even petitioners are suggesting |‘
that the statements did _not. really a the ‘views of :
‘the Congressaten making them. . .
Ne: rs
Yr a
ae (5) That Seas. may. be economic > conflict is irrelevant. ©
ec ~. This Court has often—relied on Congressional debate in
; ‘cases involving great-economic conflict. In United States
v. Third: National Bank of Nashville (Slip Op. No. 86, Octo-
ber: ‘Term 1967), 36 U.S. L. Week 4178, 4182. (March.4,
1968), | a bank merger case arising under Section 7 of tle —
_ Clayton Act, this Court looked not only to “the language .
of the Aet but . - ; the statements of those who supported
it while’ the Act: was under consideration.” |
“ Statements by members of: ‘Congress were = parry k
_ ered by. this Court in Case Swane Co. v. Sunkist Growers,
Inc. (Slip Op. No. 66, Oct.’ ‘Term, 1967), 36 U. SL. “Week.
» 407E (December 18, 1967); The Colony, Inc. v. Commis- a?
rad of Internal Revenue, 357 U:8. 28 (1958) ; First Na--.
l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 0.8.22 .:
ae ae pe ); Brown Shoe Co. v, United Biates,: 370 U. 8.294,
Sr od 312-323 (1962) ; Local 357, International. Brotherhood of - .
oe Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and ‘Helpers of . ..
east a - America v. National Labor Relations Board, 365 U. 8. 667" ~~~.
mse (1961) ; \ National Labor’ Relations ‘Board. v. Insurance x
| sce ane — 361 U. S. ATT en Mitchell
”
—
ae nnn
3,
61
v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U. §. 290 (1959); Mastro.
Plastics Corp. vy. National Labor Relations Board, 350
U.S. 270 (1955). fo ee eens .
Petitioners, seeking to avoid the effect of the unequivocal
. Statements by the sponsors of the 1962 amendment, attempt
to make much of. the definition of “charter service” in the
Senate ‘bill: which inchided an “all-expénse-paid tour” and
the statement ‘in the. Senate Committee report that this
would “conform to the traditional concept of charter” |
(C. A.,B.Br., pp. 13, 18; Supp. Br., pp. 12, 44). In the
- first place, in the first print of the Senate bill all-expense _
tours were -not included in the definition of charter and
| were clearly excluded by the prohibition “against sales to.
e he cases cited by. petitioners’ in support of their proposition
“casual and Scattered remarks emanating from one side or’ the
56
this Court recognized that it should look to-the “ Ts... when
the meaning of the Statutory words is in oll (377 U.S. 66), and
er in charge of a. bill in course‘of
im V. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390.
case entirely. There this Court rej
the interpretation espoused by persons who had’songht a more re-
' strictive wording in the statute and who had lost, “i |
eee oer
“individual ventsdbii. of the general public. So at that‘time -
they were not considered. charters for the purposes of the
Federal Aviation ‘Act even by the Senate Committee.
Secondly, while an exception was Written into later drafts
of the Senate bill, authorizing the Board to permit” the
Supplementals to offer transportation to “members of a.
group on an all-expense-paid tour”, the Senate bill was 2
not adopted; the Senate receded on the, definition of charter
service and specifically: on the inclusion of all-expense tours.
Thirdly, the traditional concept of charter to which the
Senate report referred could have reference only to the
concept used in surface transportation. | Even the peti-
‘ tioners concede that ‘the concept of, all-expense tour char-
ters did not exist.,in air transportation at this time (supra, |
. p. 9). “Moreover, the Senate was told by the managers
of the bill that the Senate bill proposed to modify, whereas
the Conference bill which was adopted: would confirm, “the
' established law as to a charter in air transportation,”
_-(supra, p. 31).
=
a < : :
- The report of the Senate Committee makes it clear that contrary
‘to petitioners’ flat assertions (e¢.g.,-C. A. B: Br., pp. 7,.19; ASTA
Br. pp. 11, 18, 21), the Senate bill. would not "have required the
Board to authorize each or any Supplemental to operate all-expense
tours (8. Rep. p. 13 {119b]) :
_ “Because the committee is convinced that individnal certifi-
cates as a supplemental air carrier must be tailored to the public
need and to the capability and interests of the particular car-
rier, the bill does not require the Board to grant every supple-
mental carrier any particular charter authority. The-Board.is
specifically authorized to designate’ the geographical area or
areas within or between which charter service may be rendered.
