Brief Amicus Curiae — Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S. p. A. v. Lisi

Supreme Court brief1968

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SUPREME) COURT: UU. +

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= s ements a oe JOHN: F. DAVW, BLERK

‘i Court nf the Ynited States 7

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Aurratta-DINEE ‘AEREE TTALIANE, S.p.A.,

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v.

Joun List, et al.,

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI LO THE UNITED STATES

. GOURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

. ° e

- BRIEF OF ARNOLD HOLTZMAN AS AMICUS CURIAE

Stuart M. SPEISER

; Counsel for amicus curtae

° en : | Arnold Holtzman ©

; * 200 Park Avent

New York, N. -Y. 10017

Cuaries F’. Krause

' Aurrep W. Gans

Donatp W. Mapo.e

Spriser, SHUMATE, GEOGHAN & KRavse | .

. Of Counsel — ee .

~ January 18, 1968

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Nature of the Interest of Amious Arnold Holtzman

‘The Questions Involved .

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TABLE OF CONTENTS i

‘ ae ; & i -, PA&GE ;

| AncuMENT— Epi |

-. I, The Second Cireuit Considered AN of the Legal

_ Arguments- Now Being “Advanced on Behalf of

" Petitioner Alitalia, and Rejected. All of Them

for Sound Legal Reasons ‘

IL Claims i in Briefs of Other dwiiet That. the De-

x: . cision Below. Compromises the Good Faith of

. the United States i in Relations With Other Na-

tions, g and. May Lead to Erosion of the Warsaw |

‘ Convention, . Are’ Entirely Unfounded. The

Warsaw: Convention: Has Outlived Its Time

Only" Because of Misrepresentation ‘of Its True

Nature. There Is No Legal,.Moral or Economic —

Justification for Warsaw Today. The Argu-

~ments Made Herein Against the Decision Below - .

‘Tacitly Admit That Warsaw Cannot Survive

if Reasonable Notice of Its Limitations Is Re- '

quired actin

= s

a. Thére Is Absolutely No Economic Jastifice-

‘tion Today for Warsaw Limitations. Total

Passenger and Cargo Liability Insurance

Costs for U.S. Airlines Are Less Than One

Percent (1%) of Operating. Costs, With or

Without Warsaw “Limitations. The . Other

‘99% of Operating Costs: Are: Not Limited

. by Treaty, and Are Readily Paid, Often at

American Prices, by Foreign Airlines Eager

to Serve the Lush U.S. Air Travel Market..

The C.A.B. Has Found That the Impact of.

‘Complete Denunciation of ‘Warsaw Would

Be Minimal

‘12

PAGE

bh: The. Warsaw Convention Confers No: Bens- :

fits . Upon. Passengers—lIt Merely. Takes

‘Away Legal Rights They Would Otherwise

. Have.- Its Solé Purpose Was ‘te Limit Car-

rier, ‘Liability. All Ticketing and Docu-: |

. mentation. Procedures Developed Through -

Warsaw Are Also Available to Non-Warsaw

Signatories Through I.A.T.A. ...

. Warsaw: Does Not Reduce Litigation or

, Bring Uniformity of Law. By Injecting the.

Irritants of Arbitrary Limitations ‘and

16

. mt

Foreign Legal Concepts Into Nornial Litiga-

tion Channels, It Actually, Foments Pro- _

19

tracted Litigation and Destroys Uniformity

. Carriers and Insurers .Whg /Claim ‘That

-Warsaw’s Liability Limitations Are Neces- _

sary, Use American Courts to Litigate Huge

Hull Claims Which Dwarf Passenger Suits,

and Which Are N ot Limited by Any ‘Treaty.

: ‘Warsaw Is Admitted by Its Strongest Pro-

ponents to Be “Completely Repugnant” to

.American Law. The Only Reported Decision

Upholding Its Constitutionality Under the

21

%§

?

. Seventh Amendment Rests on the Untenable

_ Ground that the Right to Trial:by Jury Does

Not Include Assessment of Damages ............

. U.S. Adherence to Warsaw Has No Effect on .

: ‘Operating Rights to Foreign Countries. isu x

°

23.

PAGE

7 - denaataeilip Limitations . on ‘Wrongful ear

Death Recoveries i in a Few American States, Rie

Cited as.a Parallel to Warsaw, Are on the

Way Out; Aré Being Circumvented in Many :

. Aviation. Cases; Are Subject to State Legis-

‘lative Control; and in Any Event Cannot *

- - and Do-Not Apply to Personal Injury Cases’.

. Such as List ... 26

é cree ‘The Anic ‘United Kingdom, Italy and ry

* . Are Owners or Controllers of International Air

| - Carriers. Their Position on the Warsaw Coh- .

vention Should Be Considered i in. That Light

°

“a: | In General : ; innit ~ ie

a The Republic of Ttaly a ee

© @, The United Kingdom -i:tcccecncncnnrneen SAY.

da. Canada 7 : oe

e. gATA and IATA, the Air eeeny Trade.

Associations pine , _

@&

_IV. Every Expression ‘of United. States Policy on

‘ the Warsaw Convention ‘Has: Clearly ‘Stated

~~ “*That if the, Carriers ers Do.Not Give Passengers

- » Adequate Notice of Warsaw Limitations, the

- . Carrier Must Suffer Loss of the Liability ia

tation. Since the United, States Has Stead- coi

fastly Maintained ‘That Passenger Notice Is .

_. Essential -to Warsaw Limitation of Liability, |

It Cannot Be Claimed That the Decision Below ~~

Causes Surprise or* Any Breach-of interna-

fees sila tional ene : _

~,

“$5 ri

shi "Ww:

| | Sr et eis PAGE

| a. In ‘General ONES Pe iaaaied 56

ye by US. Policy. Statements at Rio , --- 56

ec. At the, Hague - eRe SAK OE ee

. d.-United” States Goverumental Policies and |

Statements of. Position, 1962-1963 ................ 61

| e. At Montreal Papel. Meeting of ICAO in.

1966... : <a 66

£. In 1966 ‘and 1967, Following Pamiintet

ingtart i te Withdrawal of: ae Denunciation of Warsaw ae

: in May 1966 .. ; henna 73

= ” Amerlein Public Policy on Carrier ime

Limitations . ‘a " ee

_ V. In Addition to the United States, Other Partici-

pating Governments at Warsaw, Rio and The -

Hague Evinced Concern for the Passenger. .

They Noted the Inequality of Bargaining Posi-

tions of Airlines:and Passengers; Noted the

“Adhesion” Nature of the Contract_of—Car-—

___Tiage;and- Supported the Principle That Air-

lines Would Losé Their Liability Limitation if

They Did Not Give Notice to the Passenger ...

a. At ‘Warsaw. \

Be Be TOR seterirenemsvigiodih

De)

c. At the Hague spcneprneamneasieh ere

ear The Position of Air Carriers. Has Completely

Changed Since the Fledgling Days of 1929, and

the-Warsaw Convention Must Be Considered i in

— of Modern Prevailing Conditions ...........: 100

ee ais

tLe ee a pd , . er eee

_. @ The Radical Changes Sincé 1929 ...".... 100"

ob. The Warsaw Convefition Must Be Conptiend

_as a Whole in the Light of Presently Exist-

ing Conditions of International Air Travel .. 104.

VII. The Ofiginal Gresk Proposal Relating to the

Sanctions in ‘Article 3 of Warsaw, Does Not

Support Petitioner’s Position, Since It Did Not

Relate to Limitation of Liability and Would.

“Not Have Eliminated the Sanctions .................. ,

Conciusiox. _— nee : . conser ey | 121. 3

Certifitate of Service . os bio . plese 122.

‘Arrawom A seneoseeee ser ee N eee .-

te si ;

” alt ee ‘

| .

“Braniff Airways, Ine. v. L& |

. 1913. D 568 «

“TABLE oF —- .

“Cases: 7 ti | * PAGE ae

. Berner v. ‘United piven: et al., 149 N. t ¢ g, 2d 335, y= ‘17

Block et al. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France (Nov.

8, 1967), — F ad —, , 1967 CCH Neg. Cases, p

2307 , . . 20,190

‘Boryk. v. Aerolineas haben et al.,. U. SD. _ ey

Southern District, New York, 62 Civil-3855 SR oR \ eo

urtiss-Wright Corp.,

_ District Court, Southern District of New York, sev-

* eral preliminary phases of which.aré unofficially re-

__Ported'at 7 Avi. 18,114 and 8 Avi. 18, 255 (CCH Avia-

~ tion cases) .....: "99

: ysinate v. Eastern ‘Air Linea! et al., Supreme: Court, cd

- County of New York, Index No. 6747 /65 sataielinnanaaion a

Coster v. Coster (1943), 289 NY 438, 46 NEDA 509, ae

146 ALR 702 aeeapeniecnenen . 18

DeSoto Motor Corp. v. Stewart, 62 F.2d See 26 ie

Dimick y. Schiedt (1935),/293.U.S: 474, at p. 486, 79 -

Led 603, 611 S Ct.296, 95 ALR 1150...... 25 -

Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co. ( 1912), _

255 Ill. 369, 99 NE 619, LRA 1915 F 955, Ann Cas

Eck v. Whitea Arab: dite: Ine. i866), 15 yea 53,

255 NYS2d 249, 203 NE2d 640, 1 ALR3d 1260......25, 105, -

Eck ve United Arab Airlines (1966, CA 2), 360 F2d 804 6 —

Egan v. Kollsman Instrument. Co. and American Air- _.

lines, Tne. . No. 584 New oo Court of Appeals

as doe _ — eo 7, 9, 106

aaa seeteeeceeereneceeeees 18

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ee ate é ° . - ° PAGE _

~"Geotioy: v. Riggs, 133 US. 258 iti ~.........26, 112

~ Graham v. Eastern Air Lines, et al., Supreme Court,

, County of New York, Index No. 9718/65 Enea ' ©

Hamilton v. Erie R. Co. (1916), 219 NY 343, at p. 853,

-% 114 NE 399, writ of error dism in 248 US 369, eS...

' ZL ed 307, 39.8 Ct 95 - ‘ 112

Harrison v..Eastern Air Lines, et al., Supreme Court, i

- County: of New York, Index.No. 9723/65 3

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Go. v. Delta & ‘Pine

Land Co. (1934), 292 US 143, 78 L ed 1178, 54 S Ct

634, 92 ALR 928, rehearing denied in 292 US 607,

"78 Led 1468, 54 S Ct 772 sor epeens eit +48

' Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, ic (1961), 9 NY2d 34,

211 NYS2d 133, 172 NE2d 526 aia ' hiaisttel ly aoe

Loughran v. Loughran (1934), 292 US 216, 78 L ed 1219

54.8 Ct, 684, rehearing denied in = ue 615, Said

—_ Led 1474, 54 8 Ct 861 . 18

‘Love v. * Pakistan Air Lines, U. S. D. C., Southern Dis- ..

‘trict, New York, 65 Civil 2369 .. : 4

? Masci v. Toug (1932), 109 NIL 453, 162 A 623, | .

_* ALR 869, affirmed in Young v. Masei (1933), 289 U

_ 258777 L ed 1158, 83 S Ct 599, 88 ALR 170 2... & 5

al Massenburg | v. Eastern Air Lines, et al., U. S. D. C.,

Eastern Air Lines, et al., U. 8. D. C., Eastern Dis-

_ trict, New York, 65.A. 640> 4

.. Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. (1965, Aa), 341

. Fd 851, cert den 382 US. 816 ..... ; 9

_ Muller v. iecencandinedcas i aeabamce 28 8Ct

] .

, | ' ) 7 -P : Pag eS

-. Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 09 Tenn Wises ae

Noel v. Linea aprepertal beaepres: 247 F 24 667... ag ae

- Oceanic. Steam Nav. Co..v. . Corcoran (1925, cag NY),

_F24'163, 57.ALB 163, at page 168; Slioheieis 86

: Pearson v. ‘N ortheast Airtined line. (1962, CA2 NY),

309 F2d 553, 92 ALR2d 1162, ‘certiorari denied in

~ (1958) 372 U.S. 912, 9 L ed 720, 83S Ct-726............. 18, 27

Pierre \v. ‘Eastern Airlines, et al. (1957), 152 F. Supp. at

486, U.S. District. Court for oe District of New

—— oe 24

. ~ Poff. v.. New ‘England T & T Co, 72 Nu. 164, 55 Atl. .

OF sn 8

Powell v. Eastern ‘Air tinea et al;, U. 8. D. G., ‘Bast- <a

ern District, New York, 66 A. 101 ......... 4

-- Reigér v. Pan American, et al., - Goptiine. Court, County

, ~. of New York, Index No. 13252/66..... * ae |

* Rygaard v.. Eastern Air Lines, et al., Supreme Court,

a County of New — Index No. 9722/65 ae 2S

Smyth | Sales. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co. cass,

CA 3), 141 F.2d 41 at p.-44 | 25 24

: Sommers v. Eastern Air Lies, et. al., Supreme Court,

_ County of New York, Index No. 9720/65 .. a.

- Sallivan v. Kidd (1920), 254 US 433 at p. 439, 65 L ed

344, at p. 347, 41 8 Ct 158 _ 112,113

Universal Adjustment Owns’ ‘v. Midland ‘Bank, : Ltd. * |

(1933), 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E.. 152, 87 ALR. 1407, - a

p. 1422 ...... in.

Usher v. West Jersey R. Co., 126 Pa 206 | e118 *

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Pesaro aieanh Red cnr PO MENTE

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pan, Sudiiemed v. Wastern Air Linea, et “a Supreme Court, ~

3) 7 PAGE

Volney Righter, eke. v. | Aimerioan Air Lines}. at al.,

Supreme Court, County of Ne ew rey, Index ‘No. |

11487/64 —_ ie . 8

; Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, -_ (1965, cas), 352 :

- 2 OR Oe Le 6

‘Westminster Bank \ v. Imperial dninetee Limited, ;

: * United King’s Bench Division: {1936] 2°All E.R. .

890; 155 L.T.-86, 52 T.L.R. 607; 80 Sol.Jo;.794; 42 .

~ Com.Cas. 1; 55 Lloyd, LR. 242; (1986), U.S. Av.R. ee

OF. channel 43°

_ Winsor v. United Air Lines, iss F. Supp. " Rigen’ EV.

‘es |

ny of New York, Index No. 9721/65

Statutes: ce ee ae oe }

Canadian Transport. ‘Act of 1938. a | = 87

Death on the’ High Seas Act. Spacnapast bisieuihs*s

. Dominion Transport Act : 3 : 2 a “88

i. Federal Employers Liability Act ..... : ; 7

"Federal Tort Claims Act ........... aT

Railway and Canal ‘Traffic Act, 1854 88.

Other Authorities:

Appendix of U.S. Senate Hearings on, the iia he

‘Industry, Sen. Res. 231, 85th Cong., ae. 6-16, — :

at pp. 487-675 ..... . 23

7 New York: Jur, Canntans, 95399 et seq. : , 84

ll Am Jur, Conflict of Laws, §6. Radios > | 18

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at

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°° x ” 5 ye ; els :

N ae 3 : os Z Mi as PAGE

‘." 13 Oss, Cannrens, §§629. et SOQe. n-------- : ae 84»

ck aug Jur 2d, CARRIERS, §§942 et Onin wre . 84. :

ve 80 ous, ‘Suprine, §195a ...:.... toe cg ae

[1942] US Av 178 ania scckiaacasauume ta aac ae

[1947] US Ay 1. asaeneses ies ae

* Blackstone’s ‘icmeumnaas’ ineanveed 1996, Vol. T,

; Book EI, Chap. 23, Trial By Jury, p. 376 ia a

aes “Negligence Law in Europe”, 361 Insurance arsed i

ens ss Jo rnal 82 (Feb. 1953) .* - ef

-. JGIA document 23/1. 10A, Final Action, August 7,

1962, a D, page ees i 12

page 8 18

page 9 ...... 19

-Ynternational Conference on Private” Air Law, The*

Hague, September 1955 reported in ICAO Document

’ 7687-LC/140 “Hague Minutes” “..............29,33, 41, 44, 49,

-, 96, 98, 99

’ Least Committee of. ICAO (Ninth Session), Rio de

. Janeiro, August 25- September. 12, 1953, reported 1 in

° . — 7450-10 /136 “Rio Minutes” viiaias 30, 36, 38, 39,

i 40, 47, 48, 49, 51,

53, 57, 94, 95.

. Second. Interngtional Conference of Private Air Law, :

Warsaw’ Oct. 4-12, 1928 “Warsay Minutes” ......29, 30, 31,

> a -.,. & 88, 89, 92, 4.

. iG of i

58,59,60,61,

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Cane _ . PAGE -

Special ICAO Meeting a Montreal, Peliruaiy 1-15,

1966, ICAO Document $384-L0/154- 1 “Montreal Min- |

utes” » ; me sosceeipaimian 2-80, 34, 50, 54, 66,

, Sg nt 88 69, 70, 71,108, 104

Speiser, Riscineey For Wrongful Death (1966), .......:26, 27

The United States and the Warsaw Convention, Low: ,

enfeld and Mendelsohn, 80 Harvard Law Rev .. ..100,101

Volume II. ‘Hague Conference, 1955 ICAO Document |

7687-LC/140 “Hague Documents” - nasiainn a

Warsaw Convention , 1 et passim 7

- World Airline Record, 6th. Edition, 1965 pub. by Road-::

cap & Associates; Chicago, __ honnn . 28, 30, 46.

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Ix THE

Supreme Caurt uf the Wuited States

Ocronsr. Term, 1967 ©

“Aurnanta-Liwee AEREE Trattane, S.p. "

ie Petitioner,

v.