-The charter authority of-one carrier may be ‘quite different -
. from that provided to another. ...” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Board’s sweeping grant of blanket inclusive tour authority
-in the certificates involved in the present orders simply highlights
“the Béard’s disregard of another limitation that the Senate wished
to impose.
. Carrier Act.
63
Finally, inclusive tours, of the type here involved, do
not conform to the traditional concept of charter in surface k
transportation. As we-point out below (fra, pp. 68-71),
these inclusive tours are not comparable to the type of all-
expense ‘tours authorized 28 charters under the Motor
- - 3. ‘Fhe use of ‘travel agents does not transform |
inclusive tours into charters,
The Board and the Supplementals concede that. the Sup:
plementals themselves cannot sell inclusive tours (Order .
No. 23350, 345a-346a). The direct sale of inclusive tours
would clearly not constitute “charter trips in air trans-
portation” which the Board could authorize them to op-
erate. The interposition of a travel arent as a middleman - |
does not change the substance’ of the operation in any way..
<
Under the Supplementals’ existing inclusive tour authority
_members of the general public are being solicited and indi-
_ vidually ticketed by the Supplementals, often directly, as
shown in Appendices C and D. inten
One of the principal abuses the Board had to cope with |
in the earlier days .of operations by “non-scheduled” or
“irregular” carriers was the attempted use by ‘these car- -
.. Tiers of varions devices, including sales through agents,
to. circumvent tlie law and the Board’s regulations (see
supra, p. 8). Because of this past experience the Board .
had adopted regulations preventing travél agents from
' soliciting the general publi¢ and the Chairman of the Board
warned the Senate Committee against authorizing charters
that would “put travel agents in the business of soliciting
_Sroups at the expense of the ‘regular route operators” (see
_ “Supra, p. 16). In addition, Congress was told by managers
of the 1962 amendment that an air transportation charter’
4
“does not include solicitation of the general public, or any
device where individually ticketed services could be offered
- Or performed under guise of charter” and was warned to -
make sure that charters are “not mere. as a subterfuge. .-
to perform individually ticketed services” (supra, p. 25).
To permit the Board to authorize Supplementals to op-
erate inclusive tours through travel agents would be to
permit them to do indirectly and through a subterfuge
what they clearly could not do directly. It is just the ‘kind
_ of charter “device” that Congress was warned against and |
_. that Congress was assured by managers of the bill would
- not be permitted by, the 1962 amendment. Most of the all-
' expense* tours sold to individual members of the general
- public on the scheduled services of respondents are sold
through, travel agents .(see ASTA Br. . p. 3). If the Sup-
plementals . could sell inclusive tours directly ‘they -
would also use the services of travel agents. Consequently,
it is meaningless for the petitioners to argue, as they ap-
parently do here, that while the Board cannot authorize the
Supplementals to sell inclusive tours without the services
of travel agents, they can do so if the. services of the travel .
agents are used. ; oN
In spite of the use of the charter “device” the Kattandive
tour authority authorized . by the Board, is individually .
ticketed service and not “charter trips in air. transporta-
tion” and i is therefore invalid under the 1962 ——
- Utterly devoid of merit is the s iii contention that
the decision of the court below will “have an adverse effect. on the
‘balance of payments problem”, since foreign Supplementals will
be permitted to carry inclusive tours while domestic Supplementals
will not (Supp. Br., pp. 33, 53-54). The Board has-the authority —
under section 402 of the Act. to modify the certificates of the foreign
carriers so as to prevent the kind of imbalance the Supplementals
fear. a
B. The Board Cannot by. Regulation Override
the Limitations Intended by Congress, . aa ae
Having lost the battle in Congress, the Supplementals and
‘now the Board have sought to bring about inclusive tour
authority by administrative fiat. But since Congress did -
. ot give the Board power to authorize inclusive tours,.the
. Board does not have such power -even if, 48 petitioners
allege, its regulations would effectively control the abuses
that Congress feared might arise by the exercise of: such
power.” This Court has oftensrecognized that the motive
of Congress “so long as Congress acts in pursuance of its
. constitutional power” is irrelevant. Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 132 (1959). he
_ Petitioners nonetheless insist that the Board, by regula-
tion, has corrected the abuses about which Congress was
concerned when it.withheld from the Board power to au-
thorize inclusive tours and so has “justified” its assump-
_ tion of power to grant inclusive tour authority. But.to —
hold, thus‘ would be to permit the Board to expand the
scope of its: statutory. power, which it clearly cannot do.