Joun Last, ef al., a my

) . Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES ©

, COURT OF APPEALS FOR, THE SECOND CIRCUIT _

aS)

“BRIEF OF ARNOLD HOLTZMAN AS AMICUS CURIAE

‘Nature of the Interest of Amicus Arnold Holtzman

Amicus Arnold Holtzman’s motion for leave to file this

brief amicus curiae ‘was granted by this Court, on the

grounds that he now has pending an action for damages

in the Supreme Court of New York, County of Kings, en-

titled ““ArnoLp HoitzMay, Plaintiff —v— Barris Evro-

pean Arrways and De Havnaanp, Defendants,” being Index

No. 7840/1963 on the Docket of. said Court, in which: the

question involved is the same as “that presented for deci-

sion in the instant case, namely—are the limitation of lia-

bility provisions contained i in Article 22( 1) of the Warsaw

Convention (49 Stat. 3000- 3026), available to an air carrier

of a passenger receiving bodily injuries on a flight in |

international transportation in light of the provisions of

Article 3(2) of the Convention (49 Stat. 3015) precluding

&

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2

availability of various provisions ‘of the Convention limit-

ing liability where the purported ticket contains, on the

front thereof in exceedingly small print, the message,

“Each: passenger should carefully examine this ticket, par-

: .tieularly the Conditions on-page 4,” and the “notice” to

the passengers is located on page 4 of a ticket and baggage

cheeks: combined inthe form of a small booklet and.(to —

quofe the two courts below), is contained in footnotes

printed “in microscopic. type” and “camouflaged in Lillipu-

tian print in a thicket of ‘Conditions of Contract’”, and the _

“exculpatory statements ,.. are virtually invisible .. . are

ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized, and unempha-

sized by bold face type, contrasting color, or anythihg

_ else,” and “ ‘are so artfully camouflaged that their presence

is concealed’”? Amicus Holtzman states that the ticket

. “delivered” to him by. British European Airways, on the

international flight on which he sustained severe and per-—

manent bodily i injuries, is identiéal, as to its pertinent parts,

printing, typography and legibility, to the ticket delivered

to the respondents i in the instant case.

More specifically, amicus Holtaman was a passenger on

a de Hgvilland aircraft operated | by British European Air *

ways_ which. crashed and ‘burned at. Ankara, Turkey, on -

| Decaasber 21, 1961. Amicus Holtzman was .trapped in: the

flames, and aécording to paragraph 6(a) of the verified bill

of particulars which he filed in said action,

“As a “result of the accident plaintiff Arnold Holtz-

man suffered pulmonary burns. necessitating an emer- ..

' ? gency tracheotomy; plaintiff suffered burns covering

an area of 20% of the total body area including the

following: third degree burns. involving the entire. °

forehead and eyebrows, extending into the eyelids,

downward around the upper part of the left cheek and.

across the glabellar region of the nose. The lower

.

’

oes Sen hhc SESARND wie

SPN ORR F e $90 sm ESI oe ete dd Sey ue. Peete soe

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portions of the nose, upper lip, lower lip, cheek and

‘ naterior portions of the neck were deeply burned.

Scattered areas of third dégree: loss in the area of the

ears involving the helical rims of the ears causing a ~

loss of a portion of ‘the ‘area involyed. Second degree

| burns in the’ scalp. Deep and extensive third degree

Ds burns of -both hands. Said burns. resulted in many

operative procedures to repair and reconstruct the de-

stroyed areas of skin of. the face, forehead, ears and

hands. The permanent injuries are the results of the

healing scars. and the attempts at reconstruction which

have resulted in permanent disfigurement of the: plain-

tiff.”

‘An additional ground of the motion of amicus Holtzman

’ for leave to file this brief was that there are many other —

cases, now pending in various state and federal courts,

involving idéntical tickets “delivered” to passengers who

were killed or: suffered severe bodily injury in interna-

tional flight air crashes or accidents, in which the Warsaw ~

. . Convention is being-attempted to he used as a:defense,

__—-among them being the following captioned_cases in which: .

* the plaintiffs are represented by amicus Holtzman’s counsel.

Stuart M. Speiser: -Volney Righter, etc. v. American Air’. :

Lines, et al., Supreme Court, County of New York, Index —

No. 11487/64; Reiger v. Pan American, et al., Supreme

Court, County of New York, Index No. 13252/66; Byzinski.

v. Eastern Air Lines, et-al., Supreme Court, County of New

York, Index No. 6747/65; Rygaard v. Eastern Air Lines,

et al., Supreme Court, County of New York, Index No./

9722/65; Harrison vy. Eastern Air’ Lines, et al., Supreme

Court, County of New York, Index No. 9723/65 ; Graham:

v. Eastern Air Lines, et al.; Supreme Court, County of .

New York, Index No. 9718/65; Zuckerman v. Eastern Air

Lines, et al., Supreme Court, County of New York, Index ay:

~

olan . . " e |

. ,

' . ,

t 3

4

- No. 9721/65; Sivianais v. Eastern Air Lines, et ee Ringinesia

_. Court, County of New York, Index No. 9720/65; Boryk v.

- Aerolineas Argentina, et al., U. S. D. C., Southerg District,

- New York, 62 Civil 3855; Eck v. United Arab Airlines, -

Supreme Court, County of New York, Index No: 7778/63;

Eck v. United Arab Airlines, U. S. D. C., Southern District,

New York, 64 Civil 3855; Love v. Pakistan Air Lines, .

°U. S. D. C., Southern District, New York, 65 Civil 2369;

Masrenbions ¢. Eastern Aig Lines, et al., U. S.D.C., Eastern. -

- District, New York, 65 A. -640-and Powell v. Eastern Air

Lines; et-al., U. S..D, C., Eastern District, New York, 66 |

A. 101. 7 ae Sts oon

_ Amicus Holtzman further sahuceis motion for leave

_ _ to file this brief, that he-hias attempted ‘to present his views

_-. to. this: ¢ urt, by and through his present counsel, as to

the invalidity of the purported ‘‘withdrawal” of the Govern-

** ment of the United States of its earlier denunciation, of the

Warsaw Convention, in the case of Arnold Holtzman, Peti-. -

tioner, v. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, Respondent, Case

No. 1294-on-the Docket of this Court for the October, 1965,

“Term; petition for writ of certiorari was denied May 16,

1966, reported in 384 U. s. 943, 16 L. ed. 2d 541, * Sup.

">. Ct. 1466.

| Amicus Holtzman “supports the position of the respon-

- dents herein, and respectfully urges this Honorable Court -

--° to affirm the decisions of the courts a:

°

The Question Involved

~

.* the liability of an air carrier. toa passenger limited to

$8,291.87 under the Warsaw Convention, when the only:

ticket reference to the possible applicability of the Warsaw |

‘Convention is the following: a message on the front ‘of a

ticket, in exceedingly small print, stating “Each passenger

.

a” 5 ° S

. e i Ni,

should carefully examine this ticket, particularly the Con-

‘ditions on page 4”; and, on said page 4; contained in foot-

-notes. printed in microscopic. type’ and camouflaged in

Lilliputian print in a thicket of “Conditions of Contract,”

the exculpatory statements are virtually invisible, are in-

effectively positioned, diminutively sized; unemphasized

- by bold face type, contrasting color or anything else, and

are so artfully camouflaged that their presence is concealed?

ARGUMENT

<The Second Circuit Considered ‘All of the Legal Argu-

ments Now Being Advanced on Behalf of, Petitioner

Alitalia, . and — All of fem for Sound Legal

Reasons. ,

The carefully considered opinion of the Second Circuit

makes it clear that all legal arguments contained in the .

briefs submitted in support of petitioner Alitalia in this

Court have already been rejected, for sound legal reasons.

‘Therefore, amicus Holtzman will make only brief mention

of these legal arguments herein, so as not to duplicate the .

‘brief of respondent Lisi. The main thrust of this Holtzman ;

amicus brief will be directed against non-legal arguments

and innuendos raised by the briefs of other amici, as oe.

_ tailed i in Point II below. , 7

' The Court of Appeals specifically vabiatidl ‘Alitalia’ 8 con-

‘Seti that, under Article 3(2), all that was required was

_ that a ticket be delivered to passengers, the rejected argu- -

ment being based upon a strict literal construction of the-

Convention and a sought-for application of the principle.

expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Appendix, pp. 93a, —

‘94a). The Court below rejoined (Appendix, p, 94A): |

—

“Tt is apparent that Alitalia relies on a literal read-. —

‘ing of the Convention for‘its assertions. We reject the.

_ interpretation it urges upon us. While it is true that

the language of the Convention is relevant to our deci-.

-. gion, it must not become, as Justice Frankfurter stated

it, a ‘verbal prjson.’ Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S.

— 335, 358 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The

task of ascertaining the meaning of words is. difficult,

and one certain way of misinterpreting. them is by a

literal reading. As, Learned Hand put it, ‘words are —

* such temperamental beings that the surest way to lose

atheir essence is to take them at their face.’ 1942° Ad-

dress by Judge Hand to the flassachusetts Bar. Asso-

ciation. Thus, the- language of Article 3 cannot be

considered in isolation; rather, it must be viewed: in .

_.. light of the other Ketiches and the overall purposes

us of the Convention. Bee. _— v. United Arab Airlines,

3s supra.” _

~ The -reference to the Eck case . ‘to the same -court’s

opinion in Eck -v. United Arab Airlines (1966, CA2)¥ 360 .

F2d 804. The Court further fortified its rejection of this -

_ medieval rigidity by references to its own earlier opinion

in Mertens v. Flying Tiger. Line, Inc. (1965, CA2), 341 F2d

- 851, cert den 382 U.S. 816, and to that of the Ninth Circuit.

in Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. (1965, CA9), 352

, F2d 494; -(Appendix pp. 94a, 95a), juiniiiaad eoning (Ap-- -..

pendix, pp. 96a, 97a) :

“We believe. that the reasoning of the Mertens. and

Warren decisions is. apposite to the case now before

- us. The Conyention’s arbitrary limitations on liability

—which have been severely and repeatedly criticized

—are advantageous to the carrier. But. the quid pro

quo for this one-sided-advantage is delivery to the, pas-

senger of a ticket and baggage check which give him

en See en ae ee

’ . os

. ¥

é

‘y

‘notice that on the air trip he is about to take; the

amount of recovery ‘to him or his family’in the event

of a.crash, is limited very substantially. Thus the pas-

senger is given. the opportunity to purchase. addi-.

tional flight insurance or to take such other steps for

his self-protection as he sees ft. 3

This notice to passengers is especially important it in.

_ this e@miry where the overwhelming number of peo-

-ple who travel by’ air do so on domestic flights, for

~ which thegonvention’ s restrictions on liability are in-

applicable. It is too much to-expect these passengers

to be sufficiently ‘sophisticated to realize that although

they are traveling the same number of miles on an

international flight that they have frequently traveled

_ - domestically, the amount they may recover in the

event of an accident is drastically reduced. In short,

it is clear from the ratio decidendi of thé Mertens and

Warren cases, that.the inquiry that must be made if

the Convention’s Articles are to be given meaning,:is

‘whether the ticket was delivered to the passenger in

such a manner as to afford him a reasonable. op-

portunity to take self-protective measures, ...’ Mertens :

v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc,, supra at 857. ”

°

The very recent Egan case from the New York Court of

Appeals, a fully considered unanimous decision discussed

7 in detail below, Point VI, completely adopts and. supports

_ the position of the Second Circuit. The reasoning and con-

_. clusion are also, consistent with previous decisions of this

: Court supporting the proposition that if alternative mean- .

ings can be placed upon a treaty, the meaning should be

adopted, if possible, that.is least restrictive of the rights

of individuals. As the Supreme Judicial Court ef Mas-

‘. sachusetts said in Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland. —

Bank, Ltd. (1933), 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.K. 152, 87 A.L.R.

)

. .

~ 4 / ; . ; : Pe : : x t

i, ’ . ;

1407, at page 1422: “When a treaty provision admits. of -

‘two constructions, one restricting, the other enlarging,

rights which may. be claimed under it, the more liberal in-

terpretation is to be preferred. Akasura v. “Seattle, 265

USS. 332, 44 S. Ct, 515, 68 L. ed. 1041; Tucker v. Alexandroff

[183 U.S. 424, 437, 22 S- Ct. 195, 46 L. ed. 264], supra;

Geofroy v, Riggs [133 US. 258, 271,.10 8. Ct, 295, 83 Ls ed.

642],.supra.” —

As to whether the particular tickets (and SReceas

- checks) here involved gave adequate notice, the Court .

found them completely wanting (Appendix, ‘page 98a) :

“We proceed to ‘determine, therefore, whether the |

particular tickets and baggage checks involved in the:

present case gave the appellees adequate notice. On .

_ the front of the ticket ‘and haggage check, in exceed-

ingly small print, was the folowing message: ‘Hach .

passenger should carefully examine this ticket, partic-

we note that one of our reasons in Mertens v. Flying

Tiger Line, Inc., supra, for precluding the carrier from

; limifing its liability under the Convention was that

the required statement on+the ticket ‘was printed in .

‘such a manner as to virtually be unnoticeable and, un-°

readable...’ Id. at 857.

: — . Judge MacMahon’ appropriately chantghesinait’” the

‘notice’ to the ‘passenger in| his: pithy conclusion as

_. ‘camouflaged in Lilliputian print ‘in a thicket of “Con-

| _ ditions of Contract.” . . . Indeed the exculpatory,state- _.

ments on which defendas relies are virtually -in-

visible. They are ineffectivély positioned, diminutively~

sized, and unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting ‘

color, or anything else. The a truth is that their ,

ene: is concealed.’ tes

ularly the Conditions on page. 4” And, at this point,’ .

scciahieeiitinn ndhtdeenthadliahed aati

*

»

- The petitioner Alitalia makes ithe, belated after-thought

plea that the question was one for a jury.: Both courts be-

low, the trial court (Appendix; page 76a), and the Court ~

of Appeals (Appendix, page 100a) specifically. held that a

jury could not have reasonably found: that the tickets and

‘baggage checks gate the passengers the required. notice.

~When respondents- moved’ for partial summary judgment,

--petitioner submitted affidavits in opposition (Appendix, -

‘pages 72a, 73a) and: “AN /the evidentiary facts. material to

‘the motion appear on the face: of the tickets issued to the

- passengers on the flight _ involved, and there is no dispute

about them” (Appendix, . page 73a). Furthermore, counsel

for amicus Holtzman was ‘present at. the argument.of thesé

‘ cases on appeal before the Second Circuit, and heard J fudge ~

. Kaufman ask George Tompkins, Esquire, counsel ‘for peti,

tioner Alitalia, from,the Bench during the oral - qrgnment «

. whether petitioner Alitalia claimed that there was any jury

‘. issue; and Mr. Tompkins answered in the negative. And.

the Egan case, discussed below, Point’ VI, shows.that no -

Pax or jury issue is here.involved since reasonable | men 4

not possibly. differ on the question.

Virtually all counsel supporting-the position of petitioner

Alitalia have made a-reference to the last part ‘of a sen-

- tence in footnote 64 on page 512-of an article in 80 |

Harvard Law Review, by two attorneys employed in 1966 ~

by ‘the Unitéd States Department of State, Andreas F.

-Lowenfeld and Allan F’. Mendelsohn.- But as.the authors

~ pointedly remarked in an asterisk footriote on page 497 ‘of :

this articie, “The views. expressed ‘herein are those of the-

authors and not necessarily those of ‘the United States

y-Governmertt or the: Department of State.” The part of the +

footnote ‘sentefice: repeated by. opposing counsel states,

without any sitetion of any precedents to.support the re-

De - x

- - " .

2 . .° 8

. . oo

. ° * .

/ . 1 . —_ — 9" er . Se ROWER o OY

a .

~ ‘

' .* . . ‘

e . . a .

. " . . ‘

a

-

/ ries sk e Tahee oma ae fie Nei

“a ‘

mark, that the trial judge. herein, in. kt, “was bissatiais

-a chain of hundreds of. precedents”. ‘Those same oppbsing

briefs, however, fail to state the text on page 512 to which

- the footnote 64 was appended, appearing on pages 512, 513

of the article—“As to notice, it was hard to get away from

the- airlines’ standard form * * * [referring to form of. -

ticket on a facing page]. Even if the passenger coul

the ticket, he would hunt in vain for warning of the lia-

bility limit. The United States Government had sought at

« the Hague to have the warning made more specific and in -

letters at least one-half centimeter higher, but these ‘efforts. ;

had failed.” Furthermore, neither the authors of the Har-

vard article nor the briefs- supporting petitioner’ herein

have pointed out’ where one may find a list of these hun-

dred of prevedents,.nor the cifations of any of them, ;

IL

y

. OY fp. x

Claims in Briefs of er Ainici That the ‘Decision ;

Below Compromises the‘Good Faith of the United States

in ‘Relations With Other Nations, and May Lead to _

Erosion of the ‘Warsaw Convention, Are Entirely Un-—

founded. The Warsaw Convention Has’ Ontlived Its —

Time Only Because of Misrepresentation of Its ee

Nature. There Is No Legal, Moral or Economic Justi-

fication for Warsaw Today, The - Arguments Made

Herein Against the Decision Below Tacitly Admit That

Warsaw Cannot Survive if Reasonable Notice of. Its

Liniitations Is Required.

Shortly after the end of World War II, it became eppar-

_ Xent that international airlines no longer needed the extraor- <

*. dinary subsidy involved in limiting passenger liability to

$8,300, and that the United States, whose citizens make up.

. the great — ofethe victims, would not stand for it

e,

a |

ey aa 11 |

> x : ‘

much longer. Lhere.then: began a series of conferences and

considerations of ‘the |Warsaw Convention problem, which

are described in more detail in Points II, IW and V below.

Throughout these conferences, the true purposes and nature

of Warsaw have been misrepresented consistently by its

proponents, and therefore it is no surprise to see this mis-

representation continued right into the amici briefs sup-

porting petitioner in this case. The purpose of this Point

' IT is to deal directly with these misrepresentations, and to

point out the true nature and purposes of Warsaw. —

Warsaw’s proponents have attempted to vecloag its life

by making vague claims that its limited liability i is an eco-

nomic necessity;. that it confers benefits upon passéngers;

q

that it brings about uniformity and lessens litigation ; and =

that it contains important provisions and_ has important

3

purposes other than the\limitation of carrier’s liability, -

such as a uniform ticketing regime which -would not be

— possible without the Convention. These claims are Cis- |

cussed below in the remaining: seettons of this Point II,

against the background of the same old vague claims and

innuendos, such as the statement on page 10 of the brief of -

amicus United Kingdom, that “a decision of this Court up-

holding the judgments below would imperil; the. limitation

provisions of the Montreal agreement”; and. the claimed

: “effect of the decision below in. compromising the good faith

and integrity of the United States-in its relations with other ° -

“nations” found at page 8 of the first brief submitted by

amicus AT . (attached to its motion of March 31, 1967 for

leave to file’ brief amicus curiae on, the petition for

certiorari). As will be apparent after reading the material

below, the true gravamen of the aforementioned claim of.

‘amicus United Kingdom is ‘that Warsaw is so unfair and

anachronistic that the mere requirement of reasonable

notice of its. provisions is enough to imperil its existence,

lageeere® ~ ef

12

a. There Is Absolutely No Economie Justification Today —

for Warsaw Limitations. Total Passenger and Cargo -

Liability Insurance Costs for U.S. Airlines Are Less

Than One Percent (1%) of Operating Costs, With

_ or Without Warsaw Limitations. The Other 99% of

Operating Costs Are Not Limited by Treaty, and Are

Readily Paid, Often at American Prices, by Foreign

Airlines Eager ‘to Serve the Lush U.S. Air: Travél

‘Market. The C.A.B. Has Found That the Impact of

: Complete Denunciation of Warsaw Would Be Minimal.