To justify the existence of power by reliance upon. regula-
which it directed a foreign air carrier 'to show cause why an “imbal-
ance between that carrier and a United States carrier should not
be redressed by modifying the certificate of the foreign carrier”
(Order No. E-25823 (October 11, 1967) ): Indeed, just the other day, °
_the Board recognized this right in granting inclusive tour authority
to a foreign carrier. In Lloyd International Airways Ltd., Order
No. E-26616 (April 5, 1968), the Board stated (pp. 3-4) :
“..'. if. the Board’s position as to its authority with regard to
_ the American carriers is not upheld, there will be ample
opportunity thereafter to consider whether revision of Lloyd’s
_. permit is required.” ’
°° Indeed, the regulations adopted simply demonstrate that ‘the
inclusive tours authorized permit the Supplementals to duplicate ..
the a ticketed services offered by respondents (supra, .
' ‘pp. 87-41). Sill sali
a
. 66
. tions adopted to control the exercise of that power, such
as the Board suggests here (C..A. B., Br. p. 27), would
mean that power would exist or not depending on the par-
ticular regulations adopted by the Board, an altogether
untenable suggestion.
Of course, Congress had the power. to prohibit inclusive
- tours on the basis of abuses that it thought might occur.
And the Board cannot -limit that power by finding such
abuses would not in fact occur. See United States v. Penn-
* Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964)..
Respondents do not question that the “construction put
on a statute by an agency charged with administering it
is entitled to deference by the courts” Volkswagenwerk v.
Federal Maritime Commission (Slip Op. No. 69, October
Term 1967), 36 U.S.L. Week 4197 (March 6, 1968). How-
ever, as this Court pointed out in Volkswagenwerk {Slip
Op. » p. 10): ;
“the courts.are the final authorities on issues of statu- ist
tory construction.” * ail
Ra The eusiithon of inclusive tour authority is a major policy
- decision which the Board may not:assume to make (H. Rep.,
_ p. 22 [66b])." This Court, in exercising its right to review
__ Bee also Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944) ; National Labor
_ Relations. Board v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278-291 ° (1965) ; American —
‘Be (1908) Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 380 ban 300,
*: The cases cited by the Board in 5 support of the proposition that
the meaning given a statutory term by the agency charged with its
enforcement will be respected by the courts (C.A.B. Br., p. 23), and
‘the cases cited by the Supplementals for a dimilar proposition
(Supp. Br., p. 35 et seq.) are of no aid to them here.
For the Board’s quotation from Hardin v. Kentueky
- Utilities Co., 390 U.S..1 (1968), shows that this Court there recog-
_ Hized that a ' determination which “lacks reasonable support in rela-
Fe ces statutory construction, has repeatedly stated that where
G .« Congress has expressed a limitation, it is not for an admin-. “s
ie istrative agency to rewrite the law. Thus, this Court, in
determining that the Federal. Trade Commission had acted
beyond its power, in Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam
Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), pointed out (283 U.S. at 649):
“Official powers cannot be extended. beyond the terms
_- and necessary implications of the grant. If broader
powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Con-
gress. They cannot be merely assumed by administra-
.
tive officers....”* ’
, If the time has come for reevaluation of the basic ‘scope
of the Supplementals’ authority, ks petitioners seem to con-
tend (C. A. B. Br., p. 27; Supp. Br., p. 42), Congress and
not the Board must reevaluate. This precise problem
eame up in National. Labor Relations. Board v. Insurance .
ae on :
£ Aes
" AS
tion to the statutory purposes” will be set aside. In National Labor.
Relations Board v. qca Cola Bottling Co., 350_U.S. 264° (1956),
the Court found that the Board’s determination was “a reasonable, .
if indeed not a compelling, construction of the statute” (350 U.S.
269)—not the situation here. In Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402,
411-413 (1941), a question of fact finding was involved: In Udall .
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), there was “no statutory limitation
-_- Involved”.-(380 U.S. at 17) ; an executive order was involved. The
_ Secretary’s interpretation of the order had been in effect for four-
teen years before the final decision of the. Secretary from which
appeal was taken, and many peréons had relied thereon throughout
this period. On this basis, the Court: concluded that if the Secre-
* tary’s interpretation was “not unreasonable,” it should be sustained.
_ « Secursties and Exchange Commission v. New England Electric Sys-
tem, Slip Op. No. 305 (October Term, 1967), 36 U.S.L. Week 4190 y
(March 5, 1968), did not involve & question of statutory interpreta-
’ tion (see Slip Op. page 3). a eee ee
— _ See also Federal Communications. Commission ton v. American —
Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954) ; Social’ Security. Board vy.
Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) ; Burfenning v. Chicago, St...
‘ Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha RR Co., 163-U.8, 821 eee ete -
sin
- Agents ‘International Union, 361 U.S: 477 (1960), which
involved construction of section 8(b)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act. This* Court: determined that the
Board had exceeded its authority, and. that it had moved
.“into a new area of regulation which Congress.had not
committed to it” (361 U.S. at 499). It pointed out that
-— reevaluation “is for Congress. Congress has demon-
_ strated its capacity to adjust the Nation’s labor legislation’
to what, in its legislative judgment, constitutes the statu-
tory pattern appropriate to the developing state of labor
relations i in the country” (361 U.S. at 500).
This is the rule by which:the Board must abide. Any
rule by which the Board would be permitted to exceed its
_ grant of power by the adoption of regulations designed
to meet difficulties Congress supposed existed would simply
- transfer. the legislative function to. an administrative
“C. The Petitioners’ Reliance on Motor Carrier +]
Cases Is Misplaced. ae
Petitioners rely heavily on eee ee idillen the Motor ook
Carrier Act (49 Stat. 552). That reliance is misplaced |
’ for a number of reasons.
1. The Board itself has recognized that ane aa
concepts under the Interstate Commerce Act are not t6 be
imported uncritically into the Aviation Act.” Appendix A -
to Order E-23350 (868a). Indeed, the. legislative history _
makes amply clear that the common law definition. of
- charter i is not utilized i in air —r- supra, pp. 24, -
} a1-8%, 34-36. ae
2. ‘The 1962 amendment: ho a separate class of
carriers with authority limited to charter operations, the
\ * . ve
ee @
Aupplementals, and provides that carriers holding a
tificates under other provisions of the Act may not ‘receive
certificates as Supplementals (49 U. S. C. §401(d)(3)). In -
-contrast, in enacting the Motor. Carrier Act, Congress did -
not divide common carriers into two classes, one authorized :
to. engage in individually ticketed’ travel, special. service \
and charter transportation. and the other limited to char- . \
ter’ transportation. Congress authorized the issuance of .
certificates of convenience and necessity to common car-
Tiers of passengers by motor vehicle to engage in individ-’
ually ticketed travel over regular routes, “to engage in
_ Special or charter operations” or to engage in both. 49
U.S. C. §307(a).* | Rete a
_ 8. Further evidence of the difference in the legislative
scheme of the two acts is reflected by: their legislative
histories,. As pointed out in National Bus Traffic Associa-
tion v, United States, 143 F. Supp. 689, 696 (D. N. J. 1956),
affd. 352 U. 8.1020 (1957), under the Motor Carrier Act
‘there was a complete absence. of any legislative history
evidencing an intention to prohibit travel agents from,
: operating all-expense tours, whereas this was a matter of: .
specific concern ‘to Congress in the legislative history of
the 1962 amendmeat. oi | _
**In Fordham Bus Corp. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 712, 717
(S.D.N.Y. 1841), it is stated that typically a carrier engaging in _
special operations “advertises a special excursion and solicits. in-
dividuals to purchase tickets”, while in contrast in a charter “the
carrier is not the instigator of the trip, but merely negotiates with
| & group which is already formed.” Generally speaking there is
no heed under the Motor Carrier Act to distinguish between special -
and charter, operations. This was pointed out in National Bus
Traffic Association v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 689, 692 (1956),
affirmed 352 U.S. 1020 (1957),-where it was stated it was not neces-
. Sary to discuss the difference between “charter” and “special” in
order to decide the case at bar. Pea sie
a
« of by
70
' 4, The.Motor Carrier precedents relied on demonstrate
‘that the inclusive tours authori#ed by the Board here would
not constitute a valid charter or special.service under that
act. In Greyhound Corp. v. Edwards, 100 M. C. C. 453
' (1966), the Interstate Commerce Commission held that
- one-day: tours arranged by a travel agent for shopping he
or gambling were not bona fide operations because the
group lacked any community of interest beyond the de-
-- sire for transportation to and from a given point.“ The
Commission declaréd that for a “tour group to have a
community of interest the trip or tour arranged -by the
broker must include participation by the group members
in some recognizable, previously arranged. and agreed-upon _
group activity” such as “sightseeing or attendance at a.
social function, athletic contest, dramatic. presentation, cul-
tural event, religious service, or the: “like” (100 M. C. C. at -
eae 464): Similarly, in contrast with the tours. authorized -by
the Board in the present case, the tours approved in the
. Tauck Tours case were guided, all-expense tours on which
‘the group traveled together and shared accommodations
and pleasures. ‘Tauck Tours, Inc., 54 M. C. C. 291, 302
(1952), 68 M, C. C. 493 (1955), affd. sub nom., National
Bus Traffic As$ociation v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 689
(D. N. J. 1956), affd. 352 U. S. 1020 (1957). .