For several decades, proponents of Warsaw have claimed

that elimination of the liability limitation would cause finan-

cial havoc among international airlines. No figures of any

_ kind were ever presented in ‘support of this claim. To this

date, the foreign airlines, such as those operated by amict

U.K., Italy and Canada, have never submitted any sup-.

poitbess figures, even though such figures have been re-

quested by various organizations officially concerned with ~

the Warsaw problem.

Finally, as part of a seencinel review of Warsaw alenia

"by the U.S. Interagency Group on International Aviation —

(IGIA) in 1962, the Civil Aeronautics Board undertook a

staff study to. determine the economic impact of complete

_. denunciation of, Warsaw, and to study various other alter-

natives. The C.A.B: staff reached the conclusion that “The

_ increase in insurance cost to the carriers, in the event they

are subjected to unlimited lability as a result of U.S. with-

drawal from the Warsaw Convention, would be minimal”

(IGIA document 23/1.10A, Final Action, August 7, 1962, At-

tachment D, page 1). be

This conclusion is amply supported by reference to the

most recent figures*which counsel for amicus Holtzman has |

- been able to find in the public files of the C.A.B. Set forth

below are excerpts from C.A.B, Forms 41 required to be.

oo 13

_ filed with the C.A.B. by U.S. air carriers for the year end-

* ing December 31, 1966, of which amicus Holtzman respect-

‘fully requests this Court to take judicial notice. These

figures show total operating expenses, insurance costs and

passenger-cargo liability insurance cost as a percentage of

total. operating expenses, for the two largest’ all-doméstic

air°carriers (United. Airlines and American Airlines), and

various divisions of the largest. all-international air carrier

( Pan American World Airways). 2 Column A. shows total

operating expenses ; column B shows cost of purchased pub-

‘lie liability.and property damage and all other general in-

surance except insurance covering liability for i injuries, loss

and | damage to passengers and cargo, combined with. provi-

sion for self-insurance against general risks (generalized. as

‘non-passenger insurance”); column C shows cost of pur-

chased insurance and provisions for self-insurance cover-

ing liability for injuries, loss and damage to passengers

and cargo (generalized as “passenger-cargo insurance”) ;

and column D shows passe ager-cargo insurance as a per-

centage of total — expenses.

‘ D

‘ Passenger-

‘os =.

. insurance as

A {a Costof percentage

_ Total Cost of passenger- of total

. operating non-passenger cargo operating .

Carrier expenses imsurance insurance expenses

United Airlines $781,866,883 $5,607,896 $5,194, 537 .00664

-,. American Aitlines $621,000, 000 $0,907, 687 . $4,524,682 00728

Pan American, § » :

Pacific: Division . $229,510,686 - $2,110,580 $2,217,883 .00966

- Pan American, _._ i : |

Division $182,892,997 $1,701,804 $1,153,515 .00636

Pan American, - ; ee ane = ,

Atlantic Division $295,906,060 $2,519,486 $2,089,245 .00702

- @

%

14

Reveesi interesting conclusions may be drawn from these

figures: é

1. Pan American, protected by Warsaw limitations as to

most of its passenger claims, and operating entirely on‘in- -

oe ternational flights, had a higher passenger-cargo insurance

—-

/

cost (percentage-wise) than either of the two domestic air-

"lines, who are not protected by Warsaw as to most passen- .

ger claims. :

~-2.°"In four out of five instances othe cost of non-passenger _

insurance (not protected by any treaty) was a. than —

_ the cost of passenger-cargo insurance.

3. In any event, the total cost of passenger-cargo insur- :

ance, with or without Warsaw protection, .is well under one . —

aaa (1%) of total a costs.

What of the other 99% of opetating costs, which cover

such items as advertising, ticket sales, flight crew and ©

ground maintenance labor costs, fuel, legal fees, and equip-

ment depreciation! Clearly, none of these costs are limited

by any international'treaties. Yet, they are readily as-

sumed by dozéns of foreign airlines who compete energet-

¢ ically for a share of the U.S. international passenger mar-. |

ket, the largest and most lucrative in the world. Indeed, |

many of these costs are necessarily paid at American prices

in American dollars, since it is not possible to operate air

services in the U.S.A. without having extensive. personnel

* and equipment stationed here,’and without extensive ad-

' ‘vyertising and sales costs. In fact, it is well known that the-

Boeing.and Douglas jet aircraft, manufactured in the United

States, carry most of, the world’s international passengers, _

so that even equipment costs are mainly incurred at Ameri--

ean prices. But in the scramble to pay these 99% of operat-

ing costs at prices much highér than those prevailing at

. »

ana

a

~ home, the foreign carriers cling to the one area protected

by treaty, and seek to save. a-minute fraction of the less —

than: one percent involved in passenger insurance, by. con-

-. tinuing an | archaic subsidy conferred on them at the expense

of widows, orphans and cripples whose lives are shattered

by air disasters. :

ven in the claims area, foreign airlines- readily ‘accept :

- American standards in many operations. For example, they

must earry workmen’ s compensation insurance on thousands

“of their employes stationed in the U.S.A., and must carry

' liability insurance at standard rates on all their U.S.A.

ground operations, since none of these areas are protected © _

by treaty or subsidized by accident victims. Thus, the air-

lines operated by’ amici United Kingdom, Italy and Canada

must. “pay full damages if they injure or kill Americans

~ who-may be strangers to them, through negligent operation

of ground vehicles or negligent maintenance of ticket office

| premises ; but as t6 Americans who patronize these airlines

* as passengers, they seek treaty protection and limitation of

~ liability to a fraction of the actual damage ! |

This is the true economic punabdass of the Warsaw Con- -

vention. The. sole purpose of this. treaty was to limit lia- .

bility and to confer a subsidy on the carriers at the 2 expense _ va

of those passengers least able to afford it—the ones who

- do not make it safely to their destinations. Probably the

most complete answer fo the groundless economic claims

of Warsaw’s proponents is the U.S. domestic airline system,

which has developed into the largest, safest and most prof-

itable in the world, without benefit of any specially enacted

liability canitapene. ;

ae

.

©

16

b. The Warsaw Tee, Confers No ‘Benefits nen

-Passengers—It Merely Takes Away Legal Rights They

Would Otherwise Have. Its Sole Purpose Was to Limit

Carrier Liability. All Ticketing and Documentation -:

‘Procedures Developed Through Warsaw Are Also’ -

-Available to Non-Warsaw Signatories Through 1.A.T.A.

- When it became apparent after World War II that in-

~ “ternational air.transport no longer neéded special protec-

. tion, the airlines and others interested in preserving the -

special economic advantages of limited liability attempted

to portray the Warsaw Convention as a great boon to the

____ traveling public: Various claims were made as to broad-

ened legal rights. obtained by passengers, despite the ad-

mitted original purposes of the Convention to benefit the

aitlines at the expense of the passengers. These claims are

refuted by a: cursory inspection of the nepotion American

cases. : bet

_Apologiste for the Warsaw: Convention froquetttly claim

that it protects American passengers from even harsher

limitations of foreign laws, but the Courts have held that

the Convention is a ceiling and not a floor. It doés not cre- —

ate an independent cause of action but merely limits what-

ever greater rights the passenger may have under other

applicable laws (N oel'\ v. Linea’ Aeropostal Venezolana, _

F. 2d 667).

le the same category, supporters of. Warsaw mihe the

general claim that the Convention protects’ American citi-

zens who sue foreign airlines in foreign courts. Aside from

the above refutation of the “floor” argument, it is impor-

tant to note that there have been no reported cases .of .

American: passengers suing foreign airlines in foreign.

courts. Practically all of the world’s international* carriers .

- do business in the United States and thus are amenable to, -

suit here. | -

17

It is also sometimes claimed that the Conventior gives

the passenger a broader choice of. venue.for bringing suit,

‘whereas the opposite is true. Since the Convention does

not create a new cause of action, it is necessary to make

personal service of process upon the carrier in accordance

with local law. Article 28 further limits venue to four

places: the carrier’s domicile, its principal place of busi-—

nes, the place where the contract -was made, or the desti-

nation. There are no such venue limitations in the local

laws of our states, so that it is-quite possible to have a

Warsaw Convention case dismissed for improper venue or

lack of jurisdiction, when the same case could have been

.maintained against the carrier without the Warsaw Con-

_ vention (see Berner v. United Airlines, et al., 149 N. Y. 8.

2d 335; Winsor v. United Air Lines, 153 F. Bape. 244).

So far as the burden of proof i is concerned, ‘the Conven-

tion does no more than codify the rule of res ipsa loquitur,

which exists in our state laws independant of the Conven-

tion. _ [For a collection of the _— cases, see 6 ALR 2d

| 528]. ee

Inithe civil law countries, there is actually a stronger

presumption of negligence. than res ipsa Joquitur, without

the Warsaw Convention, A typical provision is: “Every .

act whatever of an individual which causes injury to an- .

other obliges the one, because of whom it has occurred,

- to make up for it”. [see Cohen, “N egligence Law in ~

Europe”, 361 Insurafice Law Journal 82 (Feb. 1953) |, e

In suits brought in the: United States for injuries or

deaths occurring in, foreign countries, when the Warsaw:

Convention is not involved, there is ample protection for

'*. the passenger in American law. -American courts would —

not even have. to consider the full faith and credit clause,

which ‘was involved in such cases as Kilberg v Northeast ©

Airlines, Inc. (1961) 9 NY2d 34, 211 NYS2d 133, 172 NE2d .

‘Y - 18 | Pa. ° . *,

526 ; and Pearson v. Northeast ‘Airlines, Ine. (1962, CA2

“NY ), 309 F2d 553, 92 ALR2d 1162, certiorari. denied in

'. (1953) 372 U.S. 912, 9 L ed 720, 83 S Ct 726, Harsh for-

eign limitations could be disregarded under established —

American precedents; see 11 Am Jur, Conflict of Laws, §6;

Loughran v Loughran (1934) 292 US 216, 78 L ed 1219,

54S Ct 684, rehearing denied in 292 US 615, 78 L ed 1474,

54 S Ct'861; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta

é Pine Land Co. (1934) 292 US 143, 78 L ed 1178; 54 8 Ct

634, 92 ALR 928, rehearing denied in 292 US 607, 78 Led

‘1468, 54 S Ct 772; Coster v Coster (1943) 289 NY 438, 46

NE2d,509, 146 ALR 702; M@sci v Young (1932) 109 NJL

453, 162 A 623, 83 ALR 869, affirmed in Y oung. y Masci

.. (1933) 289 US 253, 77°L ed 1158, 53 S Ct 599, 88 ALR.170;

Dougherty v American McK, nna Process Co. (1912) 255 -

Ill 369, 99 NE 619, LRA 19f F 955, Ann Cas 1913 D 568;

Usher v. West Jersey R. Co. 126, Pa 206; Nat. Bank v

Shaw, 1g9 Tenn 237. . =

* The C.A.B.. Staff Study made for the IGIA hidden.

~ tion of Warsaw in 1962 concluded that the “existing regime

of tort liability to which the carriers are now subject and

for which they already have insurance” is adequate protec-

. tion for the American. domestig passenger (IGIA document

—23/1.10A, Final Action, cai 7; 1962, Attachment D,

Pp. 8).

Warsaw ans have often atnnaned. bie convey the

falee impression that the liability limitation is only one

_ -small part of the Warsaw scheme, and that it also includes —

a complicated and valyable system of ticketing gud docu- —

‘mentation, without which the processing of international

flights would be seriously hampered. Examination of the

Convention reveals nothing of substance other than ‘the

- liability limitation dnd. s&pporting procedures. In°prac- °.

* tice, there are many major nations which have never ad-

19

| herd to Warsaw (e:g., Chile, Disses: but litte have al- —

ways used ‘the common. international ticketing and —

documentation system. The plain truth is that-this system

is a product of the International Air Transport Association

rather thar Warsaw. Appendix B of the ATA-IATA amici -

_ brief shows that the airlines of Chile, Turkey and other non- ~

. Warsaw nations. are members of IATA.

c. Wana Does Not Reduce Litigation or Bring Uni-

_ formity of Law. By Injecting the Irritants of Arbi-

trary. Limitations and Foreign. ‘Legal Concepts Into .

Normal Litigation Channels, It Actually Foments Pro- bs

__ tracted Litigation and Destroys Uritformity.

Another claimed benefit. of Warsaw is that it brings

about “uniformity” in the administration of justice. Ad-

mittedly, ‘Warsaw’s objective is to be uniformly unjust to

all its victims by limiting all recoveries to 4 fraction of

the actual damage suffered. . However, even within this .

narrow sphere Warsaw has not -brought uniformity. Be-

_ cause of the many legal technicalities arising even under

* the old Warsaw.,Corivention itself (without considering

further. complications caused by -Hague and Montreal),

the C.A.B. found in 1962 that only .53% of the claims

against US. -flag (overseas) airlines came under the War-..

saw Convention during the period 1950-1960, leaving some —

47% of such claims to be governed by other laws (IGIA

document 23/1.10A, Final Action, August. 7, 1962, Attach- -

‘ment A, p. 9). Furthermore, the most ludicrous instances

of non-uniformity arise under Warsaw, for many . times

passengers seated right next’ to each other, even on flights

within the United States, are governed by different laws

“because of Warsaw. The applicability of Warsaw depends:

upon the stops listed in the ticket of each passenger, rather -

than upon the place of accident ar his immediate destiitas =

tion on the crash flight. In many accidents occurring on °

%

~ “3 . e

ee

our domestic airlines, there are, some passenger claims

limited. by Warsaw and some which are. not limited at all.‘

Therefore, even the crude attempt at uniformity through®

| denial of compensation has been ineffective.

If one were seeking to disrupt the natural forces. of tort

litigation, prevent reasonable settlements and thus foment -

protracted litigation,. one would have to search hard for —

a better way to do-this than. to attempt . to-limit liability -

in aviation accidents. In -this field, we have the combina-

_ tion. of the highest earning power of victims, and the most

“serious and deadly i injuries which are an inevitable result

‘of the speed and destructive power of modern aircraft.

\

’ France Paris crash of 1962, in which the claims for the

: . Therefore, to limit liability i in this field is te create such

disparity between real damage and compensation as to give

the plaintiff practically nothing to lose and everythitig: to ~

gain by* litigating rather than settling. Because of ‘this

factor and because of the difficulties of interpretation which

are to be multiplied by Hague-Montreal, our courts -are.

now. jammed with dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Warsaw

cases which would otherwise have°been disposed of years |

ago. An example is the litigation arising out of the Air —

deaths of 62 passengers are being litigated in the US.

District Court, Northern District of Georgia. The opinion

in Block et al. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France (Noy...

8, .1967) —— F 24d ——, 1967 CCH Neg Cases, p.. 2307,

which took the Fifth Circuit panel more than two years to_

write, deals with only one obscurté provision of Warsaw, -

but it is a striking illustration of the obstructive nature.

of Warsaw when injected into the American’ legal system.

With the addition of the Hague protocol (as to some -

Warsaw signatories but not to others)\and the Montreal

agreement (as to some airlines -but not otliers), it is diffi-

cult if not impossible even for aviation law specialists to

“”

21

predict what law would apply to. many international pas-

sengers today. Yet, in the face of this. hopeless complica-

tion, the amici supporting petitioner, and the other inter-

national air carriers - seek to avoid giving passengers ade-

quate notice of ‘Waysaw even today.

~ Warsaw brings further coniplicntion ‘to litigation ‘by

erenting the atmosphere for joining of non-carrier defen-

dants, such as aircraft. manufacturers, repair agencies and ~>~-

airport operators, nune' of which -can claim the liability —

limitation. The more defendants, the more diffieult ordi-_

nary settlement and litigation procedures become, particu- - ore

larly when the non-carrier defendants do not consider ; “

themselves primarily or even substantially liable, and feel |

v that they have been joined only because the plaintiff can .

recover so little from sad airline.

.

d. Carriers and Dneuindie- Who. Claim That Warsaw's

: Liability Limitations Are Necessary, Use American

Courts to Litigate Huge Hull Claims Which Dwarf

Passenger Suits, and Ww hich Are Not Limited by “Any

' Treaty. ; 7

Another argument made by Wereew proponents is that

_ airline passenger liability claims represent a catastrophic

: risk, which must: be limited. in amount, and which are not —

appropriate for ordinary damage litigation in U. 8. courts.”

This argument is largely self-refuting in that we have

always. had the. example of domestic passenger claim

litigation, which has never. been limited, is fully covered

by liability insurance, .and has successfully been accom-

‘modated ‘by our American legal system without financial

saieetl to the airline industry.

- Moreover, this contention has lost all semblance of rea- |

son with the postwar advent of larger aircraft. In the _——

: _ pinned: accident today, the damage claims for loss of the

Fao! .

aircraft hull usually run to more than five or six million

dollars, and thus’ dwarf the amounts paid out on pas--

senger claims. ba

There is’a ‘preat” disk: of ey F this ieee be-

“. tween ‘airlines. and aircraft. manufacturers, in which the”

insurance company, which paid the hull claims on a crashed «

airliner 4s actually suing the products liability i insurer of

‘the manufacturer. There are other suits’ pitting airline

“against airline, seeking to recover ‘millions of dollars’ in

-hull claims caused by collisions. In some of these cases, |

: the passengérs on these crashed airliners are limited to .

mabe $8, 300 in claims_by the Warsaw Convention, and yet the

airline is free to sue for millidns of dollars in property |

damage arising from the same accident! Thus, the airlipes~ a

and ‘insurers who support Warsaw’s limitatioris against

_ passengers,-are not concerned over chtastrophic claims

and the imperfections of the American legal system, when

it comes to litigation! of their own claims against each other.

An example of this type of litigation is the case .of

' Braniff Airways, Ine. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., V.S._Dis- . °

trict Court, Southern, District of New York, several prelim--

‘inary phases of which dre unofficially’ reported at 7 Avi.

18,114 ahd 8 Avi. 18,255 (CCH Aviation cases). ‘There, ‘

| Braniff Airways seeks to recover $3, 750, 000 dantages for.

loss of a DC-7C airplane which crashed in Florida on.

March 25, 1958, claiming. that the defendant supplied |

, deféctive engines which caused the crash. A ‘number of

passenger cases arising out of. the same accident were

governed by the- Warsaw convention, but this has: not

deterred: Braniff’s hull insurer (a Lloyds’ of London group)

from suing the manifacturer (insured by’ another Lloyd’s

. group), for over three million dollarg. .Soon, we shall ‘see :

“such claims in the area of ten to twenty million dollars

per hull, when the “jumbo jets” and supersonic aireraft. are

‘\

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.