‘- What is more, in National Bus Pref “Association the :
court stressed the conditions impot by the Commission
.* upon the applicant. broker’ s use of charters, including one
~ that the contract be between the carrier furnishing the
motor amnention and Ba group members collectively”.
. The ‘so-called obiing ‘rive held unlawful did not posite
joint oe unlike the wango tours which did. ,
—~ ptf.
In distinguishing special and charter services it described,
_ charter services.as follows (143-F. ‘Supp. at 692):
= “Charter service contemplates the transportation of .
groups, such as lodges, bands, athletic teams, schools,
or other travel groups, assembled’ by. Someone other _
_ than the carrier, who collectively contract for the ex- :
_ clusive use of certain equipment for the duration of a
particular trip or tour.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the. inclusive tours authorized by the Board, the
' “group” assembled’ by the travel agent does not “col-
lectively contract” with the Supplemental for the use
of the aircraft. Consequently, inclusive tours would not
be charters even under the Motor Carrier Act. If they . :
are “special services” the Board has no authority to au- .
thorize them. The Federal: Aviation Act, as the Motor
‘Carrier Act, does recognize that there are. both charters °
and other “special services” since air carriers, other than
Supplementals, are authorized to perform. “charter trips
. or any other special service” without regard to the points
named in their certificates (Sec. 401(e)(6)).. The 1962
amendment, however, gives the Board power to authorize
the Supplementals to engage only in charter: operations.
‘The Board cannot authorize them to engage in’ other spe- _
cial services as the Interstate Commerce Commission can
authorize motar ‘carriers. tty Geom “as :
“
** The Supplementals had previously recognized the importance
to them of obtaining authority. to conduct special services and had
‘attempted to ree authority from the Board. Although the ad
Board’s -Examiners ‘had Tecommended ‘granting them -son-pore i
for limited special service flights, the Board refused to grant su ee eae
authority (supra, pp. 10-11). - . oie . A
ys SATE Far oo Ra ee <
ee . De hiinéaniin ‘Aboumeage | to thie Supplementale Cannot |
‘Justify Disregard of the 1962. Amendment. . eo
. The. ‘Board and’ the Supplementals seem : 40 argue that
——'
a
"Ye: < ‘the power: conferred on the Boar by ‘the 1962 amendment -
- \. “can ‘be. expanded by what they: cla to be:the overall pur-
wh of. the. statute—to improvethe economic well-being
Heol. (AOR: the Supplenientals (€.A.B. Bry p. 6, Supp, Br, P. 31).
a aa at eee and. the Distgiet“of Caluinbia Court also recognized,
ee ¢ “Respondents, “of course, ‘do not: question that one of , the
Pee, Le purposes of the 1962. amendment, a8 the court below noted,
was “to: ‘assure their: [the, Suppléinentals’] economic via: .
“bility” (880 FY 2d at 777. (1132a)). ‘But as both the court’:
; , .@ principal purpose of the 1962 amendment was “to main-
er tala ‘the regulatory scheme of the Federal Aviation Act and ..
- oe the protéctidn of -thée cértificated- carriers; suc Bs * peti-” ae
is AY 7 toners’ [xespofidents] by e liminating unregulated individu-
ae fess ticketed point-to-point comipetition from the ‘supple-_
a ies “mentale” (ibid.; 365°F. 2d-at 944-945). Nothing in the stat-_
if F ws ‘ute or its legislative history supports an argument’ that the
“f- *\+' Board: is.erapowered to do’ everything that will help the. .
; another purpose of the statute—that Supplementals should
pal ~ nnpbybe permittéd. to pperate individually ticketed | services
as, Sbut ‘should be.confined- 46, charter operations \ which do not
inoluide ‘individually. t ticketed a under the -gutige *
, we “indlustve tours”. eet ei |
| ‘What. the. Yoasd-Gnih Gupplagiental are realty. arguing
4s that ‘economic advantages that might accrue'to the Sup-
D ; -Supplementals: economically, Jeven if it runs counter to,
£
plementals, if they ‘were given free rein to solicit and =
- their’ inclusive” tour. services,’ would justify this Court in,
| disregarding “the policy: decisidn made by-: Congress was)
_ abate one made ss the. Board. ' ie
av 7a _—. . ie “>
© ° ns .
‘ a
A |
Ae « ia,
dy pores eer. ae cock Tee a
“2 fe 55 Ve, “<i” pate ; Nee ceed ut =
mie. care members. of the general ‘public. to. use-
—
Pa
, f
Vi
.
fi,
: -
Il.
The Board unlawfully deprived respondents of a hear-
ing } in the reopened Transatlantic Charter Investigation,”
The Board in the Reopened Transatlantic Charter Inves-
_ tigation amended the’ previously approved certificates of
_ two .Supplémentals, which: had become -final.** The _cer- -
_ tificates had not permitted these Supplenientals 8 carry ©
inclusive tours._The amendments authorized them to do 80. -
The Board, at the same time, and relying on the order
+ granting such amendments, also issued new certificates i >
” the transatlantic area to other Supplementals. permitting
. . them to carry. inclusive tours ( Order No. E-24242, 1097a-
%)
\ 1106a).
' These actions were: taker without-holding a panting on
whether the outstanding certificatés should be so amended
; or'the new certificates. should include inclusive tour author-
- ity; and so were'a violation of the Act and the Fifth Amend- —
ment, The Board, moreover, reversed its prior decision
: denying such authority without giving respondents the
opportunity to meet unspecified new data relied upon by
the Board and . still . undisclosed ‘in the order _ Set. aside
(Order, No. B- 24240, 1060a-1082a). |
--The - Act , requires the. Board to hold hearings before
:> granting,’ altering, amending or modifying any certificates
(49 U.S.C.§ 1871). Title 5 of the United States Code, Sec-
tion’554, sets forth the requirements for a hearing where,
_ The Board’s saggestion that-the previously approved iin :
had not become final is refuted’ by its statement on the face of
' each,’ “Issuance’of this certificate to fhe holder approved by the
ah President of the United States on February.18, 1964” (783a, 786a).
Pa
4 ae “ ¥ . a ti
ree Whe . : /
. . 7 s A ~
«-
co]
a
as here, the matter is “required by: statute to be ‘deter-
mined .on- the record after agency hearing” (5. U.S.C.
§ 554). a
>
i 2 The Board legally Amended Certificates
W ithout a Hearing.
’ The Board, in ignoring the statutory ilaiviieanaie be-
fore amending.the two Supplemental certificates,. said it
relied on the hearings held’ before the certificates -were
a issued, although on the evidence adduced at those hearings
it had denied inclusive tour authority.
_. a.) | i ele Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Acroncuiics, 367 U.S.
- 818 (1961), the Board,.as here, relied on an earlier record
to avoid the hearing requirement. It summarily modified —
the terms of Delta’s certificate without notice and. hearing, ~
on a petition for reconsideration ‘filed before the certificate
“had “become effective. The, Board thought it could do so
because at the time it permitted the certificate to become
effective, it had stated that approval did not foreclose “the
Board from full .and complete considerationtof: the pend-
ing petitions for reconsideration of their merits” (280-F.2d.
» 48, 45, n. 4).
As it does’ here (CAB. Br., p. 3), the Board. argued
' there (367 U.S. at 331) :
: “respondent ‘in ‘substance’ enjoyed the hearing con-
templated by § 401 (g) because the matters impelling -
the Board to change its mind were matters that had Ream
been thrashed out during the hearings on the cei
— ‘eal :
** Formerly. Section 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
\)
15
This Court held this (367 U.S. at 331) gh
“. .. assumes: a fact that we do not ‘have before us—
that a hearing wouid not have disclosed any further
evidence or, perhaps more importantly, any post-certi-
_* fication events weighty enough to alter the Board’s
a pointed out that the language of Section 401(g) of
the Act “represents to us an attempt by Congress to give
the Board comprehensive instructions fo meet all con-
tingencies.” (367 U.S. at 323). 3 Gs go ,
The Court concluded that ‘the hearing requirements of
the statute had not been met by this procedure. It went
even further (367 U.S. at 332). , |
Bei 3 “It might be added that some authorities have felt
strongly enough about the practical significance of this
* practice to suggest that their presence may be required
by the Fifth Amendment.” : | |
As in Délfa, the Board relied here on proceedings held
sometime earlier—four years earlier: The Board contends
here it went further than in Delta and relied also on ‘post- _
certification data that justified reversal of its earlier de-
cision that the'certificates in question should not authorize
inclusive tours. \ But respondents here were given no op-
portunity to ‘meet that new data and did not even know
about it until the Board’s opinion disclosed its action with- s
out specifying “the other data” which changed the Board’s
‘ mind. As will be shown infra (pp. 77-79), this only aggra-
vates the error.
| te
76
_B. The Board Did Not Meet the Hearing Requirements
of the Act Before ee Inclusive Tour aay
_ in New Certificates.