23

activated: It should be noted that the insurandé cost figures

. set forth in section “a” of this Point II ‘show that even

in this early stage of the jet era, passenger-cargo liability

insurance costs the airlines. less than their hull.and other

f types of i insurance. — ' oe -

Sai ie 4

@-«-

e. Warsaw Ig Admitted by Its pee Prapeuiin to.

’ * . Be “Completely’ Repugnant” to: American Law.: The

Only Reported Decision Upholding Its Constitution-

ality Under the Seventh Amendment Rests on the

@Untenable. Ground that the Right to Trial by Jury

_ Does Not Include. Assessment of Damages. :

A strong: insight into the real opinion of Warsaw held

Co its ‘strongest proponents can be obtained from the

minutes of the International Union of Aviation Insurers,

which are j&blished in the Appendix of the J.-S. Senate

- Hearings on the Insurance Industry, Sen. Res. 231, 85th -

following - quotation from page 497, referring to a -state-

ment of the American insurer’s position on Warsaw by.

George G. Orr, director of claims for U. S. Aviation

‘Underwriters, one of the two largest American aviation

insurance groups: 3 a. ms

.

“As to the revision- of he Warsaw ‘Convention, he

wanted to make the American position clear. Ameri-

..gan insurers had had plenty of experience of dealing .

with the Convention and were fully alive to its defects,

but generally speaking, it had enabled settlements to

-‘be made at lower figures than the average for non- —

- . Conyention cases and its validity had been upheld and

_ affifmed by the American Courts in a Series | of cases.,

a There were. three dangers: about revision. The first

was that although revision would no doubt cure some

| the defects, it might introduce new ones. In the

~ second “place; there was: quite a serious danger. that

¥ yon /

_

~ Cong., Aug. 6-15, 1958,’ ‘at pp. 487-675. An example is the. -

a revised Convention ‘might not be ratified by the :

American Senate, since the’ Convention ‘contained sev-

eral principles which were completely repugnant ‘to

American law and the. original Convention owed its

easy passage through the Senate to the exceptionally

_ wide powers exercised by President Roosevelt at that _

‘time. Finally, even-if the’ revised Convention were ;

7 passed, it would necessitate ‘fighting a serie of actions

‘in the Courts to establish its validity and the existing

decisions would be rendered ——- ” . (Emphasis

a me : |

; A.

In the 38 years since the: drafting. of the Warsaw _ Con-

vention, and the 33 years since the United States ad-

‘’ hérence, there has been only. one written court: opinion

on. the constitutionality of the Convention under the |

‘Seventh Amendment, which guarantees the right to trial

by jury in civil. cdses involying more than $20..

The Convention was attacked under the Seventh Amend-

ment in Pierre v. Eastern. Airlines et al. (1957), 152 F..

Supp. 486, in the U.S. District Court for the District of

New Jersey. Counsel ‘for amicus Holtzman was ‘one of

the counsel for the plaintiff, atd knows that the question

was very. carefully briefed by Ne see In addition,

the United States of America intervetfed in order to defend .

the constitutionality of the. Convention, and government -

attorneys were granted delays of. several months to pre-_

pare their briefs. Appearances were entered by the local

United States Attorney, by an Attorney from the Justice . °

Department in Washington, and by two legal advisers to

‘the State Department from Washington.

| After this thorough briefing ‘and argument, the Coast

-was able to declare the Warsaw’ Convention constitutional .

7 only 7 wceae<) that the right to trial by jury relates solely

oe

25 A

to liability, and does not cover the assessment of damages.

_ It is patent from a reading of the Court’s opinion that if

‘the assessment of damages was considered part of the

_ Tight to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment, that

the Warsaw Convention would be unconstitutional, since,

in the words of: the Court, “No treaty may authorize what

the Constitution forbids. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133°U.S. 258.”

The Court in the Pierre case did not cite a single‘

_ precedent for the holding that jury trial does not include

the right to fixing of damages, even though — si

a. subjec ect. hundreds of years old.

”. There is, of course, ample authority for the basic prin-

- ciple that the constitutional right to trial by jury includes

assessment of damages; gee Dimick v. Schiedt (1935), 293 —

‘U:S. 474, at p. 486, 79 L ed 603, 611, 55 S Ct.296, 95

ALR 1150; Smyth Sales v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co.

(1944, CA 3), 141 F.2d 41 at p. 44; Blackstone’s Commenta-

ries, SHarswood 1896, Vol. II, Book III, Chap. 23, Trial

by Jury, p. 376.

The Puerre case was settled above the Warsaw Conven-

tion limits, so that the appellate courts had no opportunity

to rule upon the emasculation of the right to jury , trial

which was found necessary to support constitutionality.

Counsel for amicus Holtzman has attempted to raise these

constitutional issues in,other Warsaw cases, including Eck

v. United Arab Airlines, - Inc. (1964), 15 NY2d 53, 255

NYS2d 249, 203 NE2d 640, 6 ALR3d: 1260, but the deci-

_ sions to date have been based on other grounds.

f. U.S. Adherence to Worm Has No Effect on Operating

Rights to Foreign Countries.

Warsaw apologists frequently imply that if the U. . a

denounced Warsaw, or if American courts did not fully .

he 26

‘Ss

support Weer s carrier subsidy at the expense of acci-

- . dent victims, the operating rights of American carriers

‘into foreign countries might be jeopardized. ‘This argu-

ment. has never beén supported by the Department ‘of

State, for the simple reason that operating rights are a

matter of reciprocity. If amicus Italy became angry at the

final result in Lisi, and: decided to revoke the operating

~ rights of American carriers into Rome, she would be losing |

her own. lucrative rights to New York, and her share of ©

the American market which .is" crifical to the financial

survival of her international airlines.

/ &

ge. ychronistic Limitations on Wrongful. Death ‘Re.

.“coveries in a Few American States, Cited as a Parallel

‘to Warsaw, Are on the Way Out; Are Being Circum-

vented in Many Aviation Cases; Are Subject to State

Legislative Cantrol; and in Any Event Cannot and |

Do Not Apply to Personal Injury Cases Such as Lisi.

Warsaw proponents frequently argue that Warsaw does

little more than parallel the limitations on recovery, ‘which

may be found in: wrongful death statutes of a number of

our. own states. ;

“This argument would a our legal standards at .the

lowest leyel of our public: morality. It is true that there,-

are still twelve states which have monetary limitations

on recovery for wrongful death. However, the entire

trend in the past quarter-century has been away from

this 19th Century railroad-inspired attempt to cheapen

human life. A review of the early wrongful death cases

reveals that most of them. were brought against.railroads,

'.and it is evident that the damage limitations were’ enacted

by: railroad-controlled legtslatures (see DeSoto Motor Corp.

v. Stewart, 62 F. 2d 914; Poff v. New England T & T Co., 72

N.H. 164, 55, Atl. 891; Speiser, Recovery si Con

Death (1966), pp. beasts

° GIR ouster

. Every one of these states has raised its limitations sub-

. stantially in recent years; and rarely does a session of

their legislatures go by without the introduction of a bill

to remove aj. limitations.-Many other states which had —

‘such limitafYons have removed them completely in the past

two decades. All.of our federal legislation touching upon

such claims has been enacted without limitations (e.g., Fed-

- eral Employers Liability Act, Federal Tort Claims Act,

Death on the High Seas Act,) Some of our states have

constitutional prohibitions against such limitations. “Fur-

thermore,. the Warsaw Convention limits recoveries not

only in death cases but in personal injury cases as well. .

This our state legislatures could ‘not constitutionally do

even if they were so inclined.

Such decisions as Kilberg v. Northeast Millen, Inc.

(1961), 9 NY2d 34, 211 NYS2d 133, 172 NE2d 526, and

Pearson y. Northeast Airlines, Inc. (1962, CA2 NY), 309 .

F.2d 553, 92 ALR2d 1162, certiorari denied in (1963)

372 US 912,9 L ed 2d 720, 83 S Ct 726, have pointed the

way to circumvention of these harsh liniitations in the

more enlightened majority of jurisdictions whtch have no

such limits. The non-limit jurisdictions coincide generally

; with.the large population centers such as New York, Cali-

fornia, Illinois, Texas and Florida, where most aviation

accident litigation takes place. For further discussion of

this point, see Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death

( 1966), pp. 721-742.

«

o

| ‘The Amici United on Italy and Cunt Are

: Owners or: Controllers of International Air Carriers. .

Their Position on the ‘Warsaw Convention Should Be i

| Considered in That Light. ;

a. In General

; Since they appear by leave. of this Cont: the amici

foreign governments—United Kingdom, Republic of. Italy

and Canada—have the right to present their: arguments -

‘in favor of petitioner’ s position. But, as amicus on behalf

of a concededly interested. person, Holtzman, we wish to . ”

point out that these amici governments do not occupy the

impartial position " of uninvolved sovereign, as does the

‘Government of the United States. These amici are all

owners, or principal stockholders, of international air. -.

carriers and. have a definite financial and pecuniary. inter-"\. :

' est in the provisions of the Warsaw Convention limiting '

‘the amounts recoverable for the injury or death of*passen- —

gers on international air flights. They are as “disinterested”.

as IATA, or as would be Pan American Airways or Trans

, World Airlines.

Ever since: the “Brandeis brief” submitted to this Court

in 1908.in Muller v. Oregon, 208 US 412, 52 L ed 551, 28

S Ct 324, this Court has taken judicial notice of economic

facts of general knowledge. We ask it to do so in this

ease, with respect to the total or controlling ownership

of international air carriers. These facts are known to the

: world; and are undisputed. Reference is hereinafter made *

to the facts stated in the “World Airline Record,” 6th Edi- -

‘tion of 1965, known as the “standard reference of the in-

‘dustry,” and published by Roadcap & Associates, 327 South -

2

29

a:

es

La Salle Street, Chlenen 4, Illinois (hereinafter. referred to, |

by page, as “World Airline”),

The positions taken by various governments. at inter-

national conferences concerning international private air

law,-held between 1929 and 1966, throw considerable light

not only on the purpose and meaning of provisions of the

Warsaw Convention and of the Hague Protocol, but also.

on the -attitude and position of such governments with

respect to the relative rights, duties, and liabilities of in-

ternational air carriers, of international air carrier passen-

- gers and their baggage, and of internationally carried air

cargo. These include international conferences: on private a

air law, meetings of the Legal Committee of ICAO—the ~

presently existing International Civil Aviation Organiza-. ,

tion—and meetings of ICAO itself. These various. inter-

national conferences and meetings were all reported or:

recorded, and the various “Minutes” or “Documents”

-- emanating therefrom reflect the positions taken ‘by various

governments.

‘References .are wikili hereinafter to: in Second itu

‘national Congerencé of Private Air Law held at Warsaw

from 4-12 October, 1928, officially reported. in the French

‘language: in. Document: 7838, reprinted under the author-

ity of the Secretary General of what was then “OACI”

with the authorization of the Government of Poland, and °

referred ‘to throughout this brief as “W. arsaw “Minutes” ;

"the International Conference on Private Air Law held at

- The Hague in September; 1955, reported in ICAO Doctv-

ment 7686—LC/140, ahd referred to hereinafter through-

out as “Hague Minutes”; to Volume II of the Hague Con- ..

ference of 1955, same document number as the immediately

“3 foregoing, referred to as “Hague Documents” ; the. meeting

of the Legal Committee of ICAO (Ninth Session) held at

- Rio de Janeiro from 25° August through. 12 —

e 30 e

1953, reported in ICAO Document 7450—LC/136, and ré-

ferred to as “Rio Minutes”; ‘and the Special ICAO Meet-

ing on “limits for passengers under. the Warsaw Conven-

tion and the Hague Protocol,” held at Montreal, 1-15 Feb-

ruary, 1966, reported in ICAO Document 8584—LC/154- :;

and geferred to as “Montreal. Minutes. ” ; of

b. The Republic of ltaly

-\_ As to Alitalia ‘itself, ‘the’ petitioner, and . the bideesnt

therein of the amicus. Republic of Italy (hereinafter

“Italy”), World Airline reports, at pages 203, 204: “Ali-

-. talia was formed on. September 16, 1946, by the Italian ©

Government and British European Airways. a eee

the original 1946 agreement setting up Alitalia, BEA

terminated its holdings in the company in 1961 by selling

its shares to the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction

[an Italian governmental agency]. The Institute now holds

74.6%; other government agencies, 21.6%; and private .

- stockholders, 3.8%.” It is undisputed that Italy owns over

__ 967%. of the stock of petitionér Alitalia.

Remarks ‘of representatives of Italy at the various: snter-

~ national conferences and nieetings on private air law, prior ~

to the adoption of the. Warsaw Convention and of. ‘the

Hague Protocol, tellingly reveal that Italy was then much |

more concerned with the welfare of international air passen-.

gers and their families, before it became the principal

owner of petitioner Alitalia.

The head of the Italian delegation. at Warsaw i in, 1929

was Signor Giannini; Member of the Council of’ State“and

Minister Plenipotentiary. (Warsaw Minutes, page 6). -

Signor Giannini took a very active role in all. the Warsaw

meetings, debates: and exchanges, and presided at the

efforts of a preparatory commission charged, at the begin-

: ning of the Warsaw — with the responsibility of

£ °

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classification and collation of amendments to the previous

CITEJA draft which had been proposed by the various

delegations’on ‘behalf of their governments before the in- _

- ternational conference was commenced (Warsaw Minutes,

pages 19, 20, 22). Giannini noted that the. contemplated

convention (later, the Warsaw Convention) was not a fixed,

immutable monument nor the law of the Medes and the

Persians. He said (page 23 of Warsaw Minutes):” -—

“ee que nous allons faire ici n’est qu’un ‘premier

‘ essai de codification, un premier effort pour codifier

le droit aérien. Il est évident, que si nous insérons

~ dans la convention une clause expresse pour dire qu’il

faudra la réviser, soit & des périodes déterminées, soit.

quand quelques Etats montreront aux autres la néces-

sité de faire cette révision, nous établirons dés au-

jourd’hui le principe que ce premier effort que nous

faisons aujourd’hui n’est pas définitif.

Je sais bien qu’il n’y a aucune convention définitive,

je dirai méme heureusement! Maite caractére par-

_ ticulier de premier effort est clairement accusé dans

- les propositions que j’ai signalées et je me permets

' @appeler votre attention sur ce point, parce que ceci

répond peut-étré..a la maniére de voir des, Délégués. _

Nous devrions donc considérer que, dans, la naviga-

- tion aérienne, il faut commencer par poser les grandes

régles générales du probléme; nous faisons, un‘ pre-

mier effort et nous devons étre heureux de le faire.

S’il y a des améliorations & apporter, la vie ne s’arréte

pas aujourd’hui, nous pourrons les faire par la suite.”

This may be translated as follows:

“what we are’ about to do here, is merely a first .

attempt at codification, a first effort to codify air law.

‘It is evident that if we insert in ‘the convention a

1

o\ |

32 . ae ‘

clause expressly designed to ask for a. revision

either at determined periods, or when a féw States

will show to the: others the necessity for this revision,

we shall, as of today, establish the principle that

this, the first effort re are making. today, | is not

definitive. .

I know that there is no . definitive convention, I should

even say luckily! But this particular character of first

effort is clearly visible in the proposals I have pointed

out, and I call your attention to this point, because .

this may be the answer to ‘the way of thinking of

the Delegates. ‘We should therefore consider that, in

air navigation; one must begin by posing the large

general rulés of the problem: we are making a first

effort and we must be happy to do it. If improve-

~ments can be made, life does not stop today, we can

make them subsequently. itn.

In addition. to. the sensible acknowledgment that the

Warsaw Convention would merely be a first effort, Signor

Giannini, at Warsaw in 1929, voiced Italy’s: then concern

for international air passengers,. when he made the forth-

right statement (Warsaw Minutes, page 32) : |

- “La Dékgation italienne tient a déclarer ‘ que, d’aprés

‘sa conception, il faut qu’il y ait ’harmonie des intéréts

nationaux.* Dans ces conditions, quand nous nous trou-

-vons én presence of d’intéréts organisés comme ‘ceux

des armateurs, et d’intéréts non organisés des trans-

portés, nous considérons .qu’il ne faut pas oublier’ ces

derniers, autrement il n’y a Bae cette harmonie des

_ intéréts qu'il faut garantir. ~

En conséquence, commes directives générales de la

Délégation italienne, je dois dire que no sommes dis-

. posés & accepter aucune mesure de faveur ou de par-

oo

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;

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: 33

. tieuligre indulgence vis-a-vis des armateurs. Cela veut

dire que. pour ce qui est de l’initérét de la. navigation

aériene, c’est-Adire de I’ intérét national, oui; esd ce

qui est privilege. ou faveur, non.”

. a

;

‘The foregoing may be. translated as follows:

“The Italian Delegation. ‘must state ‘that, according |

to its conception, there should be harmony of the na-

tional interests. In these.conditions, when we find our- ©

. selves facing organized interests like those of the

ship owners and of non-organized interests, like those

of the passengers, we feel. that. the latter should not

be forgotten, otherwise we do not have the -harmony

of interests*which must be guaranteed. _ . +

Consequently, as general directives. of the Italian

Delegation I must ‘say that we are not prepared to

accept any measure of favor or of particular indulgence —

toward the ship owners. This mearis that for what

touches the interest of air navigation, that is of na-

tional interest, yes} ; for what i is: ‘privilege or csatic no.”

be 1955, Italy had not yet wiamiiin abandoned ite, inter-

est in- the welfare of airline passengers. Hts main repre: 4

.- sentative at the Hague was Professor Ambrosini, who had

~ also represented his government at Rio in 1953. Accord-

ing to the Hague Minutes Piciact 131, middle of page), he

declared :

“that the Protocol mould: inchide a sanction, a

cally, a private law sanction, The reason for the

sanction was that the passengér ticket, being a fixed-

* term contract (contrat d’adhesion), the passenger had .

to-accept it ‘without being able to discuss the clauses

set out therein. Under these circumstances, the passen- - ; .

~~ ber should. receive notice, through a clause inserted in

zt

o Ww t,

34

‘is, that there was a deviation from the general prin-

| ciple’ of law’ that all damage should be- fully compen-

iGo \tated, For this reason, Mr.’ Drion’s arguments were

ie i a Pe ‘not valid. Mr. Drion had asked why the carrier should

é pay’ “without limitation, if. the absence of a ticket did-

4 not by: itself give rise to, actual damage. The reply to »

- fis. s question was that the carrier should be subject to. .

0 ‘unlimited, liability, because he”*had ‘violated the prin-

Ch ie. oe ~ ciple of. public. policy-to the effect that fhe passenger.

cae Sees * should be given: ‘notice of: the Timitation of linbility, PM. ~s

» . ’ is , c ‘ ; d .

4° 1 ty the ticket, that there was a hmitation of liability, that

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.

‘ “Although. this anipiifies what, the: \Pratéiecr’ had coils he .

', said in. the. Hague Meetings’ (Hague ‘Minutes, ‘page od ee a |

“His, Delegation also-wished to have’ a sanction in

the case where the carrier did not deliver a ticket or |

} A the ticket, did id vot state that: the carriage was subject , “ ia 2

cs ‘s to the, Warsaw «share : 2 \s age te

it is, a tsk ory from the gir e. aise’ position now taken |

sieu ’by/Ttaly i in its brief as amicus.’ Perhaps this later airline- -"_-

“4... «owner status of the Italian ‘Government also accounts for ~~ \

_s the lack of statements from Italiani representatives illus- oe

ae; 4, trating coneern for passengers ‘at the Special Meeting of ~ ..

_.” IOAO in’ Montreal. in 1966, notwithstanding that Italy had ~

ae four representatives. at “Montreal (Montreal: Minutes, An- mae

Seay. nex. A, preliminary’ page xjv), and the Delegate of ‘Italy i

> (Montreal Minutes, page 46;° mi iddle. of page); aa

ut! "wished to: confirnt his spirit of ca-operation and - eta

faith i in the Warsay Convention.” ieee Ea nee ete

The fi Kingdom ie TAS can

~The internatiénal: air carriers ak the United, Kingdon ie

ag Ruropean, Airways Corp: Seca and Brit:

e o . . .

“F 5 sal

Ts . 4 TaN esi ‘ * of on | ae ae es . (

35

_ish Overseas Airways Corp. (“BOAC”). Who owns BEA.‘

‘and BOAC? World Airline declares, at page 241 et .seq.,.

that.BEA is a public enterprise gwned by the, Government:

- the same work announces, at pages 248, 251, United Aaing-

- dom’a.ownership of BOAC.

. The representatives of the United Sinahoin’ (hereinafter ss

. “UK’”), moreover, at the various international confer-

ences and meetings concerning air ‘law, have-not been bash-

ful in showing their concern for the welfare of the inter-

national ‘air carriers. \.

-The chief of the UK delegation, at ‘Pande in 1929,

_ was Sir-Alfred Dennis. The various ‘national rep resenta-

tives were discussing principles of exoneration or limita-

tion of liability of international air carriers, and the law

_as to. maritime and railroad carriers and ‘their freedom °

from, or limited, liability. In discussing a maritime con-

_yention of 1924, and a proposed UK amendment to the +

_ CITEJA pre- -1929. draft which amendment would limit

‘| air carrier responsibility, Sir Alfred sald; |

.- “Cette convention | reproduisait originairement les

'. conditions qui ‘sé trouvent dans le droit maritime et

is; e’est pour cette raison que mon Gouvernement a ac-

A _ cepte ‘provisoirement et dans’ ses es générales le

@ projet de convention de-1925 sur la responsabilité du.

‘. \transpotteur. -Depuis, au cours des discussions, sont

_. intervenus des changements qui ont modifié le carac-

tere général « “de ce projet de. convention en ce qui.

touche la ‘responsabilité due transporteur. Mon Gou- >

-vernement m’a recommandé de soutenir aussi énergi- 9%.

; quement¢ qu’il me serait possible mon -amendement, |

pareé qu’il trouve que, dans ensemble; la’ responsa-

bilité qui este imposée au transporteur est beaucoup °

trop lourde.’ 3 ‘)

°

yo

ee

; _ 36

*

a translation of the foregoing is:

“This convention reproduced originally the condi-

tions which are formed-in maritime law, and it is for |

this reason that my Government accepted, temporarily

and in its principal lines, ‘the draft of convention of

1925 on the responsibility of the carrier. My. Govern-

.ment has urged me to support as. energetically as

would be possible, my amendment because it finds

; that, as a whole, the résponsibility put upon the carrier

is much too heavy. ” fae

UK's concern for the carrier has been steadfast and con-

sistent. After UK had ‘adopted. the Warsaw Convention

the internal law of UK i in 1952:(See the First Schedule.

of English Carriage by ‘Air (Non-International ° Carriage) .

- Order, 1952 [S.I. 1952, No. 158]), UK’s delegation at Rio

* in 1953 kept up its steady pressure against those provi-

sions of Warsaw which attempted to afford some modicum

of notice and protection to the international air passenger

‘or air shipper. Here is UK’s proposal to abolish all-provi-

sions relating\to documents of carriage, plus its casual

‘denigration of any right: at all-of. a ‘paksenger. to know ©

. that chrriage i is subject to Warsaw, as stated by its cenaag

_ sentative (Rio Minutes, pages 50,51): <-

“Mr. Wilberforce (United Kingdom) stated that the Ais

' British Delegation was of the opinion that Articles 3 |

to 11. were superfluous and out of date and that they

should be entirely deleted. Therefore, he proposed the

deletion of these Articles for the following reasons:

-_ i) he considered that the framers of the Warsaw

‘Convention had made one of their rare mistakes

when they had decided to deal in the Convention

~with this question of documents of carriage. Docu-

\

acy

\ ?

37 aoe ge

ments of carriage fell within the administrative -

field. Documentation was a matter of detail, a prac-

tical matter which required revision from time to

time, and it was unfortunate that it had been de-

cided, in 1929, to include very’ detailed provisions

in the Convention. The result was that they could

not be amended ynless by a new Convention. It

| “would have been wiser to leave these provisions out-

". side the Convention ;

ii) he considered ‘that these provisions were

wrong in a number of respects. The Rapporteur .

had drawn the attention of the Committee to the

particular difficulties concerning ‘Article 3, but the

samé objections of a practical nature could be raised -

against the other Articles. It was to be borne in

mind in that connection that, since 1929, there had

been an enormous development in carriage by air,

_in particular, as regards the carriage of goods. The .

bs provisions in question caused serious difficulties to .

oi those who were engaged i in such carriage ;

st) it was apparent that the various particulars,

and especially those relating to the air waybill,

“were completely out of date, that it was not possible

to comply with them and that, in fact, the carriers -

did not comply with them.

°

ss In proposing the deletion of these provisions, the

Delegation of the United Kingdom was not advocating

international anarchy. It was quite right that thé in-

terested parties should get fogether and try to reach

agreement from time to time on documents of carriage

for air transport, but it was not right that these pro-. é

visions be set out in a Convention which could not

be. amended. This matter should be left to the Inter-. :

, ~

o- ‘

‘national Air Transport Association which could meet

each year or twice a year and adapt them to changing

needs, or the International Civil Avidtion Organiza-

tion which could adapt them. to changing needs, .or,

‘lastly, to some organization of an administrative char- —

acter which could continually revise them d&-necessary.

Some Delegates might considér, as had been the

-ease in the past, that there should be—in. any case as

regards the carriage of passengers—a provision re-

quiring that it be brought to the notice of the pas-

‘senger that the carriage was subject to the Warsaw.

Convention. The British Delegation did not attach

‘much importance to this but, if some Delegates con- —

. sidered that such a provision was necessa , his Dele- ©

gation would not be opposed. The problem could be:

solved by. a“very simple provision ‘which stated merely

that a ticket must be issued to passengers and that

:. & must’ contain the declaration to the effect that the

- earriage was subject to the terms of thé Warsaw. Con-

‘vention. . sf

| Tf the Committee would not agree to the total dele-.

tion of the Articles on documents. of carriage, the ©

British Delegation would then have to ‘propose certain

amendments to the’ Warsaw Convention. -

The fact that some. delegations had described even S the

: existing Article 3(2) of Warsaw —the Article now before’

this Court for construction in the instant cases—as

“savage” and “illogical”, did not deter the UK ‘ues ae

tion, At page 57 of Rio Minutes ;

“Mr. Wilberforce (United Kingdom) said ‘that it

was impossible for him to accept the solution which

consisted in retainmg: the present provisions of the

Convention as they were. Having looked at the Ar-

ad

¢

7, Soar batt ee hare

? é

39 .

ne ticles ini question) of the Convention as a lawyer

' and having noted that there were .serious defects in

' these Articles, he considered that it was his duty.to —

. do his beg to éliminate such defects. It might- be

that. the governments would. consider Jater on .that

the improvements which the lawyers had attempted to

make were not important enough, from the practical

point of view, to justify the meeting of a diplomatic

conference but, as lawyers, the members of the Com-

~ mittee could not adopt an attitude which would mean

that they accepted the provisions such as Article 3 (2),

_which had been described as a savage, and illogical ~

provision, and Article 9, which provided that, if ‘the

number,of packages, the.nature of the packaging, ete.

‘were not included in the air waybill, the provisions .

which excluded or limited the liability-of the carrier

| would not apply. How could a lawyer accept. Article 6

Which was altogether, contrary, to practice and which

could not be complied With by an efficient carrier?”

4 Bemiadh of determined aniistition from all quarters,

however, (Rio Minutes, page’ 58))". “The proposal of the

United Kingdom to delete Articles 3 to 11 was withdrawn. ”

The UK attack on Article 3 (2), or any ‘amendments ‘to -

it that would have the effect of letting the passenger know |

‘ that his flight was subject to the limited liability. provi-

sions of Warsaw, continued. Again at Rio (Rio Minutes,

Ps page 182) : ae ee ee | | eae .

“Mf r. Wilberforce (United. Kingdom) 7 that the

article under discussion dealt with sanctions imposed .

on the carrier for not doing certain things. If this

article did-not exist, the position would be. that, under

the contract, the carrier would be, as a matter of com- .

mon law, responsible for’any damage on account of

ra)

Pree.

for which he was responsible. Therefore, the - only

purpose. of introducing a special ‘provision at this

place of the Convention must: either be to decrease © .

~ the carrier’s contractual liability. in certain events, or

to increase the contractual liability.” ”

- Shortly before ‘that; at Rio, UK delegate and Rappoitnit

: Major Beaumont (co-author of Shaweross and Beaumont

on Air Law, which is referred to on pages 13, 15 of peti-

tioner’s brief herein as written by “leading writers” and —

as though it were objective and impartial i in hature); had

-stated what he regarded as “the law’—a statement; ad-

mittedly, perfectly consistent with. the present position of

petitioner Alitalia and the various amici’ now supporting

that position (Rio Minutes, page 177):

er | Beaumont (United Kingdom), Rapporteur,

said ‘that the particulars to which Mr. Calkins had

referred in Article 3 (i) (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the

Warsaw Convention were not obligatory particulars,.

because Article 3(2) of the Convention made it very -

clear that it did not’ matter at all if any of those par- -

_ticulars were omitted. Carriers were not obliged, at

- present, to insert any of those particulars in the ticket

and‘ the omission of the particulars would not affect

‘the position of the carrier or ‘the passengers. The |

Convention should state definitely tlie ‘particulars

which’ must be contained. The Working Group had

. rightly limited the particulars which ‘must be con-

_tained to those which were made obligatory under

. Article 3 of the existing Convention, including par-

‘ticulars which indicated whether or not. ,the carriage,

was international. r

: / Ei re. ‘ e . %,

, the incorrect statements or omissions in the contract

PT ET LM NE NES FIT T

‘

we Sotho $e ROEASII I

° e

PT

41

The .“Mr. Calkins”. referred to was the chief —

of the United States at both Rio and at The Hague and

was then Chief, International and Rules Division, Civil

* Aeronautics Board, as shown by Hague Documents, page 21.

“Again, at The Hague i in 1955, UK returned to the attack.

The effort to eliminate Article 3 of ‘Warsaw and the re-

lated. articles was renewed in 1955 with undiminished vigor

by Mr. Wilberforce. In so doing, he took notice of court

decisions, including” a 1936 British holding which had taken

the strict view that it was necessary to warn the passen-

ger. The remarks are quoted in extenso to reveal the true

position of the UK with respect to rights of the pee

(Hague Minutes, pages 46-48) :

“Mr. Wilberforce (United Kingdom) said that, at

Rio de Janeiro, the United Kingdom Delegation had

put forward a proposal that all the articles in the

| Warsaw Convention. which related fo documents of

cafriage, that is to say, Articles 3. to 11 inclusive,

should be deleted. That proposal was not voted on at

. the Rio meeting, because it had been thought that a -

compromise. might be adopted which would simplify

the Warsaw Convention and yet preserve something

relating to the subject. Having reconsidered: what |

had been achieved at Rio de Janeiro, the United King- a

>> dom Delegation now wished to invite the Conference

to. reconsider seriously ‘ the question whether it was

desirable to maintain anything in the Protocol which ;

related, to documents of. carriage at all.

; The provisions of the Warsaw Convention relating

. to documents of carriage were, in modern conditions,

_ unsatisfactory. First of all, Article 3, relating to the

‘passenger ticket had been described by high authority

as futile and absurd, because it required delivery: of

—_

+

a

@/

a ticket” without seeing what oad ticket’ was going to

contain. . .».

Thess: were, therefore, tio’ questions in respect of

_which ‘some step had to be taken. Firstly, were the”

present provisions contained in the Rio Protocol satis-

_ factory, or could they be made satisfactory? Secondly,

would the consequences of the total omission of these

provisions be unfortunate or not? . . . The second re- _

spect in which the present provisions were unsatisfac-

tory related to the sanctions to be imposed on non-

compliance.~The Rio Protocol imposed the sanction

of unlimited liability. Consequently, a slip made by a

booking clerk, or a perfectly unintentional error as to

law, was visited. by the same consequences as - wilful

misconduct. If the provision under discussion were -

read together with Article 25 as at present drafted,

the result would be that the pilot. or navigator, on

whose skill the passenger relied for his safety, could

be as negligent as he pleased, and yet liability would

be limited. But, if a booking clerk made a mistake,

liability -was unlimited. That was difficult to defend

’ from the legal point of view. On the other hand, if

this solution were rejected, what alternative could be

provided? A. number of solutions were suggested in,

the documentation and the Conference might’ find it

_ ‘difficult to agree on what was the best of them. The

provisions on documents of carirage were not satis-

factory as they stood and thé United Kingdom Dele-

. gation felt very grave doubts whether the Conference

would be able to agree by a sufficient: snagarity on

satisfactory provisions to replace them. .

The segond question was ‘in regard to the con-

sequences of total omission. Would those consequences -

be unfortunate? In practice, the forms of tickets were

worked out’ by commercial organizations connected

(

+t Rear Tree came

'

‘

> oR Ser er

‘

| BBB posenantniguna caammanansa 0 REE RTS ee ee

° é me 43 ¢@

with air transport. In this regard, he was thinking

‘not only of IATA but also of other carriers. It might

‘be said that if there were nothing in the. Convention,

that would place too great power in the hands of

_ those bodies and the passenger and the consignor of

goods would consequently be helpless. He did not

think. that this would be so, “for the reason that ac-

count had to be taken of the’ fact that many courts

in many countries took a very strict view of any:

attempt to impose limitations of liability or to exclude

liability and only gave effect to such limitations or

exclusions if they were brought to the notice of the

‘passenger: ‘The carrier issuing a ticket had to take

this into account Convention or no Convention and

this provided a very effective safeguard. The United

Kingdom Delegation was not speaking entirely, from

theory in that respect since the courts of the. United —

Kingdom were among the ones thtat.togk a very strict ° -

“view as to the necessity of warning the passenger.

* The case of Westminster Bank vs. Imperial Airways

1 United Kingdom King’s Bees Division: [1936] 2 AN E.R. 890; —

155 L.T. 86; 52 T.L.R. 607; 80 Sol. Jo. 794; -42 Com. Cas..1; 55 :

. Lloyd, L.R. 242; (1936), US. Av. R. 39.

Limited showed what a strict view the United ‘King-

dom courts would take. Nevertheless, in-spite of that,

_ the United Kingdom applied the Warsaw Convention’

_ to domestic carriage within the United Kingdom ‘and a

@within the territories over which it was competent to—

@legislate without applying the provisions of the Con-

vention concerning documents of. carriage. During

the three years in which that legislation had been in

: force, no difficulty whatever had arisen. -He com--

mended that experience to the Conference as an indi- »

cation of what would happen if the provisions on docu-

44

bd

ments of carriage were removed from the Convention

altogether. .

There were two main arguments which had ‘been

used against the United Kingdom proposal. -'The first

argument was that, if these provisions were deleted,

- the result would be a lack of uniformity in an im-

portant matter. But, he wondered whether the: bare

skeletal requirements of the Protocol; ‘or even those. of

the Warsaw Convention itself achieved uniformity “are

regard to documents of carriage. All uniformity, in

fact, came about,-not because of the provisions in the .

Convention, but because of the sharing of experiences

among commercial men. What brought uniformity was

practice and not legislation of this kind. . . . He-re-

thinded the Conference that,“at the Rio meeting, all

commercial opinion which expressed itself was in

favour of the deletion of these clauses. He referred

* to such bodies as the International Chamber of, Com-

merce, the International Union of Aviation Insurers.

and the International Air Transport Association. Re-_

~ gard should be paid. to the views of those bodies and

the Conference could do no-greater service to the ~

‘ advancement of civil aviation on -an effective:-basis. _

than by deleting the provisions under discussion from

the Convention.” 0

‘The correct and logical answer to the arguments of

_UK, as stated above and as stated over. and over at the

various international meetings, was given by M. Garnault,

Delegate of France at the Hague meeting (Hague Minutes,

pages 50, 51, when he réjoined : erie

“St should be remembered that air eanspert existed not

Oty for the benefit of the carriers, but also for the ©

usefs, that i is, the nationals of the States represented.

. Ks

. ’

Rn

§ .

at the Conference. Since the principal object of the

~ Convencion was to subject the carrier to 4 more favor-

evle regime of liability than that usually established’

by common law, it was equitable to consider the situa-

tion of the passenger and to draw his attention to the-

<= that, by participating in a specific carriage, he

. Would, in consequence, be restricted in his rights. It

had deen said that the booking clerk would have diffi-

culty in'determiining whether. the Convention was ap-.

plicable. .Would the passenger have less difficulty in -

solving the same probleni? Which of the two would -

be better able to solve the problem? The employee of

the carrier skilled in his work and carrying out his

habitual activity, or an occasional.passenger? If either

of the. two parties mentioned were going to be placed

in difficulty, the French Delegation would not hesitate

- to have the difficulty borne by the employees of the

carriers.” 3

“He was not convinced by the argument: of Mr.