The Board included in the aint seaidid isbiaitee of
the Sapplementals authorized to engage in transatlantic
- operations the right to carry inclusive tours without any
hearing on that issue. It simply relied on’ its order amend-
ing the certificates<of two Supplementals discussed above.
That order, in turn, was said to be based on hearings held
before the alleged change in conditions upon whigh the ~
‘Board based its reversal, and on officially noticed data.
Those earlier hearings, on the basis of. which inclusive
tour authority had been denied,” cannot constitute.a hear-
ing according with the requirements -of the Act. - Delta,
_ supra, makes-clear that a hearing must be adequate. So
doés Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
- °339-F.24 56-{2 Cir. 1964), cert. den.,. Hughes Tool Co. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 382 U.S, 842 (1965),.in which ~
the Court of Appeals held that the “investigation and find-
ings [of the Board] preceding its previous orders” were
"no substitutes for the hearing required and remanded. the
matter to the Board for a further hearing. And in Morgan
_. y. United States, 304 US.. i mai 20 ial this Court
recognized : | :
“The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to
present evidence but also reasonable opportunity to.
' know the claims of the <ppomng party and to meet
them.” : ‘
; "8 American. Flyers Airline Corp. be Overseas National Airways, —
Inc., Trans International Airlines, Inc., World Airways, Ine. ‘
- In those original proceedings, two of the Supplementals who
_were granted certificates in the Reopened Transatlantic. Charter
Investigation, Trans International Airlines, Inc. and American
a Flyers — Corp., —_ not even |
. €
- . be = o
. ° : - . . . .
- . ‘ “ . .
> ‘ . . . °
7.
.
: The requirement for an adequate hearing is clearly not
met where the Board relies on a hearing held years earlier,
particularly when the Board bases its decision on a sub-
oo sequent change in circumstances to reverse its: contrary
decision resulting from the earlier hearing.
_. The Board Was’ Required to Give Petitioners .
the Opportunity to Meet New Data the Board ,
Relied On. dx: il oi ;
The Board also sought to support the orders reversing
its earlier decision on the basis of “official notice”. of tn-
é
specified “Form 41 reports and other data”.
“Official notice” is no substitute for the hearing required
_ by the Act. As pointed out long ago by this Court in United
States v. Abilene & Southern Railway Co., 265 U.S. 274, 289
' (1924), regulations authorizing an administrative agency
' to take notice of certain documents in its files do not
“purport to relieve” the. agency from introducing, by
specific reference, such parts of the reports as it wishes
to treat as evidence. There is very good reason for this
requirement, as Justice Brandeis explained on behalf of
<2
_» the unanimous Court (265 U.S. 289) : | :
“The objection to the use of the data contained in the
annual reports is not lack of authenticity or untrust-
_ Worthiness. It is that the carriers were left, without _
notice of the evidence with whi they were, in fact,
confronted, as later disclosed by the finding made.
. The requirement that in an-adversary proceeding spe-
cific reference is made, is essential to. the preservation
of the substantial rights of the parties,”
a - See also: Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville a
Nashville RR Co., 227 U8. 88, 93 (1913); Ohio Bell Tele-- -
: i os ns :
a
be
78
phone: Co. v. Public Utilities Cienialaaton of Ohio, 301 U. 8.”
- 292, 301-802 (1987),
The opportunity to know and to rebut damaging wien
goes to the heart of the controversy and lack of such op-*
portunity vitiates the whole proceeding. See e.g., DeGraw
v. Toon, 151 F.2d 778, 780. (2 Cir. 1945). 7
‘The Board’s own regulations, indeed, recdgnine the need .
to prevent such a violation of the statute and due ‘Process
(14 CFR § 302. .24(m)(3)) :
peer er whaed’ ‘the’ decision rests on ‘official ‘ities of a
material fact or facts, it [the Board] will set forth such
items with sufficient particularity to advise interested
persons of the matters which have been noticed.”
Yet not one of the Board’s own requirements was com- .