. Wilberforce to the effect. that no difficulty had been

encountered by the omission from the internal English

law of the special provisions of the Convention con-

. cerning. the form of the documents of carriage: If.

- English users ‘of air transport were always placed

under a system of limited liability of the carrier

whether the carriage was under English law or under ees

the international Convention, there was no point .in

_ warning them by a special provision in the document

of carriage. He was interested in an entirely differ-

ent case, the case of a user in a country which had

not included the provisions of the Warsaw Conven-

tion in its internal law. Such'a user might, under his

national law, have the benefit of a system of,unlimited

liability of the carrier when the internal law was ap-

plicable, and might be quite ignorant of the fact that,

yr

/

7 -

(

' when he undertook a journey. under the Warsaw Con-

vention, he would be .subject to ‘the sestrictions of the

Convention. ham F “

a

The eiiiben of the U nitea ‘Kingdom. is ‘decile, as Mr.

Wilberforce said at’ The Hague, to that of TATA and of .

the International Union of Aviation Insurers -(“IUAI’).

This is easier ta understand when one remembers that

~~~. the limitations and. restrictions of the Warsaw Convention

are ‘the internal law ‘of UK; limitations, consequently, are |

the "public policy of the United Kingdom’ as deliberately .

fixed by “The High Cenrt of. Parliament.” The public |

policy in the. United States, of course, as’ to limitations }

_of liability on behalf of publie carriers. of passengers, is > -

precisély the - are eae Z

- of

d. Canide : x ‘J ~ . : 7.

‘Canada also files a plea: on behalf. of petitioner for: a

. strict, literal.construction of the Warsaw Convention. But |

Canada; also, i is the owner of: an international air carrier.,

The airline Air Canada - (earlier Trans’ Canada Airlines), a

as -World Airline notes at page 272, has its stock euatiel

. “vested in the goverhment-owned Canadian National Rail-

- ways.” Canada i is thus an owner financially interested in

' and in Montreal in 1966; as is “indicated hereinafter by

| references ‘to the Minutes- of those three conferences.

- UK proposal for the elimination of Articles 3 to 11 of ©

recoveries for passengers injured or killed, on. international.

. air flights.

In 1929, - “Canada was a Dominion, and was not repre-' -

sented,yper se, at the deliberations at Warsaw. Representa-

f tives of the Canadian Government did participate actively

in-the deliberations in Rio in 1953, at ‘The Hague in 1955,

| Mr. Nadeau of Canada, at Rio, originally supported the

\

the Warne Convention, stating (Rio Minutes, £ page 55)

. “the Canadian. Delegation wis in entire agreement with

the proposal of the United Kingdom. Articles 3 to 11 of. -

the Warsaw Convention should. be completely eliminated.” -

Later; expressions. of Ganada at Rio and. at the Hague, ss

_ showing concern for the passenger ard ‘his notification of

* Warsaw limits, are somewhat. difficult to reconcile with

Canada’s present position as purported amicus demanding 4

a harsh and literal construction of Article 3 (2) of the —

-original Warsaw _Convention. Most of these statements.

“emanate from Brigadier | M..@. Booth-who was the leading

| spokesman for Canada in Rio ‘and at ‘The Hague.

For instance, at the Rio. meeting: she we page =

118): - : 5s

“He nuked if dines ‘was some spécial reason why the

air carriers should enjey a preferehtial treatment on

this question’ of a limit of: liability.It might be that

in certain States, liability was limited in other maies. 2 rea

of transport, but, in the areas with which he was fa-

miliar, liability was not limited in most other mode’ .

of transport. The liability of railways, buses and taxis

“was certainly not limited. Therefore, if the Committee

decided to limit the liability. of the air carrier, it

should: not be limited beyond a reasonable level. |

_ >The tiability of the operator of the aircraft had been

limited in the Rome Convention to prevent the results

of an accident from being catastrophic for the operator —

in question. It, might be suggested that this was the

_ basis on which the limitation of liability of air carriers

under the Warsaw Convention should be established!

. However, this was not being proposed.. _The liability

~ of the ‘operator in respect of each person killed: or

' injured was limited to 500,000 Poincaré francs under .

‘the Rome Convention. While it was true that, in that :

ane

oY “half of what it was worth under. the Rome Convention.

181) said:

‘ pe » by tife® ‘Convention. This -was-an important fact. |) <r ee

* Ps ’ "7 > Ping

» on : ® ’ . .

’ . .

“f : °<. 48

‘ “ en Or : o

Convention, different. considerations applied, it would ;

not be unreasonable to say that a human life under ie

\ the Warsaw Convention. should surely be worth at least -

CU :

dnd rahiatdhbttntihosseitvbste is alias

The cost of insurance had been constantly decreasing ~ -

since 1946. For a return: trip. between New York and |

_Rio de Janeiro, insurance could now be purchased for

_ $1.00 for each $10,00 worth of insurance. The economic ©

_ . consequences for airlines would, therefore, seem to’be

- negligible: if the limit of the existing Convention were |

ae or even tripled.” |

Whstieas Canada’s seadtion may be i in its amicus brief,

it is clear. that” at Rio in 1953, Canada specifically recog:

nized the importance of a passenger receiving notice a

that he might procure insurance for additional protection

of his family and himeelf, _ Aa. Booth pen Minutes, page

o ee : . ;

ne a Rint ct te IME AY 2 ate Sah i AB BIB RON is UO DIT Be NOG pete a BAAD tres inna ae D ic Ler gander damnit

‘ A .

“Tt had alivady ‘on. pointed out: that the Working

. Group’ s text did not provide any adequate sanction

' in the case. where “a passenger: was not given notice ~«

that the liability of the carrier to him might be limited -

RAT Be wd

_ gengers on airlines were from all walks of life.and, q

_ certainly, the vast majority of them had never heard |

* of the Warsaw Convention and had no. -knowledge of

the fact that the liability of the carrier to the 7 passen- \ \

ger might be limited by that Convention. It was im- |

. portant for every passenger to have, this knowledge, . k

so that, if he considered it necessary, he might take~ ;

-out-additional insurance for his own. protection over.

- and above the amount for which the carrier would be

liable.” .

&

”

a

hele after noting that the sipcnininead that the sanction

emia on the carrier by Article 3 (2). of the Warsaw

_ Convention was unsatisfactory, (Rio Minutes, page sith

‘he added (same page):

“was it necessary to provide ‘for a sanction in the ease’

where the passenger ticket had not been delivered, or

' -. where the statement that the carriage was: subject to

eT

. the rules. relating to liability established by the Con-

. vention was not included in the tieket? In the view of

the Canadian Delegation, the sanction provided by the

existing Convention and the French-proposal, whereby

the application of the limits was excluded in the. case

. of the non-delivery of the ticket,.was too harsh, and <

should not be retained. On the other hand, the Cana- °

' ‘dian Delegation was.of the opinion that it was impor-

tant to notify the passenger that the liability was that

- provided by the Convention. The application of the

limits of liability shou#a, therefore, be excluded, in ‘the

‘case where, the statement concerning the application ©

of the Convention was not set out in’ the passenger

titket. This was the siaiat behind. . the proposal’

: maga te Danae ——,

Then; at The Hague, in 1955, -tttagus Minutes, page 5),

Brig. Booth’s position was that

3:0 felt that there was just one ‘essential require- |

ment, namely, that. there be notice to the passenger

‘along the line indicated by the N etherlands Delega- .

tion, the United States Delegation and by some others.

— His Delegation was opposed to sarictions, because it.

believed it to be the responsibility of. the national law

to ensure that its aitlines comply .with any require-.

’ ments that might ™ ene in a convention such as

this. ” ; ’

‘e

P

‘This onpeaition to a sanction i is ounaiatent with a later

“4 statement (Hague Minutes, page 132, near bottom of. page).

Canada did ‘note support for some “upward révision” of —

Warsaw-Hague limits at the Montreal meeting in 1966

_ (Montreal Minutes, page 17, at pottom,. page 42, at.top,

page 97, page 130). But any. concern for notification to the

passenger of these limits—to whatever amount they ee

» , \

be raised—does not oppees:

ee

e. ATA and IATA, the Air Transport Trade ‘Ainpetatons

_ ‘The nature of the interest of the Air Transport Associa-

- tion of America (“ATA”) and of the The International. Air |

Transport Association (“IATA”) isin part shown by the

' direct quotation from the brief (page: 2 thereof) : filed- hy,

these two trade. and sérvice organizations as amici:

| ATA is a voluntary trade and service orgeniantion.

whose- ‘membership eomprises virtually all of the sched-

uled, federally-certificated airlines of the United States...

The names of the airline members of ATA are ~ re

“forth in Appendix A to this. brief IATA is a body

|) otitic incorporated i in 1945 by special Act of Parlia-

* ment. of Canada, 9-10 George VI, as an organization

of the world’é’scheduled airlines. [ATA has a member-

ship of one hundred airlines from over sixty nations -

of the world, The names,of the TATA member airlines

~~ aré set forth i in Appendix B.

The airline members : of: bo

<a the pearl of ATA and IATA participate in|

. the carriage of.international air traffic—over their own

‘ international routes, through interline arrangements \

_ with other carriers, or a combination of -both.”

As APPENDIX B/at page 2a, of the brief of these amici

_ further shows, among the numerous. members of IATA are’

en

RENEE EY RLS NE LE ADD I Ee HOM POS

. -

cies

in the matters at issue in this case. —

2

included petitioner Alitalia of the amicus Republic of Italy, —

BEA ‘and BOAC of amicus UK, and Air. Canada of the

f purported Amicus Canada. Indeed, as Mr. Cooper of IATA

specifically noted im 1953 at Rio (Rio: Minufes, page 191),

many of thé members of LATA are governmental entities. |

Like the amicus UK, the amicus IATA, at Rio in 1953

_ stood steadfast for the complete elimination of Article 3

of Warsaw and its provisions for any | notice to interna- .

tional airline passengers. Ag its representative noted (Rio

‘Minutes, page 53):

4M, Cooper. (IATA) stated that IATA was. iajeaia

to a revision of the Warsaw Convention for the present, *“

_ , but, if the Committee were to undertake any revjsion ._

-. whatsoever, it.must take into account the burden im: ,

_* posed on the ¢arriers by‘ Provisions | on n documénts

'. of carriage. :

There were three different. interests involved: in this:

Kee -matter: . ‘

i). the interests of the public. In this regard, he

drew the attention of the Committee to the comments _

"of the International Chamber of Commerce which ~

was certainly the most authoritative commercial or-

ganization in this field. The ICC was of the opinion y.

that it would be unyise, at the present time, to at-

tempt to revise the Warsaw Convention. If, how-

“ever, it were decided to ‘undertake a revision, the ©

ICC considered-that any amendments should be ¢on-

fined to a few essehtial points, and two of: these

.. points concerned ‘the particulars to be included. in

the passenger ticket and the particulars to be in-

* eluded in the air waybill. The ICC suggested that

- details of the particulars to be included in the pas-

_senger ticket should not be included in the Conven-

tion which should also omit all. details from the air

a 82.

waybill leaving it to the carriers and users to evolve

‘the exact form of this document in the light of

‘commercial experience; : .

2) the interests of the great. insurance companies

Everyone knew. that transportation col ot be.

carried on if insurance of the risks“involved were .

-not possible. The views ofthe insurers had been

submitted to’t ‘the Committee. The IUAT had pointed

| snig mene which had come into foree

tuted # ‘tithing example of the way, in which, with s

minimum of. amendment,‘the text of the ‘present

_¥ Convention could be brought: reasonably’ up to date. .

v In these’ regulations, the chapter of the Convention: ;

dealing with documents of carriage, had been‘to a

Parliament was sound and a perfectly: proper wey

to expedite & air transport ;~ ae

3). the views of thé International. Air Transport

_ Association, which represented. the greater part of :

_ » international air carriers. IATA had stated that the |

"provisions of documents of carriage should be “de-

leted from the Paris draft. If the Committee decided

to amend the Warsaw Convention, it. should delete °.

: Provisions on documents of carriage. -

If, nevertheless, the Committee decided | to vétahe

some provisions on documents of carriage, he hoped

it would not require the delivery of an air ‘waybill on

acceptance of the goods. A shipper sent hundreds ‘of

packages at one time to an air company, and it was

°

; great extent eliminated. | ‘The: insurers gf the world ‘

an pointed out that the decision taken by the British |

; . ns

7 . a e

: e %. a

- «4

e _-pfactically impossible to’ issue several air + waybills on

delivery of every package.

_ He hoped, showever, that the proposal of the United —

: Kingdom for deletion would be adopted and that these -

very difficult clauses would be omitted from the revised |

sian .- Odaygation. oe -

| Mr. Cooper also- stated the interest of IATA and its

“members i in the low Warsaw limits at Rio:-

“He pointed oiit that the limits had been fixed in

* 1929 and that, if any part of the transport activity of

_. the world had increased, it was air transport and that, —

without the present limits, there would hardly have

been thé imposing record of increased use of aircraft .

‘oa the public as passengers. The historical'test could

not be overlooked. The Warsaw Convention had been,.’

with its limits of liabikity, a working rule under which

air transport | had increased immensely.’ ‘ _ Minutes,

page 112) -

Although IATA tnohe the sitition that: aie ticket at all” .

was enough under Warsaw~Article 3(2), Mr. Cooper took

note, éven ne he 1953 at Rio, that some oe

did not agree (Rio Minutes, page 189):

|. “Mr. Cooper (IATA) was of the opinion *that the

Committee was considering one of the most difficult

_ and one of the most important problems involved in . |

the revision of the Warsaw Convention. A court had

given a decision to the effect that, pursuant. to. the

existing Convention, if any ticket at all were delivered,

the obligations imposed by the Convention were com-

plied with.. Some lawyers did not agree. with this

principle and believed that, when a passenger ticket,

as. described in Article 3(1). had ‘not been aomveged,

Pisa hao eo eS, <-s \

‘the liability of hes carrier was ‘unlimited. -Obvivunly,

this matter had to'be clarified, and . it wag evident . . -

that, if the second interpretation were adopted, the

effect would be to impose on the ‘varrier a penalty tats,

. beyond any justification,. since it: was provided that he

could ‘not only-not take advantage of. the limits, but’

-also that he ‘could not’ take on of the “une &

sions. excluding his liability,” Rp a

The foregoing Mr. Cooper, cake; at The: Hague i in 1955

as Legal Adviser to IATA, served as an IATA°Observer

(Hague Documents, page 26), consistently took positions ~

at The Hague similar to those maintained at Rio (Hague

Minutes, passith). | <i

Again, at Montreal i in 1966, IATA naliotehaed its previ-

ous positions - as to the Warsaw: Convention” and as to

“keeping: down”, mpealipes: of ares = (Montreal 3

Minutes, page 19): .

“The IATA: hetinis indicated - that the Associa- —

_ tion’s first, objective was to maintain "the Warsaw .Con- —

vention which, in its opinion, was a modern instrument.

The second .and the most. important Objective: was to.

find a solution that would ‘be generally acceptable. to

all parties to the Convention and the Hague Protocol. -

* A further objéctive was to preserve the Warsaw sys-

tein as a whole and to: discourage any suggestion re--

garding alternative solutions. IATA was also .inter-

- ested in.finding ways to meet the requirements of the

large. majority, of cases—not necessarily all cases, but

the average cases—to ensure the expeditious settle- .

- ment of.claims and to avoid the cost of litigation. The _

. - solution should entail reasonable cost so as not to

hinder the normal development of civil aviation; it

3 = en ‘the interest of the travelling public.

Po ee

as a shih walt not merely one aii of it. ‘Taking |

all of these objectives’ into consideration, IATA felt ©

that the $50,000 limit agreed@o by the airlines repre-

sented a reasdnable and adequate solution. This figure,

as the IATA Observer understood it, amounted.in fact

- to a doubling of the average. settlement of around

-$25,000 ae by the Jnited States i in. the year

1964. “ee

Declaring that’ the figure of $100, 000 proposed by

_... the United Statés as the limit appeared to be unrea-

. sonable and: unjustified, the IATA Observer indicated ~

that his Association ‘would: not support it. He utilized.

_‘sdata.contained in a statement issued by the Air Trans-,

port, Association o ‘the United States in, /August ‘1965.

(e.g., settlements i the U.S. during. 1963 indicated no $. ,

significant increase’ as “compared with. earlier experi- :

ence, and the: largest settlement in that year ‘was

$17, 000) to show that the $100,000 limit could not be

justified even in that country. He maintained that this —

high\figure, if adopted, would encourage litigation, |

delay compensation payments and undermine the Con-

vention.. As regards cost—on’ the basis of. the 50 cents

“per passenger figure suggested by the United States

*.. ‘Delegate and an. estimated total of:50 million passen-

gers carried 0 eduled and non-scheduled intérna-

Ba. tiqnal flights in, year 1965, it would appear that -

.. at least some $25-million would be required of the - -

airlines ‘to pay for the experiment, Some airlines -

. would probably;-have to pay more ‘than others; and

perhaps the smallér.the airline, the bigger the share

of payment, and all “this would obviously be. ‘reflected ;

in air fares:”

«|

. J g

ei ‘ein of ‘Waited Rates pony ‘on the ~

Warsaw Convention Has Clearly Stated That if the Car-

.- . wiers Do Not Give Passengers dequate Notice of War- -

‘+ gaw Limitations, the Carriers Must Suffer Loss;of the:

Liability Limitation. Since the United States Has Stead-

'. fastly, Maintained ghat Passenger Notice Is Essential to

7 Warsaw Limitation 0 Liability, It Cannot, Be Claimed

That the Decision Below Causes Surprise or. wid Breach hs

of International seas eaascait

a In General ae ae ee | | | 2

The briefs svibiaatited by amici ATA; TATA, United King-

. dom, Italy and Canada seek to convey “the. implication

- ‘that the decision. below is, in effect, .a breach of faith on:

the part of the United States, and. therefore that the - .

‘other parties to the Warsaw Corivention had some kind

_, of vested right to assume that the United States “would

never require passenger notice. to support limited War;

' saw liability. In effect, these amici seem to imply. that

they. have been gealying upon such a United States: ‘position.

Th. point of fact, a below. ‘the entixze history of

American policy expressidns on Warsaw and related topics, é

is to the opposite effect... There has never been any U. S.

. policy other than requirement éf passenge notice to sup- |

port limitee Warsaw liability, and therefo er@ could

not posgibly have been sick reliancé“ upon a contrary

‘policy. Sa ..

a *

be U. S. Policy Statements at Rio

\ The United States did not participate at ‘Westile and

‘so we-must begin our consideration of U.S. expression 3

| its =e at the Rio meeting of 1953, «where _ —

o.

Sod dey ar tee,

a¢i

Pe eee

_ - of the Civil: ‘hiccliiiiin Board was the chief, US. dele-

gate. He spoke: clearly, in ‘objecting ‘to ‘any ‘deletion of os

‘Article :3 of Warsaw, and as, to-the nécessity of provi- -

sions in documents. of carriage (Rio Minutes, page 54):