"plied with here. The Board simply stated that it relied on
“Form 41 reports and other data of which we may take
official notice.” The Board did not specify the portions of
the reports.and the other data noticed. This clearly is. not
sufficient notice, especially where the regulations provide
that the Board may take official notice. of 42 broad eate- ,
gories of documents, as well as “other matters‘ or docu-
ments properly. the subject’ of official notice” (14 CFR
§ 302. 24 (m)(1)). Certainly, “facts conceivably known to-
the commission but not put in evidence will not support an
order,” The Chicago Junction. Case, ' 264. U. 8. 258, 263
ARM
This Coart should not accept the Board’s assurance that
respondents could haye done nothing in a hearing which —
would have altered the. result the Board reached. A court
should not be required to try to apprise itself of the nature
of off-the-record evidence to determine whether a party
5
/
79
_ may be able to rebut it by evidence of its awn, See Ce
Deep South Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 347 F.2d 459, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1965); W._8.
_ Butterfield Theatres, Inc. v. Federal Communications
_ Commission, 237 F.2d 552, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1956)...
_| What the Board did here is precisely what it did in North.
eust Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 345 F.2d 484
(1 Cir. 1965), cert: den. sub nom. Eastern Airlines, Inc.
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 382 U.S. 845 (1965). In North. -
east the Board sought to overcome the requirements of a —
hearing by taking official notice of “reports filed by the
carfiers since the formal closing of the evidentiary record
_and other stipulated materials” (345 F.2d at 845). It then
“rendered a new and, what it terms ‘complete recast’ of
ay its. decision” (345 F.2d at 485). The Court, of Appeals held
(345 F.2d at 487): ae: | |
“Having opened the door to new data, the Board was
. obliged to take a full look.” )
As it had previously observed (345 F.2d at 486) :
“It is to us crystal clear that as soon as it elected to
look at such matters it could not pick and choose, at
_ least to the extent of denying an objecting party the :
rights guaranteed, but by no means created, by sec-
tion 7(d) to rebut not only those matters it looked to,
_ but also the inferences which were sought to be drawn
_ therefrom. Due process could permit no less.” ~
Respondents urged thése requirements before the Board,
but the Board refused to afford any hearing. The Board’s
action is a violation of the Act, Title 5 of the United States
_ Code, and is a denial of die process. ae .
— <
ee 80.
D. Petitioners’ Attempt to Prevent Adjudication of the
Board’s Failure to Meet Procedural Requirements.
The Supplementals and the Board contend ‘that the is-
sues raised may not be considered because: (1) there was
no prejudice since the Board relied on respondents’ own
~ reports (C.A.B. Br. p. 35); (2) the objections were first
' raised in the court below (Supp. Br. p: 56); (3) no request
was made for specification.of the additional data relied —
upon (€.A.B.’Br. p. 35); (4) respondents “failed ta specify
7 in their briefs below the alleged controversial errors com-. -
mitted by the Board or the contrary evidentiary showing
that respondents would have been prepared to .make
(C.A.B. Br. p. 35; Supp. Br. p..56).
1. The Board’s present claim that it relied on respon-
. dents’ own reports is its post hoc conclusion as to what was
relied upon. The Board’s order simply refers to “Form 41
reports and other data of which we may take official no-
tice” (supra, p. 7)—no specification i is made. Even had the
Board relied only on respondents’ own reports, petitioners
may have been prejudiced by the use of such material with-
out the right to explain it, as this Court has — out in
the cases. cited supra, pp. 11-19.
2. Respondents did object to the Board’s procedure be.
fore the Board, arguing that they were entitled. to a new
hearing before inclusive tour authority could be cage
‘in the transatlantic area (963a-967a, 968a-975a). |
right was sought 60 that, among other things, se
-eould counteract any material of which the Board might —
“take official notice. (See brief to the Board, p: —- The
— — ~~ request.
81
3. The Board having rejected this, request, any attempt.
to obtain specification from the Board would merely have
further delayed the already protracted Proceedings with. ._
out giving respondents any opportunity to refute the
Board’s data. Petitioners cannot bar respondents’ right
under. the provisions of section 1006(e) of the Act (49 USC
§ 1486(e) ) ‘because the Board’s attention-had already been
wee theerror. .
called to-its error and the Board nevertheless persisted in :
4. Respondents not only spelled out in their brief to
the: Board the prejudicial errors committed by the Board
but also specified the type of information they -contended
must be ‘considered before inclusive tour authority, if
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