| . a delegating the power to make laws to an international

ie. Ai the Hague

Mr. Calkins. was i the. chief. American spokesman at

The Hague in 1955, - Here’ he- repeatedly strebsed the gov- -

ernmental. policy: position: of : the: United States that an .-.

* airline passenger must ‘be’ notified; in a manner that he . ~

would understand, that: if -he flew on an “international”

‘flight, the- liability: of the. airy carrier. ‘would. be limited in -.

amount:. And- notification ‘in a manner that the: ‘passenger. .

could comprehend meant: notice in _a type: size. that he: ‘eould .

read: and: that would be discernible, Ee 3

‘+ @

ai? it, were left. ‘up to IATA to establish the con-

~ tents: of the documents of carriage, the carriers would

. be given a tremendous weapon which could be ‘used »

~-. to the disadvantage of the shipper and the passenger. |

| Besides, TATA did ‘hot include saad ‘the: international

- éarriers:—+ —-~———--" > =

If it were left up to ‘an fnternational ‘eteaty to

establish the contents .of the documents: of carriage,

it would: cause grave constitutional difficulties in the

United States, which could «not. adhere to a convention

y. . .': in the documents -of carriage, the carrier _

Was Sbliged to notify the passenger -or the shipper

_, that this liability might be limited. ‘The Delegation ‘of.

_. the. United States was of the-opinion that the passen-.

- ger ticket should contaty the express provision that

. the carriage was subject to the terms and conditions.

of the Warsaw Convention which might limit the*car-

rier’s er shinee 5

"* +. ot, a ‘ ie

9

6

58

As to American, preference for a “private” ( recovery

from the- carrier) sanction, he said (Hague Minutes, page

7 81) ee ahs

ee: *

“The system of sanctions set out in the present Con-

_ vention was the most appropriate one, because it was _

based onthe passenger ticket itself. The whole Con-

vention was based on the. passenger ticket; corse-

quently, if the-ticket did not contain the provisions

that. weré required by law to be set out in it, then’

_ the contract did not, in fact, meet: the requirements

_ of the Convention. Under these circumstances, it was

only just and equitable that the carrier should suffer

the consequences. One. might think otherwise if the

danger to the carrier were really very great. But if

the United States proposal for a form of advice to

passengers were adopted by the Conference, the dan-

ger would not be very great. The form could be in-

cluded in every ticket, and. consequently, all that the

agents of the carrier need do would be to fill out the

ticket properly. This was not much to ask of the

carriér in return for the reduced liability which the |

- Convention accorded him.”

: He renewed the plea aon Minutes, page 128):

“Mr. Calkins (United States) preferred to..have -

sanctions imposed by private law rather than haviny

them imposed by the various States under public law.

The reasons for this preference were, first of all; that

* with a private law sanction there would be the possi-

bility of applying a uniform sanction for non-compli-

ance with the requirements of the Convention, and.

secondly, the policing of these sanctions would be —

‘made more easy... . In the case of private law, ‘sanc-

tions, no heavy policing was: required because, in‘the _

4

- ie os

59

iS

event that ‘no ticket was issued, ‘the claimant had his

.Temedy against the carrier. ... He did not feel that

the sanction should apply: to the ‘particulars concern- ~

ing a place of departure and ‘place of destination .

and the agreed stopping places. The passenger should

. certainly assume the obligations of seeing to it that

the ticket issued. to him set forth these places. How-

ever, flie sanction should apply to the sammaon con-

act this notice.”

Agaiti and again, at The Hague; the United States ham-

mered at the need for notice for the’ international’ passen-

ger, in a -eomprehensible form, in print that would stand

out, as a fundamental of American Policy. Mr. Calkins.

stated (Hague Minutes, page 60) : ‘

: -, “Every State had the reloaliliti, not only for

maintaining its air transport services, but for pro-

tecting its citizens and giving to those citizens a trans-.

portation service that was just and equitable. .

‘His Delegation felt, in regard to the notice reevire:

ment, that this requirement of the. passenger ticket,

the baggage check and ‘the air waybill was. the one

. requirement —_ really formed _ crux of the whole -

difficulty. .

His Daegation proposed that Article TI (a) of the .

Protocol—Article 3(1) of the Convention—should pro-

" vide that every ticket sold by an international airline,

‘or om any other airline, for that matter, should include

the. . . provision:

‘ ‘Advice to International Travellers’ (in letters not

less —_ Ye centimeter —. wt 4

Also (Hague Minutes, page 61): ~ - |

“Tt had been remarked that this notion was qeally

‘uhnecessary and that all citizens were presumed to

es

‘

‘Know the law. : That might well be true in ordinary: .

commercial | affairs. However, it. did not solve the

problem in this case, since, in air transportation, do-

mestic passengers travelled side by side with interna-_

"tional passengers. “In the ordinary course of commer-_

cial affairs and in day-to-day living, a person expected

to be treated in the same way as other persons who

were in the same group in a public transportation

vehicle. Here, the matter was different. Persons on

international carriage were subject to the Warsaw Con-

-vention; those confined to domestic transportation had

the benefit, ‘in some countries, of unlimited. liability, .

which was much more preferable for the ‘passenger *

‘than the limited liability of the Convention. As a re-

sult of this, States would insist on putting some kind

of a notice requirement and on imposing it on inter-

_ national carriers coming into their territory. The re-

sult was that there would be a variation of law, a

_ variation of requirements and there would be as many

requirements as there, were States. There might be _

as many decisions ‘ss there were courts, because the

~~ ‘matter would be left up to the court.” .

Then (Hague Minutes, page 74) : 4

“In addition to having a notice more or less in the

same form as his Delegation had already proposed,

he now proposed that the rotice should be: printed in |

-a different coloured ink on the ticket so as-to make it

Stand out.” |

_& “He disagreed with =“ opinion 23 Mr. ae to. the

effect that the notice provision was worthless. To a

certain extent, the value of the provision depended on

‘the ‘amount of internal , parriage. that .went-\on.in'a _

,country. There was a. very great. amount of internal

—— in ‘the United ' ‘States ‘and’ the international

-6

FERAL RTA GANS RPT ANE TNS TOR

° Pe °

a

a”

. .

61

carriage was,’ perhaps, -the exception rather. than’ the

rtle. Consequently, the notice provision was extremely

necessary for the United States,.and also for other

countries where internal transportation was highly de-

veloped. The provision jeopardized nobody ‘and ‘had —

the advantage that all transportation from a Con-

tracting State to a non-Contracting State and back was.

covered: by the Convention. Since almost ‘all interna-

. tional air transportation was likely to be round-trip

_ transportation, the notification, as recommended by .-

> the: United States, did put the passenger definitely on

. notice that’ his: — to - a snaeonil would be

limited” it

| Finally, Mr. Calis sikesied : the passenger, jn accord-

ance with American policy as to relationships between a

carrier and a passenger, to the “man in the. street,” saying

(Hague Minutes, page 116) :. ee ire

Geammemrnnn nS

“he believed—that it was was desirable that the text.be 5

couched in: a form which thé man in the street or :

ordinary traveller could understand,. withont. the use

of legal terms that might be difficult to understand ;

the form of the text should also put the man in the

| street or passenger on notice that if he were taking

_°@ journey of a. certain type; his rights against the

carrier would be limited.” *

de United iis Governmental | Policies and Statemients

* of Position, 1962-1 963

- Frequently, 3 in 1962 and 1963, the United States ‘Govern- :

ment and various Departments and Agencies affirmed the

strong American policy as to the necessity for notice of

‘limitations of liability and as to adequacy: and understand-

ability of any —— notice. Set

; | 62 Pt res, ; {

. In 1962,.the United States Interaggney. Group on Inter- ae

- national Aviation (“IGIA”) issued a réport dated August 7, ae

- 1962, relating to the Warsaw Convention and the Hague. «+.

Protocol, after the mest extensive study of the subject

ever made by the U. S.-Government. One of the recom-

mendations of IGIA was that air carriers be.required to’ e ;

" give “clear and positive notice of the limitations of liability - 4

- article (Article 22) of the Warsaw Convention. ” Attached | .

to said report were recommendations of various United “ie

States governmental departments and agencies, including a

- the Civil Aeronantics Board,‘the Federal Aviation Agency,

- the Department of Justice, fhe Department of Commerce, oe

the. Departgtent of Labor, etc.. The recommendations of :

. thege departments and agencies are easily _ accessible and |

~ are contained in appendices to’said IGIA- Report of August | .

7, 1962, which is listed as ‘TGIA 23/1. 10A.” It is perfectly »

clear that as early as Atgust, 1962; all the governmental |

‘> agencies and departments involved reached.the conclusion .

* that the language then contained in international air ¢ar- wa

rier tickets. did not give adequate notice of the limitations ioe ant

of liability in the Warsaw Convention. > é |

The point was stressed by Senator Homer E. Rialaoe are r

in comments on the Warsaw Convention which, on Novem- . |

ber 10, 1961, he addressed to IGIA (see Attachfhent No. 61 aa @

to IGIA 23/1.3) in the following language: Ae ees, |

“Thig is the most unconscionable provision in all ae ‘

history ever to affect adversely all American citizens. . |

_. There is absolutely no need for a provision of this na- }

__ ture, and the felony is compounded i in that less than —

one-half of one percent of the passengers in interna- ' {

tional traffic are even aware of it. = :

63

Further, the IGIA Report stated that a& passenger:

_. °° “should be positively ‘advised, when he buys his ticket

. © or when he checks inyof the exact amount of. the car-*

rier’s limitation of liability. ”

To give the gist of IGIA 93/1. 10A, at page four of a ©

| -Ietter from N. E. Halaby,. Chairman of the International.

a _+—Group on International Aviation, to The Honorable Dean

Rusk, the Secretary of State, dated August .3, 1962, head

following language was used: et ;

- “It is also recommended that in supplementary Jegis-

lation United States air carriers be required tO give.

clear and positive notice of the limitation of liability .

_ article (Article 22) of the Warsaw Convelition and the’

extent of coverage under the automatic insurance plan.

Thus each passenger intending to embark on carriage

= covered by the Warsaw Convention should be posi-

way tively advised, when he. buys his ticket or when he:

checks in, of the exact amount of the carrier’s limita-

tion of liability under both the Protocol (or the Con-

vention) and the insurance plan. Such a passenger

_ would then have the opportunity of buying at his own. .

expense re insurance ar. to his needs.”

While there was ‘considerable division among the IGIA

member agencies on other phases of the IGIA Report,

-- there was sence’ on the need. for “clear and positive

- “notice”.

? Shortly after. the. « eibotion of said IGIA oaeaek: counsel

for amicus Arnold Holtzman wrote a létter on September _- ~

. 27, 1962 to Alan Boyd, then Chairman of the Civil. Aero- s

‘nautics Board, calling attention to this unanimous IGIA

recommendation that clear and positive notice be required,

ce

‘and. suiinias the C.A.B..to take action Giana: This

letter-is reproduced : as Appendix A of this —

Following. this letter, the C.A.B.. took action, bylissuing ”

_ a notice of proposed rule making, Economic Regulations -

' Docket .14411, dated April 1; 1963, dealing with Part: p>:

_of the Civil Air Regulations, concerning the ‘construction, ed

publication, filing and posting of tariffs of air carriers / .

and of foreign air carriers. ‘The C.A.B. in this notice of

proposed Tule making, was giving notice of its propose dad

- action as to the limitation of: liability for death .or injary

_ of passengers under the Wareey. Convention. The first

ee

Reamer URAM,

ne eet

paragraph states:

“Notice is hereby given ‘that the Civil Aetdnauti¢s

‘Board has under consideration a proposed amendment

to Part 221 of the. Economic Regulations that would

"provide for: improved notice of limitation’ of liability. —

: .for death or injury of passengers. under the Warsaw

Convention, eae: Be

°

Thereafter, ‘in ee Apxitenatory Statement” “of some

seven. pages attached to the foregoing sin it was stated,

on page two:

“The Warsaw Convention eile that the eiiieen

be given a ticket containing a statement that the

__, transportation is subject to the rules relating to liabil-

ity. established by the Convention. ‘The carriers’ com-

ply with this requirement by @ notice in small print —

on the face of the ticket reading’ as follows: ‘If: the

passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination |

or stop in a country other than-the country of depart-

ure, the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and -

the Convention governs and in most cases:limhits the

liability of carriers for death or personal injury and

> in _— of loss of or damage to — It appears

. 7

A:

47"

.

. . y4 - .

° ia wn , - ”

| AEB GOR A ELLs AEDES 000 st Oh Fe ed

> '

.

.

Wi 0 80 Zathey Pete ta i we tela 8 Hah teas,

.

.

.

rong

'

\

a, |

65

\ _ to the Board that this notice may be siainaette. in

two major respects: First, the ticket is by nq means —

the most effective instrument, for advising a passenger’

of.a limitation of liabiligy. There can be no-assurance -

’. that a passenger will read his ticket at all or if he

does, that he will read it ugger such circumstances as

will enable him to. realize the significance of the notice

- provision and take such. protective action as his cir-

cumstances require. The type in which the notice is

currently printed on the ticket is too small to alert the

_ passenger to the importance of the matter. Second, —

the -fact of greatest significance to the passenger,

. Namely, the amount of limitation on liability for death

or injury does not appear in the notice.”

é ee Then; on page =" the meplenainty Statement declares

as ‘follows :. ~

are On January 22, 1963, the member carriers of the Air.

: . Traffic Conferénce of. America (ATC) submitted to

the Board for approval: under §412(b) of the Federal -

| Aviation Act of 1958, a resolution effective March 22,. -

@ ~ .. 1963, | providing for an approved form of notice of the->

Pe limit of-liability of the Warsaw Convention, by means °

of a prescribed statement on a separate sheet of paper.

to be placed.in the ticket envelope or attached to the .

ticket. (Agreement No. C. A.B, 16950). -

whwetinn, on April 1, 1963, the Civil Aeronautics Board,

adopted Order No. H-19447, referring to Agreement C.A.B,

« ° No. 10559, R-2; Docket No. 14411; and, on the second page

of the order, it made the following remark and order:

-“In the Explanatory, Statement of the proposed ' rale

the Board set forth’ reasons why it considers present '

means of giving notice of Convention liability limita- -

| @

» *

a

tions | |inadequate.. ‘Insofar as applicable to the. untied a

% provisions now appearing in the ticket, the Board

“stated (1) the type in which the ticket tiotice, is: eur-

rently, printed on. the)ticket, is too small to alert pas- ig

sengers to the importance of the matter, and (2) that

' the monetary limit of liability for death, or —

‘does not appear in the notice.”

~ Thus, becatise of the unsitisfactory nature of the then,

existing: notice, the Civil” Aeronautics. Board in 1963

adopted this regulation (§221.175, Economic Regulations)

which required air carriers and: foreign. air carriers to, r give”

more complete and adequate notice of Warsaw Convention |

_ limitations t passengers to and from the United States.

e. At ldcsereal Special Resting of ICAO in 1966 ©

Following the United States denunciation of the —_—

Convention in November, 1965, a Special Meeting of ICAO .

to consider limits for passengers. under. Warsaw. andeHague © :

was commenced at. Montreal’ on Februaiy 1, 1966. The.

- Jarge American -delegation ‘was headed: iby Andreas F. . .

Lowenfeld, and-included Allan F. Mendelsohn, both then

of the United States Department of State: Mr. -Lowenfekd |

made it abundantly clear’ that :the principal conegrn of

the United “States was the a and. welfare of Amer-

< ai air line passengers.

; ~ In making a general opening statement, he said (Mon:

| - treal Minutes, pages 5, 6): :

* “his country had alreaily made gear its point of view:

the ‘Warsaw Convention or, to be specific, the limits:

of liability set forth in that Convention: had outlived

\ ” , their time. The large. attendance at the Meeting was

testimony to the general recognition of the, need to

re-examine the Convention signed at Warsaw i in 1929:

as

J : a : | |

, 67 | |

: He cninit with the President. of the Council ‘that that “ -

Convention wa’ an excellent compromise between the

different legal. systems of the world.and fully justified

as such.,On the other hand, fe comptomise between -

the interestis of the airlines and those of the: airline “*

passengers established by that. same Convention was *

— questionable” matter. The principal concern of the

-* . Government of the United States was to protect United ~~

States citizens of practically. all economic Jevels who. - —

in ever-increasing numbers were‘making use. of inter-

: national air transport. The Meeting should bring up

_to date the compromise established i in 1929 without, it. .

was hoped, disturbing the legal regime ehh: the |

“Warsaw Convention. .

” ‘Speaking | on the hiekgréund of the-i hone before the .

Meeting, he briefly: outlined the point’ of view of the _

United States. Hig country. was. mindful: of the fact

that the Warsaw Convention was one of. the most

~. igidely accepted and most significant Conventions of.

-private ‘air law. ‘It. had contributed. to the develop- _

- ment of civil aviation and, to a certain extent; to- the’:

‘ -uniformity of interpretation and practice. However,

-it had been signed in 1929 at a: timie when interna-

_ tional aviation had hardly emerged from the experi-

_ mental stage-and when it had:to be protected. from the

_ risk. of catastrophic accidents. Today, intérnational

~ °° aviation had become a vast business, Present-day tech-

gici nology had greatly. reduced the: risk involved in fly-

‘ing. The Critea States therefore considered that a —

Convention designed to tip the scales Heavily in favour

of the airlines to the prejudice of the passengers, was |

no longer justified. His Delegation believed that there

should’ he a fair balance ete, om interests ‘of air

passengers and those of aviation/

. ‘ \ " ~o

- 6% j a 4 os. %& tS)

- @& 68.

Air safety was considerably greater today than in-

; ° 1929, as @onfirmed, by the accident rate of 0.61 passen-

“

"269

$#aee™

' ger fatalities per 100 million passenger-miles. For the

period from 1925-1929, the rate was 45 passenger fatal-

ities per 100 million passenger-miles. There was thus

no longer the same concern as in.1929 about the serious

economic consequences one single air disaster, might -

have for aviation. ~

' The volume of air traffic had increased ‘enormously

with no sign of let-up. In 1964, 38 million passengers

travelled on scheduled international air services,.

frhounting toa total of 76 bilfion sansenane- saeetdls. ,

_ Between 1925 and 1929, i.e. over a five-year period, air-

lines flew a total of only. 400 million passenger-miles.

Regardig the cost of insurance, he commented that

insurance. companies were very reticent{qbout- giving

figures. In his view, insurance costs were approxi- .

/ -. mately 1% of operating costs, for example, on the ~

North Atlantic. Assuming that these costs were to in-

crease: by 50% as’ the result of a Jiability limit of WS

$100,000 under the Warsaw-Hague system, there would

be a consequential increase in operating costs of ap-

_ proximately 1.5%. The cqst per passenger would ‘rise '

approximately by $1.00 to $1.50 on a one-way trip from .

New York to London.

In respect of limits of Liability, it had been ‘said re

some foreign Governments that the United States was

<> Seeking to impose its standard of living on all the other _

| countries in the world. Nothing could be further from —

- the truth. The United States did not interpret limits

. to. mean the average compensdtion . payable, because

‘average’ would mean that 50% of the persons in-

- yolved had suffered damages. Only when a,limit was

as inadequate ‘as that of the Warsaw. Convention. _

there a tendency for it to be at an average level. .

_— 6 ‘ te

\ 5 ’.

69

Resuming: the argument (Montreal Minutes, pages 30,

31), he declared: ’ . ;

“Every victim. ef an icihitond had the right to equi-- ~

table compensation. No ,matter what methods were _

“used im‘ the different eountries or even by -the various

courts and administrative authoritiesQyifhin the same

country, the aim was always the. same:to determine

the compensation for the financial loss suffered ‘by the .

victim or, in the case of death, by the’ dependents. So |

far as ‘possible, the financial indemnification was not

intended to punish those-responsible for the accident, —-_.

but rather to restore to the dependents the financial .

i circumstances which had existed * before the acci- |

" ** dent. . |

a aan on- Warsaw claims—The aforementioned Table ts

. shows that during the same period the average com- ©

pensation per passenger* had amounted to’ approxi-

mately U.S. $38,500. From 1958 to 1964, the average

compensation had been around U. S. $52,500, ‘a figure -

which should be borne in mind. The United States was be

_ Not concerned with average compensation, but with 7

the consequences of a limit. In other words, they were

' interested in the percentage of persons who, regard-

~ less of the limit, did not receive what was due to them

as a result of the operation of the limit. If that coin- « °

_ cided with-the average, 50% of passengers would con-'

. sequently be placed at a disadvantage. .: . ?

‘The effect of the raising of the insurance premium

“upon the overall operating ‘expenditures of the air- |

lines had. been estimated , for the ‘year 1964 as follows: —

64 cents per 1,000 passenger revenue thiles; 80 tents fe

per 1,000 of the latter. at a U.S. $50,000 limit; 90

cents on the same calculation. with a limit of U.S.

$75,000; and 86 cents at a limit of U.S. $100,000. The

difference of the cost of insurance between U.S.

© + a

* ws . re

; ‘ Y. ;

70

_ $75,000 and U.S. $100,000 amounted to only 6 cents

-per. 1,000 passenger revenue miles.

In conclusion, he stated that a) the Warsaw Cones

-tion was ‘inequitable and constituted a burden which

' the United States could no longer impose upon its na-.

_ tidnals and b) that. the expenditure involved in the

proposed new limit was altogether ‘reasonable and

would impose no heavy burden either upon the world’s

- airlines or their passengers.”

_ Agafn (Montreal Miniites, page 43):

hilea, as to the protection of the passenger (Montreal oy Be

“the Delegate of the United States indicated that he

realized that his country was only one among many,

but having a great many ‘airlines and a-great many «—

citizens travelling ‘all over the world, his country

must to some extent take its own interests into ac-

count. .

Bpaaking to’the references made to the generosity

_of the United States, he said that if airlines needed

| support, or ‘countries teoodeDeapport; there-were ways

to secure it. The United States did not believe that it

cou continue to ask in effect the widows and orphans

he of its citizens to assume this burden.”

| Minutes, page 60) :

“In his opinion, however, there was a difference be-

tween a race horse and-a passenger. As he had al-

ready pointed out, the protection’of the passenger was

at the very core of the United States considerations.”

‘In closing his remarks, and stressing the “famous small

’ print purporting to give notice” of the Warsaw Conven- —

tion and.its limits, Mr. Lowenfeld stated (Montreal Mi- ©

nutes, pager 140-142) :

“Tt is with considerable sedan that I have asked

for the floor af this time. The United States delegation

thought that it had‘come to Montreal well prepared

with facts and with arguments in support of our posi-

tion. We thought we had made a persuasive presenta- i

‘tion for the proposition that the Warsaw Convention

’ needed to be updated, and updated substantially. We

believed, and still believe, that the United States pro-

-posal, or something close to it, would have been in the

.’ public interest. It would have secured er for many

persons, and at very little cost.

.We thought that this Conference would recognize _

that commercial aviation is no longer an infant indus-

.try entitled to. special shelter, but that it should: be

treated like other persons or businesses dealing with

the public. In other words, we thought this Confer-

ence would recognize the principle that persons ‘or

. firms engaged in international commercial aviation—

whether airline, manufacturer, or ground ‘control—

should, on the whole; -be held responsible ” injuries.

done to others. . fa

We hoped <r today that | it might yet be possible ;

to lay a ‘firm foundation lere for -a successful dip-~

lomatic conference, and to work ‘out an interim ar-

rangement along the lines of this Conference’s recom-

. . mendations. If this had come. about, our delegation

had ‘hoped to recommend to our government that it

withdraw the United States notice of denunciation of

‘the Warsaw Convention. It was not to 7” and we are

SOrry. . nels

- But we should not, Mr. Chairman and fellow dele- -

gates, feel too sad. From. the point of view of the

v

°

72.

traveling phic thére can- be no doubt that this Con-

ference has had a wholesome effect. All the- countries

represented here,-and doubtless many others that will

hear and read of the work of this Conference, have

come to think hard about. the question of the obliga-

tion of airlines toward their passengers. Nearly all

countries have agreed—as every one of our explora-

tory votes proved—that the Warsaw Convention. limits

are obsolete and unfait. Whatever the timing, what-

ever the procedure followed, we may be sure that the

- Convention will be brought up to date or will gradually .

fade away. In the long run, the aviation ‘industry,

which ‘has. always been. proud of its position in the

forefront of human advance, will not—indeed ‘cannot

—stand still on the simple, and orally clear-cut is-

_sue of protection of its customers. . ¢

So far as.the United States is somnsieil, Mr. Chair-

man, let me state again that while we are disappointed

: that this meeting could not have reached’ a more clear-

cut result, our impatience on the issue of compensation

for. accident victims is due only to our concern for the

traveling public. *. :

| We hope and expect that tle uniform practices es-

tablished “in the ‘light of the Warsaw Convention will

be maintained—all, that is, except for the famous

small print purporting to give notice of the applicabil-

ity of the —— and of the limits of en

contained therein. .

-We expect that courts in “the. United Sateen,

accordingly,. out-of-court settlements—will treat per-

sons involved in air accidents like persons involved in

- any other accidents. Thus compensation will be based

on the passenger’s earning ‘capacity, his: life ex-

_ pectancy at the time of accident, and the degree of

dependence of the survivors. There will be some high

.

ig

Aal ae ae ~e hist an ee ee

settlements ma” some low- ones, ain there may well

be some judgments in favour of the carriers.

Limitations’ on liability, whether statutory at, .the

_ place of accident or°’by contract in the ticket, will al-

’ ‘most certainly be disregarded on the ground that they

are contrary to public policy. But you may be sure

that. peed at will receive full justice in the .

"United States. Further, where foreign residents bring’,

suit in the United States, it will be the passenger’s

earning capacity, his life expectancy, and the status

_ of’his survivors in his own country, as well as that.

‘ eountry’s concepts of proper compensation for acci- -

‘dent victims that will: generally govern, the result in

. the United States. hae aa Y .

2

f. In 1966 aor 1 967, Following Purported Withdrawal.

of. the Denunciation of. Warsaw in ied 1966

Following the purported withdrawal of the denuncia-

tion of the Warsaw Convention in May, 1966 and the

creation of the so-called “Interitn Agreement” by some _

of the international air carriers, there have been. repeated:

‘strong ‘statements of policy by the United States Gov-

ernment,. and its Departments’ and Agencies, as to. the

absolute necessity of notice to an intending passenger of:

the applicability of Warsaw and of its limitations. of lia-

: bility, plus a notice in discernible and understandable }

form, not in fine print or type.

. On July 14, 1966, Mr. B. T. Twigt, Rueestary- General

‘of the International Civil Aviation Organization, (ICAO) .

_ distributed a letter concerning the Warsaw Convention.

There was also distributed a copy of a proposed reply

prepared by an ad hoc working group of IGIA. The pro-

“posed reply thus prepared by the working group of IGIA;

-was distributed’ by Mr. John H. Wanner, Consultant to

~*

v8)

po ee

the. Civil Aimenaiation ‘Board, to various persons, on or

about September 6, 1966. On pages 8 and 9 of said pro-

___"posed_ reply, appears th the following matter :

-¢

te

“The United States recognizes that in certain or .

: countries the problem of notice may not be as acute

‘as. it is in the - United States. This would be par-

ticularly true in countries where almost all travel by:

the citizens of that country is in international air

transportation subject to the provisions of the Warsaw

Convention, or where by domestic law the Warsaw-

- system of liability had been extended to cover domestic

‘’ and non-Warsaw international.traveél as well. In the

United States, however, and possibly in a number of

other countries, the Warsaw system is not applicable

to domestic transportation, and in such cases the lia-

bility of the airline is normally unlimited. Accordingly,

if liability is to be limited for U. S. passengers int

international, as distinguished from. domestic trans-

portation, adequate,notice must be given. In this con-

nection it should be noted that in the last few years |

* gourts in the U.’S. have become increasingly strict

- in, their application. of the notice requirements of the

Convention. The protection of the limits. of liability

have’ [sic] been denied to defendant air carriers. in

cases where, for example, the ticket and notice were.

not delivered to the passenger to make insurance or

“other arrangements, or -where the notice was printed

in fine type and failed to give proper notice. (The let- ©

ter then states the following authorities—Mertens v. —

_. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., (1965, C.A. 2 N.Y.) 341 F.2d

~ $51, cert. den. 382 U.S. 816 (1955); Warren-v. Flying

Tiger Line, Inc., (1965, C.A. 9 Calif.) 352 F.2d 494;

and the trial cian’ opinion in the instant Lisi case,

(1966; SDNY.) § 253° — 237.)

1 -

Thus, the question of notice has recently become

of greater. importance to those airlines carrying War-

saw traffic to, or from, the United States.” —

.

(The foregoing language from the proposed letter was

repeated verbatim on page 6 of the letter of September 6,

1966, signed by. Nelson B. David, United | States Repre-

sentative, sent to Mr. Twigt. This latter was the final ©

draft of the letter as approved by IUIA for and on behalf *

of the United. States.) te

Attached to these papers, aniong singe appendices, was

an Appendix: B, dated 4 May, 1966, from Montreal, which -

was a. text filed by I.A.T.A. air carriers with the Civil

Aeronautics Board of the United _— providing as

follows, i in paragraph #2, on ‘pages 1, 2

“Hach Carrier shall, at the time of detivery of ‘the

ticket, furnish to each passenger ‘whose transportation

is governed by the Convention or the Convention as-

amended. by the Hague Protocol and by the special

contract : described ‘in ‘paragraph #1 the following |

notice, which shall be printed in type at least: as }

large as 10 point modern type and in ink contrasting

with the stock on (i) each ticket; (ii) the piece of.

paper either placed in the ticket envelope with the

ticket or attached to the ticket; or (iii) on the ticket

envelope: Advice to International Passengers on

Limitation of 7 - :

> (Then follows the provision contained in the so-called

- agreement of _May 16, 1966, whereby certain of the inter-

- national air carriers agreed to raise the limit of liability

to $75, 000.00. per passenger.) ;

: Subsequently, on September ‘19, 1966, ‘the Civil Aero-

. nautics Board gave notice of proposed rule‘ making’ as to

Part 221, Economic: Regulations Docket No. 17725, with.

_ .respect, to posting of notice of limitatioh of liability for - -

- death or injury ‘of passengers under the Warsaw Con-,

vention. Attached to this notice of September 19, 1966, .

- ig another. Explanatory Statement starting with page #3. cae

On page #4 of this nme as the eo language * Je

| pears:

“By this agreement, the parties thereto ‘bound them-

‘selves to, include in their tariffs effective May 16, 1966,

a special contract in accordance with the Warsaw

Convention or the Hague Protocol providjng fora —.

limit of liability foreach passenger for death, wound-

ing or other bodily «OM of $75,000.00 inclusive of

legal fees. The partie further agree .to provide\ in

their tariffs that the. carrier would not, with respect te

to any claim arising out of the death, wounding, or :

other bodily injury of a passenger, avail itself of cer- -

tain defenses. The carriers. further stipulated: that

they would, at the time of’ delivery of the, tickets,

furnish to each passenger governed by the Conven- |

~ tion or the Protocol and by the special contract de-

, scribed above, ‘a notice in 10 point type advising such

international passengers of the limitations of liability

’ established by the Convention or the Protocol, or the

. higher liability agreed to,in these special contracts

_ pursuant to the Convention or Protocol as described .

above,” ©

2

_In the final draft IGIA letter: of September 30, 1966, : 3

~ signed by Mr. David on behalf of the United States Gov-

ernment and sent to Mr. Twigt of ICAO, the sppiiiee)

appears on pages 5, 6: |

ae

ie “As to Question 4): The inclusion of a easy

. concerning advice to international passengers on lims-

—_ aii — wes 3 - :

‘The United States considers that the notice provi-

sions of Article 3' of the Convention, and of the Con-

- vention as amended by the Hague Protocal, are inade-

quate, and that: they. should. be amended so as to.

_ Provide ‘more effective notice to passengers. Hx- ’

_. perience in the United States demonstrates that many .

| passengers, on international flights are unaware 6f. the

applicability of the Warsaw Convention to their trip.

The notice required by the’ Convention is. usually

“ae printed in small type on the ticket, and, along with |

many other standard terms and conditions. of the |

ticket, comprises material which the average passenger .

‘does not take the time to: read. Moreover, even if the

- passenger does read the notice, it fails to state that ax”

limit of either $8,300 or ‘$16,600 may be currently -

‘applicable to him. Although more complete notice is

now being given by carriers who are parties to the

Interim Agreement, that agreement is an interim and

voluntary arrangement only, and is not applicable. to

all carriers and all Warsaw transportation:

Because of the unsatisfactory nature of the existing.-

“notice, the Civil Aeronautics Board in. 1963 adopted _—

a regulation (Sec. _ 221.175, Economic Regulations) -

which requires air carriers and foreign air carriers

to give more complete and adequate notice of Warsaw.

limitations to passengers to or from the United States.

While many ajternative forms of notice could be con- —

sidered in lieu of ‘the one adopted by the Board, we

- believe that some notice of this general character

should be .included. The form of notice incorporated

in the Interim Agreement ¢ can also serve as a ae

e

. ” .

— Ra ty gts, a

i December. 23, 1966, a draft ofa ‘position paper”

s

&

a. > . re]

forfoints of view in order to prepare the position that oe »

_ the United - States would maintain. at. an ICAO’ meeting — ey

of a Panel of Experts. on Warsaw limits tobe held in .- =, ,

Montreal on January 19, 1967. The draft was transmitted :

by Mr. John H. nn Consultant to the CAB. At -

“page 9, it stated:. a} i > a Uae “a °. re

“Since ‘the Taterim Agreement is an ‘inter-carrier,

rather than inter-governmental, agreement, strictly. a> =

_ speaking an ICAO meeting i is not-an appropriate forum: ©. * |

in which: to consider possible changes i in the Agree- ae ‘..

ment in order to remove or minimize any deficiencies es

‘which have been discoyered in. it. Nevertheless, no . oS

“objection on this ground should be raised to any such” » ee

suggestions, since the Panel meeting may well be the re

best forum to obtain’ an objective. discussion of such |

problems.” moete seagate —

| “There may also be ocenplaint that the notice. re--

- quirements. under the real nee are unsatisfactory, a | ;

- and. indeed are chaotic... 2 = ms 3 |

|

o

ein >The airlines spuennily are fearful that failure a give the.

re ' notice required by the Interim Agreement may -be deeméd to be

failure. to give the notice required by Article 3 of the Convention, a

8 and thereby subject the carrier % — liability.” Bal ince

After the Panel of Egperts net, an ICAO “letter” known |

as ICAO- S-18/8-67/28; dated March >, 1967, was sent, | Le

_ covering the work of the: Panel on.Warsaw and Hague — .

"limits of liability at their “First Session.” Mr. Wanner -:

had attended as a Member representing the. United States.

_. Attached as a: restricted ‘document: was: PE-Warsaw -Re- -

- port-1, — At page 4,- f 12, this . Wareaw Report

noted: .

.

os

“y; riews were: strongly expressed in the Panel to the

effect that the carrier should hanes be deprived of the

4: # on | . uae 6 ’ ae AY

« . . Te te E . . . ;

: .

°

Pies oe : é % j eat °

Ei ee ee Ca ee Sates uae

vn

. benefit. of limits of. liability. merely by reason sof some

irregularity in the issuance of a ticket ‘or of a notice

to -passengers, The requirements of Article 3 of the |

. Warsaw :Convention in regard to ticketing or notice

are not unimportant, but they could be enforced by

other measures, e.g., by a fine ‘or a refund of the

‘passenger fare in whole or in part: While this was |

-- the general view of the Panel, one member considered

‘that such deprivation provisions were required i in order

- to ensure compliance by the carrier ‘With the notice

: ‘teqeiremante: of . .

.

Tn ANNEX B, at page 9, the tagging points were

- examined! |

“1) The jiestiiaih effects of the U. s. Court deci-

sions in the case of Mertens v. Flying Tiger Lines c

and Lisi v. Alitalia in conjunction with the waiver

provisions of the Interim’ Agreement could result in

. absolute and unlimited:liability for air carriers.. The ..-

carrier which may have lost: the limitation of liability

- for: non-compliance with, the notice requirement of

;, the Warsaw Convention may also face the consequences |

. of its contractual waiver of the defences under Ar-.

ticle 20(1) of. the ‘Warsaw Convention. Serious ‘con- ©

_sideration should theréfore be given to a temporary

amendment. of the Interim Agreement as a matter of,

urgency so as to relieve the carriers of the waiver —

provisions in the Interim Agreement until the effects

of the Lisi, case on’ notice requirements under the

Warsaw Convention can be clarified and satisfactorily _

_ resolved.” J -~

fp te cations ‘asian claimants ‘could -

recover up to $75,000 and use this sum for t

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